Executive Capacity
#12Key Findings
With a new administration still working to restore the damage done by its predecessor, the United States falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 12) with respect to executive capacity. Its score on this measure has declined by 0.5 points relative to 2014.
The Biden administration has sought to restore orderly executive procedures and undo Trump-era damage to the civil service. A major hiring campaign is underway to fill senior departmental posts. Strategic planning and expert advice are again being used. As usual, the president and White House staff prioritize issues based on the president’s agenda.
While the new administration has made an explicit attempt to return to evidence-based policymaking, RIAs have historically tended to reflect agency political preferences. The Biden team has sought to consult with more diverse communities than its predecessor. Communication has returned to a more traditional, planned style, without Trump’s tendency to engage in mercurial and inaccurate statements.
COVID-19 stimulus bills were enacted in 2020 and 2021, but other major legislative efforts have been stalled in a highly polarized Congress. Monitoring capabilities are being rebuilt. Trump-era regulatory rollbacks are being reexamined. The isolationist tendencies of the Trump era have been eliminated, and the U.S. has rejoined key global bodies.
The Biden administration has sought to restore orderly executive procedures and undo Trump-era damage to the civil service. A major hiring campaign is underway to fill senior departmental posts. Strategic planning and expert advice are again being used. As usual, the president and White House staff prioritize issues based on the president’s agenda.
While the new administration has made an explicit attempt to return to evidence-based policymaking, RIAs have historically tended to reflect agency political preferences. The Biden team has sought to consult with more diverse communities than its predecessor. Communication has returned to a more traditional, planned style, without Trump’s tendency to engage in mercurial and inaccurate statements.
COVID-19 stimulus bills were enacted in 2020 and 2021, but other major legislative efforts have been stalled in a highly polarized Congress. Monitoring capabilities are being rebuilt. Trump-era regulatory rollbacks are being reexamined. The isolationist tendencies of the Trump era have been eliminated, and the U.S. has rejoined key global bodies.
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How much influence do strategic planning units and bodies have on government decision-making?
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions, and they exercise strong influence on government decision-making.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Their influence on government decision-making is systematic but limited in issue scope or depth of impact.
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Strategic planning units and bodies take a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions. Occasionally, they exert some influence on government decision-making.
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In practice, there are no units and bodies taking a long-term view of policy challenges and viable solutions.
The U.S. government has a number of units that analyze policy issues and make long-term projections as part of the assessment of current options. The Executive Office of the President has multiple staffs and agencies tasked with analyzing various policy issues. On the legislative side, the Congressional Budget Office analyzes the 10-year fiscal impact of all bills with budget implications. Expertise about long-term considerations is available in abundance, in the agencies, Congress and the White House.
In most areas of government and policy, President Trump had virtually no interest in long-range planning, professional expertise or even organized, careful deliberation. The advent of the Biden administration led to a return to more traditional policymaking within the White House. Professional expertise has once again taken front stage and economists are playing a central role in decision-making. The Biden Administration is looking to capitalize on the strategic planning process required for agencies to advance their goals. Strategic plans with goals and performance measures for fiscal years 2022 through 2026 are due from agencies in February 2022. Agencies are also required by the Office of Management and Budget to align their goals with the Biden Administration’s top priorities like equity, pandemic response, recovery and climate.
In most areas of government and policy, President Trump had virtually no interest in long-range planning, professional expertise or even organized, careful deliberation. The advent of the Biden administration led to a return to more traditional policymaking within the White House. Professional expertise has once again taken front stage and economists are playing a central role in decision-making. The Biden Administration is looking to capitalize on the strategic planning process required for agencies to advance their goals. Strategic plans with goals and performance measures for fiscal years 2022 through 2026 are due from agencies in February 2022. Agencies are also required by the Office of Management and Budget to align their goals with the Biden Administration’s top priorities like equity, pandemic response, recovery and climate.
Does the government regularly take into account advice from non-governmental experts during decision-making?
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In almost all cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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For major political projects, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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In some cases, the government transparently consults with non-governmental experts in the early stages of government decision-making.
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The government does not consult with non-governmental experts, or existing consultations lack transparency entirely and/or are exclusively pro forma.
U.S. policymaking incorporates scholarly and expert advice in an informal and highly decentralized manner. Along with university-based experts and analytic agency staffs, there are a few hundred think tanks – non-governmental organizations that specialize in policy research and commentary.
During the first year of the pandemic, President Trump spread misinformation about COVID-19 and his administration “undermined, suppressed and censored government scientists working to study the virus and reduce its harm” (Tollefson, 2020). During the 2020 presidential campaign, Joe Biden pledged to restore the integrity of expert advice within the federal government, something he started to put into practice during his first year in the White House, which witnessed a major shift in presidential discourse and behavior surrounding the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
Citations:
Tollefson, Jeff. 2020. “How Trump damaged science – and why it could take decades to recover,” Nature, October 7. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02800-9
During the first year of the pandemic, President Trump spread misinformation about COVID-19 and his administration “undermined, suppressed and censored government scientists working to study the virus and reduce its harm” (Tollefson, 2020). During the 2020 presidential campaign, Joe Biden pledged to restore the integrity of expert advice within the federal government, something he started to put into practice during his first year in the White House, which witnessed a major shift in presidential discourse and behavior surrounding the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
Citations:
Tollefson, Jeff. 2020. “How Trump damaged science – and why it could take decades to recover,” Nature, October 7. https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02800-9
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Does the government office / prime minister’s office (GO / PMO) have the expertise to evaluate ministerial draft bills according to the government’s priorities?
