Horizontal Accountability
#7Key Findings
In the category of horizontal accountability, Austria performs well (rank 7) in international comparison.
The audit office and data protection authority are independent and well-respected. Courts are independent of political influence, and governments comply even with decisions they disagree with.
Civil rights are guaranteed by the constitution, and broadly respected. NGOs have said the police discriminate against migrants. The FPÖ party blames migrants and refugees for negative developments ranging from crime to unemployment.
Public integrity ratings are good, but anticorruption groups criticize severe deficiencies with regard to transparency and integrity in government. Parliament has sufficient resources and powers to monitor the government and guide policy. Parliamentary investigations are effective.
The audit office and data protection authority are independent and well-respected. Courts are independent of political influence, and governments comply even with decisions they disagree with.
Civil rights are guaranteed by the constitution, and broadly respected. NGOs have said the police discriminate against migrants. The FPÖ party blames migrants and refugees for negative developments ranging from crime to unemployment.
Public integrity ratings are good, but anticorruption groups criticize severe deficiencies with regard to transparency and integrity in government. Parliament has sufficient resources and powers to monitor the government and guide policy. Parliamentary investigations are effective.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There is no independent and effective audit office.
There is an independent and powerful audit office. Formally, the Austrian Court of Audit (Rechnungshof) is an instrument of parliament. Its president is elected by parliament for a period of 12 years, without the possibility of reelection. This gives the president a high degree of independence. The Court has a well-educated staff of more than 300.
The Court of Audit reports regularly to parliament, which can order it to perform specific tasks. Consequently, the parliamentary majority determines how to handle audit reports and, in cases of doubt, the majority supports the cabinet. Thus, the primary means to compel the government to respond positively to audit reports is public opinion. The Court of Audit enjoys an impeccable public reputation, which affords it a powerful role in constitutional practice.
In several key areas, such as monitoring party finances, the Court’s competencies have been recently expanded, enabling it to play a more proactive role than in the past. Additionally, the Court’s frame of reference is not limited to financial or accounting issues. For instance, in August 2023 the Court criticized the government for lacking a comprehensive and coherent strategy for addressing violence against women (Ruep 2023).
Citations:
Ruep, Stefanie. 2023. “Was die Regierung zum Schutz vor Gewalt an Frauen umgesetzt hat.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000195715/was-die-regierung-zum-schutz-vor-gewalt-an-frauen-umgesetzt-hat
The Court of Audit reports regularly to parliament, which can order it to perform specific tasks. Consequently, the parliamentary majority determines how to handle audit reports and, in cases of doubt, the majority supports the cabinet. Thus, the primary means to compel the government to respond positively to audit reports is public opinion. The Court of Audit enjoys an impeccable public reputation, which affords it a powerful role in constitutional practice.
In several key areas, such as monitoring party finances, the Court’s competencies have been recently expanded, enabling it to play a more proactive role than in the past. Additionally, the Court’s frame of reference is not limited to financial or accounting issues. For instance, in August 2023 the Court criticized the government for lacking a comprehensive and coherent strategy for addressing violence against women (Ruep 2023).
Citations:
Ruep, Stefanie. 2023. “Was die Regierung zum Schutz vor Gewalt an Frauen umgesetzt hat.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000195715/was-die-regierung-zum-schutz-vor-gewalt-an-frauen-umgesetzt-hat
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
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There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Since 2013, the Austrian Data Protection Authority (ADPA) has existed, replacing the former Data Protection Committee. In 2018, the ADPA was restructured, and its staff has been continuously increased since then. The office is headed by a chairperson appointed by the Data Protection Council.
The office and its chairperson are not dependent on the government – they are not obliged to follow any specific government directive. The independence of the office has never been seriously questioned. In recent years, there have been several occasions on which the ADPA demonstrated its willingness to block planned government laws if deemed inappropriate, such as its veto against the use of algorithms by public authorities when dealing with job-seekers in 2020.
