Coordination
#18Key Findings
Belgium falls into the lower-middle ranks internationally (rank 18) in the category of coordination.
All government proposals go through the Prime Minister’s Office, where they are discussed by the prime minister, the proposing minister and coalition party leaders. The PMO also has a policy-evaluation body with advisers specializing in specific fields.
Unofficial coordination takes place through ministerial cabinets, which include experts from at least two parties, as well as through political parties.
Many responsibilities are delegated to regions, provinces and linguistic communities. There is no formal hierarchy between the federal and regional levels. Regions can even block international treaties, as Wallonia did with CETA in 2016. Although there are few formal mechanisms to enforce common standards, EU regulations and regional ties help ensure coordination.
All government proposals go through the Prime Minister’s Office, where they are discussed by the prime minister, the proposing minister and coalition party leaders. The PMO also has a policy-evaluation body with advisers specializing in specific fields.
Unofficial coordination takes place through ministerial cabinets, which include experts from at least two parties, as well as through political parties.
Many responsibilities are delegated to regions, provinces and linguistic communities. There is no formal hierarchy between the federal and regional levels. Regions can even block international treaties, as Wallonia did with CETA in 2016. Although there are few formal mechanisms to enforce common standards, EU regulations and regional ties help ensure coordination.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
8
7
6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
5
4
3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
All government proposals in Belgium go through the Prime Minister’s Office and are discussed in a “kern” (core) meeting with the proposing minister, the prime minister, and the vice-prime ministers (one per party in the coalition). This ensures close coordination, sometimes following heated negotiations. If a proposal cannot be agreed upon, it can be vetoed or delayed in an attempt at logrolling.
The PMO contains a “strategic cell” that helps the prime minister evaluate and steer policy across all levels. Each adviser and expert in the cell specializes in one field, assessing only the most important issues due to the team’s relatively small size. Given that governments are always coalitions (comprising at least four parties), party advisers of the corresponding minister also play a central role in the lawmaking process.
Before implementation, each government project is submitted to the ministers’ council, which meets weekly. The council, composed of a secretariat that scrutinizes each proposal and prepares the agenda, includes 14 line ministers and the prime minister, who debate each proposal. Decisions are made based on political consensus, not a majority vote.
One notable feature of the Belgian system is the coexistence of politically appointed experts who work closely with their minister and professional civil servants who work in the administration. The tenure of politically appointed experts typically matches that of their minister, whereas civil servants can hold their positions for life. Some ministers try to impose a strict chain of command on their ministry, which may occasionally hamper communication across various administrations. However, whenever the government wants to table a proposal to parliament, the coordination process described above must take place.
Either directly or through the council’s secretariat, the prime minister can block or impose the redrafting of any proposal if it does not fit the government agreement or conflicts with a coalition party’s agenda, or for any other reason. All government members must defend accepted projects on a collegial basis.
This requirement has caused conflicts in the current government, which includes left-wing, right-wing, Christian Democrat, and Green parties. For example, in December 2023, the government could not agree on the appointment of a top civil servant, holding all other appointments hostage, which left several positions unfilled. As a result, the governor of the Belgian National Bank could not see his tenure renewed on time, forcing an external committee to reconfirm the governor ad interim at the last moment. Fortunately, such mishaps are rare..
Citations:
http://www.premier.be/fr/conseil-des-ministres
Structuur van de Vlaamse overheid | Vlaanderen.be
https://www.belspo.be/belspo/fedra/prog.asp?l=fr&COD=AM
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19946&langId=en
https://openjournals.ugent.be/rp/article/id/72873/download/pdf/
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/apps/jura/public/art/46n4/dejaegere.pdf
The PMO contains a “strategic cell” that helps the prime minister evaluate and steer policy across all levels. Each adviser and expert in the cell specializes in one field, assessing only the most important issues due to the team’s relatively small size. Given that governments are always coalitions (comprising at least four parties), party advisers of the corresponding minister also play a central role in the lawmaking process.
Before implementation, each government project is submitted to the ministers’ council, which meets weekly. The council, composed of a secretariat that scrutinizes each proposal and prepares the agenda, includes 14 line ministers and the prime minister, who debate each proposal. Decisions are made based on political consensus, not a majority vote.
