To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
10
---
---
9
Czechia
The electoral law guarantees parties access to state radio and television, allocating a total of 14 hours for all parties to express their views, with equal time regardless of the party’s size or previous electoral performance. However, these presentations are often tedious and unlikely to capture viewers’ and listeners’ attention. Municipalities also provide billboards, and political advertisements appear in newspapers. Despite these provisions, there is a notable coverage bias toward larger parties, driven by their greater resources and perceived importance.
Coverage by private media is less balanced than that of public media. While oversight mechanisms exist for public TV and radio, such mechanisms are largely absent for private media, especially online. Private media are not explicitly attached to any particular political party, with the exception of Halo noviny, a newspaper linked to the Communist Party, which became a weekly publication in April 2022 and does not provide circulation figures.
Online media are even less rigorously controlled than print media, with no legal restrictions on ownership by an active politician. However, the number of outlets is large and the views covered are quite diverse. These outlets provide circulation figures in the form of page views and returning users. The most successful are novinky.cz – linked to the left-leaning daily Právo, which reported 47,082 daily sales in 2022 – and iDnes, linked to the Mafra group. Both recorded daily views and regular users in the millions.
Coverage by private media is less balanced than that of public media. While oversight mechanisms exist for public TV and radio, such mechanisms are largely absent for private media, especially online. Private media are not explicitly attached to any particular political party, with the exception of Halo noviny, a newspaper linked to the Communist Party, which became a weekly publication in April 2022 and does not provide circulation figures.
Online media are even less rigorously controlled than print media, with no legal restrictions on ownership by an active politician. However, the number of outlets is large and the views covered are quite diverse. These outlets provide circulation figures in the form of page views and returning users. The most successful are novinky.cz – linked to the left-leaning daily Právo, which reported 47,082 daily sales in 2022 – and iDnes, linked to the Mafra group. Both recorded daily views and regular users in the millions.
Citations:
https://rating.gemius.com/cz/tree/2
https://rating.gemius.com/cz/tree/2
Denmark
Denmark has roughly 35 daily newspapers. This includes six national dailies (Politiken, Jyllands-Posten, Berlingske, Børsen, Kristeligt Dagblad and Information), two main tabloids (BT and Ekstra Bladet), several smaller regional newspapers and an increasing number of online news sites. The dailies Jyllands-Posten (right-wing/liberal) and Politiken (social democratic/liberal) are managed by the same publishing house, but maintain independent editorial policies and are owned by separate foundations. Only one local paper, Skive Folkeblad, is owned by a political party, the Social Liberal Party.
Most newspapers tend to be either conservative or liberal in their political philosophies. Left-wing views are often underrepresented on editorial pages. Additionally, newspapers are facing financial pressure due to declines both in advertisements and paying subscriptions. It is also challenging to convince users to pay for news published online. As some newspapers disappear, the media landscape is becoming more concentrated. However, in practice, Danish newspapers maintain a high degree of pluralism in opinions. In their news reporting, most newspapers deliver fairly wide-ranging, balanced and diverse coverage. Private media, including the main newspapers, are open to all parties and candidates, regularly including letters to the editor that do not reflect the paper’s own views. A vibrant civil society contributes to this.
Public media outlets – Denmark’s Radio and TV2 – are independent, have editorial freedom, and are required by law to meet diversity and fairness criteria in their programming. All political parties planning to take part in elections have the right to equal programming time on radio and television. Satellite and cable TV are increasingly creating more competition for public media. Additionally, a number of locally oriented radio channels exist.
Internet access is widespread and not restricted. With 98.8% of individuals in Denmark having internet access in 2023, the country ranks among the European nations with the highest share of connected households (Eurostat, 2024). All newspapers are active online and are increasingly moving toward paid content. Danes are increasingly getting their information digitally via social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and Snapchat. Specific interest groups are also producing their own online outlets. Although print media readership has declined substantially in recent years, these media and TV still play an important role in public debate and serve as a check on elected officials and authorities.
The legal framework surrounding media is rather vague and is based on two laws: the law on Radio and TV (Lov om Radio- og Fjernsynsvirksomhed) and the law on media subsidies (Lov om Mediestøtte). The first law sets the framework for TV, while the second law regulates media subsidies.
The Radio and TV law stipulates that the Danish Broadcasting Company has full independence and is run by a board to which political parties appoint members. The law on media subsidies requires that to obtain subsidies, media organizations must have their own editor in chief and permanent staff equivalent to at least three full-time positions annually. Additionally, the media must provide news to a broad, nonspecialized audience and cannot be owned by trade associations or political parties. Finally, the media must release a product to the market at least 10 times per year.
Most newspapers tend to be either conservative or liberal in their political philosophies. Left-wing views are often underrepresented on editorial pages. Additionally, newspapers are facing financial pressure due to declines both in advertisements and paying subscriptions. It is also challenging to convince users to pay for news published online. As some newspapers disappear, the media landscape is becoming more concentrated. However, in practice, Danish newspapers maintain a high degree of pluralism in opinions. In their news reporting, most newspapers deliver fairly wide-ranging, balanced and diverse coverage. Private media, including the main newspapers, are open to all parties and candidates, regularly including letters to the editor that do not reflect the paper’s own views. A vibrant civil society contributes to this.
Public media outlets – Denmark’s Radio and TV2 – are independent, have editorial freedom, and are required by law to meet diversity and fairness criteria in their programming. All political parties planning to take part in elections have the right to equal programming time on radio and television. Satellite and cable TV are increasingly creating more competition for public media. Additionally, a number of locally oriented radio channels exist.
Internet access is widespread and not restricted. With 98.8% of individuals in Denmark having internet access in 2023, the country ranks among the European nations with the highest share of connected households (Eurostat, 2024). All newspapers are active online and are increasingly moving toward paid content. Danes are increasingly getting their information digitally via social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and Snapchat. Specific interest groups are also producing their own online outlets. Although print media readership has declined substantially in recent years, these media and TV still play an important role in public debate and serve as a check on elected officials and authorities.
The legal framework surrounding media is rather vague and is based on two laws: the law on Radio and TV (Lov om Radio- og Fjernsynsvirksomhed) and the law on media subsidies (Lov om Mediestøtte). The first law sets the framework for TV, while the second law regulates media subsidies.
The Radio and TV law stipulates that the Danish Broadcasting Company has full independence and is run by a board to which political parties appoint members. The law on media subsidies requires that to obtain subsidies, media organizations must have their own editor in chief and permanent staff equivalent to at least three full-time positions annually. Additionally, the media must provide news to a broad, nonspecialized audience and cannot be owned by trade associations or political parties. Finally, the media must release a product to the market at least 10 times per year.
Citations:
Lov om mediestøtte. https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2013/1604
Lov om radio- og fjernsynsvirksomhed: https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2022/1595
Eurostat. 2024. “Digital economy and society statistics - households and individuals.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Digital_economy_and_society_statistics_-_households_and_individuals
Lov om mediestøtte. https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2013/1604
Lov om radio- og fjernsynsvirksomhed: https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2022/1595
Eurostat. 2024. “Digital economy and society statistics - households and individuals.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Digital_economy_and_society_statistics_-_households_and_individuals
Estonia
The plurality of opinion and the presence of different viewpoints in public broadcast programs are mandated by the Act on Estonian Public Broadcasting. For private media outlets, such regulations do not apply; instead, the plurality of opinions is ensured by the variety of outlets and channels. Although there are several national newspapers and TV channels in the country, media ownership is increasingly concentrated. In addition to Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), two large private media companies owned by domestic investors – Ekspress Group and Eesti Meedia Group – dominate the print and electronic media market, especially the news media.
Decreasing readership figures and the increasing expenses faced by printed newspapers have further facilitated the concentration of media outlets into two large media houses. Additionally, some media outlets, especially regional and local newspapers, have had to close down or move to online-only content. Some special weeklies, such as the Teachers’ Gazette and the cultural weekly Sirp, receive government funds.
Digitalization and the rise of smart technologies like podcasts and streaming have expanded dramatically in both public and private media production. High internet and cable TV penetration rates ensure that most of the population can access a diverse range of media channels. However, the most vulnerable citizens, who often have low levels of digital literacy and fewer financial resources, can be disadvantaged by these technological and economic changes.
Another significant development has been the spread of independent blogs and portals that provide in-depth stories and analysis, which are increasingly rare in mainstream media. These online publications, such as Edasi (edasi.org) and the blogs Levila and Poliitikaguru, enjoy an increasing number of followers and enrich the existing media landscape. Ideologically oriented portals, such as Uued Uudised run by the national-conservative party EKRE, also have numerous followers. These blogs and portals are funded by subscriptions or raise their own funding.
Criticism of government policies and state institutions is common in the media, including the public media. It is generally acknowledged that the private outlets of the Postimees group tend to skew toward conservative and traditional values, while the Ekspress group is considered more liberal. Thus, there is no political bias along government versus opposition lines, but rather along normative value orientations.
Decreasing readership figures and the increasing expenses faced by printed newspapers have further facilitated the concentration of media outlets into two large media houses. Additionally, some media outlets, especially regional and local newspapers, have had to close down or move to online-only content. Some special weeklies, such as the Teachers’ Gazette and the cultural weekly Sirp, receive government funds.
Digitalization and the rise of smart technologies like podcasts and streaming have expanded dramatically in both public and private media production. High internet and cable TV penetration rates ensure that most of the population can access a diverse range of media channels. However, the most vulnerable citizens, who often have low levels of digital literacy and fewer financial resources, can be disadvantaged by these technological and economic changes.
Another significant development has been the spread of independent blogs and portals that provide in-depth stories and analysis, which are increasingly rare in mainstream media. These online publications, such as Edasi (edasi.org) and the blogs Levila and Poliitikaguru, enjoy an increasing number of followers and enrich the existing media landscape. Ideologically oriented portals, such as Uued Uudised run by the national-conservative party EKRE, also have numerous followers. These blogs and portals are funded by subscriptions or raise their own funding.
Criticism of government policies and state institutions is common in the media, including the public media. It is generally acknowledged that the private outlets of the Postimees group tend to skew toward conservative and traditional values, while the Ekspress group is considered more liberal. Thus, there is no political bias along government versus opposition lines, but rather along normative value orientations.
Finland
Finland’s media landscape is pluralistic and includes a variety of newspapers, magazines and social media sites. The conditions in which Finnish journalists operate are among the most favorable in the world. Despite a definite decline in circulation numbers in recent years, Finland still boasts an impressive newspaper readership, including online subscriptions. According to a recent report by Reporters Without Borders, Finland ranks fifth worldwide in terms of media freedom. However, newspapers face the prospect of long-term decline due to the rise of electronic media and increasing economic pressures from a loss of advertising share and rising costs.
Indeed, during the last decade, user-generated content and online social media platforms have revolutionized the media landscape. As a rule, newspapers are privately owned but publicly subsidized. The high level of concentration in the Finnish media market constitutes a significant risk for media plurality. Although regional newspapers remain comparatively strong, most local newspapers have been assimilated into larger newspaper chains. Still, it is fair to say that major media outlets encompass a diverse range of political perspectives.
The national broadcasting company, Yleisradio, operates several national and regional television and radio channels and supplies a broad range of information online. Although state-owned and controlled by a parliamentary council, Yleisradio has generally been viewed as unbiased. Yleisradio is complemented by several private broadcasting companies. Licensing and regulatory systems for privately owned media ensure freedom from government influence and political interference.
Anti-monopoly policies have not been activated to ensure transparency of ownership structures and a plurality of opinions in digital, print and broadcast media outlets in Finland. The licensing and regulatory regimes of privately owned media seek to ensure an adequate plurality of opinions.
A significant number of major digital, print and broadcast outlets consistently critique government policies and report on abuses of power. Major media outlets do not ignore or censor significant political perspectives. There is no significant media bias against particular opposition parties or candidates.
A report on media pluralism in Finland by Mäntyoja and Manninen (2021) concludes: “Finland’s area-level risk scores throughout the Media Pluralism Monitor instrument fall in and near the medium risk range. The market plurality area reaches the highest risk score, although still within the medium risk range. Fundamental protection is the only one remaining within the low risk range. No significant changes were seen in the overall risk levels of both political independence and social inclusiveness, both of which reach the lower half of the medium risk level.”
Indeed, during the last decade, user-generated content and online social media platforms have revolutionized the media landscape. As a rule, newspapers are privately owned but publicly subsidized. The high level of concentration in the Finnish media market constitutes a significant risk for media plurality. Although regional newspapers remain comparatively strong, most local newspapers have been assimilated into larger newspaper chains. Still, it is fair to say that major media outlets encompass a diverse range of political perspectives.
The national broadcasting company, Yleisradio, operates several national and regional television and radio channels and supplies a broad range of information online. Although state-owned and controlled by a parliamentary council, Yleisradio has generally been viewed as unbiased. Yleisradio is complemented by several private broadcasting companies. Licensing and regulatory systems for privately owned media ensure freedom from government influence and political interference.
Anti-monopoly policies have not been activated to ensure transparency of ownership structures and a plurality of opinions in digital, print and broadcast media outlets in Finland. The licensing and regulatory regimes of privately owned media seek to ensure an adequate plurality of opinions.
A significant number of major digital, print and broadcast outlets consistently critique government policies and report on abuses of power. Major media outlets do not ignore or censor significant political perspectives. There is no significant media bias against particular opposition parties or candidates.
A report on media pluralism in Finland by Mäntyoja and Manninen (2021) concludes: “Finland’s area-level risk scores throughout the Media Pluralism Monitor instrument fall in and near the medium risk range. The market plurality area reaches the highest risk score, although still within the medium risk range. Fundamental protection is the only one remaining within the low risk range. No significant changes were seen in the overall risk levels of both political independence and social inclusiveness, both of which reach the lower half of the medium risk level.”
Citations:
Mäntyoja, Marianne and Ville Manninen. 2021. “Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Finland.”
Mäntyoja, Marianne and Ville Manninen. 2021. “Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Finland.”
Norway
A plurality of political and cultural views and expressions in the public sphere is valued by both the general public and political parties. This objective is pursued through three measures: first, a state scheme to financially support newspapers and magazines threatened by commercial competition; second, a self-binding commitment by the media industry to provide access to a plurality of views and interests; and third, funding the state-owned NRK through state grants to maintain at least one significant actor independent of commercial financing.
The increasing presence of digital and internet communication channels, along with broadcasting from abroad, enhances the pluralism of the media landscape. However, more intense competition may lead to content biased toward entertainment and commercial objectives rather than serving public debates, an important goal for the NRK. To address this, a separate public authority, the Norwegian Media Authority, was established in 2005 with two main tasks: first, through research and reports, to monitor the media market and address developments that may undermine ideals of media diversity and pluralism of political and cultural views; second, to administer an extensive system of state economic support to newspapers and other media channels from socially and economically disadvantaged groups and regions, promoting diversity.
