Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
10
Norway
According to the Norwegian constitution, the government must have the support of a majority of members of parliament. Any initiative from opposition parties to investigate government actions would require a parliamentary majority, as there is no institutionalized right for a minority to take action. If an allegation of misconduct is raised by the opposition but not followed up by the government, the case would likely attract the interest of the media and independent agencies. However, for the opposition to impact the government, it would need to secure a majority vote in parliament. Given the fragmentation of the Norwegian party system and the reliance on party coalitions, any proposal to investigate alleged unconstitutional activities will most likely secure a majority in parliament.
Sweden
Oversight and legislative investigations are conducted by the Parliamentary Committee for Constitutional Affairs (KU). Any member of parliament can initiate an investigation by petitioning the committee. This holds true both de jure and de facto. KU includes members of all political parties in proportion to the seats they hold in parliament. Furthermore, the current chair belongs to the Social Democrats, a party currently in the opposition.
A vote of no confidence can be initiated by any party, as long as 35 members of parliament support it. For a vote of confidence to pass, a simple majority of 175 MPs is required. The Riksdag has voted on this issue 14 times in total (Sveriges Riksdag 2024).
In 2021 an unprecedented vote took place, partly demonstrating the increasing power of the radical right Sweden Democrats in Swedish politics. The Sweden Democrats initiated a vote of no confidence against the then Social Democratic Prime Minister Stefan Löfven. The vote passed for the first time in Sweden’s history, with 181 for, 51 against, 51 abstaining, and 8 MPs absent (Sveriges Riksdag 2024). This event threw the government into turmoil since what is common practice in countries such as the UK or Greece – snap elections – is never done in Sweden. They are not unconstitutional, as in Norway, but they are not part of the normally stable Swedish political environment.
The result of the vote of no confidence was the Social Democrat Margareta Andersson replacing Stefan Löfven, leading a largely caretaker government until the 2022 elections. In those elections, the social democratic coalition lost to the right-wing alliance led by the Moderate Party.
A vote of no confidence can be initiated by any party, as long as 35 members of parliament support it. For a vote of confidence to pass, a simple majority of 175 MPs is required. The Riksdag has voted on this issue 14 times in total (Sveriges Riksdag 2024).
In 2021 an unprecedented vote took place, partly demonstrating the increasing power of the radical right Sweden Democrats in Swedish politics. The Sweden Democrats initiated a vote of no confidence against the then Social Democratic Prime Minister Stefan Löfven. The vote passed for the first time in Sweden’s history, with 181 for, 51 against, 51 abstaining, and 8 MPs absent (Sveriges Riksdag 2024). This event threw the government into turmoil since what is common practice in countries such as the UK or Greece – snap elections – is never done in Sweden. They are not unconstitutional, as in Norway, but they are not part of the normally stable Swedish political environment.
The result of the vote of no confidence was the Social Democrat Margareta Andersson replacing Stefan Löfven, leading a largely caretaker government until the 2022 elections. In those elections, the social democratic coalition lost to the right-wing alliance led by the Moderate Party.
Citations:
Sveriges Riksdag. 2024. “Misstroendeförklaring.” https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/sa-fungerar-riksdagen/riksdagens-uppgifter/kontrollerar-regeringen/#misstroendeforklaring-60
Sveriges Riksdag. 2024. “Misstroendeförklaring.” https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/sa-fungerar-riksdagen/riksdagens-uppgifter/kontrollerar-regeringen/#misstroendeforklaring-60
9
Austria
Since 2008, the creation of investigatory committees has been a minority right, allowing the opposition or any quarter of MPs in the Nationalrat to launch a parliamentary inquiry. In Austria, such inquiries have not only provided a showdown opportunity between government and opposition parties, but have also served as an arena for agreeing on political reforms considered desirable by all major parties.
However, the committees’ power became particularly evident in 2021 when Chancellor Kurz’s alleged false testimony to the Ibiza Investigative Committee led to his resignation shortly thereafter. In some of the literature, the Austrian system has been hailed as a role model for other parliamentary democracies, although without any comparative assessment (see Keppel 2023).
Actual proceedings in investigatory committees are often inefficient, as many questions go unanswered. The opposition has suggested that providing TV time for such committees might improve outcomes. However, even in its current format, investigation activities can lead to an unfavorable decision or report. The seriousness of the procedure was underscored by the conviction of Chancellor Kurz, who received an eight-month suspended sentence from a Vienna criminal court in February 2024 for making false statements to a parliamentary inquiry into alleged corruption in his first government.
However, the committees’ power became particularly evident in 2021 when Chancellor Kurz’s alleged false testimony to the Ibiza Investigative Committee led to his resignation shortly thereafter. In some of the literature, the Austrian system has been hailed as a role model for other parliamentary democracies, although without any comparative assessment (see Keppel 2023).
Actual proceedings in investigatory committees are often inefficient, as many questions go unanswered. The opposition has suggested that providing TV time for such committees might improve outcomes. However, even in its current format, investigation activities can lead to an unfavorable decision or report. The seriousness of the procedure was underscored by the conviction of Chancellor Kurz, who received an eight-month suspended sentence from a Vienna criminal court in February 2024 for making false statements to a parliamentary inquiry into alleged corruption in his first government.
Citations:
Pilgermair, Walter, eds. 2023. Parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschuss: Praxis und Perspektiven. Vienna: Verlag Österreich.
Keppel, Matthias. 2023. “Political Control and Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry: Strengthening the Quality of Democracy.” Journal of the Knowledge Economy 14 (2): 1298-1320.
Pilgermair, Walter, eds. 2023. Parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschuss: Praxis und Perspektiven. Vienna: Verlag Österreich.
Keppel, Matthias. 2023. “Political Control and Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry: Strengthening the Quality of Democracy.” Journal of the Knowledge Economy 14 (2): 1298-1320.
Belgium
Except during the COVID-19 crisis, when emergency measures tested constitutional rights, the government cannot overstep its constitutional powers without being challenged and corrected by the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat), federate entities, or opposition members in parliament. The Council of State investigates all such requests with complete independence from the government coalition. However, mistakes or unlawful behavior do not necessarily lead to the fall of the government or the responsible minister.
Denmark
The Danish parliament has several instruments by which to hold individual ministers and the government accountable. First, parliament can give a minister a warning if it finds that the minister has not provided correct or sufficient information to parliament (Ministeransvarsloven). Parliament can also express a vote of no confidence in a minister. If the vote passes, the minister has to resign. It is very rare for a minister to face such a vote, because ministers typically resign if it is clear that there is a majority behind any such motion of distrust. Finally, parliament can express a lack of confidence in the prime minister, and consequently the government. If such a motion passes, the government has to resign, although it does not necessarily mean that an election will be called. In recent history, the small minority government led by the Liberal Party resigned in 1975 because the Social Democratic Party proposed a vote of no confidence. The government resigned before the vote. Parliament can also impeach a minister. Impeachment processes have to be backed by a majority in parliament. The impeachment process is headed by the president of the Supreme Court and can include up to 15 Supreme Court judges and an equal number of members appointed by parties in parliament. Impeachments are very rare, but in 2021, Inger Støjberg was convicted and sentenced to 60 days in prison because she unlawfully separated immigrant couples. These instruments are based in the Danish constitution and the Ministerial Accountability Act (Ministeransvarlighedsloven).
Parliament has other instruments it can use. In 2021, a law was passed giving parliament the right to initiate a “granskningskommision.” This type of commission is chaired by a judge from the High Court and must report its findings within 12 months. The commission is formulated by parliament and is independent of the Ministry of Justice.
This type of investigation was recently used in a case against Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, investigating whether she knowingly ordered all minks euthanized despite the lack of a clear mandate for such action in the law. Commissions of this type cannot express a verdict; only parliament can do that. This instrument is based on the Act on Commissions of Inquiry Lov om Undersøgelseskommisioner)
Parliament has other instruments it can use. In 2021, a law was passed giving parliament the right to initiate a “granskningskommision.” This type of commission is chaired by a judge from the High Court and must report its findings within 12 months. The commission is formulated by parliament and is independent of the Ministry of Justice.
This type of investigation was recently used in a case against Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, investigating whether she knowingly ordered all minks euthanized despite the lack of a clear mandate for such action in the law. Commissions of this type cannot express a verdict; only parliament can do that. This instrument is based on the Act on Commissions of Inquiry Lov om Undersøgelseskommisioner)
Citations:
Grundloven. https://www.ft.dk/da/dokumenter/bestil-publikationer/publikationer/grundloven/danmarks-riges-grundlov
Lov om undersøgelseskommissioner. 1999. https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/1999/357
Ministeransvarlighedsloven. 1964. https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/1964/117
Grundloven. https://www.ft.dk/da/dokumenter/bestil-publikationer/publikationer/grundloven/danmarks-riges-grundlov
Lov om undersøgelseskommissioner. 1999. https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/1999/357
Ministeransvarlighedsloven. 1964. https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/1964/117
Switzerland
Legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch. Both houses of parliament are “responsible for the overall supervision of the activities of the Federal Council, the federal administration, the federal courts and other federal bodies. In order to fulfill this supervisory duty, it can set up a PUK (parliamentary commission of enquiry) if incidents of major significance need to be clarified. … It is important to note that a PUK is neither a criminal court nor a disciplinary authority. It is set up in the form of a simple federal decree. This decision is initiated by means of a parliamentary initiative by a member of the Council or a parliamentary group or a committee initiative. It is set up after consultation with the Federal Council” (Federal Assembly 2024). These commissions in some cases arrive at conclusions which are highly critical of the government. For example, a commission examining problems with the national pension fund in 1995 concluded: “The main responsibility for the debacle at the [pension fund] lies with the former head of the [finance ministry] and the two former directors of the [relevant administration]” (Federal Assembly 2024).
