Coordination
#23Key Findings
Canada performs relatively poorly in international comparison (rank 23) with regard to coordination.
Key central government agencies, especially the Privy Council Office (PCO), coordinate policy . relations with parliament and other departments. The PCO also supports the prime minister and cabinet in managing government affairs.
Interdepartmental committees are used to coordinate ministerial activities, with varying degrees of effectiveness. Informal meetings between senior officials and front-line staffers are common. The PCO has supplanted cabinet committees as the body tasked with resolving issues before they reach the cabinet.
In Canada’s federal system, provinces control key economic, environmental and social programs. Although it has some leverage through spending programs, the federal government has limited control over provincial actions in these areas. Provinces often resist national standards.
Key central government agencies, especially the Privy Council Office (PCO), coordinate policy . relations with parliament and other departments. The PCO also supports the prime minister and cabinet in managing government affairs.
Interdepartmental committees are used to coordinate ministerial activities, with varying degrees of effectiveness. Informal meetings between senior officials and front-line staffers are common. The PCO has supplanted cabinet committees as the body tasked with resolving issues before they reach the cabinet.
In Canada’s federal system, provinces control key economic, environmental and social programs. Although it has some leverage through spending programs, the federal government has limited control over provincial actions in these areas. Provinces often resist national standards.
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To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
8
7
6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
5
4
3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
The Canadian government features key central agencies, specifically the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Finance Department, and the Treasury Board Secretariat. These agencies are intended to coordinate political-administrative relations and ensure program coherence and overall fiscal direction for line departments. The PCO’s role in coordinating government legislation is paramount and part of its broader mandate to support the prime minister and the Cabinet in administering government affairs. While individual government departments and agencies are responsible for developing specific pieces of legislation, the PCO plays a coordinating and facilitative role to ensure a cohesive and effective legislative agenda.
The PCO plays a central role in coordinating government legislation and supporting the overall functioning of the government. As a key institution within the executive branch, it serves the prime minister and the Cabinet. Although its primary responsibilities extend beyond legislative coordination, its role in this area is substantial. The PCO facilitates policy coordination across government departments and agencies, ensuring that proposed legislation aligns with the government’s overall policy objectives and priorities. This coordination involves the development of legislative proposals and their consistency with the government’s agenda. Additionally, the PCO works with government departments to establish legislative agendas, identify key priorities, and allocate resources for the development and advancement of legislation.
The PCO also provides administrative support to the Cabinet, the central decision-making body in the Canadian system of government. Its tasks include assisting in the development of legislative initiatives, preparing Cabinet submissions, ensuring that proposed legislation receives appropriate consideration, and managing Order-in-Council appointments. This includes coordinating legal reviews of proposed legislation to ensure compliance with legal requirements, constitutional principles, and government policy. It may work closely with the Department of Justice – responsible for legal drafting – to refine and finalize legislative texts.
From this central vantage point, the PCO promotes collaboration and communication among various government departments involved in developing legislation. This coordination is crucial for addressing interdepartmental issues, streamlining processes, and ensuring a cohesive approach to legislative matters.
The PCO also supports the government’s engagement with Parliament. This includes preparing speeches from the throne, coordinating the government’s legislative agenda in the House of Commons and the Senate, and assisting in responding to parliamentary inquiries.
Critical as well, the Finance Department reviews all proposals coming forward to the Cabinet from line departments, ensuring these are aligned with the fiscal framework and spending priorities. The Treasury Board Secretariat reviews the proposals to ensure program design and resourcing can deliver on intended objectives and that there is no duplication in line ministry initiatives.
The coordination continues after legislation is passed, with the PCO involved in supporting its implementation. This can include coordinating efforts to ensure that government departments and agencies are prepared to operationalize new laws and policies (Wernick 2021). The Treasury Board Secretariat continues to monitor program integrity, and the Finance Department oversees the fiscal framework. These assessments are considered when new initiatives come forward from line departments in upcoming policy cycles.
Citations:
Canada. Department of Finance. 2023. 2023-24 Departmental Plan. Ottawa: His Majesty the King in Right of Canada.
Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. 2023. 2023-24 Departmental Plan. Ottawa: His Majesty the King in Right of Canada.
Wernick, Michael. 2021. Governing Canada: A Guide to the Tradecraft of Politics. Toronto: On Point Press.