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The GO / PMO provides regular, independent evaluations of draft bills for the cabinet / prime minister. These assessments are guided exclusively by the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO evaluates most draft bills according to the government’s priorities.
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The GO / PMO can rely on some sectoral policy expertise but does not evaluate draft bills.
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The GO / PMO does not have any sectoral policy expertise. Its role is limited to collecting, registering and circulating documents submitted for cabinet meetings.
The closest comparison to a government office or prime minister’s office in the U.S. system is the White House staff, along with other units of the Executive Office of the President (e.g., the Council of Economic Advisers, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security Council).
Because of the separation of powers, Congress sometimes compete with the president to shape policymaking in executive agencies. In response to these challenges, presidents have gradually established a large executive apparatus designed to help assert presidential control over the departments and agencies. The total professional staff in the presidential bureaucracy vastly exceeds that of a parliamentary system’s GO or PMO, with roughly 2,500 professionals and a budget of $300 million to $400 million.
The Trump White House was by all accounts vastly inferior in expertise and organization to that of any prior modern president. Trump did not seriously attempted to maintain orderly processes or to rely on experienced or expert judgment. The Biden administration reversed these tendencies and favored a return to the expert-informed policymaking prevalent during the Obama years.
Because of the separation of powers, Congress sometimes compete with the president to shape policymaking in executive agencies. In response to these challenges, presidents have gradually established a large executive apparatus designed to help assert presidential control over the departments and agencies. The total professional staff in the presidential bureaucracy vastly exceeds that of a parliamentary system’s GO or PMO, with roughly 2,500 professionals and a budget of $300 million to $400 million.
The Trump White House was by all accounts vastly inferior in expertise and organization to that of any prior modern president. Trump did not seriously attempted to maintain orderly processes or to rely on experienced or expert judgment. The Biden administration reversed these tendencies and favored a return to the expert-informed policymaking prevalent during the Obama years.
To what extent do line ministries involve the government office/prime minister’s office in the preparation of policy proposals?
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There are inter-related capacities for coordination between GO/PMO and line ministries.
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The GO/PMO is regularly briefed on new developments affecting the preparation of policy proposals.
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Consultation is rather formal and focuses on technical and drafting issues.
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Consultation occurs only after proposals are fully drafted as laws.
In the U.S. system, this item relates to how the executive departments and agencies involve the president and the White House staff in their work. Under long-established practice, however, the president and the White House staff are in fact dominant within the executive branch and can therefore prioritize issues they see as important to the president’s agenda. In the Trump administration, agency policy development was heavily shaped by Trump’s desire to cut regulations and to reverse actions taken by the Obama administration. There was little policy development shaped by long-term agency missions or priorities. As soon as he entered the White House, President Biden took steps to rebuild federal departments and agencies by hiring a large number of senior officials to compensate for the “talent exodus” (Zhao and Lippman, 2021) witnessed during the Trump years.
Citations:
Zhao, Alex and Lippman, Daniel. 2021. “Biden races to hire senior staff at drained agencies,” Politico, August 10. https://www.politico.com/interactives/2021/biden-staffing-hiring-trump-turnover/
Citations:
Zhao, Alex and Lippman, Daniel. 2021. “Biden races to hire senior staff at drained agencies,” Politico, August 10. https://www.politico.com/interactives/2021/biden-staffing-hiring-trump-turnover/
How effectively do ministerial or cabinet committees coordinate cabinet proposals?
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The vast majority of cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated first by committees.
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Most cabinet proposals are reviewed and coordinated by committees, in particular proposals of political or strategic importance.
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There is little review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees.
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There is no review or coordination of cabinet proposals by committees. Or: There is no ministerial or cabinet committee.
The question for the U.S. system is whether, if the White House advisory processes prepare issues thoroughly for the president, and whether interagency committees prepare them thoroughly for decision by the relevant cabinet members. The U.S. system of advisory processes varies considerably, even within a single presidential administration, but is largely under control of the president’s appointees in the White House. The process is to a great extent ad hoc, with organizational practices varying over time and from one issue area to another. Typically, important decisions are “staffed out” through an organized committee process. However, the ad hoc character of organization, along with the typically short-term service of political appointees renders the quality of these advisory processes unreliable.
President Trump’s White House thoroughly neglected the role of managing an organized, systematic policy process. Decision processes were described as chaotic, even by insiders. The Biden administration has moved away from these chaotic processes with the goal of returning to the more orderly management style of the Obama administration, in which Biden served as vice-president.