Unfavorable investigation outcomes are likely to have consequences within the federal administration. However, given the logic of coalition building in Switzerland (the government coalition does not result from the outcome of an election; rather it is a “historical” compromise between the major parties) and the quasi-presidential position of the government (it does not depend on the support of a parliamentary majority once it is elected at the beginning of the legislative term), it is not very likely that a governing party will be forced to leave the government or that a member of the government will feel pressure to step down.
Unfavorable investigation outcomes are likely to have consequences within the federal administration. However, given the logic of coalition building in Switzerland (the government coalition does not result from the outcome of an election; rather it is a “historical” compromise between the major parties) and the quasi-presidential position of the government (it does not depend on the support of a parliamentary majority once it is elected at the beginning of the legislative term), it is not very likely that a governing party will be forced to leave the government or that a member of the government will feel pressure to step down.
Citations:
Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung). 2024. “Parlamentarische Untersuchungskommissionen PUK.” https://www.parlament.ch/de/organe/kommissionen/aufsichtskommissionen/parlamentarische-untersuchungskommissionen-puk
Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung). 2024. “Parlamentarische Untersuchungskommissionen PUK.” https://www.parlament.ch/de/organe/kommissionen/aufsichtskommissionen/parlamentarische-untersuchungskommissionen-puk
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
8
Finland
In Finland, ordinary legislative committees lack the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch. This authority is granted only to the police. Consequently, opposition parties cannot initiate investigative functions within the legislature against the will of the governing party or coalition. There is no constitutional court in Finland. However, opposition parties can initiate a motion of no confidence (interpellation) against the cabinet of ministers or an individual member of the cabinet. The Constitutional Committee in the parliament can investigate and decide if a member of the cabinet should be prosecuted for a criminal offense relating to actions taken as a minister (Eduskunta 2024).
Citations:
Eduskunta. 2024. https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/naineduskuntatoimii/kirjasto/tietopalvelulta-kysyttya/Sivut/milloin-valtioneuvoston-jasenen-virkatoimen-lainmukaisuuden-tutkinnassa.aspx?TSPD_101_R0=0814c91602ab20009fec0f35c979adef1afc2303c7f99019bc123a6d2aaf453d3d6af92b419aa1fa081bd2d2a51430004698c15da9fa331ac9e167862742dafa09df52ca9fa964c5ef1141250393f51e0d06d5345792ed6bfb76ffd631dc17b0
Eduskunta. 2024. https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/naineduskuntatoimii/kirjasto/tietopalvelulta-kysyttya/Sivut/milloin-valtioneuvoston-jasenen-virkatoimen-lainmukaisuuden-tutkinnassa.aspx?TSPD_101_R0=0814c91602ab20009fec0f35c979adef1afc2303c7f99019bc123a6d2aaf453d3d6af92b419aa1fa081bd2d2a51430004698c15da9fa331ac9e167862742dafa09df52ca9fa964c5ef1141250393f51e0d06d5345792ed6bfb76ffd631dc17b0
Germany
As previously mentioned, parliamentary committees exercise oversight of the government. Specifically, committees of inquiry function to investigate possible misconduct by the executive branch. A committee must be set up at the request of at least one-quarter of the members of parliament, regardless of their party (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d). Thus, the opposition can, in principle, initiate the setup of a committee of inquiry, even against the will of the governing coalition. As of 2020, around three-quarters of the 46 committees of inquiry set up since 1949 were based on a request from the opposition (Knelagen, 2021).
Nonetheless, in July 2023, a committee of inquiry requested by the CDU to examine the CumEx Scandal was denied by the governing coalition on the premise that the issue was not within the government’s competence. It was argued that, as a federal committee of inquiry can only examine misconduct covered by the government’s competence, the committee would be unconstitutional. However, Article 44 of the Basic Law does not stipulate that a committee of inquiry can only deal with issues covered by the government’s competence. Moreover, this was the first time in the Federal Republic’s history that a majority denied a committee of inquiry despite at least 25% of members of parliament demanding it. The CDU filed a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court (Kohnert and Kornmeier, 2023).
Regarding the actual capacity of committees to investigate unconstitutional or illegal government activities, the V-Dem index (2023) estimates that it is nearly certain the legislature would conduct an investigation resulting in an unfavorable decision or report to the executive if the executive were engaged in unconstitutional or illegal activity.
As committees of inquiry are primarily an instrument of parliamentary control designed to hold the government accountable, the outcomes of such investigations do not necessarily have severe consequences for the government. Depending on the extent of an investigation’s success, its outcome can have political consequences, such as damaging the reputation of government members or leading to changes in policy content. Additionally, the outcome can have legal consequences if illegal actions are uncovered. However, the impact of an investigation largely depends on two factors: whether the committee can expose illegal or unconstitutional activities and the amount of media attention the investigation receives, which creates additional public pressure on the government (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010).
Nonetheless, in July 2023, a committee of inquiry requested by the CDU to examine the CumEx Scandal was denied by the governing coalition on the premise that the issue was not within the government’s competence. It was argued that, as a federal committee of inquiry can only examine misconduct covered by the government’s competence, the committee would be unconstitutional. However, Article 44 of the Basic Law does not stipulate that a committee of inquiry can only deal with issues covered by the government’s competence. Moreover, this was the first time in the Federal Republic’s history that a majority denied a committee of inquiry despite at least 25% of members of parliament demanding it. The CDU filed a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court (Kohnert and Kornmeier, 2023).
Regarding the actual capacity of committees to investigate unconstitutional or illegal government activities, the V-Dem index (2023) estimates that it is nearly certain the legislature would conduct an investigation resulting in an unfavorable decision or report to the executive if the executive were engaged in unconstitutional or illegal activity.
As committees of inquiry are primarily an instrument of parliamentary control designed to hold the government accountable, the outcomes of such investigations do not necessarily have severe consequences for the government. Depending on the extent of an investigation’s success, its outcome can have political consequences, such as damaging the reputation of government members or leading to changes in policy content. Additionally, the outcome can have legal consequences if illegal actions are uncovered. However, the impact of an investigation largely depends on two factors: whether the committee can expose illegal or unconstitutional activities and the amount of media attention the investigation receives, which creates additional public pressure on the government (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010).
Citations:
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Untersuchungsausschuss.” https://www.bundestag.de/services/glossar/glossar/U/unters_aussch-245546
Deutscher Bundestag. 2010. “Das schärfste Schwer der Opposition.” https://www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/textarchiv/2010/29580373_untersuchungsausschuesse-201648
Knelagen, W. 2021. “Untersuchungsausschüsse.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/511480/untersuchungsausschuesse/
Kohnert, N., Kornmeier, C. 2023. “Union treibt Scholz mit Klage vor sich her.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/union-scholz-warburg-cumex-100.html
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Untersuchungsausschuss.” https://www.bundestag.de/services/glossar/glossar/U/unters_aussch-245546
Deutscher Bundestag. 2010. “Das schärfste Schwer der Opposition.” https://www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/textarchiv/2010/29580373_untersuchungsausschuesse-201648
Knelagen, W. 2021. “Untersuchungsausschüsse.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/511480/untersuchungsausschuesse/
Kohnert, N., Kornmeier, C. 2023. “Union treibt Scholz mit Klage vor sich her.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/union-scholz-warburg-cumex-100.html
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph
Greece
Historically, the ability to initiate legislative investigations depended heavily on the support of the parliamentary majority. However, a constitutional reform in 2019 changed this dynamic. The constitution now allows for the establishment of investigative committees by a two-fifths vote of all MPs (100 out of 300), enabling opposition parties to form such committees without the consent of the majority.
For example, in August 2022, the opposition initiated a parliamentary committee to investigate the wiretapping of journalists and politicians, and in November 2023, they launched another committee to investigate the causes of a major railway accident in February 2023. While the government majority did not support the first committee, it consented to the formation of the second.
These investigative committees can produce reports unfavorable to the government, although they cannot initiate criminal investigations against ministers. Such criminal investigations require a different type of committee, which must be established by an absolute majority of MPs (151 out of 300).
