Vertical Accountability
#14Key Findings
Belgium falls into the middle ranks (rank 14) in the category of vertical accountability.
The country has a proportional representation system with two main linguistic groups, Flemish- and French-speaking. Voting is compulsory for citizens aged 18 and above, but abstention is not punished. Electoral lists have strong gender balance constraints.
The consociational political system typically involves a grand coalition and mutual veto rights. No party has held a majority since World War I, and the country’s political landscape is highly fragmented. Polarization and personalization have made coalition governance more difficult.
Decentralization has given considerable power to the regions, which represent different linguistic communities. A constitutional provision grants access to government documents, but the Freedom of Information law applies only to administrative functions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches.
The country has a proportional representation system with two main linguistic groups, Flemish- and French-speaking. Voting is compulsory for citizens aged 18 and above, but abstention is not punished. Electoral lists have strong gender balance constraints.
The consociational political system typically involves a grand coalition and mutual veto rights. No party has held a majority since World War I, and the country’s political landscape is highly fragmented. Polarization and personalization have made coalition governance more difficult.
Decentralization has given considerable power to the regions, which represent different linguistic communities. A constitutional provision grants access to government documents, but the Freedom of Information law applies only to administrative functions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches.
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To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
Belgium is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional representation system and two linguistic groups, Flemish and French-speaking. There are currently 11 parties sitting in the lower chamber of parliament (Pilet 2021), along with two independent MPs. This is testimony to Belgium’s fair and accessible electoral system, despite a 5% electoral threshold since early 2000 (Reuchamps et al. 2014).
Legal restrictions, such as requiring a certain number of signatures before an individual may run, are fair and are effective in controlling the number of candidates running for election. The same holds for parties, which can be relatively easily registered, possibly in a single district (or electoral “arrondissement”). In practice, of course, such restrictions may represent a higher de facto hurdle for smaller or local parties or candidates. Like in any country, established parties developed enhanced knowledge of registration procedures and of the law’s subtleties.
Given mandatory voting, established parties typically slate candidates with diverse backgrounds (e.g., regarding age and cultural origins). Additionally, there are strong and effective constraints on gender balance in electoral lists which increased the proportion of women MPs which reached 42.7% at the 2019s election (Talukder, 2023). While these rules are abided by the parties, there remains overall a higher proportion of male candidates at the top of party lists, implying a higher chance of being elected and the way candidates are selected is not that clear (see Vandeleeene and Van Haute 2021).
Citations:
https://elections.fgov.be/toutes-les-faq
Delwit, P., and De Waele, J. M., eds. 2021. Les partis politiques en Belgique. Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles.
Reuchamps, M., Onclin, F., Caluwaerts, D., and Baudewyns, P. 2014. “Raising the Threshold, Fighting Fragmentation? Mechanical and Psychological Effects of the Legal Electoral Threshold in Belgium.” West European Politics 37 (5): 1087-1107.
Talukder, D. 2023. “Challenging Assumptions: Investigating Measurement Sensitivity in Substantive Representation and Its Effects on Policy Satisfaction.” European Journal of Politics and Gender 6 (3): 414-432.
Pilet, J. B. 2021. “Hard Times for Governing Parties: The 2019 Federal Elections in Belgium.” West European Politics 44 (2): 439-449.
Vandeleene, A., and Van Haute, E. 2021. “A Comparative Analysis of Selection Criteria of Candidates in Belgium.” Frontiers in Political Science 3: 777747.
Legal restrictions, such as requiring a certain number of signatures before an individual may run, are fair and are effective in controlling the number of candidates running for election. The same holds for parties, which can be relatively easily registered, possibly in a single district (or electoral “arrondissement”). In practice, of course, such restrictions may represent a higher de facto hurdle for smaller or local parties or candidates. Like in any country, established parties developed enhanced knowledge of registration procedures and of the law’s subtleties.
