To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
10
Canada
In Canada, there are no barriers to traditional or social media reporting outside of traditional libel and slander laws, and criticism of the government is very common.
However, foreign companies are prevented from owning controlling stakes in Canadian media companies. Outside the government-owned Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and its French-language counterpart, Radio Canada, traditional media ownership in Canada is concentrated in the hands of a small number of Canadian-owned and Canadian-controlled media conglomerates. There is also particularly strong media concentration in some parts of the country, such as the Irving newspapers in New Brunswick. This makes it difficult for new companies to break into Canadian media markets and limits competition (Murray 2007).
This trend accelerated following the shutdown of several dozen local newspapers, which occurred after a 2017 deal between two national newspaper corporations, Torstar and Postmedia Group, and the earlier demise of the Canwest-Global company.
The influence of mainstream newspapers has waned considerably in the last decade or so in favor of online sources of information and social media, where Canadians can find a greater diversity of opinions and political perspectives.
However, foreign companies are prevented from owning controlling stakes in Canadian media companies. Outside the government-owned Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) and its French-language counterpart, Radio Canada, traditional media ownership in Canada is concentrated in the hands of a small number of Canadian-owned and Canadian-controlled media conglomerates. There is also particularly strong media concentration in some parts of the country, such as the Irving newspapers in New Brunswick. This makes it difficult for new companies to break into Canadian media markets and limits competition (Murray 2007).
This trend accelerated following the shutdown of several dozen local newspapers, which occurred after a 2017 deal between two national newspaper corporations, Torstar and Postmedia Group, and the earlier demise of the Canwest-Global company.
The influence of mainstream newspapers has waned considerably in the last decade or so in favor of online sources of information and social media, where Canadians can find a greater diversity of opinions and political perspectives.
Citations:
Murray, Catherine. 2007. “The Media.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, eds. L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 286–97. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Murray, Catherine. 2007. “The Media.” In Policy Analysis in Canada: The State of the Art, eds. L. Dobuzinskis, M. Howlett, and D. Laycock, 286–97. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Denmark
Denmark is a liberal democracy, and Article 77 of the constitution protects the freedom of speech: “Any person shall be at liberty to publish his ideas in print, in writing and in speech, subject to his being held responsible in a court of law. Censorship and other preventive measures shall never again be introduced.” Freedom of speech includes freedom of the press.
The penal code sets two limits to the freedom of speech: libel and racism. Independent courts interpret the boundaries of these exceptions. In December 2023, the Danish parliament endorsed a law to prevent the burning of religious texts, including the Quran (Bologna 2023). Technically, the law was enacted as an amendment to the penal code (Straffeloven 2023). The debate surrounding the enactment of the law has been intense because the law stipulates that it extends to artistic products. The law is so new that there is no information on how the legal system interprets potential transgressions.
Denmark was ranked third out of 180 countries in the Global Press Freedom Index for 2023. A recent report from Roskilde University found that a strong norm of noninterference and acceptance of media independence supports media freedom in Denmark (Schrøder et al. 2021).
There have been various reports indicating harassment of journalists, but self-censorship has not been identified as an issue. Furthermore, the Danish press holds both nationally and locally elected politicians and civil servants accountable.
The penal code sets two limits to the freedom of speech: libel and racism. Independent courts interpret the boundaries of these exceptions. In December 2023, the Danish parliament endorsed a law to prevent the burning of religious texts, including the Quran (Bologna 2023). Technically, the law was enacted as an amendment to the penal code (Straffeloven 2023). The debate surrounding the enactment of the law has been intense because the law stipulates that it extends to artistic products. The law is so new that there is no information on how the legal system interprets potential transgressions.
Denmark was ranked third out of 180 countries in the Global Press Freedom Index for 2023. A recent report from Roskilde University found that a strong norm of noninterference and acceptance of media independence supports media freedom in Denmark (Schrøder et al. 2021).
There have been various reports indicating harassment of journalists, but self-censorship has not been identified as an issue. Furthermore, the Danish press holds both nationally and locally elected politicians and civil servants accountable.
Citations:
Bologna. 2023. “Folketinget stemmer ja til omstridt koranlov.” DR December 7. https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/folketinget-stemmer-ja-til-omstridt-koranlov
Ministry of Cultural Affairs. 2020. “Media Development in Denmark.” https://mediernesudvikling.kum.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumenter/medier/Mediernes_udvikling/2020/ Overblik_og_perspektivering/Summary_and_discourse_2020.pdf
Straffeloven 2023. https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2023/1554
Schrøder, K. C., Blach-Ørsten, M., and Eberholst, M. K. 2021. “Denmark.” In N. Newman, R. Fletcher, A.
Schulz, S.,. Andi, C. T. Robertson, and R. K. Nielsen, eds. 2021. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021.
(pp. 74-
75). Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-newsreport/
Reporters Without Borders. 2021. (https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2021)
Reporters Without Borders. “World Press Freedom Index.” https://rsf.org/en/ranking
Zahle, Henrik. 2001. Dansk Forfatningsret 1.
https://rsf.org/en/2023-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-threatened-fake-content-industry
Bologna. 2023. “Folketinget stemmer ja til omstridt koranlov.” DR December 7. https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/folketinget-stemmer-ja-til-omstridt-koranlov
Ministry of Cultural Affairs. 2020. “Media Development in Denmark.” https://mediernesudvikling.kum.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/dokumenter/medier/Mediernes_udvikling/2020/ Overblik_og_perspektivering/Summary_and_discourse_2020.pdf
Straffeloven 2023. https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2023/1554
Schrøder, K. C., Blach-Ørsten, M., and Eberholst, M. K. 2021. “Denmark.” In N. Newman, R. Fletcher, A.
Schulz, S.,. Andi, C. T. Robertson, and R. K. Nielsen, eds. 2021. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021.
(pp. 74-
75). Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-newsreport/
Reporters Without Borders. 2021. (https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2021)
Reporters Without Borders. “World Press Freedom Index.” https://rsf.org/en/ranking
Zahle, Henrik. 2001. Dansk Forfatningsret 1.
https://rsf.org/en/2023-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-threatened-fake-content-industry
Finland
The independence of the media is ensured by the 2003 Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media, and is supported by the public and political discourse. A free and pluralist media is considered an important contributor to debate among citizens and the formation of public opinion.
The Council for Mass Media in Finland has successfully managed a system of self-regulation among media outlets.
Furthermore, as Finland is one of the least corrupt societies in the world, the government has generally avoided interfering with press freedoms, although a few exceptions to this rule have occurred in recent years.
The regulations regarding wiretapping, the protection of whistleblowers and “fake news” do not hinder media freedom in Finland.
There is no censorship of digital, print or broadcast media. The government and other public officials do not indirectly attempt to censor digital, print or broadcast media. The government does not censor online content. Public officials may be held accountable for instances of unlawful censorship; however, such cases are rare.
There is no research on the level of self-censorship among journalists. However, it is not considered a problem. Journalists do not face physical harassment. However, hate speech – especially on social media – and legal threats against journalists are common, particularly targeting those criticizing the True Finns party and its supporters.
The Council for Mass Media in Finland has successfully managed a system of self-regulation among media outlets.
Furthermore, as Finland is one of the least corrupt societies in the world, the government has generally avoided interfering with press freedoms, although a few exceptions to this rule have occurred in recent years.
The regulations regarding wiretapping, the protection of whistleblowers and “fake news” do not hinder media freedom in Finland.
There is no censorship of digital, print or broadcast media. The government and other public officials do not indirectly attempt to censor digital, print or broadcast media. The government does not censor online content. Public officials may be held accountable for instances of unlawful censorship; however, such cases are rare.
There is no research on the level of self-censorship among journalists. However, it is not considered a problem. Journalists do not face physical harassment. However, hate speech – especially on social media – and legal threats against journalists are common, particularly targeting those criticizing the True Finns party and its supporters.
Citations:
“Reporters without Borders, Finland,” https://rsf.org/en/finland
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/supreme_court_upholds_legality_of_hs_journalists_home_search/1092036
Manninen, Wille. 2017. “Monitoring Media Pluralism in Europe 2017. Country Report: Finland.”
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/61138/2018_Finland_EN.pdf
“Reporters without Borders, Finland,” https://rsf.org/en/finland
https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/supreme_court_upholds_legality_of_hs_journalists_home_search/1092036
Manninen, Wille. 2017. “Monitoring Media Pluralism in Europe 2017. Country Report: Finland.”
https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/61138/2018_Finland_EN.pdf
Norway
The freedom of the media is protected within the general legal framework for free speech and by laws regulating commercials. An important institution of press self-regulation, the Ethical Code of Practice of the Norwegian Press, was first adopted by the Norwegian Press Association in 1936 and most recently revised in 2020. All traditional media outlets, both broadcast and print, operating under editorial oversight have committed to this set of normative principles.
The national public broadcaster, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), has been organized as a limited state-owned company financed through taxes since 1996. Its board members are appointed by the Ministry of Culture and by NRK employees. To provide authoritative public assessments of NRK publication policies and handle complaints raised by individuals, a separate independent body, “Kringkastingsrådet,” was established in 1992. This legal framework is intended to ensure NRK maintains sufficient independence from the state as its owner.
The financing of mass media through advertising is strictly regulated. Only one private actor is allowed to operate at a national level, and a license, granted for a six-year term, is awarded through a bidding process. Since the system’s introduction in 1991, one company – TV2 – has consistently won all the licenses, effectively functioning as a private monopoly.
All media are generally regarded as independent from political control. There are no institutional restrictions or cases of political interference in the work of journalists and media.
The national public broadcaster, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), has been organized as a limited state-owned company financed through taxes since 1996. Its board members are appointed by the Ministry of Culture and by NRK employees. To provide authoritative public assessments of NRK publication policies and handle complaints raised by individuals, a separate independent body, “Kringkastingsrådet,” was established in 1992. This legal framework is intended to ensure NRK maintains sufficient independence from the state as its owner.
The financing of mass media through advertising is strictly regulated. Only one private actor is allowed to operate at a national level, and a license, granted for a six-year term, is awarded through a bidding process. Since the system’s introduction in 1991, one company – TV2 – has consistently won all the licenses, effectively functioning as a private monopoly.
All media are generally regarded as independent from political control. There are no institutional restrictions or cases of political interference in the work of journalists and media.
Citations:
Norwegian Press Association. 2020. “Code of Ethics of the Norwegian Press.” https://presse.no/pfu/etiske-regler/vaer-varsom-plakaten/vvpl-engelsk/
NRK. 2007. “NRK’s Organization.” https://www.nrk.no/organisasjon/nrks-eigar-og-styre-1.3911342
Norwegian Press Association. 2020. “Code of Ethics of the Norwegian Press.” https://presse.no/pfu/etiske-regler/vaer-varsom-plakaten/vvpl-engelsk/
NRK. 2007. “NRK’s Organization.” https://www.nrk.no/organisasjon/nrks-eigar-og-styre-1.3911342
Sweden
Freedom of the media is protected in the Swedish constitution. Two of the four fundamental laws include the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression, collectively ensuring freedom of the media and expression of opinion.
Sweden consistently scores high in all aspects of media freedom and freedom of expression. It has an effective framework for regulating hate speech. The Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom reports that Sweden generally shows a very low risk for media pluralism, with indicators holding stable (Färdigh, 2022).
In 2023, the government issued a decision to formalize what had previously been practiced but not legislated. At the request of the foundation controlling Swedish media – Swedish Radio (SR), Swedish Television (SVT), and Swedish Educational Radio (UR) – it is now formally forbidden for any members of these organizations’ boards to hold political office (Government Offices of Sweden, 2024).
Also in 2023, a parliamentary committee was assigned to assess Swedish public media and suggest changes if needed. This was framed as an attempt to ensure that public media keeps up with a changing media landscape and as a resource optimization issue (Sveriges Riksdag, 2023).
In 2023, against the background of spiraling costs due to inflation, Swedish Radio announced that they would have to make significant reductions in activities to run a balanced budget in the coming years (SVT, 2024). This trend may weaken public broadcasting and media pluralism in Sweden in the future.
Sweden consistently scores high in all aspects of media freedom and freedom of expression. It has an effective framework for regulating hate speech. The Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom reports that Sweden generally shows a very low risk for media pluralism, with indicators holding stable (Färdigh, 2022).
In 2023, the government issued a decision to formalize what had previously been practiced but not legislated. At the request of the foundation controlling Swedish media – Swedish Radio (SR), Swedish Television (SVT), and Swedish Educational Radio (UR) – it is now formally forbidden for any members of these organizations’ boards to hold political office (Government Offices of Sweden, 2024).
Also in 2023, a parliamentary committee was assigned to assess Swedish public media and suggest changes if needed. This was framed as an attempt to ensure that public media keeps up with a changing media landscape and as a resource optimization issue (Sveriges Riksdag, 2023).
In 2023, against the background of spiraling costs due to inflation, Swedish Radio announced that they would have to make significant reductions in activities to run a balanced budget in the coming years (SVT, 2024). This trend may weaken public broadcasting and media pluralism in Sweden in the future.
Citations:
Färdigh, Mathias A. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), 2022, Country Reports. https://hdl.handle.net/1814/74707
Government Offices of Sweden. 2023. “Regeringen säkerställer Public service-företagens oberoende från politiken” https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2023/10/regeringen-sakerstaller-public-service-foretagens-oberoende-fran-partipolitik/
SVT. 2024. “Stora nedskärningar på Sveriges radio – 180 tjänster försvinner.” https://www.svt.se/kultur/organisationen-pa-sveriges-radio-gors-om
Färdigh, Mathias A. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), 2022, Country Reports. https://hdl.handle.net/1814/74707
Government Offices of Sweden. 2023. “Regeringen säkerställer Public service-företagens oberoende från politiken” https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2023/10/regeringen-sakerstaller-public-service-foretagens-oberoende-fran-partipolitik/
SVT. 2024. “Stora nedskärningar på Sveriges radio – 180 tjänster försvinner.” https://www.svt.se/kultur/organisationen-pa-sveriges-radio-gors-om
9
Czechia
The Czech Republic has long been characterized by a significant degree of media freedom, partly due to the independence of public media and the foreign ownership of private media. However, the private media market has changed significantly over the past decade. The most critical changes have been the concentration of media ownership, the departure of several foreign media owners, and the expansion of media holdings to include print, online, radio, and television.
In recent years, print media readership has declined significantly, while online media has grown.
The MAFRA media group dominates the daily print media market, with an estimated 3.2 million readers. However, Prime Minister Babiš’s ownership of MAFRA and other media outlets led to biased reporting and possible self-censorship among journalists.
In 2023, Babiš sold MAFRA, which owns two large dailies (Mladá Fronta Dnes and Lidové Noviny), to an investment group owned by billionaire Karel Pražák. This sale was effectively forced by the adoption of an amendment to existing conflict-of-interest laws in August 2023. Previously, Babiš had protected his media holdings by placing them under the control of a fund he claimed was independent. However, changes insisted on by the EU, despite Babiš’s resistance, meant that as the ultimate beneficiary, he would still be judged the owner unless he could demonstrate otherwise. As an active politician, he could not own print media.
However, there is no equivalent restriction on a politician owning internet journals, which have more influence than print media.
The government does not censor media. Czech public TV is independent, overseen by an 18-member council chosen by parliament and intended to represent the country’s political, cultural, and regional diversity. Its composition has broadly fulfilled this aim. Public TV invites speakers and experts who represent independent views. When politicians or their proxies are invited to debate on public or private TV channels, they are mostly faced with representatives from the opposition. Current media, both private and public, are free to criticize the government and face no repercussions.
The government remains slow and ineffective in mitigating the spread of disinformation. The military intelligence service asked internet providers to block pro-Russian sites, but this was only a request and could be circumvented, although visits to those sites did appear to decrease. Chain emails and Russian-related bots remain a critical issue, contributing to polarization and radicalization, particularly targeting seniors. For example, during the second round of the 2023 presidential elections, a hoax that presidential candidate and eventual winner Petr Pavel had died was spread.
Formal protection for whistleblowers was mandated by an EU directive and should have been incorporated into Czech law by December 2021, but it faced opposition from parties within the government. The impact of such protection could be substantial, as survey evidence suggests that one-fifth of Czech citizens observe some form of corrupt practice or illegal activity. The law, as finally introduced, would provide protection only if a criminal offense was being committed that could result in a fine of at least CZK 100,000. Both ANO, the main opposition party, and STAN, a coalition member party, favored strengthening the law, while other government parties were swayed by arguments that it would create problems for businesses.
In recent years, print media readership has declined significantly, while online media has grown.
The MAFRA media group dominates the daily print media market, with an estimated 3.2 million readers. However, Prime Minister Babiš’s ownership of MAFRA and other media outlets led to biased reporting and possible self-censorship among journalists.
In 2023, Babiš sold MAFRA, which owns two large dailies (Mladá Fronta Dnes and Lidové Noviny), to an investment group owned by billionaire Karel Pražák. This sale was effectively forced by the adoption of an amendment to existing conflict-of-interest laws in August 2023. Previously, Babiš had protected his media holdings by placing them under the control of a fund he claimed was independent. However, changes insisted on by the EU, despite Babiš’s resistance, meant that as the ultimate beneficiary, he would still be judged the owner unless he could demonstrate otherwise. As an active politician, he could not own print media.
However, there is no equivalent restriction on a politician owning internet journals, which have more influence than print media.
The government does not censor media. Czech public TV is independent, overseen by an 18-member council chosen by parliament and intended to represent the country’s political, cultural, and regional diversity. Its composition has broadly fulfilled this aim. Public TV invites speakers and experts who represent independent views. When politicians or their proxies are invited to debate on public or private TV channels, they are mostly faced with representatives from the opposition. Current media, both private and public, are free to criticize the government and face no repercussions.
