Coordination
#5Key Findings
Australia performs well (rank 5) in the area of coordination.
Significant mechanisms exist for coordination between the center, prime minister and line ministries in Australia. The cabinet is the principal forum for ensuring a whole-of-government approach. Overcentralization is one risk of this system.
Government agencies routinely create working groups to address cross-domain challenges. Informal meetings between agency staffers take place through a variety of forums.
The federal government seeks to provide uniform national service standards, but states retain significant control over public service delivery in many areas. Actors across different levels of government cooperate routinely, though tensions are not uncommon.
Significant mechanisms exist for coordination between the center, prime minister and line ministries in Australia. The cabinet is the principal forum for ensuring a whole-of-government approach. Overcentralization is one risk of this system.
Government agencies routinely create working groups to address cross-domain challenges. Informal meetings between agency staffers take place through a variety of forums.
The federal government seeks to provide uniform national service standards, but states retain significant control over public service delivery in many areas. Actors across different levels of government cooperate routinely, though tensions are not uncommon.
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To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
8
7
6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
5
4
3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
Significant coordination mechanisms exist between the center, prime minister, and line ministries in Australia. The cabinet is the principal forum for ensuring a whole-of-government approach. Although the Cabinet operates collectively with shared decision-making and responsibility, its processes provide the prime minister with unique resources for agenda setting and establishing decision-making rules. One risk of the Australian line management system is over-centralization, prioritizing coherence over the benefits of decentralization, checks and balances, and some autonomy for line ministries. This risk was evident during the COVID-19 pandemic when it was revealed that then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison secretly assumed direct control of five ministries without informing his cabinet colleagues.
However, the COVID-19 pandemic merely exacerbated trends that have been decades in the making. As political scientist James Walter (2021) points out, Australian prime ministers have built up resources around their office to enhance their autonomy and influence. The result is the creation of “retail” leaders who are primarily experts in delivering the message and “winning” what they see as a permanent campaign.
Citations:
Walter, J. 2021. “Power without Purpose.” Inside Story September 24. https://insidestory.org.au/power-without-purpose/
However, the COVID-19 pandemic merely exacerbated trends that have been decades in the making. As political scientist James Walter (2021) points out, Australian prime ministers have built up resources around their office to enhance their autonomy and influence. The result is the creation of “retail” leaders who are primarily experts in delivering the message and “winning” what they see as a permanent campaign.
Citations:
Walter, J. 2021. “Power without Purpose.” Inside Story September 24. https://insidestory.org.au/power-without-purpose/
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
8
7
6
7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
5
4
3
4
3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
2
1
1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Government agencies in Australia have well-established practices for creating working groups to foster inter-agency cooperation on cross-domain challenges, such as cybersecurity. These groups often include external actors for additional input. For example, recent cybersecurity reforms stress coordination involving multiple federal departments – Home Affairs, Defence, Australian Signals Directorate, Foreign Affairs, and Attorney General’s – along with state governments and industry in a whole-of-nation effort to protect against cyber threats (Department of Home Affairs 2023). Regular movement across the public service, including secondments, facilitates knowledge-sharing. Many departments send staff to common training programs at institutions like the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG), supporting a common perspective on policy approaches.
Citations:
Department of Home Affairs. 2023. “Cyber security: Our partners.” Australian Government Department of Home Affairs https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/our-partners
Citations:
Department of Home Affairs. 2023. “Cyber security: Our partners.” Australian Government Department of Home Affairs https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/our-partners
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Regular informal meetings between agency staff at different levels (though especially at higher ranks), through a variety of forums, support interministerial cooperation. These activities do not undermine the formal coordination efforts within the bureaucracy or at ministerial level.
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To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
10
9
9
The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
2
1
1
The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
The federal government is committed to providing uniform national services and works to ensure consistent program delivery, particularly in health and education. This is complicated by differences in state sizes, population distribution, and resistance from state governments keen to preserve their independence. Variation in funding levels according to need, determined by the Commonwealth Grants Commission, helps ensure uniformity.
High-level coordination mechanisms, including the National Cabinet, provide a forum for governments of all jurisdictions to discuss mutual concerns. The federal bargain, enforced through constitutional law and the courts, grants states significant autonomy over service provision. The national government, with greater revenue-raising capacity, can incentivize certain services and act as a provider of last resort. However, states retain significant control over public service delivery in education, healthcare, public transport, and housing, resulting in policy divergence across jurisdictions.
The COVID-19 pandemic was a critical period in Australian federalism, leading to the institutionalization of the National Cabinet and a revival of state power. The Australian federal system contributed to the country’s low mortality rate, as states could devise policies suited to their circumstances, with the National Cabinet smoothing potential clashes. However, the National Cabinet did not always ensure coherence, as shown by unilateral decisions to close/open state borders during and after the pandemic, which may have increased economic costs.
Citations:
Murphy, J.R., and E. Arban. 2023. “Assessing the Performance of Australian Federalism in Responding to the Pandemic.” Publius 51 (4): 627-649. https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/51/4/627/6352190
High-level coordination mechanisms, including the National Cabinet, provide a forum for governments of all jurisdictions to discuss mutual concerns. The federal bargain, enforced through constitutional law and the courts, grants states significant autonomy over service provision. The national government, with greater revenue-raising capacity, can incentivize certain services and act as a provider of last resort. However, states retain significant control over public service delivery in education, healthcare, public transport, and housing, resulting in policy divergence across jurisdictions.
The COVID-19 pandemic was a critical period in Australian federalism, leading to the institutionalization of the National Cabinet and a revival of state power. The Australian federal system contributed to the country’s low mortality rate, as states could devise policies suited to their circumstances, with the National Cabinet smoothing potential clashes. However, the National Cabinet did not always ensure coherence, as shown by unilateral decisions to close/open state borders during and after the pandemic, which may have increased economic costs.
Citations:
Murphy, J.R., and E. Arban. 2023. “Assessing the Performance of Australian Federalism in Responding to the Pandemic.” Publius 51 (4): 627-649. https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/51/4/627/6352190
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
10
9
9
National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
2
1
1
There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
The National Cabinet, an elite body that serves as a forum for ministerial-level discussion, integrates different governments but does not directly represent local issues. Various state-level working groups include local governments, and the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) represents local governments at the national level, engaging in advocacy on issues like road infrastructure, aviation, airport construction, and renewable energy (ALGA 2023). Local government civil servants often have more grievances with state governments, which constrain their revenue-raising capacity and sometimes impose decisions over local objections. Nonetheless, there is significant cooperation between actors across different levels of government.
Citations:
ALGA. 2023. “ALGA Advocacy.” Australian Local Government Association. https://alga.com.au/category/alga-advocacy/
Citations:
ALGA. 2023. “ALGA Advocacy.” Australian Local Government Association. https://alga.com.au/category/alga-advocacy/