Given mandatory voting, established parties typically slate candidates with diverse backgrounds (e.g., regarding age and cultural origins). Additionally, there are strong and effective constraints on gender balance in electoral lists which increased the proportion of women MPs which reached 42.7% at the 2019s election (Talukder, 2023). While these rules are abided by the parties, there remains overall a higher proportion of male candidates at the top of party lists, implying a higher chance of being elected and the way candidates are selected is not that clear (see Vandeleeene and Van Haute 2021).
Citations:
https://elections.fgov.be/toutes-les-faq
Delwit, P., and De Waele, J. M., eds. 2021. Les partis politiques en Belgique. Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles.
Reuchamps, M., Onclin, F., Caluwaerts, D., and Baudewyns, P. 2014. “Raising the Threshold, Fighting Fragmentation? Mechanical and Psychological Effects of the Legal Electoral Threshold in Belgium.” West European Politics 37 (5): 1087-1107.
Talukder, D. 2023. “Challenging Assumptions: Investigating Measurement Sensitivity in Substantive Representation and Its Effects on Policy Satisfaction.” European Journal of Politics and Gender 6 (3): 414-432.
Pilet, J. B. 2021. “Hard Times for Governing Parties: The 2019 Federal Elections in Belgium.” West European Politics 44 (2): 439-449.
Vandeleene, A., and Van Haute, E. 2021. “A Comparative Analysis of Selection Criteria of Candidates in Belgium.” Frontiers in Political Science 3: 777747.
To what extent can all citizens, both in legal terms (de jure) and in practice (de facto), exercise their right to vote?
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There are no significant barriers, by law or in practice, that hinder citizens or specific groups in society from exercising their right to vote.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles that substantially hinder voting.
Voting is compulsory for all Belgians aged 18 and above in all first-order elections (EU, federal, and regional levels). At the local level, voting is mandatory in Wallonia and Brussels, and for the first time in 2024, voting will not be mandatory at the local elections in Flanders. Citizens are automatically registered as voters and receive an official invitation to vote by mail. For the European Elections of 2024, a reform introduced voting rights for citizens aged 16 and 17, with automatic registration, though voting is not compulsory for this age group (elections.fgov.be). Since 2004, non-Belgian citizens with their main residence in Belgium for more than five years can also register to vote in municipal elections. Citizens from other EU countries can register to elect their Belgian European representatives if they decide not to vote in the EU election in their home country.
The European, national, and regional elections are typically held on the same day to facilitate citizen participation. Voting is compulsory by law, and noncompliance can lead to penalties and the loss of political and civil rights. However, in practice, no one has been charged for abstention since 2003 (Le Soir, May 25, 2019). The latest election was in 2019, with a turnout rate above 88% for both the national and European parliaments. V-Dem’s Democracy report 2023 ranks Belgium in the top 10% of most democratic countries, above the Netherlands, Germany, and France but below Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.
Citations:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Droit_de_vote_des_%C3%A9trangers_aux_%C3%A9lections_communales_en_Belgique
https://elections2018.brussels/electeur.html
Vlaamse regering schrapt opkomstplicht bij lokale verkiezingen | De Standaard
https://www.lesoir.be/226381/article/2019-05-24/elections-2019-risquez-vous-vraiment-des-sanctions-si-vous-nallez-pas-voter
The European, national, and regional elections are typically held on the same day to facilitate citizen participation. Voting is compulsory by law, and noncompliance can lead to penalties and the loss of political and civil rights. However, in practice, no one has been charged for abstention since 2003 (Le Soir, May 25, 2019). The latest election was in 2019, with a turnout rate above 88% for both the national and European parliaments. V-Dem’s Democracy report 2023 ranks Belgium in the top 10% of most democratic countries, above the Netherlands, Germany, and France but below Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.