One notable feature of the Belgian system is the coexistence of politically appointed experts who work closely with their minister and professional civil servants who work in the administration. The tenure of politically appointed experts typically matches that of their minister, whereas civil servants can hold their positions for life. Some ministers try to impose a strict chain of command on their ministry, which may occasionally hamper communication across various administrations. However, whenever the government wants to table a proposal to parliament, the coordination process described above must take place.
Either directly or through the council’s secretariat, the prime minister can block or impose the redrafting of any proposal if it does not fit the government agreement or conflicts with a coalition party’s agenda, or for any other reason. All government members must defend accepted projects on a collegial basis.
This requirement has caused conflicts in the current government, which includes left-wing, right-wing, Christian Democrat, and Green parties. For example, in December 2023, the government could not agree on the appointment of a top civil servant, holding all other appointments hostage, which left several positions unfilled. As a result, the governor of the Belgian National Bank could not see his tenure renewed on time, forcing an external committee to reconfirm the governor ad interim at the last moment. Fortunately, such mishaps are rare..
Citations:
http://www.premier.be/fr/conseil-des-ministres
Structuur van de Vlaamse overheid | Vlaanderen.be
https://www.belspo.be/belspo/fedra/prog.asp?l=fr&COD=AM
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19946&langId=en
https://openjournals.ugent.be/rp/article/id/72873/download/pdf/
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/apps/jura/public/art/46n4/dejaegere.pdf
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
8
7
6
7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
5
4
3
4
3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
2
1
1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
At the federal level, Belgium, like many OECD countries, allows internal mobility for civil servants, including senior levels, but this is neither promoted nor expected (OECD 2023). This can become a problem when ministries lose responsibilities. For instance, when the single market was created, Belgium had an excess supply of customs officers. Instead of reskilling them for other ministries, many remained in their original administration. Furthermore, Belgium has yet to adopt the approach of formulating learning plans for the majority or entirety of its public sector employees (OECD 2023).
As detailed in “Effective Coordination Mechanisms of the GO/PMO,” coordination between ministers is necessary to table a proposal. However, this does not prevent a single minister from using their own administration to develop a proposal unbeknownst to ministers from other parties and revealing it at a later stage. To limit this, experts close to another party are typically embedded in the minister’s team.
Concerning digitalization, the Federal Public Service for Information & Communication Technology (FEDICT) is responsible for defining and implementing an e-governance strategy. However, this agency primarily focuses on government-to-citizen (G2C) and government-to-business (G2B) communication, while government-to-government (G2G) interactions are largely overlooked. Although cooperation and coordination are improving within each government level, the federal structure hinders the sharing of a single IT architecture across government levels. Each level is responsible for its digital infrastructure.
However, Belgium fares comparatively well internationally. The U.N. E-Government Survey 2022 ranked Belgium among the countries with a “very high” e-government development index.
Citations:
OECD. 2023. “Belgium | Country Notes | OECD Government at a Glance.” https://www.oecd.org/publication/government-at-a-glance/2023/country-notes/belgium-054f6923/
http://www.premier.be/fr/conseil-des-ministres
Structuur van de Vlaamse overheid | Vlaanderen.be : https://www.vlaanderen.be/structuur-van-de-vlaamse-overheid#q-06c38c8d-d3ea-4577-ac6f-b52c5672dc25
Opdrachten | FOD Kanselarij van de Eerste Minister (belgium.be): https://www.kanselarij.belgium.be/nl/opdrachten
Arrete Royal du 22/02/2017 arrete royal portant creation du service public federal strategie et appui. 2017. openjustice.be. https://etaamb.openjustice.be/fr/arrete-royal-du-22-fevrier-2017_n2017010836
G-Cloud – Home (belgium.be) : https://www.gcloud.belgium.be/nl/home
https://infocenter.belgium.be/fr/statistiques/spf-technologie-de-l-information-et-de-la-communication
https://d9db56472fd41226d193-1e5e0d4b7948acaf6080b0dce0b35ed5.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/events/forum/2004/panel_handouts/fedict.pdf
https://digitaldashboard.belgium.be/fr
http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/UNPAN97453.pdf
United Nations. 2022. “E-Government Survey 2022: The Future of Digital Government.” https://desapublications.un.org/sites/default/files/publications/2022-09/Web%20version%20E-Government%202022.pdf
As detailed in “Effective Coordination Mechanisms of the GO/PMO,” coordination between ministers is necessary to table a proposal. However, this does not prevent a single minister from using their own administration to develop a proposal unbeknownst to ministers from other parties and revealing it at a later stage. To limit this, experts close to another party are typically embedded in the minister’s team.