In recent years, the issue of media illiteracy has been raised, focusing on the capacity of the population, particularly among the elderly and the young, to identify fake news and disinformation (Norwegian Media Authority, 2021; Wikipedia, 2024).
In sum, the Norwegian media landscape, with its significant state presence as a public service broadcaster and regulatory authority, provides a solid foundation for a public sphere where all political parties and opinions have a fair and equal chance of expression. Criticism of political and other elites is commonplace, and any attempt by the government to limit the operations of a free media will likely be punished by voters.
The increasing presence of digital and internet communication channels, along with broadcasting from abroad, enhances the pluralism of the media landscape. However, more intense competition may lead to content biased toward entertainment and commercial objectives rather than serving public debates, an important goal for the NRK. To address this, a separate public authority, the Norwegian Media Authority, was established in 2005 with two main tasks: first, through research and reports, to monitor the media market and address developments that may undermine ideals of media diversity and pluralism of political and cultural views; second, to administer an extensive system of state economic support to newspapers and other media channels from socially and economically disadvantaged groups and regions, promoting diversity.
In recent years, the issue of media illiteracy has been raised, focusing on the capacity of the population, particularly among the elderly and the young, to identify fake news and disinformation (Norwegian Media Authority, 2021; Wikipedia, 2024).
In sum, the Norwegian media landscape, with its significant state presence as a public service broadcaster and regulatory authority, provides a solid foundation for a public sphere where all political parties and opinions have a fair and equal chance of expression. Criticism of political and other elites is commonplace, and any attempt by the government to limit the operations of a free media will likely be punished by voters.
Citations:
Norwegian Media Authority. 2021. “Organization.” https://www.medietilsynet.no/english/organzation/
Wikipedia. 2024. “Norwegian Media Authority.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norwegian_Media_Authority
Norwegian Media Authority. 2021. “Organization.” https://www.medietilsynet.no/english/organzation/
Wikipedia. 2024. “Norwegian Media Authority.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norwegian_Media_Authority
Sweden
Media plurality and freedom of expression are protected from governmental abuse. In addition to the constitution, which automatically grants constitutional protection to internet publications, media and freedom of expression are regulated by the Radio and Television Act (SFS 2020:875) (Government Offices of Sweden, 2020). The latter was updated in 2020 to include provisions for video recording platforms, regulatory changes regarding TV broadcasting, child protection (for example ads cannot target children under 12), and program accessibility for people with disabilities.
Sweden is rated high risk for news media concentration indicators (96%) and commercial and owner influence over editorial content (68%), while the score for transparency of media ownership is medium (50%). The EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom argues that the Swedish regulatory system is inadequate and cannot ensure transparency and prevent media concentration (Färdigh, 2022).
Sweden is rated high risk for news media concentration indicators (96%) and commercial and owner influence over editorial content (68%), while the score for transparency of media ownership is medium (50%). The EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom argues that the Swedish regulatory system is inadequate and cannot ensure transparency and prevent media concentration (Färdigh, 2022).
Citations:
Färdigh, Mathias A. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Sweden. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), 2022, Country Reports. https://hdl.handle.net/1814/74707
Government Offices of Sweden. 2020. Lag om ändring i radio- och tv-lagen. https://svenskforfattningssamling.se/sites/default/files/sfs/2020-10/SFS2020-875.pdf
Färdigh, Mathias A. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Sweden. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), 2022, Country Reports. https://hdl.handle.net/1814/74707
Government Offices of Sweden. 2020. Lag om ändring i radio- och tv-lagen. https://svenskforfattningssamling.se/sites/default/files/sfs/2020-10/SFS2020-875.pdf
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
8
Canada
Canada is widely recognized as a country with a high degree of press freedom, often ranking prominently in global indices. For instance, the World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders consistently ranks Canada among the leading nations for press freedom.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the Constitution Act of 1982, guarantees freedom of the press as a fundamental right. Canada has a diverse media landscape with a mix of public and private broadcasters, newspapers, and online news outlets. This diversity contributes to a plurality of voices and perspectives.
Traditional media are expensive to establish and operate and are controlled by large communication conglomerates. This results in very limited perspectives in national media. Local media, though more competitive, still exhibit a pro-business perspective on public affairs. Moreover, Canada has recently witnessed a series of local newspaper closures and layoffs within large media corporations, negatively affecting both local and national news coverage.
A strong case can be made that a lack of competition in the media industry has led to a lack of diversity in views and positions, as mainstream media companies tend to align with existing political parties and, for example, rarely support social-democratic or regional parties. The mainstream print media generally express a centrist to center-right political orientation but some, such as the Globe and Mail and La Presse, make an effort to bring in other perspectives to provide balanced coverage of issues. The CBC is very Central Canada–centric, and Radio Canada exists mainly for the French-language population in Quebec (Taylor and O’Hagen 2017).
Social media, on the other hand, is wide open and has no barriers to entry.
Like many other countries, Canada faces challenges related to the impact of digital media on traditional journalism, including issues such as misinformation, disinformation, and the business model of online news, especially in terms of the provision and promotion of Canadian content.
The protection of journalistic sources is recognized as an important aspect of press freedom in Canada. Journalists may be protected from compelled disclosure of their sources under certain circumstances. Additional mechanisms also protect media activity, such as press councils and self-regulatory bodies like the National NewsMedia Council. These entities aim to maintain high journalistic standards and address public concerns about media practices. They operate independently of the government and the media organizations they oversee.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part of the Constitution Act of 1982, guarantees freedom of the press as a fundamental right. Canada has a diverse media landscape with a mix of public and private broadcasters, newspapers, and online news outlets. This diversity contributes to a plurality of voices and perspectives.
Traditional media are expensive to establish and operate and are controlled by large communication conglomerates. This results in very limited perspectives in national media. Local media, though more competitive, still exhibit a pro-business perspective on public affairs. Moreover, Canada has recently witnessed a series of local newspaper closures and layoffs within large media corporations, negatively affecting both local and national news coverage.
A strong case can be made that a lack of competition in the media industry has led to a lack of diversity in views and positions, as mainstream media companies tend to align with existing political parties and, for example, rarely support social-democratic or regional parties. The mainstream print media generally express a centrist to center-right political orientation but some, such as the Globe and Mail and La Presse, make an effort to bring in other perspectives to provide balanced coverage of issues. The CBC is very Central Canada–centric, and Radio Canada exists mainly for the French-language population in Quebec (Taylor and O’Hagen 2017).
Social media, on the other hand, is wide open and has no barriers to entry.
Like many other countries, Canada faces challenges related to the impact of digital media on traditional journalism, including issues such as misinformation, disinformation, and the business model of online news, especially in terms of the provision and promotion of Canadian content.
The protection of journalistic sources is recognized as an important aspect of press freedom in Canada. Journalists may be protected from compelled disclosure of their sources under certain circumstances. Additional mechanisms also protect media activity, such as press councils and self-regulatory bodies like the National NewsMedia Council. These entities aim to maintain high journalistic standards and address public concerns about media practices. They operate independently of the government and the media organizations they oversee.
Citations:
Taylor, Lisa and Cara-Marie O’Hagan, eds. 2017. The Unfulfilled Promise of Press Freedom in Canada. Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press.
Taylor, Lisa and Cara-Marie O’Hagan, eds. 2017. The Unfulfilled Promise of Press Freedom in Canada. Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press.
Germany
Pluralism of opinions within the media is an important aspect in Germany, especially in publicly owned media. Based on the requirements formulated by the Federal Constitutional Court, publicly owned media should portray the diverse existing opinions to support free and comprehensive opinion formation. In this regard, the government must ensure that the media content fulfills a minimum of objectivity, mutual respect, and balance in opinions (Deutscher Bundestag, 2007).
As explained earlier in our discussion on media freedom, there are supervisory boards for publicly owned media, namely a board of directors (Verwaltungsrat) and a Media Commission (Rundfunkrat). The board of directors oversees the operations of publicly owned media, excluding program design, while the Media Commission monitors the programs and their content, representing the interests of the general public (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006). The commission is intended to include representatives from various key institutions and social groups, including politicians. Based on a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, the number of governmental and government-related members cannot exceed one-third of the total number of commission members.
As previously mentioned, since politicians are present on the commission, public-owned media has been increasingly criticized for a lack of neutrality. Critics claim it is too close to the government and does not fulfill the requirement for diversity. Further, it is criticized for reporting that is too one-sided. In fact, a study found that trust in the neutrality of public-owned media has decreased over recent years. In October 2023, 39%, compared to 25% in 2020, had no or very little trust in the credibility of the public-owned television stations ARD and ZDF (ZDF, 2023).
Still, derived from the V-Dem index for media, all major media outlets critique the government consistently. Additionally, based on a 2022 media bias score of 3.35, even though there is a focus on governing parties, the German media covers opposition parties more or less impartially (V-Dem, 2023).
According to the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), the transparency of ownership poses a low risk for print and broadcasting media. The Interstate Media Treaty mandates that privately owned media must disclose ownership information to maintain a broadcasting license and must report any changes. Additionally, the Political Parties Act requires political parties to disclose their holdings in media companies. Online-only media, which do not require a license, face lower requirements. For the digital media sphere, the CMPF indicates that pluralism is at a higher risk compared to print and broadcast media, criticizing the legislature for not adapting laws to media digitalization (Holznagel and Kalbhenn, 2022). A major problem is that the current instruments used to monitor media diversity primarily cover the supply side but largely ignore the actual usage behavior of citizens, especially in the digital sphere (Stark and Stegmann, 2021).
Issues concerning monopolies are primarily regulated by the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt). Additionally, to prevent monopolies, a separate independent regulatory body, the Commission on Concentration in the Media (KEK), evaluates whether changes in ownership structures or new licensing procedures for privately owned media give a company a dominating influence on public opinion. The commission works to secure pluralism of opinion.
Media pluralism has, however, decreased in recent years, particularly affecting print media. The number of sold copies of newspapers decreased by around one million from 2022 to 2023. Moreover, a small number of media outlets hold a large share of the market. For instance, in the second quarter of 2023, the Bild, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung were the highest circulated newspapers nationally and held a significant share of readers (Statista, 2023). Likewise, as of September 2023, the top five broadcasters – ZDF, ARD Dritte, ARD Das Erste, RTL, and VOX – held over 50% of the market share (AFG, 2023).
As explained earlier in our discussion on media freedom, there are supervisory boards for publicly owned media, namely a board of directors (Verwaltungsrat) and a Media Commission (Rundfunkrat). The board of directors oversees the operations of publicly owned media, excluding program design, while the Media Commission monitors the programs and their content, representing the interests of the general public (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006). The commission is intended to include representatives from various key institutions and social groups, including politicians. Based on a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court, the number of governmental and government-related members cannot exceed one-third of the total number of commission members.
As previously mentioned, since politicians are present on the commission, public-owned media has been increasingly criticized for a lack of neutrality. Critics claim it is too close to the government and does not fulfill the requirement for diversity. Further, it is criticized for reporting that is too one-sided. In fact, a study found that trust in the neutrality of public-owned media has decreased over recent years. In October 2023, 39%, compared to 25% in 2020, had no or very little trust in the credibility of the public-owned television stations ARD and ZDF (ZDF, 2023).
Still, derived from the V-Dem index for media, all major media outlets critique the government consistently. Additionally, based on a 2022 media bias score of 3.35, even though there is a focus on governing parties, the German media covers opposition parties more or less impartially (V-Dem, 2023).
According to the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), the transparency of ownership poses a low risk for print and broadcasting media. The Interstate Media Treaty mandates that privately owned media must disclose ownership information to maintain a broadcasting license and must report any changes. Additionally, the Political Parties Act requires political parties to disclose their holdings in media companies. Online-only media, which do not require a license, face lower requirements. For the digital media sphere, the CMPF indicates that pluralism is at a higher risk compared to print and broadcast media, criticizing the legislature for not adapting laws to media digitalization (Holznagel and Kalbhenn, 2022). A major problem is that the current instruments used to monitor media diversity primarily cover the supply side but largely ignore the actual usage behavior of citizens, especially in the digital sphere (Stark and Stegmann, 2021).
Issues concerning monopolies are primarily regulated by the Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt). Additionally, to prevent monopolies, a separate independent regulatory body, the Commission on Concentration in the Media (KEK), evaluates whether changes in ownership structures or new licensing procedures for privately owned media give a company a dominating influence on public opinion. The commission works to secure pluralism of opinion.
Media pluralism has, however, decreased in recent years, particularly affecting print media. The number of sold copies of newspapers decreased by around one million from 2022 to 2023. Moreover, a small number of media outlets hold a large share of the market. For instance, in the second quarter of 2023, the Bild, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung were the highest circulated newspapers nationally and held a significant share of readers (Statista, 2023). Likewise, as of September 2023, the top five broadcasters – ZDF, ARD Dritte, ARD Das Erste, RTL, and VOX – held over 50% of the market share (AFG, 2023).
Citations:
AFG. 2023. “TV-Daten.” https://www.agf.de/daten/tv-daten
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2014. “Leitsätze, zum Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 25. März 2014.” https://www.bverfg.de/e/fs20140325_1bvf000111.html
Holznagel, B., and J. C. Kalbhenn. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Germany. European University Institute.
KEK. 2023. “Auftrag.” https://www.kek-online.de/ueber-uns/auftrag
Deutscher Bundestag. 2006. “Der öffentlich-rechtliche Rundfunk im 21. Jahrhundert.” https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/413880/8e316e93e801051f0b69e7d151052fba/WD-10-029-06-pdf-data.pdf
Statista. 2023. “Auflagenstruktur der Tageszeitungen in Deutschland im 2. Quartal 2022 und 2. Quartal 2023.” https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/382058/umfrage/auflagenstruktur-der-tageszeitungen/
Stark, B., and D. Stegmann. 2021. “Vielfaltssicherung im Zeitalter von Medienintermediären.” bidt Working Paper Nr. 3. https://www.bidt.digital/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/08/bidt_Working-Paper_Vielfaltssicherung.pdf
ZDF. 2023. “Vertrauen in die Glaubwürdigkeit der Berichterstattung von ARD und ZDF, ZDF-Politbarometer.” https://www.zdf.de/zdfunternehmen/medienforschung-studien-122.html
V-Dem, Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/
AFG. 2023. “TV-Daten.” https://www.agf.de/daten/tv-daten
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2014. “Leitsätze, zum Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 25. März 2014.” https://www.bverfg.de/e/fs20140325_1bvf000111.html
Holznagel, B., and J. C. Kalbhenn. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Germany. European University Institute.
