To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
10
Estonia
The freedom of association and freedom of assembly are constitutional rights in Estonia. The Act on Public Meetings (1997) specifies the rights and duties of meeting organizers. Every person legally residing in Estonia has the right to initiate a public meeting; the meeting must be registered with the relevant municipal government seven days in advance. Police can use force only on occasions specified in the law.
Political liberties are an important part of Estonia’s constitution, and they are widely respected in society. There are 11 political parties registered, collectively covering the entire spectrum of mainstream political ideologies. Only citizens of Estonia have the right to be members of a political party. Civil society groups organize open forums to discuss important social and political issues. One such forum, the Arvamusfestival (Opinion Festival), has been held annually since 2013.
Public meetings are typically peaceful. Harassment, arbitrary arrests, and the detention or imprisonment of peaceful demonstrators are not common practices in Estonia.
Political liberties are an important part of Estonia’s constitution, and they are widely respected in society. There are 11 political parties registered, collectively covering the entire spectrum of mainstream political ideologies. Only citizens of Estonia have the right to be members of a political party. Civil society groups organize open forums to discuss important social and political issues. One such forum, the Arvamusfestival (Opinion Festival), has been held annually since 2013.
Public meetings are typically peaceful. Harassment, arbitrary arrests, and the detention or imprisonment of peaceful demonstrators are not common practices in Estonia.
New Zealand
Political rights such as the freedom of association and freedom of assembly are effectively safeguarded. While New Zealand does not have a single written constitution, these rights are protected through various laws, statutes and legal norms – most importantly, through the Bill of Rights Act 1990, which outlines fundamental rights and freedoms like the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, the freedom of association, and specific human rights legislation, such as the Human Rights Act 1993.
The WJP Rule of Law Index 2023 awards New Zealand a score of 0.84 (out of 1.00) on its “freedom of assembly and association” measure, ranking the country 15th in global comparison (World Justice Project 2023).
The government generally applies transparent and nondiscriminatory criteria when evaluating requests for permits to associate and assemble. If a permit request is denied or disputed, individuals or groups have the right to seek judicial review. This legal recourse allows for an independent assessment of whether the decision-making process was fair and aligned with legal standards.
In recent months and years, numerous individuals have been arrested and convicted for participating in violent demonstrations against the government’s COVID-19 measures (Nichols and Harris 2023) and climate change protests (Dunseath 2023). However, these arrests have generally been in accordance with the law, and do not reveal any evidence of the systematic use of intimidation or harassment aimed at hindering citizens from exercising their political rights.
The WJP Rule of Law Index 2023 awards New Zealand a score of 0.84 (out of 1.00) on its “freedom of assembly and association” measure, ranking the country 15th in global comparison (World Justice Project 2023).
The government generally applies transparent and nondiscriminatory criteria when evaluating requests for permits to associate and assemble. If a permit request is denied or disputed, individuals or groups have the right to seek judicial review. This legal recourse allows for an independent assessment of whether the decision-making process was fair and aligned with legal standards.
In recent months and years, numerous individuals have been arrested and convicted for participating in violent demonstrations against the government’s COVID-19 measures (Nichols and Harris 2023) and climate change protests (Dunseath 2023). However, these arrests have generally been in accordance with the law, and do not reveal any evidence of the systematic use of intimidation or harassment aimed at hindering citizens from exercising their political rights.
Citations:
Dunseath, F. 2023. “Climate protesters charged after blocking traffic in central Wellington, road open.” Stuff, April 20. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/wellington/131818715/climate-protesters-charged-after-blocking-traffic-in-central-wellington-road-open
Nichols, L., and Harris, K. 2023. “Wellington Parliament protests: Hundreds charged but just 31 convicted so far, IPCA report released.” New Zealand Herald, April 20. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/wellington-parliament-protests-hundreds-charged-but-just-31-convicted-so-far-ipca-report-released/T7HIIWSRAVCJJG6NKJC5MIUARY
World Justice Project. 2023. “Rule of Law Index: New Zealand.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/New%20Zealand/Fundamental%20Rights
Dunseath, F. 2023. “Climate protesters charged after blocking traffic in central Wellington, road open.” Stuff, April 20. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/wellington/131818715/climate-protesters-charged-after-blocking-traffic-in-central-wellington-road-open
Nichols, L., and Harris, K. 2023. “Wellington Parliament protests: Hundreds charged but just 31 convicted so far, IPCA report released.” New Zealand Herald, April 20. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/wellington-parliament-protests-hundreds-charged-but-just-31-convicted-so-far-ipca-report-released/T7HIIWSRAVCJJG6NKJC5MIUARY
World Justice Project. 2023. “Rule of Law Index: New Zealand.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/New%20Zealand/Fundamental%20Rights
Norway
The right of citizens to form organizations and express opinions through collective action has been secured in the constitution since 1814. There is a long historical tradition of organizing cultural and economic interests in civil society. This tradition began with the first religious, linguistic, and rural interests, and the temperance movement from the 1840s, followed by political parties from the 1880s. Subsequently, trade unions and other economic interest organizations emerged. Additionally, there is a comprehensive array of organizations promoting sports, cultural, and leisure activities. Though not political by nature, these voluntary organizations are regarded as “schools in democracy” and receive state economic support.
In Norway, gambling is a state monopoly (Norsk Tipping), and all profits from gambling are redistributed to civil society organizations. The voluntary organizations have their own interest organization, Voluntary Norway. Seventy-eight percent of the adult population are members of at least one organization, and half the population are members of two or more organizations. Forty-four percent of the income of voluntary organizations comes from state or local government sources.
In Norway, gambling is a state monopoly (Norsk Tipping), and all profits from gambling are redistributed to civil society organizations. The voluntary organizations have their own interest organization, Voluntary Norway. Seventy-eight percent of the adult population are members of at least one organization, and half the population are members of two or more organizations. Forty-four percent of the income of voluntary organizations comes from state or local government sources.
Citations:
https://www.frivillighetnorge.no/english-summary
https://www.norsk-tipping.no/selskapet/om-selskapet
https://www.frivillighetnorge.no/english-summary
https://www.norsk-tipping.no/selskapet/om-selskapet
Sweden
The freedom of association and the freedom of assembly are constitutionally protected. Civil society organizations in Sweden have a formal seat at the policymaking table through the referral system (remiss system): the findings of any commission of inquiry ahead of proposed legislative changes are sent out to relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations, for comments, which form the final piece of legislation.
Rules and conditions under which demonstrations may take place are posted by the Swedish police on their website (see https://polisen.se/om-polisen/polisens-arbete/demonstrationer/). Recent events, embroiled in larger geopolitical challenges and domestic politics, have challenged the freedom of assembly and highlighted the tensions between free speech and hate crimes. This has engendered a heated debate. Amnesty International reports that the UN International Independent Expert Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice in the Context of Law Enforcement expressed concerns that responses aimed at addressing security challenges are handled through over-policing, surveillance, and arbitrary stops and searches (Amnesty International, 2023).
Public burnings of the Quran culminated in June 2023, sparking heated public debate. These incidents became fodder for power games played by Erdoğan, who used them to extract as many concessions as possible from Sweden toward Turkey in the bargaining of Sweden’s NATO membership. Several voices within the country urged the police to ban the burning of the Quran; however, the courts ruled that this act does not constitute a hate crime and that the only permissible action within the existing legal framework would be to move these burnings to a less sensitive area (SVT, 2023). The Swedish Institute reports that such incidents have the potential to damage the country’s image abroad (Svenska Institutet, 2023).
Rules and conditions under which demonstrations may take place are posted by the Swedish police on their website (see https://polisen.se/om-polisen/polisens-arbete/demonstrationer/). Recent events, embroiled in larger geopolitical challenges and domestic politics, have challenged the freedom of assembly and highlighted the tensions between free speech and hate crimes. This has engendered a heated debate. Amnesty International reports that the UN International Independent Expert Mechanism to Advance Racial Justice in the Context of Law Enforcement expressed concerns that responses aimed at addressing security challenges are handled through over-policing, surveillance, and arbitrary stops and searches (Amnesty International, 2023).
Public burnings of the Quran culminated in June 2023, sparking heated public debate. These incidents became fodder for power games played by Erdoğan, who used them to extract as many concessions as possible from Sweden toward Turkey in the bargaining of Sweden’s NATO membership. Several voices within the country urged the police to ban the burning of the Quran; however, the courts ruled that this act does not constitute a hate crime and that the only permissible action within the existing legal framework would be to move these burnings to a less sensitive area (SVT, 2023). The Swedish Institute reports that such incidents have the potential to damage the country’s image abroad (Svenska Institutet, 2023).
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
Svenska Institutet. 2023. “Omvärldens reaktioner på koranbränningar i Sverige sommaren 2023.” https://si.se/omvarldens-reaktioner-pa-koranbranningar-i-sverige-sommaren-2023/
SVT. 2023. “Guide: Det här säger lagen om koranbränning i Sverige.” https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/guide-det-har-sager-lagen-om-koranbranning
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
Svenska Institutet. 2023. “Omvärldens reaktioner på koranbränningar i Sverige sommaren 2023.” https://si.se/omvarldens-reaktioner-pa-koranbranningar-i-sverige-sommaren-2023/
SVT. 2023. “Guide: Det här säger lagen om koranbränning i Sverige.” https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/guide-det-har-sager-lagen-om-koranbranning
9
Austria
Citizens in Austria can freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions. The freedom of association and assembly is guaranteed by the constitution. This constitutional guarantee includes any religious, philosophical, or ideological position, with few exceptions, such as attempts to generate support for Nazi ideology.
The right to gather in public and hold a meeting or demonstration does not require a specific application. Authorities simply need to be informed about scheduled events no less than 48 hours in advance. Failing to do so can result in a fine, though this does not mean that an unregistered gathering will be automatically dissolved by the police. However, if the police have doubts about a particular gathering and suspect it might endanger public security, the event can be called off.
Recent events, especially during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, have seen an increase in such incidents. Planned demonstrations against Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip have been among these occurrences. The climate change protests, where young people adhered themselves to the floor, have also attracted significant public attention. Notably, key representatives of the Austrian state, including Federal President Van der Bellen, have sided with the demonstrators.
On some occasions, the courts declared government actions against groups that wanted to assemble as unlawful. The FPÖ, one of the harshest and most powerful critics of liberal democracy, benefited from these judgments, as seen in early 2021. This situation demonstrates that Austria is willing to face the challenging task of allowing public criticism against some of its most fundamental values, rather than simply keeping those groups at bay through legal means.
Different societal groups have played varying roles in the recent chapters of civil society development. Women have been particularly active in pandemic-related protests in Austria, while some observers believe that Muslims, or “political Islam,” have been gradually pushed to the sidelines of civil society by recent governments.
The right to gather in public and hold a meeting or demonstration does not require a specific application. Authorities simply need to be informed about scheduled events no less than 48 hours in advance. Failing to do so can result in a fine, though this does not mean that an unregistered gathering will be automatically dissolved by the police. However, if the police have doubts about a particular gathering and suspect it might endanger public security, the event can be called off.
Recent events, especially during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, have seen an increase in such incidents. Planned demonstrations against Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip have been among these occurrences. The climate change protests, where young people adhered themselves to the floor, have also attracted significant public attention. Notably, key representatives of the Austrian state, including Federal President Van der Bellen, have sided with the demonstrators.
On some occasions, the courts declared government actions against groups that wanted to assemble as unlawful. The FPÖ, one of the harshest and most powerful critics of liberal democracy, benefited from these judgments, as seen in early 2021. This situation demonstrates that Austria is willing to face the challenging task of allowing public criticism against some of its most fundamental values, rather than simply keeping those groups at bay through legal means.
Different societal groups have played varying roles in the recent chapters of civil society development. Women have been particularly active in pandemic-related protests in Austria, while some observers believe that Muslims, or “political Islam,” have been gradually pushed to the sidelines of civil society by recent governments.