For example, in August 2022, the opposition initiated a parliamentary committee to investigate the wiretapping of journalists and politicians, and in November 2023, they launched another committee to investigate the causes of a major railway accident in February 2023. While the government majority did not support the first committee, it consented to the formation of the second.
These investigative committees can produce reports unfavorable to the government, although they cannot initiate criminal investigations against ministers. Such criminal investigations require a different type of committee, which must be established by an absolute majority of MPs (151 out of 300).
Citations:
The constitution provides for the launch of investigative committees, even without the consent of the parliamentary majority (article 68 paragraph 2).
The constitution does not allow the launch of a committee to investigate criminal liability of a minister, without the consent of the absolute majority of all MPs (article 86 paragraph 3).
The constitution provides for the launch of investigative committees, even without the consent of the parliamentary majority (article 68 paragraph 2).
The constitution does not allow the launch of a committee to investigate criminal liability of a minister, without the consent of the absolute majority of all MPs (article 86 paragraph 3).
Italy
In addition to the Standing Committees, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate may form special investigative committees, with membership reflecting the strength of parliamentary groups. Article 82 of the Italian constitution regulates these committees, which can be established ad hoc to conduct investigations and research on public interest matters, possessing the same powers and limitations as the judiciary. Their activities include missions and inspections, ministerial hearings, report approvals, conference organization, and thorough research and documentation.
Committees of inquiry can be unicameral or bicameral. Unicameral committees require a resolution from either the Chamber or the Senate for their establishment. Bicameral committees, composed of deputies and senators, must be established by law. In both cases, the opposition often finds it challenging to set up a committee of inquiry without agreement from the governing majority. The constitutive act outlines the purposes, composition, powers and limitations, secrecy regulations, internal organization, and budget ceiling for each committee of inquiry.
During the 18th legislature (2018–2022), 126 bills were introduced to establish bicameral commissions of inquiry, but only five were approved (OpenPolis). Between the start of the 19th legislature (September 2022) and December 2023, 78 bills were introduced for bicameral investigative committees, with three approved.
A parliamentary committee of inquiry into the management of the health emergency caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the measures taken to address it is currently being approved. The bill has passed the Senate and awaits debate in the chamber. Some observers suggest this committee aims to serve as propaganda and retaliation against former prime ministers Conte and Draghi by the new center-right majority, which has criticized mandatory mass vaccinations and pandemic-related movement restrictions.
In general, the work of these committees could benefit from greater transparency, as monitoring their activities is often difficult.
Committees of inquiry can be unicameral or bicameral. Unicameral committees require a resolution from either the Chamber or the Senate for their establishment. Bicameral committees, composed of deputies and senators, must be established by law. In both cases, the opposition often finds it challenging to set up a committee of inquiry without agreement from the governing majority. The constitutive act outlines the purposes, composition, powers and limitations, secrecy regulations, internal organization, and budget ceiling for each committee of inquiry.
During the 18th legislature (2018–2022), 126 bills were introduced to establish bicameral commissions of inquiry, but only five were approved (OpenPolis). Between the start of the 19th legislature (September 2022) and December 2023, 78 bills were introduced for bicameral investigative committees, with three approved.
A parliamentary committee of inquiry into the management of the health emergency caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the measures taken to address it is currently being approved. The bill has passed the Senate and awaits debate in the chamber. Some observers suggest this committee aims to serve as propaganda and retaliation against former prime ministers Conte and Draghi by the new center-right majority, which has criticized mandatory mass vaccinations and pandemic-related movement restrictions.
In general, the work of these committees could benefit from greater transparency, as monitoring their activities is often difficult.
Citations:
OpenPolis. https://www.openpolis.it/parole/cosa-cosa-fanno-le-commissioni-dinchiesta
OpenPolis. https://www.openpolis.it/parole/cosa-cosa-fanno-le-commissioni-dinchiesta
Lithuania
The legislature is generally able to exercise its investigative function. As the 2004 impeachment of President Rolandas Paksas illustrated, the Seimas can make political decisions once sufficient evidence of unconstitutional activities by the executive is presented.
However, investigations of suspected illegal activities are mostly used for political purposes to attract media attention and create additional opportunities for criticizing the governing coalition and its decisions. They rarely lead to substantive policy changes or resignations. For example, in September 2022 the opposition initiated a motion for resignation against Minister of Energy Dainius Kreivys over alleged mishandling of the energy crisis and the reform of electricity market rules. At the end of 2022, another interpellation was initiated by the opposition against the minister of foreign affairs and the head of the main coalition party Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, Gabrielius Landsbergis, over controversial foreign policy decisions. Both of these motions failed when it came to the final vote on forcing the resignation of the ministers because the opposition did not have enough votes in the Seimas, and majority governing coalitions tend to defend their ministers during such votes.
Disagreements between opposition parties can sometimes complicate investigative actions. For example, in November 2022, the opposition’s attempt to establish a temporary commission to investigate the activities of Interior Minister Agnė Bilotaitė failed at the initial stage. This failure occurred not only because ruling coalition parties voted against it but also because some members of the opposition parties abstained from voting.
However, investigations of suspected illegal activities are mostly used for political purposes to attract media attention and create additional opportunities for criticizing the governing coalition and its decisions. They rarely lead to substantive policy changes or resignations. For example, in September 2022 the opposition initiated a motion for resignation against Minister of Energy Dainius Kreivys over alleged mishandling of the energy crisis and the reform of electricity market rules. At the end of 2022, another interpellation was initiated by the opposition against the minister of foreign affairs and the head of the main coalition party Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, Gabrielius Landsbergis, over controversial foreign policy decisions. Both of these motions failed when it came to the final vote on forcing the resignation of the ministers because the opposition did not have enough votes in the Seimas, and majority governing coalitions tend to defend their ministers during such votes.
Disagreements between opposition parties can sometimes complicate investigative actions. For example, in November 2022, the opposition’s attempt to establish a temporary commission to investigate the activities of Interior Minister Agnė Bilotaitė failed at the initial stage. This failure occurred not only because ruling coalition parties voted against it but also because some members of the opposition parties abstained from voting.
New Zealand
In New Zealand’s Parliament, both “subject” and “specialist” committees have the capacity to investigate potentially illegal or unethical activities carried out by the executive branch. To perform this function, committees can summon government officials, experts or relevant individuals to provide testimony and produce documents related to the inquiry. Committees may suggest corrective actions to address any identified illegal or unethical activities; they cannot make binding legal judgments.
In 2023, Transport Minister Michael Wood and Education Minister Jan Tinetti were investigated by the Privileges Committee for not declaring shares in Auckland Airport (Neilson and Coughlan 2023) and for failing to correct a false statement in Parliament (Coughlan 2023), respectively. The former figure subsequently lost his cabinet role, and later lost his safe Labour seat in the 2023 election.
In 2023, Transport Minister Michael Wood and Education Minister Jan Tinetti were investigated by the Privileges Committee for not declaring shares in Auckland Airport (Neilson and Coughlan 2023) and for failing to correct a false statement in Parliament (Coughlan 2023), respectively. The former figure subsequently lost his cabinet role, and later lost his safe Labour seat in the 2023 election.
Citations:
Coughlan, T. 2023. “Jan Tinetti referred to Privileges Committee for possible contempt.” New Zealand Herald, 30 May. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/jan-tinetti-referred-to-privileges-committee-for-possible-contempt/VFNJBGV3YVHYLCIKHON4DWCAFY/
Neilson, M., and Coughlan, T. 2023. “Embattled MP Michael Wood Referred to Privileges Committee After Report Finds He ‘Cast a Shadow’ Over MPs’ Declarations.” New Zealand Herald, July 18. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/embattled-labour-mps-kiri-allan-and-michael-wood-return-to-parliament/UUBJLWLCTFAFVPGXAYC6ZO3FYY/
Coughlan, T. 2023. “Jan Tinetti referred to Privileges Committee for possible contempt.” New Zealand Herald, 30 May. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/jan-tinetti-referred-to-privileges-committee-for-possible-contempt/VFNJBGV3YVHYLCIKHON4DWCAFY/
Neilson, M., and Coughlan, T. 2023. “Embattled MP Michael Wood Referred to Privileges Committee After Report Finds He ‘Cast a Shadow’ Over MPs’ Declarations.” New Zealand Herald, July 18. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/politics/embattled-labour-mps-kiri-allan-and-michael-wood-return-to-parliament/UUBJLWLCTFAFVPGXAYC6ZO3FYY/
Portugal
Opposition parties can effectively initiate investigative processes by forming ad hoc parliamentary committees of inquiry. These committees are unique because they lack a predetermined role. According to procedural rules, the primary task of each new ad hoc committee is to define its purpose and competencies. This is a crucial aspect, as it requires political parties to negotiate to determine the committee’s objectives. The outcome of these negotiations can significantly influence the committee’s effectiveness and the results it achieves.