Citations:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Droit_de_vote_des_%C3%A9trangers_aux_%C3%A9lections_communales_en_Belgique
https://elections2018.brussels/electeur.html
Vlaamse regering schrapt opkomstplicht bij lokale verkiezingen | De Standaard
https://www.lesoir.be/226381/article/2019-05-24/elections-2019-risquez-vous-vraiment-des-sanctions-si-vous-nallez-pas-voter
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To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
Belgium’s proportional election system, combined with mandatory voting, ensures that many parties run in elections, representing a wide array of preferences. The consociational nature of Belgium, based on Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal pillars, includes nonprofit organizations, political parties, unions, and social security organizations. This system is associated with political parties representing the interests of a significant proportion of citizens in parliament and, although not always, in government (Delwi, 2022). However, the consociational nature can be questioned (Van Haute & Wauter, 2019) as eleven parties and two independent MPs have seats in the lower chamber of parliament. The presence of multiple parties, including far-right and far-left, allows a diversity of interests to be represented and to achieve societal integration in parliament, although it makes governing coalitions difficult (Pile, 2021).
Some parties with unique positions, such as the “Islam” party in 2012 or “DierAnimal” in 2019, ran for election but did not win seats. This reflects the main parties’ incentive to incorporate such positions into their platforms as they become salient (Meguid 2005). One growing criticism from elected representatives is that the power of party leaders and technocrats can become overbearing, with party discipline resulting in a top-down chain of command that sometimes restricts individual representatives’ freedom of expression.
V-Dem’s Democracy report 2023 ranks Belgium in the top 10% of most democratic countries, above the Netherlands, Germany, and France but below Denmark, Sweden, and Norway..
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/551084/article/2023-11-23/laicite-et-democratie-interne-pourquoi-julien-uyttendaele-quitte-le-ps
https://www.lesoir.be/556046/article/2023-12-17/rachid-madrane-un-clan-decide-autour-dun-repas-de-la-confection-des-listes-du-ps
Delwit, P. 2022. La vie politique en Belgique de 1830 à nos jours. Bruxelles: UB Lire.
Meguid, B. M. 2005. “Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success.” American Political Science Review 99 (3): 347-359.
Pilet, J. B. 2021. “Hard Times for Governing Parties: The 2019 Federal Elections in Belgium.” West European Politics 44 (2): 439-449.
Van Haute, E., and B. Wauters. 2019. “Do Characteristics of Consociational Democracies Still Apply to Belgian Parties.” Politics of the Low Countries 1: 6.
Some parties with unique positions, such as the “Islam” party in 2012 or “DierAnimal” in 2019, ran for election but did not win seats. This reflects the main parties’ incentive to incorporate such positions into their platforms as they become salient (Meguid 2005). One growing criticism from elected representatives is that the power of party leaders and technocrats can become overbearing, with party discipline resulting in a top-down chain of command that sometimes restricts individual representatives’ freedom of expression.
V-Dem’s Democracy report 2023 ranks Belgium in the top 10% of most democratic countries, above the Netherlands, Germany, and France but below Denmark, Sweden, and Norway..
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/551084/article/2023-11-23/laicite-et-democratie-interne-pourquoi-julien-uyttendaele-quitte-le-ps
https://www.lesoir.be/556046/article/2023-12-17/rachid-madrane-un-clan-decide-autour-dun-repas-de-la-confection-des-listes-du-ps
Delwit, P. 2022. La vie politique en Belgique de 1830 à nos jours. Bruxelles: UB Lire.
Meguid, B. M. 2005. “Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success.” American Political Science Review 99 (3): 347-359.
Pilet, J. B. 2021. “Hard Times for Governing Parties: The 2019 Federal Elections in Belgium.” West European Politics 44 (2): 439-449.
Van Haute, E., and B. Wauters. 2019. “Do Characteristics of Consociational Democracies Still Apply to Belgian Parties.” Politics of the Low Countries 1: 6.