The PCO plays a central role in coordinating government legislation and supporting the overall functioning of the government. As a key institution within the executive branch, it serves the prime minister and the Cabinet. Although its primary responsibilities extend beyond legislative coordination, its role in this area is substantial. The PCO facilitates policy coordination across government departments and agencies, ensuring that proposed legislation aligns with the government’s overall policy objectives and priorities. This coordination involves the development of legislative proposals and their consistency with the government’s agenda. Additionally, the PCO works with government departments to establish legislative agendas, identify key priorities, and allocate resources for the development and advancement of legislation.
The PCO also provides administrative support to the Cabinet, the central decision-making body in the Canadian system of government. Its tasks include assisting in the development of legislative initiatives, preparing Cabinet submissions, ensuring that proposed legislation receives appropriate consideration, and managing Order-in-Council appointments. This includes coordinating legal reviews of proposed legislation to ensure compliance with legal requirements, constitutional principles, and government policy. It may work closely with the Department of Justice – responsible for legal drafting – to refine and finalize legislative texts.
From this central vantage point, the PCO promotes collaboration and communication among various government departments involved in developing legislation. This coordination is crucial for addressing interdepartmental issues, streamlining processes, and ensuring a cohesive approach to legislative matters.
The PCO also supports the government’s engagement with Parliament. This includes preparing speeches from the throne, coordinating the government’s legislative agenda in the House of Commons and the Senate, and assisting in responding to parliamentary inquiries.
Critical as well, the Finance Department reviews all proposals coming forward to the Cabinet from line departments, ensuring these are aligned with the fiscal framework and spending priorities. The Treasury Board Secretariat reviews the proposals to ensure program design and resourcing can deliver on intended objectives and that there is no duplication in line ministry initiatives.
The coordination continues after legislation is passed, with the PCO involved in supporting its implementation. This can include coordinating efforts to ensure that government departments and agencies are prepared to operationalize new laws and policies (Wernick 2021). The Treasury Board Secretariat continues to monitor program integrity, and the Finance Department oversees the fiscal framework. These assessments are considered when new initiatives come forward from line departments in upcoming policy cycles.
Citations:
Canada. Department of Finance. 2023. 2023-24 Departmental Plan. Ottawa: His Majesty the King in Right of Canada.
Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. 2023. 2023-24 Departmental Plan. Ottawa: His Majesty the King in Right of Canada.
Wernick, Michael. 2021. Governing Canada: A Guide to the Tradecraft of Politics. Toronto: On Point Press.
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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7
6
7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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4
3
4
3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
2
1
1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Many interdepartmental committees exist to coordinate ministerial activities. Some work better than others (Canadian Heritage 2021).
Draft bills are vetted primarily by the Privy Council Office and, to a lesser extent, by Finance Canada and the Treasury Board. These central agencies are crucial for a proposal to advance to senior levels within the federal public service. Central-agency staff members typically possess the expertise needed for the regular and independent evaluation of draft bills based on the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.
Line departments and central agencies have different capacities for coordinating policy proposals since ultimate authority lies with central agencies like the PCO and the Treasury Board. Financing of policy initiatives and program design are vetted by Finance Canada and the Treasury Board Secretariat, respectively.
Many policy proposals are coordinated by line ministries with other line ministries. In the past, cabinet committees facilitated this interdepartmental coordination. However, in the modern era, the power to resolve issues before they reach the cabinet lies with the Privy Council Office and often the Prime Minister’s Office.
Department-to-department processes are generally not as effective as central agency coordination. On certain issues, a line department may be unwilling to recognize the role or expertise of other line departments, or it may have fundamental differences in perspectives on the issue. As a result, the department may fail to consult sufficiently or
Coordinate a policy proposal with others, requiring Treasury Board, PCO, or PMO intervention (French 1980).
For policy proposals advancing to the cabinet, line departments must undertake the necessary consultations to ensure the proposal has been circulated and considered by other relevant ministries. Central agencies, however, still perform a critical oversight and steering role in this process.
Deputies meet regularly to discuss issues, policies, and programs under development. Frequently, when new policies are being developed, steering committees are formed involving several departments and led by senior officials. This often precedes the interministerial consultations that the PCO requires. Additionally, there is a rotation of personnel among posts to enhance collaboration and knowledge in other mandate areas. This rotation includes not only senior officials but also mid-range managers and operational personnel.