Over the past decade, ad hoc committees have become increasingly prominent and impactful in the legislative sphere (Fernandes 2016). Research suggests that these committees are indispensable for oversight by Portuguese political parties, as they are typically established with the express goal of ensuring compliance with constitutional mandates and conducting thorough examinations of various aspects of government and administrative actions (Fernandes and Riera 2019). This underscores the critical role of ad hoc committees in fostering accountability and transparency within the legislative process.
During the evaluated period, the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the Political Control of TAP (Portuguese Airlines) Management exemplified such an initiative. This committee’s primary focus was examining the government’s oversight of TAP’s management. However, the final report produced by this committee was met with controversy. It garnered approval solely through the absolute majority vote of the PS (Socialist Party), prompting criticism from opposition parties. The opposition condemned the report as an insufficient and incomplete evaluation of the situation, alleging it to be an attempt to shield the government from accountability regarding TAP’s management practices.
Over the past decade, ad hoc committees have become increasingly prominent and impactful in the legislative sphere (Fernandes 2016). Research suggests that these committees are indispensable for oversight by Portuguese political parties, as they are typically established with the express goal of ensuring compliance with constitutional mandates and conducting thorough examinations of various aspects of government and administrative actions (Fernandes and Riera 2019). This underscores the critical role of ad hoc committees in fostering accountability and transparency within the legislative process.
During the evaluated period, the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the Political Control of TAP (Portuguese Airlines) Management exemplified such an initiative. This committee’s primary focus was examining the government’s oversight of TAP’s management. However, the final report produced by this committee was met with controversy. It garnered approval solely through the absolute majority vote of the PS (Socialist Party), prompting criticism from opposition parties. The opposition condemned the report as an insufficient and incomplete evaluation of the situation, alleging it to be an attempt to shield the government from accountability regarding TAP’s management practices.
Citations:
Assembleia da República. n.d. “Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito à Tutela Política da Gestão da TAP.” https://www.parlamento.pt/sites/COM/XVLeg/CPITAP/Paginas/Relatorio-da-Comissao.aspx
Fernandes, J., and P. Riera. 2019. “Committee systems in Portugal and Spain.” In Fernandes, J., and C. Leston-Bandeira, eds., The Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
Fernandes, J. 2016. “Intra-party Delegation in the Portuguese Legislature: Assigning Committee Chairs and Party Coordination Positions.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 22 (1): 108–128.
Regimento da Assembleia da República n.º 1/2020, de 31 de Agosto. https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/RegimentoAR_Simples.pdf
Assembleia da República. n.d. “Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito à Tutela Política da Gestão da TAP.” https://www.parlamento.pt/sites/COM/XVLeg/CPITAP/Paginas/Relatorio-da-Comissao.aspx
Fernandes, J., and P. Riera. 2019. “Committee systems in Portugal and Spain.” In Fernandes, J., and C. Leston-Bandeira, eds., The Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
Fernandes, J. 2016. “Intra-party Delegation in the Portuguese Legislature: Assigning Committee Chairs and Party Coordination Positions.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 22 (1): 108–128.
Regimento da Assembleia da República n.º 1/2020, de 31 de Agosto. https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/RegimentoAR_Simples.pdf
Slovenia
The National Assembly may order an investigation into matters of public importance and appoint a commission of inquiry. The constitution, the Law on Parliamentary Investigation, and the Rules of Procedure for Parliamentary Investigation determine its role, status, and powers. Once the inquiry is completed, a commission may draw up a final report and submit it to the Assembly for presentation and discussion at a plenary session.
Commission meetings are generally open to the public, allowing them to exert some form of political and public pressure. A commission can also propose that the Assembly adopt a resolution on the political responsibility of officeholders or request the competent authorities to propose a legislative amendment in a specific area. Several such commissions have been set up in each legislative period since 1992, totaling 38. The highest number of such commissions was in the 2008 – 2011 and 2018 – 2022 legislative periods, each with seven committees of inquiry. Nonetheless, only 12 reports prepared by commissions were adopted by the National Assembly.
From June 2022 to January 2024, three commissions of inquiry were formed; the opposition requested one, which an opposition member of parliament also chairs.
In general, it is common for the opposition to call for establishing such commissions. As many have observed, the outcome rarely has important consequences for the government. The commissions often serve the political agenda and the election campaign. Therefore, many are highly politicized and misused for campaign purposes or discrediting.
Commission meetings are generally open to the public, allowing them to exert some form of political and public pressure. A commission can also propose that the Assembly adopt a resolution on the political responsibility of officeholders or request the competent authorities to propose a legislative amendment in a specific area. Several such commissions have been set up in each legislative period since 1992, totaling 38. The highest number of such commissions was in the 2008 – 2011 and 2018 – 2022 legislative periods, each with seven committees of inquiry. Nonetheless, only 12 reports prepared by commissions were adopted by the National Assembly.
From June 2022 to January 2024, three commissions of inquiry were formed; the opposition requested one, which an opposition member of parliament also chairs.
In general, it is common for the opposition to call for establishing such commissions. As many have observed, the outcome rarely has important consequences for the government. The commissions often serve the political agenda and the election campaign. Therefore, many are highly politicized and misused for campaign purposes or discrediting.
Citations:
Državni zbor. 2024. “Vprašanja novinarjev in odgovori nanje.” https://www.dz rs.si/wps/portal/Home/is/PogostaVprasanja
RTVSLO. 2022. “Rok Snežič: Kot podjetnik nimam kaj odgovarjati parlamentarni komisiji.” https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/rok-snezic-kot-podjetnik-nimam-kaj-odgovarjati-parlamentarni-komisiji/610175
Državni zbor. 2024. “Vprašanja novinarjev in odgovori nanje.” https://www.dz rs.si/wps/portal/Home/is/PogostaVprasanja
RTVSLO. 2022. “Rok Snežič: Kot podjetnik nimam kaj odgovarjati parlamentarni komisiji.” https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/rok-snezic-kot-podjetnik-nimam-kaj-odgovarjati-parlamentarni-komisiji/610175
Spain
Opposition parties can initiate investigations within the legislature against the governing party’s will. According to the standing order of Congress, the Plenary of Congress – at the proposal of the government, the Bureau, two Parliamentary Groups, or one-fifth of the members of the House – may agree to set up a Commission of Inquiry into any matter of public interest. Those summoned by a committee of inquiry must comply or face serious disobedience charges.
During the 2019-2023 legislative period, several Commissions of Investigation were established, requiring appearances from the former prime minister and ministers. In the current legislative term beginning in August 2023, the opposition party Esquerra Republicans, supported by Bildu and BNG, registered several commissions, including one to investigate alleged Pegasus spying in Congress. The agreement between the Socialist Party and Junts per Catalunya in November 2023 includes creating commissions to investigate lawfare related to the Catalonia conflict. However, judges are “independent, irremovable, accountable, and subject only to the rule of law,” according to Article 117.1 of the constitution.
Commissions of Inquiry address legislative defects or monitor government actions, serving as political control instruments with significant media impact. However, their scope is limited as their conclusions are not binding, and decisions need not be based on their findings. Partisan organization of conclusions can undermine overall coherence, and findings should be reported to the Prosecutor’s Office for further action.
During the 2019-2023 legislative period, several Commissions of Investigation were established, requiring appearances from the former prime minister and ministers. In the current legislative term beginning in August 2023, the opposition party Esquerra Republicans, supported by Bildu and BNG, registered several commissions, including one to investigate alleged Pegasus spying in Congress. The agreement between the Socialist Party and Junts per Catalunya in November 2023 includes creating commissions to investigate lawfare related to the Catalonia conflict. However, judges are “independent, irremovable, accountable, and subject only to the rule of law,” according to Article 117.1 of the constitution.
Commissions of Inquiry address legislative defects or monitor government actions, serving as political control instruments with significant media impact. However, their scope is limited as their conclusions are not binding, and decisions need not be based on their findings. Partisan organization of conclusions can undermine overall coherence, and findings should be reported to the Prosecutor’s Office for further action.
Citations:
El Pais. 2022. “Congress Ratifies That Rajoy Was Politically Responsible for ‘Operation Kitchen’.” https://elpais.com/espana/2022-02-03/el-congreso-ratifica-que-rajoy-fue-el-responsable-politico-de-la-operacion-kitchen.html
El Pais. 2022. “Congress Ratifies That Rajoy Was Politically Responsible for ‘Operation Kitchen’.” https://elpais.com/espana/2022-02-03/el-congreso-ratifica-que-rajoy-fue-el-responsable-politico-de-la-operacion-kitchen.html
UK
Opposition parties can initiate investigations, but the usual channel is through select committee inquiries. These committees typically have a government majority, but they value their independence. If the government tries to block an inquiry or influence it by whipping members, it would likely face a backlash. In some recent high-profile cases, particularly concerning privileges, committees have conducted inquiries against the government’s wishes and published reports critical of the individuals investigated.
Two notable examples are the inquiry into Owen Paterson, a former minister, who was found to have taken money from private companies (not against the rules) and lobbied ministers on their behalf (which is against the rules). When then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson tried to persuade Parliament not to enforce the committee’s proposed sanctions, Parliament overruled his request. Subsequently, Johnson himself was investigated for misleading Parliament and was found to have done so. In this case, Parliament voted overwhelmingly to approve the sanctions.