Concerning digitalization, the Federal Public Service for Information & Communication Technology (FEDICT) is responsible for defining and implementing an e-governance strategy. However, this agency primarily focuses on government-to-citizen (G2C) and government-to-business (G2B) communication, while government-to-government (G2G) interactions are largely overlooked. Although cooperation and coordination are improving within each government level, the federal structure hinders the sharing of a single IT architecture across government levels. Each level is responsible for its digital infrastructure.
However, Belgium fares comparatively well internationally. The U.N. E-Government Survey 2022 ranked Belgium among the countries with a “very high” e-government development index.
Citations:
OECD. 2023. “Belgium | Country Notes | OECD Government at a Glance.” https://www.oecd.org/publication/government-at-a-glance/2023/country-notes/belgium-054f6923/
http://www.premier.be/fr/conseil-des-ministres
Structuur van de Vlaamse overheid | Vlaanderen.be : https://www.vlaanderen.be/structuur-van-de-vlaamse-overheid#q-06c38c8d-d3ea-4577-ac6f-b52c5672dc25
Opdrachten | FOD Kanselarij van de Eerste Minister (belgium.be): https://www.kanselarij.belgium.be/nl/opdrachten
Arrete Royal du 22/02/2017 arrete royal portant creation du service public federal strategie et appui. 2017. openjustice.be. https://etaamb.openjustice.be/fr/arrete-royal-du-22-fevrier-2017_n2017010836
G-Cloud – Home (belgium.be) : https://www.gcloud.belgium.be/nl/home
https://infocenter.belgium.be/fr/statistiques/spf-technologie-de-l-information-et-de-la-communication
https://d9db56472fd41226d193-1e5e0d4b7948acaf6080b0dce0b35ed5.ssl.cf1.rackcdn.com/events/forum/2004/panel_handouts/fedict.pdf
https://digitaldashboard.belgium.be/fr
http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/UNPAN97453.pdf
United Nations. 2022. “E-Government Survey 2022: The Future of Digital Government.” https://desapublications.un.org/sites/default/files/publications/2022-09/Web%20version%20E-Government%202022.pdf
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Apart from official coordination via the PMO, Belgium has a robust unofficial coordination system through two channels: first, ministers’ teams (“ministerial cabinets”) are composed of experts from at least two parties (though most are close to the minister’s party). Second, political parties are very strong and align the actions of all politicians and their teams within the same party. Between formal and informal arrangements, the PMO enforces additional policy coordination across line ministries through meetings with various ministers’ political advisers. The chief of staff within the prime minister’s political cabinet plays a crucial role in policy coordination.
Citations:
Opdrachten | FOD Kanselarij van de Eerste Minister. https://www.kanselarij.belgium.be/nl/opdrachten
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19946&langId=en
Citations:
Opdrachten | FOD Kanselarij van de Eerste Minister. https://www.kanselarij.belgium.be/nl/opdrachten
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19946&langId=en
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
10
9
9
The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
2
1
1
The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
Belgian federalism is centrifugal, having evolved from a unitary state to multiple entities with autonomous decision-making power (Faniel et al. 2021). Several core responsibilities of the Belgian central government have been delegated to provinces and municipalities and some core responsibilities have been transferred to regional or subregional levels: to the three regions (Flanders, the Brussels region, and Wallonia), and to the linguistic communities (Flemish, French, and German). Some standards are set at the federal level but implemented locally. This works well for older standards like access to free education, but newer standards, particularly on environmental issues, are more challenging to impose and are sometimes resisted by the regions.
The federal government can ensure that subnational self-governments (i.e., provinces and municipalities) meet national standards, but it cannot do so for federate entities (regions and linguistic communities). The Belgian federal model is one of cooperation: the state has no formal authority over regions and communities, as there is no hierarchy between the federal and regional/community levels. This creates complications, such as any single region being able to block an international treaty, as happened with the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in 2016, which was withheld by Wallonia alone. It is also difficult for the federal government to impose budget limits on the regions.