The government remains slow and ineffective in mitigating the spread of disinformation. The military intelligence service asked internet providers to block pro-Russian sites, but this was only a request and could be circumvented, although visits to those sites did appear to decrease. Chain emails and Russian-related bots remain a critical issue, contributing to polarization and radicalization, particularly targeting seniors. For example, during the second round of the 2023 presidential elections, a hoax that presidential candidate and eventual winner Petr Pavel had died was spread.
Formal protection for whistleblowers was mandated by an EU directive and should have been incorporated into Czech law by December 2021, but it faced opposition from parties within the government. The impact of such protection could be substantial, as survey evidence suggests that one-fifth of Czech citizens observe some form of corrupt practice or illegal activity. The law, as finally introduced, would provide protection only if a criminal offense was being committed that could result in a fine of at least CZK 100,000. Both ANO, the main opposition party, and STAN, a coalition member party, favored strengthening the law, while other government parties were swayed by arguments that it would create problems for businesses.
Citations:
Respekt. 2023. “Babiš se po deseti letech zbavil mediálního impéria.” https://www.respekt.cz/informacni-servis/babis-se-po-deseti-letech-zbavil-medialniho-imperia
https://www.transparency.cz/vlada-slibila-zakrocit-proti-stretu-zajmu-zatim-se-odvazila-jen-k-dilcim-krokum/
https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/whistleblower-zakon-prace-sikana-bossing_2302021150_bko
Respekt. 2023. “Babiš se po deseti letech zbavil mediálního impéria.” https://www.respekt.cz/informacni-servis/babis-se-po-deseti-letech-zbavil-medialniho-imperia
https://www.transparency.cz/vlada-slibila-zakrocit-proti-stretu-zajmu-zatim-se-odvazila-jen-k-dilcim-krokum/
https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/whistleblower-zakon-prace-sikana-bossing_2302021150_bko
Estonia
Estonia follows a liberal approach to media policy with minimal legal restrictions. The Estonian Public Broadcasting company (ERR) is constituted under the Estonian Public Broadcasting Act and governed by a 10-member council. Based on the principle of political balance, five members are specialists in the field, while the other five represent different political parties that hold seats in the national parliament. Members of the ERR Council are elected for five years; members of parliament serve until the next parliamentary elections.
The private media market is generally self-regulated. Audiovisual and radio services are governed by the Media Services Act (2010), which outlines procedures and principles for service provision. Amendments in 2022 clarify the principles of content freedom and political balance during election campaigns. All providers of radio and TV services must apply for a fixed-term license from the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority. Issuing private newspapers, magazines or news portals is not specifically regulated; they operate on free-market principles. The umbrella organization Union of Media Enterprises represents its members’ interests, including advocacy in policymaking initiatives.
The government does not censor digital, print or broadcast media directly or indirectly. The risk of government influence or political interference is considered low (MPM 2022). However, due to the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, government control has become stricter. On 25 February 2022, the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority (TTJA) ordered Estonian telecom service providers to stop broadcasting Belarusian and Russian TV and radio channels, and Russian websites that promoted war propaganda were shut down.
Freedom of the media is guaranteed by the constitution and specified in several legal acts. Currently, the Riigikogu is processing the Hate Speech Bill and the Whistleblower Protection Bill (related to EU Directive 2019/1937). Both processes have been lengthy and accompanied by criticism from conservative political parties and various interest groups, including the Union of Media Enterprises.
Instances of unlawful censorship are very rare. One such legal incident occurred in April 2022, when the Harju County Court fined two journalists following the publication of an article about alleged money laundering at one of Estonia’s largest banks, Swedbank. The information was published without legally required prior approval from the prosecutor’s office. The court ruling supported the prosecutor’s office’s argument that there was a “lack of public interest” and that the journalists’ only motive was to “satisfy curiosity.” However, the Supreme Court overruled this decision in January 2023, finding that the decision to impose fines on the journalists had insufficient legal grounding (Supreme Court of Estonia, 2023).
Compared to many countries, being a journalist in Estonia does not pose a risk to one’s life or physical health. However, mental harassment and humiliation on social media do occur. When ideological controversies become heated, such as during the COVID pandemic or in debates over LGBTQ+ rights, journalists face a greater risk of humiliation.
The private media market is generally self-regulated. Audiovisual and radio services are governed by the Media Services Act (2010), which outlines procedures and principles for service provision. Amendments in 2022 clarify the principles of content freedom and political balance during election campaigns. All providers of radio and TV services must apply for a fixed-term license from the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority. Issuing private newspapers, magazines or news portals is not specifically regulated; they operate on free-market principles. The umbrella organization Union of Media Enterprises represents its members’ interests, including advocacy in policymaking initiatives.
The government does not censor digital, print or broadcast media directly or indirectly. The risk of government influence or political interference is considered low (MPM 2022). However, due to the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, government control has become stricter. On 25 February 2022, the Consumer Protection and Technical Regulatory Authority (TTJA) ordered Estonian telecom service providers to stop broadcasting Belarusian and Russian TV and radio channels, and Russian websites that promoted war propaganda were shut down.
Freedom of the media is guaranteed by the constitution and specified in several legal acts. Currently, the Riigikogu is processing the Hate Speech Bill and the Whistleblower Protection Bill (related to EU Directive 2019/1937). Both processes have been lengthy and accompanied by criticism from conservative political parties and various interest groups, including the Union of Media Enterprises.
Instances of unlawful censorship are very rare. One such legal incident occurred in April 2022, when the Harju County Court fined two journalists following the publication of an article about alleged money laundering at one of Estonia’s largest banks, Swedbank. The information was published without legally required prior approval from the prosecutor’s office. The court ruling supported the prosecutor’s office’s argument that there was a “lack of public interest” and that the journalists’ only motive was to “satisfy curiosity.” However, the Supreme Court overruled this decision in January 2023, finding that the decision to impose fines on the journalists had insufficient legal grounding (Supreme Court of Estonia, 2023).
Compared to many countries, being a journalist in Estonia does not pose a risk to one’s life or physical health. However, mental harassment and humiliation on social media do occur. When ideological controversies become heated, such as during the COVID pandemic or in debates over LGBTQ+ rights, journalists face a greater risk of humiliation.
Citations:
The Media Pluralism Monitor 2022 (MPM2022). Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Estonia. European University Institute.
Supreme Court of Estonia. 2023. https://www.riigikohus.ee/et/uudiste-arhiiv/riigikohus-prokuratuur-peab-ajakirjanikele-trahvi-taotlemist-usutavalt-pohjendama
The Media Pluralism Monitor 2022 (MPM2022). Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Estonia. European University Institute.
Supreme Court of Estonia. 2023. https://www.riigikohus.ee/et/uudiste-arhiiv/riigikohus-prokuratuur-peab-ajakirjanikele-trahvi-taotlemist-usutavalt-pohjendama
Lithuania
Lithuania’s media are not subject to government influence or censorship. Private newspapers and independent broadcasters express a wide variety of views and freely criticize the government. Licensing and regulatory requirements do not expose media outlets to political interference. The media’s independence is generally respected by the government, although there have been a few attempts in the past to restrict media freedom.
For example, the ruling coalition led by the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (2016 – 2020) was alleged to have interfered in the operations of the public broadcaster, Lithuanian Radio and Television. The coalition set up a special parliamentary inquiry commission to investigate the activities of the broadcaster. This commission found that the broadcaster’s operations were ineffective and opaque, and suggested changes to its governance. These changes could politicize appointments to its council and a new board that the recommendations proposed to establish. Although the committee’s conclusions were not approved by the parliament during its plenary vote in November 2018, new legislative proposals were later introduced to implement them.
In September 2018, Lithuanian authorities discontinued the practice of providing free data from the Center of Registers for requests from journalists. However, this decision was later reversed after reporters appealed to government officials.
In 2020, the courts ruled in favor of journalists’ rights to access information in an important case. Skvernelis’ government had refused to provide information about a government meeting and had deleted the recordings. According to Reporters Without Borders, “This set a very important precedent, giving journalists right of access to all nonclassified information” (Reporters Without Borders 2021).
In addition, media independence may be compromised because the government remains a key advertiser, and a large proportion of media outlets are owned by a small number of domestic and foreign companies. Similarly, regional media depend on local government for advertising and other types of support, which might restrict their ability to criticize local authorities. In its 2023 Rule of Law report on Lithuania, the European Commission noted that “following public discussions, legislation to improve the effectiveness and impartiality of media self-regulatory bodies was adopted. As of 2023, public institutions and bodies have to make public on their websites information about the funds they have used for state advertising.”
In recent years, assessments of media freedom and international rankings have shown improvements in Lithuania. In Reporters Without Borders’ 2023 Press Freedom Index, Lithuania was ranked seventh out of 180 countries in terms of press freedom, a significant improvement compared to 2021 when it was ranked 28th. Similarly, the European Center for Press and Media Freedom’s 2022 report noted only one alert in the case of Lithuania – one of the smallest numbers among EU member states.
For example, the ruling coalition led by the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (2016 – 2020) was alleged to have interfered in the operations of the public broadcaster, Lithuanian Radio and Television. The coalition set up a special parliamentary inquiry commission to investigate the activities of the broadcaster. This commission found that the broadcaster’s operations were ineffective and opaque, and suggested changes to its governance. These changes could politicize appointments to its council and a new board that the recommendations proposed to establish. Although the committee’s conclusions were not approved by the parliament during its plenary vote in November 2018, new legislative proposals were later introduced to implement them.
In September 2018, Lithuanian authorities discontinued the practice of providing free data from the Center of Registers for requests from journalists. However, this decision was later reversed after reporters appealed to government officials.
In 2020, the courts ruled in favor of journalists’ rights to access information in an important case. Skvernelis’ government had refused to provide information about a government meeting and had deleted the recordings. According to Reporters Without Borders, “This set a very important precedent, giving journalists right of access to all nonclassified information” (Reporters Without Borders 2021).
In addition, media independence may be compromised because the government remains a key advertiser, and a large proportion of media outlets are owned by a small number of domestic and foreign companies. Similarly, regional media depend on local government for advertising and other types of support, which might restrict their ability to criticize local authorities. In its 2023 Rule of Law report on Lithuania, the European Commission noted that “following public discussions, legislation to improve the effectiveness and impartiality of media self-regulatory bodies was adopted. As of 2023, public institutions and bodies have to make public on their websites information about the funds they have used for state advertising.”
In recent years, assessments of media freedom and international rankings have shown improvements in Lithuania. In Reporters Without Borders’ 2023 Press Freedom Index, Lithuania was ranked seventh out of 180 countries in terms of press freedom, a significant improvement compared to 2021 when it was ranked 28th. Similarly, the European Center for Press and Media Freedom’s 2022 report noted only one alert in the case of Lithuania – one of the smallest numbers among EU member states.
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. “Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law in Lithuania.” Brussels 5.7.2023. SWD (2023) 815 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “The World Press Freedom Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
European Center for Press and Media Freedom. 2022. “Monitoring Report 2022.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/monitoring-report-2022/
Reporters without Borders. 2021. “The World Press Freedom Index 2021.” https://rsf.org/en/lithuania
European Commission. 2023. “Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law in Lithuania.” Brussels 5.7.2023. SWD (2023) 815 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “The World Press Freedom Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
European Center for Press and Media Freedom. 2022. “Monitoring Report 2022.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/monitoring-report-2022/
Reporters without Borders. 2021. “The World Press Freedom Index 2021.” https://rsf.org/en/lithuania
New Zealand
Media freedom is generally guaranteed and respected in New Zealand. In the 2023 World Press Freedom Index – published by Reporters Without Borders – New Zealand is ranked 13th, down two places compared to 2022 (Reporters Without Borders 2023).
The news media is considered free from political pressure and intervention. This assessment also applies to the state-owned broadcast networks, Television New Zealand (TVNZ) and Radio New Zealand (RNZ). These outlets operate independently and contribute to the diversity of opinions and information available to the public.
While New Zealand has a legal framework that supports media freedom, certain legal considerations may impact the work of journalists, including defamation and privacy laws. Additionally, regulatory bodies such as the Broadcasting Standards Authority and the Press Council oversee media content to ensure it aligns with ethical and professional standards.
The government does not engage in widespread censorship of online content. It is worth noting, though, that after the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack, the administration under Jacinda Ardern took steps to curb the spread of extremist and violent content on the internet – in particular, passing legislation to hold social media platforms accountable for the spread of extremist material (Roy 2019).
Journalists generally work in an environment free from violence and intimidation, although they increasingly face online harassment. The working conditions became tougher in early 2022 when, during protests against COVID-19 restrictions, journalists were subjected to violence, insults and death threats (Swift 2022).
The news media is considered free from political pressure and intervention. This assessment also applies to the state-owned broadcast networks, Television New Zealand (TVNZ) and Radio New Zealand (RNZ). These outlets operate independently and contribute to the diversity of opinions and information available to the public.
While New Zealand has a legal framework that supports media freedom, certain legal considerations may impact the work of journalists, including defamation and privacy laws. Additionally, regulatory bodies such as the Broadcasting Standards Authority and the Press Council oversee media content to ensure it aligns with ethical and professional standards.
The government does not engage in widespread censorship of online content. It is worth noting, though, that after the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack, the administration under Jacinda Ardern took steps to curb the spread of extremist and violent content on the internet – in particular, passing legislation to hold social media platforms accountable for the spread of extremist material (Roy 2019).
Journalists generally work in an environment free from violence and intimidation, although they increasingly face online harassment. The working conditions became tougher in early 2022 when, during protests against COVID-19 restrictions, journalists were subjected to violence, insults and death threats (Swift 2022).
Citations:
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “New Zealand.” https://rsf.org/en/country/new-zealand
Roy, E. A. 2019. “Christchurch attack: New Zealand tries new tactic to disrupt online extremism.” The Guardian, October 14. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/christchurch-attack-new-zealand-tries-new-tactic-to-disrupt-online-extremism
Swift, M. 2022. “Overwhelming Number of Kiwi Journalists Face Death Threats and Violence – Study.” Newshub, May 10. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2022/05/overwhelming-number-of-kiwi-journalists-face-death-threats-and-violence-study.html
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “New Zealand.” https://rsf.org/en/country/new-zealand
Roy, E. A. 2019. “Christchurch attack: New Zealand tries new tactic to disrupt online extremism.” The Guardian, October 14. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/christchurch-attack-new-zealand-tries-new-tactic-to-disrupt-online-extremism
Swift, M. 2022. “Overwhelming Number of Kiwi Journalists Face Death Threats and Violence – Study.” Newshub, May 10. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2022/05/overwhelming-number-of-kiwi-journalists-face-death-threats-and-violence-study.html
Portugal
Freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed in Portugal (CRP, Article 38º, part I). Both private and public media in Portugal operate independently of the government, with strong constitutional protections for media freedom. The Entidade Reguladora da Comunicação Social (ERC) serves as the independent body regulating social communication activities and ensuring the autonomy of media entities (Lei n.º 2/99).
However, the election process for the ERC’s Regulatory Body has faced criticism, particularly regarding the selection of its fifth member. The two predominant parties in parliament appear to retain significant influence in this process, even though the member should ideally be chosen jointly by the four ERC members appointed through a parliamentary majority (Público, 2017). Additionally, the ERC struggles with a funding model that compromises its financial independence and limits its ability to effectively intervene in various media issues (ECO, 2023).
The government, whether directly or indirectly, lacks the authority to censor any type of media. The 2021 Charter on Human Rights in the Digital Age aims to strengthen citizens’ free speech online, enhance internet access rights, and combat disinformation. Although Article 6 of the charter sparked controversy for potentially enabling censorship, its content was largely revoked following a Constitutional Court inspection in 2022 (Lusa, 2022). Unlawful censorship hindering freedom of the press can result in a prison sentence of 3 months to 2 years or a fine of 25 to 100 days. For public officials involved, the sentence is aggravated, ranging from 3 months to 3 years of imprisonment or 30 to 150 days in fines (Lei n.º 2/99, art.33). Journalistic investigations and public scrutiny play a crucial role in holding offenders accountable by bringing visibility to such cases.
Portugal is globally recognized for its press freedom, as acknowledged by Freedom House, which assigns the highest score to Portugal for free and independent media (4 points). Despite this achievement, challenges persist, including occasional instances of journalists facing physical intimidation during their reporting and precarious labor conditions for many in the profession. Generalized low-income and financial instability may lead to a shift in priorities, prompting some to resort to self-censorship (Expresso, 2018). This scenario poses risks to the collective strength of journalists’ voices. Additionally, there is a prevailing notion that journalists face increased violence and harassment, albeit sporadically. Since 2018, assaults on journalists carrying out their duties are considered a public crime, following an amendment to Article 132 of the penal code.
However, the election process for the ERC’s Regulatory Body has faced criticism, particularly regarding the selection of its fifth member. The two predominant parties in parliament appear to retain significant influence in this process, even though the member should ideally be chosen jointly by the four ERC members appointed through a parliamentary majority (Público, 2017). Additionally, the ERC struggles with a funding model that compromises its financial independence and limits its ability to effectively intervene in various media issues (ECO, 2023).