Investigations requiring more resources or independence from political parties are typically conducted through independent statutory inquiries, such as the UK COVID-19 inquiry.
Two notable examples are the inquiry into Owen Paterson, a former minister, who was found to have taken money from private companies (not against the rules) and lobbied ministers on their behalf (which is against the rules). When then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson tried to persuade Parliament not to enforce the committee’s proposed sanctions, Parliament overruled his request. Subsequently, Johnson himself was investigated for misleading Parliament and was found to have done so. In this case, Parliament voted overwhelmingly to approve the sanctions.
Investigations requiring more resources or independence from political parties are typically conducted through independent statutory inquiries, such as the UK COVID-19 inquiry.
7
Australia
Parliamentary committees have considerable powers to call witnesses and demand documents. They are often well-resourced, enabling them to conduct in-depth probes of government action. A structural weakness is the executive’s control over the appointment of chairs for key accountability committees. Governments can subtly influence the work of these committees, even though they are meant to be formally independent. For instance, the private office of then-premier of Victoria, Daniel Andrews, was accused of pressuring Labor members to curtail potentially embarrassing hearings of the Integrity and Oversight Committee in the Legislative Assembly (Love 2022). Moreover, just as important as its capacity to exert influence in the legislature is the government’s considerably autonomy regarding its response to investigative/committee findings that are critical of the government or its proposals.
Citations:
Love, S. 2022. “Daniel Andrews’ Private Office Accused of Directing Labor MPs While They Were on an Independent Parliamentary Committee.” Sky News October 5. https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/politics/daniel-andrews-private-office-accused-of-directing-labor-mps-while-they-were-on-an-independent-parliamentary-committee/news-story/f9658a5c55e7ca7d3c6294711ab0ee84
Love, S. 2022. “Daniel Andrews’ Private Office Accused of Directing Labor MPs While They Were on an Independent Parliamentary Committee.” Sky News October 5. https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/politics/daniel-andrews-private-office-accused-of-directing-labor-mps-while-they-were-on-an-independent-parliamentary-committee/news-story/f9658a5c55e7ca7d3c6294711ab0ee84
Ireland
Opposition parties in the Irish legislature can initiate investigations against the will of the governing party or coalition, particularly when they control and chair parliamentary committees. However, the most significant inquiry, the 2014 Banking Inquiry, revealed that despite directing issues of public controversy and policy fiasco toward such inquiries, the houses of the Oireachtas lack the competence, capacity and resources to effectively conduct them. After the 2008 banking and financial crisis, dissatisfaction with parliamentary committees’ ability to establish personal liability led to an attempted constitutional amendment in 2011 to increase their investigative powers, which ultimately failed.
In general, it is unlikely that investigative activities would result in an unfavorable decision or report, as this could have major consequences for the government, potentially leading to its dissolution. However, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), always chaired by an opposition party member, is considered particularly effective in its investigative role. Recently, even committees chaired by government backbench representatives have proven effective. An example is the 2023 parliamentary investigation of the national broadcaster, RTÉ, conducted by several committees, including the PAC. Nonetheless, investigations can be less effective when the government controls the committees.
In general, it is unlikely that investigative activities would result in an unfavorable decision or report, as this could have major consequences for the government, potentially leading to its dissolution. However, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), always chaired by an opposition party member, is considered particularly effective in its investigative role. Recently, even committees chaired by government backbench representatives have proven effective. An example is the 2023 parliamentary investigation of the national broadcaster, RTÉ, conducted by several committees, including the PAC. Nonetheless, investigations can be less effective when the government controls the committees.
Citations:
Connaughton, B. 2021. Committees and the Legislature: Policy Analysis in Ireland. Bristol: Policy Press.
Connaughton, B. 2021. Committees and the Legislature: Policy Analysis in Ireland. Bristol: Policy Press.
Latvia
The Saeima can establish a parliamentary committee of inquiry if requested by at least one-third of members of parliament. Parliamentary committees of inquiry have the power to request information, invite public officials to their meetings, and order audits.
According to the Law on Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry, these committees will cease to function on the eighth day after the final report has been examined at a meeting of the Saeima unless the Saeima decides otherwise. After the final report is published, the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee sends the proposals for eliminating the identified shortcomings mentioned in the final report to the committees of the Saeima, the Cabinet of Ministers, ministries or the institution of a public person responsible for implementing the relevant proposals.
The authorities mentioned in the final report must review its findings and determine the necessary measures to rectify the identified deficiencies. However, no subsequent report is required to assess whether these recommendations have been implemented, nor is an explanation required if the suggestions are not adopted within a specific timeframe. Consequently, it is not always possible to observe the actual impact of parliamentary investigation on policymaking.
There is a trend that parliamentary committees are established on controversial and politically sensitive issues. On April 8, 2022, a parliamentary committee of inquiry was set up, following an application from 36 members of parliament, to investigate possible government misconduct during the Covid-19 pandemic. The committee consisted of eight members and held 25 sittings. A parliamentary committee of inquiry was also established in 2023. It examined the adverse effects of a restructuring of the financial sector, linked to efforts to strengthen state supervision, on the country’s financial and capital market system. Additionally, the committee investigated the possible insolvency of PNB Bank, the circumstances of the forced self-liquidation of ABLV Bank, and the suspension of Baltic International Bank.
According to the Law on Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry, these committees will cease to function on the eighth day after the final report has been examined at a meeting of the Saeima unless the Saeima decides otherwise. After the final report is published, the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee sends the proposals for eliminating the identified shortcomings mentioned in the final report to the committees of the Saeima, the Cabinet of Ministers, ministries or the institution of a public person responsible for implementing the relevant proposals.
The authorities mentioned in the final report must review its findings and determine the necessary measures to rectify the identified deficiencies. However, no subsequent report is required to assess whether these recommendations have been implemented, nor is an explanation required if the suggestions are not adopted within a specific timeframe. Consequently, it is not always possible to observe the actual impact of parliamentary investigation on policymaking.
There is a trend that parliamentary committees are established on controversial and politically sensitive issues. On April 8, 2022, a parliamentary committee of inquiry was set up, following an application from 36 members of parliament, to investigate possible government misconduct during the Covid-19 pandemic. The committee consisted of eight members and held 25 sittings. A parliamentary committee of inquiry was also established in 2023. It examined the adverse effects of a restructuring of the financial sector, linked to efforts to strengthen state supervision, on the country’s financial and capital market system. Additionally, the committee investigated the possible insolvency of PNB Bank, the circumstances of the forced self-liquidation of ABLV Bank, and the suspension of Baltic International Bank.
Citations:
Saeima. 2003. Parlamentārās izmeklēšanas komisiju likums. https://likumi.lv/ta/id/75140-parlamentaras-izmeklesanas-komisiju-likums
Saeima. 2023. “Saeimas gada pārskats 2022. gads.” https://www.saeima.lv/files/PP/Saeimasgadaparskats2022.pdf
Vīlipa-Folka, D., Kincis, J., and Līcīte, M. 2023. “Izveido parlamentārās izmeklēšanas komisiju par finanšu sektora ‘kapitāla remonta’ sekām.” https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/izveido-parlamentaras-izmeklesanas-komisiju-par-finansu-sektora-kapitala-remonta-sekam.a494147/
Saeima. 2003. Parlamentārās izmeklēšanas komisiju likums. https://likumi.lv/ta/id/75140-parlamentaras-izmeklesanas-komisiju-likums
Saeima. 2023. “Saeimas gada pārskats 2022. gads.” https://www.saeima.lv/files/PP/Saeimasgadaparskats2022.pdf
Vīlipa-Folka, D., Kincis, J., and Līcīte, M. 2023. “Izveido parlamentārās izmeklēšanas komisiju par finanšu sektora ‘kapitāla remonta’ sekām.” https://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/izveido-parlamentaras-izmeklesanas-komisiju-par-finansu-sektora-kapitala-remonta-sekam.a494147/
Netherlands
Legislative investigations in the Netherlands can be highly effective and are even capable of bringing down an entire government. For instance, the Kok government fell due to a NIOD investigation into the role of Dutchbat during the Srebrenica massacre, and the Rutte III cabinet resigned following a parliamentary investigation into the childcare benefit scandal. However, initiating legislative investigations requires a parliamentary majority, meaning that opposition parties cannot launch such investigations on their own. This dependency on majority support is one reason why the role of the second chamber itself – and specifically its demand for a stringent anti-fraud law – often goes undiscussed.