Citations:
Canadian Heritage. 2021. “Evaluation of Interdepartmental Coordination (in Relation to Section 42 of the Official Languages Act) 2013-14 to 2017-18.” https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/corporate/publications/evaluations/official-languages-interdepartmental-coordination.html
French, R. 1980. How Ottawa Decides: Planning and Industrial Policy-Making 1968-1980. Toronto: Lorimer.
Draft bills are vetted primarily by the Privy Council Office and, to a lesser extent, by Finance Canada and the Treasury Board. These central agencies are crucial for a proposal to advance to senior levels within the federal public service. Central-agency staff members typically possess the expertise needed for the regular and independent evaluation of draft bills based on the government’s strategic and budgetary priorities.
Line departments and central agencies have different capacities for coordinating policy proposals since ultimate authority lies with central agencies like the PCO and the Treasury Board. Financing of policy initiatives and program design are vetted by Finance Canada and the Treasury Board Secretariat, respectively.
Many policy proposals are coordinated by line ministries with other line ministries. In the past, cabinet committees facilitated this interdepartmental coordination. However, in the modern era, the power to resolve issues before they reach the cabinet lies with the Privy Council Office and often the Prime Minister’s Office.
Department-to-department processes are generally not as effective as central agency coordination. On certain issues, a line department may be unwilling to recognize the role or expertise of other line departments, or it may have fundamental differences in perspectives on the issue. As a result, the department may fail to consult sufficiently or
Coordinate a policy proposal with others, requiring Treasury Board, PCO, or PMO intervention (French 1980).
For policy proposals advancing to the cabinet, line departments must undertake the necessary consultations to ensure the proposal has been circulated and considered by other relevant ministries. Central agencies, however, still perform a critical oversight and steering role in this process.
Deputies meet regularly to discuss issues, policies, and programs under development. Frequently, when new policies are being developed, steering committees are formed involving several departments and led by senior officials. This often precedes the interministerial consultations that the PCO requires. Additionally, there is a rotation of personnel among posts to enhance collaboration and knowledge in other mandate areas. This rotation includes not only senior officials but also mid-range managers and operational personnel.
Citations:
Canadian Heritage. 2021. “Evaluation of Interdepartmental Coordination (in Relation to Section 42 of the Official Languages Act) 2013-14 to 2017-18.” https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/corporate/publications/evaluations/official-languages-interdepartmental-coordination.html
French, R. 1980. How Ottawa Decides: Planning and Industrial Policy-Making 1968-1980. Toronto: Lorimer.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Many informal venues exist. In some cases, these are thought to enhance formal mechanisms; in others, they undermine them. However, very little is known about them, as they escape review through lobbying and other registration systems (Sarpkaya 1988; Hogan et al. 2009).
There are numerous and frequent informal mechanisms for interministerial coordination. Senior officials, managers, and front-line operational personnel regularly engage in bilateral and multilateral meetings and coordination. These interactions are often issue-dependent and typically take place when preparing policy and program changes for Cabinet consideration, but they may also address specific programmatic challenges.
Citations:
Hogan, John, Raj S. Chari, and Gary Murphy. 2009. “Lobbying Regulation Across Four Continents: Promoting Transparency?” SSRN eLibrary. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450816&
Sarpkaya, S. 1988. Lobbying in Canada – Ways and Means. Don Mills: CCH Canadian Ltd.
There are numerous and frequent informal mechanisms for interministerial coordination. Senior officials, managers, and front-line operational personnel regularly engage in bilateral and multilateral meetings and coordination. These interactions are often issue-dependent and typically take place when preparing policy and program changes for Cabinet consideration, but they may also address specific programmatic challenges.
Citations:
Hogan, John, Raj S. Chari, and Gary Murphy. 2009. “Lobbying Regulation Across Four Continents: Promoting Transparency?” SSRN eLibrary. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450816&
Sarpkaya, S. 1988. Lobbying in Canada – Ways and Means. Don Mills: CCH Canadian Ltd.
