Horizontal Accountability
#13Key Findings
In the category of horizonal accountability, Belgium falls into the middle ranks internationally (rank 13).
The Court of Audit is independent and autonomous, but its recommendations are rarely followed by political action. The Data Protection Authority has faced governance issues, with efforts to reform the body having stalled. The judiciary operates without interference, but is underfunded.
Political and civil liberties are broadly respected. Immigration policies have become stricter, eroding the rights of refugees, while prison overcrowding has drawn criticism from Amnesty International.
Financial disclosure regulations for politicians are extensive, but oversight is weak. Corruption risks are rising, driven especially by the presence of organized crime. Parliament has sufficient resources and powers to monitor the executive, but legislative proposals tend to be offered by the government rather than by lawmakers.
The Court of Audit is independent and autonomous, but its recommendations are rarely followed by political action. The Data Protection Authority has faced governance issues, with efforts to reform the body having stalled. The judiciary operates without interference, but is underfunded.
Political and civil liberties are broadly respected. Immigration policies have become stricter, eroding the rights of refugees, while prison overcrowding has drawn criticism from Amnesty International.
Financial disclosure regulations for politicians are extensive, but oversight is weak. Corruption risks are rising, driven especially by the presence of organized crime. Parliament has sufficient resources and powers to monitor the executive, but legislative proposals tend to be offered by the government rather than by lawmakers.
Graph View
Graph View
Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no independent and effective audit office.
Established by the constitution (Article 180), the Court of Audit (Cour des Comptes/Rekenhof) is a collateral body of parliament. It exerts external control over the budgetary, accounting, and financial operations of the federal state, the communities, the regions, public-service institutions that depend on them, and the provinces. Some public firms and nonprofit organizations are also subject to review, such as the Flemish public-transportation firm De Lijn, which was audited in 2013.
The Court of Audit’s legal powers grant it considerable independence and broad autonomy to fulfill its mandate. Members of the Court of Audit are elected by parliament. The court’s reports are public and presented to parliament along with the state accounts. The body regularly attracts media attention for its critical remarks regarding the management of public entities or services, such as roads in Wallonia or so-called Economic Activity Zones. However, its recommendations and criticisms are seldom followed up with concrete political actions.
Citations:
https://www.rtbf.be/article/la-cour-des-comptes-dezingue-la-gestion-des-parcs-d-activites-economiques-en-wallonie-11171356
https://www.ccrek.be/EN/Presentation/Presentation.html
https://www.courdescomptes.be/EN/
The Court of Audit’s legal powers grant it considerable independence and broad autonomy to fulfill its mandate. Members of the Court of Audit are elected by parliament. The court’s reports are public and presented to parliament along with the state accounts. The body regularly attracts media attention for its critical remarks regarding the management of public entities or services, such as roads in Wallonia or so-called Economic Activity Zones. However, its recommendations and criticisms are seldom followed up with concrete political actions.
Citations:
https://www.rtbf.be/article/la-cour-des-comptes-dezingue-la-gestion-des-parcs-d-activites-economiques-en-wallonie-11171356
https://www.ccrek.be/EN/Presentation/Presentation.html
https://www.courdescomptes.be/EN/
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
10
9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
8
7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
In May 2018, the Belgian federal government established the Data Protection Authority (DPA – Autorité de protection des données/ Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit). The DPA’s mission is to protect individual privacy during personal data processing. To enhance efficiency, several pre-existing authorities and services were consolidated under the DPA. The restructured authority, accountable to the House of Representatives, appoints its board of directors politically for six-year terms. Belgium was also one of the first countries to create the function of Secretary of State for Privacy in 2015 (De Busser 2021).
However, the DPA has faced issues related to transparency, conflicts of interest, and governance errors. Notably, the European Commission initiated a serious infringement procedure against Belgium due to DPA member Frank Robben’s dual role as the head of a public body handling social security and health-related data. The complaint was withdrawn following Robben’s resignation from the DPA in early 2022.
Robben’s resignation did not resolve the DPA’s issues. In 2020, two whistleblowers alerted parliament about conflicts of interest and governance errors within the DPA, particularly concerning member David Stevens. Parliament eventually dismissed Stevens and one of the whistleblowers. Since then, the secretary of state for data protection has attempted to reform the body, but without success to date.
Citations:
https://www.dataprotectionauthority.be/
https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/belgique/federal/demission-de-l-adp-frank-robben-n-est-que-le-sommet-de-l-iceberg/10365250.html
https://www.lesoir.be/492667/article/2023-02-02/critique-torpille-sabote-le-projet-de-loi-apd-de-mathieu-michel-va-une-nouvelle
https://www.lesoir.be/438557/article/2022-04-27/lapd-est-inoperante-un-et-demi-dalertes-de-ses-deux-codirectrices
De Busser, E. 2021. “Data Protection Around the World: Belgium.” Data Protection Around the World: Privacy Laws in Action 7-21.
