Consensus-Building
#17Key Findings
In the category of consensus-building, Belgium falls into the middle ranks internationally (rank 17).
Belgium’s executive and parliament occasionally draw on scientific knowledge. In politically sensitive areas like tax reform, academic and international experts have minimal influence.
Employers’ organizations and trade unions are deeply integrated into decision-making processes at both federal and regional levels, and can negotiate directly with the government. Other CSOs also play an important role, though environmental groups tend to be involved in policymaking only on a case-by-case basis.
Belgium’s data publication practices are rated below the OECD average, with data accessibility being a major issue. Data aggregations and digitalized public services are helpful, but do not help citizens hold the government accountable.
Belgium’s executive and parliament occasionally draw on scientific knowledge. In politically sensitive areas like tax reform, academic and international experts have minimal influence.
Employers’ organizations and trade unions are deeply integrated into decision-making processes at both federal and regional levels, and can negotiate directly with the government. Other CSOs also play an important role, though environmental groups tend to be involved in policymaking only on a case-by-case basis.
Belgium’s data publication practices are rated below the OECD average, with data accessibility being a major issue. Data aggregations and digitalized public services are helpful, but do not help citizens hold the government accountable.
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To what extent is the government successful in effectively harnessing the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes?
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9
9
The government is able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, the government is able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
5
4
3
4
3
Only rarely is the government able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
2
1
1
The government is not able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
Consultation with non-governmental academic experts varies depending on the subject matter. Their influence on final decisions is often limited and marginal compared to full-time ministerial cabinet experts. The executive branch and parliament are able to harness the best available scientific knowledge, but they do not systematically consult full-time academic experts with independent views. They do so only occasionally, and their efforts in this regard do not necessarily foster genuine scientific debate.
In Belgium’s neo-corporatist system, representatives of social partners (employers’ organizations and trade unions) are consistently involved when strategic socioeconomic decisions are made. However, in politically sensitive areas like tax reform, academic and international expertise has minimal influence. Fobe and colleagues (2017) show that Belgium has numerous advisory bodies at federal (250) and regional (46) levels, deeply integrated into policymaking, but these advisory bodies are often valuing experiential expertise over academic opinions due to the consensus-based political system.
There are exceptions, such as the National Committee for Pensions, which had one of three subcommittees composed solely of academic experts. Yet, its impact on actual reforms was limited (see, for instance, Devolder and Hindriks 2023). The Belgian Healthcare Knowledge Center is another exception.
The trend of consulting scientific experts increased during the COVID-19 crisis, with the government forming ad hoc groups of expert scientific advisers and numerous coordination committees. However, this trend has not been consistent over time, with scientific experts consulted more sporadically post-COVID-19. A recent example is a scientific committee tasked with evaluating the law on abortion extension (see press article).
Citations:
Press article on the scientific committee evaluating the law on abortion extension: https://www.lesoir.be/500147/article/2023-03-10/ivg-le-comite-dexperts-favorable-lunanimite-lextension-18-semaines
Devolder, P., and J. Hindriks. 2023. “Cadre pour une réforme acceptable des pensions.” Regards économiques 178.
Fobé, E., Biard, B., Schiffino, N., and Brans, M. 2017. “Seven: Policy Advisory Bodies in Belgium.” In Policy Analysis in Belgium. Bristol: Policy Press.
In Belgium’s neo-corporatist system, representatives of social partners (employers’ organizations and trade unions) are consistently involved when strategic socioeconomic decisions are made. However, in politically sensitive areas like tax reform, academic and international expertise has minimal influence. Fobe and colleagues (2017) show that Belgium has numerous advisory bodies at federal (250) and regional (46) levels, deeply integrated into policymaking, but these advisory bodies are often valuing experiential expertise over academic opinions due to the consensus-based political system.
There are exceptions, such as the National Committee for Pensions, which had one of three subcommittees composed solely of academic experts. Yet, its impact on actual reforms was limited (see, for instance, Devolder and Hindriks 2023). The Belgian Healthcare Knowledge Center is another exception.