To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
Belgium is a textbook example of consociational parliamentary democracy, characterized by a grand coalition, proportionality, mutual veto rights, segmental autonomy, and cultural public passivity (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2020). The proportional representation system implies that no party has held a majority since WWI. A de facto constraint is the decentralization trend since the 1960s, which delegates increasing powers to the country’s regions, serving different communities: mainly the Flemish-speaking north and the French-speaking south, both represented in Brussels. It is de facto impossible for a French-speaking party to profitably run for election in the north, and vice versa. The increasing fractionalization of the electoral landscape has induced some parties to run together to reach a critical mass, notably the Flemish and French-speaking Greens, the far-left PTB-PVDA, and the Christian Democrats in Brussels.
A self-imposed constraint on cross-party cooperation is the “cordon sanitaire” meant to exclude extreme-right parties since the 1980s (Biard, 2020). This results in lower access to traditional media platforms and exclusion from potential coalitions. Conversely, some right-wing parties want to impose the same “cordon sanitaire” around extreme-left parties, with less success. Over the last decade, the main extreme-right party in Belgium, the Flemish Vlaams Belang (previously Vlaams Blok), has worked to portray itself as less anti-Semitic and distanced from former WWII Nazi collaborators. This “mainstreaming” strategy (Hjorth et al. 2024) adapts challenger parties’ rhetoric and political style to the norms and policy positions of dominant parties to be considered credible coalition partners. This has led some “democratic” parties to be less openly reluctant to cooperate with the extreme right.
Like in almost all democracies, the last decades have seen some degree of polarization and personalization of politics. In Belgium, this mainly takes the form of individual politicians overcommunicating on social media and taking ostentatious positions on minor issues. This makes coalition governance harder and has induced many “old school” politicians to retire, claiming they can no longer “work for the population” as they did in the past.
Citations:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_elections_in_Belgium
Biard, B. 2021. “La lutte contre l’extrême droite en Belgique: I. Moyens légaux et cordon sanitaire politique.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 38: 5-114.
Delwit, Pascal. 2019. “Radical Right-Wing Parties Facing the Wall of the Local? The Vlaams Belang and Local Elections (1982-2018).” Open Journal of Political Science 9: 631-651. DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2019.94039
Erk, Jan. 2007. “From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself.” West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500085681
Larsen, M. V., Nyrup, J., and Hjorth, F. 2024. “Reining in the Rascals: Challenger Parties’ Path to Power.” The Journal of Politics.
https://www.lesoir.be/528414/article/2023-07-30/catherine-fonck-par-degout-des-jeux-politiques
Kristof Calvo stopt in 2024 met nationale politiek, ondanks vrees voor ‘pikzwarte zondag’ | De Standaard
‘Bouchez moet stoppen met N-VA-ambassadeur te spelen binnen Vivaldi’ | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20211210_97902349
A self-imposed constraint on cross-party cooperation is the “cordon sanitaire” meant to exclude extreme-right parties since the 1980s (Biard, 2020). This results in lower access to traditional media platforms and exclusion from potential coalitions. Conversely, some right-wing parties want to impose the same “cordon sanitaire” around extreme-left parties, with less success. Over the last decade, the main extreme-right party in Belgium, the Flemish Vlaams Belang (previously Vlaams Blok), has worked to portray itself as less anti-Semitic and distanced from former WWII Nazi collaborators. This “mainstreaming” strategy (Hjorth et al. 2024) adapts challenger parties’ rhetoric and political style to the norms and policy positions of dominant parties to be considered credible coalition partners. This has led some “democratic” parties to be less openly reluctant to cooperate with the extreme right.
Like in almost all democracies, the last decades have seen some degree of polarization and personalization of politics. In Belgium, this mainly takes the form of individual politicians overcommunicating on social media and taking ostentatious positions on minor issues. This makes coalition governance harder and has induced many “old school” politicians to retire, claiming they can no longer “work for the population” as they did in the past.
Citations:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_elections_in_Belgium
Biard, B. 2021. “La lutte contre l’extrême droite en Belgique: I. Moyens légaux et cordon sanitaire politique.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 38: 5-114.