Citations:
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/h/demoverbot-wegen-corona-nicht-rechtens
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000143726711/klimaproteste-und-versammlungsrechts
Simsa, Ruth. 2023. “Civic Spaces between Turbulent Politics and the Pandemic-The Civil Society in Austria.” Contested Civic Spaces: A European Perspective 22: 133.
Hafez, F. 2023. “Criminalizing Muslim Agency in Europe: The Case of ‘Political Islam’ in Austria, Germany, and France.” French Cultural Studies 34 (3): 313-328. https://doi.org/10.1177/09571558221133253
Daniel, Antje, Markus Brunner, and Florian Knasmüller. 2023. “Does Gender Play a Role?: A Gendered Frame Analysis of the Pandemic Skeptic Protests in Austria.” German Politics and Society 41 (2): 61-79.
https://www.wienerzeitung.at/h/demoverbot-wegen-corona-nicht-rechtens
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000143726711/klimaproteste-und-versammlungsrechts
Simsa, Ruth. 2023. “Civic Spaces between Turbulent Politics and the Pandemic-The Civil Society in Austria.” Contested Civic Spaces: A European Perspective 22: 133.
Hafez, F. 2023. “Criminalizing Muslim Agency in Europe: The Case of ‘Political Islam’ in Austria, Germany, and France.” French Cultural Studies 34 (3): 313-328. https://doi.org/10.1177/09571558221133253
Daniel, Antje, Markus Brunner, and Florian Knasmüller. 2023. “Does Gender Play a Role?: A Gendered Frame Analysis of the Pandemic Skeptic Protests in Austria.” German Politics and Society 41 (2): 61-79.
Belgium
Belgium is known for its extensive civil liberties, as confirmed by the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, which ranks Belgium 8th out of 140 countries for fundamental rights. Notably, Belgium performs exceptionally well in the sub-factors of “Freedom of opinion and expression” and “Freedom of assembly and association.”
However, these civil liberties can sometimes appear endangered, primarily due to political responses to external shocks or events. During the COVID-19 crisis, civil liberties were under pressure, with restrictions on the right to assemble and, consequently, to demonstrate. High tension within the police forces, bordering on exhaustion, resulted in acts of violence both from and against the police. While these were not part of a deliberate policy to restrict civil liberties, they contributed to a gradual erosion of norms.
This trend likely began with the 2001 terror attacks in the United States and accelerated following the 2015 and 2016 attacks across Europe. As early as 2016, Human Rights Watch expressed “grounds for concern” about counterterror measures.
With the end of the COVID-19 crisis, these restrictions were loosened. However, the debate around the effective freedom of assembly has been reignited by the government’s plan to introduce a bill proposed by Justice Minister Vincent Van Quickenborne. The bill would allow judges to ban individuals who commit protest-related offenses, such as assault or property damage, from participating in future demonstrations. Unions and the president of the Human Rights League (LDH) have deemed this bill too stringent, fearing it would “pose great risks to the right to collective action in general.”
However, these civil liberties can sometimes appear endangered, primarily due to political responses to external shocks or events. During the COVID-19 crisis, civil liberties were under pressure, with restrictions on the right to assemble and, consequently, to demonstrate. High tension within the police forces, bordering on exhaustion, resulted in acts of violence both from and against the police. While these were not part of a deliberate policy to restrict civil liberties, they contributed to a gradual erosion of norms.
This trend likely began with the 2001 terror attacks in the United States and accelerated following the 2015 and 2016 attacks across Europe. As early as 2016, Human Rights Watch expressed “grounds for concern” about counterterror measures.
With the end of the COVID-19 crisis, these restrictions were loosened. However, the debate around the effective freedom of assembly has been reignited by the government’s plan to introduce a bill proposed by Justice Minister Vincent Van Quickenborne. The bill would allow judges to ban individuals who commit protest-related offenses, such as assault or property damage, from participating in future demonstrations. Unions and the president of the Human Rights League (LDH) have deemed this bill too stringent, fearing it would “pose great risks to the right to collective action in general.”
Citations:
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Belgium/Fundamental%20Rights/
https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/workers-strike-against-bill-banning-rioters-from-protests-fourteen-arrested-as-activists-occupy-gas-terminal/
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Belgium/Fundamental%20Rights/
https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/workers-strike-against-bill-banning-rioters-from-protests-fourteen-arrested-as-activists-occupy-gas-terminal/
Canada
Canada has a legal framework that generally supports freedom of assembly as a fundamental right. This freedom is protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is part of the Constitution Act of 1982. This includes the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.
Freedom of assembly, like all other rights enumerated in the Charter, is not absolute. It is subject to reasonable limitations that can be justified “in a free and democratic society.” This allows governments to impose certain restrictions on the time, place, and manner of assemblies to balance individual rights with the broader public interest.
There are, however, very few barriers to assembly and protest in Canada with the exception of hate groups and banned organizations, which are very few (Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression). In many cases, local authorities may require organizers to obtain permits for certain types of assemblies, especially large gatherings or events that may impact public safety or traffic. These permit requirements are typically meant to balance the right to assembly with the need for public order.
Law enforcement agencies are responsible for managing public events and ensuring public safety. However, interventions by law enforcement must comply with the law and should not unduly restrict the right to peaceful assembly.
Freedom of assembly, like all other rights enumerated in the Charter, is not absolute. It is subject to reasonable limitations that can be justified “in a free and democratic society.” This allows governments to impose certain restrictions on the time, place, and manner of assemblies to balance individual rights with the broader public interest.
There are, however, very few barriers to assembly and protest in Canada with the exception of hate groups and banned organizations, which are very few (Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression). In many cases, local authorities may require organizers to obtain permits for certain types of assemblies, especially large gatherings or events that may impact public safety or traffic. These permit requirements are typically meant to balance the right to assembly with the need for public order.
Law enforcement agencies are responsible for managing public events and ensuring public safety. However, interventions by law enforcement must comply with the law and should not unduly restrict the right to peaceful assembly.
Citations:
Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression: Legal Boundaries in Canada
Background Paper – Julian Walker, Legal and Social Affairs Division, Parliament of Canada
Publication No. 2018-25-E
https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/201825E
Hate Speech and Freedom of Expression: Legal Boundaries in Canada
Background Paper – Julian Walker, Legal and Social Affairs Division, Parliament of Canada
Publication No. 2018-25-E
https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPublications/201825E
Czechia
Freedoms of association and assembly are fully guaranteed in the Czech Republic. The law on political parties and movements regulates the formation and registration of all political entities. As of April – October 2020, over 147,257 autonomous, self-organized groups, associations, foundations, and organizations are registered in the country, although not all are active.
The influx of refugees from Ukraine mobilized civil society; volunteers worked around the clock at the main arrival points, such as the Prague train station and key border crossings, to help refugees. In addition, small groups and individuals offered free transit from the Slovak-Ukraine borders. In the first half of 2022, Czechs donated CZK 4 billion (€168 million) to humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine.
The Ukrainian community also mobilized to provide translation services. In response to the refugee, energy, and financial crises, several anti-government protests took place, especially in Prague. Some of these protests, organized by parties and organizations with no representation in parliament, threatened to turn violent.
The extent of the right to peaceful protest was tested during a demonstration related to the conflict in Gaza, highlighting both the authorities’ power to declare protests illegal and the legal limits on their actions. Theologian and author Filip Outrata sought permission for a demonstration with the slogan “From the river to the sea Palestine will be free.” The Ministry of the Interior warned that propagating the slogan could be a criminal offense, and the Prague city administration banned the demonstration. However, on December 17, 2023, the municipal court ruled that the ban itself was not legal. After hearing from academic experts on political extremism, the court accepted that the slogan was not inherently anti-Semitic or a call to genocide. It was not solely used by Hamas and had different possible interpretations depending on the context.
The influx of refugees from Ukraine mobilized civil society; volunteers worked around the clock at the main arrival points, such as the Prague train station and key border crossings, to help refugees. In addition, small groups and individuals offered free transit from the Slovak-Ukraine borders. In the first half of 2022, Czechs donated CZK 4 billion (€168 million) to humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine.
The Ukrainian community also mobilized to provide translation services. In response to the refugee, energy, and financial crises, several anti-government protests took place, especially in Prague. Some of these protests, organized by parties and organizations with no representation in parliament, threatened to turn violent.
The extent of the right to peaceful protest was tested during a demonstration related to the conflict in Gaza, highlighting both the authorities’ power to declare protests illegal and the legal limits on their actions. Theologian and author Filip Outrata sought permission for a demonstration with the slogan “From the river to the sea Palestine will be free.” The Ministry of the Interior warned that propagating the slogan could be a criminal offense, and the Prague city administration banned the demonstration. However, on December 17, 2023, the municipal court ruled that the ban itself was not legal. After hearing from academic experts on political extremism, the court accepted that the slogan was not inherently anti-Semitic or a call to genocide. It was not solely used by Hamas and had different possible interpretations depending on the context.
Citations:
https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/cost-of-living-protesters-clash-with-police-austerity-measures-cause-discontent/
https://denikreferendum.cz/clanek/35939-rec-zalobce-proti-zakazu-hesla-svobodu-palestine-od-reky-az-k-mori
https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/cost-of-living-protesters-clash-with-police-austerity-measures-cause-discontent/
https://denikreferendum.cz/clanek/35939-rec-zalobce-proti-zakazu-hesla-svobodu-palestine-od-reky-az-k-mori
Denmark
Civil society organizations have a strong presence in Denmark. The country has a long tradition of voluntary groups, including social organizations, that pursue specific interests and objectives. Most Danes are members of one or several such organizations, including unions and various other associations. Contributions and donations to charitable associations are tax-deductible up to a total cap of DKK 17,700 in 2023. Municipalities are required to support associations financially by providing meeting rooms and other resources.
One explanation for Denmark’s comparatively rich associational life is the historical fact that the country’s major political parties have long been connected to civil society organizations (Pedersen 1989). Although the strong formal ties between these organizations and political parties have weakened substantially, civil organizations remain influential. Many still have a clear voice in the political process.
There are two major sources of bias in associational life in Denmark. First, citizens with low socioeconomic status are considerably less likely to be part of civil society organizations, probably due to costs. Second, immigrants participate in associations less frequently than do native Danes (Medborgerskabsundersøgelsen 2023).
One explanation for Denmark’s comparatively rich associational life is the historical fact that the country’s major political parties have long been connected to civil society organizations (Pedersen 1989). Although the strong formal ties between these organizations and political parties have weakened substantially, civil organizations remain influential. Many still have a clear voice in the political process.
There are two major sources of bias in associational life in Denmark. First, citizens with low socioeconomic status are considerably less likely to be part of civil society organizations, probably due to costs. Second, immigrants participate in associations less frequently than do native Danes (Medborgerskabsundersøgelsen 2023).
Citations:
Medborgerskabsundersøgelsen 2023. https://integrationsbarometer.dk/t al-og-analyser/medborgerskab-ligebehandling-og-selvbestemmelse
Pedersen, M.N. 1989. “En kortfattet oversigt over det danske partisystems udvikling.” Politica.
Medborgerskabsundersøgelsen 2023. https://integrationsbarometer.dk/t al-og-analyser/medborgerskab-ligebehandling-og-selvbestemmelse
Pedersen, M.N. 1989. “En kortfattet oversigt over det danske partisystems udvikling.” Politica.
Finland
In Finland, citizens can freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions. The constitution safeguards basic political rights such as freedom of association and freedom of assembly. Article 13 in the constitution reads: “Everyone has the right to arrange meetings and demonstrations without a permit, as well as the right to participate in them.”
Everyone has the freedom of association. This freedom includes the right to form an association without a permit, to be a member or not to be a member, and to participate in an association’s activities. The freedom to form trade unions and to organize in order to protect various interests is also guaranteed.
Various laws and guidelines, such as the Act on the Openness of Government Activities, contain provisions on consultation and participation. By and large, the system functions reasonably well. Admittedly, consultation tends to favor organized groups and neglect outside participation. Additionally, consultation is carried out mainly to build consensus rather than to gather support or assess impact. However, in the long run, this helps generate public support for government policies.