The government, whether directly or indirectly, lacks the authority to censor any type of media. The 2021 Charter on Human Rights in the Digital Age aims to strengthen citizens’ free speech online, enhance internet access rights, and combat disinformation. Although Article 6 of the charter sparked controversy for potentially enabling censorship, its content was largely revoked following a Constitutional Court inspection in 2022 (Lusa, 2022). Unlawful censorship hindering freedom of the press can result in a prison sentence of 3 months to 2 years or a fine of 25 to 100 days. For public officials involved, the sentence is aggravated, ranging from 3 months to 3 years of imprisonment or 30 to 150 days in fines (Lei n.º 2/99, art.33). Journalistic investigations and public scrutiny play a crucial role in holding offenders accountable by bringing visibility to such cases.
Portugal is globally recognized for its press freedom, as acknowledged by Freedom House, which assigns the highest score to Portugal for free and independent media (4 points). Despite this achievement, challenges persist, including occasional instances of journalists facing physical intimidation during their reporting and precarious labor conditions for many in the profession. Generalized low-income and financial instability may lead to a shift in priorities, prompting some to resort to self-censorship (Expresso, 2018). This scenario poses risks to the collective strength of journalists’ voices. Additionally, there is a prevailing notion that journalists face increased violence and harassment, albeit sporadically. Since 2018, assaults on journalists carrying out their duties are considered a public crime, following an amendment to Article 132 of the penal code.
Citations:
CRP, Constituição da República Portuguesa (1976)
Law No. 2/99. 1999. Lei de Imprensa. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=138&tabela=leis
Lusa. 2022. “Presidente da República promulga alteração à Carta de Direitos Humanos na Era Digital.” https://expresso.pt/politica/2022-08-03-Presidente-da-Republica-promulga-alteracao-a-Carta-de-Direitos-Humanos-na-Era-Digital-55edd616
Código Penal de 1982 versão consolidada posterior a 1995, DL n.º 48/95, de 15 de Março. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?artigo_id=109A0132&nid=109&tabela=leis&pagina=1&ficha=1&so_miolo=&nversao=#artigo
Expresso. 2018. “O romantismo do jornalismo acaba aos 30 anos.” https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2018-05-03-O-romantismo-do-jornalismo-acaba-aos-30-anos
Público. 2017. “A independência da regulação da comunicação social.” https://www.publico.pt/2017/01/25/sociedade/opiniao/a-independencia-da-regulacao-da-comunicacao-social-1759480
ECO. 2023. “ERC reforça necessidade de uma ‘verdadeira independência financeira.’” https://eco.sapo.pt/2023/05/10/erc-reforca-necessidade-de-uma-verdadeira-independencia-financeira/
Freedom House. 2023. “Portugal 2023.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/portugal/freedom-world/2023
CRP, Constituição da República Portuguesa (1976)
Law No. 2/99. 1999. Lei de Imprensa. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=138&tabela=leis
Lusa. 2022. “Presidente da República promulga alteração à Carta de Direitos Humanos na Era Digital.” https://expresso.pt/politica/2022-08-03-Presidente-da-Republica-promulga-alteracao-a-Carta-de-Direitos-Humanos-na-Era-Digital-55edd616
Código Penal de 1982 versão consolidada posterior a 1995, DL n.º 48/95, de 15 de Março. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?artigo_id=109A0132&nid=109&tabela=leis&pagina=1&ficha=1&so_miolo=&nversao=#artigo
Expresso. 2018. “O romantismo do jornalismo acaba aos 30 anos.” https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2018-05-03-O-romantismo-do-jornalismo-acaba-aos-30-anos
Público. 2017. “A independência da regulação da comunicação social.” https://www.publico.pt/2017/01/25/sociedade/opiniao/a-independencia-da-regulacao-da-comunicacao-social-1759480
ECO. 2023. “ERC reforça necessidade de uma ‘verdadeira independência financeira.’” https://eco.sapo.pt/2023/05/10/erc-reforca-necessidade-de-uma-verdadeira-independencia-financeira/
Freedom House. 2023. “Portugal 2023.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/portugal/freedom-world/2023
Switzerland
Public- and private sector media corporations are free from government influence (Hänggli/Feddersen 2023). This is enshrined in Art. 17 of the Swiss constitution, which states: “Freedom of the press, radio and television and of other forms of dissemination of features and information by means of public telecommunications is guaranteed. Censorship is prohibited. The protection of sources is guaranteed.”
Although the federal government chooses the chairperson and some board members of the quasi-public nonprofit radio and television organization, it exercises no influence over the organization’s daily reporting or journalistic work.
Since 2014, journalists reporting on illegal financial activities have faced up to three years in prison if they use information that violates bank secrecy regulations. Hence, no Swiss journalists took part in the Suisse Secrets investigations (NZZ 2022).
The Swiss government subsidizes media in various ways. It subsidizes the delivery of subscription-based daily and weekly newspapers, as well as club and association magazines, so that all parts of the country and all language regions can be covered by the media. This applies in particular to daily newspapers in sparsely populated regions. Likewise, private local radio and regional television receive money from the government. More far-reaching subsidies were rejected in a recent popular vote on 13 February 2022. However, the government has no means of influencing the contents of these media. These subsidies are not considered to be linked to political interference, as they are granted indiscriminately to many outlets (Höchli 2008). To the best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to use these subsidies to influence the work of journalists. Likewise, no scandals or conflicts have become public regarding the government’s choice of board members of the quasi-public media organizations.
To our knowledge, there is no substantial issue with regard to self-censorship or harassment of journalists in Switzerland.
Although the federal government chooses the chairperson and some board members of the quasi-public nonprofit radio and television organization, it exercises no influence over the organization’s daily reporting or journalistic work.
Since 2014, journalists reporting on illegal financial activities have faced up to three years in prison if they use information that violates bank secrecy regulations. Hence, no Swiss journalists took part in the Suisse Secrets investigations (NZZ 2022).
The Swiss government subsidizes media in various ways. It subsidizes the delivery of subscription-based daily and weekly newspapers, as well as club and association magazines, so that all parts of the country and all language regions can be covered by the media. This applies in particular to daily newspapers in sparsely populated regions. Likewise, private local radio and regional television receive money from the government. More far-reaching subsidies were rejected in a recent popular vote on 13 February 2022. However, the government has no means of influencing the contents of these media. These subsidies are not considered to be linked to political interference, as they are granted indiscriminately to many outlets (Höchli 2008). To the best of our knowledge, there have been no attempts to use these subsidies to influence the work of journalists. Likewise, no scandals or conflicts have become public regarding the government’s choice of board members of the quasi-public media organizations.
To our knowledge, there is no substantial issue with regard to self-censorship or harassment of journalists in Switzerland.
Citations:
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19
Höchli, Mark. 2008. The Invisible Scissors: Media Freedom and Censorship in Switzerland. Doctoral thesis, Brunel University London.
NZZ. 2022. “Suisse Secrets: Datenleck bei der Credit Suisse.” https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/suisse-secrets-datenleck-bei-der-credit-suisse-ld.1670838#subtitle-warum-ist-kein-schweizer-medienhaus-beteiligt-second
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19
Höchli, Mark. 2008. The Invisible Scissors: Media Freedom and Censorship in Switzerland. Doctoral thesis, Brunel University London.
NZZ. 2022. “Suisse Secrets: Datenleck bei der Credit Suisse.” https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/suisse-secrets-datenleck-bei-der-credit-suisse-ld.1670838#subtitle-warum-ist-kein-schweizer-medienhaus-beteiligt-second
USA
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is regarded as a major legal protection for freedom of speech and the press. The United States has historically had a very pluralistic media culture, and news outlets typically operate without much evidence of direct or indirect government interference (Arcenaux and Johnson 2013).
There is limited censorship in the United States, with courts typically adopting a relaxed view about the content of materials published by private individuals and companies.
While the mainstream media in the United States generally operate free from government interference, many popular news outlets are owned by a few wealthy individuals. In a diverse global media landscape, local news has declined significantly in recent years. A growing interest in partisan media threatens objectivity, and public confidence in the media has fallen dangerously. After four years of President Trump constantly denigrating the press, President Biden signaled his administration’s desire to see the U.S. reclaim its global status as a model of freedom of expression, reinstating regular White House and federal agency press briefings. Despite these efforts, many underlying chronic issues impacting journalists remain unaddressed by authorities – including the disappearance of local news, the polarization of the media, and the weakening of journalism and democracy caused by digital platforms and social networks.
There is limited censorship in the United States, with courts typically adopting a relaxed view about the content of materials published by private individuals and companies.
While the mainstream media in the United States generally operate free from government interference, many popular news outlets are owned by a few wealthy individuals. In a diverse global media landscape, local news has declined significantly in recent years. A growing interest in partisan media threatens objectivity, and public confidence in the media has fallen dangerously. After four years of President Trump constantly denigrating the press, President Biden signaled his administration’s desire to see the U.S. reclaim its global status as a model of freedom of expression, reinstating regular White House and federal agency press briefings. Despite these efforts, many underlying chronic issues impacting journalists remain unaddressed by authorities – including the disappearance of local news, the polarization of the media, and the weakening of journalism and democracy caused by digital platforms and social networks.
Citations:
Kevin Arcenaux and Martin Johnson. 2013. Changing Minds or Changing Channels? Partisan News in an Age of Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Matthew Levendusky. 2013. How Partisan Media Polarize America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Reporters without Frontiers. “United States.” https://rsf.org/en/country/united-states
Kevin Arcenaux and Martin Johnson. 2013. Changing Minds or Changing Channels? Partisan News in an Age of Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Matthew Levendusky. 2013. How Partisan Media Polarize America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Reporters without Frontiers. “United States.” https://rsf.org/en/country/united-states
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
8
Austria
Media freedom in Austria is guaranteed by the constitution. There is no censorship, and new electronic or print media organizations can be freely established. Limits on the freedom of expression in the media are defined by law, and the courts ensure these limits are enforced.
Some media outlets are not completely free of government influence. Both federal and regional governments have used public money to promote specific policies during election campaigns and beyond in various print publications. Public money has also been used to pay fines for violating established rules. This tradition, repeatedly criticized by the Austrian Court of Audit and media organizations, reduces the credibility and freedom of the media.
One of the defining features of the Austrian media landscape is the existence of powerful public media. The Austrian Public Broadcasting (Österreichischer Rundfunk Fernsehen, ORF) company dominates both the television and radio markets. The ORF is legally mandated to operate independently and submit comprehensive reports on its activities. All parties in parliament are represented on the ORF’s oversight body, the Stiftungsrat. Compared to the situation in Germany, for example, the majorities in the Stiftungsrat strongly reflect the respective majorities in the Nationalrat, with significant changes occurring after parliamentary elections.
Several cases of alleged political influence over the ORF by various political parties have been reported. However, the ORF generally fulfills its mandate very well, especially by international standards. There is an imbalance between the ORF and other TV and radio stations. The ORF is primarily financed by public fees, which must be paid by everyone who owns a TV or radio device. In contrast, other TV and radio broadcasters generate revenue through advertisements. The ORF and the government justify this imbalance by citing the ORF’s specific educational mission, which private companies are not required to fulfill.
There are other imbalances in print media that reflect an uneven regime of direct media subsidies. Subsidies for print journalism generally went to high-quality journals like “Die Presse” or “Der Standard.” Public money from advertising was twice as high in recent years, mostly benefiting the yellow press. This advertising is problematic because it leaves room for rewarding favorable journalism. Thus, popular tabloid titles benefit disproportionately from the existing funding regime.
While regional weekly newspapers tend to face disadvantages (see Seethaler & Beaufort, 2022).
Many observers deemed the period of the ÖVP-FPÖ government to be the nadir for media freedom due to government intervention, highlighted by unusually aggressive attacks from the FPÖ on the ORF for being “not objective.” However, the overall situation has not fundamentally improved under the new ÖVP-Green government, as evidenced by Austria’s position in international press freedom rankings. In the most recent Reporters Without Borders 2023 ranking, Austria was placed 29th among 180 countries worldwide, down from 17th in the 2021 report and slightly up from 2022.
The past year has been particularly marked by the resignations of several renowned editors-in-chief who maintained unreasonably close relationships with individual senior politicians. Additional recent developments – such as a house search at the newspaper “Heute” and the transformation of the “Wiener Zeitung,” the world’s oldest newspaper, into an online-only publication – were not yet accounted for in this recent assessment. Furthermore, Austria’s suggested involvement in the PEGASUS scandal, which concerns the distribution and use of spyware, has also cast an unfavorable light on media freedom.
In the Monitoring Report 2022 of the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom/EUI (covering the EU, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey), Austria is highlighted as a country where “journalistic profession, standards and protection” have deteriorated, shifting from a low risk to a medium risk classification (with only three other countries in the same or a lower category). Regarding the sub-indicator on the “working conditions” of journalists, Austria is considered to be at a high risk (alongside thirteen other countries out of the 32 covered). Concerning the sub-indicator on the “legal protection of the right to information,” Austria, alongside Turkey, is the only country considered to be at a high risk.
At the same time, Austria is among the minority of countries (8 out of 32) that have rules aiming to ensure the fairness and transparency of political advertising on online platforms. Further, Austria is one of only five countries out of 32 that have a reasonably sophisticated and efficient regulatory framework designed to combat the spread of hate speech.
Some media outlets are not completely free of government influence. Both federal and regional governments have used public money to promote specific policies during election campaigns and beyond in various print publications. Public money has also been used to pay fines for violating established rules. This tradition, repeatedly criticized by the Austrian Court of Audit and media organizations, reduces the credibility and freedom of the media.
One of the defining features of the Austrian media landscape is the existence of powerful public media. The Austrian Public Broadcasting (Österreichischer Rundfunk Fernsehen, ORF) company dominates both the television and radio markets. The ORF is legally mandated to operate independently and submit comprehensive reports on its activities. All parties in parliament are represented on the ORF’s oversight body, the Stiftungsrat. Compared to the situation in Germany, for example, the majorities in the Stiftungsrat strongly reflect the respective majorities in the Nationalrat, with significant changes occurring after parliamentary elections.
Several cases of alleged political influence over the ORF by various political parties have been reported. However, the ORF generally fulfills its mandate very well, especially by international standards. There is an imbalance between the ORF and other TV and radio stations. The ORF is primarily financed by public fees, which must be paid by everyone who owns a TV or radio device. In contrast, other TV and radio broadcasters generate revenue through advertisements. The ORF and the government justify this imbalance by citing the ORF’s specific educational mission, which private companies are not required to fulfill.
There are other imbalances in print media that reflect an uneven regime of direct media subsidies. Subsidies for print journalism generally went to high-quality journals like “Die Presse” or “Der Standard.” Public money from advertising was twice as high in recent years, mostly benefiting the yellow press. This advertising is problematic because it leaves room for rewarding favorable journalism. Thus, popular tabloid titles benefit disproportionately from the existing funding regime.
While regional weekly newspapers tend to face disadvantages (see Seethaler & Beaufort, 2022).
Many observers deemed the period of the ÖVP-FPÖ government to be the nadir for media freedom due to government intervention, highlighted by unusually aggressive attacks from the FPÖ on the ORF for being “not objective.” However, the overall situation has not fundamentally improved under the new ÖVP-Green government, as evidenced by Austria’s position in international press freedom rankings. In the most recent Reporters Without Borders 2023 ranking, Austria was placed 29th among 180 countries worldwide, down from 17th in the 2021 report and slightly up from 2022.
The past year has been particularly marked by the resignations of several renowned editors-in-chief who maintained unreasonably close relationships with individual senior politicians. Additional recent developments – such as a house search at the newspaper “Heute” and the transformation of the “Wiener Zeitung,” the world’s oldest newspaper, into an online-only publication – were not yet accounted for in this recent assessment. Furthermore, Austria’s suggested involvement in the PEGASUS scandal, which concerns the distribution and use of spyware, has also cast an unfavorable light on media freedom.
In the Monitoring Report 2022 of the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom/EUI (covering the EU, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia, and Turkey), Austria is highlighted as a country where “journalistic profession, standards and protection” have deteriorated, shifting from a low risk to a medium risk classification (with only three other countries in the same or a lower category). Regarding the sub-indicator on the “working conditions” of journalists, Austria is considered to be at a high risk (alongside thirteen other countries out of the 32 covered). Concerning the sub-indicator on the “legal protection of the right to information,” Austria, alongside Turkey, is the only country considered to be at a high risk.
At the same time, Austria is among the minority of countries (8 out of 32) that have rules aiming to ensure the fairness and transparency of political advertising on online platforms. Further, Austria is one of only five countries out of 32 that have a reasonably sophisticated and efficient regulatory framework designed to combat the spread of hate speech.
Citations:
https://rsf.org/en/region/europe-central-asia
https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2021
https://www.moment.at/story/wie-finanzieren-sich-unabhaengige-medien
https://www.puls24.at/news/chronik/pressefreiheits-index-oesterreichs-ranking-wieder-dramatisch-schlecht/296218
https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2022-results/
Seethaler, J, and Beaufort, M. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Austria. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. https://cadmus.eui.eu
https://orf.at/stories/3292919/
https://kurier.at/kultur/medien/hausdurchsuchung-bei-heute-nach-dichand-intervention-in-finanzministerium/402383861
https://kurier.at/politik/inland/regierungsausgaben-pressefoerderung-sinkt-inseratengelder-steigen/401773839
https://rsf.org/en/region/europe-central-asia
https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2021
https://www.moment.at/story/wie-finanzieren-sich-unabhaengige-medien
https://www.puls24.at/news/chronik/pressefreiheits-index-oesterreichs-ranking-wieder-dramatisch-schlecht/296218
https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2022-results/
Seethaler, J, and Beaufort, M. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Austria. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. https://cadmus.eui.eu
https://orf.at/stories/3292919/
https://kurier.at/kultur/medien/hausdurchsuchung-bei-heute-nach-dichand-intervention-in-finanzministerium/402383861
https://kurier.at/politik/inland/regierungsausgaben-pressefoerderung-sinkt-inseratengelder-steigen/401773839
Belgium
Media freedom is enshrined in the Belgian constitution and widely respected in practice. Any news medium may be created and is free to express any political opinion unless it is reprehensible (e.g., open racism, calls to violence). Criticism of the government, even if unfair, is allowed. However, the Belgian market is narrow and divided between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking submarkets, limiting the entry of new media. For instance, some satirical/investigative media akin to the French Charlie Hebdo entered and eventually exited. The TV and radio market features large public players, partly managed by representatives of the main political parties. The head of the main French-speaking public-media organization is appointed by the government and holds a post comparable to that of a civil servant. Nevertheless, the media organization’s journalists work largely free from direct control or political influence, even if some reporting may be a bit too uncritical of the government position.
