Coordination
#18Key Findings
In the category of coordination, Austria falls into the lower-middle ranks internationally (rank 18).
The Chancellor’s Office coordinates line ministries but has limited capacity to evaluate the policy content of proposals. The chancellor holds a “first among equals” position, lacking formal authority over other ministers. Strategic capacities are thus fragmented, with responsibility distributed among autonomous ministers and competing political parties.
Interministerial coordination mechanisms focus largely on specific issue areas. Informal coordination mechanisms are routinely used, especially within and between the governing parties.
States hold significant de facto power within the federal system. The federal government provides most of the funding for the states, but is weak with regard to enforcing its political will. National administrative tasks are often carried out by subnational agencies.
The Chancellor’s Office coordinates line ministries but has limited capacity to evaluate the policy content of proposals. The chancellor holds a “first among equals” position, lacking formal authority over other ministers. Strategic capacities are thus fragmented, with responsibility distributed among autonomous ministers and competing political parties.
Interministerial coordination mechanisms focus largely on specific issue areas. Informal coordination mechanisms are routinely used, especially within and between the governing parties.
States hold significant de facto power within the federal system. The federal government provides most of the funding for the states, but is weak with regard to enforcing its political will. National administrative tasks are often carried out by subnational agencies.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
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Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
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Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
The Federal Chancellery can be considered the functional center within the Austrian political executive, responsible for coordinating the government’s various activities. However, it lacks the specialized personnel to function as a comprehensive strategy unit and has no authority to issue instructions to other ministries. The Chancellor’s Office focuses on coordinating line ministries’ activities rather than monitoring them, thus possessing limited capacity to evaluate the policy content of line ministry proposals against the government’s priorities.
Ultimately, these limitations are more political or constitutional than administrative. First, the federal chancellor, who chairs the cabinet, is only the first among equals (Binder 2016). He or she has no formal authority over the other members of the council (Müller 2003). Second, with the exception of the years between 1966 and 1983, Austria has been governed by coalitions since 1945. This further reduces the authority of the head of government, as another key member of the government – the vice-chancellor – is usually the leader of another coalition party. The result is a significant division, or indeed fragmentation, of strategic capacities. Responsibility within the government is distributed among highly autonomous ministers and among political parties that are closely linked by a coalition agreement but compete for votes independently. The Chancellor’s Office’s coordinative roles include overseeing the implementation of the coalition agreement.
The Federal Chancellery has a department called the Legal and Constitutional Service (Verfassungsdienst), which is responsible for checking the constitutionality of policy proposals from various ministries, rather than providing functional coordination.
Chancellor Sebastian Kurz (2017 – 2019; 2019 – 2021) introduced several major reforms to enhance the chancellery’s functional strategic potential as the government’s central hub. However, most changes concerned the public relations and outreach functions of the chancellery rather than the relations between the chancellery and individual government departments, with the exception of political communication issues. Possibly more important in terms of policy-related strategy was a newly formed strategic unit or think tank called “Think Austria.” This unit was, however, dissolved under Chancellor Nehammer (in office since late 2021) (Der Standard 2022).
Nehammer added several senior positions to his staff (to serve from 2024). However, it is unclear to what extent this step was motivated by a desire to strengthen the coordination capacities of the chancellery. The opposition criticized Nehammer, suggesting he was instead making “reward appointments” for loyal supporters (Der Standard, 31 October 2023).
Citations:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/aktuelles/pk/jahr_2018/pk0401
Binder, Andreas Franz. 2016. Die Richtlinienkompetenz des österreichischen Bundeskanzlers.
gibt es sie doch?; Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Magister der Rechtswissenschaften, Johannes-Keppler-Universität Linz.