Political and civic groups in Finland are able to operate freely without any unwarranted state intrusion or interference in their activities. The government applies transparent and nondiscriminatory criteria when evaluating requests for permits to associate and assemble. There are very few restrictions on assembly and association, which mainly pertain to public safety. These restrictions affect, for example, demonstrations without prior notice or those intended to counter an opposing group (e.g., right-wing activists vs. antiracist movements) or environmental groups trying to block traffic. The government does not employ intimidation, harassment or threats of retaliation to hinder citizens from exercising their rights to legally assemble and associate (e.g., through arbitrary arrests, detentions, imprisonment of peaceful demonstrators or the excessive use of force).
Everyone has the freedom of association. This freedom includes the right to form an association without a permit, to be a member or not to be a member, and to participate in an association’s activities. The freedom to form trade unions and to organize in order to protect various interests is also guaranteed.
Various laws and guidelines, such as the Act on the Openness of Government Activities, contain provisions on consultation and participation. By and large, the system functions reasonably well. Admittedly, consultation tends to favor organized groups and neglect outside participation. Additionally, consultation is carried out mainly to build consensus rather than to gather support or assess impact. However, in the long run, this helps generate public support for government policies.
Political and civic groups in Finland are able to operate freely without any unwarranted state intrusion or interference in their activities. The government applies transparent and nondiscriminatory criteria when evaluating requests for permits to associate and assemble. There are very few restrictions on assembly and association, which mainly pertain to public safety. These restrictions affect, for example, demonstrations without prior notice or those intended to counter an opposing group (e.g., right-wing activists vs. antiracist movements) or environmental groups trying to block traffic. The government does not employ intimidation, harassment or threats of retaliation to hinder citizens from exercising their rights to legally assemble and associate (e.g., through arbitrary arrests, detentions, imprisonment of peaceful demonstrators or the excessive use of force).
Citations:
The Constitution of Finland. https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf
The Constitution of Finland. https://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf
France
Freedom of association has been granted since the passage of the 1901 law on associations. Since a famous ruling of the Constitutional Court in 1971, this freedom constitutes one aspect of the constitutional freedoms. Associations may be created by citizens without any previous authorization; a simple declaration to the prefecture – the local authority representing the state – is sufficient to gain the status of a moral person. The only restrictions concern illegal behaviors, for instance those that may undermine national security, the integrity of the national territory or the republican character of the government.
Some restrictions have been added by the law on republican principles (24 August 2021), which was enacted in response to the increasing frequency of terrorist actions and the rise of movements backing such actions. The law allows for the dissolution of associations that provoke violence against persons or properties. However, any dissolution is subject to legal control by the courts. In a ruling made on 9 November 2023, the Council of State stated precisely the criteria that would be used to judge such a dissolution. Another restriction may be seen in the obligation for any association that applies for state subsidies to sign a moral contract in favor of the country’s republican principles.
During the Macron era (2018 – 2024), 26 associations have been dissolved, an increase compared to seven during the era of President François Hollande (2012 – 2017).
While Amnesty International (2023: 168) has identified instances of religious or racist discrimination or restriction against associations, these rare cases concern associations engaged in illegal actions. All such measures are overseen and if necessary modified or canceled by the courts or the Council of State, and do not alter the general assessment of a large and real guarantee of the freedom of association (Vie publique 2024).
Contemporary France is characterized by a thriving civil society and a significant number of civil society organizations (CSOs). According to official data, there are currently 1.3 million different CSOs with 23 million members aged 14 or above. An average of 70,000 new CSOs are created every year. On the whole, the CSO sector employs about 1.8 million people.
While CSOs are massively subsidized by the state, the share of public funding is going down, forcing CSOs to look for alternative funding sources.
Some restrictions have been added by the law on republican principles (24 August 2021), which was enacted in response to the increasing frequency of terrorist actions and the rise of movements backing such actions. The law allows for the dissolution of associations that provoke violence against persons or properties. However, any dissolution is subject to legal control by the courts. In a ruling made on 9 November 2023, the Council of State stated precisely the criteria that would be used to judge such a dissolution. Another restriction may be seen in the obligation for any association that applies for state subsidies to sign a moral contract in favor of the country’s republican principles.
During the Macron era (2018 – 2024), 26 associations have been dissolved, an increase compared to seven during the era of President François Hollande (2012 – 2017).
While Amnesty International (2023: 168) has identified instances of religious or racist discrimination or restriction against associations, these rare cases concern associations engaged in illegal actions. All such measures are overseen and if necessary modified or canceled by the courts or the Council of State, and do not alter the general assessment of a large and real guarantee of the freedom of association (Vie publique 2024).
Contemporary France is characterized by a thriving civil society and a significant number of civil society organizations (CSOs). According to official data, there are currently 1.3 million different CSOs with 23 million members aged 14 or above. An average of 70,000 new CSOs are created every year. On the whole, the CSO sector employs about 1.8 million people.
While CSOs are massively subsidized by the state, the share of public funding is going down, forcing CSOs to look for alternative funding sources.
Citations:
Edith Archambault, Lionel Prouteau. 2020. “France: A Large and Diverse Civil Society Faced with Significant Concerns.” European Union-Russia Civil Society ForumReport, halshs-02884061.
https://www.associations.gouv.fr/les-associations-en-france.html
Prouteau, Lionel, and Valérie Tchernonog. 2022. Le paysage associatif français. Paris: Dalloz.
Vie publique. 2024. “La liberté d’association en France: un état des lieux.” Vie publique.fr, April 23. Retrieved March 7, 2024, from https://www.vie-publique.fr/eclairage/292065-la-liberte-dassociation-en-france-un-etat-des-lieux
Edith Archambault, Lionel Prouteau. 2020. “France: A Large and Diverse Civil Society Faced with Significant Concerns.” European Union-Russia Civil Society ForumReport, halshs-02884061.
https://www.associations.gouv.fr/les-associations-en-france.html
Prouteau, Lionel, and Valérie Tchernonog. 2022. Le paysage associatif français. Paris: Dalloz.
Vie publique. 2024. “La liberté d’association en France: un état des lieux.” Vie publique.fr, April 23. Retrieved March 7, 2024, from https://www.vie-publique.fr/eclairage/292065-la-liberte-dassociation-en-france-un-etat-des-lieux
Germany
The Basic Law grants every German citizen the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed (Article 8). The Federal Act concerning Assemblies and Processions (Versammlungsgesetz des Bundes) specifies relevant regulations regarding the right to freedom of assembly. As the states are responsible for assemblies, some states, such as Bavaria, have enacted their own state laws concerning assemblies. Generally, no prior notification or permission is necessary. However, the regulations differ for assemblies taking place outdoors. These assemblies need to be registered with a public authority at least 48 hours before being announced and may be restricted. This ensures that the authorities can provide protection for the assembly and manage consequences for third parties. Further, in the case of a direct threat to public safety, an assembly may be forbidden or dissolved. The prohibition, however, is considered a last resort to be used when restrictions to avert a threat are not sufficient (BMI, 2023).
In June 2023 the Federal Administrative Court ruled that the overall prohibition of assemblies during the Covid pandemic by the state of Saxony was disproportionate and that exceptions should have been clearly regulated. Simultaneously, it declared that restrictions during a pandemic are justified as a pandemic poses a threat to people’s lives and health (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 2023).
Overall, the allocated score of 3.88 for the year 2022 (V-Dem, 2023) suggests that state authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful assemblies, where a ban or restriction of an assembly concerns only lawful, necessary, and proportionate limitations. Likewise, the World Justice Project’s score for Germany is 0.9, with 1.0 being the highest possible score (World Justice Project, 2022).
While government intimidation is not a systematic issue in Germany, the research project “Police use of excessive force” found that in 2021 there were 2,790 investigations against police officers due to the unlawful use of force, 55% of which were related to protests or other political assemblies. It is important to note that the study’s sample is not representative (Grasnick, 2023).
Additionally, freedom of association is granted to every citizen based on Article 9 of the Basic Law. However, associations violating the constitution or criminal laws are prohibited. Once an association is banned, it becomes illegal and must be dissolved. In practice, the relatively high score of 0.88 implies that political and civic groups are able to form and operate with a significant amount of freedom (V-Dem, 2023).
In June 2023 the Federal Administrative Court ruled that the overall prohibition of assemblies during the Covid pandemic by the state of Saxony was disproportionate and that exceptions should have been clearly regulated. Simultaneously, it declared that restrictions during a pandemic are justified as a pandemic poses a threat to people’s lives and health (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, 2023).
Overall, the allocated score of 3.88 for the year 2022 (V-Dem, 2023) suggests that state authorities almost always allow and actively protect peaceful assemblies, where a ban or restriction of an assembly concerns only lawful, necessary, and proportionate limitations. Likewise, the World Justice Project’s score for Germany is 0.9, with 1.0 being the highest possible score (World Justice Project, 2022).
While government intimidation is not a systematic issue in Germany, the research project “Police use of excessive force” found that in 2021 there were 2,790 investigations against police officers due to the unlawful use of force, 55% of which were related to protests or other political assemblies. It is important to note that the study’s sample is not representative (Grasnick, 2023).
Additionally, freedom of association is granted to every citizen based on Article 9 of the Basic Law. However, associations violating the constitution or criminal laws are prohibited. Once an association is banned, it becomes illegal and must be dissolved. In practice, the relatively high score of 0.88 implies that political and civic groups are able to form and operate with a significant amount of freedom (V-Dem, 2023).
Citations:
Bundesverwaltungsgericht. 2023. “Untersagung von Versammlungen durch die Sächsische Corona-Schutz-Verordnung vom 17. April 2020 war unverhältnismäßig.” Pressemitteilung Nr. 49/2023, 21.06.2023.
BMI. 2023. “Versammlungsrecht.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/staatliche-ordnung/versammlungsrecht/versammlungsrecht-node.html
Grasnick, B. 2023. “Die Definitionsmacht der Polizei.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/gesellschaft/polizeigewalt-studie-100.html
World Justice Project. 2022. “Germany, Fundamental Rights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Germany/Fundamental%20Rights/
V-Dem. 2023. “is missing.”
Bundesverwaltungsgericht. 2023. “Untersagung von Versammlungen durch die Sächsische Corona-Schutz-Verordnung vom 17. April 2020 war unverhältnismäßig.” Pressemitteilung Nr. 49/2023, 21.06.2023.
BMI. 2023. “Versammlungsrecht.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/staatliche-ordnung/versammlungsrecht/versammlungsrecht-node.html
Grasnick, B. 2023. “Die Definitionsmacht der Polizei.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/gesellschaft/polizeigewalt-studie-100.html
World Justice Project. 2022. “Germany, Fundamental Rights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Germany/Fundamental%20Rights/
V-Dem. 2023. “is missing.”
Greece
The Greek constitution guarantees freedom of assembly (Article 11) and association, including the establishment of labor unions, athletic clubs, and other organizations (Articles 12, 23, and 16, para. 9). Political rallies are common, and numerous associations operate freely without unwarranted state intrusion or interference. The courts, rather than the government, evaluate requests for permits to associate or assemble, applying transparent and nondiscriminatory criteria. However, legal restrictions prohibit fascist or racist organizations from participating in parliamentary elections.
In 2022, Greece ranked 42nd out of 140 countries according to the World Justice Project, placing it above average (World Justice Project, 2022). Amnesty International reported in 2022 that, in some instances, police used excessive force against protesters, and security forces engaged in pushbacks against incoming migrants and refugees (Amnesty International, 2022).
In some cases, associations are restricted when foreign policy issues arise. For example, Greek courts, based on the Lausanne Treaty signed between Greece and Turkey in 2023, prohibit associations established by members of the Muslim minority near the Greek-Turkish border in Northern Greece from using the term “Turkish” in their names. The courts argue that this term indicates a collective ethnic identity, while the treaty only recognizes a collective religious identity.
Few restrictions on assembly exist, except when high-ranking foreign dignitaries visit Greece’s capital. There is no intimidation, harassment, or threat of retaliation against citizens exercising their rights to legally assemble and associate.