Parliamentary inquiries in the Netherlands aim to investigate and improve political decision-making, policy implementation and government spending. The Dutch parliament has recognized its inadequacy in performing legislative and oversight tasks due to the small size of the second chamber (150 members) and political fragmentation into as many as 20 factions or more. The complexity of the work and parliamentarians’ reluctance to delve deeply into policy issues further exacerbate these challenges. Most of the effort during parliamentary inquiries involves examining documentation and conducting interviews with involved parties, tasks typically performed by officials and specialized researchers. The most visible and consequential part of these inquiries are the public hearings conducted by the Inquiry Committee, which focus on reconstructing decision-making processes and uncovering the truth. While most individuals questioned during these hearings do not face direct consequences, some (former) government officials have been held personally responsible and have resigned. The enduring impact of parliamentary inquiries lies not in political accountability but in substantive recommendations that lead to significant adjustments in government policy and regulations. Since the first modern parliamentary inquiry in 1984, inquiries have led to important changes in various areas. Research has shown that the most substantial learning occurs when inquiries focus on the legality and legal certainty for citizens and other actors, emphasizing long-term implications rather than the short-term fate of individual officials or politicians.
Political complications have arisen in the case of approved parliamentary investigations into the government’s COVID-19 policies and the Groningen gas exploitation and earthquake problem. Major political parties have been reluctant to provide commission members, likely due to political polarization. These parties fear that opposition groups such as PVV and Forum for Democracy, which have sided with demonstrators and conspiracy theorists during past anti-pandemic-policy demonstrations, will use these investigations to showcase their political convictions.
Parliamentary inquiries in the Netherlands aim to investigate and improve political decision-making, policy implementation and government spending. The Dutch parliament has recognized its inadequacy in performing legislative and oversight tasks due to the small size of the second chamber (150 members) and political fragmentation into as many as 20 factions or more. The complexity of the work and parliamentarians’ reluctance to delve deeply into policy issues further exacerbate these challenges. Most of the effort during parliamentary inquiries involves examining documentation and conducting interviews with involved parties, tasks typically performed by officials and specialized researchers. The most visible and consequential part of these inquiries are the public hearings conducted by the Inquiry Committee, which focus on reconstructing decision-making processes and uncovering the truth. While most individuals questioned during these hearings do not face direct consequences, some (former) government officials have been held personally responsible and have resigned. The enduring impact of parliamentary inquiries lies not in political accountability but in substantive recommendations that lead to significant adjustments in government policy and regulations. Since the first modern parliamentary inquiry in 1984, inquiries have led to important changes in various areas. Research has shown that the most substantial learning occurs when inquiries focus on the legality and legal certainty for citizens and other actors, emphasizing long-term implications rather than the short-term fate of individual officials or politicians.
Political complications have arisen in the case of approved parliamentary investigations into the government’s COVID-19 policies and the Groningen gas exploitation and earthquake problem. Major political parties have been reluctant to provide commission members, likely due to political polarization. These parties fear that opposition groups such as PVV and Forum for Democracy, which have sided with demonstrators and conspiracy theorists during past anti-pandemic-policy demonstrations, will use these investigations to showcase their political convictions.
Citations:
NRC-H. 2023. “Bruno Bruins: ‘Niets kon Kamer of kabinetten weerhouden van het doorzetten van het hardvochtige fraudebeleid’.” September 15.
NRC. 2023. “De parlementaire enquête naar het coronabeleid komt er nu niet, en misschien nooit.” June 27.
Wolffram, D. J. 2021. “Enquêtes: gaat de Kamer ten onder?” De Hofvijver 12 (134).
https://www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/9394000/1/j9vvllwqvzjxdyx/vlwkjbb869ss ?pk_campaign=hofv-2209&pk_kwd=vlwkjbb869ss
Tinnevelt, R., Jansen, R., and van Emmerik, M. 2023. De weerbare democratische rechtsstaat.
Straalen, L. V. 2023. De Parlementaire Enquête: het kan nog steeds. Master’s thesis, Leiden Universiteit.
NRC-H. 2023. “Bruno Bruins: ‘Niets kon Kamer of kabinetten weerhouden van het doorzetten van het hardvochtige fraudebeleid’.” September 15.
NRC. 2023. “De parlementaire enquête naar het coronabeleid komt er nu niet, en misschien nooit.” June 27.
Wolffram, D. J. 2021. “Enquêtes: gaat de Kamer ten onder?” De Hofvijver 12 (134).
https://www.montesquieu-instituut.nl/9394000/1/j9vvllwqvzjxdyx/vlwkjbb869ss ?pk_campaign=hofv-2209&pk_kwd=vlwkjbb869ss
Tinnevelt, R., Jansen, R., and van Emmerik, M. 2023. De weerbare democratische rechtsstaat.
Straalen, L. V. 2023. De Parlementaire Enquête: het kan nog steeds. Master’s thesis, Leiden Universiteit.
6
Czechia
The opposition can initiate investigations. Forty MPs are needed to propose a new investigative commission, the formation of which is then voted on in the full parliament. Twenty-three commissions were established from 1993 to 2021, but none since then. These commissions usually relate to long-running scandals, such as privatization cases in the 1990s and the allocation of procurement contracts since then.
The nature of Czech politics – with multiple parties represented in parliament and coalition governments that are not fully united – has meant that issues potentially embarrassing to government ministers can be subjects of investigation. A notable case continuing into the review period involved pollution of the Bečva River in Moravia. The worst incident occurred on September 20, 2020, when cyanide was released into the river, leading to the death of 40 metric tons of fish along 40 km of the river. There was suspicion that the issue was not being properly investigated, while a highly plausible culprit, a firm owned by Babiš, was not at the center of investigations.
The parliamentary commission was not aimed at finding the guilty party but rather at determining whether public agencies had conducted the investigation properly. It concluded that the investigation was not handled correctly. A final court decision on January 30, 2023, blamed a different firm but found no criminal offense. Several expert witnesses to the commission publicly expressed their astonishment at the verdict and the apparent lack of police investigation into other possibilities. Thus, in this case, the parliamentary commission could highlight the possibility of serious irregularities but could not influence or overrule a court’s decision.
The nature of Czech politics – with multiple parties represented in parliament and coalition governments that are not fully united – has meant that issues potentially embarrassing to government ministers can be subjects of investigation. A notable case continuing into the review period involved pollution of the Bečva River in Moravia. The worst incident occurred on September 20, 2020, when cyanide was released into the river, leading to the death of 40 metric tons of fish along 40 km of the river. There was suspicion that the issue was not being properly investigated, while a highly plausible culprit, a firm owned by Babiš, was not at the center of investigations.
The parliamentary commission was not aimed at finding the guilty party but rather at determining whether public agencies had conducted the investigation properly. It concluded that the investigation was not handled correctly. A final court decision on January 30, 2023, blamed a different firm but found no criminal offense. Several expert witnesses to the commission publicly expressed their astonishment at the verdict and the apparent lack of police investigation into other possibilities. Thus, in this case, the parliamentary commission could highlight the possibility of serious irregularities but could not influence or overrule a court’s decision.
Citations:
https://www.psp.cz/sqw/hp.sqw?k=8400&o=8
https://www.psp.cz/sqw/hp.sqw?k=8400&o=8
France
The right to initiate investigations exists, but the executive has historically had the ability to evade the scrutiny of unwanted commissions. Since 2009 – following the constitutional amendment of 2008 – the opposition has had the right to form one investigative commission (“Commission d’enquête”) per year in the lower house. In the upper house, each group can nominate a commission every year.
These commissions have to fulfill a certain number of conditions detailed in the internal rules of the two chambers. In particular, such a commission must not interfere with judicial investigations, which usually means that a commission is not created after a judicial process is initiated, or is dismantled within six months of this time. The commission can have up to 30 members whose political affiliation must mirror the share of parliamentary groups in the plenary.
Commissions have the right to summon ministers and can call upon the Court of Auditors to assist them. In principle, noncompliance or refusal to appear may lead to fines and other judicial sanctions. This is very rare, however.
While these commissions undeniably have power, it is worth mentioning that several major issues in the past few years, such as the handling of the yellow vest crisis or the pandemic, did not lead to the initiation of investigative committees. Moreover, the general impression is that the principle of noninterference with judicial investigations – in the name of the separation of powers – ultimately prevents the creation of investigative committees on the issues with the most political importance. For the same reasons, the effects of these committees, which regularly produce lengthy reports, are rather minor, and they are very rarely critical of government action. Interestingly, the last serious study of these committees is more than 20 years old (Vallet 2003).
These commissions have to fulfill a certain number of conditions detailed in the internal rules of the two chambers. In particular, such a commission must not interfere with judicial investigations, which usually means that a commission is not created after a judicial process is initiated, or is dismantled within six months of this time. The commission can have up to 30 members whose political affiliation must mirror the share of parliamentary groups in the plenary.
Commissions have the right to summon ministers and can call upon the Court of Auditors to assist them. In principle, noncompliance or refusal to appear may lead to fines and other judicial sanctions. This is very rare, however.
While these commissions undeniably have power, it is worth mentioning that several major issues in the past few years, such as the handling of the yellow vest crisis or the pandemic, did not lead to the initiation of investigative committees. Moreover, the general impression is that the principle of noninterference with judicial investigations – in the name of the separation of powers – ultimately prevents the creation of investigative committees on the issues with the most political importance. For the same reasons, the effects of these committees, which regularly produce lengthy reports, are rather minor, and they are very rarely critical of government action. Interestingly, the last serious study of these committees is more than 20 years old (Vallet 2003).