Müller, Wolfgang C. 2003. “Tight Coalitions and Stable Government.” In Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strom, eds., Coalition Governments in Western Europe, 86-125. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000193273/spoe-kritisiert-neue-top-jobs-im-kanzleramt
Der Standard. 2022. “Nehammer löste Kurz’ umstrittenen Thinktank auf.” Available at https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000133232281/nehammer-loeste-kurz-umstrittenen-think-tank-auf
https://www.kleinezeitung.at/politik/innenpolitik/6048669/Neustart-gefordert_80-Medienleute-im-Kanzleramt-aber-immer-weniger
Ultimately, these limitations are more political or constitutional than administrative. First, the federal chancellor, who chairs the cabinet, is only the first among equals (Binder 2016). He or she has no formal authority over the other members of the council (Müller 2003). Second, with the exception of the years between 1966 and 1983, Austria has been governed by coalitions since 1945. This further reduces the authority of the head of government, as another key member of the government – the vice-chancellor – is usually the leader of another coalition party. The result is a significant division, or indeed fragmentation, of strategic capacities. Responsibility within the government is distributed among highly autonomous ministers and among political parties that are closely linked by a coalition agreement but compete for votes independently. The Chancellor’s Office’s coordinative roles include overseeing the implementation of the coalition agreement.
The Federal Chancellery has a department called the Legal and Constitutional Service (Verfassungsdienst), which is responsible for checking the constitutionality of policy proposals from various ministries, rather than providing functional coordination.
Chancellor Sebastian Kurz (2017 – 2019; 2019 – 2021) introduced several major reforms to enhance the chancellery’s functional strategic potential as the government’s central hub. However, most changes concerned the public relations and outreach functions of the chancellery rather than the relations between the chancellery and individual government departments, with the exception of political communication issues. Possibly more important in terms of policy-related strategy was a newly formed strategic unit or think tank called “Think Austria.” This unit was, however, dissolved under Chancellor Nehammer (in office since late 2021) (Der Standard 2022).
Nehammer added several senior positions to his staff (to serve from 2024). However, it is unclear to what extent this step was motivated by a desire to strengthen the coordination capacities of the chancellery. The opposition criticized Nehammer, suggesting he was instead making “reward appointments” for loyal supporters (Der Standard, 31 October 2023).
Citations:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/aktuelles/pk/jahr_2018/pk0401
Binder, Andreas Franz. 2016. Die Richtlinienkompetenz des österreichischen Bundeskanzlers.
gibt es sie doch?; Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Magister der Rechtswissenschaften, Johannes-Keppler-Universität Linz.
Müller, Wolfgang C. 2003. “Tight Coalitions and Stable Government.” In Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strom, eds., Coalition Governments in Western Europe, 86-125. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000193273/spoe-kritisiert-neue-top-jobs-im-kanzleramt
Der Standard. 2022. “Nehammer löste Kurz’ umstrittenen Thinktank auf.” Available at https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000133232281/nehammer-loeste-kurz-umstrittenen-think-tank-auf
https://www.kleinezeitung.at/politik/innenpolitik/6048669/Neustart-gefordert_80-Medienleute-im-Kanzleramt-aber-immer-weniger
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
There are formally established interministerial coordination mechanisms within the Austrian political executive. However, these structures or mechanisms are confined to specific areas, such as gender issues or youth issues. In some cases, it is subjective to determine whether existing structures should be considered formal or informal mechanisms (on the latter, see G1.3).
Arguably, the most prominent and important formal structure in the field of interministerial coordination is the Interministerial Working Group on Gender Mainstreaming/Budgeting, chaired by the federal minister for women, family, integration, and media in the Federal Chancellor’s Office. This group supports the process of implementing gender mainstreaming – accomplishing gender parity in all relevant areas – and gender budgeting across all government departments and governance levels.
The body’s tasks include organizing information exchange, examining best-practice examples from individual departments and abroad, and developing and evaluating current projects and laws concerning the adoption of central gender mainstreaming goals. Members of this working group include representatives from all government departments, the courts, the Austrian Ombudsman Board (Volksanwaltschaft), the Court of Audit, and parliament, as well as the trade union for public services and the states (Länder) (Schieder and Schmidt 2023).