More generally, the ADPA has exercised its right to take positions in legislative processes widely and effectively. In 2023, it criticized various aspects of the suggested ORF reform bill (Der Standard 2023). The key focus of the ADPA’s annual agenda in 2023 was on the financial sector (Fonds professionell 2023).
The proliferation of anonymized administrative data for researchers in Austria remains underdeveloped. While the Austrian Micro Data Center (AMDC) at Statistics Austria provides a platform for accessing some of this data, most governmental administrative data have yet to be delivered to the AMDC.
Citations:
https://www.data-protection-authority.gv.at/
Der Standard. 2023. “Datenschutzbehörde äußert ernste Bedenken zu ORF-Beitrag.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000034792/datenschutzbehoerde-aeussert-ernste-bedenken-zu-orf-beitrag
https://www.fondsprofessionell.at/news/recht/headline/datenschutzbehoerde-prueft-den-finanzsektor-225930/
The office and its chairperson are not dependent on the government – they are not obliged to follow any specific government directive. The independence of the office has never been seriously questioned. In recent years, there have been several occasions on which the ADPA demonstrated its willingness to block planned government laws if deemed inappropriate, such as its veto against the use of algorithms by public authorities when dealing with job-seekers in 2020.
More generally, the ADPA has exercised its right to take positions in legislative processes widely and effectively. In 2023, it criticized various aspects of the suggested ORF reform bill (Der Standard 2023). The key focus of the ADPA’s annual agenda in 2023 was on the financial sector (Fonds professionell 2023).
The proliferation of anonymized administrative data for researchers in Austria remains underdeveloped. While the Austrian Micro Data Center (AMDC) at Statistics Austria provides a platform for accessing some of this data, most governmental administrative data have yet to be delivered to the AMDC.
Citations:
https://www.data-protection-authority.gv.at/
Der Standard. 2023. “Datenschutzbehörde äußert ernste Bedenken zu ORF-Beitrag.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000034792/datenschutzbehoerde-aeussert-ernste-bedenken-zu-orf-beitrag
https://www.fondsprofessionell.at/news/recht/headline/datenschutzbehoerde-prueft-den-finanzsektor-225930/
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
The role of the various courts in Austria is notably strong, characterized by qualified personnel, autonomy, and public trust and support. The EU-Justice-Barometer 2022 ranked Austria in the top group of countries for the fifth consecutive year; 83% of Austrians had a “very good” or “fairly good” impression of the independence of the Austrian courts.
The entire sphere of politics in Austria operates under the principle of independent judicial review. The three high courts – Constitutional Court, Administrative Court, and Supreme Court – effectively oversee the legality of all government actions as stipulated by the constitution.
The established written and unwritten rules for selecting justices have so far proven sufficient to guarantee a high degree of judicial independence in constitutional practice. The 12 judges of the Austria Constitutional Court are appointed by the federal president, who acts on the suggestions of the federal government (nominating six judges), the Nationalrat, and the Bundesrat (each nominating three judges). The president and vice president of the Court are nominated by the federal government. The federal president is bound by suggestions from the executive and legislative chambers but does not have to accept individual nominations. The appointment procedures for judges to other courts have occasionally been criticized for the weak position of parliament and the widespread absence of any legal protection for applicants who have been passed over. However, the overall quality of the selection and appointment regime has been judged as good (see Vasek 2022).
Government actions can be effectively challenged by invoking the courts. Legislative minorities, and in some cases individual citizens, have the right to take matters to the Constitutional Court. Governments have been aware of this and acted accordingly. Court rulings have been independent, and governments have complied with court decisions even when they disagreed with them.