The trend of consulting scientific experts increased during the COVID-19 crisis, with the government forming ad hoc groups of expert scientific advisers and numerous coordination committees. However, this trend has not been consistent over time, with scientific experts consulted more sporadically post-COVID-19. A recent example is a scientific committee tasked with evaluating the law on abortion extension (see press article).
Citations:
Press article on the scientific committee evaluating the law on abortion extension: https://www.lesoir.be/500147/article/2023-03-10/ivg-le-comite-dexperts-favorable-lunanimite-lextension-18-semaines
Devolder, P., and J. Hindriks. 2023. “Cadre pour une réforme acceptable des pensions.” Regards économiques 178.
Fobé, E., Biard, B., Schiffino, N., and Brans, M. 2017. “Seven: Policy Advisory Bodies in Belgium.” In Policy Analysis in Belgium. Bristol: Policy Press.
Graph View
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of trade unions and business organizations in policymaking?
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9
9
The government is able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is rarely able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
2
1
1
The government is not able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
Belgium is known for its strong culture of consultation and consensus, particularly in relation to socioeconomic policies. Pineda-Hernández et al. (2022) demonstrate that Belgium has both a high bargaining coverage (96% according to OECD data) and a high level of centralization.
In the Belgian political landscape, both trade unions and employers’ associations hold significant representation within the decision-making process at the federal and regional echelons. Their ability to negotiate with each other and the government is bolstered by their representation of a substantial and stable proportion of employees and corporations. Their inclusion in a multitude of committees ensures that their viewpoints are effectively articulated to, and taken into account by, the authorities. Furthermore, they have the capacity to forge binding agreements among themselves, thereby exerting considerable influence over the entire economic terrain of Belgium.
Nevertheless, there are instances where these entities engage in negotiations that result in unbalanced agreements, necessitating the Belgian government to intervene and bridge the ensuing financial disparity. Moreover, the occasional failure of trade unions and employers’ associations to reach consensus can impede their capacity to shape public policy effectively. This highlights the complexities inherent in the decision-making process and the challenges faced by these entities in their pursuit of influencing policy.
Despite generally positive indicators and outcomes, there are underlying issues eroding the power of social dialogue and the dynamics of social partners. This is evident in the declining share of produced wealth going to wages, indicating a shift in the balance of power between labor and capital to the detriment of workers and trade unions (Hermans 2022).
Citations:
Pineda-Hernández, K., Rycx, F., and Volral, M. 2022. “How Collective Bargaining Shapes Poverty: New Evidence for Developed Countries.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 60 (3): 895–928. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12693
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?lang=en&SubSessionId=ca458b88-af39-4929-a213-4719b63c342e&themetreeid=13
https://worker-participation.eu/national-industrial-relations/countries/belgium
https://www.etui.org/covid-social-impact/belgium/industrial-relations-in-belgium-background-summary
Hermans, M. 2022. “Hoe sterk is het sociaal overleg nog?” Samenleving & Politiek 29: 36-41. Available at https://www.sampol.be/2022/01/hoe-sterk-is-het-sociaal-overleg-nog
In the Belgian political landscape, both trade unions and employers’ associations hold significant representation within the decision-making process at the federal and regional echelons. Their ability to negotiate with each other and the government is bolstered by their representation of a substantial and stable proportion of employees and corporations. Their inclusion in a multitude of committees ensures that their viewpoints are effectively articulated to, and taken into account by, the authorities. Furthermore, they have the capacity to forge binding agreements among themselves, thereby exerting considerable influence over the entire economic terrain of Belgium.
Nevertheless, there are instances where these entities engage in negotiations that result in unbalanced agreements, necessitating the Belgian government to intervene and bridge the ensuing financial disparity. Moreover, the occasional failure of trade unions and employers’ associations to reach consensus can impede their capacity to shape public policy effectively. This highlights the complexities inherent in the decision-making process and the challenges faced by these entities in their pursuit of influencing policy.