Austria does not have a notable tradition of formalized digitized interministerial coordination, or if it does, little is known about it. However, much like in other countries, the coronavirus pandemic acted as a significant digitalization catalyst. Since early 2020, Austrian ministers and ministries have used Zoom and other digital formats to host regular interministerial exchanges. With some exceptions, there generally exists a high degree of informal interministerial coordination at the level of civil servants.
Citations:
https://www.imag-gmb.at/arbeitsgruppe/interministerielle-arbeitsgruppe.html#:~:text=Die%20Interministerielle%20Arbeitsgruppe%20ist%20ein,des%20f%C3%BCr%20Frauenangelegenheiten%20zust%C3%A4ndigen%20Regierungsmitglieds
Wojtarowicz, Natalie, and David M. Herold. 2014. “Coordination Practices in Federal Government: The Case of Integration Policy in Austria.” Journal of Economic & Social Policy 16 (2): 210-232.
Schieder, Sandra, and Colette M. Schmidt. 2023. “Inside Ministerrat: Ein Blick hinter die Kulissen eines wöchentlichen Regierungsrituals.” Der Standard, October 4.
https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000186930/inside-ministerrat-ein-blick-hinter-die-kulissen-eines-woechentlichen-regierungsrituals
Arguably, the most prominent and important formal structure in the field of interministerial coordination is the Interministerial Working Group on Gender Mainstreaming/Budgeting, chaired by the federal minister for women, family, integration, and media in the Federal Chancellor’s Office. This group supports the process of implementing gender mainstreaming – accomplishing gender parity in all relevant areas – and gender budgeting across all government departments and governance levels.
The body’s tasks include organizing information exchange, examining best-practice examples from individual departments and abroad, and developing and evaluating current projects and laws concerning the adoption of central gender mainstreaming goals. Members of this working group include representatives from all government departments, the courts, the Austrian Ombudsman Board (Volksanwaltschaft), the Court of Audit, and parliament, as well as the trade union for public services and the states (Länder) (Schieder and Schmidt 2023).
Austria does not have a notable tradition of formalized digitized interministerial coordination, or if it does, little is known about it. However, much like in other countries, the coronavirus pandemic acted as a significant digitalization catalyst. Since early 2020, Austrian ministers and ministries have used Zoom and other digital formats to host regular interministerial exchanges. With some exceptions, there generally exists a high degree of informal interministerial coordination at the level of civil servants.
Citations:
https://www.imag-gmb.at/arbeitsgruppe/interministerielle-arbeitsgruppe.html#:~:text=Die%20Interministerielle%20Arbeitsgruppe%20ist%20ein,des%20f%C3%BCr%20Frauenangelegenheiten%20zust%C3%A4ndigen%20Regierungsmitglieds
Wojtarowicz, Natalie, and David M. Herold. 2014. “Coordination Practices in Federal Government: The Case of Integration Policy in Austria.” Journal of Economic & Social Policy 16 (2): 210-232.
Schieder, Sandra, and Colette M. Schmidt. 2023. “Inside Ministerrat: Ein Blick hinter die Kulissen eines wöchentlichen Regierungsrituals.” Der Standard, October 4.
https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000186930/inside-ministerrat-ein-blick-hinter-die-kulissen-eines-woechentlichen-regierungsrituals
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Before government bills can be formally considered at cabinet meetings, they need to be agreed upon by the governing coalition parties. These negotiations occur at different levels. Typically, the department primarily responsible for drafting a government bill collaborates with a department under the political control of the coalition partner (Schieder and Schmidt 2023). For example, in the current ÖVP-Green government, the minister of justice, Alma Zadić (Green), often cooperates with the minister for constitutional affairs, Karoline Edtstadler (ÖVP). If no direct counterpart exists for a given department, the department responsible for preparing the bill will coordinate with the coalition partner’s spokesperson for a particular policy field in the Nationalrat.