Citations:
Vasek, Markus. 2022. Richterbestellung in Österreich. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur demokratischen Legitimation der Gerichtsbarkeit. Wien: Verlag Österreich.
https://www.bmj.gv.at/ministerium/presse/Pressemitteilungen-2022/EU-Justizbarometer-2022_%C3%96sterreich-f%C3%BCnftes-Jahr-in-Folge-im-Spitzenfeld.html#:~:text=%E2%80%9C&text=Laut%20dem%20aktuellen%20Justizbarometer%20haben,oder%20Deutschland%20(76%20Prozent)
The entire sphere of politics in Austria operates under the principle of independent judicial review. The three high courts – Constitutional Court, Administrative Court, and Supreme Court – effectively oversee the legality of all government actions as stipulated by the constitution.
The established written and unwritten rules for selecting justices have so far proven sufficient to guarantee a high degree of judicial independence in constitutional practice. The 12 judges of the Austria Constitutional Court are appointed by the federal president, who acts on the suggestions of the federal government (nominating six judges), the Nationalrat, and the Bundesrat (each nominating three judges). The president and vice president of the Court are nominated by the federal government. The federal president is bound by suggestions from the executive and legislative chambers but does not have to accept individual nominations. The appointment procedures for judges to other courts have occasionally been criticized for the weak position of parliament and the widespread absence of any legal protection for applicants who have been passed over. However, the overall quality of the selection and appointment regime has been judged as good (see Vasek 2022).
Government actions can be effectively challenged by invoking the courts. Legislative minorities, and in some cases individual citizens, have the right to take matters to the Constitutional Court. Governments have been aware of this and acted accordingly. Court rulings have been independent, and governments have complied with court decisions even when they disagreed with them.
Citations:
Vasek, Markus. 2022. Richterbestellung in Österreich. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur demokratischen Legitimation der Gerichtsbarkeit. Wien: Verlag Österreich.
https://www.bmj.gv.at/ministerium/presse/Pressemitteilungen-2022/EU-Justizbarometer-2022_%C3%96sterreich-f%C3%BCnftes-Jahr-in-Folge-im-Spitzenfeld.html#:~:text=%E2%80%9C&text=Laut%20dem%20aktuellen%20Justizbarometer%20haben,oder%20Deutschland%20(76%20Prozent)
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
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There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
Civil rights are guaranteed by the constitution, and Austrian governments have observed these rules.
Systematic intimidation by authorities and unjust arrests or torture have had no place in Austrian postwar constitutional practice.
In the WJP Rule of Law Index for 2023, Austria ranks among the top 7% of the 142 countries surveyed. Specifically, Austria is in the top ten in terms of the effective enforcement of civil rights (10/142). Additionally, Austria is ranked among the top countries for keeping civil justice free from improper government influence (14/142). The country also received a favorable score for the low degree of corruption in civil justice, indicating a system free of bribery and improper influence by private interests (15/142).
The worst score (55/142 and 28/31 in the regional ranking) was received for the question of whether there were any alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that are affordable, fair, and efficient. The score concerning discrimination in civil justice – measuring whether the civil justice system discriminates in practice based on socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or gender identity – was also less than fully satisfying (33/142).
Other sources also suggest there remains room for improvement. The 2022 – 2023 Amnesty International Report on human rights points out that the use of Strategic Litigation against Public Participation (SLAPPs) was “concerning” in Austria, as it is in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Greece. The same report notes that “at several protests in the capital, Vienna, police prevented journalists from observing and reporting protests or failed to adequately protect them from attacks by protesters.” High fees for accessing courts also create a significant obstacle to the protection of civil rights for many social groups.
Discrimination issues have figured prominently over the years. Cases documented by various NGOs have shown members of the Austrian police to have used cruelty and violence in interactions with non-citizens, especially migrants without a residence permit. The overall impression is that in recent years and decades, the Austrian security apparatus – police and the military – has drifted somewhat to the right. Right-wing populist parties, especially the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), instrumentalize social and economic anxieties among the broader population to blame migrants and refugees for various negative developments, ranging from crime to unemployment. Mainstream political parties have sometimes been reluctant to insist that the guarantees provided by human-rights declarations signed by Austria – for example, the Council of Europe’s Declaration of Human Rights – cover refugees and migrants and must be implemented without reservation.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International International Report 2022/23. The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2023/03/POL1056702023ARABIC.pdf
World Justice Project. 2023. “WJP Rule of Law Index: Austria.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Austria
Systematic intimidation by authorities and unjust arrests or torture have had no place in Austrian postwar constitutional practice.