The country’s main newspapers are privately owned and run. There are also important private television and radio stations, which operate independently of political parties, though some interpersonal connections exist at the upper management level. The internet has enabled private citizen initiatives to scrutinize public action. Privately held press organizations are largely independent and do their best to scrutinize public activities despite increasing financial pressures. There is limited self-censorship to gain better access to highly visible politicians, but no outright censorship by the government or other public entities..
The country’s main newspapers are privately owned and run. There are also important private television and radio stations, which operate independently of political parties, though some interpersonal connections exist at the upper management level. The internet has enabled private citizen initiatives to scrutinize public action. Privately held press organizations are largely independent and do their best to scrutinize public activities despite increasing financial pressures. There is limited self-censorship to gain better access to highly visible politicians, but no outright censorship by the government or other public entities..
Citations:
EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom – Media Pluralism Monitor MPM2022 Results – Centre for Media Pluralism and Freedom (eui.eu) - https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2022-results/
European Centre for Press & Media Freedom: Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/monitoring-report-2022/
Freedom House. 2022. “Freedom on the Net Report.” freedomhouse.org/FOTN2022Digital.pdf
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/FOTN2022Digital.pdf
EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom – Media Pluralism Monitor MPM2022 Results – Centre for Media Pluralism and Freedom (eui.eu) - https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2022-results/
European Centre for Press & Media Freedom: Media Freedom Rapid Response (MFRR) https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/monitoring-report-2022/
Freedom House. 2022. “Freedom on the Net Report.” freedomhouse.org/FOTN2022Digital.pdf
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/FOTN2022Digital.pdf
France
The media system is lively and contributes positively to public debate. In principle, the legal framework sufficiently guarantees media freedom and even provides for pluralism. The reality is somewhat more complex.
Public media have a history of critical reporting, and again in principle, public authorities have little or no direct capacity to intervene. However, these services are today facing an uncertain financial future, and recent appointments have called the independence of the public media into question. Emmanuel Macron’s administration abolished the “television tax” (redevance audiovisuelle) in 2022, possibly making public broadcasters more dependent on the good will of individual administrations. This adds to measures by the Sarkozy administration (2007 – 2012) that had curtailed those broadcasters’ access to advertising markets.
Relatedly, recent decisions concerning public radio and in particular Radio France – France’s largest radio service in terms of national audience – raised criticism regarding their possible political motivation. Specifically, the recent appointment of Adèle van Reeth as CEO of France Inter led to controversy after she canceled a popular daily comedy show, “C’est encore nous!” That show had regularly been very critical of the incumbent administration.
This said, there is no evidence of effective censorship or any form of constraints on critical journalism, despite a growing number of attempts by politicians to use legal channels to prevent the publication of news that could be politically costly.
Public media have a history of critical reporting, and again in principle, public authorities have little or no direct capacity to intervene. However, these services are today facing an uncertain financial future, and recent appointments have called the independence of the public media into question. Emmanuel Macron’s administration abolished the “television tax” (redevance audiovisuelle) in 2022, possibly making public broadcasters more dependent on the good will of individual administrations. This adds to measures by the Sarkozy administration (2007 – 2012) that had curtailed those broadcasters’ access to advertising markets.
Relatedly, recent decisions concerning public radio and in particular Radio France – France’s largest radio service in terms of national audience – raised criticism regarding their possible political motivation. Specifically, the recent appointment of Adèle van Reeth as CEO of France Inter led to controversy after she canceled a popular daily comedy show, “C’est encore nous!” That show had regularly been very critical of the incumbent administration.
This said, there is no evidence of effective censorship or any form of constraints on critical journalism, despite a growing number of attempts by politicians to use legal channels to prevent the publication of news that could be politically costly.
Citations:
Aude Dassonville. 2023. “Adèle Van Reeth fait entendre sa différence à France Inter.” Le Monde September 3.
Claire Sécail. 2024. Touche pas à mon peuple. Paris: Seuil.
Aude Dassonville. 2023. “Adèle Van Reeth fait entendre sa différence à France Inter.” Le Monde September 3.
Claire Sécail. 2024. Touche pas à mon peuple. Paris: Seuil.
Germany
Media freedom in Germany is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Basic Law (Article 5), which includes freedom of speech and prohibits media censorship. The media is considered the fourth pillar of democracy, and this freedom extends to publicly owned media (Rundfunk).
Additionally, publicly owned media in Germany operates under a legally secured mandate based on the Interstate Treaty on the Modernization of Media (Medienstaatsvertrag), which provides a framework for both public and private broadcast media. According to constitutional requirements set by the Federal Constitutional Court, the government is prohibited from interfering with or influencing the selection, content, or implementation of programs (Grundsatz der Staatsfreiheit). However, public media often faces criticism for being too close to the government, primarily because the supervisory board, the Rundfunkrat, includes multiple former and active politicians. This raises concerns about the neutrality of public media (Grimberg, 2020).
Generally, censorship of print and broadcast media is rare and usually concerns only highly sensitive issues. If attempts at censorship are discovered, the responsible officials are typically punished (V-Dem, 2023). However, an incident in June 2023, where the Bavarian Federal Police wiretapped the climate activist group “Letzte Generation” and their press contacts, raised concerns about interference with press freedom. While the Munich public prosecutor’s office deemed the interception reasonable, experts viewed it as an infringement on press freedom (Brack, 2023).
A new law regulating whistleblower protection took effect in July 2023. While it prohibits reprisals against whistleblowers and obliges enterprises and organizations to establish secure channels for informants, the Whistleblower Netzwerk (2023) criticizes that these regulations only cover reports addressed to internal or external governmental channels. Public whistleblowers are protected only in exceptional cases. Article 32 of the Whistleblower Protection Act (Hinweisgeberschutzgesetz, HinSchG) specifies that public whistleblowers are protected only when they did not receive an answer from external channels or if the relevant information relates to an immediate and obvious danger to the public. This complicates cooperation between investigative journalists and whistleblowers, particularly in cases of white-collar crime and illegal intelligence activities (RSF, 2023).
Media freedom in Germany has worsened in recent years, according to RSF’s annual ranking, which assigned Germany 81.91 points out of 100. There were 103 recorded attacks on reporters in 2022, an increase from previous years (65 in 2020 and 80 in 2021). Many attacks go unreported, suggesting the actual number is higher. Most attacks are physical, with many journalists being kicked or hit. Approximately 84% of these attacks are attributed to the extreme right, conspiracy ideologies, or antisemitism. One-third of journalists reported that police did not help when attacks occurred, and in some cases, police carried out the assaults. Additionally, police often did not investigate, or journalists refrained from filing complaints due to fear of further attacks. Besides physical violence, populist politicians attempt to create mistrust toward the media, and hate speech and threats on social media are increasing issues, especially for people of color, women, or journalists reporting on gender issues.
The government seldom blocks websites, but it has blocked Russian state-owned media outlets following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine due to an EU regulation. Additionally, Vodafone, following a regional court order in Munich, has blocked multiple streaming and file-sharing websites in response to complaints from rights holders (Freedom House, 2023).
To combat hate speech and the distribution of fake news and misinformation, Germany introduced the Network Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz). This law requires social networks to delete such content. According to Google’s Transparency Report, German government agencies made 293 requests to take down content in the second half of 2022 (Freedom House, 2023). The lack of judicial oversight is problematic, as there is no judicial remedy if a social media network restricts an individual’s freedom of speech or right to information.
The Digital Services Act, an EU directive that came into force in November 2022, aims to enable the deletion of illegal content and protect users’ fundamental rights. Member states are required to implement this directive by February 2024 (Reporter ohne Grenzen, 2023).
Lastly, while journalists in Germany adhere to a self-binding code of ethics, self-censorship is not a prevalent or documented issue, either online or in other media (Freedom House, 2023). If self-censorship occurs, it is only on isolated, highly political issues (V-Dem, 2023).
Additionally, publicly owned media in Germany operates under a legally secured mandate based on the Interstate Treaty on the Modernization of Media (Medienstaatsvertrag), which provides a framework for both public and private broadcast media. According to constitutional requirements set by the Federal Constitutional Court, the government is prohibited from interfering with or influencing the selection, content, or implementation of programs (Grundsatz der Staatsfreiheit). However, public media often faces criticism for being too close to the government, primarily because the supervisory board, the Rundfunkrat, includes multiple former and active politicians. This raises concerns about the neutrality of public media (Grimberg, 2020).
Generally, censorship of print and broadcast media is rare and usually concerns only highly sensitive issues. If attempts at censorship are discovered, the responsible officials are typically punished (V-Dem, 2023). However, an incident in June 2023, where the Bavarian Federal Police wiretapped the climate activist group “Letzte Generation” and their press contacts, raised concerns about interference with press freedom. While the Munich public prosecutor’s office deemed the interception reasonable, experts viewed it as an infringement on press freedom (Brack, 2023).
A new law regulating whistleblower protection took effect in July 2023. While it prohibits reprisals against whistleblowers and obliges enterprises and organizations to establish secure channels for informants, the Whistleblower Netzwerk (2023) criticizes that these regulations only cover reports addressed to internal or external governmental channels. Public whistleblowers are protected only in exceptional cases. Article 32 of the Whistleblower Protection Act (Hinweisgeberschutzgesetz, HinSchG) specifies that public whistleblowers are protected only when they did not receive an answer from external channels or if the relevant information relates to an immediate and obvious danger to the public. This complicates cooperation between investigative journalists and whistleblowers, particularly in cases of white-collar crime and illegal intelligence activities (RSF, 2023).
Media freedom in Germany has worsened in recent years, according to RSF’s annual ranking, which assigned Germany 81.91 points out of 100. There were 103 recorded attacks on reporters in 2022, an increase from previous years (65 in 2020 and 80 in 2021). Many attacks go unreported, suggesting the actual number is higher. Most attacks are physical, with many journalists being kicked or hit. Approximately 84% of these attacks are attributed to the extreme right, conspiracy ideologies, or antisemitism. One-third of journalists reported that police did not help when attacks occurred, and in some cases, police carried out the assaults. Additionally, police often did not investigate, or journalists refrained from filing complaints due to fear of further attacks. Besides physical violence, populist politicians attempt to create mistrust toward the media, and hate speech and threats on social media are increasing issues, especially for people of color, women, or journalists reporting on gender issues.
The government seldom blocks websites, but it has blocked Russian state-owned media outlets following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine due to an EU regulation. Additionally, Vodafone, following a regional court order in Munich, has blocked multiple streaming and file-sharing websites in response to complaints from rights holders (Freedom House, 2023).
To combat hate speech and the distribution of fake news and misinformation, Germany introduced the Network Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz). This law requires social networks to delete such content. According to Google’s Transparency Report, German government agencies made 293 requests to take down content in the second half of 2022 (Freedom House, 2023). The lack of judicial oversight is problematic, as there is no judicial remedy if a social media network restricts an individual’s freedom of speech or right to information.
The Digital Services Act, an EU directive that came into force in November 2022, aims to enable the deletion of illegal content and protect users’ fundamental rights. Member states are required to implement this directive by February 2024 (Reporter ohne Grenzen, 2023).
Lastly, while journalists in Germany adhere to a self-binding code of ethics, self-censorship is not a prevalent or documented issue, either online or in other media (Freedom House, 2023). If self-censorship occurs, it is only on isolated, highly political issues (V-Dem, 2023).
Citations:
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. n.d. “Rundfunkbeitrag.” https://www.bpb.de/themen/medien-journalismus/medienpolitik/500718/rundfunkbeitrag-rundfunkgebuehren/
Deutscher Bundestag. 2007. Medienpolitik in Deutschland: Übersicht über die föderale Kompetenzverteilung einschließlich der europäischen Medienkompetenzen, WD 10 - 047/07.
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom on the Net 2023, Germany.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-net/2023
Grimberg, S. 2020. “Wie staatsnah ist unser Rundfunk?” https://www.mdr.de/medien360g/medienpolitik/rundfunkbeitrag-einfluss-politik-100.html
Human Rights Watch. 2018. “Germany: Flawed Social Media Law.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law
Reporter ohne Grenzen. n.d. “Regulierung sozialer Medien.” https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/themen/internetfreiheit/regulierung-sozialer-medien
Reporter ohne Grenzen. n.d. “Germany.” https://rsf.org/en/country/germany
Reporter ohne Grenzen. 2023. “Rangliste der Pressefreiheit 2023, Nahaufnahme Deutschland.” https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Downloads/Ranglisten/Rangliste_2023/RSF_Nahaufnahme_Deutschland_2023.pdf
Brack, G., and Wolf, G. 2023. “Warum wurde der Pressekontakt der ‘Letzten Generation’ abgehört?” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/regional/bayern/br-warum-wurde-der-pressekontakt-der-letzten-generation-abgehoert-102.html
V-Dem. 2022. “Varieties of Democracy.” https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/
Whistleblower-Netzwerk. 2023. “Die Enttäuschung überwiegt.” https://www.whistleblower-net.de/online-magazin/2023/03/30/verabschiedung-hinweisgeberschutzgesetz-pm-von-wbn-und-rsf/
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. n.d. “Rundfunkbeitrag.” https://www.bpb.de/themen/medien-journalismus/medienpolitik/500718/rundfunkbeitrag-rundfunkgebuehren/
Deutscher Bundestag. 2007. Medienpolitik in Deutschland: Übersicht über die föderale Kompetenzverteilung einschließlich der europäischen Medienkompetenzen, WD 10 - 047/07.
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom on the Net 2023, Germany.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-net/2023
Grimberg, S. 2020. “Wie staatsnah ist unser Rundfunk?” https://www.mdr.de/medien360g/medienpolitik/rundfunkbeitrag-einfluss-politik-100.html
Human Rights Watch. 2018. “Germany: Flawed Social Media Law.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/14/germany-flawed-social-media-law
Reporter ohne Grenzen. n.d. “Regulierung sozialer Medien.” https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/themen/internetfreiheit/regulierung-sozialer-medien
Reporter ohne Grenzen. n.d. “Germany.” https://rsf.org/en/country/germany
Reporter ohne Grenzen. 2023. “Rangliste der Pressefreiheit 2023, Nahaufnahme Deutschland.” https://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/fileadmin/Redaktion/Downloads/Ranglisten/Rangliste_2023/RSF_Nahaufnahme_Deutschland_2023.pdf
Brack, G., and Wolf, G. 2023. “Warum wurde der Pressekontakt der ‘Letzten Generation’ abgehört?” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/regional/bayern/br-warum-wurde-der-pressekontakt-der-letzten-generation-abgehoert-102.html
V-Dem. 2022. “Varieties of Democracy.” https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/
Whistleblower-Netzwerk. 2023. “Die Enttäuschung überwiegt.” https://www.whistleblower-net.de/online-magazin/2023/03/30/verabschiedung-hinweisgeberschutzgesetz-pm-von-wbn-und-rsf/
Ireland
The media in Ireland is largely free from government influence and able to operate independently. Media freedom is guaranteed through the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (BAI), established on October 1, 2009, and renamed the Media Commission in 2023. Regulations governing publicly owned media ensure relative independence from government influence and political interference. Licensing and regulatory systems for privately owned media also promote independence, though ongoing debates persist about two major concerns: funding for public broadcasting and monopoly ownership in the private media sector. Economics heavily dominates public discourse in Ireland, influenced by neoclassical preferences for economic growth and free markets. Legal regulations do not hinder independent media from reporting freely, and there are restrictions on wiretapping and protections for whistleblowers, with no new regulations enacted between 2022 and 2024.
Regulations concerning the impact of “fake news” on media reporting are complex, especially given Ireland’s role as a major EU regulator for international MNC-owned social media, which is also bound by international directives, political dynamics and practical imperatives. Government or public officials do not censor digital, print or broadcast media. However, the forthcoming Hate Crimes Bill in 2024 will introduce some legitimate limits on free speech. There are few controls over broadcast frequencies, influence on printing facilities, selective distribution of subsidies or advertising (with exceptions for alcohol and tobacco limits and time thresholds), imposing prohibitive tariffs or bribery. Excluding child pornography and similar content, the government does not censor online material. Blasphemy was abolished as a constitutional offense in 2013, although a censorship office still exists.
While Directive (EU) 2016/680, which prohibits the illegal monitoring of journalists by law enforcement authorities, has been transposed into Irish law, the 2011 Data Retention Act still allows the police to monitor the communications of all citizens, including journalists. “Journalistic privilege” is not officially recognized in Ireland, but in practice, the judiciary is reluctant to force journalists to surrender material to the police (Colfer et al., 2022). The European Centre for Press and Media Freedom’s 2022 report ranks Ireland joint 3rd among EU states and does not mention Ireland in relation to the 813 recorded incidences of press violations that year. Freedom House’s “Freedom on the Net” report does not mention Ireland’s potential role in overseeing EU-level social media regulation and enforcement.