When most issues have been settled between the coalition parties, bills are forwarded to the coalition’s coordination group, which – as of late 2023 – includes members from the ministerial cabinets of Finance Minister Magnus Brunner (ÖVP) and Vice-Chancellor Werner Kogler (Grüne). As this coordination process proceeds, other “pairs” representing both sides will be involved, such as the press spokespersons, the chiefs of the political cabinets of the chancellor and vice-chancellor, and the parliamentary party group leaders of both governing parties in the Nationalrat. Sometimes, the chancellor or vice-chancellor will personally attend meetings.
The coordination group typically meets on Mondays or Tuesdays. Both governing parties also convene separately for informal discussions behind closed doors immediately before scheduled cabinet meetings.
Overall, the informal elements of this coordination clearly tend to support rather than challenge or undermine the more formal coordination efforts.
Citations:
Sandra Schieder and Colette M. Schmidt. 2023. “Inside Ministerrat: Ein Blick hinter die Kulissen eines wöchentlichen Regierungsrituals.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000186930/inside-ministerrat-ein-blick-hinter-die-kulissen-eines-woechentlichen-regierungsrituals
When most issues have been settled between the coalition parties, bills are forwarded to the coalition’s coordination group, which – as of late 2023 – includes members from the ministerial cabinets of Finance Minister Magnus Brunner (ÖVP) and Vice-Chancellor Werner Kogler (Grüne). As this coordination process proceeds, other “pairs” representing both sides will be involved, such as the press spokespersons, the chiefs of the political cabinets of the chancellor and vice-chancellor, and the parliamentary party group leaders of both governing parties in the Nationalrat. Sometimes, the chancellor or vice-chancellor will personally attend meetings.
The coordination group typically meets on Mondays or Tuesdays. Both governing parties also convene separately for informal discussions behind closed doors immediately before scheduled cabinet meetings.
Overall, the informal elements of this coordination clearly tend to support rather than challenge or undermine the more formal coordination efforts.
Citations:
Sandra Schieder and Colette M. Schmidt. 2023. “Inside Ministerrat: Ein Blick hinter die Kulissen eines wöchentlichen Regierungsrituals.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000186930/inside-ministerrat-ein-blick-hinter-die-kulissen-eines-woechentlichen-regierungsrituals
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
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The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
In Austria’s federation, many policies are decided at the federal level. In areas where the federal government has the power to legislate through the Nationalrat, central governments can establish national standards. From a purely constitutional perspective, subnational governments have limited room to introduce significantly different public service standards. However, in practice, the central government – notwithstanding the strong constitutional and fiscal centralization that marks the Austrian federation – is remarkably weak when it comes to enforcing its political will against potential resistance from state governments (Eller 2023).
Subnational self-governments in Austria effectively utilize their constitutional scope of discretion. While the constitution limits the competencies and independent financial resources of the states (Länder) and municipalities, national administrative tasks are often carried out by subnational agencies. This gives the states considerable de facto political power.
Each state can largely defend its own way of dealing with certain issues by setting up its own legal and administrative regimes, resulting in a highly complex and opaque system of state and federal rules. This is particularly true in policy fields such as education, health, and construction. There have also been remarkably strong differences between the states in the overall amount of money paid to applicants in various areas of social policy. The COVID-19 pandemic provided the most glaring and dramatic examples of the large diversity of competing rules on Austrian soil. State governors (“Landeshauptleute”) have long been identified as exceptionally powerful political players beyond the national level.
A defining feature of the Austrian federation is that the states do not have to take significant responsibility for their own finances. Only about 2% of the states’ fiscal income is generated at the state level. The majority of the funds are provided by the federal government, and states can negotiate for additional funds if necessary, which is quite common in constitutional practice.