KEK. 2023. “Auftrag.” https://www.kek-online.de/ueber-uns/auftrag
Deutscher Bundestag. 2006. “Der öffentlich-rechtliche Rundfunk im 21. Jahrhundert.” https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/413880/8e316e93e801051f0b69e7d151052fba/WD-10-029-06-pdf-data.pdf
Statista. 2023. “Auflagenstruktur der Tageszeitungen in Deutschland im 2. Quartal 2022 und 2. Quartal 2023.” https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/382058/umfrage/auflagenstruktur-der-tageszeitungen/
Stark, B., and D. Stegmann. 2021. “Vielfaltssicherung im Zeitalter von Medienintermediären.” bidt Working Paper Nr. 3. https://www.bidt.digital/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/08/bidt_Working-Paper_Vielfaltssicherung.pdf
ZDF. 2023. “Vertrauen in die Glaubwürdigkeit der Berichterstattung von ARD und ZDF, ZDF-Politbarometer.” https://www.zdf.de/zdfunternehmen/medienforschung-studien-122.html
V-Dem, Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/
Greece
There are no significant legal impediments preventing media outlets from representing the full spectrum of political perspectives in Greek society. Media outlets express views across the entire right-left political spectrum.
Currently, Greece has 21 newspapers with national circulation, along with dozens of regional and local newspapers. The left-wing opposition is supported by its party-controlled press and radio outlets, with at least three newspapers articulating the views of various left-wing opposition parties. Similarly, there are newspapers representing far-right political parties, often espousing traditionalist and chauvinistic views.
Approximately one-third of all national circulation newspapers can be classified as yellow press, frequently publishing unsubstantiated accusations against public figures such as celebrities, journalists, and government officials.
In addition to the three publicly owned TV channels (ERT 1, 2, and 3), seven private TV channels operate nationwide, supplemented by numerous private regional TV channels spread across Greece’s 13 regions. This landscape ensures that there is, in practice, pluralism in the private media sector.
A few large media conglomerates dominate the private media landscape, owning both nationwide TV channels and newspapers. These conglomerates also have significant business interests in sectors such as construction and shipping, and they often own Greece’s most competitive soccer and basketball teams. As a result, the largest private media outlets operate as part of an oligopoly with substantial economic influence (Papathanassopoulos et al., 2021).
Media owners occasionally attempt to influence public policymaking. However, instances of policy capture are mitigated by fierce competition among business conglomerates, and Greek governments typically rely on strong single-party parliamentary majorities.
Currently, Greece has 21 newspapers with national circulation, along with dozens of regional and local newspapers. The left-wing opposition is supported by its party-controlled press and radio outlets, with at least three newspapers articulating the views of various left-wing opposition parties. Similarly, there are newspapers representing far-right political parties, often espousing traditionalist and chauvinistic views.
Approximately one-third of all national circulation newspapers can be classified as yellow press, frequently publishing unsubstantiated accusations against public figures such as celebrities, journalists, and government officials.
In addition to the three publicly owned TV channels (ERT 1, 2, and 3), seven private TV channels operate nationwide, supplemented by numerous private regional TV channels spread across Greece’s 13 regions. This landscape ensures that there is, in practice, pluralism in the private media sector.
A few large media conglomerates dominate the private media landscape, owning both nationwide TV channels and newspapers. These conglomerates also have significant business interests in sectors such as construction and shipping, and they often own Greece’s most competitive soccer and basketball teams. As a result, the largest private media outlets operate as part of an oligopoly with substantial economic influence (Papathanassopoulos et al., 2021).
Media owners occasionally attempt to influence public policymaking. However, instances of policy capture are mitigated by fierce competition among business conglomerates, and Greek governments typically rely on strong single-party parliamentary majorities.
Citations:
Papathanassopoulos, S., Karadimitriou, A., Kostopoulos, C., and Archontaki, I. 2021. “Greece: Media concentration and independent journalism between austerity and digital disruption.” In J. Trappel and T. Tomaz, eds.
The Media for Democracy Monitor 2021: How leading news media survive digital transformation (Vol. 2)
(pp. 177–230). Nordicom, University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.48335/9789188855428-5
Papathanassopoulos, S., Karadimitriou, A., Kostopoulos, C., and Archontaki, I. 2021. “Greece: Media concentration and independent journalism between austerity and digital disruption.” In J. Trappel and T. Tomaz, eds.
The Media for Democracy Monitor 2021: How leading news media survive digital transformation (Vol. 2)
(pp. 177–230). Nordicom, University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.48335/9789188855428-5
Ireland
Anti-monopoly policies in Ireland aim to ensure transparency of ownership structures and a plurality of opinions in digital, print and broadcast media outlets. Regulations for publicly owned media help maintain an adequate plurality of opinions. However, media ownership remains a significant concern, posing a high economic risk to media pluralism. While professional journalistic norms generally prevent editorial content from being shaped by commercial or owner influence, the lack of explicit rules mandating this remains problematic. A 2021 study found that fundamental protections for media pluralism in Ireland did not face significant risks, with the overall risk assessed at 23%. Nevertheless, power, wealth and economic resources are highly concentrated in Ireland. This structural reality of golden circles and state capture by domestic and international vested interests (Carrington, 2023) is a crucial context for those seeking transformational change, and media ownership must be understood within this framework.
In practice, many major digital, print and broadcast outlets consistently critique government policies and report on abuses of power. Ireland is rated as low risk for media pluralism, with fundamental protections and political independence also rated as low risk (23% and 30%, respectively) for the main media regulator, the Media Commission. Legal protections for the anonymity of journalistic sources and legislation permitting state access to metadata related to private electronic communications could be more definitive. Social inclusiveness is rated as medium (49%) and improving, with no proven media bias against certain opposition parties or candidates. However, there are gender, class, ethnicity and other equality grounds where some perspectives are less heard or validated. Internal guidelines aim to improve diversity, but the increasingly diverse nature of Irish society is not always reflected in media content. Without stronger regulation, initiatives to combat discriminatory, prejudicial, misleading and hateful content remain ineffective. The awaited Criminal Justice (Hate Crime) Bill in 2024 may address some of these issues.
Regulatory challenges persist, particularly concerning social media. The Media Commission now oversees the entire audiovisual sector, including broadcasting, on-demand audio and visual services, and online platforms such as social media sites. An Electoral Reform Bill regulating political advertising, including online advertising, was passed in 2022. The Future of Media Commission reported in 2022, highlighting funding for public broadcasting as a central issue of public controversy, discussed in two parliamentary committee inquiries into state broadcasting in 2023.
In practice, many major digital, print and broadcast outlets consistently critique government policies and report on abuses of power. Ireland is rated as low risk for media pluralism, with fundamental protections and political independence also rated as low risk (23% and 30%, respectively) for the main media regulator, the Media Commission. Legal protections for the anonymity of journalistic sources and legislation permitting state access to metadata related to private electronic communications could be more definitive. Social inclusiveness is rated as medium (49%) and improving, with no proven media bias against certain opposition parties or candidates. However, there are gender, class, ethnicity and other equality grounds where some perspectives are less heard or validated. Internal guidelines aim to improve diversity, but the increasingly diverse nature of Irish society is not always reflected in media content. Without stronger regulation, initiatives to combat discriminatory, prejudicial, misleading and hateful content remain ineffective. The awaited Criminal Justice (Hate Crime) Bill in 2024 may address some of these issues.
Regulatory challenges persist, particularly concerning social media. The Media Commission now oversees the entire audiovisual sector, including broadcasting, on-demand audio and visual services, and online platforms such as social media sites. An Electoral Reform Bill regulating political advertising, including online advertising, was passed in 2022. The Future of Media Commission reported in 2022, highlighting funding for public broadcasting as a central issue of public controversy, discussed in two parliamentary committee inquiries into state broadcasting in 2023.
Citations:
R. Flynn. 2021. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era; Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, 2021 Country Report: Ireland. Florence: European University Institute.
Carrington, D. 2023. “Revealed: the industry figures behind ‘declaration of scientists’ backing meat eating.” https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/oct/27/revealed-industry
figures-declaration-scientists-backing-meat-eating>
R. Flynn. 2021. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era; Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, 2021 Country Report: Ireland. Florence: European University Institute.
Carrington, D. 2023. “Revealed: the industry figures behind ‘declaration of scientists’ backing meat eating.” https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/oct/27/revealed-industry
figures-declaration-scientists-backing-meat-eating>
Israel
The ownership of private media is transparent, as stated by the media monitoring organization the Seventh Eye. Most media owners are businessmen with little involvement in the media. Consequently, they are significantly influenced by government regulation. Although almost all private media outlets criticize the government to some extent, the amount and type of critique depends on the personal interests of the owners (The Seventh Eye).
Public radio and television in Israel are highly committed to the plurality of opinions and the representation of different segments of the population. This commitment is evident in the diverse profiles of their journalists, who come from various minority groups and sectors. Additionally, there are channels dedicated to amplifying the voices of different groups.
Israeli media broadcasts and publishes in multiple languages, including Hebrew, Arabic, English, Russian, French and Amharic. There are also specific channels for different population groups. Moreover, in several major news programs, two hosts representing different political and partisan affiliations are featured to ensure a plurality of perspectives.
Private broadcasters also employ journalists from different groups. An examination of these journalists reveals that there are left- and right-wing journalists working for every channel.
However, private media programs present less plurality due to profit considerations. Although formal regulations require a specific amount of time to be dedicated to various groups and populations, this is rarely enforced in practice.
Over recent years, the media in general has been accused of being one-sided or leaning to the left. However, there is no empirical evidence of such bias. Research has found that perceived biases are a function of the political perceptions of the observer and have little to do with any actual bias (Yair & Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2018).
Public radio and television in Israel are highly committed to the plurality of opinions and the representation of different segments of the population. This commitment is evident in the diverse profiles of their journalists, who come from various minority groups and sectors. Additionally, there are channels dedicated to amplifying the voices of different groups.
Israeli media broadcasts and publishes in multiple languages, including Hebrew, Arabic, English, Russian, French and Amharic. There are also specific channels for different population groups. Moreover, in several major news programs, two hosts representing different political and partisan affiliations are featured to ensure a plurality of perspectives.
Private broadcasters also employ journalists from different groups. An examination of these journalists reveals that there are left- and right-wing journalists working for every channel.
However, private media programs present less plurality due to profit considerations. Although formal regulations require a specific amount of time to be dedicated to various groups and populations, this is rarely enforced in practice.
Over recent years, the media in general has been accused of being one-sided or leaning to the left. However, there is no empirical evidence of such bias. Research has found that perceived biases are a function of the political perceptions of the observer and have little to do with any actual bias (Yair & Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2018).
Citations:
The Seventh Eye, “Israel media ownership.” https://www.the7eye.org.il/198518
Yair, Omer, and Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan. 2018. “When Do We Care about Political Neutrality? The Hypocritical Nature of Reaction to Political Bias.” PLoS ONE 13 (5): e0196674.
The Seventh Eye, “Israel media ownership.” https://www.the7eye.org.il/198518
Yair, Omer, and Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan. 2018. “When Do We Care about Political Neutrality? The Hypocritical Nature of Reaction to Political Bias.” PLoS ONE 13 (5): e0196674.
Latvia
In response to the digitalization trend, the number of newspapers and magazines has decreased, with many media outlets shifting to online content. Privately owned print media have transitioned more quickly to online formats, although they face financial challenges. Online news portals, such as the public media outlet LSM and the privately owned Delfi, have successfully replaced newspapers as the primary sources of information. Regional media have experienced a similar transition. In contrast, printed media are now limited in scope and data. The role of digital media and social media in news consumption among residents is growing.
The licensing of electronic media in Latvia is politically neutral and follows the procedures outlined in the Law on Electronic Communication. The Media Ombudsman, elected in 2021 and in office since March 2022, oversees public electronic media and their services, ensuring compliance with the code of ethics and editorial guidelines.
The Media Pluralism Report 2023 indicated that Latvian media fall within the medium-risk zone regarding pluralism (65%). The primary risks in this domain stem from the low level of media market pluralism and the influence of advertisers and owners on editorial independence. Latvia lacks specific regulations for digital media companies to publish data on beneficiaries and owners. Since 2020, data on media owners has been available for free in the Enterprise Register database.
Latvian media regulation and self-regulation do not include mechanisms to protect journalists in the event of a change in media ownership or editorial direction, resulting in a high risk to editorial independence from commercial and owner influences (78%). Political autonomy is assessed at 37% due to potential influence from politicians and media owners.
The 2023 Media Pluralism Report showed improvement in the indicator for minority representation in the media (low risk – 22%), development in media literacy (53%), and better protection against disinformation and hate speech (66%) (Rožukalne, 2023).
The media in Latvia enjoy freedom, with no restrictions on criticizing government actions and policies. While the government has faced significant criticism in certain areas, the media’s capacity for investigative journalism, particularly regarding the economy, is limited, resulting in milder criticism (Rožukalne, 2023).
Public administration is implementing strategic measures to combat disinformation. However, the only organization conducting sustainable fact-checking is the REBaltica initiative RE: Check of the Center for Investigative Journalism.
The licensing of electronic media in Latvia is politically neutral and follows the procedures outlined in the Law on Electronic Communication. The Media Ombudsman, elected in 2021 and in office since March 2022, oversees public electronic media and their services, ensuring compliance with the code of ethics and editorial guidelines.
The Media Pluralism Report 2023 indicated that Latvian media fall within the medium-risk zone regarding pluralism (65%). The primary risks in this domain stem from the low level of media market pluralism and the influence of advertisers and owners on editorial independence. Latvia lacks specific regulations for digital media companies to publish data on beneficiaries and owners. Since 2020, data on media owners has been available for free in the Enterprise Register database.
Latvian media regulation and self-regulation do not include mechanisms to protect journalists in the event of a change in media ownership or editorial direction, resulting in a high risk to editorial independence from commercial and owner influences (78%). Political autonomy is assessed at 37% due to potential influence from politicians and media owners.
The 2023 Media Pluralism Report showed improvement in the indicator for minority representation in the media (low risk – 22%), development in media literacy (53%), and better protection against disinformation and hate speech (66%) (Rožukalne, 2023).
The media in Latvia enjoy freedom, with no restrictions on criticizing government actions and policies. While the government has faced significant criticism in certain areas, the media’s capacity for investigative journalism, particularly regarding the economy, is limited, resulting in milder criticism (Rožukalne, 2023).
Public administration is implementing strategic measures to combat disinformation. However, the only organization conducting sustainable fact-checking is the REBaltica initiative RE: Check of the Center for Investigative Journalism.
Citations:
Rožukalne, A. 2023. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in 2022. Country Report: Latvia. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/75728
Elektronisko sakaru likums. https://likumi.lv/ta/id/334345-elektronisko-sakaru-likums
Rožukalne, A. 2023. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in 2022. Country Report: Latvia. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/75728
Elektronisko sakaru likums. https://likumi.lv/ta/id/334345-elektronisko-sakaru-likums
Portugal
Portugal’s media landscape demonstrates some degree of diversity. Media pluralism is a key aspect of the ERC’s mandate, emphasizing “the range of expressions from various schools of thought,” as stated in Article 7, Point A of its regulations.