The Office of the Press Ombudsman is self-regulated and funded by the press industry but is very poorly resourced, with only 2.5 staff members, including the Ombudsman. The office handled 302 cases in 2022, up 50 from the previous year, and is conscious of the need to address the culture of libel and court action associated with Ireland’s unlimited defamation laws. Self-censorship among journalists can occur due to concerns about the chilling effects of the strict 2009 Defamation Act (with no upper limits on awards) and related libel laws, as well as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). While journalists tend not to face direct harassment, there are increasing threats of libel, including from Sinn Féin politicians. A new defamation bill is due in 2024 and should address these vulnerabilities. There are few arrests, physical assaults and no murders since 1996, but there are concerns about spillover from Northern Ireland, where journalist Lyra McKee was shot dead in Derry in 2019. Perpetrators of crimes against journalists have been effectively prosecuted. Working conditions are increasingly precarious, with poor union engagement in significant media organizations and concerns about the digital safety of journalists.
Regulations concerning the impact of “fake news” on media reporting are complex, especially given Ireland’s role as a major EU regulator for international MNC-owned social media, which is also bound by international directives, political dynamics and practical imperatives. Government or public officials do not censor digital, print or broadcast media. However, the forthcoming Hate Crimes Bill in 2024 will introduce some legitimate limits on free speech. There are few controls over broadcast frequencies, influence on printing facilities, selective distribution of subsidies or advertising (with exceptions for alcohol and tobacco limits and time thresholds), imposing prohibitive tariffs or bribery. Excluding child pornography and similar content, the government does not censor online material. Blasphemy was abolished as a constitutional offense in 2013, although a censorship office still exists.
While Directive (EU) 2016/680, which prohibits the illegal monitoring of journalists by law enforcement authorities, has been transposed into Irish law, the 2011 Data Retention Act still allows the police to monitor the communications of all citizens, including journalists. “Journalistic privilege” is not officially recognized in Ireland, but in practice, the judiciary is reluctant to force journalists to surrender material to the police (Colfer et al., 2022). The European Centre for Press and Media Freedom’s 2022 report ranks Ireland joint 3rd among EU states and does not mention Ireland in relation to the 813 recorded incidences of press violations that year. Freedom House’s “Freedom on the Net” report does not mention Ireland’s potential role in overseeing EU-level social media regulation and enforcement.
The Office of the Press Ombudsman is self-regulated and funded by the press industry but is very poorly resourced, with only 2.5 staff members, including the Ombudsman. The office handled 302 cases in 2022, up 50 from the previous year, and is conscious of the need to address the culture of libel and court action associated with Ireland’s unlimited defamation laws. Self-censorship among journalists can occur due to concerns about the chilling effects of the strict 2009 Defamation Act (with no upper limits on awards) and related libel laws, as well as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). While journalists tend not to face direct harassment, there are increasing threats of libel, including from Sinn Féin politicians. A new defamation bill is due in 2024 and should address these vulnerabilities. There are few arrests, physical assaults and no murders since 1996, but there are concerns about spillover from Northern Ireland, where journalist Lyra McKee was shot dead in Derry in 2019. Perpetrators of crimes against journalists have been effectively prosecuted. Working conditions are increasingly precarious, with poor union engagement in significant media organizations and concerns about the digital safety of journalists.
Citations:
Colfer, B., O’Brennan, J., and Bandelow, N. C. 2022. Ireland Report: Sustainable Governance Indicators 2022. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann.
Media Freedom. 2023. “Freedom House.” https://freedomhouse.org/issues/media-freedom
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom. 2022. “Monitoring Report 2022.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/monitoring-report-2022/
Lowry, H. 2023. Love Not Fear. Dublin: HCC.
Suiter, J., and Flynn, R. 2021. “Irish Media and the Shaping of Political Discourse.” In The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, eds. D. M. Farrell and N. Hardiman, 595-609. Oxford: OUP.
Criminal Justice (Incitement to Violence or Hatred and Hate Offences) Bill 2022. 2022. Houses of the Oireachtas.
Colfer, B., O’Brennan, J., and Bandelow, N. C. 2022. Ireland Report: Sustainable Governance Indicators 2022. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann.
Media Freedom. 2023. “Freedom House.” https://freedomhouse.org/issues/media-freedom
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom. 2022. “Monitoring Report 2022.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/monitoring-report-2022/
Lowry, H. 2023. Love Not Fear. Dublin: HCC.
Suiter, J., and Flynn, R. 2021. “Irish Media and the Shaping of Political Discourse.” In The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, eds. D. M. Farrell and N. Hardiman, 595-609. Oxford: OUP.
Criminal Justice (Incitement to Violence or Hatred and Hate Offences) Bill 2022. 2022. Houses of the Oireachtas.
Latvia
In Latvia, the media operate with independence and freedom, allowing journalists to investigate cases without restriction. Analytical journalism is highly developed, enabling the media to hold politicians accountable.
The Public Electronic Media Council (Sabiedrisko Elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu padome, SEPLP) was established under the Law on Public Electronic Mass Media. The council is an independent, autonomous public body representing public interests in the electronic media sector.
The Media Ombudsman was elected in 2021 and has been effective since March 2022. The Media Ombudsman monitors public electronic media and the services delivered by public electronic mass media. The monitoring covers the code of ethics and editorial guidelines of public electronic mass media. In addition, the Media Ombudsman – either upon its initiative or based on the submissions of individuals – provides an opinion on the conformity of public electronic mass media programs and services.
The legal framework ensures freedom of the press, confidentiality of journalistic sources, and access to public information. There is no censorship in any form – digital, print, or broadcast media.
Media licensing in Latvia is politically neutral and adheres to legal procedures. Many TV channels broadcasting from Russia, accused of spreading propaganda and violating Latvian laws, have been banned. According to the law, TV programs registered in a country (such as Russia) that threaten the territorial integrity and independence of another country are prohibited from operating in Latvia.
The legal framework distinguishes among political influences, differences, and media oversight. In addition, the oversight function of public media and the regulatory function within the industry have been separated.
Journalists work in a safe environment. However, they may be subject to verbal attacks online. At the end of 2022, the Riga Regional Court upheld a lower court’s decision, sentencing an individual to two months’ imprisonment for harassing a “re:Baltica” investigative journalist. This case marked the first time someone was imprisoned for harassing a journalist.
The government plans to merge the public television and radio entities into a unified public broadcasting company. Additionally, there is a plan to introduce a new public media financing model to enhance media independence.
While overt acts of media censorship or direct harassment of journalists are challenging to address, self-censorship presents significant obstacles within the media landscape, extending to both state and regional outlets (Ramāns 2020). Various factors contribute to self-censorship. While the lack of stable media financing stands out as a primary concern, an overdependence on state funding through Media Support Programs has also resulted in the promotion of pro-government narratives. Additionally, the consolidation of public media into a unified broadcasting entity has drawn criticism from media experts who argue that it undermines media independence by intensifying government influence.
The Public Electronic Media Council (Sabiedrisko Elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu padome, SEPLP) was established under the Law on Public Electronic Mass Media. The council is an independent, autonomous public body representing public interests in the electronic media sector.
The Media Ombudsman was elected in 2021 and has been effective since March 2022. The Media Ombudsman monitors public electronic media and the services delivered by public electronic mass media. The monitoring covers the code of ethics and editorial guidelines of public electronic mass media. In addition, the Media Ombudsman – either upon its initiative or based on the submissions of individuals – provides an opinion on the conformity of public electronic mass media programs and services.
The legal framework ensures freedom of the press, confidentiality of journalistic sources, and access to public information. There is no censorship in any form – digital, print, or broadcast media.
Media licensing in Latvia is politically neutral and adheres to legal procedures. Many TV channels broadcasting from Russia, accused of spreading propaganda and violating Latvian laws, have been banned. According to the law, TV programs registered in a country (such as Russia) that threaten the territorial integrity and independence of another country are prohibited from operating in Latvia.
The legal framework distinguishes among political influences, differences, and media oversight. In addition, the oversight function of public media and the regulatory function within the industry have been separated.
Journalists work in a safe environment. However, they may be subject to verbal attacks online. At the end of 2022, the Riga Regional Court upheld a lower court’s decision, sentencing an individual to two months’ imprisonment for harassing a “re:Baltica” investigative journalist. This case marked the first time someone was imprisoned for harassing a journalist.
The government plans to merge the public television and radio entities into a unified public broadcasting company. Additionally, there is a plan to introduce a new public media financing model to enhance media independence.
While overt acts of media censorship or direct harassment of journalists are challenging to address, self-censorship presents significant obstacles within the media landscape, extending to both state and regional outlets (Ramāns 2020). Various factors contribute to self-censorship. While the lack of stable media financing stands out as a primary concern, an overdependence on state funding through Media Support Programs has also resulted in the promotion of pro-government narratives. Additionally, the consolidation of public media into a unified broadcasting entity has drawn criticism from media experts who argue that it undermines media independence by intensifying government influence.
Citations:
Latvia. https://rsf.org/en/country/latvia
Law on Public Electronic Mass Media and Administration. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/319096
SEPLP. 2022. “Ombuda konference 2022.” https://www.seplp.lv/lv/ombuda-konference-2022
SEPLP. 2023. “Latvijas sabiedrisko elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu attīstības plāns 2024. – 2026. gadam.” https://www.seplp.lv/lv/media/1377/download?attachment
LSM. 2022. “Apgabaltiesa Sondaram negroza divu mēnešu cietumsodu par žurnālistes vajāšanu.” https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/apgabaltiesa-sondaram-negroza-divu-menesu-cietumsodu-par-zurnalistes-vajasanu.a484583/
Ramāns, J. 2020. “Pašcenzūra joprojām sastopama teju visos medijos; sabiedriskie mediji – visbrīvākie.” https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/medijpratiba/pascenzura-joprojam-sastopama-teju-visos-medijos-sabiedriskie-mediji–visbrivakie.a351322/
Latvia. https://rsf.org/en/country/latvia
Law on Public Electronic Mass Media and Administration. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/319096
SEPLP. 2022. “Ombuda konference 2022.” https://www.seplp.lv/lv/ombuda-konference-2022
SEPLP. 2023. “Latvijas sabiedrisko elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu attīstības plāns 2024. – 2026. gadam.” https://www.seplp.lv/lv/media/1377/download?attachment
LSM. 2022. “Apgabaltiesa Sondaram negroza divu mēnešu cietumsodu par žurnālistes vajāšanu.” https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/apgabaltiesa-sondaram-negroza-divu-menesu-cietumsodu-par-zurnalistes-vajasanu.a484583/
Ramāns, J. 2020. “Pašcenzūra joprojām sastopama teju visos medijos; sabiedriskie mediji – visbrīvākie.” https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/medijpratiba/pascenzura-joprojam-sastopama-teju-visos-medijos-sabiedriskie-mediji–visbrivakie.a351322/
Slovakia
Media freedom in Slovakia is guaranteed by the constitution and upheld by a set of laws, including media law and election legislation. Censorship is prohibited, the judicial oversight system is functional, and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) serves as the final authority for free speech cases. While the press does not require a license to publish, radio and TV broadcasting operate under a state-regulated license regime (cf. Hanák, 2022).
Slovakia ranks highly in the World Index of Media Freedom, placing 17th in 2022 (RSF 2022). According to Urbániková (2022), while the legal regulation of media freedom is sophisticated, its implementation faces challenges. Public radio and TV broadcasting (RTVS) exemplifies media capture, partly because politicians in parliament elect the director. This issue is highlighted in the 2021 Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom report (2022).
Oligarchs influence some media outlets. For instance, Boris Kollár, leader of the Sme Rodina party and Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic from 2020 to 2023, owns two of the four most popular radio stations in Slovakia.
In the Media Pluralism Monitor 2022, Slovakia was rated as a low-risk country for the “Journalistic profession, standards and protection” indicator (Urbániková, 2022). However, the 2018 murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée remains partially unresolved. Two perpetrators and an intermediary were convicted, but the trial of the alleged instigator, Marian Kočner, and his accomplice continues. While direct physical attacks against journalists are rare, politicians frequently intimidate them (Urbániková, 2022).
Slovakia ranks highly in the World Index of Media Freedom, placing 17th in 2022 (RSF 2022). According to Urbániková (2022), while the legal regulation of media freedom is sophisticated, its implementation faces challenges. Public radio and TV broadcasting (RTVS) exemplifies media capture, partly because politicians in parliament elect the director. This issue is highlighted in the 2021 Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom report (2022).
Oligarchs influence some media outlets. For instance, Boris Kollár, leader of the Sme Rodina party and Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic from 2020 to 2023, owns two of the four most popular radio stations in Slovakia.
In the Media Pluralism Monitor 2022, Slovakia was rated as a low-risk country for the “Journalistic profession, standards and protection” indicator (Urbániková, 2022). However, the 2018 murder of journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée remains partially unresolved. Two perpetrators and an intermediary were convicted, but the trial of the alleged instigator, Marian Kočner, and his accomplice continues. While direct physical attacks against journalists are rare, politicians frequently intimidate them (Urbániková, 2022).
Citations:
Hanák, P. 2022. Media Law and Media Capture in Slovakia and the Czech Republic after the Year 2000. Prague: Charles University.
Urbániková, M. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Slovakia. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom.
https://rsf.org/en/index
Hanák, P. 2022. Media Law and Media Capture in Slovakia and the Czech Republic after the Year 2000. Prague: Charles University.
Urbániková, M. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Slovakia. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom.
https://rsf.org/en/index
Spain
The freedom of the press is guaranteed in the Spanish constitution. Law 13/2022 of July 7, 2022, regulates the provision of audiovisual services, and Law 17/2006 of June 5, 2006, on State-Owned Radio and Television safeguards the independence, neutrality, and objectivity of the public media. Indeed, Spain has a diverse and free print, audio, digital, and TV media landscape.
In the past decade, some laws, such as the so-called gag law, placed constraints on media freedom and created difficulties for journalists. Although the government tried to repeal the most controversial articles of this law, the lack of agreement on this issue before the parliamentary elections in July 2023 constituted a serious breach of one of the government’s electoral promises. Reporters Without Borders reported on a climate of polarization, which is eroding society’s confidence in journalists and fueling hate speech against the media. According to the World Press Freedom Index, reporting is being replaced by opinion. Spain was ranked 36th in the 2023 World Press Freedom Index, down from 29th in 2021.
Certain media outlets have alleged that the government is declining to address questions during press conferences. Simultaneously, extremist parties engage in verbal assaults against journalists whose inquiries they deem problematic. Particularly, the far-right party Vox continues to spread false information and deny journalists and the media access to its press conferences and other events.
During the review period, the appointment of the public broadcast (RTVE) president continued to be a challenge. In February 2021, the PSOE and PP reached an agreement to renew the Board of Directors of RTVE, and a new president was appointed in March 2021. Nevertheless, after losing support from the government coalition, the president resigned in 2022, and an “acting chair” with limited executive powers was nominated.
According to the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), editorial autonomy in Spain increased from a medium risk of 63% in 2020 to a high risk of 75% in 2021 because the appointment and removal of media editors-in-chief are not safe from political interference in practice.
The situation regarding regional public-broadcast groups is particularly concerning, as incumbent governments often openly promote their partisan political objectives. This has been notably evident in Andalusia, Madrid, and especially Catalonia, where public media has overtly supported the nationalist regional government’s pro-secession stance while limiting access for those with opposing or pluralistic perspectives.
In private broadcasting operations, there is no regulation guaranteeing autonomy in appointing and dismissing editors-in-chief. While media groups are formally independent, both national and regional parties in office have traditionally sought to support newspapers, radio, and television stations ideologically aligned with them. Various mechanisms enable political influence on media decisions, with licensing and institutional advertising being prominent among them. In 2021, the central government increased its allocation for institutional advertising by 86% compared to 2020. Independent media outlets have called on the government to safeguard information plurality and quality by ensuring a fair distribution of institutional advertising. However, there have been no new developments regarding the legal framework for institutional advertising during the review period.
The National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC) serves as the national-level audiovisual regulator, while regional audiovisual authorities oversee service providers at the regional level. Law 7 July 2022 advocates for better cooperation between the CNMC and regional audiovisual authorities to improve the supervision of online services, platforms, and providers. In 2023, the CNMC was allocated additional human and financial resources.
Despite attempts to exert influence, government or public officials do not censor digital, print, or broadcast media. Freedom House’s 2022 Freedom on the Net report does not include data for Spain, but there is no evidence of state censorship, self-censorship among journalists, or harassment of journalists beyond isolated incidents.
A recent survey from the Center for Sociological Research (CIS) shows that the confidence of Spanish citizens in media information has slightly decreased, scoring 4.1 on a 10-point scale. Law 2/2023 establishes an authority to protect whistleblowers, aiming to enhance transparency and accountability in media practices.
In the past decade, some laws, such as the so-called gag law, placed constraints on media freedom and created difficulties for journalists. Although the government tried to repeal the most controversial articles of this law, the lack of agreement on this issue before the parliamentary elections in July 2023 constituted a serious breach of one of the government’s electoral promises. Reporters Without Borders reported on a climate of polarization, which is eroding society’s confidence in journalists and fueling hate speech against the media. According to the World Press Freedom Index, reporting is being replaced by opinion. Spain was ranked 36th in the 2023 World Press Freedom Index, down from 29th in 2021.
Certain media outlets have alleged that the government is declining to address questions during press conferences. Simultaneously, extremist parties engage in verbal assaults against journalists whose inquiries they deem problematic. Particularly, the far-right party Vox continues to spread false information and deny journalists and the media access to its press conferences and other events.