Despite generally positive indicators and outcomes, there are underlying issues eroding the power of social dialogue and the dynamics of social partners. This is evident in the declining share of produced wealth going to wages, indicating a shift in the balance of power between labor and capital to the detriment of workers and trade unions (Hermans 2022).
Citations:
Pineda-Hernández, K., Rycx, F., and Volral, M. 2022. “How Collective Bargaining Shapes Poverty: New Evidence for Developed Countries.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 60 (3): 895–928. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12693
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?lang=en&SubSessionId=ca458b88-af39-4929-a213-4719b63c342e&themetreeid=13
https://worker-participation.eu/national-industrial-relations/countries/belgium
https://www.etui.org/covid-social-impact/belgium/industrial-relations-in-belgium-background-summary
Hermans, M. 2022. “Hoe sterk is het sociaal overleg nog?” Samenleving & Politiek 29: 36-41. Available at https://www.sampol.be/2022/01/hoe-sterk-is-het-sociaal-overleg-nog
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of leading social welfare CSOs in policymaking?
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9
9
The government is able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is rarely able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
2
1
1
The government is not able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
As referenced under “Effective Civil Society Organizations (social welfare),” various CSOs in Belgium significantly impact policy. Numerous associations, not primarily driven by economic interests, receive government funding and have the ability to suggest and shape policy. The principle of consociationalism ensures that key societal decisions are made efficiently. This is largely due to the dominance of political parties. Associations and groups that are funded often establish or evolve to have favorable political ties with political parties or government officials. This suggests that social groups, associations, and to a certain extent, publicly funded schools, often maintain long-term relationships with a political faction. This creates a strong motivation for noneconomic interest groups to suggest policies and ensure their proposals are well-argued, given the high likelihood of these proposals being discussed in parliament. A downside of this structure is the reliance on public funding, which politicians can use strategically.
This system may limit the ability of organizations that are truly independent of political parties to participate in policymaking. However, these organizations are not idle and employ various methods to influence political decisions, such as active involvement in public works inquiries, parliamentary interventions, legal challenges against government decisions, and organizing presentations and debates.
Lastly, as highlighted by Pineda-Hernández et al. (2022), social partners play a crucial role in unemployment benefit schemes. They are involved through bipartite social dialogue regarding policy designs or reforms and through direct participation in establishing general rules and managing the unemployment benefits system. This is true even for the Ghent system, whereby unions collect and distribute unemployment benefits. Belgium, however, only has a hybrid or “quasi-Ghent” system, whereby the government is the main provider, but unemployed workers can ask to deal with their union instead of the official unemployment office.
Citations:
Pineda-Hernández, K., Rycx, F., and Volral, M. 2022. “How Collective Bargaining Shapes Poverty: New Evidence for Developed Countries.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 60: 895–928. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12693
https://cbcs.be/societe-civile-et-pouvoirs-publics-1313/
https://www.bruzz.be/stedenbouw/werken-vastgoedproject-brouckr-opnieuw-voor-langere-tijd-geblokkeerd-2023-10-10
https://www.bruzz.be/stedenbouw/wegwerparchitectuur-en-afleidingsmanoeuvres-vrees-voor-gentrificatie-noordwijk-niet-weg
https://www.bruzz.be/stedenbouw/protest-tegen-movehub-project-aan-zuidstation-houdt-aan-meer-groen-minder-torens-2023-12
https://www.bruzz.be/mobiliteit/dont-look-down-mini-documentaire-kritisch-over-bouw-metro-3-2022-03-22
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20180715_03615174
This system may limit the ability of organizations that are truly independent of political parties to participate in policymaking. However, these organizations are not idle and employ various methods to influence political decisions, such as active involvement in public works inquiries, parliamentary interventions, legal challenges against government decisions, and organizing presentations and debates.