President Trump’s White House thoroughly neglected the role of managing an organized, systematic policy process. Decision processes were described as chaotic, even by insiders. The Biden administration has moved away from these chaotic processes with the goal of returning to the more orderly management style of the Obama administration, in which Biden served as vice-president.
How effectively do ministry officials/civil servants coordinate policy proposals?
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Most policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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Many policy proposals are effectively coordinated by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is some coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
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There is no or hardly any coordination of policy proposals by ministry officials/civil servants.
In general, there is an expectation of interagency coordination at various levels of the bureaucracy. The quality of this coordination varies, and as with cabinet-level coordination, it is adversely affected by the short-term service of political appointees, which results in underdeveloped working relationships across agencies. President Trump failed to appoint or nominate people to occupy many of the important political-appointee positions in the agencies. In addition, permanent staff departed. President Biden is seeking to undo the damage made during the Trump administration through a bold hiring campaign, the largest in decades. This campaign should help rejuvenate an aging federal civil service.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms generally support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms support formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms tend to undermine rather than complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
The U.S. government is highly prone to informal coordination, relying on personal networks, constituency relationships and other means. As with formal processes, the effectiveness of such coordination is adversely affected by underdeveloped working relationships resulting from the short-term service of political appointees. The overall or average performance of informal coordination mechanisms has not been systematically evaluated.
The Trump administration’s lack of experienced personnel in key agency positions lead to an increased role for informal coordination. The executive branch under Trump was seen calamitous failures of coordination. Such failures, however, largely reflected general problems of understaffing and lack of competent leadership in the departments and agencies during the Trump presidency. The Biden administration is currently addressing these challenges by hiring more staff and appointing component leaders across departments and agencies. The Biden administration is also adopting a managing style reminiscent of the Obama administration’s, which was more orderly than the Trump administration’s chaotic approach.
The Trump administration’s lack of experienced personnel in key agency positions lead to an increased role for informal coordination. The executive branch under Trump was seen calamitous failures of coordination. Such failures, however, largely reflected general problems of understaffing and lack of competent leadership in the departments and agencies during the Trump presidency. The Biden administration is currently addressing these challenges by hiring more staff and appointing component leaders across departments and agencies. The Biden administration is also adopting a managing style reminiscent of the Obama administration’s, which was more orderly than the Trump administration’s chaotic approach.
How extensively and effectively are digital technologies used to support interministerial coordination (in policy development and monitoring)?
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The government uses digital technologies extensively and effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies in most cases and somewhat effectively to support interministerial coordination.
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The government uses digital technologies to a lesser degree and with limited effects to support interministerial coordination.
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The government makes no substantial use of digital technologies to support interministerial coordination.
The U.S. government invests heavily in technology, although it is not a world leader in e-government. The multiple intelligence agencies are sometimes criticized as prone to hording intelligence information, rather than sharing it within the intelligence community. Reforms adopted in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks have increased the sharing of information among the intelligence agencies.
Apart from intelligence issues, problems of coordination generally arise from political forces that promote agency autonomy and response to specialized constituencies, not from deficiencies in communication technology.
Over the last several years, the U.S. government has developed several collaborative digital services that can help federal agencies use data and technology to achieve their goals and cooperate more effectively. The Joint Venture Program (JVP), for example, assists agencies in developing and implementing innovative ways to collect, connect, access or use federal data and data services.
Apart from intelligence issues, problems of coordination generally arise from political forces that promote agency autonomy and response to specialized constituencies, not from deficiencies in communication technology.
Over the last several years, the U.S. government has developed several collaborative digital services that can help federal agencies use data and technology to achieve their goals and cooperate more effectively. The Joint Venture Program (JVP), for example, assists agencies in developing and implementing innovative ways to collect, connect, access or use federal data and data services.
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To what extent does the government assess the potential impacts of existing and prepared legal acts (regulatory impact assessments, RIA)?
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RIA are applied to all new regulations and to existing regulations which are characterized by complex impact paths. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied systematically to most new regulations. RIA methodology is guided by common minimum standards.
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RIA are applied in some cases. There is no common RIA methodology guaranteeing common minimum standards.
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RIA are not applied or do not exist.
In general, the U.S. government has provided for extensive analysis of major decisions, within both the legislative and executive branches, and for administrative or regulatory decisions as well as legislation. Regulatory impact assessment for agency regulations is supervised by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For significant regulations, OMB must approve impact assessments conducted by the agencies as a condition for issuing the regulations. In addition, the Government Accountability Office, which reports to Congress, conducts assessments on an ad hoc basis, mostly in response to requests by Congress. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) conducts analyses of proposed bills, including cost estimates over a 10-year period. The Congressional Research Service has also conducted several notable studies on climate change.
The Trump administration largely abandoned impact analysis and other professional expertise. Agencies were under a strong presidential mandate to reduce regulations. The beginning of the Biden administration marked a departure from Trump’s practices, and it featured an explicit attempt to return to evidence-based policymaking.