During the review period, the appointment of the public broadcast (RTVE) president continued to be a challenge. In February 2021, the PSOE and PP reached an agreement to renew the Board of Directors of RTVE, and a new president was appointed in March 2021. Nevertheless, after losing support from the government coalition, the president resigned in 2022, and an “acting chair” with limited executive powers was nominated.
According to the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), editorial autonomy in Spain increased from a medium risk of 63% in 2020 to a high risk of 75% in 2021 because the appointment and removal of media editors-in-chief are not safe from political interference in practice.
The situation regarding regional public-broadcast groups is particularly concerning, as incumbent governments often openly promote their partisan political objectives. This has been notably evident in Andalusia, Madrid, and especially Catalonia, where public media has overtly supported the nationalist regional government’s pro-secession stance while limiting access for those with opposing or pluralistic perspectives.
In private broadcasting operations, there is no regulation guaranteeing autonomy in appointing and dismissing editors-in-chief. While media groups are formally independent, both national and regional parties in office have traditionally sought to support newspapers, radio, and television stations ideologically aligned with them. Various mechanisms enable political influence on media decisions, with licensing and institutional advertising being prominent among them. In 2021, the central government increased its allocation for institutional advertising by 86% compared to 2020. Independent media outlets have called on the government to safeguard information plurality and quality by ensuring a fair distribution of institutional advertising. However, there have been no new developments regarding the legal framework for institutional advertising during the review period.
The National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC) serves as the national-level audiovisual regulator, while regional audiovisual authorities oversee service providers at the regional level. Law 7 July 2022 advocates for better cooperation between the CNMC and regional audiovisual authorities to improve the supervision of online services, platforms, and providers. In 2023, the CNMC was allocated additional human and financial resources.
Despite attempts to exert influence, government or public officials do not censor digital, print, or broadcast media. Freedom House’s 2022 Freedom on the Net report does not include data for Spain, but there is no evidence of state censorship, self-censorship among journalists, or harassment of journalists beyond isolated incidents.
A recent survey from the Center for Sociological Research (CIS) shows that the confidence of Spanish citizens in media information has slightly decreased, scoring 4.1 on a 10-point scale. Law 2/2023 establishes an authority to protect whistleblowers, aiming to enhance transparency and accountability in media practices.
Citations:
Reporters without borders. 2023. “World Press Freedom Index.” https://rsf.org/en/spain
European University Institute. 2022. “Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era in the Year 2021.” https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2870/74922
Reporters without borders. 2023. “World Press Freedom Index.” https://rsf.org/en/spain
European University Institute. 2022. “Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era in the Year 2021.” https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2870/74922
Netherlands
On the World Press Freedom Index (WPFI) compiled by Reporters without Borders (RSF 2023), the Netherlands has made a strong comeback from 28th place in 2022 to sixth place in 2023 (out of 180 countries). This is specifically – and sadly – due in part to stepping up security measures for reporters following the killing of crime reporter Peter R. de Vries in July 2021. Ongoing dangers from organized crime as well as threatening behavior from supporters of populist parties toward journalists during demonstrations – cheered on by PVV political leader Wilders, who publicly called journalists “scum of the earth” – have resulted in somewhat improved police protection and an emergency number that journalists can use to report crimes and receive advice on what to do. Nevertheless, the Center for Media Pluralism and Media
Freedom (CMPF 2023) index sees the country as being low-risk with regard to the media’s fundamental protection, social inclusiveness and political independence. Although there are some signs of self-censorship, Dutch media feel free to question and criticize government ministers and members of parliament. Journalists have practically unlimited access to the parliament building, and may approach MPs and ministers after commission meetings, with the informal rule being that they will allow (short) interviews.
The Dutch media landscape consists of commercial media – owned by three large press conglomerates (one Dutch-German, two Belgian) – and public media, overseen by Dutch Public Broadcasting (NPO). The small number of media owners and the dominance of uncontrollable international mega-companies in commercial media is considered a plurality risk. The Dutch Authority on Consumers and Market (ACM) prohibited a merger between Talpa and RTL. There is no formal legislation to limit media concentration.
NPO is still structured to serve putatively different segments of the population, each with their own distinct set of beliefs, perspectives and convictions, along with a number of paying members. The system has been modernized several times; most recently by limiting the number of media organizations to six. Every five years, two “aspiring” members are admitted on a temporary basis. To the astonishment of many, in 2021, Unheard Netherlands! (ON!) – the mouthpiece of adherents of extreme right-wing political parties such as PVV and FvD – and Black (Zwart) – which leans toward BIJ1 and DENK – were admitted. Both broadcasting organizations are rooted in vocal protest movements, and have played a prominent role in Dutch public debates for some time thanks to demonstrations and provocative actions. In 2022 and 2023, ON! was formally accused by the NPO board of engaging in biased reporting and interviewing, thus violating rules of good journalistic practice. However, the minister of culture, acting for a caretaker government after the PVV election win, declined to take punitive action. This is in line with the national culture of political noninterference, leaving freedom and pluralism issues to be dealt with by the editorial statutes of the media themselves.
Freedom (CMPF 2023) index sees the country as being low-risk with regard to the media’s fundamental protection, social inclusiveness and political independence. Although there are some signs of self-censorship, Dutch media feel free to question and criticize government ministers and members of parliament. Journalists have practically unlimited access to the parliament building, and may approach MPs and ministers after commission meetings, with the informal rule being that they will allow (short) interviews.
The Dutch media landscape consists of commercial media – owned by three large press conglomerates (one Dutch-German, two Belgian) – and public media, overseen by Dutch Public Broadcasting (NPO). The small number of media owners and the dominance of uncontrollable international mega-companies in commercial media is considered a plurality risk. The Dutch Authority on Consumers and Market (ACM) prohibited a merger between Talpa and RTL. There is no formal legislation to limit media concentration.
NPO is still structured to serve putatively different segments of the population, each with their own distinct set of beliefs, perspectives and convictions, along with a number of paying members. The system has been modernized several times; most recently by limiting the number of media organizations to six. Every five years, two “aspiring” members are admitted on a temporary basis. To the astonishment of many, in 2021, Unheard Netherlands! (ON!) – the mouthpiece of adherents of extreme right-wing political parties such as PVV and FvD – and Black (Zwart) – which leans toward BIJ1 and DENK – were admitted. Both broadcasting organizations are rooted in vocal protest movements, and have played a prominent role in Dutch public debates for some time thanks to demonstrations and provocative actions. In 2022 and 2023, ON! was formally accused by the NPO board of engaging in biased reporting and interviewing, thus violating rules of good journalistic practice. However, the minister of culture, acting for a caretaker government after the PVV election win, declined to take punitive action. This is in line with the national culture of political noninterference, leaving freedom and pluralism issues to be dealt with by the editorial statutes of the media themselves.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders (RSF). 2023. “Netherlands.” https://rsf.org/en/country/netherlands
Commissariaat voor de Media. 2023. Mediamonitor.
CMPF. 2023. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom: Freedom Country Report: The Netherlands. Fiesole: European University Institute.
Leen d’Haenens, Hanne Vandenberghe. “Country Report Netherlands.” https://media-ownership.eu/findings/countries/the-netherlands/
NRC_H. 2022. “Toezichthouder legt niet alleen Ongehoord Nederland, maar héle publieke omroep onder vergrootglas.” van den Bos, July 22.
RTL Nieuws. 2023. “Scholieren kiezen liefst heel links, of heel rechts: ‘Ze zijn gevoelig voor oneliners’.” November 22.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Streep door fusie Talpa and RTL, ‘consument zou de rekening betalen’.” January 30.
Ohme, Jakob, Kiki de Bruin, Yael de Haan, Sanne Kruikemeier, Toni G.L.A. van der Meer, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2023. “Avoiding the News to Participate in Society? The Longitudinal Relationship Between News Avoidance and Civic Engagement.” Communications 48 (4): 551-562. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2021-0099
Verboord, M. 2023. “Bundles of Trust? Examining the Relationships between Media Repertoires, Institutional Trust, and Social Contexts.” Communications.
Reporters without Borders (RSF). 2023. “Netherlands.” https://rsf.org/en/country/netherlands
Commissariaat voor de Media. 2023. Mediamonitor.
CMPF. 2023. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom: Freedom Country Report: The Netherlands. Fiesole: European University Institute.
Leen d’Haenens, Hanne Vandenberghe. “Country Report Netherlands.” https://media-ownership.eu/findings/countries/the-netherlands/
NRC_H. 2022. “Toezichthouder legt niet alleen Ongehoord Nederland, maar héle publieke omroep onder vergrootglas.” van den Bos, July 22.
RTL Nieuws. 2023. “Scholieren kiezen liefst heel links, of heel rechts: ‘Ze zijn gevoelig voor oneliners’.” November 22.
NOS Nieuws. 2023. “Streep door fusie Talpa and RTL, ‘consument zou de rekening betalen’.” January 30.
Ohme, Jakob, Kiki de Bruin, Yael de Haan, Sanne Kruikemeier, Toni G.L.A. van der Meer, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2023. “Avoiding the News to Participate in Society? The Longitudinal Relationship Between News Avoidance and Civic Engagement.” Communications 48 (4): 551-562. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2021-0099
Verboord, M. 2023. “Bundles of Trust? Examining the Relationships between Media Repertoires, Institutional Trust, and Social Contexts.” Communications.
UK
The UK government faces robust media scrutiny from both the press and broadcasters. Broadcasters are formally required to ensure political balance, with OFCOM, an agency tasked with monitoring and investigating complaints, overseeing this obligation. Despite regular criticism from politicians across the political spectrum, the main public broadcaster, the BBC, continues to be regarded as fair and uninhibited in its criticism of the government. In 2023, the BBC updated its social media guidance following complaints from the UK Conservative government about a tweet critical of government immigration policy by one of the BBC’s most famous presenters. Similar debates occur in Scotland regarding media criticism of the SNP-led Scottish government.
The recent establishment of GB News, which takes a distinctly partisan (broadly right-wing) stance, has challenged the assurance of balance in media coverage. This challenge has intensified, especially as GB News has given programs to serving members of Parliament without providing corresponding opposition voices. However, GB News remains far from becoming a UK equivalent of Fox News.
Press freedom faced challenges in the late 2000s following hacking and other scandals, but the government largely resisted calls for restrictions. The print industry is regulated by the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which aims to “hold newspapers and magazines to account for their actions, protect individual rights, uphold high standards of journalism, and help maintain freedom of expression for the press.”
The Online Safety Bill, aimed at regulating harmful content, became law on October 26, 2023, after a long and highly contested passage through Parliament. Media groups, not just those operating online, expressed concerns about whether its provisions would inhibit media freedom.
The recent establishment of GB News, which takes a distinctly partisan (broadly right-wing) stance, has challenged the assurance of balance in media coverage. This challenge has intensified, especially as GB News has given programs to serving members of Parliament without providing corresponding opposition voices. However, GB News remains far from becoming a UK equivalent of Fox News.
Press freedom faced challenges in the late 2000s following hacking and other scandals, but the government largely resisted calls for restrictions. The print industry is regulated by the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which aims to “hold newspapers and magazines to account for their actions, protect individual rights, uphold high standards of journalism, and help maintain freedom of expression for the press.”
The Online Safety Bill, aimed at regulating harmful content, became law on October 26, 2023, after a long and highly contested passage through Parliament. Media groups, not just those operating online, expressed concerns about whether its provisions would inhibit media freedom.
Citations:
BBC News. 2023. “Gary Lineker: New rules for BBC flagship presenters after social media row,” September 28. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-66940530
BBC News. 2023. “Gary Lineker: New rules for BBC flagship presenters after social media row,” September 28. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-66940530
7
Australia
Australia has traditionally had a lively media landscape, with internet platforms and social media greatly expanding the number and range of broadcasters (BBC 2023). Private operators maintain significant independence from government, while public operators rely on public funding but are operationally independent.
Governments occasionally attempt to pressure the influential ABC into slanting agendas in their favor, but such moves are strongly resisted by the organization, bolstered by its high public standing (Muller 2019). Media experts suggest that reforms to make the appointment of the ABC Board and its funding stream less manipulable by governments would reinforce its independence.
Various pieces of recently passed legislation impinge on media freedom. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 allows for control orders to restrict freedom of speech for individuals and the media (Murphy 2019). The National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 restricts the ability of journalists to report on secret intelligence operations, allowing for up to 10 years of jail for exposing errors made by security agencies. In addition, the Data Retention Act makes it almost impossible for journalists to protect government sources. The Foreign Fighters Act potentially criminalizes media reports covering militant extremists, and the most recently passed measure, the Foreign Interference and Espionage Act, significantly broadens the scope of information defined as “classified.” Federal police raids on journalists’ homes and media offices have highlighted these issues, prompting a concerted campaign by journalists and media organizations for legislative changes to protect media and whistleblowers, with advocates arguing that the country’s democratic functioning is at stake (Meade 2021). In response to raids on a journalist’s home and the offices of the ABC, Australian newspapers appeared with blackened front pages in October 2019.
Despite these challenges, journalists generally work without significant government intimidation, and there is no evidence of censorship or self-censorship. Well-established norms of press freedom allow media platforms to criticize the government with legal protection. Threats to journalists (e.g., libel) are not uncommon but they are handled in a reasonably fair and peaceful manner through the legal process.
Governments occasionally attempt to pressure the influential ABC into slanting agendas in their favor, but such moves are strongly resisted by the organization, bolstered by its high public standing (Muller 2019). Media experts suggest that reforms to make the appointment of the ABC Board and its funding stream less manipulable by governments would reinforce its independence.
Various pieces of recently passed legislation impinge on media freedom. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 allows for control orders to restrict freedom of speech for individuals and the media (Murphy 2019). The National Security Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 restricts the ability of journalists to report on secret intelligence operations, allowing for up to 10 years of jail for exposing errors made by security agencies. In addition, the Data Retention Act makes it almost impossible for journalists to protect government sources. The Foreign Fighters Act potentially criminalizes media reports covering militant extremists, and the most recently passed measure, the Foreign Interference and Espionage Act, significantly broadens the scope of information defined as “classified.” Federal police raids on journalists’ homes and media offices have highlighted these issues, prompting a concerted campaign by journalists and media organizations for legislative changes to protect media and whistleblowers, with advocates arguing that the country’s democratic functioning is at stake (Meade 2021). In response to raids on a journalist’s home and the offices of the ABC, Australian newspapers appeared with blackened front pages in October 2019.
Despite these challenges, journalists generally work without significant government intimidation, and there is no evidence of censorship or self-censorship. Well-established norms of press freedom allow media platforms to criticize the government with legal protection. Threats to journalists (e.g., libel) are not uncommon but they are handled in a reasonably fair and peaceful manner through the legal process.
Citations:
BBC. 2023. “Australia Media Guide.” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15675260
Muller, D. 2019. “Australian governments have a long history of trying to manipulate the ABC – and it’s unlikely to stop now.” The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/australian-governments-have-a-long-history-of-trying-to-manipulate-the-abc-and-its-unlikely-to-stop-now-110712
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/call-to-scrap-security-laws-that-could-jail-journos/news-story/0b7b4d888751c0b11dc093ccb11c07bd
http://www.pressfreedom.org.au/press-media-alliance-freedom-report/introduction/foreword
Murphy, P. 2019. “The Public’s Right to Know.” Medium. https://pressfreedom.org.au/the-publics-right-to-know-3aee204f9036
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/australia
Meade, A. 2021. “Australia Needs to Strengthen Press Freedom Laws and Promote Transparency, Inquiry Finds.” The Guardian May 19. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/may/19/australia-needs-to-strengthen-press-freedom-laws-and-promote-transparency-inquiry-finds
BBC. 2023. “Australia Media Guide.” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-15675260
Muller, D. 2019. “Australian governments have a long history of trying to manipulate the ABC – and it’s unlikely to stop now.” The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/australian-governments-have-a-long-history-of-trying-to-manipulate-the-abc-and-its-unlikely-to-stop-now-110712
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/call-to-scrap-security-laws-that-could-jail-journos/news-story/0b7b4d888751c0b11dc093ccb11c07bd
http://www.pressfreedom.org.au/press-media-alliance-freedom-report/introduction/foreword
Murphy, P. 2019. “The Public’s Right to Know.” Medium. https://pressfreedom.org.au/the-publics-right-to-know-3aee204f9036
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/australia
Meade, A. 2021. “Australia Needs to Strengthen Press Freedom Laws and Promote Transparency, Inquiry Finds.” The Guardian May 19. https://www.theguardian.com/media/2021/may/19/australia-needs-to-strengthen-press-freedom-laws-and-promote-transparency-inquiry-finds
Italy
Article 21 of the Italian constitution safeguards the fundamental right to freedom of expression, encompassing all forms of communication, including speech, writing, and other mediums. This right includes media freedom, as established by prevailing interpretations (see Media Pluralism Monitor 2022).
Beyond this constitutional safeguard, journalistic freedom of expression is regulated by a comprehensive network of legislative provisions and judicially produced rules. A significant recent development in this area is the Constitutional Court’s ruling (Sentence 150/2021), which declared Article 13 of the Press Law (47/1948) unconstitutional. This article had imposed a prison sentence for defamation committed through the press. Now, imprisonment is limited to cases involving hate speech and the dissemination of fake news.
Legal limitations to freedom of expression exist but must be proportionate to the intended purpose and adhere to legal principles. Citizens have legal remedies in case of infringement. These rules formally extend to online information. The right to information is regulated by the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, Legislative Decree 97/2016).