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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9
9
The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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6
7
6
Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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3
4
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The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
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1
The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
Canada is a highly decentralized federation where the provinces hold significant authority over many key economic, environmental, and social programs. In most cases, the federal government has little to no control over provincial actions in these areas, necessitating a system of “federal-provincial diplomacy” to advance its interests (Simeon 1972).
Moreover, Canada’s federal system has no formal provisions that specifically address federal-provincial coordination. Pressing federal-provincial issues and other matters requiring intergovernmental discussions are usually addressed in the annual First Ministers’ Conference, which includes the prime minister, provincial premiers, and territorial leaders, along with their officials. These meetings are called by the prime minister and have no formal schedule. Some similar informal arrangements exist in areas such as education and forestry. The lack of any requirement for these conferences to be held regularly has been a cause for concern regarding ongoing problems with federal-provincial coordination in many areas (Simeon 1985).
Due to the nature of this system, there are very few national standards for public service delivery in Canada, as provincial governments have extensive freedom to determine their policy objectives, instruments, and designs. When the federal government transfers funds to the provinces, it could have some practical leverage to establish standards but typically does not use this leverage because its exercise has proven counterproductive in the past (Simeon 1980).
National standards often face opposition from provinces – primarily Québec and Alberta in the modern era, but at various points in Canadian history, other provinces as well. This opposition results in a political struggle that the federal government might not win. In healthcare, for example, provincial governments must conform to the five principles of the 1984 Canada Health Act: care must be available to all eligible residents of Canada, comprehensive in coverage, accessible without financial or other barriers, portable within the country and during travel abroad, and publicly administered. However, funds from the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) are rarely withheld by the federal government even if these principles are violated or ignored. Similarly, the Canada Social Transfer (CST), which supports social assistance in provinces among other things, has a very low bar of conditionality.
Yet, within the context of the Canadian constitution, the federal government has exercised leadership in specific areas. For example, during the pandemic, it worked with provinces and territories on protective equipment and vaccines. Similarly, a Common Statement of Principles on Shared Health Care Priorities was established with provinces and territories in 2017, and agreements on universal day care were signed with provinces and territories in 2021. The government of Canada is also supporting independent agencies developing national standards around long-term care.
Citations:
Simeon, Richard. 1985. Intergovernmental Relations. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Simeon, Richard. 1980. “Intergovernmental Relations and the Challenges to Canadian Federalism.” Canadian Public Administration 23 (1): 14-32.
Simeon, Richard. 1972. Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/transparency/health-agreements/principles-shared-health-priorities.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/early-learning-child-care-agreement/agreements-provinces-territories.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-safe-long-term-care/document.html#a1
Moreover, Canada’s federal system has no formal provisions that specifically address federal-provincial coordination. Pressing federal-provincial issues and other matters requiring intergovernmental discussions are usually addressed in the annual First Ministers’ Conference, which includes the prime minister, provincial premiers, and territorial leaders, along with their officials. These meetings are called by the prime minister and have no formal schedule. Some similar informal arrangements exist in areas such as education and forestry. The lack of any requirement for these conferences to be held regularly has been a cause for concern regarding ongoing problems with federal-provincial coordination in many areas (Simeon 1985).
Due to the nature of this system, there are very few national standards for public service delivery in Canada, as provincial governments have extensive freedom to determine their policy objectives, instruments, and designs. When the federal government transfers funds to the provinces, it could have some practical leverage to establish standards but typically does not use this leverage because its exercise has proven counterproductive in the past (Simeon 1980).
National standards often face opposition from provinces – primarily Québec and Alberta in the modern era, but at various points in Canadian history, other provinces as well. This opposition results in a political struggle that the federal government might not win. In healthcare, for example, provincial governments must conform to the five principles of the 1984 Canada Health Act: care must be available to all eligible residents of Canada, comprehensive in coverage, accessible without financial or other barriers, portable within the country and during travel abroad, and publicly administered. However, funds from the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) are rarely withheld by the federal government even if these principles are violated or ignored. Similarly, the Canada Social Transfer (CST), which supports social assistance in provinces among other things, has a very low bar of conditionality.
Yet, within the context of the Canadian constitution, the federal government has exercised leadership in specific areas. For example, during the pandemic, it worked with provinces and territories on protective equipment and vaccines. Similarly, a Common Statement of Principles on Shared Health Care Priorities was established with provinces and territories in 2017, and agreements on universal day care were signed with provinces and territories in 2021. The government of Canada is also supporting independent agencies developing national standards around long-term care.