The Trump administration largely abandoned impact analysis and other professional expertise. Agencies were under a strong presidential mandate to reduce regulations. The beginning of the Biden administration marked a departure from Trump’s practices, and it featured an explicit attempt to return to evidence-based policymaking.
Does the RIA process ensure participation, transparency and quality evaluation?
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RIA analyses consistently involve stakeholders by means of consultation or collaboration, results are transparently communicated to the public and assessments are effectively evaluated by an independent body on a regular basis.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to one of the three objectives.
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The RIA process displays deficiencies with regard to two of the three objectives.
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RIA analyses do not exist or the RIA process fails to achieve any of the three objectives of process quality.
Regulatory impact assessment is a highly political process, with a strong tendency for results to reflect the preferences and expectations of the agency or political official that controls the process. During preparation for an RIA, the U.S. Office for Information and Regulatory Affairs does not make the documents public or invite participation. So in comparison to European countries, the process becomes public at a later stage when the RIA is published for comment.
Trump administration regulatory officials demonstrated little concern about impact assessments. In canceling the Obama-era’s “net neutrality” regulations, the Federal Communications Commission relied on a large volume of citizen messages that it had already determined were produced by internet bots, rather than actual people.
Immediately after entering the White House, President Biden, with the help of Democrats in Congress, began to undo what his predecessor had done on the regulatory front. Simultaneously, President Biden “issued a memorandum calling for the Office of Management and Budget to undertake a process for modernizing regulatory review. The review is expected to include suggestions on how regulatory review processes can promote public health and safety, economic growth, social welfare, racial justice, environmental stewardship, human dignity, equity, and the interests of future generations.” (OECD, 2021).
Citations:
Presidential Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, Issued on: January 30, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-reducing-regulation-controlling-regulatory-costs/
Federal Register January 10, 2020: Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/10/2019-28106/update-to-the-regulations-implementing-the-procedural-provisions-of-the-national-environmental
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2022/01/20/an-overview-of-bidens-first-regulatory-year/
OECD. 2021. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/2e5af0c4-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/2e5af0c4-en
Trump administration regulatory officials demonstrated little concern about impact assessments. In canceling the Obama-era’s “net neutrality” regulations, the Federal Communications Commission relied on a large volume of citizen messages that it had already determined were produced by internet bots, rather than actual people.
Immediately after entering the White House, President Biden, with the help of Democrats in Congress, began to undo what his predecessor had done on the regulatory front. Simultaneously, President Biden “issued a memorandum calling for the Office of Management and Budget to undertake a process for modernizing regulatory review. The review is expected to include suggestions on how regulatory review processes can promote public health and safety, economic growth, social welfare, racial justice, environmental stewardship, human dignity, equity, and the interests of future generations.” (OECD, 2021).
Citations:
Presidential Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, Issued on: January 30, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-reducing-regulation-controlling-regulatory-costs/
Federal Register January 10, 2020: Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/10/2019-28106/update-to-the-regulations-implementing-the-procedural-provisions-of-the-national-environmental
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2022/01/20/an-overview-of-bidens-first-regulatory-year/
OECD. 2021. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/2e5af0c4-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/2e5af0c4-en
Does the government conduct effective sustainability checks within the framework of RIA?
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Sustainability checks are an integral part of every RIA; they draw on an exhaustive set of indicators (including social, economic, and environmental aspects of sustainability) and track impacts from the short- to long-term.
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Sustainability checks lack one of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks lack two of the three criteria.
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Sustainability checks do not exist or lack all three criteria.
There has been no standard, separate check required for “sustainability” as such. Assessments have been expected to consider the important costs and benefits relevant to a particular project or policy. While environmental considerations figured prominently in some cases prior to 2016, environmental issues were aggressively dismissed by the Trump administration. Sustainability checks were either manipulated, ignored or simply did not take place. There were undoubtedly some areas of government – below the radar of Trump, his thin cadre of political appointees, and the business lobbyists that have his attention – in which serious sustainability checks were taking place and guiding decisions. Unsurprisingly, the Biden administration has embraced a strong sustainability agenda that repudiates the Trump White House’s policies. Sustainability is now a key objective of the Biden administration, which is fostering an expansion of sustainability checks.
On December 8, 2021, President Biden issued an executive Order on Catalyzing Clean Energy Industries and Jobs through Federal Sustainability (EO), which sets out a range of ambitious goals to deliver an emission reduction pathway consistent with Bidens’ goal of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 50-52% from 2055 levels by 2030 and limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
On December 8, 2021, President Biden issued an executive Order on Catalyzing Clean Energy Industries and Jobs through Federal Sustainability (EO), which sets out a range of ambitious goals to deliver an emission reduction pathway consistent with Bidens’ goal of reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions by 50-52% from 2055 levels by 2030 and limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius.
To what extent do government ministries regularly evaluate the effectiveness and/or efficiency of public policies and use results of evaluations for the revision of existing policies or development of new policies?
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for all significant policies and are generally used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are carried out for most significant policies and are used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are rarely carried out for significant policies and are rarely used for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
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Ex post evaluations are generally not carried out and do not play any relevant role for the revision of existing policies or the development of new policies.