Citations:
Eller, Mathias. 2023. “Federalism in Austria.” In Encyclopedia of Contemporary Constitutionalism, eds. J. Cremades and C. Hermida. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31739-7_35
Karlhofer, Ferdinand, and Günther Pallaver. 2013. “Strength through Weakness: State Executive Power and Federal Reform in Austria.” Swiss Political Science Review 19 (1): 41-59.
https://www.statistik.at/fileadmin/pages/348/Mindestsicherung_und_Sozialhilfe_der_Bundeslaender_im_Jahr_2021.pdf
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000142184719/oesterreich-und-der-foerderalismus-land-der-fuerstentuemer
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000141467766/ein-neuer-foederalismus-muss-her
Subnational self-governments in Austria effectively utilize their constitutional scope of discretion. While the constitution limits the competencies and independent financial resources of the states (Länder) and municipalities, national administrative tasks are often carried out by subnational agencies. This gives the states considerable de facto political power.
Each state can largely defend its own way of dealing with certain issues by setting up its own legal and administrative regimes, resulting in a highly complex and opaque system of state and federal rules. This is particularly true in policy fields such as education, health, and construction. There have also been remarkably strong differences between the states in the overall amount of money paid to applicants in various areas of social policy. The COVID-19 pandemic provided the most glaring and dramatic examples of the large diversity of competing rules on Austrian soil. State governors (“Landeshauptleute”) have long been identified as exceptionally powerful political players beyond the national level.
A defining feature of the Austrian federation is that the states do not have to take significant responsibility for their own finances. Only about 2% of the states’ fiscal income is generated at the state level. The majority of the funds are provided by the federal government, and states can negotiate for additional funds if necessary, which is quite common in constitutional practice.
Citations:
Eller, Mathias. 2023. “Federalism in Austria.” In Encyclopedia of Contemporary Constitutionalism, eds. J. Cremades and C. Hermida. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31739-7_35
Karlhofer, Ferdinand, and Günther Pallaver. 2013. “Strength through Weakness: State Executive Power and Federal Reform in Austria.” Swiss Political Science Review 19 (1): 41-59.
https://www.statistik.at/fileadmin/pages/348/Mindestsicherung_und_Sozialhilfe_der_Bundeslaender_im_Jahr_2021.pdf
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000142184719/oesterreich-und-der-foerderalismus-land-der-fuerstentuemer
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000141467766/ein-neuer-foederalismus-muss-her
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
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National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Austria’s federal fiscal constitution is heavily centralized, yet a consensus-driven political system serves as a counterweight. While the national parliament has overwhelming taxing authority and decides on tax sharing, cost-bearing rules, and transfers, legislation is usually drafted on a consensual basis across government levels and amended every four to six years. Within this framework, each state (Land) or local government is responsible for its own budget. To coordinate budgetary policies, the Internal Austrian Stability Pact sets well-defined budgetary goals for each government and ensures compliance through potential sanctions. The intergovernmental framework does provide tax leveraging autonomy for state governments and municipalities; however, this is hardly ever used. States are traditionally financed mostly via federal tax-sharing and transfers.
The lack of accountability to taxpayers, as well as a lack of fiscal transparency due to federal co-financing, reduces efficiency, and the considerable political clout of the Länder leads to soft-budget constraints. In practice, the national government’s power over the states is conspicuously limited; specifically, there are no sanctions against states that do not comply with the political and policy agendas of the central government (see Bußjäger 2015).
In stark contrast to the situation in Germany, the Austrian Bundesrat (the second chamber of the Austrian parliament representing the states at the federal level) plays a noticeably limited role in cross-level political cooperation. Coordination between the individual states occurs in the “Landeshauptleute-Konferenz,” an informal yet firmly institutionalized gathering of state governors (“Landeshauptleute”) held twice a year (see Bußjäger 2018). These conferences have become events where senior representatives of the federal government, up to the chancellor, participate to resolve cross-level issues.