This diversity is evident across various media platforms, including broadcast television networks, radio stations, and newspapers. In terms of television stations, there are four free-to-air channels: two public channels (RTP, with four channels, and ARTV, the official Portuguese Assembly’s channel) and two private channels (SIC and TVI), owned by Impresa and Media Capital, respectively. In the realm of radio stations, a high degree of plurality is observed at the national, regional, and local levels, with public radio (affiliated with RTP), RFM, Rádio Comercial, and Rádio Renascença enjoying extensive coverage.
Portugal’s media landscape is marked by a diverse array of large media groups, including the Global Media Group (which owns Jornal de Notícias and Diário de Notícias), the Impresa group (owner of Expresso), the Sonae group (controlling Público), and Cofina Media (holding Correio da Manhã), among several others. A notable trend is the emergence of independent and alternative journalism platforms like Fumaça, Shifter, and Setenta e Quatro, which offer distinctive perspectives and are funded differently from traditional media’s reliance on advertising (Média Alternativos, n.d.).
However, challenges remain in the realm of media pluralism. Evidence suggests a continued limitation in the representation of smaller political parties and those without parliamentary representation, both in terms of visibility and access to media space (Silva et al., 2020).
Portuguese media universally enjoy the right to freedom of the press, allowing them to freely express societal discontent regarding the government and to frequently report, investigate, and critically denounce any irregularities and potential abuses of power. Yet, two significant issues impact the media’s capacity to scrutinize effectively.
First, there is a notable lack of resources dedicated to investigative journalism, a concern raised by Portuguese journalists themselves (Setenta e Quatro, 2021). Second, the profession is marred by precarious working conditions and instability. A recent study by the Observatory for Living and Working Conditions at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, which surveyed 866 journalists in April and May 2022, highlighted toxic work environments and identified a profession burdened by labor overload, ethical conflicts, declining work quality, challenges in balancing professional and personal life, low wages, and job insecurity (Antunes et al.).
This diversity is evident across various media platforms, including broadcast television networks, radio stations, and newspapers. In terms of television stations, there are four free-to-air channels: two public channels (RTP, with four channels, and ARTV, the official Portuguese Assembly’s channel) and two private channels (SIC and TVI), owned by Impresa and Media Capital, respectively. In the realm of radio stations, a high degree of plurality is observed at the national, regional, and local levels, with public radio (affiliated with RTP), RFM, Rádio Comercial, and Rádio Renascença enjoying extensive coverage.
Portugal’s media landscape is marked by a diverse array of large media groups, including the Global Media Group (which owns Jornal de Notícias and Diário de Notícias), the Impresa group (owner of Expresso), the Sonae group (controlling Público), and Cofina Media (holding Correio da Manhã), among several others. A notable trend is the emergence of independent and alternative journalism platforms like Fumaça, Shifter, and Setenta e Quatro, which offer distinctive perspectives and are funded differently from traditional media’s reliance on advertising (Média Alternativos, n.d.).
However, challenges remain in the realm of media pluralism. Evidence suggests a continued limitation in the representation of smaller political parties and those without parliamentary representation, both in terms of visibility and access to media space (Silva et al., 2020).
Portuguese media universally enjoy the right to freedom of the press, allowing them to freely express societal discontent regarding the government and to frequently report, investigate, and critically denounce any irregularities and potential abuses of power. Yet, two significant issues impact the media’s capacity to scrutinize effectively.
First, there is a notable lack of resources dedicated to investigative journalism, a concern raised by Portuguese journalists themselves (Setenta e Quatro, 2021). Second, the profession is marred by precarious working conditions and instability. A recent study by the Observatory for Living and Working Conditions at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, which surveyed 866 journalists in April and May 2022, highlighted toxic work environments and identified a profession burdened by labor overload, ethical conflicts, declining work quality, challenges in balancing professional and personal life, low wages, and job insecurity (Antunes et al.).
Citations:
Antunes, J., Areosa, J., Rolo, D., Santa, R., Silveira, H., and Varela, R. (cord). 2023. Inquérito Nacional às Condições de Vida e de Trabalho dos Jornalistas em Portugal. Observatório para as condições de vida e trabalho. https://jornalistas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Inquerito-Nacional-as-Condicoes-de-Vida-e-de-Trabalho-dos-Jornalistas-em-Portugal-03-11-2023-c.pdf
Law No. 53/2005. 2005. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=588&tabela=leis
Média Alternativos. n.d. “Os projectos.” https://mediaalternativos.pt/projectos/
Setenta e Quatro. 2021. “Os desafios do jornalismo de investigação: a responsabilidade do jornalista.” https://setentaequatro.pt/ensaio/os-desafios-do-jornalismo-de-investigacao-responsabilidade-do-jornalista
Público. 2020. “Partidos e líderes políticos nos media: quem aparece mais?” https://www.publico.pt/2020/09/20/politica/noticia/partidos-lideres-politicos-media-aparece-1931798
Antunes, J., Areosa, J., Rolo, D., Santa, R., Silveira, H., and Varela, R. (cord). 2023. Inquérito Nacional às Condições de Vida e de Trabalho dos Jornalistas em Portugal. Observatório para as condições de vida e trabalho. https://jornalistas.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Inquerito-Nacional-as-Condicoes-de-Vida-e-de-Trabalho-dos-Jornalistas-em-Portugal-03-11-2023-c.pdf
Law No. 53/2005. 2005. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=588&tabela=leis
Média Alternativos. n.d. “Os projectos.” https://mediaalternativos.pt/projectos/
Setenta e Quatro. 2021. “Os desafios do jornalismo de investigação: a responsabilidade do jornalista.” https://setentaequatro.pt/ensaio/os-desafios-do-jornalismo-de-investigacao-responsabilidade-do-jornalista
Público. 2020. “Partidos e líderes políticos nos media: quem aparece mais?” https://www.publico.pt/2020/09/20/politica/noticia/partidos-lideres-politicos-media-aparece-1931798
Switzerland
The most important electronic media organizations in Switzerland in terms of coverage and intensity of citizen use are either online or publicly owned. Private sector television stations play only a small role in the country’s media landscape. These are largely regional stations. A number of foreign radio and television stations can be received in Switzerland, contributing to the country’s media plurality. The country has a high number of privately owned newspapers, with a highly decentralized system of regional concentration. However, a strong tendency toward centralization has weakened the regional newspaper market. This has been amplified by the strong growth of free papers for commuters such as 20 Minuten in the morning (which is distributed in three of the country’s linguistic regions). These newspapers have crowded out the readership of traditional newspapers, which have collectively suffered from a decline in subscriptions. The number of independent newspapers has also been on the decline as media concentration continues. There are eight major publishing houses in the whole country; among these major publishing houses, the three largest – Tamedia, NZZ and Ringier – account for about 80% of all major publishers’ newspaper circulation (calculated from FSO 2024; see also Hänggli and Fedddersen 2022; 2023). In parallel, online media consumption is outgrowing print media consumption. A specialized website finds in 2024 that there is “no nationally dominant majority media that could determine the opinion and audience market alone, even in 2022.” Combining the perceived media quality by citizens and the quantitative “market power” of media in an index of “opinion power,” Medienmonitor Schweiz found that online information is most important (29%), followed by television (23%), radio (18%), social media 16% and finally print media (14%) (Medienmonitor Schweiz 2024).
Certain media are politically oriented. This is most evident in the leading national newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung, which has strong historical and ideological ties to the “freisinnig” or pro-free-market liberal party. There are other newspapers and television stations that have been criticized for a left-green bias. In general, however, it can be said that all political positions are adequately represented in the media.
In a popular vote in March 2018, a proposal for a constitutional article relating to the public radio and television services was rejected by a large majority of 72%. The proposed article would have prohibited the federal government from subsidizing or running radio and television stations. This would have implied the abandonment of public radio and television. Although rejected, the debate on the initiative triggered reform processes within the public radio and television system – such as increasing efficiency and improving the use of resources.
In February 2022, a referendum that would have increased and expanded public subsidies for media was rejected. This aimed to ensure broad coverage of various media across the country. This represents a threat to smaller regional media channels, as well as to the pluralism of media and media ownership in Switzerland.
Currently, right-wing politicians are making attempts to reduce state subsidies to public sector media. If these attempts are successful, the campaign will in all likelihood lead to reduced subsidies to public TV and radio. According to the public sector media, “(t)he reduction of the SRG budget would inevitably have a negative impact on the program, for example in the areas of regional information, sports productions, coproductions of Swiss films and music recordings, and major popular events” (Tageanzeiger 2023).
Certain media are politically oriented. This is most evident in the leading national newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung, which has strong historical and ideological ties to the “freisinnig” or pro-free-market liberal party. There are other newspapers and television stations that have been criticized for a left-green bias. In general, however, it can be said that all political positions are adequately represented in the media.
In a popular vote in March 2018, a proposal for a constitutional article relating to the public radio and television services was rejected by a large majority of 72%. The proposed article would have prohibited the federal government from subsidizing or running radio and television stations. This would have implied the abandonment of public radio and television. Although rejected, the debate on the initiative triggered reform processes within the public radio and television system – such as increasing efficiency and improving the use of resources.
In February 2022, a referendum that would have increased and expanded public subsidies for media was rejected. This aimed to ensure broad coverage of various media across the country. This represents a threat to smaller regional media channels, as well as to the pluralism of media and media ownership in Switzerland.
Currently, right-wing politicians are making attempts to reduce state subsidies to public sector media. If these attempts are successful, the campaign will in all likelihood lead to reduced subsidies to public TV and radio. According to the public sector media, “(t)he reduction of the SRG budget would inevitably have a negative impact on the program, for example in the areas of regional information, sports productions, coproductions of Swiss films and music recordings, and major popular events” (Tageanzeiger 2023).
Citations:
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2024. “Printmedien: Auflage- und Leserzahlen ausgewählter Tages- und Sonntagszeitungen, nach Sprachregionen.” Accessed on 2024 01 03.
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19.
Hänggli, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2022. “Medien und politische Kommunikation.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 491-516.
Medienmonitor Schweiz 2024: https://www.medienmonitor-schweiz.ch/
Tagesanzeiger. 2023. “Alternative zur Halbierungsinitiative. So funktioniert Röstis Plan für tiefere SRG-Gebühren.” https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/fragen-und-antworten-zur-halbierungsinitiative-so-funktioniert-roestis-plan-fuer-tiefere-srg-gebuehren-935068662902
FSO (Federal Statistical Office, Bundesamt für Statistik). 2024. “Printmedien: Auflage- und Leserzahlen ausgewählter Tages- und Sonntagszeitungen, nach Sprachregionen.” Accessed on 2024 01 03.
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19.
Hänggli, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2022. “Medien und politische Kommunikation.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. 7th ed. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 491-516.
Medienmonitor Schweiz 2024: https://www.medienmonitor-schweiz.ch/
Tagesanzeiger. 2023. “Alternative zur Halbierungsinitiative. So funktioniert Röstis Plan für tiefere SRG-Gebühren.” https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/fragen-und-antworten-zur-halbierungsinitiative-so-funktioniert-roestis-plan-fuer-tiefere-srg-gebuehren-935068662902
USA
The fragmented nature of the American media landscape allows for a reasonably pluralistic environment across digital, print, and broadcast media. Citizens and media outlets regularly engage in criticism of the government, with little sense of formal or informal reprisal from government officials. Indeed, robust criticism of the government and debate are generally seen as valuable parts of the political culture (Reuning and Dietrich 2019).
Media pluralism is weakest in local journalism. Declining readership and viewership have eroded the profitability of local media companies. Consequently, most local broadcast and print media are owned by a small number of national networks (Hayes and Lawless 2015).
A major characteristic of the U.S. media landscape is the hyper-partisan nature of many media outlets (Iyengar and Hahn 2013). For the last several decades, cable television and talk radio have made little attempt to be neutral or balanced in their editorializing about politics (Levendusky 2013). These outlets create an echo chamber effect where viewers often choose media sources based on their politics, and then their views about current affairs are reinforced by these sources (Arcenaux and Johnson 2013). This is not new to the American media landscape. In the 19th century, local newspapers were often hyper-partisan and would, in some cases, actually advertise their political allegiances in the newspaper name. Hence, many older local newspapers contain the words “Democrat,” “Republican,” or even “Whig” in their names.
Media pluralism is weakest in local journalism. Declining readership and viewership have eroded the profitability of local media companies. Consequently, most local broadcast and print media are owned by a small number of national networks (Hayes and Lawless 2015).
A major characteristic of the U.S. media landscape is the hyper-partisan nature of many media outlets (Iyengar and Hahn 2013). For the last several decades, cable television and talk radio have made little attempt to be neutral or balanced in their editorializing about politics (Levendusky 2013). These outlets create an echo chamber effect where viewers often choose media sources based on their politics, and then their views about current affairs are reinforced by these sources (Arcenaux and Johnson 2013). This is not new to the American media landscape. In the 19th century, local newspapers were often hyper-partisan and would, in some cases, actually advertise their political allegiances in the newspaper name. Hence, many older local newspapers contain the words “Democrat,” “Republican,” or even “Whig” in their names.
Citations:
Danny Hayes and Jennifer Lawless. 2015. “As Local News Goes, So Goes Citizen Engagement: Media, Knowledge, and Participation in US House Elections.” Journal of Politics.
Kevin Arcenaux and Martin Johnson. 2013. Changing Minds or Changing Channels? Partisan News in an Age of Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kevin Reuning and Nick Dietrich. 2019. “Media Coverage, Public Interest, and Support in the 2016 Republican Invisible Primary.” Perspectives on Politics.
Shanto Iyengar and Kyu Hahn. 2009. “Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use.” Journal of Communication.
Danny Hayes and Jennifer Lawless. 2015. “As Local News Goes, So Goes Citizen Engagement: Media, Knowledge, and Participation in US House Elections.” Journal of Politics.
Kevin Arcenaux and Martin Johnson. 2013. Changing Minds or Changing Channels? Partisan News in an Age of Choice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kevin Reuning and Nick Dietrich. 2019. “Media Coverage, Public Interest, and Support in the 2016 Republican Invisible Primary.” Perspectives on Politics.
Shanto Iyengar and Kyu Hahn. 2009. “Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use.” Journal of Communication.
7
Austria
The Austrian media system has a distinct lack of pluralism in both the broadcast and print media sectors. The TV and radio markets are still dominated by the public Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF), though its market share has been shrinking. ORF’s television market share in 2022 was 34.6%, down from 35.5% in 2021, while its radio market share was 68%, down from 72% in 2021.
The ORF is required by law to follow a policy of internal pluralism, which in practice translates primarily into a reflection of the various political parties’ current strength in parliament. Thus, interests and movements not yet established in the political system may occasionally face a disadvantage.