The United States has extensive and highly sophisticated capabilities for evaluating the impact of public policies – within government, in a large sector of think tanks and consulting firms, and in the extensive public policy-oriented academic community. In normal times, however, U.S. government is relatively inflexible, and slow to respond to evidence of the need for change. This is a widely recognized consequence of the separation-of-powers constitutional system, which was designed to inhibit policy change.
The lack of interest in information about the consequences of policies reached a new and quite extraordinary level during the Trump presidency. In some cases, the Republican leadership overrode congressional rules by refusing to wait for CBO analysis before voting on bills. Effective use of evaluation information was limited to issues that were not on presidential or partisan agendas.
Early on, the Biden administration broke away from the Trump administration’s practices when, on January 27, 2021, the new president signed the memorandum which created a Task Force on Scientific Integrity while promoting evidence-based policymaking, which relies extensively on policy evaluation, on the regulatory front and beyond. This memorandum is part of a broader push by the Biden administration to restore the importance of evidence and policy evaluation within the federal decision-making process.
Citations:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/27/memorandum-on-restoring-trust-in-government-through-scientific-integrity-and-evidence-based-policymaking/
The lack of interest in information about the consequences of policies reached a new and quite extraordinary level during the Trump presidency. In some cases, the Republican leadership overrode congressional rules by refusing to wait for CBO analysis before voting on bills. Effective use of evaluation information was limited to issues that were not on presidential or partisan agendas.
Early on, the Biden administration broke away from the Trump administration’s practices when, on January 27, 2021, the new president signed the memorandum which created a Task Force on Scientific Integrity while promoting evidence-based policymaking, which relies extensively on policy evaluation, on the regulatory front and beyond. This memorandum is part of a broader push by the Biden administration to restore the importance of evidence and policy evaluation within the federal decision-making process.
Citations:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/27/memorandum-on-restoring-trust-in-government-through-scientific-integrity-and-evidence-based-policymaking/
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Does the government consult with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner?
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The government always consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government in most cases consults with societal actors in a fair and pluralistic manner.
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The government does consult with societal actors, but mostly in an unfair and clientelistic manner.
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The government rarely consults with any societal actors.
The U.S. political system is noteworthy for the degree to which it elicits opinions and preferences from societal actors at all stages of the policy process and enables such actors to shape policy outcomes. These processes, however, are informal, decentralized and not especially conducive to careful deliberation. In the U.S. system, the president and congressional leaders must build congressional support for each measure. Interest groups, ideological activists, experts and ordinary citizens have extensive opportunity to influence policymakers before decisions have been made. The White House maintains direct relationships with some interest groups. Congressional committees hold hearings on most legislative initiatives and on general policy issues. In sum, the U.S. government is highly open to influence by societal forces. This openness is not designed to ensure consensus and does not do so, although action without broad support is normally difficult.
The Trump administration focused more on behind-closed-door meetings with lobbyists and supporters and it did not seek to integrate a plurality of societal actors, a situation the Biden administration is seeking to change, with the explicit goal of engaging with more diverse constituencies.
The Trump administration focused more on behind-closed-door meetings with lobbyists and supporters and it did not seek to integrate a plurality of societal actors, a situation the Biden administration is seeking to change, with the explicit goal of engaging with more diverse constituencies.
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To what extent does the government achieve coherent communication?
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Ministries are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries most of the time are highly successful in aligning their communication with government strategy.
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Ministries occasionally issue public statements that contradict the public communication of other ministries or the government strategy.
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Strategic communication planning does not exist; individual ministry statements regularly contradict each other. Messages are often not factually consistent with the government’s strategy.
Under normal conditions, politically appointed leadership in every agency means that executive agencies and departments will typically have coordinated their messages with those responsible for the White House communications strategy. Agency press releases and statements on politically salient matters are often cleared with the White House and will be planned for consistency with the president’s priorities and political strategy.
During the Trump presidency, the White House press office was heavily engaged in defending or obscuring Trump’s many false claims and inconsistent positions. The Washington Post has counted more than 30,000 false or misleading claims (including repetitions) during Trump’s four years in office.
The Biden administration has repudiated Trump’s communication and policymaking style and has embraced a return to a more traditional approach similar to the one witnessed during the Obama years. This attempt to “return to normalcy” in public communication is a central characteristic of the Biden administration.
During the Trump presidency, the White House press office was heavily engaged in defending or obscuring Trump’s many false claims and inconsistent positions. The Washington Post has counted more than 30,000 false or misleading claims (including repetitions) during Trump’s four years in office.
The Biden administration has repudiated Trump’s communication and policymaking style and has embraced a return to a more traditional approach similar to the one witnessed during the Obama years. This attempt to “return to normalcy” in public communication is a central characteristic of the Biden administration.
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To what extent can the government achieve its own policy objectives?
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The government can largely implement its own policy objectives.
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The government is partly successful in implementing its policy objectives or can implement some of its policy objectives.