Lastly, as highlighted by Pineda-Hernández et al. (2022), social partners play a crucial role in unemployment benefit schemes. They are involved through bipartite social dialogue regarding policy designs or reforms and through direct participation in establishing general rules and managing the unemployment benefits system. This is true even for the Ghent system, whereby unions collect and distribute unemployment benefits. Belgium, however, only has a hybrid or “quasi-Ghent” system, whereby the government is the main provider, but unemployed workers can ask to deal with their union instead of the official unemployment office.
Citations:
Pineda-Hernández, K., Rycx, F., and Volral, M. 2022. “How Collective Bargaining Shapes Poverty: New Evidence for Developed Countries.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 60: 895–928. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12693
https://cbcs.be/societe-civile-et-pouvoirs-publics-1313/
https://www.bruzz.be/stedenbouw/werken-vastgoedproject-brouckr-opnieuw-voor-langere-tijd-geblokkeerd-2023-10-10
https://www.bruzz.be/stedenbouw/wegwerparchitectuur-en-afleidingsmanoeuvres-vrees-voor-gentrificatie-noordwijk-niet-weg
https://www.bruzz.be/stedenbouw/protest-tegen-movehub-project-aan-zuidstation-houdt-aan-meer-groen-minder-torens-2023-12
https://www.bruzz.be/mobiliteit/dont-look-down-mini-documentaire-kritisch-over-bouw-metro-3-2022-03-22
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20180715_03615174
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of leading environmental CSOs in policymaking?
10
9
9
The government is able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is rarely able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
2
1
1
The government is not able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
In the context of climate change, dialogue is less institutionalized and hence less effective. As mentioned under “Effective Civil Society Organizations (environment),” the civil society movement addressing climate issues can be broadly categorized into two main groups. The first group, which enjoys support from politicians across the spectrum, is largely consensual. The second group, often disavowed by politicians, is more radical.
Despite the involvement of the more consensual groups, neither group actively participates in the formulation of relevant policies. Their involvement is typically on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis. For instance, the official website (climat.be) still highlights a series of academic seminars organized in 2018. A stakeholder workshop was also arranged prior to COP 28, providing an opportunity for them to express their views and concerns. However, none of these activities are binding for the authorities.
Nevertheless, recent improvements are worth emphasizing. In the summer of 2023, the federal parliament passed a federal law on climate policy governance by a large majority. This law introduced a committee of independent scientific experts with a consultative role, among other things. Moreover, a coalition of civil society and activists lodged a formal complaint for climate inaction. The justices sentenced the governments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55%.
As a result, civil society organizations (CSOs) are advocating for more consultation and for their opinions to be more effectively considered in the upcoming elections..
Citations:
https://www.revuepolitique.be/le-mouvement-climat-doit-assumer-son-aile-radicale/
https://climat.be/politique-climatique/belge/nationale/gouvernance-climatique
https://climat.be/actualites/2023/le-parlement-federal-approuve-la-loi-relative-a-la-gouvernance-de-la-politique-climatique-federale
https://klimaatcoalitie.be/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/20231011-FR-Coalition-Climat-Elections-2024-1.pdf
The website of the Climate Case: https://affaire-climat.be/en
Despite the involvement of the more consensual groups, neither group actively participates in the formulation of relevant policies. Their involvement is typically on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis. For instance, the official website (climat.be) still highlights a series of academic seminars organized in 2018. A stakeholder workshop was also arranged prior to COP 28, providing an opportunity for them to express their views and concerns. However, none of these activities are binding for the authorities.
Nevertheless, recent improvements are worth emphasizing. In the summer of 2023, the federal parliament passed a federal law on climate policy governance by a large majority. This law introduced a committee of independent scientific experts with a consultative role, among other things. Moreover, a coalition of civil society and activists lodged a formal complaint for climate inaction. The justices sentenced the governments to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55%.
As a result, civil society organizations (CSOs) are advocating for more consultation and for their opinions to be more effectively considered in the upcoming elections..