The print media sector is highly concentrated by comparative standards. For nearly 9 million inhabitants, there are just 14 daily newspapers, compared to Switzerland with a population of 8.7 million, which has more than 40 dailies, or Sweden, with a population of 10.4 million and more than 90 dailies. Regional monopolies also pose a threat to media pluralism in Austria. In some states, a single daily paper dominates the market.
One paper, the tabloid Kronenzeitung, dominates the print market, though its market share has been shrinking recently. The Kronenzeitung’s market share was 22.4% in 2022, or 1.7 million readers (down from 23.9% in 2021 and more than 40% in 2009). With a reach of 9.4 and 8.9%, the two daily newspapers “Kleine Zeitung” and “Heute” were the second and third most important papers in 2022, respectively. The Kronenzeitung carries particular political weight as politicians of various parties seek to please its editor and staff, eroding the fair and open democratic competition of ideas and interests. Further limits to media pluralism arise from close personal relationships between the chief editors of different major newspapers. For example, the editor-in-chief of “Heute” is the spouse of the editor-in-chief of the Kronenzeitung.
According to data published by the Media Pluralism Monitor 2022, media pluralism in Austria is at medium risk in all areas investigated, except for one – fundamental protection – which shows a low risk. The report indicates that risks to media pluralism in Austria arise primarily from horizontal and cross-media concentration, insufficient reflection on changes in the media landscape within competition law, threats to the independence of public service media governance and funding, endangered editorial autonomy, shortcomings in provisions on media ownership transparency, limited access to media for women and minorities, the lack of a policy or resources to promote media literacy, and a system of state subsidies.
There is a notable amount of news media concentration on online platforms. Those who control online news media also hold powerful positions in other sectors, such as Mediaprint, ORF, or Styria Media Group. However, for now, there remains a sufficient number of major digital, print, and broadcast outlets that are able and willing to consistently critique government policies and report on abuses of power.
The ORF is required by law to follow a policy of internal pluralism, which in practice translates primarily into a reflection of the various political parties’ current strength in parliament. Thus, interests and movements not yet established in the political system may occasionally face a disadvantage.
The print media sector is highly concentrated by comparative standards. For nearly 9 million inhabitants, there are just 14 daily newspapers, compared to Switzerland with a population of 8.7 million, which has more than 40 dailies, or Sweden, with a population of 10.4 million and more than 90 dailies. Regional monopolies also pose a threat to media pluralism in Austria. In some states, a single daily paper dominates the market.
One paper, the tabloid Kronenzeitung, dominates the print market, though its market share has been shrinking recently. The Kronenzeitung’s market share was 22.4% in 2022, or 1.7 million readers (down from 23.9% in 2021 and more than 40% in 2009). With a reach of 9.4 and 8.9%, the two daily newspapers “Kleine Zeitung” and “Heute” were the second and third most important papers in 2022, respectively. The Kronenzeitung carries particular political weight as politicians of various parties seek to please its editor and staff, eroding the fair and open democratic competition of ideas and interests. Further limits to media pluralism arise from close personal relationships between the chief editors of different major newspapers. For example, the editor-in-chief of “Heute” is the spouse of the editor-in-chief of the Kronenzeitung.
According to data published by the Media Pluralism Monitor 2022, media pluralism in Austria is at medium risk in all areas investigated, except for one – fundamental protection – which shows a low risk. The report indicates that risks to media pluralism in Austria arise primarily from horizontal and cross-media concentration, insufficient reflection on changes in the media landscape within competition law, threats to the independence of public service media governance and funding, endangered editorial autonomy, shortcomings in provisions on media ownership transparency, limited access to media for women and minorities, the lack of a policy or resources to promote media literacy, and a system of state subsidies.
There is a notable amount of news media concentration on online platforms. Those who control online news media also hold powerful positions in other sectors, such as Mediaprint, ORF, or Styria Media Group. However, for now, there remains a sufficient number of major digital, print, and broadcast outlets that are able and willing to consistently critique government policies and report on abuses of power.
Citations:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/aktuelles/pk/jahr_2023/pk0875
https://kontrast.at/zeitungen-oesterreich/#Geringe_Pressevielfalt_bei_Tageszeitungen
https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000180498/oesterreichs-groesste-medienhaeuser-2023–vor-dem-umbruch
https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74681
https://www.parlament.gv.at/aktuelles/pk/jahr_2023/pk0875
https://kontrast.at/zeitungen-oesterreich/#Geringe_Pressevielfalt_bei_Tageszeitungen
https://www.derstandard.at/story/3000000180498/oesterreichs-groesste-medienhaeuser-2023–vor-dem-umbruch
https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74681
Belgium
Relatively few actors have an ownership stake in the major private-media companies, which is expected in a small economy with two submarkets (Dutch and French). As a result, the market is relatively concentrated. However, various media outlets (television, radio, print, and web) offer a diverse range of opinions, and most political positions are well represented. The boards of Belgium’s two large public-media entities for radio and television (the Flemish VRT and the francophone RTBF) are composed of representatives from most political parties, including opposition parties (from among the main parliamentary parties). There is a “Cordon Sanitaire médiatique” in French-speaking Belgium, which prevents parties, representatives, or movements that do not respect democratic principles and values (including extreme right-wing and fundamentalist religious parties) from having free speaking time on live television. This excludes them from live talk shows and debates. However, journalists have the right and are invited to talk about the far-right and its program, provided they put this political current and its ideas into perspective (Biard 2021). This barrier impacts the diffusion of far-right political opinion on traditional media and can explain the lack of successful far-right parties in French-speaking Belgium.
One issue affecting media outlets is the growing financial stress on print media. Tighter budgets have restricted newspapers’ ability to pursue in-depth investigations systematically and have generally diminished some of the public scrutiny a free press is supposed to exert. Most major print press groups, both Flemish and Francophone, face severe financial difficulties as print sales decline and web-based business models fail to sustain a broad pool of professional journalists.
One issue affecting media outlets is the growing financial stress on print media. Tighter budgets have restricted newspapers’ ability to pursue in-depth investigations systematically and have generally diminished some of the public scrutiny a free press is supposed to exert. Most major print press groups, both Flemish and Francophone, face severe financial difficulties as print sales decline and web-based business models fail to sustain a broad pool of professional journalists.
Citations:
EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom – Media Pluralism Monitor : https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2022-results/
Biard, B. 2021. “La lutte contre l’extrême droite en Belgique: II. Cordon sanitaire médiatique, société civile et services de renseignement.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 2524-2525: 5-78. https://doi.org/10.3917/cris.2524.0005
EUI Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom – Media Pluralism Monitor : https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2022-results/
Biard, B. 2021. “La lutte contre l’extrême droite en Belgique: II. Cordon sanitaire médiatique, société civile et services de renseignement.” Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP 2524-2525: 5-78. https://doi.org/10.3917/cris.2524.0005
France
There is a substantial diversity of opinions expressed in French media. Like elsewhere, there is considerable debate on the issue of media ownership and its consequences for media pluralism.
One evolution that has sparked some concern in the media landscape is the increasing influence of billionaire Vincent Bolloré. Having made a fortune in marine transport, he started expanding into the media sector 20 years ago. He now owns the largest private radio broadcaster, Europe 1; the TV channels CNews and Canal+; and a host of weekly and monthly magazines since the acquisition of Vivendi in May 2021. These takeovers have regularly been followed by a significant reorientation of the editorial line. In particular, two of Bolloré’s TV channels, CNews and C8, have regularly been accused of overrepresenting the far right or even actively promoting far right candidates like Eric Zemmour. In the summer of 2022, the takeover of the Journal du Dimanche (JDD), a Sunday weekly, was followed by the appointment of one of Zemmour’s main supporters to head of the journal, leading to a months-long strike.
A more recent player in the media landscape is Czech billionaire Daniel Kretinsky, who bought a minority share of quality newspaper Le Monde. He has since acquired a minority share in the most important French TV network, TF1, and 45% of online media company Loopsider. He recently sold his stake in Le Monde. His motivations seem to be more commercial than political.
Public media are regularly criticized for their left-leaning orientation, while commercial media are supposed to be more conservative. A recent study has put these accusations into perspective. These differences are usually exaggerated, according to Cagé and colleagues.
One evolution that has sparked some concern in the media landscape is the increasing influence of billionaire Vincent Bolloré. Having made a fortune in marine transport, he started expanding into the media sector 20 years ago. He now owns the largest private radio broadcaster, Europe 1; the TV channels CNews and Canal+; and a host of weekly and monthly magazines since the acquisition of Vivendi in May 2021. These takeovers have regularly been followed by a significant reorientation of the editorial line. In particular, two of Bolloré’s TV channels, CNews and C8, have regularly been accused of overrepresenting the far right or even actively promoting far right candidates like Eric Zemmour. In the summer of 2022, the takeover of the Journal du Dimanche (JDD), a Sunday weekly, was followed by the appointment of one of Zemmour’s main supporters to head of the journal, leading to a months-long strike.
A more recent player in the media landscape is Czech billionaire Daniel Kretinsky, who bought a minority share of quality newspaper Le Monde. He has since acquired a minority share in the most important French TV network, TF1, and 45% of online media company Loopsider. He recently sold his stake in Le Monde. His motivations seem to be more commercial than political.
Public media are regularly criticized for their left-leaning orientation, while commercial media are supposed to be more conservative. A recent study has put these accusations into perspective. These differences are usually exaggerated, according to Cagé and colleagues.
Citations:
Claudia Cohen and Marie Bartnik. 2023. “Médias, distribution, informatique… L’empire tentaculaire de Daniel Kretinsky en France.” Le Figaro, August 1.
“Comment Vincent Bolloré construit un empire médiatique par la force et l’argent.” Sud Ouest, June 24.
Julia Cagé, Moritz Hengel, Nicolas Hervé, and Camille Urvoy. “Hosting Media Bias: Evidence from the Universe of French Broadcasts, 2002-2020.” SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036211
Claudia Cohen and Marie Bartnik. 2023. “Médias, distribution, informatique… L’empire tentaculaire de Daniel Kretinsky en France.” Le Figaro, August 1.
“Comment Vincent Bolloré construit un empire médiatique par la force et l’argent.” Sud Ouest, June 24.
Julia Cagé, Moritz Hengel, Nicolas Hervé, and Camille Urvoy. “Hosting Media Bias: Evidence from the Universe of French Broadcasts, 2002-2020.” SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036211
Italy
Media pluralism is legally guaranteed by Legislative Decree 208/2021. This decree incorporates the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive into the Italian legal framework. It replaced the previous Consolidated Act, TUSMAR (Legislative Decree 177/2005), with a new one named TUSMA (Testo unico sui servizi di media audiovisivi). TUSMA revised the media sector’s anti-concentration rules to safeguard media pluralism and broadened the responsibilities of the media authority, Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni (AGCOM). It also expanded some regulations governing the audiovisual sector and video-sharing platforms (see Media Pluralism Monitor 2022).
Established in 1997 by Law 249, AGCOM is an independent authority tasked with safeguarding fair competition among market operators and upholding user interests. It exercises regulatory and oversight duties across various sectors, including electronic communications, audiovisual media, publishing, postal services, and more recently, online platforms. AGCOM is accountable to the Italian parliament, which has defined its powers, outlined its statutes, and elected its members. The president and four members of the AGCOM Board are appointed through a joint process involving the government and parliament. This mechanism protects the media authority from being beholden to a parliamentary majority or aligned with the electoral cycle. However, it is only partially impervious to the risks of political bargaining (see Media Pluralism Monitor 2022).
A key responsibility of AGCOM is to establish election regulations that guarantee equitable media access for all candidates. This is complemented by monitoring and enforcing compliance with the “par condicio” principle, as Law 28/2000 mandates. AGCOM’s responsibilities also include maintaining the Register of Communication Operators (ROC). The purpose of the ROC is to ensure transparency and publicity of ownership structures and enable the application of rules concerning anti-concentration discipline. Public access to the information provided by AGCOM, however, has substantial limitations that undermine transparency.
AGCOM submits an annual report on its activities to the prime minister. It also publishes a quarterly monitoring of media markets on its website and verifies compliance with political pluralism monthly by monitoring radio and television broadcasts.
The recent introduction of the TUSMA has failed to undermine the concentration of the traditional media market, which has historically been high, particularly in the audiovisual sector. The development of the digital environment has not sufficiently balanced this concentration due to the dominating roles of a few platforms in facilitating access to news and in the online advertising market (see Media Pluralism Monitor 2022).
Despite persistent concerns over media concentration, encouraging signs of growing plurality are emerging. The long-standing duopoly between RAI, the public broadcaster, and MEDIASET, the private media group controlled by the Berlusconi family, has faced significant challenges from new players such as Comcast/Sky, La7, and Discovery (see AGCOM 2022). This helps to ensure a greater degree of pluralism. Additionally, streaming services have witnessed a remarkable surge in market share in recent years, further diversifying the media landscape.
However, the radio and newspaper sectors have experienced a decline in plurality due to numerous mergers and acquisitions. This has led to a concentration of ownership and control, raising concerns about media diversity and the potential impact on editorial independence and the range of viewpoints available to the public (Media Pluralism Monitor 2022).
Established in 1997 by Law 249, AGCOM is an independent authority tasked with safeguarding fair competition among market operators and upholding user interests. It exercises regulatory and oversight duties across various sectors, including electronic communications, audiovisual media, publishing, postal services, and more recently, online platforms. AGCOM is accountable to the Italian parliament, which has defined its powers, outlined its statutes, and elected its members. The president and four members of the AGCOM Board are appointed through a joint process involving the government and parliament. This mechanism protects the media authority from being beholden to a parliamentary majority or aligned with the electoral cycle. However, it is only partially impervious to the risks of political bargaining (see Media Pluralism Monitor 2022).
A key responsibility of AGCOM is to establish election regulations that guarantee equitable media access for all candidates. This is complemented by monitoring and enforcing compliance with the “par condicio” principle, as Law 28/2000 mandates. AGCOM’s responsibilities also include maintaining the Register of Communication Operators (ROC). The purpose of the ROC is to ensure transparency and publicity of ownership structures and enable the application of rules concerning anti-concentration discipline. Public access to the information provided by AGCOM, however, has substantial limitations that undermine transparency.
AGCOM submits an annual report on its activities to the prime minister. It also publishes a quarterly monitoring of media markets on its website and verifies compliance with political pluralism monthly by monitoring radio and television broadcasts.
The recent introduction of the TUSMA has failed to undermine the concentration of the traditional media market, which has historically been high, particularly in the audiovisual sector. The development of the digital environment has not sufficiently balanced this concentration due to the dominating roles of a few platforms in facilitating access to news and in the online advertising market (see Media Pluralism Monitor 2022).
Despite persistent concerns over media concentration, encouraging signs of growing plurality are emerging. The long-standing duopoly between RAI, the public broadcaster, and MEDIASET, the private media group controlled by the Berlusconi family, has faced significant challenges from new players such as Comcast/Sky, La7, and Discovery (see AGCOM 2022). This helps to ensure a greater degree of pluralism. Additionally, streaming services have witnessed a remarkable surge in market share in recent years, further diversifying the media landscape.