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The government partly fails to implement its objectives or fails to implement several policy objectives.
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The government largely fails to implement its policy objectives.
In comparison to parliamentary systems that anticipate the near-automatic legislative approval of government bills, policy implementation in the United States’ separation-of-powers system is presumed to depend on coalition building, negotiation and a relatively broad consensus. In the current, highly polarized state of the major political parties, the ability to act depends heavily on whether partisan control of the presidency and Congress is unified (with the same party controlling the presidency, House and Senate) or divided.
The Trump administration implemented major policy initiatives by issuing executive orders and thereby avoiding the process of legislative change. Preoccupied by the Mueller investigation and divided party control, Congress passed no major legislation in 2019. Trump was by far the least productive of any modern president so far.
Things changed somewhat in 2020 and 2021, with the enactment of major COVID-19 stimulus legislation. In 2021, the Biden administration put forward an ambitious Build Back Better legislative agenda but these efforts have been stalled by a few moderate Democratic Senators, who acquired veto power due to the tiny Democratic majority in the Senate – and are unlikely to pass the bill through Congress before the 2022 midterm elections.
The Trump administration implemented major policy initiatives by issuing executive orders and thereby avoiding the process of legislative change. Preoccupied by the Mueller investigation and divided party control, Congress passed no major legislation in 2019. Trump was by far the least productive of any modern president so far.
Things changed somewhat in 2020 and 2021, with the enactment of major COVID-19 stimulus legislation. In 2021, the Biden administration put forward an ambitious Build Back Better legislative agenda but these efforts have been stalled by a few moderate Democratic Senators, who acquired veto power due to the tiny Democratic majority in the Senate – and are unlikely to pass the bill through Congress before the 2022 midterm elections.
To what extent does the organization of government provide mechanisms to ensure that ministers implement the government’s program?
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The organization of government successfully provides strong mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides some mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government provides weak mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
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The organization of government does not provide any mechanisms for ministers to implement the government’s program.
The president has a high level of control over appointments such as agency and department heads. They serve at the president’s discretion and need the support of the White House for their success. Conflicts between the department heads and the White House occasionally emerge, but they are usually limited to a speech or remark that conflicts with presidential policy. As recent presidents have upgraded their ability to monitor agency activities and to draw major issues into the White House, conflicts between the agencies and the White House have largely disappeared. In some cases, agency heads ignored or discounted apparent orders from President Trump, which appeared to reflect his spontaneous, un-deliberated responses, often conveyed via Twitter rather than formal presidential documents. We do not consider these instances to constitute failures of compliance. So far, President Biden has clearly steered away from his predecessor’s widely criticized mercurial style.
How effectively does the government office/prime minister’s office monitor line ministry activities with regard to implementation?
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The GO / PMO effectively monitors the implementation activities of all line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of most line ministries.
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The GO / PMO monitors the implementation activities of some line ministries.
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The GO / PMO does not monitor the implementation activities of line ministries.
The president and the White House monitor activities in departments and agencies to widely varying degrees, depending on the centrality of the activities to the president’s political agenda. Agencies and programs that are not the focus of presidential policy initiatives and are not politically controversial may get little attention from the White House, and in fact may receive most of their political direction from Congress or the congressional committees with jurisdiction over the policy area. Recent years have seen a number of serious failures of administrative control.
Under the Trump administration, unprecedented severe staffing deficiencies in both the White House and the departments diminished the capacity for monitoring. The Biden White House is working toward rebuilding this capacity through a massive hiring campaign.
Under the Trump administration, unprecedented severe staffing deficiencies in both the White House and the departments diminished the capacity for monitoring. The Biden White House is working toward rebuilding this capacity through a massive hiring campaign.
How effectively do federal and subnational ministries monitor the activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies with regard to implementation?
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The ministries effectively monitor the implementation activities of all bureaucracies/executive agencies.
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The ministries monitor the implementation activities of most bureaucracies/executive agencies.
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The ministries monitor the implementation activities of some bureaucracies/executive agencies.
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The ministries do not monitor the implementation activities of bureaucracies/executive agencies.
Federal departments have central units attached to the relevant secretary’s office that monitor the activities of subordinate agencies. There are no semi- autonomous agencies in the U.S. administrative system. Independent regulatory commissions –including the Federal Reserve Board (both a regulatory agency and the central bank, responsible for monetary policy) – are headed by bipartisan commissions with fixed terms of office and are in some respects outside the executive branch. The White House and certain executive agencies such as the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department monitor the activities of regulatory agencies, despite lacking formal authority to impose changes. State-level agencies which administer federal programs are subject to highly inconsistent federal supervision. The losses of organizational capacity in the federal bureaucracy under Trump reduced the ability of departments to monitor agencies. The Biden administration is currently rebuilding this lost organizational capacity.
To what extent does the central government ensure that tasks delegated to subnational self-governments are adequately funded?
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The central government enables subnational self-governments to fulfill all their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
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The central government enables subnational governments to fulfill most of their delegated tasks by funding these tasks sufficiently and/or by providing adequate revenue-raising powers.