In 2022, Greece ranked 42nd out of 140 countries according to the World Justice Project, placing it above average (World Justice Project, 2022). Amnesty International reported in 2022 that, in some instances, police used excessive force against protesters, and security forces engaged in pushbacks against incoming migrants and refugees (Amnesty International, 2022).
In some cases, associations are restricted when foreign policy issues arise. For example, Greek courts, based on the Lausanne Treaty signed between Greece and Turkey in 2023, prohibit associations established by members of the Muslim minority near the Greek-Turkish border in Northern Greece from using the term “Turkish” in their names. The courts argue that this term indicates a collective ethnic identity, while the treaty only recognizes a collective religious identity.
Few restrictions on assembly exist, except when high-ranking foreign dignitaries visit Greece’s capital. There is no intimidation, harassment, or threat of retaliation against citizens exercising their rights to legally assemble and associate.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2022. “Greece.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/greece/report-greece/
US Department of State. 2022. “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Greece.” https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/greece/
World Justice Project. 2022. “Greece- Factor 4, Fundamental Rights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Greece/Fundamental%20Rights
Amnesty International. 2022. “Greece.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/greece/report-greece/
US Department of State. 2022. “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Greece.” https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/greece/
World Justice Project. 2022. “Greece- Factor 4, Fundamental Rights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Greece/Fundamental%20Rights
Latvia
Fundamental rights are effectively protected. Latvia ranks 22nd among 142 countries in the World Justice Project Assessment. There are no legal, political, or de facto restrictions for citizens to enjoy freedom of association and assembly. According to Freedom in the World, Latvia scored 88 out of 100, categorizing it as free.
The law protects the freedom of assembly, and the practice is well-established and respected. Some restrictions were applied during COVID-19, but since 2022, all rules have been lifted. However, there was a case when authorities attempted to ban protests. Ogre municipality tried to deny a protest supporting the Ogre Museum in the conflict between the mayor and the museum in 2023. The protest was allowed after a second application to the city and a recommendation from the ombudsman.
Political and civic groups can operate freely. All permit requests to assemble are evaluated according to the criteria set in the law, with an opportunity to appeal to the administrative court afterward.
The law protects the freedom of assembly, and the practice is well-established and respected. Some restrictions were applied during COVID-19, but since 2022, all rules have been lifted. However, there was a case when authorities attempted to ban protests. Ogre municipality tried to deny a protest supporting the Ogre Museum in the conflict between the mayor and the museum in 2023. The protest was allowed after a second application to the city and a recommendation from the ombudsman.
Political and civic groups can operate freely. All permit requests to assemble are evaluated according to the criteria set in the law, with an opportunity to appeal to the administrative court afterward.
Citations:
World Justice Project. 2023. “Latvia.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Latvia/Fundamental%20Rights/
Freedom House. 2023. “Latvia.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/latvia/freedom-world/2023
World Justice Project. 2023. “Latvia.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Latvia/Fundamental%20Rights/
Freedom House. 2023. “Latvia.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/latvia/freedom-world/2023
Lithuania
Lithuania’s constitution and other legal norms generally safeguard freedom of association and assembly. Article 35 of the constitution states that “citizens shall be guaranteed the right to freely form societies, parties, and associations, provided that the aims and activities thereof are not contrary to the constitution and laws.” Article 36 says that “citizens may not be prohibited or hindered from assembling unarmed in peaceful meetings.” It also states that “this right may not be limited otherwise than by law and only when this is necessary to protect the security of the State or society, public order, the health or morals of people, or the rights or freedoms of other persons.” The main restrictions, in force since 2022, apply to assemblies that support the military aggression of Russia and Belarus.
In general, political and civic groups can operate freely without state interference in their activities. According to the Freedom House report of 2023, “freedom of assembly is generally respected,” with a ranking of four out of four points assigned in this category. The World Justice Project Report of 2023 also indicates that the freedoms of assembly and association are effectively guaranteed in Lithuania, giving the country a score of 0.78 out of 1.0, and ranking the country 27th out of 142 states worldwide. Additionally, Civicus Monitor in 2023 assigned Lithuania the status of an open country, with a score of 91 out of 100.
In general, political and civic groups can operate freely without state interference in their activities. According to the Freedom House report of 2023, “freedom of assembly is generally respected,” with a ranking of four out of four points assigned in this category. The World Justice Project Report of 2023 also indicates that the freedoms of assembly and association are effectively guaranteed in Lithuania, giving the country a score of 0.78 out of 1.0, and ranking the country 27th out of 142 states worldwide. Additionally, Civicus Monitor in 2023 assigned Lithuania the status of an open country, with a score of 91 out of 100.
Citations:
The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. 1992. Art. 78. https://lrkt.lt/en/about-the-court/legal-information/the-constitution/192
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World Report 2023: Lithuania.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2023
World Justic Project Report 2023. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Lithuania/Fundamental%20Rights/
Civicus Monitor findings 2023. “Lithuania.” https://monitor.civicus.org/country/lithuania/
The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. 1992. Art. 78. https://lrkt.lt/en/about-the-court/legal-information/the-constitution/192
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World Report 2023: Lithuania.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2023
World Justic Project Report 2023. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Lithuania/Fundamental%20Rights/
Civicus Monitor findings 2023. “Lithuania.” https://monitor.civicus.org/country/lithuania/
Portugal
Portugal provides a wide range of civil and political rights and freedoms for its citizens, as outlined in the Portuguese constitution of 1976. This is exemplified by Article 45, which specifically addresses freedom of assembly, and Article 46, which centers on freedom of association.
Every citizen or legal entity can establish and operate an association without any government intervention or discrimination, both de jure and in practice. According to the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index in 2023, Portugal maintained a score above the global and regional averages (0.85/1) in effectively guaranteeing freedom of assembly and association (WJP, 2023).
The Portuguese legal framework strictly prohibits any form of intimidation, harassment, or threats against individuals exercising their right to assemble or associate. The process for establishing an association is transparent and accessible, with clear, non-discriminatory criteria for obtaining permits. This process merely requires citizens to present identification or a residence permit. However, the constitution imposes certain restrictions, notably forbidding the formation of armed, military, or paramilitary groups, as well as racist or fascist organizations.
To further facilitate the formation of associations, Portugal has introduced “Associação na Hora” branches in all district capitals and other regions. Established under Law No. 40/2007, these branches expedite the creation of associations. Additionally, in recent years, incentives have been introduced specifically to foster youth associations.
Freedom of association is respected, and national and international NGOs, including human rights groups, operate freely without unwarranted state intrusion or interference.
Every citizen or legal entity can establish and operate an association without any government intervention or discrimination, both de jure and in practice. According to the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index in 2023, Portugal maintained a score above the global and regional averages (0.85/1) in effectively guaranteeing freedom of assembly and association (WJP, 2023).
The Portuguese legal framework strictly prohibits any form of intimidation, harassment, or threats against individuals exercising their right to assemble or associate. The process for establishing an association is transparent and accessible, with clear, non-discriminatory criteria for obtaining permits. This process merely requires citizens to present identification or a residence permit. However, the constitution imposes certain restrictions, notably forbidding the formation of armed, military, or paramilitary groups, as well as racist or fascist organizations.
To further facilitate the formation of associations, Portugal has introduced “Associação na Hora” branches in all district capitals and other regions. Established under Law No. 40/2007, these branches expedite the creation of associations. Additionally, in recent years, incentives have been introduced specifically to foster youth associations.
Freedom of association is respected, and national and international NGOs, including human rights groups, operate freely without unwarranted state intrusion or interference.
Citations:
Constituição da República Portuguesa. 1976. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=4&tabela=leis
Freedom House. 2023. “2023 Freedom of the World Data: Portugal.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/portugal/freedom-world/2023
WJP. 2023. “World Justice Project Rule of Law Index: Portugal.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/Portugal
Criar uma associação na hora. n.d. “Criar uma associação na hora.” https://eportugal.gov.pt/servicos/criar-uma-associacao-na-hora
Constituição da República Portuguesa. 1976. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=4&tabela=leis
Freedom House. 2023. “2023 Freedom of the World Data: Portugal.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/portugal/freedom-world/2023
WJP. 2023. “World Justice Project Rule of Law Index: Portugal.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/Portugal
Criar uma associação na hora. n.d. “Criar uma associação na hora.” https://eportugal.gov.pt/servicos/criar-uma-associacao-na-hora
Slovakia
Slovakia’s constitution and other legal institutions fully safeguard political rights, including freedom of association and assembly. Political and civic groups can operate freely without unwarranted state intrusion or interference, provided they respect the law. These freedoms can only be restricted under the law and to the extent necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim. The right to associate is executed through registration, which can only be rejected for specific reasons, such as incomplete documentation or if the public space is already booked for another event.
The government does not use intimidation, harassment, or threats of retaliation to prevent citizens from exercising their rights to assemble and associate legally (see Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria 2021).
An example of civic groups operating freely is the Platform of Volunteer Centers and Organizations. In 2023, they organized a series of roundtables with representatives from public administration, local government, and organizations promoting volunteerism. They drafted the National Plan for the Development of Volunteerism for 2024–2030, which is now open for public comment.
The situation may, however, change. The new government, led by Prime Minister Robert Fico, has expressed intentions to adopt new legislation related to NGOs and cancel the existing tax assignation system. Currently, all taxpayers can assign 2 or 3% of their income tax to civil society organizations (CSOs), including associations, foundations, nonprofit funds, and nonprofit organizations delivering public services. Eligible CSOs must be registered annually with a notary, and their activities must be connected with health, sports, social care, culture, education, protection of human rights, environmental protection, research and development, or voluntary work (paragraph 50, the law on income taxation 595/2003). The legislation also permits direct allocations of public funds to CSOs, commonly at the self-government level (laws on budgetary rules 523/2004 and 583/2004).
Robert Fico has referred to some NGOs as foreign agents (see Správy RTVS, 4 November 2023, or Robert Fico’s post on social media). He explicitly called Transparency International Slovakia a foreign agent because it is financed from abroad. Fico announced plans to “copy and paste” the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), a U.S. law requiring political and lobbying groups or individuals linked to foreign entities to register.
The Law on Obligatory Registration of NGOs, which came into effect in 2019 during a Smer-led government, created a register of NGOs launched in 2021. There are more than 82,000 registered NGOs in Slovakia. Concerns over the new government’s actions and rhetoric have increased (ECNL 2023).
The government does not use intimidation, harassment, or threats of retaliation to prevent citizens from exercising their rights to assemble and associate legally (see Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria 2021).
An example of civic groups operating freely is the Platform of Volunteer Centers and Organizations. In 2023, they organized a series of roundtables with representatives from public administration, local government, and organizations promoting volunteerism. They drafted the National Plan for the Development of Volunteerism for 2024–2030, which is now open for public comment.
The situation may, however, change. The new government, led by Prime Minister Robert Fico, has expressed intentions to adopt new legislation related to NGOs and cancel the existing tax assignation system. Currently, all taxpayers can assign 2 or 3% of their income tax to civil society organizations (CSOs), including associations, foundations, nonprofit funds, and nonprofit organizations delivering public services. Eligible CSOs must be registered annually with a notary, and their activities must be connected with health, sports, social care, culture, education, protection of human rights, environmental protection, research and development, or voluntary work (paragraph 50, the law on income taxation 595/2003). The legislation also permits direct allocations of public funds to CSOs, commonly at the self-government level (laws on budgetary rules 523/2004 and 583/2004).
Robert Fico has referred to some NGOs as foreign agents (see Správy RTVS, 4 November 2023, or Robert Fico’s post on social media). He explicitly called Transparency International Slovakia a foreign agent because it is financed from abroad. Fico announced plans to “copy and paste” the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), a U.S. law requiring political and lobbying groups or individuals linked to foreign entities to register.
The Law on Obligatory Registration of NGOs, which came into effect in 2019 during a Smer-led government, created a register of NGOs launched in 2021. There are more than 82,000 registered NGOs in Slovakia. Concerns over the new government’s actions and rhetoric have increased (ECNL 2023).