Citations:
Simeon, Richard. 1985. Intergovernmental Relations. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Simeon, Richard. 1980. “Intergovernmental Relations and the Challenges to Canadian Federalism.” Canadian Public Administration 23 (1): 14-32.
Simeon, Richard. 1972. Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/corporate/transparency/health-agreements/principles-shared-health-priorities.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/early-learning-child-care-agreement/agreements-provinces-territories.html
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/programs/consultation-safe-long-term-care/document.html#a1
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
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9
9
National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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3
4
3
National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
2
1
1
There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Local and regional governments in Canada are created by provincial governments, meaning the federal government’s powers toward these local entities are limited. The federal government frequently tries to influence these governments through spending programs but has few mechanisms to ensure compliance (Tindal and Tindal 2000). However, some areas allow the federal government to have an indirect influence or interact with local governments, such as funding transportation or industrial infrastructure on a one-off basis.
In Canada, the powers of the federal, provincial, territorial, and local governments are distributed based on the principles of federalism. The federal government’s powers are outlined in the Constitution Act, 1867, focusing primarily on matters of national concern. Local governments derive their powers from provincial or territorial legislation, and their authority is subject to the framework established by the respective province or territory.
Federal programs and policies can have implications for local governments. For example, national housing strategies, environmental regulations, and social welfare programs may affect local communities, and local governments may be involved in their implementation. The federal government often provides financial assistance to local governments through fiscal transfer programs designed to support specific policy objectives, such as infrastructure development, housing, or social services. However, the funds are typically transferred to the provincial or territorial government, which then may or may not allocate them to local governments.
The federal government may contribute to local infrastructure projects through funding programs. While the funds are often administered at the provincial or territorial level, they can indirectly benefit local governments. Examples include investments in public transit, water infrastructure, and community facilities.
In emergencies or disasters, the federal government assists local governments, often deploying troops to help with floods, forest fires, and other natural calamities. This support may include financial aid, resources, and coordination efforts.
A more robust federal presence is necessary for engaging with local governments in areas with a significant Indigenous population or impact. Indigenous affairs remain under federal jurisdiction, but native communities often rely on provinces for highways and other services. Consultation and collaboration with local governments are part of the federal government’s efforts to address Indigenous rights and interests.
Other specific federal departments and agencies may collaborate with local governments on certain projects or initiatives. This collaboration often occurs in areas such as community development, environmental protection, and social programs.
Citations:
Tindal, C. R., and S. N. Tindal. 2000. Local Government in Canada. Toronto: Nelson Canada.
In Canada, the powers of the federal, provincial, territorial, and local governments are distributed based on the principles of federalism. The federal government’s powers are outlined in the Constitution Act, 1867, focusing primarily on matters of national concern. Local governments derive their powers from provincial or territorial legislation, and their authority is subject to the framework established by the respective province or territory.
Federal programs and policies can have implications for local governments. For example, national housing strategies, environmental regulations, and social welfare programs may affect local communities, and local governments may be involved in their implementation. The federal government often provides financial assistance to local governments through fiscal transfer programs designed to support specific policy objectives, such as infrastructure development, housing, or social services. However, the funds are typically transferred to the provincial or territorial government, which then may or may not allocate them to local governments.
The federal government may contribute to local infrastructure projects through funding programs. While the funds are often administered at the provincial or territorial level, they can indirectly benefit local governments. Examples include investments in public transit, water infrastructure, and community facilities.
In emergencies or disasters, the federal government assists local governments, often deploying troops to help with floods, forest fires, and other natural calamities. This support may include financial aid, resources, and coordination efforts.
A more robust federal presence is necessary for engaging with local governments in areas with a significant Indigenous population or impact. Indigenous affairs remain under federal jurisdiction, but native communities often rely on provinces for highways and other services. Consultation and collaboration with local governments are part of the federal government’s efforts to address Indigenous rights and interests.
Other specific federal departments and agencies may collaborate with local governments on certain projects or initiatives. This collaboration often occurs in areas such as community development, environmental protection, and social programs.
Citations:
Tindal, C. R., and S. N. Tindal. 2000. Local Government in Canada. Toronto: Nelson Canada.