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The central government sometimes and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational governments.
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The central government often and deliberately shifts unfunded mandates to subnational self-governments.
The United States has a federal system in which the 50 states are independent sovereign governments, although the federal constitution is “the supreme law of the land.” States have unrestricted power to raise their own revenue, although the federal government takes full advantage of their more productive sources, such as the income tax. There is no general presumption of uniform standards for public services. Rather, the federal government imposes standards or seeks to induce certain levels of performance in varying degrees on different issues.
State officials have often complained that federal mandates required substantial expenditures without providing the necessary funds. In 1995, the Republican Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The act provides incentives for Congress and regulatory agencies to identify potential unfunded mandates in the legislative or rule-making process but does not prevent them from setting mandates. As a result, complaints from state officials have subsided. The Trump administration increased the states’ discretion in the use of funds for food stamps, medical care for the poor (Medicaid), and cash assistance to the poor. Unsurprisingly, the Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction, for instance by rolling back Medicaid waivers that allowed states to impose work requirements.
State officials have often complained that federal mandates required substantial expenditures without providing the necessary funds. In 1995, the Republican Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The act provides incentives for Congress and regulatory agencies to identify potential unfunded mandates in the legislative or rule-making process but does not prevent them from setting mandates. As a result, complaints from state officials have subsided. The Trump administration increased the states’ discretion in the use of funds for food stamps, medical care for the poor (Medicaid), and cash assistance to the poor. Unsurprisingly, the Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction, for instance by rolling back Medicaid waivers that allowed states to impose work requirements.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments may use their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation?
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The central government enables subnational self-governments to make full use of their constitutional scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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Central government policies inadvertently limit the subnational self-governments’ scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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The central government formally respects the constitutional autonomy of subnational self-governments, but de facto narrows their scope of discretion with regard to implementation.
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The central government deliberately precludes subnational self-governments from making use of their constitutionally provided implementation autonomy.
Whether the federal government permits the states to exercise their constitutional authority without undue interference is one of the central, long-term constitutional controversies in U.S. politics. In one sense, there is no such thing as the federal government depriving states of their constitutional discretion. Whatever decisions the federal government imposes on the states can be appealed to the federal courts. Given the availability of appeals, one can assume that states are able to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction as it is currently interpreted. On the other hand, multiple states have legalized medical and sometimes recreational use of marijuana. The Trump administration sought to impose controls on states that maintained certain liberal policies. The advent of the Biden administration has put an end to such policies.
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services?
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Central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
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Central government largely ensures that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
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Central government ensures that subnational self-governments realize national minimum standards of public services.
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Central government does not ensure that subnational self-governments realize national standards of public services.
Due to the dual nature of the U.S. federal system, the issue of national standards applies mostly to co-financed federal programs, where the federal government sometimes asserts its right to set and monitor compliance with these standards. The bulk of public services are delivered by local and state agencies with minimal intervention by the federal government. The question of enforcing federal standards arises in specific areas where federal policymakers have sought to impose such standards, sometimes to enforce citizens’ rights under the federal constitution, and other times for policy reasons. The Environmental Protection Agency, for example, requires states to meet air-quality standards under the Clean Air Act. Moreover, states exercise broad discretion in setting standards of eligibility for Medicaid coverage or with regard to unemployment insurance. A large variation in state government policies and standards of service is regarded as legitimate in most fields.
To what extent is government enforcing regulations in an effective and unbiased way, also against vested interests?
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Government agencies enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
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Government agencies, for the most part, enforce regulations effectively and without bias.
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Government agencies enforce regulations, but ineffectively and with bias.
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Government agencies enforce regulations ineffectively, inconsistently and with bias.
In general, the United States has invested quite heavily in regulatory enforcement. A substantial amount of investment reflects the frequent, substantial legal resistance to enforcement actions on the part of the targeted firms or other entities. U.S. regulatory agencies are highly subject to judicial review, and their enforcement actions are often appealed, raising the costs of enforcement and reducing its effectiveness. In general, however, enforcement efforts have been sufficiently energetic. As a result, the targeted firms generally take regulations seriously.
During the Trump presidency, however, many of the regulatory agencies were headed by appointees with extremely strong and direct ties to the regulated industries, or with strong ideological opposition to their agencies’ programs. The Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction of its predecessor. On January 20, 2021, President Biden signed an executive order that “directs all executive departments and agencies (agencies) to immediately review and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, take action to address the promulgation of Federal regulations and other actions during the last 4 years that conflict with these important national objectives, and to immediately commence work to confront the climate crisis.”
Citations:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-protecting-public-health-and-environment-and-restoring-science-to-tackle-climate-crisis/
During the Trump presidency, however, many of the regulatory agencies were headed by appointees with extremely strong and direct ties to the regulated industries, or with strong ideological opposition to their agencies’ programs. The Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction of its predecessor. On January 20, 2021, President Biden signed an executive order that “directs all executive departments and agencies (agencies) to immediately review and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, take action to address the promulgation of Federal regulations and other actions during the last 4 years that conflict with these important national objectives, and to immediately commence work to confront the climate crisis.”