Citations:
The Right of Peaceful Assembly: A Global Analysis of Domestic Regimes – Slovakia. 2021. Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria. https://www.rightofassembly.info/country/slovakia
Správy RTVS. 2023. “Robert Fico avizuje nový zákon: Mimovládne organizácie by boli označené ako zahraniční agenti. Môže to pomôcť proti dezinformáciám.” https://spravy.rtvs.sk/2023/11/robert-fico-avizoval-novy-zakon-mimovladne-organizacie-by-boli-oznacovane-ako-zahranicny-agent/
FinState.sk. 2024. “Databáza nadácií, neziskových organizácií a združení (Database of foundations, nonprofit organizations and associations).” https://finstat.sk/databaza-nadacii-neziskovych-organizacii-zdruzeni
Ministry of Interior. 2023. Národný program rozvoja dobrovoľníctva na roky 2024 – 2030. Návrh. https://www.dobrovolnickecentra.sk/images/stories/files/2023/Narodny_plan_rozvoja_dobrovolnictva.pdf
The European Center for Not-for-Profit Law Stichting (ECNL). 2023. “Slovak Civil Society Is Concerned That the New Government’s Actions and Rhetoric Are Shrinking Space for Their Work. How Can They Respond?” https://ecnl.org/news/slovakia-civil-society-under-threat
The Right of Peaceful Assembly: A Global Analysis of Domestic Regimes – Slovakia. 2021. Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria. https://www.rightofassembly.info/country/slovakia
Správy RTVS. 2023. “Robert Fico avizuje nový zákon: Mimovládne organizácie by boli označené ako zahraniční agenti. Môže to pomôcť proti dezinformáciám.” https://spravy.rtvs.sk/2023/11/robert-fico-avizoval-novy-zakon-mimovladne-organizacie-by-boli-oznacovane-ako-zahranicny-agent/
FinState.sk. 2024. “Databáza nadácií, neziskových organizácií a združení (Database of foundations, nonprofit organizations and associations).” https://finstat.sk/databaza-nadacii-neziskovych-organizacii-zdruzeni
Ministry of Interior. 2023. Národný program rozvoja dobrovoľníctva na roky 2024 – 2030. Návrh. https://www.dobrovolnickecentra.sk/images/stories/files/2023/Narodny_plan_rozvoja_dobrovolnictva.pdf
The European Center for Not-for-Profit Law Stichting (ECNL). 2023. “Slovak Civil Society Is Concerned That the New Government’s Actions and Rhetoric Are Shrinking Space for Their Work. How Can They Respond?” https://ecnl.org/news/slovakia-civil-society-under-threat
Spain
Article 21 of the constitution affirms the right to peaceful assembly without prior authorization, although authorities must be notified in advance when assemblies are planned in public areas. Article 22 recognizes the right of association, requiring notifications 10 days before an event, with a 24-hour notice acceptable in exceptional cases. Law no. 4/2015 for the Protection of Public Security prohibits spontaneous demonstrations and introduces penalties for failing to declare gatherings at essential community service facilities.
In 2022 and 2023, the government attempted to repeal controversial articles of this law but was unsuccessful due to early elections. Several rule of law reports and the Venice Commission noted the law’s negative impact on the right of assembly and freedom of expression. Political and civic groups operated freely during the review period.
In October and November 2023, protesters demonstrated against the agreement and the investiture of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. Most demonstrations were peaceful, but some groups used violence against public security forces. The government did not apply arbitrary restrictions or employ intimidation or harassment.
In 2022 and 2023, the government attempted to repeal controversial articles of this law but was unsuccessful due to early elections. Several rule of law reports and the Venice Commission noted the law’s negative impact on the right of assembly and freedom of expression. Political and civic groups operated freely during the review period.
In October and November 2023, protesters demonstrated against the agreement and the investiture of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. Most demonstrations were peaceful, but some groups used violence against public security forces. The government did not apply arbitrary restrictions or employ intimidation or harassment.
Switzerland
The constitution safeguards political rights such as freedom of association and freedom of assembly.
Art. 22 states: “Freedom of assembly is guaranteed. Every person has the right to organize meetings and to participate or not to participate in meetings.”
Art. 23 states: “Freedom of association is guaranteed. Every person has the right to form, join or belong to an association and to participate in the activities of an association.”
Art. 28 states: “Employees, employers and their organizations have the right to join together to protect their interests, to form associations, and to join or not to join such associations. Disputes must wherever possible be resolved through negotiation or mediation. Strikes and lockouts are permitted if they relate to employment relations and if they do not contravene any requirements to preserve peaceful employment relations or to conduct conciliation proceedings.”
These constitutional rules are implemented by public authorities without any major deviations in practice. While freedom of association as a fundamental right is strong in international comparison, human rights associations have raised concerns about the extended powers granted to surveillance authorities through the Federal Act on the Intelligence Service (put in place in 2017) for preventive surveillance purposes (Amnesty International 2023; Human Rights.ch). The 2022 Federal Act on Police Measures to Combat Terrorism has raised similar concerns among human rights organizations regarding the prerogatives granted to the Federal Office of Police and the criteria used to justify restraining measures taken against individuals (Amnesty.ch).
Art. 22 states: “Freedom of assembly is guaranteed. Every person has the right to organize meetings and to participate or not to participate in meetings.”
Art. 23 states: “Freedom of association is guaranteed. Every person has the right to form, join or belong to an association and to participate in the activities of an association.”
Art. 28 states: “Employees, employers and their organizations have the right to join together to protect their interests, to form associations, and to join or not to join such associations. Disputes must wherever possible be resolved through negotiation or mediation. Strikes and lockouts are permitted if they relate to employment relations and if they do not contravene any requirements to preserve peaceful employment relations or to conduct conciliation proceedings.”
These constitutional rules are implemented by public authorities without any major deviations in practice. While freedom of association as a fundamental right is strong in international comparison, human rights associations have raised concerns about the extended powers granted to surveillance authorities through the Federal Act on the Intelligence Service (put in place in 2017) for preventive surveillance purposes (Amnesty International 2023; Human Rights.ch). The 2022 Federal Act on Police Measures to Combat Terrorism has raised similar concerns among human rights organizations regarding the prerogatives granted to the Federal Office of Police and the criteria used to justify restraining measures taken against individuals (Amnesty.ch).
Citations:
https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/europe-asie-centrale/suisse/mesures-policieres-de-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-mpt
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The state of the world’s human rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
https://www.humanrights.ch/fr/pfi/droits-humains/securite-interieure/suisse-loi-renseignement
https://www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/europe-asie-centrale/suisse/mesures-policieres-de-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-mpt
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The state of the world’s human rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
https://www.humanrights.ch/fr/pfi/droits-humains/securite-interieure/suisse-loi-renseignement
USA
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the freedom of assembly. Americans have robust rights to form political groups without unwarranted state intrusion or interference in their activities. Similarly, citizen groups usually possess strong rights to use public and private spaces to assemble and promote their ideas (Abrams 2017).
The Supreme Court has permitted a certain degree of government regulation regarding the time, place, and manner of assemblies, adhering to reasonably strict criteria. The court insists that any administrative regulation of the right to assemble must remain strictly neutral concerning the content of the assembly. Alternative means of communication must also be allowed (Nossell 2020).
The Supreme Court has permitted a certain degree of government regulation regarding the time, place, and manner of assemblies, adhering to reasonably strict criteria. The court insists that any administrative regulation of the right to assemble must remain strictly neutral concerning the content of the assembly. Alternative means of communication must also be allowed (Nossell 2020).
Citations:
Floyd Abrams. 2017. The Soul of the First Amendment. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Suzanne Nossell. 2020. Dare to Speak. New York: Dey Street Books.
Floyd Abrams. 2017. The Soul of the First Amendment. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Suzanne Nossell. 2020. Dare to Speak. New York: Dey Street Books.
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
8
Ireland
The 1937 Irish constitution and other legal norms safeguard political rights such as freedom of association and freedom of assembly. In practice, political and civic groups can operate freely without unwarranted state intrusion or interference. Transparent and non-discriminatory criteria are used to evaluate requests for permits to associate and assemble (Papada et al., 2023; WJP 2022). While Ireland experiences some of the global trend of declining civic space, it remained, in 2023, among the world’s 2.1% considered “open” by Civicus, with freedom to associate, demonstrate and express dissent. Nonetheless, government needs to do more to leverage this civil society strength particularly in the local implementation of often controversial policies that lack full consensus. However, there are concerns that powers are not effectively used to police far-right intimidation, with a strategy of soft policing being exercised. Generally, the government does not employ intimidation, harassment or threats of retaliation to hinder citizens from exercising their rights to legally assemble and associate. Nevertheless, there have been incidents of imprisonment of peaceful demonstrators and excessive use of force during some protests, such as the 2023 house evictions and recent environmental protests.
Papada et al. (2023) rate Ireland 8th in its global database, scoring 0.65 on participation, 0.92 on deliberative democracy and 0.89 on egalitarian democracy. The World Justice Project (WJP) 2023 returns an overall score of 84 for Ireland, with a score of 90 (highest) for freedom from arbitrary interference and 0.78 (lowest) for freedom of religion, all indicators being above regional averages (regional average is 0.74 overall).
Papada et al. (2023) rate Ireland 8th in its global database, scoring 0.65 on participation, 0.92 on deliberative democracy and 0.89 on egalitarian democracy. The World Justice Project (WJP) 2023 returns an overall score of 84 for Ireland, with a score of 90 (highest) for freedom from arbitrary interference and 0.78 (lowest) for freedom of religion, all indicators being above regional averages (regional average is 0.74 overall).
Citations:
WJP (World Justice Project). 2023. “WJP 2023 Rule of Law Index | Ireland Insights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPInsights2023.pdf
Papada, E., Altman, D., Angiolillo, F., Gastaldi, L., Köhler, T., Lundstedt, M., Natsika, N., Nord, M., Sato, Y., Wiebrecht, F., Lindberg, S. I. 2023. “Defiance in the Face of Autocratization. Democracy Report 2023.” V-Dem Working Paper - Democracy Report 2023 (March 2). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4560857 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4560857
WJP (World Justice Project). 2023. “WJP 2023 Rule of Law Index | Ireland Insights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPInsights2023.pdf
Papada, E., Altman, D., Angiolillo, F., Gastaldi, L., Köhler, T., Lundstedt, M., Natsika, N., Nord, M., Sato, Y., Wiebrecht, F., Lindberg, S. I. 2023. “Defiance in the Face of Autocratization. Democracy Report 2023.” V-Dem Working Paper - Democracy Report 2023 (March 2). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4560857 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4560857
Italy
The right to assembly is enshrined in the Italian constitution (Article 17), guaranteeing citizens the ability to gather and express their collective views. However, this right is not absolute and is subject to certain limitations imposed by the constitution and the law. All assemblies must be conducted peacefully and without weapons. For public assemblies, organizers must provide prior notice to the local police chief (questore) at least three days before the event. This notice allows the police to assess potential risks and determine whether preventive or supervisory measures are necessary to ensure public safety. If participant safety is deemed at risk, the police may prohibit the assembly. This approach balances the right to assembly with the need to protect public order and safety.
In December 2022, the Italian parliament introduced a new offense penalizing trespassing to organize a musical or entertainment gathering considered detrimental to public health and safety standards. This legislation aimed to address public health and safety concerns but has been criticized for potentially infringing on the fundamental rights of assembly and expression.
According to Amnesty International’s 2023 report, police used excessive force against demonstrators on several occasions during the period under observation. These incidents are isolated cases widely condemned by the media and political leaders. The Meloni government has shown a tendency to be more severe with protest actions from ecologist or leftist groups.
Freedom of association is also enshrined in the Italian constitution (Article 18), guaranteeing citizens the right to freely associate without prior authorization for purposes not prohibited by criminal law. Secret associations and those pursuing political ends through military organizations are prohibited. The constitution explicitly upholds this right in politics (Article 49), labor unions (Article 39), and religion (Article 19). However, ongoing challenges related to freedom of worship persist, including issues such as accessing tax exemptions for religious groups and constructing places of worship. These challenges have been more prevalent for Islamic groups, particularly regarding the construction of mosques in Italy.