In the WJP Rule of Law Index for 2023, Austria ranks among the top 7% of the 142 countries surveyed. Specifically, Austria is in the top ten in terms of the effective enforcement of civil rights (10/142). Additionally, Austria is ranked among the top countries for keeping civil justice free from improper government influence (14/142). The country also received a favorable score for the low degree of corruption in civil justice, indicating a system free of bribery and improper influence by private interests (15/142).
The worst score (55/142 and 28/31 in the regional ranking) was received for the question of whether there were any alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that are affordable, fair, and efficient. The score concerning discrimination in civil justice – measuring whether the civil justice system discriminates in practice based on socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or gender identity – was also less than fully satisfying (33/142).
Other sources also suggest there remains room for improvement. The 2022 – 2023 Amnesty International Report on human rights points out that the use of Strategic Litigation against Public Participation (SLAPPs) was “concerning” in Austria, as it is in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Greece. The same report notes that “at several protests in the capital, Vienna, police prevented journalists from observing and reporting protests or failed to adequately protect them from attacks by protesters.” High fees for accessing courts also create a significant obstacle to the protection of civil rights for many social groups.
Discrimination issues have figured prominently over the years. Cases documented by various NGOs have shown members of the Austrian police to have used cruelty and violence in interactions with non-citizens, especially migrants without a residence permit. The overall impression is that in recent years and decades, the Austrian security apparatus – police and the military – has drifted somewhat to the right. Right-wing populist parties, especially the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), instrumentalize social and economic anxieties among the broader population to blame migrants and refugees for various negative developments, ranging from crime to unemployment. Mainstream political parties have sometimes been reluctant to insist that the guarantees provided by human-rights declarations signed by Austria – for example, the Council of Europe’s Declaration of Human Rights – cover refugees and migrants and must be implemented without reservation.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International International Report 2022/23. The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2023/03/POL1056702023ARABIC.pdf
World Justice Project. 2023. “WJP Rule of Law Index: Austria.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Austria
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
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Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
The 2021 Index for Public Integrity (Subcategory: Corruption Risk Forecast Report) ranks Austria 13th in the world for public integrity, showing significant change over the past 12 years: “Its good control of corruption showed in recent years when a new generation of politicians broke the established integrity norms, but they were eventually brought to account for their acts. Although in the past the country managed to control corruption despite low transparency and high reliance on networking, the limits of these past arrangements seem to have been reached. To prevent further abuse of office as seen in recent scandals, Austria needs more fiscal transparency, access to information and transparent monitoring of assets and interests of public officials.”
Other sources have drawn a considerably less favorable picture. In 2023, Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) criticized the state of affairs in Austria harshly, pointing to severe deficiencies regarding transparency and noting political influence exerted on staffing top positions within the police (Graber and Schmid 2023). Further, the same source criticized a notable lack of transparency, integrity, and quality standards at the level of cabinet ministers, cabinet staff, and general secretaries. It was even suggested to disclose the financial circumstances not only of the officeholders themselves but also of their spouses and other close relatives.
The branch of special prosecutors dedicated to combating political corruption (WKStA), established in 2011 and currently featuring about 40 prosecutors, is partially independent from the Ministry of Justice. However, the WKStA’s independence is limited to certain aspects of its activities, leading some observers to argue that the possibility of political influence remains. GRECO inspectors also criticized that the established reporting duties to the Ministry of Justice are extremely time-consuming and may keep prosecutors away from other tasks (Graber and Schmid 2023). These reports were also seen as a potential gateway to indiscretions and interventions in ongoing inquiries. The WKStA continues to suffer from attacks by the executive branch.