The Austrian system of local governance is characterized by an exceptionally high degree of homogeneity and notable limits on central government power. The constitution provides for a uniform model of municipalities and allows for substantial material influence from the federation on the municipalities, at least in areas of federal competence. More recently, the national government has launched the “Gemeindepakete” – financial resources dedicated to triggering infrastructure investments at the local level.
Ultimately, states rather than the central government are the key actors in local governance. The states’ close relationships with municipalities are structurally favored by the Austrian system of “indirect” federal administration. The mix of constitutional, administrative, and political factors has resulted in a considerable diversity of local government regimes within the federation (see Haller 2023).
Citations:
Bußjäger, Peter, eds. 2010. Kooperativer Föderalismus in Österreich: Beiträge zur Verflechtung von Bund und Ländern. Braumüller.
https://www.bmf.gv.at/presse/pressemeldungen/2023/juli/kig.html
Bußjäger, Peter. 2015. “Austria’s Cooperative Federalism.” Austrian Federalism in Comparative Perspective: 11-33.
Bußjäger, P. 2018. “The Austrian Bundesrat–Imperfect and Unreformed.” Perspectives on Federalism 10 (2): 182-197. http://archive.sciendo.com/POF/pof.2018.10.issue-2/pof-2018-0022/pof-2018-0022.pdf
Haller, Matthias. 2023. “Local Governance in Austria: Diversity in Homogeneity.” Local Governance in Multi-Layered Systems: A Comparative Legal Study in the Federal-Local Connection. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 139-166.
The lack of accountability to taxpayers, as well as a lack of fiscal transparency due to federal co-financing, reduces efficiency, and the considerable political clout of the Länder leads to soft-budget constraints. In practice, the national government’s power over the states is conspicuously limited; specifically, there are no sanctions against states that do not comply with the political and policy agendas of the central government (see Bußjäger 2015).
In stark contrast to the situation in Germany, the Austrian Bundesrat (the second chamber of the Austrian parliament representing the states at the federal level) plays a noticeably limited role in cross-level political cooperation. Coordination between the individual states occurs in the “Landeshauptleute-Konferenz,” an informal yet firmly institutionalized gathering of state governors (“Landeshauptleute”) held twice a year (see Bußjäger 2018). These conferences have become events where senior representatives of the federal government, up to the chancellor, participate to resolve cross-level issues.
The Austrian system of local governance is characterized by an exceptionally high degree of homogeneity and notable limits on central government power. The constitution provides for a uniform model of municipalities and allows for substantial material influence from the federation on the municipalities, at least in areas of federal competence. More recently, the national government has launched the “Gemeindepakete” – financial resources dedicated to triggering infrastructure investments at the local level.
Ultimately, states rather than the central government are the key actors in local governance. The states’ close relationships with municipalities are structurally favored by the Austrian system of “indirect” federal administration. The mix of constitutional, administrative, and political factors has resulted in a considerable diversity of local government regimes within the federation (see Haller 2023).
Citations:
Bußjäger, Peter, eds. 2010. Kooperativer Föderalismus in Österreich: Beiträge zur Verflechtung von Bund und Ländern. Braumüller.
https://www.bmf.gv.at/presse/pressemeldungen/2023/juli/kig.html
Bußjäger, Peter. 2015. “Austria’s Cooperative Federalism.” Austrian Federalism in Comparative Perspective: 11-33.
Bußjäger, P. 2018. “The Austrian Bundesrat–Imperfect and Unreformed.” Perspectives on Federalism 10 (2): 182-197. http://archive.sciendo.com/POF/pof.2018.10.issue-2/pof-2018-0022/pof-2018-0022.pdf
Haller, Matthias. 2023. “Local Governance in Austria: Diversity in Homogeneity.” Local Governance in Multi-Layered Systems: A Comparative Legal Study in the Federal-Local Connection. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 139-166.