However, the radio and newspaper sectors have experienced a decline in plurality due to numerous mergers and acquisitions. This has led to a concentration of ownership and control, raising concerns about media diversity and the potential impact on editorial independence and the range of viewpoints available to the public (Media Pluralism Monitor 2022).
Citations:
Media Pluralism Monitor 2022: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74694
AGCOM Annual Report 2022: https://www.agcom.it/documents/10179/27251843/Documento+generico+29-07-2022/c049d0cb-a8ae-4a07-8eb5-7389dd61c288?version=1.0
Media Pluralism Monitor 2022: https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74694
AGCOM Annual Report 2022: https://www.agcom.it/documents/10179/27251843/Documento+generico+29-07-2022/c049d0cb-a8ae-4a07-8eb5-7389dd61c288?version=1.0
Lithuania
Lithuania’s electronic and print media markets feature a mix of diversified and oligopolistic ownership structures. However, these ownership structures lack transparency. Regulations overseeing publicly owned media ensure adequate plurality of opinions. At the national level and in digital media, a diverse array of political perspectives is represented, with no censorship of significant political viewpoints. There is consistent critical evaluation of government policies and potential abuses of power.
Business conglomerates often own multiple newspapers and TV channels. Media ownership concentration has increased in recent years due to the purchase of media outlets by domestic and foreign companies. Six media companies – Delfi, 15min, LNK Group, All Media, Lietuvos rytas and Verslo žinios – dominate the media market.
On the municipal level, ownership links between decision makers and media outlets pose a risk to the plurality of opinions. For example, according to a study published on 22 June 2022 by Transparency International (the Vilnius office), 68 politicians, civil servants or their spouses owned one in every eight media outlets in Lithuania. Publicly owned electronic media – the state-funded Lithuanian Radio and Television – to some extent compensates for deficiencies or biases in private sector media reporting.
According to the Media Pluralism Monitor 2022, Lithuania ranked eighth among 32 European countries assessed. The situation in Lithuania was described as posing a medium risk to media pluralism, though it was close to the category of low risk. The highest risk was identified in the category of market plurality, with news media concentration seen as posing a very high risk. The lowest risk was identified in the category of fundamental protection, particularly the independence and effectiveness of the media authority and the protection of freedom of expression.
The risk to media freedom due to ownership concentration has been noted for a number of years by Freedom House. In its 2023 report, Freedom House stated that “increasing concentration of media ownership in the hands of a small number of companies raises the risk of editorial interference by powerful political and business interests. Journalists often engage in self-censorship when reporting on certain large companies. The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic left the media more vulnerable to undue influence and affected the job security of journalists. Journalists also face online harassment and abuse.”
In addition to ownership concentration, another source of the risk of editorial interference from political and business interests is the business model of the largest privately owned media groups, which is heavily dependent on advertising revenues.
As noted by Freedom House, “Under the state of emergency declared after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the transmission of any programs broadcast by Russian and Belarusian television and radio channels was suspended. The state of emergency also allowed for the restriction of Lithuanian media if they were deemed to spread disinformation or propaganda, incite war or breach Lithuanian sovereignty. On the other hand, state institutions, major media outlets and civil society groups stepped up their efforts to fight disinformation on the internet.”
The population displays relatively low levels of trust in the media. According to a representative survey conducted by the Vilmorus company from 22 November to 2 December 2023, 28.6% of respondents indicated they trusted the media, while 30.8% stated they did not. This represents a slight improvement compared to a Vilmorus survey conducted in December 2021, when only 25% of respondents expressed trust in the media and 34% indicated distrust. Despite this improvement, the share of the population that does not trust the media remains higher than the share that does hold this trust.
Business conglomerates often own multiple newspapers and TV channels. Media ownership concentration has increased in recent years due to the purchase of media outlets by domestic and foreign companies. Six media companies – Delfi, 15min, LNK Group, All Media, Lietuvos rytas and Verslo žinios – dominate the media market.
On the municipal level, ownership links between decision makers and media outlets pose a risk to the plurality of opinions. For example, according to a study published on 22 June 2022 by Transparency International (the Vilnius office), 68 politicians, civil servants or their spouses owned one in every eight media outlets in Lithuania. Publicly owned electronic media – the state-funded Lithuanian Radio and Television – to some extent compensates for deficiencies or biases in private sector media reporting.
According to the Media Pluralism Monitor 2022, Lithuania ranked eighth among 32 European countries assessed. The situation in Lithuania was described as posing a medium risk to media pluralism, though it was close to the category of low risk. The highest risk was identified in the category of market plurality, with news media concentration seen as posing a very high risk. The lowest risk was identified in the category of fundamental protection, particularly the independence and effectiveness of the media authority and the protection of freedom of expression.
The risk to media freedom due to ownership concentration has been noted for a number of years by Freedom House. In its 2023 report, Freedom House stated that “increasing concentration of media ownership in the hands of a small number of companies raises the risk of editorial interference by powerful political and business interests. Journalists often engage in self-censorship when reporting on certain large companies. The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic left the media more vulnerable to undue influence and affected the job security of journalists. Journalists also face online harassment and abuse.”
In addition to ownership concentration, another source of the risk of editorial interference from political and business interests is the business model of the largest privately owned media groups, which is heavily dependent on advertising revenues.
As noted by Freedom House, “Under the state of emergency declared after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the transmission of any programs broadcast by Russian and Belarusian television and radio channels was suspended. The state of emergency also allowed for the restriction of Lithuanian media if they were deemed to spread disinformation or propaganda, incite war or breach Lithuanian sovereignty. On the other hand, state institutions, major media outlets and civil society groups stepped up their efforts to fight disinformation on the internet.”
The population displays relatively low levels of trust in the media. According to a representative survey conducted by the Vilmorus company from 22 November to 2 December 2023, 28.6% of respondents indicated they trusted the media, while 30.8% stated they did not. This represents a slight improvement compared to a Vilmorus survey conducted in December 2021, when only 25% of respondents expressed trust in the media and 34% indicated distrust. Despite this improvement, the share of the population that does not trust the media remains higher than the share that does hold this trust.
Citations:
Transparency International (Vilnius Office). 2022. https://transparency.lt/pernai-68-politikai-ir-ju-sutuoktiniai-valde-kas-astunta-ziniasklaidos-priemone-2/
EUI Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. 2022. “Media Pluralism Monitor 2022.” https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2022-general-ranking/ (accessed 22.12.2023)
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World Report 2023: Lithuania.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2023
Vilmorus. 2023. “Naujienos, Pasitikėjimas institucijomis.” http://www.vilmorus.lt/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=2&cntnt01returnid=20
Transparency International (Vilnius Office). 2022. https://transparency.lt/pernai-68-politikai-ir-ju-sutuoktiniai-valde-kas-astunta-ziniasklaidos-priemone-2/
EUI Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. 2022. “Media Pluralism Monitor 2022.” https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2022-general-ranking/ (accessed 22.12.2023)
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World Report 2023: Lithuania.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2023
Vilmorus. 2023. “Naujienos, Pasitikėjimas institucijomis.” http://www.vilmorus.lt/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=2&cntnt01returnid=20
Slovakia
According to the Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom’s 2022 report (Urbániková 2022), Slovak anti-monopoly policies ensure the transparency of ownership structures and maintain a plurality of opinions in digital, print, and broadcast media outlets at low-risk levels. Regulations overseeing publicly owned media formally ensure an adequate plurality of views. However, the plurality of opinions in private media presents a risk. For the “Market Plurality” indicator, Slovakia is among the countries with the highest risk. The concentration of media ownership in the hands of Slovak, Czech, and other regional entrepreneurs has been increasing. The most profitable media outlets are currently divided among Czech-Slovak entrepreneurs whose core business lies outside the media (Godársky & Mračka 2023).
The 2022 Law on Media introduced the obligation to register all media outlets in the registry of public sector partners, increasing the transparency of the media market.
Many major digital, print, and broadcast outlets consistently critique government policies and report on abuses of power, which applies to both the 2020 – 2023 OLANO and 2023 – SMER governments. The legislation forces the broadcasting media to encompass a diverse range of political perspectives – paragraph 16, article 3a of Law 308/2000 directly requests the versatility of information and plurality of opinions.
Commercial and owner influence over editorial content is at a medium risk level in Slovakia. However, for the public broadcaster RTVS and most private media, the political independence of the media and the level of conflict of interest are at high risk. The political independence of local and regional media is also endangered due to their funding and ownership by local and regional authorities, resulting in content often blatantly skewed in favor of the current local and regional political representation (Urbániková, 2022).
The 2022 Law on Media introduced the obligation to register all media outlets in the registry of public sector partners, increasing the transparency of the media market.
Many major digital, print, and broadcast outlets consistently critique government policies and report on abuses of power, which applies to both the 2020 – 2023 OLANO and 2023 – SMER governments. The legislation forces the broadcasting media to encompass a diverse range of political perspectives – paragraph 16, article 3a of Law 308/2000 directly requests the versatility of information and plurality of opinions.
Commercial and owner influence over editorial content is at a medium risk level in Slovakia. However, for the public broadcaster RTVS and most private media, the political independence of the media and the level of conflict of interest are at high risk. The political independence of local and regional media is also endangered due to their funding and ownership by local and regional authorities, resulting in content often blatantly skewed in favor of the current local and regional political representation (Urbániková, 2022).
Citations:
Monitoring media pluralism in the digital era. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, 2022
Urbániková, M. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Slovakia. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom.
Godársky, I., and Mračka, M. 2023. “Slovakia. Country Report 2023.” Euromedia Ownership Monitor (EurOMo), https://media-ownership.eu/findings/countries/slovakia.
Zákon 452/2021 o elektronických komunikáciách. 2021. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2021/452/20220201
Zákon 308/2000 o vysielaní a retransmisii. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2000/308/20201120.html
Monitoring media pluralism in the digital era. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, 2022
Urbániková, M. 2022. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Slovakia. Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom.
Godársky, I., and Mračka, M. 2023. “Slovakia. Country Report 2023.” Euromedia Ownership Monitor (EurOMo), https://media-ownership.eu/findings/countries/slovakia.
Zákon 452/2021 o elektronických komunikáciách. 2021. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2021/452/20220201
Zákon 308/2000 o vysielaní a retransmisii. https://www.slov-lex.sk/pravne-predpisy/SK/ZZ/2000/308/20201120.html
Spain
The constitution provides for freedom of expression and the right to information, ensuring a pluralistic media environment with various public and private television and radio stations, newspapers, and internet portals. According to Law 17/2006 on State-Owned Radio and Television, public media must reflect the social, ideological, political, and cultural diversity of Spanish society. The CNMC, together with regional audiovisual authorities, oversees public and private media to ensure a plurality of opinions. The licensing and regulatory regimes for privately owned media also support this plurality.
Spain’s largest newspaper is the influential center-left El País, while other nationwide newspapers include the center-right El Mundo and the conservative ABC. In Catalonia, the moderate nationalist La Vanguardia leads the market. Progressive digital publications like Eldiario.es and Publico.es have large readerships, while significant center-right digital media sites include Elconfidencial.com, and right-wing sites consist of Elespanol.com and Okdiario.com. Despite the rise of digital media, the electronic versions of print newspapers remain the country’s most widely read information websites.
The radio market is dominated by the center-left SER station, followed by Cadena Cope (owned by the Catholic Church), the center-right Onda Cero, and the Catalan private station RAC-1. The publicly owned Radio Nacional de España also has a notable presence. In television, the market is largely controlled by the Italian company Mediaset (including Telecinco and Cuatro channels), Atresmedia Corporación (owning the right-wing Antena 3 and the leftist La Sexta), and the public broadcaster Televisión Española, alongside regional public-television networks and small private stations. The primary media groups collectively secure 80% of advertising revenue in television and 96% in radio, while the press sector’s four major publishing groups reach 87% of audiences.
The CNMC has warned that this concentration could threaten media pluralism in the future. The concentration of the advertising market by Mediaset and Atresmedia has been confirmed by a CNMC sanction. According to the MPM 2022 Report, Spanish media pluralism faces a high risk of media concentration (67%). The widespread use of social networks has facilitated the proliferation of electronic newspapers and independent blogs, counterbalancing oligopolistic trends and ensuring a variety of opinions in public debate.
Although media criticism of the government varies in intensity and tone, all outlets report on government issues and acknowledge significant political perspectives. Some media exhibit bias toward certain political parties.
Spain’s largest newspaper is the influential center-left El País, while other nationwide newspapers include the center-right El Mundo and the conservative ABC. In Catalonia, the moderate nationalist La Vanguardia leads the market. Progressive digital publications like Eldiario.es and Publico.es have large readerships, while significant center-right digital media sites include Elconfidencial.com, and right-wing sites consist of Elespanol.com and Okdiario.com. Despite the rise of digital media, the electronic versions of print newspapers remain the country’s most widely read information websites.
The radio market is dominated by the center-left SER station, followed by Cadena Cope (owned by the Catholic Church), the center-right Onda Cero, and the Catalan private station RAC-1. The publicly owned Radio Nacional de España also has a notable presence. In television, the market is largely controlled by the Italian company Mediaset (including Telecinco and Cuatro channels), Atresmedia Corporación (owning the right-wing Antena 3 and the leftist La Sexta), and the public broadcaster Televisión Española, alongside regional public-television networks and small private stations. The primary media groups collectively secure 80% of advertising revenue in television and 96% in radio, while the press sector’s four major publishing groups reach 87% of audiences.
The CNMC has warned that this concentration could threaten media pluralism in the future. The concentration of the advertising market by Mediaset and Atresmedia has been confirmed by a CNMC sanction. According to the MPM 2022 Report, Spanish media pluralism faces a high risk of media concentration (67%). The widespread use of social networks has facilitated the proliferation of electronic newspapers and independent blogs, counterbalancing oligopolistic trends and ensuring a variety of opinions in public debate.
Although media criticism of the government varies in intensity and tone, all outlets report on government issues and acknowledge significant political perspectives. Some media exhibit bias toward certain political parties.
Citations:
Asociación para la Investigación de Medios de Comunicación. 2023. “Audiencia de Internet.” https://www.aimc.es/
Universidad de Navarra. 2023. “Digital News Report.” https://www.digitalnewsreport.es
European University Institute. 2022. “Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union.” https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2870/74922
Asociación para la Investigación de Medios de Comunicación. 2023. “Audiencia de Internet.” https://www.aimc.es/
Universidad de Navarra. 2023. “Digital News Report.” https://www.digitalnewsreport.es
European University Institute. 2022. “Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union.” https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2870/74922
Netherlands
The arrival of commercial broadcasters made the media landscape much more diverse. The advent of social media had a major impact on both the reporting of debates and the behavior that politicians (parliamentarians and ministers) themselves exhibit. With Twitter (now X), Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, blogs on websites, etc., politicians were given the opportunity to deliver news themselves. Increased competition has resulted in a wider range of offerings, but at the same time, an impoverishment of content. This multiplicity ultimately detracted from a reliability that had previously been taken for granted. Paradoxically, this plethora of information has contributed to making the public worse rather than better informed about politics. “Fast” and “fun” became more appealing than “professional” and “reliable.”