In practice, Italian journalists generally operate in a relatively open environment. However, they often self-censor to align with their news organization’s editorial stance, protect themselves from lawsuits or other legal repercussions, or avoid potential retaliation from extremist groups or organized crime, as reported by Reporters sans Frontières in their 2023 press freedom dossier. Media Freedom Rapid Response (2022) notes that the main concerns about media freedom stem from strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs; known as “querela temeraria” in the Italian legal framework) and other legal threats, especially following the establishment of the center-right government led by Giorgia Meloni (October 2022), leader of Brothers of Italy, who between 2020 and 2023 filed lawsuits against two journalists.
The Coordination Center for the Permanent Monitoring, Analysis, and Exchange of Information on the phenomenon of intimidation acts against journalists, chaired by the Minister of the Interior, registered 111 acts of intimidation committed against journalists in 2022, 52% lower than in 2021, and 46 in the first six months of 2023, 23% lower than in the first half of 2022 (see Ministry of Interior). Most of these incidents stem from social and political contexts or organized crime and result in verbal threats and physical assaults.
The most significant issue concerning media freedom relates to the political interdependence of public service media. Political parties and governments have historically wielded considerable influence over Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI), Italy’s public broadcaster and largest media organization. Governing parties frequently intervened in RAI’s personnel decisions, dictated its organizational structure, and controlled resources. While opposition parties were granted some representation, their influence was limited.
The Renzi government’s Law 220/2015 reshaped RAI’s governance structure to curb excessive political influence by concentrating power in the hands of the CEO, the company’s senior executive. This shift of authority from the board – traditionally composed of representatives from major political parties – to the CEO diminished direct political control over RAI. However, it simultaneously increased government influence, as the government proposes the CEO to the board. While the Draghi government prioritized meritocracy in appointing the CEO and other senior RAI officials, the Meloni government has prioritized ideological alignment, seeking to fill critical positions with individuals close to the center-right bloc.
This shift led to the Draghi-appointed CEO’s resignation, whose term was scheduled to end in 2024, to facilitate new appointments aligned with the government’s political leanings. Consequently, the change in editorial direction has prompted several anchorwomen and anchormen to depart RAI for rival media outlets.
Further elements underscore the close relationship between RAI and politics. RAI is publicly funded, and a bicameral parliamentary committee, proportionately reflecting the strength of the parties in parliament but usually chaired by the opposition, oversees RAI’s activities.
Beyond this constitutional safeguard, journalistic freedom of expression is regulated by a comprehensive network of legislative provisions and judicially produced rules. A significant recent development in this area is the Constitutional Court’s ruling (Sentence 150/2021), which declared Article 13 of the Press Law (47/1948) unconstitutional. This article had imposed a prison sentence for defamation committed through the press. Now, imprisonment is limited to cases involving hate speech and the dissemination of fake news.
Legal limitations to freedom of expression exist but must be proportionate to the intended purpose and adhere to legal principles. Citizens have legal remedies in case of infringement. These rules formally extend to online information. The right to information is regulated by the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, Legislative Decree 97/2016).
In practice, Italian journalists generally operate in a relatively open environment. However, they often self-censor to align with their news organization’s editorial stance, protect themselves from lawsuits or other legal repercussions, or avoid potential retaliation from extremist groups or organized crime, as reported by Reporters sans Frontières in their 2023 press freedom dossier. Media Freedom Rapid Response (2022) notes that the main concerns about media freedom stem from strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs; known as “querela temeraria” in the Italian legal framework) and other legal threats, especially following the establishment of the center-right government led by Giorgia Meloni (October 2022), leader of Brothers of Italy, who between 2020 and 2023 filed lawsuits against two journalists.
The Coordination Center for the Permanent Monitoring, Analysis, and Exchange of Information on the phenomenon of intimidation acts against journalists, chaired by the Minister of the Interior, registered 111 acts of intimidation committed against journalists in 2022, 52% lower than in 2021, and 46 in the first six months of 2023, 23% lower than in the first half of 2022 (see Ministry of Interior). Most of these incidents stem from social and political contexts or organized crime and result in verbal threats and physical assaults.
The most significant issue concerning media freedom relates to the political interdependence of public service media. Political parties and governments have historically wielded considerable influence over Radiotelevisione Italiana (RAI), Italy’s public broadcaster and largest media organization. Governing parties frequently intervened in RAI’s personnel decisions, dictated its organizational structure, and controlled resources. While opposition parties were granted some representation, their influence was limited.
The Renzi government’s Law 220/2015 reshaped RAI’s governance structure to curb excessive political influence by concentrating power in the hands of the CEO, the company’s senior executive. This shift of authority from the board – traditionally composed of representatives from major political parties – to the CEO diminished direct political control over RAI. However, it simultaneously increased government influence, as the government proposes the CEO to the board. While the Draghi government prioritized meritocracy in appointing the CEO and other senior RAI officials, the Meloni government has prioritized ideological alignment, seeking to fill critical positions with individuals close to the center-right bloc.
This shift led to the Draghi-appointed CEO’s resignation, whose term was scheduled to end in 2024, to facilitate new appointments aligned with the government’s political leanings. Consequently, the change in editorial direction has prompted several anchorwomen and anchormen to depart RAI for rival media outlets.
Further elements underscore the close relationship between RAI and politics. RAI is publicly funded, and a bicameral parliamentary committee, proportionately reflecting the strength of the parties in parliament but usually chaired by the opposition, oversees RAI’s activities.
Citations:
Media Pluralism Monitor 2022: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74694
Media Freedom Rapid Response 2022: https://www.mappingmediafreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/MFRR-Monitoring-Report-2022.pdf
Ministry of Interior, Coordination Centre for the Permanent Monitoring, Analysis, and Exchange of Information on the phenomenon of intimidation acts against journalists, https://www.interno.gov.it/it/stampa-e-comunicazione/dati-e-statistiche/atti-intimidatori-nei-confronti-dei-giornalisti
Reporters sans frontières press freedom dossier: https://rsf.org/en/country/italy
Media Pluralism Monitor 2022: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74694
Media Freedom Rapid Response 2022: https://www.mappingmediafreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/MFRR-Monitoring-Report-2022.pdf
Ministry of Interior, Coordination Centre for the Permanent Monitoring, Analysis, and Exchange of Information on the phenomenon of intimidation acts against journalists, https://www.interno.gov.it/it/stampa-e-comunicazione/dati-e-statistiche/atti-intimidatori-nei-confronti-dei-giornalisti
Reporters sans frontières press freedom dossier: https://rsf.org/en/country/italy
6
Greece
Media freedom in Greece is constitutionally guaranteed (Article 14). However, regulations governing public-owned media allow the government to appoint the Board of Directors and CEO of entities like the ERT television and radio company, including their regional branches. This appointment process grants the government considerable influence over media content. Despite this, opposition pressures and independent media reactions have led successive governments to gradually reduce their control over ERT.
In the 2010s, government control over ERT was particularly intense, highlighted by the abrupt closure of ERT in 2012 as part of economic austerity measures, followed by its reopening under full government control from 2015 to 2019. Currently, such control is less stringent.
Private media in Greece operate without censorship. The licensing and regulatory systems ensure their independence from government influence and political interference. However, during the COVID-19 crisis (2020–2022), the government faced accusations of attempting to influence the press by directing budget funds to selected media outlets. This funding supported public awareness campaigns for anti-COVID measures, such as vaccination drives. While some opposition media also received funding, certain newspapers known for their personal attacks against government officials were excluded.
Journalists in Greece work in a relatively free environment but periodically face significant pressures. In the previous decade and after 2020, some government ministers sued journalists accused of slander. Unlike during the Greek economic crisis, when a few prominent pro-EU journalists faced threats or even physical violence from anti-austerity protesters and political party officials, physical harassment of journalists is now rare.
The unresolved murder of a well-known reporter investigating mafia crime in 2021 remains a troubling case. In 2022, it was revealed that the cell phones of several journalists reporting on immigration were wiretapped, with Greece’s national intelligence service, the EYP, implicated in this surveillance case, which remains unresolved. During 2022–2023, the Greek justice system was slow to process these cases. Conversely, in the summer of 2022, some foreign journalists falsely reported the death of a young Syrian girl on the Greek-Turkish border, leading to accusations of government negligence, only for the story to later be debunked as a complete fabrication.
Overall, foreign correspondents have been less critical of the left-wing government in power from 2015 to 2019 compared to the center-right government since 2019. This shift has strained relations between the Greek government and the foreign press. As a result, Greece’s ranking in the World Press Freedom Index dropped from 65th in 2020 to 107th in 2023. In 2024, concerns about media freedom were highlighted in a European Parliament resolution (Klosidis, 2024), which the Greek government dismissed as a partisan attempt to undermine its progress in this area.
In the 2010s, government control over ERT was particularly intense, highlighted by the abrupt closure of ERT in 2012 as part of economic austerity measures, followed by its reopening under full government control from 2015 to 2019. Currently, such control is less stringent.
Private media in Greece operate without censorship. The licensing and regulatory systems ensure their independence from government influence and political interference. However, during the COVID-19 crisis (2020–2022), the government faced accusations of attempting to influence the press by directing budget funds to selected media outlets. This funding supported public awareness campaigns for anti-COVID measures, such as vaccination drives. While some opposition media also received funding, certain newspapers known for their personal attacks against government officials were excluded.
Journalists in Greece work in a relatively free environment but periodically face significant pressures. In the previous decade and after 2020, some government ministers sued journalists accused of slander. Unlike during the Greek economic crisis, when a few prominent pro-EU journalists faced threats or even physical violence from anti-austerity protesters and political party officials, physical harassment of journalists is now rare.
The unresolved murder of a well-known reporter investigating mafia crime in 2021 remains a troubling case. In 2022, it was revealed that the cell phones of several journalists reporting on immigration were wiretapped, with Greece’s national intelligence service, the EYP, implicated in this surveillance case, which remains unresolved. During 2022–2023, the Greek justice system was slow to process these cases. Conversely, in the summer of 2022, some foreign journalists falsely reported the death of a young Syrian girl on the Greek-Turkish border, leading to accusations of government negligence, only for the story to later be debunked as a complete fabrication.
Overall, foreign correspondents have been less critical of the left-wing government in power from 2015 to 2019 compared to the center-right government since 2019. This shift has strained relations between the Greek government and the foreign press. As a result, Greece’s ranking in the World Press Freedom Index dropped from 65th in 2020 to 107th in 2023. In 2024, concerns about media freedom were highlighted in a European Parliament resolution (Klosidis, 2024), which the Greek government dismissed as a partisan attempt to undermine its progress in this area.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Greece.” https://rsf.org/en/country/greece
Deutsche Welle. 2022. “Mystery around alleged death of girl on Greek-Turkish border.” https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/45091/mystery-around-alleged-death-of-girl-on-greekturkish-border
Klosidis, K. 2024. “Parliament concerned about very serious threats to EU values in Greece.” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17312/parliament-concerned-about-very-serious-threats-to-eu-values-in-greece
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Greece.” https://rsf.org/en/country/greece
Deutsche Welle. 2022. “Mystery around alleged death of girl on Greek-Turkish border.” https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/45091/mystery-around-alleged-death-of-girl-on-greekturkish-border
Klosidis, K. 2024. “Parliament concerned about very serious threats to EU values in Greece.” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17312/parliament-concerned-about-very-serious-threats-to-eu-values-in-greece
Israel
Freedom of the press is based on Supreme Court rulings and has no constitutional protection (Hanegbi 1995). This freedom is best demonstrated by the willingness of most media outlets to publicly and harshly oppose Israeli governments, particularly the current government’s attempts to overhaul the judiciary.
In Israel, there is a single public broadcaster, which operates one TV channel and several radio channels. In recent years, it has become very active on digital media platforms. Prior to 2015, the public broadcaster was subject to political intervention. However, since 2015, it has operated independently, although there has been constant pressure from politicians to close it down or increase their control. These threats have increased under the current government, with the minister of communication submitting a reform to increase political control over the media and threatening to close the public broadcaster.
The press and most media outlets operate generally free from political intervention, although not completely. Prime Minister Netanyahu is accused of attempting to influence media coverage in two newspapers. The newspaper Israel Hayom was established by billionaire Sheldon Adelson and distributed for free to increase support for the prime minister, which it did (Grossman et al. 2022). Additionally, Channel 14, originally founded as a heritage channel, was transformed by politicians into a news channel to support the government and criticize its opponents. In his press conferences, Prime Minister Netanyahu consistently attacks the media, accusing it of being one-sided. According to the Israeli Democratic Index, public trust in the media is only 37% (Israel Democracy Institute, 2022).
Despite the attacks on the media, no legislation limiting freedom of the press was officially introduced to the Knesset. Hence, if there is self-censorship, it is the result of the stated intentions of the politicians and not their actions.
The 2023 World Press Freedom Index gave Israel a score of 57.7, which is categorized as problematic. Israel dropped 11 places to rank 97 out of 180 countries. The report said that press freedom in Israel decreased due to the current government’s constant threats to press freedoms.
The private broadcasting channels are regulated by a public council. This council is not entirely independent, as its budget and personnel are dependent on the ministry and, therefore, the minister. The minister also nominates the chair of the council. The current council is relatively weak, fails to enforce violations and does not prevent the publication of fake news.
Private broadcasting entities are controlled by powerful corporations and face the constant threat of closure due to a lack of funding. Consequently, journalists find it difficult to criticize the corporations that own the channels, resulting in self-censorship.
The government censors publications related to security issues. According to the World Press Freedom report, Palestinian journalists reporting from Israel are harassed and attacked. Crimes against Palestinian journalists are not prosecuted sufficiently. Self-censorship is especially prominent concerning security issues, particularly in the context of the war in Gaza, where mainstream press outlets have barely reported on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza (Somfalvi et al. 2024).
In Israel, there is a single public broadcaster, which operates one TV channel and several radio channels. In recent years, it has become very active on digital media platforms. Prior to 2015, the public broadcaster was subject to political intervention. However, since 2015, it has operated independently, although there has been constant pressure from politicians to close it down or increase their control. These threats have increased under the current government, with the minister of communication submitting a reform to increase political control over the media and threatening to close the public broadcaster.
The press and most media outlets operate generally free from political intervention, although not completely. Prime Minister Netanyahu is accused of attempting to influence media coverage in two newspapers. The newspaper Israel Hayom was established by billionaire Sheldon Adelson and distributed for free to increase support for the prime minister, which it did (Grossman et al. 2022). Additionally, Channel 14, originally founded as a heritage channel, was transformed by politicians into a news channel to support the government and criticize its opponents. In his press conferences, Prime Minister Netanyahu consistently attacks the media, accusing it of being one-sided. According to the Israeli Democratic Index, public trust in the media is only 37% (Israel Democracy Institute, 2022).
Despite the attacks on the media, no legislation limiting freedom of the press was officially introduced to the Knesset. Hence, if there is self-censorship, it is the result of the stated intentions of the politicians and not their actions.
The 2023 World Press Freedom Index gave Israel a score of 57.7, which is categorized as problematic. Israel dropped 11 places to rank 97 out of 180 countries. The report said that press freedom in Israel decreased due to the current government’s constant threats to press freedoms.
The private broadcasting channels are regulated by a public council. This council is not entirely independent, as its budget and personnel are dependent on the ministry and, therefore, the minister. The minister also nominates the chair of the council. The current council is relatively weak, fails to enforce violations and does not prevent the publication of fake news.
Private broadcasting entities are controlled by powerful corporations and face the constant threat of closure due to a lack of funding. Consequently, journalists find it difficult to criticize the corporations that own the channels, resulting in self-censorship.
The government censors publications related to security issues. According to the World Press Freedom report, Palestinian journalists reporting from Israel are harassed and attacked. Crimes against Palestinian journalists are not prosecuted sufficiently. Self-censorship is especially prominent concerning security issues, particularly in the context of the war in Gaza, where mainstream press outlets have barely reported on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza (Somfalvi et al. 2024).
Citations:
2023 World Press Freedom Index https://rsf.org/en/2023-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-threatened-fake-content-industry?data_type=general&year=2023
Israel Democracy Index 2022 https://www.idi.org.il/articles/47360
Hanegbi, Moshe. 1995. Freedom of Press in Israel. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute.
Somfalvi, Attila, David Siman-Tov, and Ofir Dayan. 2024. “The Israeli Media Mobilized for War: Interim Conclusions from the Conduct of the Israeli Media and Journalists after October 7, 2023” (Hebrew). Strategic Update, INSS. https://www.inss.org.il/he/strategic_assessment/press
Grossman, G., Margalit, Y., and Mitts, T. 2022. “How the Ultra-Rich Use Media Ownership as a Political Investment.” The Journal of Politics 719: 415. https://doi.org/10.1086/719415
2023 World Press Freedom Index https://rsf.org/en/2023-world-press-freedom-index-journalism-threatened-fake-content-industry?data_type=general&year=2023
Israel Democracy Index 2022 https://www.idi.org.il/articles/47360
Hanegbi, Moshe. 1995. Freedom of Press in Israel. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute.
Somfalvi, Attila, David Siman-Tov, and Ofir Dayan. 2024. “The Israeli Media Mobilized for War: Interim Conclusions from the Conduct of the Israeli Media and Journalists after October 7, 2023” (Hebrew). Strategic Update, INSS. https://www.inss.org.il/he/strategic_assessment/press
Grossman, G., Margalit, Y., and Mitts, T. 2022. “How the Ultra-Rich Use Media Ownership as a Political Investment.” The Journal of Politics 719: 415. https://doi.org/10.1086/719415
Slovenia
During the third Janša government (2020 – 2022), the Slovenian Press Agency (STA) had a dispute with UKOM, the government’s communications office, over public service tasks and state funding. This conflict was resolved in early 2022 when Igor Kadunc took over the agency and reached an agreement with UKOM, ending a period of uncertainty for the press agency and its employees.