Formally, there is limited capacity to impose common standards. De facto, however, coordination is relatively well enforced due to European regulations and the presence of externalities between the regions. Additionally, the ability to publicly accuse or ridicule each other for incompetence provides leverage. While this creates more scandals than necessary, Belgium continues to function and performs well economically.
Citations:
Faniel, J., Istasse, C., Lefebve, V., and Sägesser, C. 2021. “La Belgique, un État fédéral singulier.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 2500: 7-266. https://doi.org/10.3917/cris.2500.0007
The federal government can ensure that subnational self-governments (i.e., provinces and municipalities) meet national standards, but it cannot do so for federate entities (regions and linguistic communities). The Belgian federal model is one of cooperation: the state has no formal authority over regions and communities, as there is no hierarchy between the federal and regional/community levels. This creates complications, such as any single region being able to block an international treaty, as happened with the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) in 2016, which was withheld by Wallonia alone. It is also difficult for the federal government to impose budget limits on the regions.
Formally, there is limited capacity to impose common standards. De facto, however, coordination is relatively well enforced due to European regulations and the presence of externalities between the regions. Additionally, the ability to publicly accuse or ridicule each other for incompetence provides leverage. While this creates more scandals than necessary, Belgium continues to function and performs well economically.
Citations:
Faniel, J., Istasse, C., Lefebve, V., and Sägesser, C. 2021. “La Belgique, un État fédéral singulier.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 2500: 7-266. https://doi.org/10.3917/cris.2500.0007
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
10
9
9
National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
2
1
1
There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Belgium has a federal structure with little hierarchy, known as cooperative federalism. Each level controls its areas of responsibility and cannot be dictated a different behavior by another level (except courts). In this flat structure, various government levels must negotiate any form of cooperation. This proved necessary during the COVID-19 crisis, where cooperation was effective but tedious and open to logrolling. The crisis brought renewed awareness of the need for enhanced cooperation, which has improved somewhat compared to a decade ago, though it depends heavily on the ministers’ personal willingness to exchange and cooperate.
The federate entities (regions) have better capacity to induce cooperation among cities and smaller municipalities. Small municipalities were merged in the late 1970s to save on fixed costs. Today, the regions provide technical expertise and high-powered financial incentives to their cities, enforcing de facto cooperation more smoothly than between the regions and the federal government. Mayors benefit from high levels of autonomy in their choice of Instruments (Ladner et al. 2021).
For example, municipalities have joined forces to establish intermunicipal waste agencies, improving waste management practices and saving costs. The Brussels-Capital Region works closely with its municipalities to improve public transport, leading to better connectivity and accessibility. The Walloon Region promotes cooperation among its cities through cultural events, attracting tourists and fostering community. Many Belgian municipalities have committed to the Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, pledging to reduce CO2 emissions by at least 40% by 2030 and to adopt an integrated approach to tackling climate change.