However, the DPA has faced issues related to transparency, conflicts of interest, and governance errors. Notably, the European Commission initiated a serious infringement procedure against Belgium due to DPA member Frank Robben’s dual role as the head of a public body handling social security and health-related data. The complaint was withdrawn following Robben’s resignation from the DPA in early 2022.
Robben’s resignation did not resolve the DPA’s issues. In 2020, two whistleblowers alerted parliament about conflicts of interest and governance errors within the DPA, particularly concerning member David Stevens. Parliament eventually dismissed Stevens and one of the whistleblowers. Since then, the secretary of state for data protection has attempted to reform the body, but without success to date.
Citations:
https://www.dataprotectionauthority.be/
https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/belgique/federal/demission-de-l-adp-frank-robben-n-est-que-le-sommet-de-l-iceberg/10365250.html
https://www.lesoir.be/492667/article/2023-02-02/critique-torpille-sabote-le-projet-de-loi-apd-de-mathieu-michel-va-une-nouvelle
https://www.lesoir.be/438557/article/2022-04-27/lapd-est-inoperante-un-et-demi-dalertes-de-ses-deux-codirectrices
De Busser, E. 2021. “Data Protection Around the World: Belgium.” Data Protection Around the World: Privacy Laws in Action 7-21.
Graph View
To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
10
9
9
The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
2
1
1
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
In Belgium, the independence of the judiciary is central to the constitution and the rule of law. The Belgian constitution includes provisions (Art. 159 and 160) for the judicial oversight of unilateral administrative measures. The Conseil d’État (Council of State) is responsible for judicial review, and the Cour de Cassation is the Supreme Court of the Belgian judicial system, hearing appeals in the last resort against judgments and other decisions of lower courts.
While the courts generally operate unhindered, ensuring the capacity to challenge government action, two adverse developments must be noted. One is the chronic underfunding of the judiciary, which limits its capacity for investigation. The second was temporary: during the COVID-19 crisis, the government had to take rapid actions and declared a state of emergency, imposing restrictions on fundamental liberties such as meeting in public or private spaces and operating businesses. During this period, the courts often sided with the government out of urgency, but some officials complained that their independence was under threat. This tension evaporated after the emergency period, and independence was restored. The only serious constraint to effective oversight remains the chronic underfunding of the justice system.
Citations:
Renders, David, Luca Ceci, and Sarah Koval. 2021. “Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review in Belgium.” In Judicial Review of Administration in Europe, eds. David Renders, Luca Ceci, and Sarah Koval. Oxford: Oxford Academic. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867609.003.0004.
http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/?lang=fr&page=news&newsitem=640
http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/?page=news&lang=fr&newsitem=651
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=4slQ6QSmlBEDzFEovLCuW9oVixnwFxc9x
L1Osr7QWIfxei5srTR0exdYA3bKT8diQ0ZNoXOVMczrMWXwhteibbSfJvG%2f0KhroTNHkqwvs%2bp7
sQrVWzfSfh6Pv%2fX5E2xM
https://www.liguedh.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Urgence-sanitaire-et-restrictions-des-libertespubliques_
Chronique_LDH_191.pdf
https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/belgique/federal/que-vont-changer-ces-pouvoirsspeciaux/
10214652
https://www.lecho.be/entreprises/horeca/un-conseil-d-etat-fort-avec-l-horeca-faible-avec-legouvernement/
10272082.html
While the courts generally operate unhindered, ensuring the capacity to challenge government action, two adverse developments must be noted. One is the chronic underfunding of the judiciary, which limits its capacity for investigation. The second was temporary: during the COVID-19 crisis, the government had to take rapid actions and declared a state of emergency, imposing restrictions on fundamental liberties such as meeting in public or private spaces and operating businesses. During this period, the courts often sided with the government out of urgency, but some officials complained that their independence was under threat. This tension evaporated after the emergency period, and independence was restored. The only serious constraint to effective oversight remains the chronic underfunding of the justice system.