A final fact worth noting is the alarming state of public views on Austrian authorities concerning corruption: In 2023, no less than 62% of the electorate considered Austria a “corrupt” or “very corrupt” country (Seidl 2023). The three major parties (ÖVP, SPÖ, and FPÖ), the ORF, and the building authorities were considered the most corrupt organizations, while the Austrian army (Bundesheer) was viewed as the least corrupt among 21 possible choices. Several recent corruption scandals involved local politicians who have considerable leeway in deciding on construction projects.
Citations:
Graber, Renate, and Fabian Schmid. 2023. “Europarat stellt Österreich ein schlechtes Zeugnis bei der Korruptionsbekämpfung aus.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000142546440/europarat-stellt-oesterreich-schlechtes-zeugnis-bei-korruptionsbekaempfung-aus
Seidl, Conrad. 2023. “Jeder Vierte hält Österreich für ein sehr korruptes Land.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000145265188/jeder-vierte-haelt-oesterreich-fuer-ein-sehr-korruptes-land
https://www.corruptionrisk.org/transparency/
Other sources have drawn a considerably less favorable picture. In 2023, Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) criticized the state of affairs in Austria harshly, pointing to severe deficiencies regarding transparency and noting political influence exerted on staffing top positions within the police (Graber and Schmid 2023). Further, the same source criticized a notable lack of transparency, integrity, and quality standards at the level of cabinet ministers, cabinet staff, and general secretaries. It was even suggested to disclose the financial circumstances not only of the officeholders themselves but also of their spouses and other close relatives.
The branch of special prosecutors dedicated to combating political corruption (WKStA), established in 2011 and currently featuring about 40 prosecutors, is partially independent from the Ministry of Justice. However, the WKStA’s independence is limited to certain aspects of its activities, leading some observers to argue that the possibility of political influence remains. GRECO inspectors also criticized that the established reporting duties to the Ministry of Justice are extremely time-consuming and may keep prosecutors away from other tasks (Graber and Schmid 2023). These reports were also seen as a potential gateway to indiscretions and interventions in ongoing inquiries. The WKStA continues to suffer from attacks by the executive branch.
A final fact worth noting is the alarming state of public views on Austrian authorities concerning corruption: In 2023, no less than 62% of the electorate considered Austria a “corrupt” or “very corrupt” country (Seidl 2023). The three major parties (ÖVP, SPÖ, and FPÖ), the ORF, and the building authorities were considered the most corrupt organizations, while the Austrian army (Bundesheer) was viewed as the least corrupt among 21 possible choices. Several recent corruption scandals involved local politicians who have considerable leeway in deciding on construction projects.
Citations:
Graber, Renate, and Fabian Schmid. 2023. “Europarat stellt Österreich ein schlechtes Zeugnis bei der Korruptionsbekämpfung aus.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000142546440/europarat-stellt-oesterreich-schlechtes-zeugnis-bei-korruptionsbekaempfung-aus
Seidl, Conrad. 2023. “Jeder Vierte hält Österreich für ein sehr korruptes Land.” https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000145265188/jeder-vierte-haelt-oesterreich-fuer-ein-sehr-korruptes-land
https://www.corruptionrisk.org/transparency/
Graph View
Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Members of the Austrian Nationalrat receive administrative support from the parliamentary administration (Parlamentsdirektion). Within this administration, a specific unit, the “Rechts-, Legislativ- & Wissenschaftliche Dienst (RLW),” provides legal, economic, and social science-based information to all MPs and the wider public. This service aims to ensure that MPs are informed about national and international media reporting at all times. In 2019, the parliamentary administration launched the EULE Media Monitor / 360° Topic-Monitoring system, which helps parliamentarians stay up to date by delivering information in an easy-to-access web-based form.