Citations:
Ladner, Andreas, Nicolas Keuffer, and Alexander Bastianen. 2021. “Self-rule index for local authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries, 1990-2020.” http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%
20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
National and regional governments often rely and collaborate with local governments to improve public service delivery:
Vlaanderen is Sterke Steden – het Vlaamse stedenbeleid | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/vlaanderen-is-sterke-steden-het-vlaamse-stedenbeleid
https://www.uvcw.be/missions/defense
https://crac.wallonie.be/le-centre/missions
Tutelle – Fonctionnement général des communes | Rise 360 (articulate.com) : https://rise.articulate.com/share/cYfpyPd-fbrjaCxxjUOMuo_0RfE2hl0v#/lessons/zE7rm9Y8mGpuRkG79SWtIHpV5SHOBasj
Examples:
Waterafvoer en riolering | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/waterafvoer-en-riolering
Lokale besturen en publieke laadinfrastructuur | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/lokale-besturen-en-publieke-laadinfrastructuur
The federal government cooperates on a regular basis with regional/community entities:
Samenwerking met federale en regionale overheden | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/intern/beleid-en-regelgeving/regelgeving-en-besluitvorming/werking-en-besluitvorming-vlaamse-regering/samenwerking/samenwerking-met-federale-en-regionale-overheden
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19946&langId=en
https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlegcomit%C3%A9
https://cidh.be/nl/activiteiten-van-de-ichr
https://www.sdgs.be/nl/news/interministeriele-conferentie-duurzame-ontwikkeling-imcdo-organiseert-informatieve-dag-over-0
https://overlegorganen.gezondheid.belgie.be/nl/advies-en-overlegorgaan/interministeriele-conferentie/interministeriele-conferentie-volksgezondheid
https://www.vlaanderen.be/intern/beleid-en-regelgeving/regelgeving-en-besluitvorming/werking-en-besluitvorming-vlaamse-regering/samenwerking/samenwerking-met-federale-en-regionale-overheden
Organes et processus de décision (climat.be)
But:
https://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/interministeriele-conferentie-migratie-ligt-al-meer-dan-jaar-stil/
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220920_93596677
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230825_95121625
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230302_98058535
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220831_91297366
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20231023_96850704
Ideas for improvement:
https://m.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20160522_02301085
The federate entities (regions) have better capacity to induce cooperation among cities and smaller municipalities. Small municipalities were merged in the late 1970s to save on fixed costs. Today, the regions provide technical expertise and high-powered financial incentives to their cities, enforcing de facto cooperation more smoothly than between the regions and the federal government. Mayors benefit from high levels of autonomy in their choice of Instruments (Ladner et al. 2021).
For example, municipalities have joined forces to establish intermunicipal waste agencies, improving waste management practices and saving costs. The Brussels-Capital Region works closely with its municipalities to improve public transport, leading to better connectivity and accessibility. The Walloon Region promotes cooperation among its cities through cultural events, attracting tourists and fostering community. Many Belgian municipalities have committed to the Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy, pledging to reduce CO2 emissions by at least 40% by 2030 and to adopt an integrated approach to tackling climate change.
Citations:
Ladner, Andreas, Nicolas Keuffer, and Alexander Bastianen. 2021. “Self-rule index for local authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries, 1990-2020.” http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%
20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
National and regional governments often rely and collaborate with local governments to improve public service delivery:
Vlaanderen is Sterke Steden – het Vlaamse stedenbeleid | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/vlaanderen-is-sterke-steden-het-vlaamse-stedenbeleid
https://www.uvcw.be/missions/defense
https://crac.wallonie.be/le-centre/missions
Tutelle – Fonctionnement général des communes | Rise 360 (articulate.com) : https://rise.articulate.com/share/cYfpyPd-fbrjaCxxjUOMuo_0RfE2hl0v#/lessons/zE7rm9Y8mGpuRkG79SWtIHpV5SHOBasj
Examples:
Waterafvoer en riolering | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/waterafvoer-en-riolering
Lokale besturen en publieke laadinfrastructuur | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/lokale-besturen-en-publieke-laadinfrastructuur
The federal government cooperates on a regular basis with regional/community entities:
Samenwerking met federale en regionale overheden | Vlaanderen.be: https://www.vlaanderen.be/intern/beleid-en-regelgeving/regelgeving-en-besluitvorming/werking-en-besluitvorming-vlaamse-regering/samenwerking/samenwerking-met-federale-en-regionale-overheden
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=19946&langId=en
https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overlegcomit%C3%A9
https://cidh.be/nl/activiteiten-van-de-ichr
https://www.sdgs.be/nl/news/interministeriele-conferentie-duurzame-ontwikkeling-imcdo-organiseert-informatieve-dag-over-0
https://overlegorganen.gezondheid.belgie.be/nl/advies-en-overlegorgaan/interministeriele-conferentie/interministeriele-conferentie-volksgezondheid
https://www.vlaanderen.be/intern/beleid-en-regelgeving/regelgeving-en-besluitvorming/werking-en-besluitvorming-vlaamse-regering/samenwerking/samenwerking-met-federale-en-regionale-overheden
Organes et processus de décision (climat.be)
But:
https://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/interministeriele-conferentie-migratie-ligt-al-meer-dan-jaar-stil/
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220920_93596677
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230825_95121625
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230302_98058535
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220831_91297366
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20231023_96850704
Ideas for improvement:
https://m.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20160522_02301085