Citations:
Renders, David, Luca Ceci, and Sarah Koval. 2021. “Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review in Belgium.” In Judicial Review of Administration in Europe, eds. David Renders, Luca Ceci, and Sarah Koval. Oxford: Oxford Academic. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198867609.003.0004.
http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/?lang=fr&page=news&newsitem=640
http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/?page=news&lang=fr&newsitem=651
http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=4slQ6QSmlBEDzFEovLCuW9oVixnwFxc9x
L1Osr7QWIfxei5srTR0exdYA3bKT8diQ0ZNoXOVMczrMWXwhteibbSfJvG%2f0KhroTNHkqwvs%2bp7
sQrVWzfSfh6Pv%2fX5E2xM
https://www.liguedh.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Urgence-sanitaire-et-restrictions-des-libertespubliques_
Chronique_LDH_191.pdf
https://www.lecho.be/economie-politique/belgique/federal/que-vont-changer-ces-pouvoirsspeciaux/
10214652
https://www.lecho.be/entreprises/horeca/un-conseil-d-etat-fort-avec-l-horeca-faible-avec-legouvernement/
10272082.html
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
10
9
9
There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
8
7
6
7
6
There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
5
4
3
4
3
There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
2
1
1
There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
Political and civil liberties are extensive in Belgium. Even during the coronavirus crisis, political liberties remained intact. However, civil liberties came under pressure during the crisis, with restrictions on the right to assemble and demonstrate. High tension within police forces resulted in occasional violence, both from and against the police. While these were not part of a deliberate policy to restrict civil liberties, they contributed to a progressive erosion of norms.
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the liberties and rights of EU citizens have been fully restored or even improved. For instance, new rape laws enshrining the principle of consent entered into force in Belgium (Amnesty International 2023). However, following the immigration waves of 2015 and 2022, the government has hardened its stance on immigrants and political refugees, leading to an erosion of their rights. Amnesty International also highlights the inhumane treatment of prison inmates due to overcrowding in dilapidated prisons (2023, 92).
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2023: The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2023/en
Rule of Law Index (World Justice Project): https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/factors/2022/Belgium/
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the liberties and rights of EU citizens have been fully restored or even improved. For instance, new rape laws enshrining the principle of consent entered into force in Belgium (Amnesty International 2023). However, following the immigration waves of 2015 and 2022, the government has hardened its stance on immigrants and political refugees, leading to an erosion of their rights. Amnesty International also highlights the inhumane treatment of prison inmates due to overcrowding in dilapidated prisons (2023, 92).
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2023: The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2023/en
Rule of Law Index (World Justice Project): https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/factors/2022/Belgium/
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Belgium has extensive financial disclosure legislation to prevent officials from entering situations of conflict of interest. However, these regulations have limited effectiveness due to a lack of control, fines, and transparency in reporting.
In 2013, the OECD published a report on bribery, expressing disappointment at Belgium’s lack of priority in combating bribery. The report highlighted the lack of resources for investigations, prosecutions, and sentencing. The EuroPAM database reveals that the situation remains largely unchanged. In practice, this translates into repeated situations that do not qualify as explicit corruption but are morally unacceptable to the public. A recurrent issue is the creation of semi-public entities run by political appointees who get involved in payment or procurement situations that test the limits of the law. While legal provisions to reinforce transparency and prevention remain lacking, public scandals and proactive actions by the judiciary are progressively addressing these issues. Recently, the risk of outright corruption has increased due to the global expansion of criminal organizations and shifts in political balances, such as Middle Eastern countries seeking political support in European parliaments. Belgium is particularly exposed to these risks. The Port of Antwerp is one entry point exploited by drug traffickers, and the presence of international institutions in Brussels makes it tempting to lobby politicians. The absence of a well-funded anti-corruption agency in Belgium reinforces these risks.
Citations:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_d%27affaires_politico-financi%C3%A8res_belges
https://www.lesoir.be/537086/article/2023-09-14/qatargate-les-suspects-devant-la-chambre-des-mises-en-accusation-ce-mardi
https://www.lesoir.be/art/d-20230119-407MPX
https://www.lesoir.be/art/d-20230213-40TMU1
https://www.lecho.be/opinions/canal-nord-sud/chronique-canal-nord-sud-le-retour-des-affaires-et-des-raccourcis/10434606.html
https://www.lesoir.be/354149/article/2021-02-09/scandale-en-flandre-rutten-vld-justifie-loctroi-de-50000-euros-la-societe-dune
Europese anticorruptiewaakhond geeft België minder dan 2 op 10 | De Standaard : https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220124_98043706
Onderbemand en geen leiding: strijd tegen corruptie is zwalpende scheepstanker | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190514_04400141
Regering voert strijd op tegen corruptie bij politie en cipiers | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220807_97544880
In 2013, the OECD published a report on bribery, expressing disappointment at Belgium’s lack of priority in combating bribery. The report highlighted the lack of resources for investigations, prosecutions, and sentencing. The EuroPAM database reveals that the situation remains largely unchanged. In practice, this translates into repeated situations that do not qualify as explicit corruption but are morally unacceptable to the public. A recurrent issue is the creation of semi-public entities run by political appointees who get involved in payment or procurement situations that test the limits of the law. While legal provisions to reinforce transparency and prevention remain lacking, public scandals and proactive actions by the judiciary are progressively addressing these issues. Recently, the risk of outright corruption has increased due to the global expansion of criminal organizations and shifts in political balances, such as Middle Eastern countries seeking political support in European parliaments. Belgium is particularly exposed to these risks. The Port of Antwerp is one entry point exploited by drug traffickers, and the presence of international institutions in Brussels makes it tempting to lobby politicians. The absence of a well-funded anti-corruption agency in Belgium reinforces these risks.