Delwit, Pascal. 2019. “Radical Right-Wing Parties Facing the Wall of the Local? The Vlaams Belang and Local Elections (1982-2018).” Open Journal of Political Science 9: 631-651. DOI: 10.4236/ojps.2019.94039
Erk, Jan. 2007. “From Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang: The Belgian Far-Right Renames Itself.” West European Politics. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380500085681
Larsen, M. V., Nyrup, J., and Hjorth, F. 2024. “Reining in the Rascals: Challenger Parties’ Path to Power.” The Journal of Politics.
https://www.lesoir.be/528414/article/2023-07-30/catherine-fonck-par-degout-des-jeux-politiques
Kristof Calvo stopt in 2024 met nationale politiek, ondanks vrees voor ‘pikzwarte zondag’ | De Standaard
‘Bouchez moet stoppen met N-VA-ambassadeur te spelen binnen Vivaldi’ | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20211210_97902349
Graph View
To what extent can citizens and residents access official information?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose many/various significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
The Belgian constitution was amended in 1993 to include the right of access to government documents. However, the FOI law applies only to administrative functions and documents in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (EuroPAM). Banisar (2006, 48) identifies several weaknesses in implementing that framework: “The protection of the right of access to the official documents is not ensured enough… People are not familiar enough with the right of access.” He also points to the civil servants’ lack of training.
Beyond federal-level issues, the federal law only applies to federal entities. The Belgian regions, which are federated entities, have their own freedom of information laws. Mabillard et al. (2023) tested their implementation by sending information requests to a large number of municipalities (each subject to its region’s laws). Their results show that barriers to information disclosure remain widespread, with most municipalities either not responding to the requests, arguing the requests are not specific enough, claiming they do not have the resources to respond, or, in a few cases, asking for fees to disclose information.
Furthermore, academic research is often impeded by individual data protection regulations, leading to a lack of genuinely open data. For example, it is impossible to assess wealth inequality in Belgium because the data are not available, not necessarily for privacy reasons but due to a lack of willingness to make the data publicly available. This restricts the capacity to stimulate evidence-based policymaking or evaluate policy performance.
Citations:
Banisar, David. 2006. Freedom of Information Around the World 2006: A Global Survey of Access to Government Information Laws. Privacy International. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1707336 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1707336
European Public Accountability Mechanism: https://europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Belgium#info_FOI
Mabillard, Vincent, Giovanni Esposito, Lorenzo Ciccatiello, Giuseppe Gaeta, and Martial Pasquie. 2023. Barriers to Freedom of Information: Insights from an Experiment in Belgium. ULB Mimeo.
Beyond federal-level issues, the federal law only applies to federal entities. The Belgian regions, which are federated entities, have their own freedom of information laws. Mabillard et al. (2023) tested their implementation by sending information requests to a large number of municipalities (each subject to its region’s laws). Their results show that barriers to information disclosure remain widespread, with most municipalities either not responding to the requests, arguing the requests are not specific enough, claiming they do not have the resources to respond, or, in a few cases, asking for fees to disclose information.
Furthermore, academic research is often impeded by individual data protection regulations, leading to a lack of genuinely open data. For example, it is impossible to assess wealth inequality in Belgium because the data are not available, not necessarily for privacy reasons but due to a lack of willingness to make the data publicly available. This restricts the capacity to stimulate evidence-based policymaking or evaluate policy performance.
Citations:
Banisar, David. 2006. Freedom of Information Around the World 2006: A Global Survey of Access to Government Information Laws. Privacy International. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1707336 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1707336
European Public Accountability Mechanism: https://europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Belgium#info_FOI
Mabillard, Vincent, Giovanni Esposito, Lorenzo Ciccatiello, Giuseppe Gaeta, and Martial Pasquie. 2023. Barriers to Freedom of Information: Insights from an Experiment in Belgium. ULB Mimeo.