Citations:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-protecting-public-health-and-environment-and-restoring-science-to-tackle-climate-crisis/
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To what extent does the government respond to international and supranational developments by adapting domestic government structures?
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The government has appropriately and effectively adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
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In many cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
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In some cases, the government has adapted domestic government structures to international and supranational developments.
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The government has not adapted domestic government structures, no matter how beneficial adaptation might be.
The United States has developed institutional structures that are able to respond to its international obligations. Climate-change negotiations, for example, have been firmly institutionalized in the Office of Global Affairs in the State Department. Similarly, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security was a domestic structural response to the challenges of international terrorism. Whether the policies of these units and agencies have been successful or have facilitated multilateral cooperation has depended on the policy choices of each administration and the disposition of Congress.
To what extent is the government able to collaborate effectively with international efforts to foster global public goods?
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The government can take a leading role in shaping and implementing collective efforts to provide global public goods. It is able to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
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The government is largely able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Existing processes enabling the government to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress are, for the most part, effective.
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The government is partially able to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. Processes designed to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress show deficiencies.
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The government does not have sufficient institutional capacities to shape and implement collective efforts to provide global public goods. It does not have effective processes to ensure coherence in national policies affecting progress.
The United States has often led international efforts to pursue collective goods. Its institutional structures and political traditions – especially the role of presidential leadership – accommodate all of these approaches. But the United States often cannot act effectively unless a national consensus or single-party control of the government enables the president and Congress to agree on a strategy.
U.S. performance in this area is not significantly constrained by deficiencies of institutional capability. However, the Trump administration reduced its engagement in international forums and agreements. This included lecturing NATO members on their allegedly insufficient contributions, withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, declining to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, and opting out of the World Health Organization in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. Once again, here the Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction of its predecessor, notably by cancelling some of its isolationist decisions. For instance, the Democratic president returned the United States to the Paris Climate Agreement while rejoining the World Health Organization.
U.S. performance in this area is not significantly constrained by deficiencies of institutional capability. However, the Trump administration reduced its engagement in international forums and agreements. This included lecturing NATO members on their allegedly insufficient contributions, withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement, declining to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, and opting out of the World Health Organization in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. Once again, here the Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction of its predecessor, notably by cancelling some of its isolationist decisions. For instance, the Democratic president returned the United States to the Paris Climate Agreement while rejoining the World Health Organization.
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To what extent do actors within the government monitor whether institutional arrangements of governing are appropriate?
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The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly and effectively.
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The institutional arrangements of governing are monitored regularly.
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The institutional arrangements of governing are selectively and sporadically monitored.
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There is no monitoring.
On the one hand, presidential advisory and administrative arrangements in and around the White House are reconfigured in important respects by each president. As a result of this fluidity, presidents, their staffs and commentators discuss the effectiveness of the given arrangements of the president’s senior aides almost constantly. By contrast, most other organizational structures – including the basic separation-of-powers system; the structure of Congress; and the structure of departments and major agencies of the executive branch – are rigid. None of these units are subject to change by executive decision or ordinary legislative majority, and they are evaluated only in extreme circumstances.
The executive structures of the Trump presidency proved to be exceptionally casual and unstable, with a president who appeared to have no appreciation for the benefits of systematic deliberation and the division of labor. In many important agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the State Department, and parts of the Department of Justice, mid-tier and lower-level professionals also left in large numbers. Through its expert-friendly appointment process, the Biden administration is seeking to repair the damage done by the Trump administration.
The executive structures of the Trump presidency proved to be exceptionally casual and unstable, with a president who appeared to have no appreciation for the benefits of systematic deliberation and the division of labor. In many important agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the State Department, and parts of the Department of Justice, mid-tier and lower-level professionals also left in large numbers. Through its expert-friendly appointment process, the Biden administration is seeking to repair the damage done by the Trump administration.
To what extent does the government improve its strategic capacity by changing the institutional arrangements of governing?
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The government improves its strategic capacity considerably by changing its institutional arrangements.
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The government improves its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
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The government does not improve its strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
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The government loses strategic capacity by changing its institutional arrangements.
The U.S. government is exceptionally resistant to constructive institutional reform. There are several major sources of rigidity. First, the requirements for amending the Constitution to change core institutions are virtually impossible to meet. Second, statutory institutional change requires agreement between the president, the Senate and the House, all of which may have conflicting interests on institutional matters. Third, the committee system in Congress gives members significant personal career stakes in the existing division of jurisdictions, a barrier to change not only in congressional committees themselves but in the organization of the executive branch agencies that the committees oversee. Fourth, the Senate operates with a supermajority requirement (the requirement of 60 votes, a three-fifths majority, to invoke “cloture” and end a filibuster), and (except at the beginning of each Congress) changes in Senate procedures themselves are normally subject to the same procedures. Fifth, elected politicians, such as members of Congress, are rarely willing to alter the electoral arrangements and practices that enabled them to win office.