Citations:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_d%27affaires_politico-financi%C3%A8res_belges
https://www.lesoir.be/537086/article/2023-09-14/qatargate-les-suspects-devant-la-chambre-des-mises-en-accusation-ce-mardi
https://www.lesoir.be/art/d-20230119-407MPX
https://www.lesoir.be/art/d-20230213-40TMU1
https://www.lecho.be/opinions/canal-nord-sud/chronique-canal-nord-sud-le-retour-des-affaires-et-des-raccourcis/10434606.html
https://www.lesoir.be/354149/article/2021-02-09/scandale-en-flandre-rutten-vld-justifie-loctroi-de-50000-euros-la-societe-dune
Europese anticorruptiewaakhond geeft België minder dan 2 op 10 | De Standaard : https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220124_98043706
Onderbemand en geen leiding: strijd tegen corruptie is zwalpende scheepstanker | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190514_04400141
Regering voert strijd op tegen corruptie bij politie en cipiers | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220807_97544880
Graph View
Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
10
9
9
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
8
7
6
7
6
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
5
4
3
4
3
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
2
1
1
The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Belgium is a parliamentary democracy where the government relies on the support of parliament to function. De jure, the legislature has full authority to monitor and constrain government actions. It can summon ministers and experts, and propose legislation without needing government approval. Parliament frequently establishes special committees or investigative commissions (commissions d’enquête) for in-depth investigations. Since the government is often a coalition of parties holding a parliamentary majority, members of parliament typically play predictable roles: coalition members defend the government’s actions, while opposition members criticize nearly every action. This dynamic is not unique to Belgium and is a common feature of parliamentary democracies (Sieberer 2020; Bäck et al. 2022).
Recurring tensions within coalition parties have facilitated the work of the opposition, enhancing parliament’s capacity to monitor government actions. Not all coalition partners are always willing to defend the actions of a single minister. While Belgium is generally considered an average-to-good performer in legislative oversight (Bäck et al. 2022, Fig. 5), recent performance has been above this long-term average.
Members of parliament are sometimes criticized for having excessive budgets and personnel, with several MPs using their resources to support their parties. MPs are also expected to transfer some of their wages to their party.
Citations:
Bäck, H., Müller, W. C., Angelova, M., and Strobl, D. 2022. “Ministerial Autonomy, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reform Output in Parliamentary Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 55 (2): 254-286. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211024312
Sieberer, U. 2020. “Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies: A Comparative Analysis.” In _The Impact of Legislatures_, eds. Olivier Rozenberg and Shane Martin, 141-169. Abington: Routledge.
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190307_04238571
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190704_04494384
Recurring tensions within coalition parties have facilitated the work of the opposition, enhancing parliament’s capacity to monitor government actions. Not all coalition partners are always willing to defend the actions of a single minister. While Belgium is generally considered an average-to-good performer in legislative oversight (Bäck et al. 2022, Fig. 5), recent performance has been above this long-term average.
Members of parliament are sometimes criticized for having excessive budgets and personnel, with several MPs using their resources to support their parties. MPs are also expected to transfer some of their wages to their party.
Citations:
Bäck, H., Müller, W. C., Angelova, M., and Strobl, D. 2022. “Ministerial Autonomy, Parliamentary Scrutiny and Government Reform Output in Parliamentary Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 55 (2): 254-286. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211024312
Sieberer, U. 2020. “Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies: A Comparative Analysis.” In _The Impact of Legislatures_, eds. Olivier Rozenberg and Shane Martin, 141-169. Abington: Routledge.
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190307_04238571
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190704_04494384
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
Parliament currently runs 11 permanent commissions, 14 ad hoc commissions, and 1 inquiry commission. Defense, justice, and interior commissions are chaired by opposition members, while other commissions, such as budget and external relations, are chaired by members of the government coalition but co-chaired by opposition members. They can summon ministers, documents, and experts at will. Chiru and De Winter (2023) show that portfolios are more often attributed to the opposition when the ideological gap between government and opposition widens, showing parliament’s de facto oversight capacity.