Further, the parliamentary staff members law (“Parlamentsmitarbeiter:innen-Gesetz”), which can be amended by parliament, provides all MPs with a monthly allowance for hiring support staff. In 2018, the amount available for such support staff was approximately €3,600 per month, gross (after deduction of other employers’ costs for this personnel), which compares favorably with the situation in several other countries (see Rada for Europe, Assistants to MPs; www.undp.org/sites).
Parliamentary assistants are typically responsible for preparing parliamentary meetings – both plenary and committee sessions – and maintaining contact with citizens and the wider public. These assistants can work for several MPs and can form working groups serving up to seven MPs. It is common to split financial resources and tasks among multiple assistants. Many MPs employ two part-time assistants: one serving in their constituency and another in Vienna.
Citations:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/verstehen/das-hohe-haus/parlamentsdirektion/#:~:text=Die%20Parlamentsdirektion%20ist%20f%C3%BCr%20den,Plenarsitzungen%20von%20Nationalrat%20und%20Bundesrat
https://www.ipu.org/innovation-tracker/story/austria-uses-ai-keep-mps-informed
https://www.diepresse.com/3825077/mitarbeiter-die-heimlichen-helfer-im-parlament
https://www.vol.at/nationalrat-mit-hoeheren-spesen-in-die-sommerpause/4022548
https://austria-forum.org/af/AustriaWiki/Nationalrat_%28%C3%96sterreich%29
https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/ua/assistants-to-MPs-EN.pdf
Further, the parliamentary staff members law (“Parlamentsmitarbeiter:innen-Gesetz”), which can be amended by parliament, provides all MPs with a monthly allowance for hiring support staff. In 2018, the amount available for such support staff was approximately €3,600 per month, gross (after deduction of other employers’ costs for this personnel), which compares favorably with the situation in several other countries (see Rada for Europe, Assistants to MPs; www.undp.org/sites).
Parliamentary assistants are typically responsible for preparing parliamentary meetings – both plenary and committee sessions – and maintaining contact with citizens and the wider public. These assistants can work for several MPs and can form working groups serving up to seven MPs. It is common to split financial resources and tasks among multiple assistants. Many MPs employ two part-time assistants: one serving in their constituency and another in Vienna.
Citations:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/verstehen/das-hohe-haus/parlamentsdirektion/#:~:text=Die%20Parlamentsdirektion%20ist%20f%C3%BCr%20den,Plenarsitzungen%20von%20Nationalrat%20und%20Bundesrat
https://www.ipu.org/innovation-tracker/story/austria-uses-ai-keep-mps-informed
https://www.diepresse.com/3825077/mitarbeiter-die-heimlichen-helfer-im-parlament
https://www.vol.at/nationalrat-mit-hoeheren-spesen-in-die-sommerpause/4022548
https://austria-forum.org/af/AustriaWiki/Nationalrat_%28%C3%96sterreich%29
https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/ua/assistants-to-MPs-EN.pdf
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
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The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
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The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
All parliamentary committees of the Austrian Nationalrat have the authority to request any type of document. However, documents classified as “secret” can only be viewed in a special parliamentary room and cannot be copied.
The Nationalrat – similar to the Bundesrat as the second chamber – is entitled to examine the administration of affairs by the government, interrogate its members about all subjects pertaining to execution, demand all relevant information, and articulate in resolutions their wishes about the exercise of executive power.
Every parliamentarian is entitled to ask brief oral questions to members of the government during plenary sessions. The deadline for responding to an oral question tabled in the plenary sitting is the end of the same day. A debate takes place whenever it is requested. Parliamentarians also have the right to submit written questions to the president of the House and the chairpersons of committees. The individual to whom a question is addressed replies in writing. If they are not in a position to answer, their reply must indicate the reason. In practice, however, many questions are answered superficially or evasively, without any consequences for the officeholders obliged to respond.
When summoned, ministers, or their state secretaries, attend the respective meetings. The legal ability to summon ministers is, in practice, limited by the majority that the governing parties enjoy in all committees. As the majority party groups tend to follow the policy defined by the cabinet, there typically is limited interest in summoning cabinet members, at least not against a minister’s will. While this de facto limitation can be seen as part of the logic of a parliamentary system in which the government and the parliamentary majority are essentially a single political entity, this limitation is a major one in Austria given the established high level of party discipline.