According to the World Justice Project (2023), Italy ranks high in the freedom of association, religion, and expression indices.
In December 2022, the Italian parliament introduced a new offense penalizing trespassing to organize a musical or entertainment gathering considered detrimental to public health and safety standards. This legislation aimed to address public health and safety concerns but has been criticized for potentially infringing on the fundamental rights of assembly and expression.
According to Amnesty International’s 2023 report, police used excessive force against demonstrators on several occasions during the period under observation. These incidents are isolated cases widely condemned by the media and political leaders. The Meloni government has shown a tendency to be more severe with protest actions from ecologist or leftist groups.
Freedom of association is also enshrined in the Italian constitution (Article 18), guaranteeing citizens the right to freely associate without prior authorization for purposes not prohibited by criminal law. Secret associations and those pursuing political ends through military organizations are prohibited. The constitution explicitly upholds this right in politics (Article 49), labor unions (Article 39), and religion (Article 19). However, ongoing challenges related to freedom of worship persist, including issues such as accessing tax exemptions for religious groups and constructing places of worship. These challenges have been more prevalent for Islamic groups, particularly regarding the construction of mosques in Italy.
According to the World Justice Project (2023), Italy ranks high in the freedom of association, religion, and expression indices.
Citations:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2023.pdf
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2023.pdf
Japan
Article 21 of the Japanese constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and association, which is respected by the authorities. Marches and street demonstrations require local police permission, but are rarely refused. Peaceful demonstrations are frequently organized by civil society groups representing different ideological stances. These often include protests in front of the Japanese Diet or embassies of different countries. The police rarely interfere, usually arresting only violent protesters.
In principle, those involved in diverse bottom-up initiatives and lobbying for various goals can operate freely in Japan and are not subject to undue restrictions. The activity of civil society groups is regulated by the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities of 1998, and the Association and Foundation Law of 2008. Nonprofit organizations specialize in a wide array of activities, such as promoting health outcomes, environmental conservation, disaster relief, international cooperation, consumer protections, and science and technology. Citizens are permitted to establish foundations and associations regardless of whether they operate in the public interest or not.
Japan’s civil society is comparatively fragmented. Most officially recognized NGOs (referred to as nonprofit organizations or NPOs in Japan) are small and have little or no professional staff. Since a 1998 reform, there are now more stringent regulations for obtaining official recognition, whereas previously there had been significant bureaucratic discretion. Nonetheless, many NPOs closely cooperate with authorities or even take on semi-public roles, which sometimes blurs the line between civil society and the state (Ogawa 2021).
NPOs in Japan are generally exempt from corporation tax, though they have to pay taxes on income related to their profit-making activities. Moreover, there are limitations to tax exemptions and deductions on donations from individuals to certified NPOs, as very few NPOs have the related status (NPO Center).
On the other hand, unjustifiable restrictions on protests became more frequent during the COVID-19 pandemic. In November 2022, the U.N. Human Rights Committee pointed to the problem of arrests of protesters and journalists, as well as excessive use of force by the police and recording of protesters, especially during demonstrations in front of the Diet and in Okinawa.
In principle, those involved in diverse bottom-up initiatives and lobbying for various goals can operate freely in Japan and are not subject to undue restrictions. The activity of civil society groups is regulated by the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities of 1998, and the Association and Foundation Law of 2008. Nonprofit organizations specialize in a wide array of activities, such as promoting health outcomes, environmental conservation, disaster relief, international cooperation, consumer protections, and science and technology. Citizens are permitted to establish foundations and associations regardless of whether they operate in the public interest or not.
Japan’s civil society is comparatively fragmented. Most officially recognized NGOs (referred to as nonprofit organizations or NPOs in Japan) are small and have little or no professional staff. Since a 1998 reform, there are now more stringent regulations for obtaining official recognition, whereas previously there had been significant bureaucratic discretion. Nonetheless, many NPOs closely cooperate with authorities or even take on semi-public roles, which sometimes blurs the line between civil society and the state (Ogawa 2021).
NPOs in Japan are generally exempt from corporation tax, though they have to pay taxes on income related to their profit-making activities. Moreover, there are limitations to tax exemptions and deductions on donations from individuals to certified NPOs, as very few NPOs have the related status (NPO Center).
On the other hand, unjustifiable restrictions on protests became more frequent during the COVID-19 pandemic. In November 2022, the U.N. Human Rights Committee pointed to the problem of arrests of protesters and journalists, as well as excessive use of force by the police and recording of protesters, especially during demonstrations in front of the Diet and in Okinawa.
Citations:
Freedom House. 2022. “Freedom in the World 2022, Japan.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan/freedom-world/2022
Ogawa, Akihiro. 2021. “Civil Society in Japan.” In The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, eds. R.J. Pekkanen and S.M. Pekkanen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 299-316.
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
The Global Development Research Center. 1998. “Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities.” https://www.gdrc.org/ngo/jp-npo_law.pdf
U.N. Human Rights Committee. 2022. “Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Japan.” https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsuBJT%2Fi29ui%2Fb4Ih9%2FUIJO87S0HPMR1PnCPt3LQO6EolLe709268JsfEokJ6QyNqFgswSBy1rovzRJaQqYHclTttywUvvrbUCI%2F6iBnTGHkY
Freedom House. 2022. “Freedom in the World 2022, Japan.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan/freedom-world/2022
Ogawa, Akihiro. 2021. “Civil Society in Japan.” In The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, eds. R.J. Pekkanen and S.M. Pekkanen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 299-316.
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
The Global Development Research Center. 1998. “Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities.” https://www.gdrc.org/ngo/jp-npo_law.pdf
U.N. Human Rights Committee. 2022. “Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Japan.” https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsuBJT%2Fi29ui%2Fb4Ih9%2FUIJO87S0HPMR1PnCPt3LQO6EolLe709268JsfEokJ6QyNqFgswSBy1rovzRJaQqYHclTttywUvvrbUCI%2F6iBnTGHkY
Slovenia
Slovenian civil society organizations are vibrant, active, and reasonably well-organized. The Slovenian constitution guarantees citizens the right to peaceful and public assembly, and everyone has the right to freely associate with others. The “Friday protesters,” who regularly gathered in city centers during the SDS government, especially in Ljubljana but also online during the lockdown, continued their protest activities into early 2022. They focused on mobilizing voters for the parliamentary elections in April 2022 and aimed to remove the government that violated civil liberties. The movement successfully mobilized voters for the center-left option, presenting it as an alternative. The last Friday protest occurred on April 22, shortly before the national elections. Following the change of government and a Constitutional Court decision, the Ministry of the Interior lifted the fines imposed on civil society during the COVID-19 lockdowns.
The government of Prime Minister Golob from the Freedom Movement party appeared more open to proposals from civil society. For example, the coalition parties supported legislative proposals from the 8 March Institute and the NGO Legal Network for the Protection of Democracy. The opposition labeled such cooperation as “Slovenia is governed by civil society.” At the same time, civil society was criticized for being too tolerant of the new government, as most of its promises to civil society remained unfulfilled. In the first year of the Golob government, the Voice of the People initiative highlighted that the government had not fulfilled 113 of the 122 promises made to civil society. The NGO CNVOS, which has been monitoring and analyzing how governments comply with the National Assembly’s Resolution on Normative Activity since 2009 – obliging them to hold a public debate of at least 30 days on each new regulation – found that all governments violate this resolution to a similar extent, namely between 60% and 80%.
There were also some other problematic events. During the traditional Pride parade on June 17 in Ljubljana, several homophobic and transphobic acts – such as insults, thefts, the burning of rainbow flags, physical attacks, and threats – were reported on social media. Additionally, President Pirc Musar was criticized for excluding one member of her Youth Advisory Council, Sara Štiglic, because of her civic activism against pro-life activists and their installation. Women’s rights groups particularly criticized the president’s decision.
The government of Prime Minister Golob from the Freedom Movement party appeared more open to proposals from civil society. For example, the coalition parties supported legislative proposals from the 8 March Institute and the NGO Legal Network for the Protection of Democracy. The opposition labeled such cooperation as “Slovenia is governed by civil society.” At the same time, civil society was criticized for being too tolerant of the new government, as most of its promises to civil society remained unfulfilled. In the first year of the Golob government, the Voice of the People initiative highlighted that the government had not fulfilled 113 of the 122 promises made to civil society. The NGO CNVOS, which has been monitoring and analyzing how governments comply with the National Assembly’s Resolution on Normative Activity since 2009 – obliging them to hold a public debate of at least 30 days on each new regulation – found that all governments violate this resolution to a similar extent, namely between 60% and 80%.
There were also some other problematic events. During the traditional Pride parade on June 17 in Ljubljana, several homophobic and transphobic acts – such as insults, thefts, the burning of rainbow flags, physical attacks, and threats – were reported on social media. Additionally, President Pirc Musar was criticized for excluding one member of her Youth Advisory Council, Sara Štiglic, because of her civic activism against pro-life activists and their installation. Women’s rights groups particularly criticized the president’s decision.
Citations:
Rakar, Tatjana, and Tomaž Deželan. 2023. “The Strength of Civil Society in Slovenia After Three Decades of Post-Communist Experience.” In Handbook of Civil Society and Social Movements in Small States, eds. Lino Briguglio. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 248-261. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341536-21.
CNVOS. 2022. “Števec kršitev, Arhiv prejšnjih vlad.” https://www.cnvos.si/nvo-vseved/stevec-krsitev/arhiv-prejsnjih-vlad/
La. Da. 2023. “Kolesarji ob prvi obletnici vlade nazdovoljni s številom izpolnjenih obljub.” https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/kolesarji-ob-prvi-obletnici-vlade-nezadovoljni-s-stevilom-izpolnjenih-obljub/670330
24ur.com. 2023. “Še en odstop v podporo Sari Štiglic, na njeni strani tudi Golob.” https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/pirc-musarjeva-po-izkljucitvi-stigliceve-plaz-kritik-na-mojo-odlocitev-je-prekomeren.html
Rakar, Tatjana, and Tomaž Deželan. 2023. “The Strength of Civil Society in Slovenia After Three Decades of Post-Communist Experience.” In Handbook of Civil Society and Social Movements in Small States, eds. Lino Briguglio. Abingdon; New York: Routledge, 248-261. DOI: 10.4324/9781003341536-21.
CNVOS. 2022. “Števec kršitev, Arhiv prejšnjih vlad.” https://www.cnvos.si/nvo-vseved/stevec-krsitev/arhiv-prejsnjih-vlad/
La. Da. 2023. “Kolesarji ob prvi obletnici vlade nazdovoljni s številom izpolnjenih obljub.” https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/kolesarji-ob-prvi-obletnici-vlade-nezadovoljni-s-stevilom-izpolnjenih-obljub/670330
24ur.com. 2023. “Še en odstop v podporo Sari Štiglic, na njeni strani tudi Golob.” https://www.24ur.com/novice/slovenija/pirc-musarjeva-po-izkljucitvi-stigliceve-plaz-kritik-na-mojo-odlocitev-je-prekomeren.html
7
Australia
Australia has a long history of civic activism, recently highlighted by the debate on The Voice referendum. Organized social movements have emerged on both sides of this debate, actively presenting their views, especially in urban areas.
The constitution and Australia’s political norms protect the rights of civil society organizations (CSOs) to form and express their views publicly, provided these do not constitute hate speech. Recently, governments throughout the federation have strengthened laws against hate speech and minority vilification, aiming to secure the public space for legitimate debate within acceptable conduct bounds.
While there is tolerance for peaceful protests that do not incite hatred or violence, there has been increasing intolerance in some jurisdictions for protests that are merely “disruptive.” For example, the South Australian government recently passed legislation significantly increasing the penalties for protests that cause traffic chaos (Prosser and Richards 2023). This law responded to pro-environment activism in Adelaide, increasing the maximum penalty for such protests from AUD 750 to AUD 50,000 or three-months’ imprisonment.