There are no anti-monopoly laws, though in practice Dutch print media and commercial broadcast media are owned by just two-and-a-half international corporations (DPG, Mediahuis and RTL/Bertelsmann). These oligopolistic practices have kept newspapers financially healthy, while rendering the media sector as a whole vulnerable. For the time being, this does not endanger plurality of views in the (inter)national media landscape, because the owners are “journalism-friendly” and allow for liberal editorial statutes. Local media do suffer from a lack of plurality due to “imported” reporting, because of affiliations with national media organizations, as well as due to a lack of resources. There are many municipalities that have just one or even no local newspaper. Radio and TV broadcasting organizations are being forced into regional cooperation structures to survive.
The real change in the media landscape is the fact that people are increasingly exposed to news through indirect access, for instance via news gathering sites, notifications or search engines. This change is particularly evident among young people. Thus, access to news is gradually becoming more and more determined by personalized notifications or by the intervention of a recommendation system. About 22% of young people target specific individuals rather than news brands when it comes to online news.
Confidence in the media has declined among all age groups, but especially among young people. About 19% of young people report difficulty understanding or following the news. Although Dutch people’s overall trust in the news has declined, trust in various news media does remain stable compared to previous years. The NOS receives the highest trust rating (7.4 out of 10 possible poiints), followed by RTL News (6.7). Podcasts also continue to rise in popularity, a trend that has continued in recent years. More than three-quarters of young people report listening to podcasts over the course of a month.
Dutch media consistently critique government policies, though some do so more than others. Special mention is deserved by crowdfunded investigative journalism initiatives (affiliated with and supported by some of the quality journals) like Follow the Money, the Correspondent and Investico. Moreover, some well-known TV anchors have said they have meticulously prepared interview strategies to expose leading politicians as habitual liars, frauds or truth evaders. It thus appears that many in the media see their primary task as critiquing government and revealing abuses of power and broken promises, especially certainly after the childcare benefit, Groningen gas exploitation and earthquake scandals. The logic of the media rejects the political practice of compromise that underlies a consensus democracy like the Netherlands. In that sense, the media have developed as distrust-producing machines.
Yet the Netherlands is not a mediocracy. The major media outlets encompass most political perspectives in a fairly unbiased way. Of course, major political parties draw more attention, but smaller parties (like Party for the Animals; DENK, a party focused on minority rights; and BIJ1, a left-wing social-justice-focused party) are regularly, though less frequently, covered. There is no media bias against opposition parties/candidates. Thanks to social media they have their own outlets, and they are sometimes able to enter the formal system. But such parties do get less attention than major political parties, as defined by ongoing polling results.
During crucial political periods, however, there is substantial distortion of the playing field. A media analysis of all NPO radio and TV programs during the 2021 campaign revealed a notable imbalance in the coverage of political figures, with a clear emphasis on right-wing ideologies and male politicians. The findings underscore the importance of considering media dynamics when evaluating political discourses and representation in the context of elections. Further analysis is warranted to explore the specific subjects discussed during the election campaign, as this would help provide a comprehensive understanding of media influence on political narratives.
There are no anti-monopoly laws, though in practice Dutch print media and commercial broadcast media are owned by just two-and-a-half international corporations (DPG, Mediahuis and RTL/Bertelsmann). These oligopolistic practices have kept newspapers financially healthy, while rendering the media sector as a whole vulnerable. For the time being, this does not endanger plurality of views in the (inter)national media landscape, because the owners are “journalism-friendly” and allow for liberal editorial statutes. Local media do suffer from a lack of plurality due to “imported” reporting, because of affiliations with national media organizations, as well as due to a lack of resources. There are many municipalities that have just one or even no local newspaper. Radio and TV broadcasting organizations are being forced into regional cooperation structures to survive.
The real change in the media landscape is the fact that people are increasingly exposed to news through indirect access, for instance via news gathering sites, notifications or search engines. This change is particularly evident among young people. Thus, access to news is gradually becoming more and more determined by personalized notifications or by the intervention of a recommendation system. About 22% of young people target specific individuals rather than news brands when it comes to online news.
Confidence in the media has declined among all age groups, but especially among young people. About 19% of young people report difficulty understanding or following the news. Although Dutch people’s overall trust in the news has declined, trust in various news media does remain stable compared to previous years. The NOS receives the highest trust rating (7.4 out of 10 possible poiints), followed by RTL News (6.7). Podcasts also continue to rise in popularity, a trend that has continued in recent years. More than three-quarters of young people report listening to podcasts over the course of a month.
Dutch media consistently critique government policies, though some do so more than others. Special mention is deserved by crowdfunded investigative journalism initiatives (affiliated with and supported by some of the quality journals) like Follow the Money, the Correspondent and Investico. Moreover, some well-known TV anchors have said they have meticulously prepared interview strategies to expose leading politicians as habitual liars, frauds or truth evaders. It thus appears that many in the media see their primary task as critiquing government and revealing abuses of power and broken promises, especially certainly after the childcare benefit, Groningen gas exploitation and earthquake scandals. The logic of the media rejects the political practice of compromise that underlies a consensus democracy like the Netherlands. In that sense, the media have developed as distrust-producing machines.
Yet the Netherlands is not a mediocracy. The major media outlets encompass most political perspectives in a fairly unbiased way. Of course, major political parties draw more attention, but smaller parties (like Party for the Animals; DENK, a party focused on minority rights; and BIJ1, a left-wing social-justice-focused party) are regularly, though less frequently, covered. There is no media bias against opposition parties/candidates. Thanks to social media they have their own outlets, and they are sometimes able to enter the formal system. But such parties do get less attention than major political parties, as defined by ongoing polling results.
During crucial political periods, however, there is substantial distortion of the playing field. A media analysis of all NPO radio and TV programs during the 2021 campaign revealed a notable imbalance in the coverage of political figures, with a clear emphasis on right-wing ideologies and male politicians. The findings underscore the importance of considering media dynamics when evaluating political discourses and representation in the context of elections. Further analysis is warranted to explore the specific subjects discussed during the election campaign, as this would help provide a comprehensive understanding of media influence on political narratives.
Citations:
NRC-H. 2022. “Vrijwel alle dagbladen zijn in handen van twee concerns. Wat merkt de lezer daarvan?” August 21.
Parlement.com. 2022. “Misschien wel de grootste verandering: de media.” https://www.parlement.com
Commissariaat voor de Media. 2022. “Digital News Report, Nederland.”
NRC-H. 2022. “Vertrouwen in het nieuws weer gedaald na piek in coronatijd.” Fit, July 15.
NRC. “Hoogtepunt voor Wollaars in prijswinnend Hoekstra-interview: ‘Heb ik nou antwoord gekregen op mijn vraag?’”
Rob Wijberg. 2023. “Hoe onze mediacratie een wantrouwenmachine werd.” De Correspondent September 23.
https://mediasuitedatastories.clariah.nl/elections-2021-first-results/
https://nos.nl/artikel/2372814-onderzoek-rechts-domineert-de-verkiezingscampagne-op-radio-en-tv
NRC-H. 2022. “Vrijwel alle dagbladen zijn in handen van twee concerns. Wat merkt de lezer daarvan?” August 21.
Parlement.com. 2022. “Misschien wel de grootste verandering: de media.” https://www.parlement.com
Commissariaat voor de Media. 2022. “Digital News Report, Nederland.”
NRC-H. 2022. “Vertrouwen in het nieuws weer gedaald na piek in coronatijd.” Fit, July 15.
NRC. “Hoogtepunt voor Wollaars in prijswinnend Hoekstra-interview: ‘Heb ik nou antwoord gekregen op mijn vraag?’”
Rob Wijberg. 2023. “Hoe onze mediacratie een wantrouwenmachine werd.” De Correspondent September 23.
https://mediasuitedatastories.clariah.nl/elections-2021-first-results/
https://nos.nl/artikel/2372814-onderzoek-rechts-domineert-de-verkiezingscampagne-op-radio-en-tv
UK
Because of the requirement for broadcasters to be politically balanced, mainstream channels provide a plurality of views, despite the challenges from newcomers such as GB News. The regulator, OFCOM, does rule on complaints and, to give one example in relation to GB News, said “in light of the likely similarity of the views of the participants in this program on the major matter being discussed, the licensee should have taken additional steps to ensure that due impartiality was preserved.” OFCOM has, however, acted decisively to remove the broadcasting licenses of channels such as CGTN (China) or Press TV (Iran) adjudged to have been too unbalanced.
The press is independent, but ownership has been concentrated in a relatively small number of groups, to some extent constraining its plurality (and skewing coverage toward center-right audiences). However, the power of News International – led by Rupert Murdoch – has manifestly waned and the profitability of the press has declined as citizens look to online sources.
The press is independent, but ownership has been concentrated in a relatively small number of groups, to some extent constraining its plurality (and skewing coverage toward center-right audiences). However, the power of News International – led by Rupert Murdoch – has manifestly waned and the profitability of the press has declined as citizens look to online sources.
6
Japan
Traditional newspapers are still popular in Japan. Japanese media represent a wide range of different points of view – from right-wing (Sankei Shimbun) to left-wing (Akahata, owned by the Japanese Communist Party) – both have a circulation of about one million copies. The two most influential newspapers – Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun – represent center-right and center-left stances, respectively. Other significant titles include Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo Shimbun and Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei).
The Broadcast Act prohibits corporations in which 20% or more of voting rights are held by foreigners from conducting basic broadcasting operations. Cross-ownership between broadcasters and newspaper publishers or other media companies is not regulated, but owning all of the terrestrial television and radio broadcasting, as well as the newspapers in the same area is not allowed if there are no local alternative mass media. As a result, an oligopolistic media structure has emerged, comprising five leading media conglomerates: Nippon Television/Yomiuri, TV Asahi Network, Fujisankei Communications Group, Tokyo Broadcasting System/Mainichi, and the Nikkei, Inc., along with the public broadcaster NHK.
While public media tend to avoid excessive criticism of the government, private media sympathize with different political stances. Japanese journalists have generally performed well as the “fourth power” revealing scandals related to political elites. For instance, in February 2023, Prime Minister Kishida dismissed his executive secretary after the media disclosed the secretary’s discriminatory remarks on sexual minorities, even though the source of the information was kept secret. However, news media have been criticized as being reluctant to critically question government strategies and information during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Tokyo Olympics and the Fukushima triple disaster. Powerful advertising agencies such as Dentsu are thought to have influenced reporting on the Olympics and nuclear power, using their large advertising budgets (NYT 2021; Honma 2012).
Although the high concentration of media ownership is detrimental to pluralism, the gradual decline in traditional media, and growing popularity of foreign and digital media has created opportunities for non-mainstream sources of information. However, this has also made it easier for extremist, mainly nationalist, stances to penetrate the public discourse. In the absence of any law prohibiting the promotion of radical views, xenophobic or historical revisionist content is widely available in books and other print publications.
The Broadcast Act prohibits corporations in which 20% or more of voting rights are held by foreigners from conducting basic broadcasting operations. Cross-ownership between broadcasters and newspaper publishers or other media companies is not regulated, but owning all of the terrestrial television and radio broadcasting, as well as the newspapers in the same area is not allowed if there are no local alternative mass media. As a result, an oligopolistic media structure has emerged, comprising five leading media conglomerates: Nippon Television/Yomiuri, TV Asahi Network, Fujisankei Communications Group, Tokyo Broadcasting System/Mainichi, and the Nikkei, Inc., along with the public broadcaster NHK.
While public media tend to avoid excessive criticism of the government, private media sympathize with different political stances. Japanese journalists have generally performed well as the “fourth power” revealing scandals related to political elites. For instance, in February 2023, Prime Minister Kishida dismissed his executive secretary after the media disclosed the secretary’s discriminatory remarks on sexual minorities, even though the source of the information was kept secret. However, news media have been criticized as being reluctant to critically question government strategies and information during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Tokyo Olympics and the Fukushima triple disaster. Powerful advertising agencies such as Dentsu are thought to have influenced reporting on the Olympics and nuclear power, using their large advertising budgets (NYT 2021; Honma 2012).
Although the high concentration of media ownership is detrimental to pluralism, the gradual decline in traditional media, and growing popularity of foreign and digital media has created opportunities for non-mainstream sources of information. However, this has also made it easier for extremist, mainly nationalist, stances to penetrate the public discourse. In the absence of any law prohibiting the promotion of radical views, xenophobic or historical revisionist content is widely available in books and other print publications.
Citations:
Dooley, Ben, and Hisako Ueno. 2021. “The Invisible Hand Behind the Tokyo Olympics.” New York Times, July 23. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/business/tokyo-olympics-dentsu.html
Honma, Ryu. “Dentsû to genpatsu hôdô – kyodai kôkoku-nushi to ôte kôkoku dairiten ni yoru media shihai no shikumi” [Dentsu and nuclear power plant coverage: How giant advertisers and major advertising agencies control the media]. Tokyo: Aki Shobou.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. 1950. “The Broadcast Act.” https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/Resources/laws/pdf/090204_5.pdf
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “Japan.” https://rsf.org/en/country/japan
Sawa, Yasuomi, and Reiko Saisho. 2023. “Japan.” Reuters Institute, June 14. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023/japan
Dooley, Ben, and Hisako Ueno. 2021. “The Invisible Hand Behind the Tokyo Olympics.” New York Times, July 23. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/business/tokyo-olympics-dentsu.html
Honma, Ryu. “Dentsû to genpatsu hôdô – kyodai kôkoku-nushi to ôte kôkoku dairiten ni yoru media shihai no shikumi” [Dentsu and nuclear power plant coverage: How giant advertisers and major advertising agencies control the media]. Tokyo: Aki Shobou.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. 1950. “The Broadcast Act.” https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/Resources/laws/pdf/090204_5.pdf
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “Japan.” https://rsf.org/en/country/japan
Sawa, Yasuomi, and Reiko Saisho. 2023. “Japan.” Reuters Institute, June 14. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023/japan
New Zealand
Concerns about New Zealand’s media pluralism, particularly due to high levels of media ownership concentration, have persisted for years (e.g., JMAD 2022; Reporters Without Borders 2023). In the TV segment, competition is mainly between Television New Zealand (TVNZ) – which, despite being publicly owned, operates on a commercial basis – and two international media giants, the U.S.-owned MediaWorks and Australian-owned Sky. Media pluralism faced further threats when MediaWorks sold its Three network, as well as the news and current affairs element under the Newshub banner, to U.S. media company Discovery in 2020. Despite the sale, the news and current affairs programming remained intact (Jennings 2021). In the commercial radio market, MediaWorks and New Zealand Media and Entertainment (NZME) dominate, while publicly owned and non-commercial Radio New Zealand serves as a third player with a loyal audience. In the newspaper and magazine publishing industry, a near-duopoly exists where the market is split between NZME and Stuff. NZME owns the leading daily newspaper, the New Zealand Herald, while Stuff controls the country’s second- and third-highest circulation daily newspapers, The Dominion Post and The Press. Stuff, one of New Zealand’s largest media companies, was sold by its parent company, Nine Entertainment, for $1 to its chief executive, former journalist Sinead Boucher. This deal ended years of speculation about the company’s ownership after lengthy attempts by NZME to buy the company were blocked by the Commerce Commission, which had received submissions from various concerned groups and networks in civil society. Several online media outlets provide alternative sources of news and information (e.g., The Spinoff, Newsroom and The Guardian New Zealand). These outlets have fewer readers than the major news outlets but offer critical and evidence-informed analyses that are often picked up by the main broadcasting actors noted above.