One concrete case that has bogged the government over the course of the legislature is Belgium’s energy policy. In line with the EU’s climate transition strategy, Belgium is actively moving toward electrification and efforts to phase out fossil-based energy. At the same time, it is shutting down its nuclear power plants, insufficiently investing in other dispatchable energies, and has witnessed delays in the expansion of its green but non-dispatchable energy sources (namely solar and wind). This portends a significant energy deficit in the years ahead. Initially, the energy minister dismissed concerns about phasing out nuclear power and relying on imports. Another party in the coalition was from the start strongly opposed to the phasing out of nuclear energy. Opposition parties also constantly challenged the minister in parliament, but this was more a matter of form than of content and she proved able to sidestep the more “painful” questions on this issue. However, the invasion of Ukraine showed that Belgium could not rely on imports, intensifying questioning and challenges that eventually forced the government to redirect its strategy toward investing in nuclear power and accelerating investment in renewable power production.
Citations:
Chiru, M., and De Winter, L. 2023. “The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium.” Government and Opposition 58 (1): 129-144. doi:10.1017/gov.2021.27
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/comm/LstCom.cfm
Er dreigt betonrot in het huis van de democratie: ‘Het Vlaams Parlement wordt meer en meer een praatbarak’ | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230319_97203506
One concrete case that has bogged the government over the course of the legislature is Belgium’s energy policy. In line with the EU’s climate transition strategy, Belgium is actively moving toward electrification and efforts to phase out fossil-based energy. At the same time, it is shutting down its nuclear power plants, insufficiently investing in other dispatchable energies, and has witnessed delays in the expansion of its green but non-dispatchable energy sources (namely solar and wind). This portends a significant energy deficit in the years ahead. Initially, the energy minister dismissed concerns about phasing out nuclear power and relying on imports. Another party in the coalition was from the start strongly opposed to the phasing out of nuclear energy. Opposition parties also constantly challenged the minister in parliament, but this was more a matter of form than of content and she proved able to sidestep the more “painful” questions on this issue. However, the invasion of Ukraine showed that Belgium could not rely on imports, intensifying questioning and challenges that eventually forced the government to redirect its strategy toward investing in nuclear power and accelerating investment in renewable power production.
Citations:
Chiru, M., and De Winter, L. 2023. “The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium.” Government and Opposition 58 (1): 129-144. doi:10.1017/gov.2021.27
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/comm/LstCom.cfm
Er dreigt betonrot in het huis van de democratie: ‘Het Vlaams Parlement wordt meer en meer een praatbarak’ | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230319_97203506
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
Except during the COVID-19 crisis, when emergency measures tested constitutional rights, the government cannot overstep its constitutional powers without being challenged and corrected by the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat), federate entities, or opposition members in parliament. The Council of State investigates all such requests with complete independence from the government coalition. However, mistakes or unlawful behavior do not necessarily lead to the fall of the government or the responsible minister.
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
10
9
9
The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
2
1
1
The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
The number of parliamentary committees in the Chamber of Deputies slightly exceeds the number of ministries. There are 11 permanent committees addressing key policy areas aligned with ministerial portfolios, while 14 special committees focus on specific topics or cross-cutting issues. Committees can effectively monitor ministries, but this monitoring can be underwhelming, as demonstrated by the nuclear safety and electricity supply case. It ultimately took Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the imminent risk of power cuts to prompt effective government action.
While these committees can effectively monitor government actions ex post or amend government law projects, they are less effective at guiding policy ex ante. That role has been taken over by ministers’ cabinets of experts, with almost all legislative proposals being tabled by the government rather than parliament.
Citations:
List and functioning of commissions:
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/comm/LstCom.cfm
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/fiche/fr_12_02.pdf
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220611_94598864
Er dreigt betonrot in het huis van de democratie: ‘Het Vlaams Parlement wordt meer en meer een praatbarak’ | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230319_97203506
While these committees can effectively monitor government actions ex post or amend government law projects, they are less effective at guiding policy ex ante. That role has been taken over by ministers’ cabinets of experts, with almost all legislative proposals being tabled by the government rather than parliament.
Citations:
List and functioning of commissions:
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/comm/LstCom.cfm
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/pri/fiche/fr_12_02.pdf
https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20220611_94598864
Er dreigt betonrot in het huis van de democratie: ‘Het Vlaams Parlement wordt meer en meer een praatbarak’ | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230319_97203506