Civicus, the civic space monitor, rated conditions in Australia as “narrowed” in its most recent report (Civicus 2023). In 2018, conditions were rated as “open.” Concerns raised by Civicus include harsh treatment of whistleblowers, anti-protest laws clashing with international standards, and the willingness to arrest climate protesters (Civicus 2023).
The constitution and Australia’s political norms protect the rights of civil society organizations (CSOs) to form and express their views publicly, provided these do not constitute hate speech. Recently, governments throughout the federation have strengthened laws against hate speech and minority vilification, aiming to secure the public space for legitimate debate within acceptable conduct bounds.
While there is tolerance for peaceful protests that do not incite hatred or violence, there has been increasing intolerance in some jurisdictions for protests that are merely “disruptive.” For example, the South Australian government recently passed legislation significantly increasing the penalties for protests that cause traffic chaos (Prosser and Richards 2023). This law responded to pro-environment activism in Adelaide, increasing the maximum penalty for such protests from AUD 750 to AUD 50,000 or three-months’ imprisonment.
Civicus, the civic space monitor, rated conditions in Australia as “narrowed” in its most recent report (Civicus 2023). In 2018, conditions were rated as “open.” Concerns raised by Civicus include harsh treatment of whistleblowers, anti-protest laws clashing with international standards, and the willingness to arrest climate protesters (Civicus 2023).
Citations:
Civicus. 2023. “Australia: Protesters Face Arrest While Security Laws Are Putting Press Freedom at Risk.” Monitor. https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/australia-protesters-face-arrest-while-security-laws-are-putting-press-freedom-at-risk/
Prosser, C., and S. Richards. 2023. “South Australia’s Protest Laws Are Changing. Here’s How.” ABC News June 2. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-06-02/south-australia-public-obstruction-laws-explainer-/102418400
Civicus. 2023. “Australia: Protesters Face Arrest While Security Laws Are Putting Press Freedom at Risk.” Monitor. https://monitor.civicus.org/explore/australia-protesters-face-arrest-while-security-laws-are-putting-press-freedom-at-risk/
Prosser, C., and S. Richards. 2023. “South Australia’s Protest Laws Are Changing. Here’s How.” ABC News June 2. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-06-02/south-australia-public-obstruction-laws-explainer-/102418400
UK
In most respects, UK civil society enjoys similar freedoms to its continental European neighbors, with few restrictions on membership in civil society organizations or their ability to function. The main exceptions are groups deemed to foster political extremism or terrorist-related activities. While the UK has an unwritten constitution, the 1998 Human Rights Act conferred rights equivalent to those set out in the European Convention on Human Rights. However, the government and some sections of the Conservative Party periodically criticize the Convention and the Strasbourg Court, with ongoing demands for the UK to withdraw from the court. These demands have resurfaced in connection with the government’s efforts to curb irregular migration by sending migrants to Rwanda, a policy that has yet to result in any migrants being sent.
The government has also been inclined to limit certain rights of assembly, usually citing security or public order concerns. Successive versions of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, since 2015, impose various restrictions, such as on the right of entry into the UK and powers of investigation. The right to demonstrate was tested after the October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas on Israel. Despite calls from some leading politicians to ban demonstrations, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, citing the Public Order Act, rejected these calls but worked with organizers to agree on conditions provided in the Act.
The UK has an exceptionally high number of CCTV cameras, estimated to be the third highest density after China and the United States, and is more receptive to facial recognition technology than the EU. There appear to be no plans for legislation equivalent to the EU’s 2023 Artificial Intelligence Act. However, the adoption of facial recognition by a property developer elicited a backlash, and the Information Commissioner’s Office provides regulatory protections.
For the most part, citizens are unaffected by these provisions and are not inhibited from demonstrations or other forms of assembly. In fact, there has been criticism of lax policing of protests against climate change by groups like Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion. Authorities are sometimes accused of harsher treatment of certain groups, such as the tough policing by the London Metropolitan Police Service of a vigil for Sarah Everard, a woman murdered by a serving police officer. This incident prompted the Met to commission a review into its “culture and standards of behavior” (Casey 2023). Regarding CCTV, public concerns are mitigated by evidence that cameras help in the fight against crime.
The government has also been inclined to limit certain rights of assembly, usually citing security or public order concerns. Successive versions of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, since 2015, impose various restrictions, such as on the right of entry into the UK and powers of investigation. The right to demonstrate was tested after the October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas on Israel. Despite calls from some leading politicians to ban demonstrations, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, citing the Public Order Act, rejected these calls but worked with organizers to agree on conditions provided in the Act.
The UK has an exceptionally high number of CCTV cameras, estimated to be the third highest density after China and the United States, and is more receptive to facial recognition technology than the EU. There appear to be no plans for legislation equivalent to the EU’s 2023 Artificial Intelligence Act. However, the adoption of facial recognition by a property developer elicited a backlash, and the Information Commissioner’s Office provides regulatory protections.
For the most part, citizens are unaffected by these provisions and are not inhibited from demonstrations or other forms of assembly. In fact, there has been criticism of lax policing of protests against climate change by groups like Just Stop Oil and Extinction Rebellion. Authorities are sometimes accused of harsher treatment of certain groups, such as the tough policing by the London Metropolitan Police Service of a vigil for Sarah Everard, a woman murdered by a serving police officer. This incident prompted the Met to commission a review into its “culture and standards of behavior” (Casey 2023). Regarding CCTV, public concerns are mitigated by evidence that cameras help in the fight against crime.
Citations:
https://www.calipsa.io/blog/cctv-statistics-in-the-uk-your-questions-answered
https://news.met.police.uk/news/statement-ahead-of-palestinian-solidarity-campaign-march-in-central-london-474457
Casey, L. 2023. “Baroness Casey Review Final Report: March 2023.” https://www.met.police.uk/police-forces/metropolitan-police/areas/about-us/about-the-met/bcr/baroness-casey-review
https://www.calipsa.io/blog/cctv-statistics-in-the-uk-your-questions-answered
https://news.met.police.uk/news/statement-ahead-of-palestinian-solidarity-campaign-march-in-central-london-474457
Casey, L. 2023. “Baroness Casey Review Final Report: March 2023.” https://www.met.police.uk/police-forces/metropolitan-police/areas/about-us/about-the-met/bcr/baroness-casey-review
6
Israel
Freedom of association is not a constitutionally protected right. Instead, it is protected via a Supreme Court ruling. In Israel, there are relatively few legal barriers to forming associations. A group of people can register as an association with the Association Registrar. Similarly, freedom of assembly is not legally institutionalized but rather guaranteed through a Supreme Court ruling. In practice, there are also relatively few limitations on protests.
During the recent protests against overhauling the judiciary, the minister of national security (formerly minister of police and internal security) and the prime minister made several attempts to limit the demonstrations. However, these attempts were thwarted by the attorney general. During the ongoing war with Hamas, there have also been attempts to limit demonstrations calling for a cease-fire, but these restrictions were overruled by the Supreme Court.
In general, as the extensive protest against overhauling the judicial overhaul demonstrates, freedom of assembly in Israel is a protected right and is maintained even under the current populist government.
In recent years, there have been constant attempts to limit the operation of various civil society organizations by restricting their fundraising capabilities or attempting to make some associations illegal. These efforts primarily target left-wing and human rights organizations that rely on external funding, for example, from the European Union. These attempts remain ongoing, with little success. Although some left-wing organizations have been banned from entering schools, this remains an exception.
Nonetheless, during Israel’s war with Hamas and the protests against overhauling the judiciary, the police have used excessive force to stop demonstrations, including violent and in some cases seemingly political arrests. This was also part of the minister’s policy, which encouraged the police to use force and threatened to dismiss the police officer in charge of the Tel Aviv District, who said he would not authorize violence during the protests. The use of excessive force by the police can more frequently be seen in cases involving Arab or Palestinian protesters, as well as when protesters belong to Jewish minority groups such as those of Ethiopian descent or ultraorthodox groups.
During the recent protests against overhauling the judiciary, the minister of national security (formerly minister of police and internal security) and the prime minister made several attempts to limit the demonstrations. However, these attempts were thwarted by the attorney general. During the ongoing war with Hamas, there have also been attempts to limit demonstrations calling for a cease-fire, but these restrictions were overruled by the Supreme Court.
In general, as the extensive protest against overhauling the judicial overhaul demonstrates, freedom of assembly in Israel is a protected right and is maintained even under the current populist government.
In recent years, there have been constant attempts to limit the operation of various civil society organizations by restricting their fundraising capabilities or attempting to make some associations illegal. These efforts primarily target left-wing and human rights organizations that rely on external funding, for example, from the European Union. These attempts remain ongoing, with little success. Although some left-wing organizations have been banned from entering schools, this remains an exception.
Nonetheless, during Israel’s war with Hamas and the protests against overhauling the judiciary, the police have used excessive force to stop demonstrations, including violent and in some cases seemingly political arrests. This was also part of the minister’s policy, which encouraged the police to use force and threatened to dismiss the police officer in charge of the Tel Aviv District, who said he would not authorize violence during the protests. The use of excessive force by the police can more frequently be seen in cases involving Arab or Palestinian protesters, as well as when protesters belong to Jewish minority groups such as those of Ethiopian descent or ultraorthodox groups.
Netherlands
All the usual political liberties are guaranteed by the constitution. The Netherlands is a signatory to all pertinent major international treaties (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European Convention on Human Rights). All relevant ranking institutions, such as The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index and the Freedom House ranking of political liberties, consistently list the Netherlands as one of the top five most free countries in the world.
However, the freedoms of assembly and demonstration have been subject to considerable pressure. The number and size of demonstrations is changing due to the fast organizing power of social media. Meanwhile, in addition to the “classic” forms of demonstration, there are new forms of protest such as the defacement of art, gluing oneself to the street or blocking a highway. Especially when protests turn into unannounced visits to the homes of politicians, police officers or journalists, demonstrators are seen as going over the bounds of normal rules of conduct.
In summer 2022, farmers organized a series of protests against government policies relating to the reduction of nitrogen emissions by agricultural enterprises near protected Natura 2000 areas. Demonstrators used huge parades of tractors to block the nation’s highways and access to supermarkets’ distribution centers and government buildings in provincial capitals. Police forces were accused of failing to intervene and manage the protests. The Sinterklaas parade in Staphorst in 2022 featured tensions between anti-Blackface activists who were on their way to the site of an approved demonstration and a crowd of intimidating and even violent pro-Blackface individuals. Despite a large-scale police presence, security forces proved unable or unwilling to deal with this. The mayor subsequently issued a ban on the anti-Blackface demonstration. Thus, a legal demonstration was banned only because of the behavior of a hostile public that could no longer be adequately dealt with by the public authorities.
Amnesty International has argued that both national and local governments are failing to guarantee the right to demonstrate. In practice, police frequently ask peaceful protesters for their identification. Demonstrators are sometimes monitored via social media or even receive unannounced visits from the police. Especially with large demonstrations and blockades, the police quite often engage in (mass) detentions or enclose groups of protesters (kettling), or administratively relocate protesters.
In brief, demonstrations are seen primarily as a risk to public order, not as the exercise of a human right. Adequate, independent evaluation of government action is lacking. However, consultations sometimes take place in which organized demonstrators and local government negotiate on conditions for safe demonstrations.
In addition, there is a process of democratic backsliding underway, visible in public opinion and behavior of political elites. There is an increasing proportion of Dutch citizens that are tolerant of violence for political means. Even some legislators, particularly those belonging to the extreme-right FvD party, have threatened colleagues belonging to other parties.
However, the freedoms of assembly and demonstration have been subject to considerable pressure. The number and size of demonstrations is changing due to the fast organizing power of social media. Meanwhile, in addition to the “classic” forms of demonstration, there are new forms of protest such as the defacement of art, gluing oneself to the street or blocking a highway. Especially when protests turn into unannounced visits to the homes of politicians, police officers or journalists, demonstrators are seen as going over the bounds of normal rules of conduct.