The problem of media pluralism was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, which cost approximately 700 jobs in the sector. For example, the New Zealand Herald laid off 200 staff in 2020, while magazine giant Bauer – publisher of The Listener and the Women’s Weekly – was even forced to close down. The government announced a $50 million aid package; however, this was met with widespread derision by the industry (in comparison, the racing industry received a $72.5 million emergency support package) (Roy 2020).
In early 2023, the Labour administration under Chris Hipkins scrapped its plans to merge TVNZ and RNZ. This decision was welcomed by commercial media outlets, which had feared that the merger would have given the combined entity too much dominance. At the same time, the government announced that RNZ would receive an extra $26 million a year, partly to develop a new digital platform (Pullar-Strecker 2023).
The problem of media pluralism was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, which cost approximately 700 jobs in the sector. For example, the New Zealand Herald laid off 200 staff in 2020, while magazine giant Bauer – publisher of The Listener and the Women’s Weekly – was even forced to close down. The government announced a $50 million aid package; however, this was met with widespread derision by the industry (in comparison, the racing industry received a $72.5 million emergency support package) (Roy 2020).
In early 2023, the Labour administration under Chris Hipkins scrapped its plans to merge TVNZ and RNZ. This decision was welcomed by commercial media outlets, which had feared that the merger would have given the combined entity too much dominance. At the same time, the government announced that RNZ would receive an extra $26 million a year, partly to develop a new digital platform (Pullar-Strecker 2023).
Citations:
JMAD. 2022. “Aotearoa New Zealand Media Ownership 2022.” https://www.jmadresearch.com/_files/ugd/a95e86_131d36c434db480fbbb90e84ed430b14.pdf
Pullar-Strecker, T. 2023. “More than $16m Spent on TVNZ/RNZ Merger Before it Was Called Off.” Stuff, February 8. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/131175405/more-than-16m-spent-on-tvnzrnz-merger-before-it-was-called-off
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “New Zealand.” https://rsf.org/en/country/new-zealand
Roy, E. A. 2020. “New Zealand to Give $50m to Help Ailing Media Groups During Covid-19 Crisis.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/23/new-zealand-to-give-50m-to-help-ailing-media-groups-during-covid-19-crisis
JMAD. 2022. “Aotearoa New Zealand Media Ownership 2022.” https://www.jmadresearch.com/_files/ugd/a95e86_131d36c434db480fbbb90e84ed430b14.pdf
Pullar-Strecker, T. 2023. “More than $16m Spent on TVNZ/RNZ Merger Before it Was Called Off.” Stuff, February 8. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/131175405/more-than-16m-spent-on-tvnzrnz-merger-before-it-was-called-off
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “New Zealand.” https://rsf.org/en/country/new-zealand
Roy, E. A. 2020. “New Zealand to Give $50m to Help Ailing Media Groups During Covid-19 Crisis.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/23/new-zealand-to-give-50m-to-help-ailing-media-groups-during-covid-19-crisis
Slovenia
Media pluralism in Slovenia is governed by the Mass Media Act, which allocates state funds to ensure pluralism, democracy, and freedom of expression. However, the small media market is marked by significant ownership concentration, often with unclear agendas favoring certain parties. Notably, outlets like Nova24TV and publications like Demokracija and Škandal24 tend to support one party (SDS) while criticizing others. Conversely, Necenzurirano.si leans toward center-left parties. Additionally, customer-friendly media are owned by Hungarian investors linked to the government, raising concerns about geopolitical influence.
The European Commission and Media Pluralism Report have highlighted challenges to media freedom, particularly in market plurality, political independence, and social inclusion. The Agency for Communications Networks and Services regulates the electronic communications market but faces criticism for not addressing ownership accumulation, leading to content homogeneity across outlets.
To address these issues, the Ministry of Culture proposed a new media law in December 2023 to enhance transparency in public funding usage, improve ownership disclosure, and bolster media pluralism. The law is slated for parliamentary discussion in April 2024.
The European Commission and Media Pluralism Report have highlighted challenges to media freedom, particularly in market plurality, political independence, and social inclusion. The Agency for Communications Networks and Services regulates the electronic communications market but faces criticism for not addressing ownership accumulation, leading to content homogeneity across outlets.
To address these issues, the Ministry of Culture proposed a new media law in December 2023 to enhance transparency in public funding usage, improve ownership disclosure, and bolster media pluralism. The law is slated for parliamentary discussion in April 2024.
Citations:
Simona Rogelj. 2023. “V razpravi o medijih v Sloveniji opozorila o koncentriranju lastništva in nezadostnem financiranju.” MMC RTV SLO, July 9. https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/v-razpravi-o-medijih-v-sloveniji-opozorila-o-koncentriranju-lastnistva-in-nezadostnem-financiranju/674571
Marko Milosavljevic and Romana Biljak Gerjevic. 2021. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Slovenia. European University Institute. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74705
Simona Rogelj. 2023. “V razpravi o medijih v Sloveniji opozorila o koncentriranju lastništva in nezadostnem financiranju.” MMC RTV SLO, July 9. https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/v-razpravi-o-medijih-v-sloveniji-opozorila-o-koncentriranju-lastnistva-in-nezadostnem-financiranju/674571
Marko Milosavljevic and Romana Biljak Gerjevic. 2021. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Slovenia. European University Institute. https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/74705
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
Australia
Australia’s technologically advanced media system presents contrasting agendas and positions on many policy questions. However, heavy concentration in the media market poses significant obstacles to representing all relevant political perspectives. The influential public broadcasters, ABC and SBS, contribute significantly to the diversity of the media landscape. ABC raises and explores issues of general interest without advancing a partisan view, while SBS provides distinctive programming appealing to niche and minority interests based on taste, culture, or language.
A critical weakness in the media system is the heavy market concentration of the newspaper industry. News Corp controls nearly 60% of the market by circulation, raising concerns about its influence on elite politicians, political discourse, and access opportunities for other media outlets. Influential political actors, such as former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, have called for measures to diversify media ownership.
In 2021, the government implemented a news media mandatory bargaining code requiring digital platforms, especially Google and Facebook, to pay news media companies for content they link to or display (ACMA 2022). This promotes media plurality by increasing the viability of a broader number of news media outlets. However, critics argue that the code does little for small and regional news media operators (Fisher et al. 2021). The value of payments from Google and Facebook under the code remains unknown due to confidentiality agreements.
A critical weakness in the media system is the heavy market concentration of the newspaper industry. News Corp controls nearly 60% of the market by circulation, raising concerns about its influence on elite politicians, political discourse, and access opportunities for other media outlets. Influential political actors, such as former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, have called for measures to diversify media ownership.
In 2021, the government implemented a news media mandatory bargaining code requiring digital platforms, especially Google and Facebook, to pay news media companies for content they link to or display (ACMA 2022). This promotes media plurality by increasing the viability of a broader number of news media outlets. However, critics argue that the code does little for small and regional news media operators (Fisher et al. 2021). The value of payments from Google and Facebook under the code remains unknown due to confidentiality agreements.
Citations:
ACMA. 2022. “News Media Bargaining Code.” Australian Communications and Media Authority. https://www.acma.gov.au/news-media-bargaining-code
Fisher, C., McCallum, K., and Park, K. 2021. “Is the News Media Bargaining Code Fit for Purpose?” The Conversation https://theconversation.com/is-the-news-media-bargaining-code-fit-for-purpose-172224
ACMA. 2022. “News Media Bargaining Code.” Australian Communications and Media Authority. https://www.acma.gov.au/news-media-bargaining-code
Fisher, C., McCallum, K., and Park, K. 2021. “Is the News Media Bargaining Code Fit for Purpose?” The Conversation https://theconversation.com/is-the-news-media-bargaining-code-fit-for-purpose-172224
Poland
Media plurality in Poland is legally protected under the Press Law and other regulations. However, the Media Pluralism Report rates Poland’s media plurality at just 50%, a lower figure than in other Central and East European countries except for Hungary (Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom 2023). This low ranking is partly due to a media landscape divided between public and private broadcasters – both domestically and foreign-owned – with strong political polarization between the government and opposition influencing the most significant players.
Foreign investors such as the U.S.-based Discovery (owner of TVN), the Swiss-German Ringier/Axel Springer and the German Bauer have a notable presence, a fact that drew criticism from the governing PiS party as it advocated for the “repolonization” of Polish media. An early but unsuccessful attempt in this area was the 2021 “Lex TVN” law, which aimed to prevent owners outside the European Economic Area from holding more than 50% of a broadcaster’s shares. Further efforts included nationalizing and centralizing media assets by state-controlled entities like PKN Orlen, which acquired the largest regional media company, Polska Press, from the German Passauer Neue and the major press distributor RUCH. This consolidation led to national control over 90% of regional media and the replacement of independent editors-in-chief.
The use of abusive litigation and financial penalties has been a key strategy to weaken critical media and encourage self-censorship. The business environment has been destabilized by delays in granting licenses to private broadcasters like TVN and Radio Tok FM, and private media have been excluded from state advertising revenue programs. Print media, already struggling to transition to digital formats, faced significant financial strain.
Local media in particular faced financial and distribution challenges and legal threats. Despite this, the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKIK) did not intervene in the significant consolidation of the local newspaper market.
However, UOKIK did block Agora’s (owner of Gazeta Wyborcza) acquisition of Radio Eurozet in 2021, citing concerns about the creation of a harmful duopoly in the radio market. In 2023, Agora successfully appealed this decision, challenging the lack of a legal definition of “duopoly” (Media Freedom Rapid Response 2023).
Currently, no public authority is empowered to assess market concentration in the press sector regarding media pluralism, a fact that has raised concerns from the Commissioner for Human Rights.
Foreign investors such as the U.S.-based Discovery (owner of TVN), the Swiss-German Ringier/Axel Springer and the German Bauer have a notable presence, a fact that drew criticism from the governing PiS party as it advocated for the “repolonization” of Polish media. An early but unsuccessful attempt in this area was the 2021 “Lex TVN” law, which aimed to prevent owners outside the European Economic Area from holding more than 50% of a broadcaster’s shares. Further efforts included nationalizing and centralizing media assets by state-controlled entities like PKN Orlen, which acquired the largest regional media company, Polska Press, from the German Passauer Neue and the major press distributor RUCH. This consolidation led to national control over 90% of regional media and the replacement of independent editors-in-chief.
The use of abusive litigation and financial penalties has been a key strategy to weaken critical media and encourage self-censorship. The business environment has been destabilized by delays in granting licenses to private broadcasters like TVN and Radio Tok FM, and private media have been excluded from state advertising revenue programs. Print media, already struggling to transition to digital formats, faced significant financial strain.
Local media in particular faced financial and distribution challenges and legal threats. Despite this, the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKIK) did not intervene in the significant consolidation of the local newspaper market.
However, UOKIK did block Agora’s (owner of Gazeta Wyborcza) acquisition of Radio Eurozet in 2021, citing concerns about the creation of a harmful duopoly in the radio market. In 2023, Agora successfully appealed this decision, challenging the lack of a legal definition of “duopoly” (Media Freedom Rapid Response 2023).
Currently, no public authority is empowered to assess market concentration in the press sector regarding media pluralism, a fact that has raised concerns from the Commissioner for Human Rights.
Citations:
Media Freedom Rapid Response. 2023. “Media Freedom at a Crossroads: Journalism in Poland Faces Uncertain Future Ahead of Election.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/media-freedom-at-a-crossroads-journalism-in-poland-faces-uncertain-future-ahead-of-election
Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. 2023. “Media Pluralism Report 2023.” https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor-2023/
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
Media Freedom Rapid Response. 2023. “Media Freedom at a Crossroads: Journalism in Poland Faces Uncertain Future Ahead of Election.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/media-freedom-at-a-crossroads-journalism-in-poland-faces-uncertain-future-ahead-of-election
Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. 2023. “Media Pluralism Report 2023.” https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor-2023/
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
4
Hungary
The competition of opinions in Hungary is distorted. The regulatory agency is not independent but is de facto bound to the government’s political will. Even the competition agency, long a beacon of Hungarian democracy and market economy, has become ineffective in combating the concentration of the media landscape. In June 2020, the Constitutional Court upheld a controversial 2018 government decree that prevented the Hungarian Competition Authority from examining the centralization of leadership and financing of about 500 media outlets under the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), a pro-government media conglomerate. Media surveillance by the responsible authority, the Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH), is criticized as biased. The head of the agency serves an extensively long nine-year term and also heads the Media Council, an institution criticized for lacking proper controls. The Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom of the Robert Schuman Center, in its 2022 report, ranks the risks for Hungary as “high” (66%). Biased reporting by pro-government outlets and public media primarily affects older and rural residents with lower education levels. At the same time, some of the most-visited news sites operate independently and reach large segments of urban young and middle-aged readers who consume little legacy media.
According to Eurostat data, 87% of the population regularly reads news on the internet (Hungary Today 2022). Online media remain plural, and some of the highest-quality independent outlets have shifted toward subscription-based models, alleviating their dependence on advertising income. Recognizing the challenges of reaching online populations, the governing party has increased its spending on social media, partly by outsourcing its campaign messages to a social media agency called Megafon that distributes content on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and TikTok.
According to Eurostat data, 87% of the population regularly reads news on the internet (Hungary Today 2022). Online media remain plural, and some of the highest-quality independent outlets have shifted toward subscription-based models, alleviating their dependence on advertising income. Recognizing the challenges of reaching online populations, the governing party has increased its spending on social media, partly by outsourcing its campaign messages to a social media agency called Megafon that distributes content on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and TikTok.
Citations:
Hungary Today. 2022. “Hungarians Are Hooked on Online News.” 26 August. https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarians-are-hooked-on-online-news/
Hungary Today. 2022. “Hungarians Are Hooked on Online News.” 26 August. https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarians-are-hooked-on-online-news/
3
---
---
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
---
---
1
---
---