Citations:
VALLET, Élisabeth. 2003. “Les commissions d’enquête parlementaires sous la Cinquième République.” Revue française de droit constitutionnel 2003 (2): 249-278.
VALLET, Élisabeth. 2003. “Les commissions d’enquête parlementaires sous la Cinquième République.” Revue française de droit constitutionnel 2003 (2): 249-278.
USA
Congress has the power to remove any executive branch official for treason, bribery, or other “high crimes and misdemeanors.” This last category of offense is undefined and gives the legislative branch, in theory, wide discretion to investigate and prosecute members of the executive branch (Gerhardt 2024).
In practice, however, the impeachment power is rarely exercised. Only eight individuals have been successfully convicted and removed from office by the Senate. All of these were judges, not members of the executive branch. The threat of impeachment, however, has occasionally driven executive branch officials to resign. President Richard Nixon resigned from office in 1974 rather than be convicted by the Senate, as he expected. William Belknap, the Secretary of War, resigned in anticipation of being impeached in 1876 over his corrupt dealings with Native American trading posts.
The threshold for a successful removal is quite high – two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. It is almost unheard of for a single political party to enjoy that kind of strength in the Senate. Thus, impeachments must be bipartisan to be successful. Because they are deeply embarrassing for the party affected, there is rarely such widespread support.
There is a serious issue at the presidential level because it is generally accepted that presidents cannot be tried for criminal offenses while in office. For them to face penalties for crimes committed as president, they must first be impeached and removed from office. In practice, this means presidents can evade consequences for crimes as long as one-third of the Senate is willing to back them up, which is a troubling state of affairs (Howell and Moe 2023).
In practice, however, the impeachment power is rarely exercised. Only eight individuals have been successfully convicted and removed from office by the Senate. All of these were judges, not members of the executive branch. The threat of impeachment, however, has occasionally driven executive branch officials to resign. President Richard Nixon resigned from office in 1974 rather than be convicted by the Senate, as he expected. William Belknap, the Secretary of War, resigned in anticipation of being impeached in 1876 over his corrupt dealings with Native American trading posts.
The threshold for a successful removal is quite high – two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. It is almost unheard of for a single political party to enjoy that kind of strength in the Senate. Thus, impeachments must be bipartisan to be successful. Because they are deeply embarrassing for the party affected, there is rarely such widespread support.
There is a serious issue at the presidential level because it is generally accepted that presidents cannot be tried for criminal offenses while in office. For them to face penalties for crimes committed as president, they must first be impeached and removed from office. In practice, this means presidents can evade consequences for crimes as long as one-third of the Senate is willing to back them up, which is a troubling state of affairs (Howell and Moe 2023).
Citations:
Michael Gerhardt. 2024. The Law of Presidential Impeachment. New York: NYU Press.
William Howell and Terry Moe. 2023. “The Strongman Presidency and the Two Logics of Presidential Power.” Presidential Studies Quarterly.
Michael Gerhardt. 2024. The Law of Presidential Impeachment. New York: NYU Press.
William Howell and Terry Moe. 2023. “The Strongman Presidency and the Two Logics of Presidential Power.” Presidential Studies Quarterly.
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
5
Canada
In majority situations, the government controls committee and parliamentary agendas and can block any inquiries it wishes.
In Canada, parliamentary and legislative committees are dominated by the government and provide some scrutiny but rarely criticize the government.
In the Canadian version of Westminster government, legislative committees should play a crucial role in scrutinizing government actions, policies, and legislation. While committees were originally intended to operate independently, the government – typically formed by the majority party or coalition in the legislature – can exert influence over committees in various ways (Savoie 1999).
The majority party or coalition in the legislature typically maintains a dominant position in committee assignments. Members of the majority party chair committees, and their members typically outnumber those from opposition parties. This structural advantage impacts the committee’s agenda and decisions. By controlling these leadership positions, the government can shape the direction and priorities of the committee’s work. Governments strategically place members on committees who are more likely to support government positions.
Party whips play a role in ensuring party discipline, and they use their influence to guide committee members to align with the party’s position. Members may be expected to adhere to party policy and vote in a manner consistent with the government’s preferences.
The government also controls access to the information, resources, and expert advice that committees may require to carry out their work effectively. Limited access to information can hinder a committee’s ability to scrutinize government actions independently. While committees have the authority to set their own agendas, the government may attempt to influence the topics and issues they take up. This can be done through informal channels, discussions with committee leaders, or public statements expressing government priorities.
The government also has the ability to influence committee proceedings by suggesting or providing witnesses for committee hearings or refusing to do so. This impacts the information presented to the committee and shapes the narrative around government policies. The scheduling of committee meetings is also influenced by the government.
Committees often produce reports with recommendations or findings. The government has the opportunity to respond to these reports – or not – and the tone and substance of the government’s response influence the public, media, and legislative perception and impact of the committee’s work.
Members of legislative committees enjoy parliamentary privilege, protecting them from legal consequences for statements made during committee proceedings. However, concerns about party discipline or potential repercussions can influence committee members’ willingness to openly challenge government positions.
Committee members, particularly those from opposition parties, often strive to scrutinize government actions, policies, and legislation but may not be able to do so.
These dynamics between the government and legislative committees can be complex, but in general, committees have limited abilities to investigate governments.
In Canada, parliamentary and legislative committees are dominated by the government and provide some scrutiny but rarely criticize the government.
In the Canadian version of Westminster government, legislative committees should play a crucial role in scrutinizing government actions, policies, and legislation. While committees were originally intended to operate independently, the government – typically formed by the majority party or coalition in the legislature – can exert influence over committees in various ways (Savoie 1999).
The majority party or coalition in the legislature typically maintains a dominant position in committee assignments. Members of the majority party chair committees, and their members typically outnumber those from opposition parties. This structural advantage impacts the committee’s agenda and decisions. By controlling these leadership positions, the government can shape the direction and priorities of the committee’s work. Governments strategically place members on committees who are more likely to support government positions.
Party whips play a role in ensuring party discipline, and they use their influence to guide committee members to align with the party’s position. Members may be expected to adhere to party policy and vote in a manner consistent with the government’s preferences.
The government also controls access to the information, resources, and expert advice that committees may require to carry out their work effectively. Limited access to information can hinder a committee’s ability to scrutinize government actions independently. While committees have the authority to set their own agendas, the government may attempt to influence the topics and issues they take up. This can be done through informal channels, discussions with committee leaders, or public statements expressing government priorities.
The government also has the ability to influence committee proceedings by suggesting or providing witnesses for committee hearings or refusing to do so. This impacts the information presented to the committee and shapes the narrative around government policies. The scheduling of committee meetings is also influenced by the government.
Committees often produce reports with recommendations or findings. The government has the opportunity to respond to these reports – or not – and the tone and substance of the government’s response influence the public, media, and legislative perception and impact of the committee’s work.
Members of legislative committees enjoy parliamentary privilege, protecting them from legal consequences for statements made during committee proceedings. However, concerns about party discipline or potential repercussions can influence committee members’ willingness to openly challenge government positions.
Committee members, particularly those from opposition parties, often strive to scrutinize government actions, policies, and legislation but may not be able to do so.
These dynamics between the government and legislative committees can be complex, but in general, committees have limited abilities to investigate governments.
Citations:
Savoie, Donald J. 1999. “The Rise of Court Government in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 32 (4): 635–64.
Savoie, Donald J. 1999. “The Rise of Court Government in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 32 (4): 635–64.
Israel
The Knesset has the authority to establish a parliamentary inquiry committee. To do so, a majority in the plenum is required. This makes it difficult for the opposition to establish such a committee.
Even if such a committee is established, the law does not define its legal mandate. Therefore, parliamentary inquiry committees lack the authority to compel witnesses to appear before the committee and their powers are similar to those of a regular parliamentary committee. Over the years, several dozen such committees have been formed. However, while the respective reports were often critical of the government, the recommendations were rarely implemented.
Even if such a committee is established, the law does not define its legal mandate. Therefore, parliamentary inquiry committees lack the authority to compel witnesses to appear before the committee and their powers are similar to those of a regular parliamentary committee. Over the years, several dozen such committees have been formed. However, while the respective reports were often critical of the government, the recommendations were rarely implemented.
4
Japan
According to the constitution, each house may conduct investigations related to the government, summon witnesses and demand records. However, under the Diet Law, the cabinet may refuse to submit the requested reports and records if it declares that such an act would be severely detrimental to the national interest.