The chancellor rarely attends the collective question time, sometimes less than once a year. As Serban (2022: 164) notes, “correspondence with officials indicated that this mechanism is considered perfunctory; instead, parliamentarians use urgent questions to summon the chancellor to answer questions on specific issues.”
Citations:
http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2017_F.htm#contradmin
Serban, Ruxandra. 2022. “How Are Prime Ministers Held to Account? Exploring Procedures and Practices in 31 Parliamentary Democracies.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 28 (2): 155-178.
The Nationalrat – similar to the Bundesrat as the second chamber – is entitled to examine the administration of affairs by the government, interrogate its members about all subjects pertaining to execution, demand all relevant information, and articulate in resolutions their wishes about the exercise of executive power.
Every parliamentarian is entitled to ask brief oral questions to members of the government during plenary sessions. The deadline for responding to an oral question tabled in the plenary sitting is the end of the same day. A debate takes place whenever it is requested. Parliamentarians also have the right to submit written questions to the president of the House and the chairpersons of committees. The individual to whom a question is addressed replies in writing. If they are not in a position to answer, their reply must indicate the reason. In practice, however, many questions are answered superficially or evasively, without any consequences for the officeholders obliged to respond.
When summoned, ministers, or their state secretaries, attend the respective meetings. The legal ability to summon ministers is, in practice, limited by the majority that the governing parties enjoy in all committees. As the majority party groups tend to follow the policy defined by the cabinet, there typically is limited interest in summoning cabinet members, at least not against a minister’s will. While this de facto limitation can be seen as part of the logic of a parliamentary system in which the government and the parliamentary majority are essentially a single political entity, this limitation is a major one in Austria given the established high level of party discipline.
The chancellor rarely attends the collective question time, sometimes less than once a year. As Serban (2022: 164) notes, “correspondence with officials indicated that this mechanism is considered perfunctory; instead, parliamentarians use urgent questions to summon the chancellor to answer questions on specific issues.”
Citations:
http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2017_F.htm#contradmin
Serban, Ruxandra. 2022. “How Are Prime Ministers Held to Account? Exploring Procedures and Practices in 31 Parliamentary Democracies.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 28 (2): 155-178.
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
Since 2008, the creation of investigatory committees has been a minority right, allowing the opposition or any quarter of MPs in the Nationalrat to launch a parliamentary inquiry. In Austria, such inquiries have not only provided a showdown opportunity between government and opposition parties, but have also served as an arena for agreeing on political reforms considered desirable by all major parties.
However, the committees’ power became particularly evident in 2021 when Chancellor Kurz’s alleged false testimony to the Ibiza Investigative Committee led to his resignation shortly thereafter. In some of the literature, the Austrian system has been hailed as a role model for other parliamentary democracies, although without any comparative assessment (see Keppel 2023).
Actual proceedings in investigatory committees are often inefficient, as many questions go unanswered. The opposition has suggested that providing TV time for such committees might improve outcomes. However, even in its current format, investigation activities can lead to an unfavorable decision or report. The seriousness of the procedure was underscored by the conviction of Chancellor Kurz, who received an eight-month suspended sentence from a Vienna criminal court in February 2024 for making false statements to a parliamentary inquiry into alleged corruption in his first government.
Citations:
Pilgermair, Walter, eds. 2023. Parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschuss: Praxis und Perspektiven. Vienna: Verlag Österreich.
Keppel, Matthias. 2023. “Political Control and Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry: Strengthening the Quality of Democracy.” Journal of the Knowledge Economy 14 (2): 1298-1320.
However, the committees’ power became particularly evident in 2021 when Chancellor Kurz’s alleged false testimony to the Ibiza Investigative Committee led to his resignation shortly thereafter. In some of the literature, the Austrian system has been hailed as a role model for other parliamentary democracies, although without any comparative assessment (see Keppel 2023).