In summer 2022, farmers organized a series of protests against government policies relating to the reduction of nitrogen emissions by agricultural enterprises near protected Natura 2000 areas. Demonstrators used huge parades of tractors to block the nation’s highways and access to supermarkets’ distribution centers and government buildings in provincial capitals. Police forces were accused of failing to intervene and manage the protests. The Sinterklaas parade in Staphorst in 2022 featured tensions between anti-Blackface activists who were on their way to the site of an approved demonstration and a crowd of intimidating and even violent pro-Blackface individuals. Despite a large-scale police presence, security forces proved unable or unwilling to deal with this. The mayor subsequently issued a ban on the anti-Blackface demonstration. Thus, a legal demonstration was banned only because of the behavior of a hostile public that could no longer be adequately dealt with by the public authorities.
Amnesty International has argued that both national and local governments are failing to guarantee the right to demonstrate. In practice, police frequently ask peaceful protesters for their identification. Demonstrators are sometimes monitored via social media or even receive unannounced visits from the police. Especially with large demonstrations and blockades, the police quite often engage in (mass) detentions or enclose groups of protesters (kettling), or administratively relocate protesters.
In brief, demonstrations are seen primarily as a risk to public order, not as the exercise of a human right. Adequate, independent evaluation of government action is lacking. However, consultations sometimes take place in which organized demonstrators and local government negotiate on conditions for safe demonstrations.
In addition, there is a process of democratic backsliding underway, visible in public opinion and behavior of political elites. There is an increasing proportion of Dutch citizens that are tolerant of violence for political means. Even some legislators, particularly those belonging to the extreme-right FvD party, have threatened colleagues belonging to other parties.
Citations:
Parlementaire Monitor. 2023. “mw. Bruins Slot, Minister van BZK.” July 7.
Amnesty International. n.d. DEMONSTRATIERECHT ONDER DRUK. Regels en praktijk in Nederland moeten beter.
Groene Amsterdammer/Investico Onderzoeksjournalisten. 2023. “Klein tegen de grote politie. Onderzoek Demonstratierecht in de knel.” Groene Amsterdammer March 23.
Erasmus School of Law. 2023. “Hoe de drang naar veiligheid het demonstratierecht in gevaar brengt.” 30 mrt.
NOS Nieuws. 2022. “Politici voelen zich onveilig door protest bij voordeur, ‘aanval op democratie’.” June 29.
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/5426691/onderzoek-scp-omverwerpen-overheidssysteem-hardere-acties-regering
Parlementaire Monitor. 2023. “mw. Bruins Slot, Minister van BZK.” July 7.
Amnesty International. n.d. DEMONSTRATIERECHT ONDER DRUK. Regels en praktijk in Nederland moeten beter.
Groene Amsterdammer/Investico Onderzoeksjournalisten. 2023. “Klein tegen de grote politie. Onderzoek Demonstratierecht in de knel.” Groene Amsterdammer March 23.
Erasmus School of Law. 2023. “Hoe de drang naar veiligheid het demonstratierecht in gevaar brengt.” 30 mrt.
NOS Nieuws. 2022. “Politici voelen zich onveilig door protest bij voordeur, ‘aanval op democratie’.” June 29.
https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/5426691/onderzoek-scp-omverwerpen-overheidssysteem-hardere-acties-regering
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
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Hungary
The Hungarian Basic Law guarantees freedom of assembly and association. However, in recent years, both rights have been challenged from multiple sides. During the migration crisis, the right to assembly was constrained, and these limitations expanded during the pandemic. The transition from justifying the state of emergency (as of the time of writing prolonged until May 2024) with reference to COVID-19 to a reference to the war in Ukraine indicates that these limitations serve as means of support for government policies. For instance, demonstrations by teachers against the government’s education policies have been harshly restricted, leading teachers to challenge the government legally. The government is currently able to govern by decree. Organizations such as Transparency International Hungary (Mikola 2021) and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union have heavily criticized the situation. Since the 2016 – 2017 period, when the Orbán government implemented several measures targeting civil society organizations, NGOs have faced an increasingly hostile environment. CSO sustainability has been impeded (United States Agency for International Development 2022: 2). CSO face threats with respect to the legal environment, their organizational capacity and finances, and the public image of CSOs overall. The “lex NGO” treats foreign-financed organizations in a way similar to Russia’s foreign-agent law, putting them under a registration obligation, especially if they are publicly funded or registered as nonprofit organizations. Noncompliance can result in fines or dissolution, although these penalties are used more as intimidation and are rarely enforced in practice. Other discriminatory measures, such as the “Stop Soros Law,” impose punitive fines on organizations that support migration.
The European Court of Justice deemed the “lex NGO” incompatible with EU norms. It took significant pressure from the EU to prompt the government to change the law (Law XLIX/2021). However, the changes that have been made are largely cosmetic, such as varying thresholds and granting exemptions for religious communities, sports associations and ethnic minority bodies. The amended law bypasses the government’s responsibility to the Audit Office, turning the agency into a political body beyond its constitutionally given scope, whose reports cannot be legally challenged. Not surprisingly, the State Audit Office has imposed some highly dubious fines on the issue. Eight affected NGOs have complained about the amended law to the Constitutional Court. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee considers the law to be a violation of freedom of association and expression (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2022).
Not deterred by these challenges, the government opened a new front in November 2023 by adopting a Sovereignty Protection Act. The act aims to establish an Office for the Defense of National Sovereignty. The law reads like a frontal offense to international organizations, and even mentions the combination of international organizations and the left-liberal political camp as a “threat to Hungarian sovereignty.” The office could be used to supervise the political and financial activities of people and organizations not sharing Orbán’s illiberal, nationalistic and populist view of the world. This constitutes yet another step in Hungary’s deviation from basic standards of Western democracies, even though it formally has a mandate only to investigate foreign-funded activities aimed at influencing election outcomes. Intimidating communication campaigns targeting organized LGBTQ+ communities add to insecurities. Civil society organizations have reacted to the threat by forming the Civilizáció (Civilisation) platform, uniting several prominent CSOs with international networks to combat democratic backsliding in Hungary. Compared to the money the government uses to further its narratives, this attempt is small but noteworthy.
The European Court of Justice deemed the “lex NGO” incompatible with EU norms. It took significant pressure from the EU to prompt the government to change the law (Law XLIX/2021). However, the changes that have been made are largely cosmetic, such as varying thresholds and granting exemptions for religious communities, sports associations and ethnic minority bodies. The amended law bypasses the government’s responsibility to the Audit Office, turning the agency into a political body beyond its constitutionally given scope, whose reports cannot be legally challenged. Not surprisingly, the State Audit Office has imposed some highly dubious fines on the issue. Eight affected NGOs have complained about the amended law to the Constitutional Court. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee considers the law to be a violation of freedom of association and expression (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2022).
Not deterred by these challenges, the government opened a new front in November 2023 by adopting a Sovereignty Protection Act. The act aims to establish an Office for the Defense of National Sovereignty. The law reads like a frontal offense to international organizations, and even mentions the combination of international organizations and the left-liberal political camp as a “threat to Hungarian sovereignty.” The office could be used to supervise the political and financial activities of people and organizations not sharing Orbán’s illiberal, nationalistic and populist view of the world. This constitutes yet another step in Hungary’s deviation from basic standards of Western democracies, even though it formally has a mandate only to investigate foreign-funded activities aimed at influencing election outcomes. Intimidating communication campaigns targeting organized LGBTQ+ communities add to insecurities. Civil society organizations have reacted to the threat by forming the Civilizáció (Civilisation) platform, uniting several prominent CSOs with international networks to combat democratic backsliding in Hungary. Compared to the money the government uses to further its narratives, this attempt is small but noteworthy.
Citations:
Hungarian Helsinki Committee. 2022. https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/05/HHC_LexNGO2021_info_note.pdf
United States Agency for International Development. 2022. “2021 Civil Society Organization Index Hungary.” October. https://okotars.hu/sites/default/files/downloads/hungary_2021.pdf
Mikola, Bálint. 2021. “Hungary’s Rule of Law Backsliding Continues Amidst the COVID-19 Crisis.” Transparency International February 18. https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/hungarys-rule-of-law-backsliding-continues-amidst-the-covid-19-crisis
Hungarian Helsinki Committee. 2022. https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/05/HHC_LexNGO2021_info_note.pdf
United States Agency for International Development. 2022. “2021 Civil Society Organization Index Hungary.” October. https://okotars.hu/sites/default/files/downloads/hungary_2021.pdf
Mikola, Bálint. 2021. “Hungary’s Rule of Law Backsliding Continues Amidst the COVID-19 Crisis.” Transparency International February 18. https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/hungarys-rule-of-law-backsliding-continues-amidst-the-covid-19-crisis
Poland
Poles can freely join independent groups, both political and civic, as guaranteed by the national constitution and national and international legislation. Article 31 of the Polish constitution stipulates that any limitations on rights and liberties can only be imposed by law and only if necessary to ensure security, public order, environmental protection, health, public morality, or the freedom and rights of others. Additionally, the “Public Benefit Activity and Volunteerism” law outlines criteria and principles for supporting civil society organizations (CSOs). Polish law also provides an additional benefit for members of associations or trade unions – the ability to deduct and offset membership fees from income. Taxpayers can voluntarily donate 1.5% of their personal income tax to a chosen public benefit organization. Since October 15, 2017, the National Freedom Institute – Center for Civil Society Development has been the main governmental platform for non-governmental organizations (National Freedom Institute, 2023).
Throughout 2022 – 2023, no public assemblies were prohibited, except in the region near the Belarusian border, where the government imposed a state of emergency due to the migration crisis. This state of emergency, which concluded on June 1, 2022, restricted access for humanitarian NGOs, activists, and journalists.
During this period, civil dialogue in Poland deteriorated, and financial treatment favored conservative, pro-government organizations. Arbitrary arrests, detentions, and imprisonments of peaceful demonstrators were less frequent compared to 2020 – 2021, a time when massive protests against tightening abortion laws and changes in the judiciary system brought many Poles to the streets. In June and October 2023, two major demonstrations in support of opposition parties were organized in Warsaw, gathering hundreds of thousands of Poles from across the country. No incidents of violations of citizens’ rights were reported during these demonstrations.
Despite the absence of prohibitions on public assemblies, the government’s state of emergency near the Belarusian border, which ended on June 1, 2022, hindered access for humanitarian NGOs, activists and journalists. Incidents of unlawful behavior by the police, such as the use of excessive force, were not investigated, leading to accusations of politicization within the top police leadership.
Throughout 2022 – 2023, no public assemblies were prohibited, except in the region near the Belarusian border, where the government imposed a state of emergency due to the migration crisis. This state of emergency, which concluded on June 1, 2022, restricted access for humanitarian NGOs, activists, and journalists.
During this period, civil dialogue in Poland deteriorated, and financial treatment favored conservative, pro-government organizations. Arbitrary arrests, detentions, and imprisonments of peaceful demonstrators were less frequent compared to 2020 – 2021, a time when massive protests against tightening abortion laws and changes in the judiciary system brought many Poles to the streets. In June and October 2023, two major demonstrations in support of opposition parties were organized in Warsaw, gathering hundreds of thousands of Poles from across the country. No incidents of violations of citizens’ rights were reported during these demonstrations.
Despite the absence of prohibitions on public assemblies, the government’s state of emergency near the Belarusian border, which ended on June 1, 2022, hindered access for humanitarian NGOs, activists and journalists. Incidents of unlawful behavior by the police, such as the use of excessive force, were not investigated, leading to accusations of politicization within the top police leadership.
Citations:
Le Monde. 2023. “Polish opposition rally draws ‘a million’ protesters to Warsaw.” 1.10.2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/europe/article/2023/10/01/polish-opposition-rally-draws-a-million-protesters-to-warsaw_6142279_143.html
National Freedom Institute (2023): https://niw.gov.pl/en/about-nfi/history/
Le Monde. 2023. “Polish opposition rally draws ‘a million’ protesters to Warsaw.” 1.10.2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/europe/article/2023/10/01/polish-opposition-rally-draws-a-million-protesters-to-warsaw_6142279_143.html
National Freedom Institute (2023): https://niw.gov.pl/en/about-nfi/history/
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
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