Meanwhile, RTV, the public television and radio broadcaster, faced turmoil with significant staff turnover and appointments favoring individuals close to Janez Janša’s administration. Critical programs and presenters were removed, and editorial changes were made due to their opposition to the government. The former UKOM director, who was responsible for withholding funding for STA, assumed the directorship of RTV in July 2022, while Ksenija Koren, a retired PR advisor in Janša’s cabinet, was appointed chief editor of the country’s nightly national news broadcastern October 2022.
Studio City, a politically critical program, was discontinued in March 2022, raising concerns about censorship ahead of elections. A petition with 40,000 signatures demanded its return, which happened in January 2024 with a new program. RTV employees went on strike in 2023 due to irregularities, violations of the journalists’ code, and management’s influence on news content. The Union of Journalists of Slovenia expressed concern about journalist overwork and burnout, particularly at RTV and newspapers.
After the elections, center-left parties proposed amendments to the law on public radio and television, aiming to reorganize the governance and supervision of RTV. Critics warned of reduced openness and transparency, citing rushed legislative procedures. In a November 2023 referendum, citizens supported the changes, resulting in the appointment of 17 members to the new RTV Council. These members were selected by various organizations and institutions, with six representing RTV Slovenia employees. Zvezdan Martić, a longtime RTV journalist, was elected chairman of the management board.
Print media has suffered from declining circulation numbers and revenues, leading to journalist layoffs. These challenges have been attributed to politically motivated ownership changes. In response to workplace violations, the Whistleblower Act was passed in October 2022 and enforced in February 2023, providing protections for whistleblowers. This legislation aligned Slovenian law with the European Directive, although the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) criticized it as being too broad and exceeding public interest areas.
Meanwhile, RTV, the public television and radio broadcaster, faced turmoil with significant staff turnover and appointments favoring individuals close to Janez Janša’s administration. Critical programs and presenters were removed, and editorial changes were made due to their opposition to the government. The former UKOM director, who was responsible for withholding funding for STA, assumed the directorship of RTV in July 2022, while Ksenija Koren, a retired PR advisor in Janša’s cabinet, was appointed chief editor of the country’s nightly national news broadcastern October 2022.
Studio City, a politically critical program, was discontinued in March 2022, raising concerns about censorship ahead of elections. A petition with 40,000 signatures demanded its return, which happened in January 2024 with a new program. RTV employees went on strike in 2023 due to irregularities, violations of the journalists’ code, and management’s influence on news content. The Union of Journalists of Slovenia expressed concern about journalist overwork and burnout, particularly at RTV and newspapers.
After the elections, center-left parties proposed amendments to the law on public radio and television, aiming to reorganize the governance and supervision of RTV. Critics warned of reduced openness and transparency, citing rushed legislative procedures. In a November 2023 referendum, citizens supported the changes, resulting in the appointment of 17 members to the new RTV Council. These members were selected by various organizations and institutions, with six representing RTV Slovenia employees. Zvezdan Martić, a longtime RTV journalist, was elected chairman of the management board.
Print media has suffered from declining circulation numbers and revenues, leading to journalist layoffs. These challenges have been attributed to politically motivated ownership changes. In response to workplace violations, the Whistleblower Act was passed in October 2022 and enforced in February 2023, providing protections for whistleblowers. This legislation aligned Slovenian law with the European Directive, although the Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) criticized it as being too broad and exceeding public interest areas.
Citations:
Kaja Jakopič. 2023. “Največja težava novinarjev v Sloveniji niso več slabe place ampak preobremenjenost (The biggest problem of journalists in Slovenia is no longer poor salaries but overwork).” MMC RTV SLO, January 4. https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/najvecja-tezava-novinarjev-v-sloveniji-niso-vec-slabe-place-ampak-preobremenjenost/652915
Krušič, Janez. 2023. “Kriza tiskanih medijev: ‘Sedanji lastniki večino tiskanih medijev upravljajo kot tovarne konzerv’ [Print media crisis: ‘Current owners run most print media like can factories’].” MMC RTV SLO, January 15. https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/kriza-tiskanih-medijev-sedanji-lastniki-vecino-tiskanih-medijev-upravljajo-kot-tovarne-konzerv/654407
Marko Milosavljevic and Romana Biljak Gerjevic. 2021. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Slovenia. European University Institute. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74705
Kaja Jakopič. 2023. “Največja težava novinarjev v Sloveniji niso več slabe place ampak preobremenjenost (The biggest problem of journalists in Slovenia is no longer poor salaries but overwork).” MMC RTV SLO, January 4. https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/najvecja-tezava-novinarjev-v-sloveniji-niso-vec-slabe-place-ampak-preobremenjenost/652915
Krušič, Janez. 2023. “Kriza tiskanih medijev: ‘Sedanji lastniki večino tiskanih medijev upravljajo kot tovarne konzerv’ [Print media crisis: ‘Current owners run most print media like can factories’].” MMC RTV SLO, January 15. https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/kriza-tiskanih-medijev-sedanji-lastniki-vecino-tiskanih-medijev-upravljajo-kot-tovarne-konzerv/654407
Marko Milosavljevic and Romana Biljak Gerjevic. 2021. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Slovenia. European University Institute. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74705
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
Japan
Freedom of speech and press, guaranteed in Article 21 of the Japanese constitution, is generally respected by the government. Under the Abe cabinet (2012 – 2020), the government strengthened control over public broadcaster NHK through the controversial appointment of conservative figures to management positions and attempted to influence reporting in private media by repeatedly declaring the need to maintain political neutrality. However, since 2021, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has not employed such practices.
There are concerns that Article 4 of the Broadcast Act of 1950, which stipulates that all broadcasters should ensure their programs are politically fair, could allow state interference in media content. This had long been understood to mean that the government would not censor broadcast programs. However, in 2014, Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Takaichi Sanae stated that, under certain circumstances, evaluations of political fairness could be based on a single program, not only on the entirety of programs aired by a broadcaster. In March 2023, it was leaked to the press that the government had put pressure on bureaucrats to reinterpret this regulation. Prime Minister Kishida did not explicitly retract the interpretation from 2014, but he dismissed the possibility of limiting the freedom of reporting.
Another problem is the Bill on Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, enacted in 2014, which introduced a punishment of up to five years of imprisonment for journalists who disclose information designated as “special secret.” In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic led to the enactment of new regulations that can limit freedom of reporting. In 2020, NHK was added to the list of institutions obliged to follow government instructions in case of a major crisis. In 2021, the government designated 58 areas with restricted public access, punishable by up to two years in prison or a fine of up to JPY 2 million (about €12,400).
There is little active censorship, although some media practice informal forms of self-censorship. The so-called chrysanthemum taboo discourages media from reporting negative information about the imperial family. Journalists who violate this informal rule have occasionally been subject to violence from radical nationalist groups. Moreover, the system of exclusive reporters’ clubs severely limits the access of non-established news organizations, foreign media and freelancers to government events and press conferences.
There are concerns that Article 4 of the Broadcast Act of 1950, which stipulates that all broadcasters should ensure their programs are politically fair, could allow state interference in media content. This had long been understood to mean that the government would not censor broadcast programs. However, in 2014, Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Takaichi Sanae stated that, under certain circumstances, evaluations of political fairness could be based on a single program, not only on the entirety of programs aired by a broadcaster. In March 2023, it was leaked to the press that the government had put pressure on bureaucrats to reinterpret this regulation. Prime Minister Kishida did not explicitly retract the interpretation from 2014, but he dismissed the possibility of limiting the freedom of reporting.
Another problem is the Bill on Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, enacted in 2014, which introduced a punishment of up to five years of imprisonment for journalists who disclose information designated as “special secret.” In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic led to the enactment of new regulations that can limit freedom of reporting. In 2020, NHK was added to the list of institutions obliged to follow government instructions in case of a major crisis. In 2021, the government designated 58 areas with restricted public access, punishable by up to two years in prison or a fine of up to JPY 2 million (about €12,400).
There is little active censorship, although some media practice informal forms of self-censorship. The so-called chrysanthemum taboo discourages media from reporting negative information about the imperial family. Journalists who violate this informal rule have occasionally been subject to violence from radical nationalist groups. Moreover, the system of exclusive reporters’ clubs severely limits the access of non-established news organizations, foreign media and freelancers to government events and press conferences.
Citations:
“A return to ideals of Broadcast Law would help end censorship trend.” The Asahi Shimbun, March 13. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14859972
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. 1950. “The Broadcast Act.” https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/Resources/laws/pdf/090204_5.pdf
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “Japan.” https://rsf.org/en/country/japan
“A return to ideals of Broadcast Law would help end censorship trend.” The Asahi Shimbun, March 13. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14859972
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. 1950. “The Broadcast Act.” https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/Resources/laws/pdf/090204_5.pdf
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “Japan.” https://rsf.org/en/country/japan
4
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3
Hungary
Since Prime Minister Orbán regained office in 2010, media pluralism in Hungary has faced significant challenges. The country has seen increasing government control over the public media and a concentration of private media ownership among companies close to Orbán’s party, Fidesz. The public broadcaster (MTVA) is under absolute government control, and many pro-government private TV channels and radio stations exist.
The remaining independent media have been pushed out of traditional broadcasting channels (radio, TV, newspapers) and have taken refuge on the web. Even online, they face growing challenges regarding reach, financing and administrative hurdles. If foreign sources finance them, they are subject to the “foreign agent” law or the “law on protection of Hungarian sovereignty,” risking high fines and potential self-censorship. Overall, independent media reach only a portion of Hungarians, primarily the educated, cosmopolitan urban population, but not the segments of society upon which Fidesz has built its support (the elderly and residents of rural areas).
Additionally, the government uses social media and internet-based channels to conduct disinformation and smear campaigns funded by taxpayer money. Public advertisement budgets disproportionately favor pro-government outlets, while market advertisers’ fears of potential repercussions place independent outlets in a precarious financial position (see Bátorfy and Urbán 2019). The environment for journalists has become increasingly hostile, with harassment escalating since the “fake news paragraph” was included in the March 2020 Authorization Act adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic. This provision threatens journalists producing fake news with prison sentences of up to five years for “scaremongering.”
Cyberattacks on media outlets are not uncommon. Since 2022, and especially during the spring and summer of 2023, several attacks have been reported, rendering the webpages of critical media barely accessible. However, pro-government news sites have also been similarly attacked (Hungary Today 2022). Forensic studies show that these attacks were coordinated (International Press Studio 2023). Opposition parties’ web pages were affected as well. The Sovereignty Protection Act, adopted in 2023, is extensive in scope but vague in detail, and may be used by the government to target critical journalists. It also emerged that the government employed Pegasus spyware in the lead-up to the 2022 elections to monitor opposition politicians, journalists and NGO workers. All international observers in the field have raised concerns about the situation in Hungary. The Freedom House Freedom on the Net Report 2022 categorizes Hungary as only partly free (Freedom House 2023).
The remaining independent media have been pushed out of traditional broadcasting channels (radio, TV, newspapers) and have taken refuge on the web. Even online, they face growing challenges regarding reach, financing and administrative hurdles. If foreign sources finance them, they are subject to the “foreign agent” law or the “law on protection of Hungarian sovereignty,” risking high fines and potential self-censorship. Overall, independent media reach only a portion of Hungarians, primarily the educated, cosmopolitan urban population, but not the segments of society upon which Fidesz has built its support (the elderly and residents of rural areas).
Additionally, the government uses social media and internet-based channels to conduct disinformation and smear campaigns funded by taxpayer money. Public advertisement budgets disproportionately favor pro-government outlets, while market advertisers’ fears of potential repercussions place independent outlets in a precarious financial position (see Bátorfy and Urbán 2019). The environment for journalists has become increasingly hostile, with harassment escalating since the “fake news paragraph” was included in the March 2020 Authorization Act adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic. This provision threatens journalists producing fake news with prison sentences of up to five years for “scaremongering.”
Cyberattacks on media outlets are not uncommon. Since 2022, and especially during the spring and summer of 2023, several attacks have been reported, rendering the webpages of critical media barely accessible. However, pro-government news sites have also been similarly attacked (Hungary Today 2022). Forensic studies show that these attacks were coordinated (International Press Studio 2023). Opposition parties’ web pages were affected as well. The Sovereignty Protection Act, adopted in 2023, is extensive in scope but vague in detail, and may be used by the government to target critical journalists. It also emerged that the government employed Pegasus spyware in the lead-up to the 2022 elections to monitor opposition politicians, journalists and NGO workers. All international observers in the field have raised concerns about the situation in Hungary. The Freedom House Freedom on the Net Report 2022 categorizes Hungary as only partly free (Freedom House 2023).
Citations:
Bátorfy, A., and Á. Urbán. 2020. “State Advertising as an Instrument of Transformation of the Media Market in Hungary.” East European Politics 36(1): 44-65.
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom on the Net 2022.” https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/FOTN2022Digital.pdf
International Press Studio. 2023. “https://ipi.media/ddos-ipi/”
Hungary Today. 2022. “Several Pro-Fidesz Websites Hacked by Anonymous.” 28 March. https://hungarytoday.hu/several-pro-fidesz-gvernment-websites-hacked-anonymous
Bátorfy, A., and Á. Urbán. 2020. “State Advertising as an Instrument of Transformation of the Media Market in Hungary.” East European Politics 36(1): 44-65.
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom on the Net 2022.” https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/FOTN2022Digital.pdf
International Press Studio. 2023. “https://ipi.media/ddos-ipi/”
Hungary Today. 2022. “Several Pro-Fidesz Websites Hacked by Anonymous.” 28 March. https://hungarytoday.hu/several-pro-fidesz-gvernment-websites-hacked-anonymous
Poland
Until 2015, Poland had a diverse and robust media market featuring strong public media, private broadcasters and foreign investments. The National Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji) oversaw the public media, ensuring compliance with laws and exerting indirect control over state-owned media. Despite rules against political affiliations or public activities by its members, the Council became politicized. Legal tools allowed interference with private media content, with political pressure most effectively applied through licensing processes and technical standards. Journalistic confidentiality was protected under the Press Law, with additional protections for whistleblowers and against wiretapping outlined in the criminal laws.
Following the PiS government’s victory, a new body, the National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych), was established. This council took over the authority to appoint and dismiss public media officials from the minister responsible for state treasury matters. In December 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that removing the National Broadcasting Council from these decisions was unconstitutional. Despite objections from Ombudsman for Civil Rights Adam Bodnar, the National Media Council continued to make key appointments at TVP (Telewizja Polska), often bypassing the constitutional body.
Both councils have faced criticism for bias in favor of the Law and Justice party, and Telewizja Polska and Polish Radio were transformed into propaganda platforms. The public media presented a one-sided, pro-government perspective, while attacking critics. Although private media encountered less direct censorship, they too experienced significant pressure. The National Broadcasting Council (NBC) misused its power, imposing arbitrary fines on critical broadcasters. The prevalence of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists, often funded by public money from ruling party politicians or state-owned entities, contributed to a hostile environment for independent journalism. These tactics and financial penalties were used to weaken critical media and encourage self-censorship.
The NBC also created business uncertainty by delaying licenses for private broadcasters like TVN and Radio Tok FM, and by excluding them from state advertising revenue programs. Print media, which has been transitioning to digital formats, faced financial strain, while the local press contended with financial, distribution and legal challenges. Consequently, Poland fell to its lowest-ever rank in the World Press Freedom Index, placing 66th in 2022 and 57th in 2023 (according to Reporters Without Borders). Upon taking office in December 2023, the newly elected government led by Donald Tusk immediately began implementing pluralistic reforms in the public media sector.
Following the PiS government’s victory, a new body, the National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych), was established. This council took over the authority to appoint and dismiss public media officials from the minister responsible for state treasury matters. In December 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that removing the National Broadcasting Council from these decisions was unconstitutional. Despite objections from Ombudsman for Civil Rights Adam Bodnar, the National Media Council continued to make key appointments at TVP (Telewizja Polska), often bypassing the constitutional body.
Both councils have faced criticism for bias in favor of the Law and Justice party, and Telewizja Polska and Polish Radio were transformed into propaganda platforms. The public media presented a one-sided, pro-government perspective, while attacking critics. Although private media encountered less direct censorship, they too experienced significant pressure. The National Broadcasting Council (NBC) misused its power, imposing arbitrary fines on critical broadcasters. The prevalence of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists, often funded by public money from ruling party politicians or state-owned entities, contributed to a hostile environment for independent journalism. These tactics and financial penalties were used to weaken critical media and encourage self-censorship.
The NBC also created business uncertainty by delaying licenses for private broadcasters like TVN and Radio Tok FM, and by excluding them from state advertising revenue programs. Print media, which has been transitioning to digital formats, faced financial strain, while the local press contended with financial, distribution and legal challenges. Consequently, Poland fell to its lowest-ever rank in the World Press Freedom Index, placing 66th in 2022 and 57th in 2023 (according to Reporters Without Borders). Upon taking office in December 2023, the newly elected government led by Donald Tusk immediately began implementing pluralistic reforms in the public media sector.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
see: Bachmann, K. 2024. Die Geisterfahrer. Polen und acht Jahre PiS. Berlin: Fototapete.
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
see: Bachmann, K. 2024. Die Geisterfahrer. Polen und acht Jahre PiS. Berlin: Fototapete.
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
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