Actual proceedings in investigatory committees are often inefficient, as many questions go unanswered. The opposition has suggested that providing TV time for such committees might improve outcomes. However, even in its current format, investigation activities can lead to an unfavorable decision or report. The seriousness of the procedure was underscored by the conviction of Chancellor Kurz, who received an eight-month suspended sentence from a Vienna criminal court in February 2024 for making false statements to a parliamentary inquiry into alleged corruption in his first government.
Citations:
Pilgermair, Walter, eds. 2023. Parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschuss: Praxis und Perspektiven. Vienna: Verlag Österreich.
Keppel, Matthias. 2023. “Political Control and Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry: Strengthening the Quality of Democracy.” Journal of the Knowledge Economy 14 (2): 1298-1320.
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
10
9
9
The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
2
1
1
The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
The organization and operations of legislative committees in the Austrian Nationalrat are effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals, including the substantive review of government bills.
Although parliamentary committees outnumber ministries, their task areas are, with few exceptions, more or less identical to those of the ministries. The National Council’s General Committee has a broad range of competencies, including determining the government’s position within the European Council.
In the current lineup of legislative committees (as of early 2024), several committees have a cross-cutting policy profile, such as the Committee for Economics, Industry, and Energy. This structure does not neatly match the organization at the level of cabinet departments, which includes a Ministry for Labor and Economics (a result of a 2022 merger of two independent ministries for labor and economics) and a Ministry for Climate Protection, Environment, Mobility, Innovation, and Technology.
Several policy areas, which are combined into one portfolio at the ministerial level, face individual specialized committees. For example, the Committee for Consumer Protection deals with a policy area integrated into the larger ministerial portfolio of Social Affairs, Health, Nursing, and Consumer Protection. Additionally, some legislative committees focus specifically on a single policy area that is not named in the titles of individual ministries, such as tourism.
Importantly, these committees are staffed for the entire legislative period. They bring together policy specialists from different parties and deliberate on bills behind closed doors, which promotes a highly substantive review of government bills. Additionally, some legislative committees, by convention, are chaired by MPs representing the parliamentary opposition.
Citations:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/recherchieren/ausschuesse
Schnapp, Kai-Uwe, and Philipp Harfst. 2005. “Parlamentarische Informations- und Kontrollressourcen in 22 westlichen Demokratien.” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 36 (2): 348-370.
Although parliamentary committees outnumber ministries, their task areas are, with few exceptions, more or less identical to those of the ministries. The National Council’s General Committee has a broad range of competencies, including determining the government’s position within the European Council.
In the current lineup of legislative committees (as of early 2024), several committees have a cross-cutting policy profile, such as the Committee for Economics, Industry, and Energy. This structure does not neatly match the organization at the level of cabinet departments, which includes a Ministry for Labor and Economics (a result of a 2022 merger of two independent ministries for labor and economics) and a Ministry for Climate Protection, Environment, Mobility, Innovation, and Technology.
Several policy areas, which are combined into one portfolio at the ministerial level, face individual specialized committees. For example, the Committee for Consumer Protection deals with a policy area integrated into the larger ministerial portfolio of Social Affairs, Health, Nursing, and Consumer Protection. Additionally, some legislative committees focus specifically on a single policy area that is not named in the titles of individual ministries, such as tourism.
Importantly, these committees are staffed for the entire legislative period. They bring together policy specialists from different parties and deliberate on bills behind closed doors, which promotes a highly substantive review of government bills. Additionally, some legislative committees, by convention, are chaired by MPs representing the parliamentary opposition.
Citations:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/recherchieren/ausschuesse
Schnapp, Kai-Uwe, and Philipp Harfst. 2005. “Parlamentarische Informations- und Kontrollressourcen in 22 westlichen Demokratien.” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 36 (2): 348-370.