Citations:
https://www.revuepolitique.be/le-mouvement-climat-doit-assumer-son-aile-radicale/
https://climat.be/politique-climatique/belge/nationale/gouvernance-climatique
https://climat.be/actualites/2023/le-parlement-federal-approuve-la-loi-relative-a-la-gouvernance-de-la-politique-climatique-federale
https://klimaatcoalitie.be/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/20231011-FR-Coalition-Climat-Elections-2024-1.pdf
The website of the Climate Case: https://affaire-climat.be/en
Graph View
To what extent does the government publish data and information that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a manner that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable.
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Most of the time, the government publishes data and information in a manner that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable.
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The government rarely publishes data and information in a manner that strengthens citizens to hold the government accountable.
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The government does not publish data and information in a manner that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable.
According to the OECD’s OURdata index, Belgium’s data publication practices are below the OECD average, with data accessibility being a significant issue. This assessment aligns with the experience of academics, who often face difficulties in obtaining access to detailed microdata for Belgium. Data availability is also problematic compared to other countries. Solutions to this lack of availability often come from ad hoc initiatives by academics.
Aggregated data, however, are generally available through platforms like Open Data by Statistics Belgium (Statbel) and the different statistical institutions of the three regions (VSA, IWEPS, and IBSA/BISA). These platforms provide a wealth of information on various topics, making it possible for citizens to access and use government data. There have been efforts to increase the digitalization of public services, which can be tracked by a website launched by the federal government (digitaldashboard.belgium.be). Although helpful, it hardly allows citizens to hold the government accountable.
One challenge is that one can get lost looking for a particular type of data as different structures and websites are involved. For example, health-related data is available from Sciensano, National Accounting-related data from the National Bank of Belgium, and various other data from Statbel. Although a platform was developed to consolidate these data sources (data.gov), it has usability issues and limitations.
Regarding individual accountability, the complexity of the Belgian system and the overlap of responsibilities make it very difficult to map information into a voting decision. For instance, Brussels performs poorly on labor market outcomes, but it is also the region with the highest rate of non-native speakers and the city where workers must master Dutch, French, and English. Other regions can perhaps rightly blame Brussels for its low performance, while Brussels politicians can easily defend that they work hard and effectively at improving the situation.
Citations:
https://www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government/open-government-data.htm
https://data.gov.be/
Open Data | Statbel (fgov.be)
https://ibsa.brussels/
https://www.iweps.be/
https://www.vlaanderen.be/statistiek-vlaanderen
https://digitaldashboard.belgium.be/en
Aggregated data, however, are generally available through platforms like Open Data by Statistics Belgium (Statbel) and the different statistical institutions of the three regions (VSA, IWEPS, and IBSA/BISA). These platforms provide a wealth of information on various topics, making it possible for citizens to access and use government data. There have been efforts to increase the digitalization of public services, which can be tracked by a website launched by the federal government (digitaldashboard.belgium.be). Although helpful, it hardly allows citizens to hold the government accountable.
One challenge is that one can get lost looking for a particular type of data as different structures and websites are involved. For example, health-related data is available from Sciensano, National Accounting-related data from the National Bank of Belgium, and various other data from Statbel. Although a platform was developed to consolidate these data sources (data.gov), it has usability issues and limitations.
Regarding individual accountability, the complexity of the Belgian system and the overlap of responsibilities make it very difficult to map information into a voting decision. For instance, Brussels performs poorly on labor market outcomes, but it is also the region with the highest rate of non-native speakers and the city where workers must master Dutch, French, and English. Other regions can perhaps rightly blame Brussels for its low performance, while Brussels politicians can easily defend that they work hard and effectively at improving the situation.
Citations:
https://www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government/open-government-data.htm
https://data.gov.be/
Open Data | Statbel (fgov.be)
https://ibsa.brussels/
https://www.iweps.be/
https://www.vlaanderen.be/statistiek-vlaanderen
https://digitaldashboard.belgium.be/en