It is unlikely that the opposition parties will initiate an investigation into the government’s mishandling of issues. Summoning witnesses is possible only if the ruling parties agree to investigate a scandal under popular pressure or if the opposition parties hold a majority in the upper house. Moreover, the approval of two-thirds of committee members is needed to charge a witness with violating the law by refusing to testify or perjury, which is almost impossible to achieve without cooperation from the ruling parties. Special committees for investigating particular scandals are rarely established and witnesses are usually summoned by the budget committees of both houses. The last time a witness was summoned before the parliament was in 2018, when Ministry of Finance officials concealed documents related to Prime Minister Abe’s involvement in the Moritomo Gakuen scandal, which concerned the purchase of land by a private school in Osaka at a reduced price. The investigation led to a temporary decrease in the popularity of the government.
It is unlikely that the opposition parties will initiate an investigation into the government’s mishandling of issues. Summoning witnesses is possible only if the ruling parties agree to investigate a scandal under popular pressure or if the opposition parties hold a majority in the upper house. Moreover, the approval of two-thirds of committee members is needed to charge a witness with violating the law by refusing to testify or perjury, which is almost impossible to achieve without cooperation from the ruling parties. Special committees for investigating particular scandals are rarely established and witnesses are usually summoned by the budget committees of both houses. The last time a witness was summoned before the parliament was in 2018, when Ministry of Finance officials concealed documents related to Prime Minister Abe’s involvement in the Moritomo Gakuen scandal, which concerned the purchase of land by a private school in Osaka at a reduced price. The investigation led to a temporary decrease in the popularity of the government.
Citations:
Giin ni okeru Shônin no Sensei oyobi Shôgen-tô ni kansuru Hôritsu [Act on Witnesses’ Oath, Testimony, etc. Before Both Houses of the Diet]. 1947. e-Gov. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=322AC1000000225_20220617_504AC0000000068
House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. “The Diet Law.” https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/diet/index.htm
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
Giin ni okeru Shônin no Sensei oyobi Shôgen-tô ni kansuru Hôritsu [Act on Witnesses’ Oath, Testimony, etc. Before Both Houses of the Diet]. 1947. e-Gov. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=322AC1000000225_20220617_504AC0000000068
House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. “The Diet Law.” https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/diet/index.htm
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
Poland
Individual members of parliament have the right to obtain necessary documents and information from government administration bodies, local self-government bodies, state-owned institutions or enterprises, social organizations, and non-state economic entities. Groups of at least 15 members of parliament and parliamentary party groups are entitled to request current information from government officials. A member of parliament can also submit important queries about government issues. Such queries should be concise, explain the situation and ask relevant questions. The person being questioned has to provide a written answer within 21 days of receiving the query.
Under PiS rule, opposition legislators investigated various issues in 2023, including the system of bonuses and awards for ministerial staff, the unauthorized publication of personal data by the minister of healthcare, and unclear competition procedures in the National Center for Research and Development (Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju, NCBiR). In most cases, reports prepared after such interventions were highly unfavorable to the government. In some instances, especially those made public by the media, the authorities decided to change the heads of the institutions, as in the case of NCBiR. However, they did not launch in-depth investigations or reforms.
Conversely, the number of parliamentary interpellations dropped year by year (from 15,988 in 2020 to 8,045 in 2022) due to the provision of unsatisfactory answers or the failure to respond to queries (Rzeczpospolita 2023). PiS government representatives often ignored this duty, and ministers occasionally declined invitations or did not respond to inquiries.
Under PiS rule, opposition legislators investigated various issues in 2023, including the system of bonuses and awards for ministerial staff, the unauthorized publication of personal data by the minister of healthcare, and unclear competition procedures in the National Center for Research and Development (Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju, NCBiR). In most cases, reports prepared after such interventions were highly unfavorable to the government. In some instances, especially those made public by the media, the authorities decided to change the heads of the institutions, as in the case of NCBiR. However, they did not launch in-depth investigations or reforms.
Conversely, the number of parliamentary interpellations dropped year by year (from 15,988 in 2020 to 8,045 in 2022) due to the provision of unsatisfactory answers or the failure to respond to queries (Rzeczpospolita 2023). PiS government representatives often ignored this duty, and ministers occasionally declined invitations or did not respond to inquiries.
Citations:
Rzeczpospolita. 2023. “Interpelacje poselskie: Poseł już raczej nie pyta, woli skontrolować.” https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art37878761-interpelacje-poselskie-posel-juz-raczej-nie-pyta-woli-skontrolowac
Rzeczpospolita. 2023. “Interpelacje poselskie: Poseł już raczej nie pyta, woli skontrolować.” https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art37878761-interpelacje-poselskie-posel-juz-raczej-nie-pyta-woli-skontrolowac
3
Estonia
De jure, opposition parties can initiate investigations in the Riigikogu concerning the government or individual ministers. This right is stipulated in the Act on House Rules of the Riigikogu, which allows the establishment of temporary investigative committees to clarify issues of public interest. The decision requires a simple majority of MPs.
However, this right is difficult to realize in practice if the governing coalition holds a parliamentary majority, as is typically the case in Estonia. One unsuccessful attempt occurred in the fall of 2023 when a proposal by opposition parties to establish an investigative committee on the prime minister’s husband’s Russia-oriented business failed in repeated votes (ERR Sept. 27, 2023).
However, this right is difficult to realize in practice if the governing coalition holds a parliamentary majority, as is typically the case in Estonia. One unsuccessful attempt occurred in the fall of 2023 when a proposal by opposition parties to establish an investigative committee on the prime minister’s husband’s Russia-oriented business failed in repeated votes (ERR Sept. 27, 2023).
Citations:
ERR. 2023. September 27. https://www.err.ee/1609114466/riigikogu-haaletas-uurimiskomisjoni-loomise-maha
ERR. 2023. December 21. https://www.err.ee/1609201612/koalitsioon-lukkas-peaministri-uurimiskomisjoni-loomise-riigikogus-tagasi
ERR. 2023. September 27. https://www.err.ee/1609114466/riigikogu-haaletas-uurimiskomisjoni-loomise-maha
ERR. 2023. December 21. https://www.err.ee/1609201612/koalitsioon-lukkas-peaministri-uurimiskomisjoni-loomise-riigikogus-tagasi
Hungary
In socialist Hungary, the parliament was de jure the highest and strongest institution in the political system; de facto, it was utterly impotent. After 1990, the Hungarian parliament became a stronghold of democracy and the central site for political debate. Since 2010, successive Orbán governments have constantly diminished the parliament’s role, easily achieving this through a two-thirds supermajority and centralized control over Prime Minister Orbán’s party ranks. The government can tailor regulations to fit its policy agenda without fearing opposition in parliament. In parliament, the opposition faces significant challenges in seeking to oppose the Fidesz supermajority. This difficulty has led even prominent politicians to use public media and the streets instead of parliament to set their political agendas. The government majority often changes the constitution or the house order. Since the government side controls agenda-setting and all parliamentary committees, the opposition has little opportunity to push reports through parliament if the government wants to prevent this, not to mention the severe consequences that might arise from such reports. Both de lege and de facto, the legislature faces strong constraints in fulfilling its obligation to oversee the government, especially since the government announced the pandemic-era state of emergency (which has persisted ever since), during which it has governed extensively through decrees, bypassing parliament. Moreover, due to the immunity enjoyed by members of parliament, criminal investigations against any legislator may be launched only once there is a majority vote in favor of suspending their immunity, something that rarely happens with Fidesz parliamentarians or members of the government (although there have been such precedents). Potential investigations against the prime minister or members of his family are especially unlikely to occur under these circumstances. Overall, there is a certain danger that the parliament will be pushed back into a position resembling its state before the democratic transition.
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
2
Slovakia
The main right of opposition parties is to call meetings of parliamentary committees to control the executive, including individual ministers, but not to initiate proper “investigations.” Even if such a control procedure did take place, the likelihood of an unfavorable decision or report is minimal, as coalition members of parliament usually boycott such meetings. This has been the common practice of all recent Slovak governments – for example, Jabúrková (2023). Slovakia’s parliamentary committees are the weakest among EU countries (Zubek 2021).
Citations:
Jabúrková, N. 2023. “Mimoriadny ústavný výbor sa mal zaoberať ministrom vnútra, nakoniec však bol neuznášaniaschopný.” Noviny PLUS, November 10. https://plus.noviny.sk/855454-mimoriadny-ustavny-vybor-sa-mal-zaoberat-ministrom-vnutra-nakoniec-vsak-bol-neuznasaniaschopny
Zubek, R. 2021. “Committee Strength in Parliamentary Democracies: A New Index.” European Journal of Political Research 60 (4): 1018-1031.
Jabúrková, N. 2023. “Mimoriadny ústavný výbor sa mal zaoberať ministrom vnútra, nakoniec však bol neuznášaniaschopný.” Noviny PLUS, November 10. https://plus.noviny.sk/855454-mimoriadny-ustavny-vybor-sa-mal-zaoberat-ministrom-vnutra-nakoniec-vsak-bol-neuznasaniaschopny
Zubek, R. 2021. “Committee Strength in Parliamentary Democracies: A New Index.” European Journal of Political Research 60 (4): 1018-1031.
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