Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
10
Norway
The 169 members of parliament are divided into 12 committees, roughly corresponding to the ministries. Norway is a small country, and the processes of policymaking are generally open and transparent. The conditions under which the government may withhold a document from a parliamentary committee are clearly specified and very rarely a matter of dispute. Ministers are required to come to parliament and answer any questions committee members may have. If dissatisfied with the response or with any other aspect of how the office of being a minister is executed, a vote of no confidence may be proposed.
Sweden
Parliamentary committees have the right to review all public documents, with the exception of those that are classified or part of an ongoing decision-making process. The Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs (KU) is responsible for reviewing the work of members of parliament. The committee has the mandate to weigh in on any issue raised by members of parliament, including EU subsidiarity issues, which have been on the rise in 2023 (Sveriges Riksdag 2023). KU also has the authority to summon parliamentarians and access documents. While this access to documents has been an issue in past years, current reports do not indicate the continuation of this problem.
Citations:
Sveriges Riksdag. 2023. “Uppföljning av riksdagens tillämpning av subsidiaritetsprincipen.” https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/betankande/uppfoljning-av-riksdagens-tillampning-av_hb01ku5/
Sveriges Riksdag. 2023. “Uppföljning av riksdagens tillämpning av subsidiaritetsprincipen.” https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/betankande/uppfoljning-av-riksdagens-tillampning-av_hb01ku5/
Switzerland
Parliamentary committees can be regarded as one of the major elements of the Swiss legislative process. They are equipped with major prerogatives (Sciarini 2023: 272, 278). They design, debate and reach compromises on legislative projects. “A more recent study of all votes in the National Council between 1996 and 2018 confirms that the committees are very often followed by the plenum: During this period, in 87% of cases, the plenum supported the proposal of the majority of a committee, rather than the proposal of the minority” (Sciarini 2023: 453). They, like individual members of parliament, have access to government documents and receive copies of these promptly upon request. Legislators have also electronic access to the majority of government documents.
Parliamentary committees can summon ministers for hearings. Formally, this request is not binding. However, for political reasons, ministers typically respond to these requests and answer the committees’ questions.
Parliamentary committees are free to invite experts to provide testimony at hearings. This right is actively used. For example, in the summer of 2018, the National Council’s Foreign Policy Committee decided that it would publicly hear from experts on the outcome of the negotiations on the institutional agreement between Switzerland and the European Union. The committee set the relevant hearings for the afternoon of 15 January 2019, and the hearings were broadcast live over the internet.
Parliamentary committees can summon ministers for hearings. Formally, this request is not binding. However, for political reasons, ministers typically respond to these requests and answer the committees’ questions.
Parliamentary committees are free to invite experts to provide testimony at hearings. This right is actively used. For example, in the summer of 2018, the National Council’s Foreign Policy Committee decided that it would publicly hear from experts on the outcome of the negotiations on the institutional agreement between Switzerland and the European Union. The committee set the relevant hearings for the afternoon of 15 January 2019, and the hearings were broadcast live over the internet.
Citations:
Sciarini, Pascal. 2023. Politique suisse. Institutions, acteurs, processus. Lausanne: Épistémé.
Sciarini, Pascal. 2023. Politique suisse. Institutions, acteurs, processus. Lausanne: Épistémé.
9
Belgium
Parliament currently runs 11 permanent commissions, 14 ad hoc commissions, and 1 inquiry commission. Defense, justice, and interior commissions are chaired by opposition members, while other commissions, such as budget and external relations, are chaired by members of the government coalition but co-chaired by opposition members. They can summon ministers, documents, and experts at will. Chiru and De Winter (2023) show that portfolios are more often attributed to the opposition when the ideological gap between government and opposition widens, showing parliament’s de facto oversight capacity.
One concrete case that has bogged the government over the course of the legislature is Belgium’s energy policy. In line with the EU’s climate transition strategy, Belgium is actively moving toward electrification and efforts to phase out fossil-based energy. At the same time, it is shutting down its nuclear power plants, insufficiently investing in other dispatchable energies, and has witnessed delays in the expansion of its green but non-dispatchable energy sources (namely solar and wind). This portends a significant energy deficit in the years ahead. Initially, the energy minister dismissed concerns about phasing out nuclear power and relying on imports. Another party in the coalition was from the start strongly opposed to the phasing out of nuclear energy. Opposition parties also constantly challenged the minister in parliament, but this was more a matter of form than of content and she proved able to sidestep the more “painful” questions on this issue. However, the invasion of Ukraine showed that Belgium could not rely on imports, intensifying questioning and challenges that eventually forced the government to redirect its strategy toward investing in nuclear power and accelerating investment in renewable power production.
One concrete case that has bogged the government over the course of the legislature is Belgium’s energy policy. In line with the EU’s climate transition strategy, Belgium is actively moving toward electrification and efforts to phase out fossil-based energy. At the same time, it is shutting down its nuclear power plants, insufficiently investing in other dispatchable energies, and has witnessed delays in the expansion of its green but non-dispatchable energy sources (namely solar and wind). This portends a significant energy deficit in the years ahead. Initially, the energy minister dismissed concerns about phasing out nuclear power and relying on imports. Another party in the coalition was from the start strongly opposed to the phasing out of nuclear energy. Opposition parties also constantly challenged the minister in parliament, but this was more a matter of form than of content and she proved able to sidestep the more “painful” questions on this issue. However, the invasion of Ukraine showed that Belgium could not rely on imports, intensifying questioning and challenges that eventually forced the government to redirect its strategy toward investing in nuclear power and accelerating investment in renewable power production.
Citations:
Chiru, M., and De Winter, L. 2023. “The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium.” Government and Opposition 58 (1): 129-144. doi:10.1017/gov.2021.27
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/comm/LstCom.cfm
Er dreigt betonrot in het huis van de democratie: ‘Het Vlaams Parlement wordt meer en meer een praatbarak’ | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230319_97203506
Chiru, M., and De Winter, L. 2023. “The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium.” Government and Opposition 58 (1): 129-144. doi:10.1017/gov.2021.27
https://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=/none&language=fr&cfm=/site/wwwcfm/comm/LstCom.cfm
Er dreigt betonrot in het huis van de democratie: ‘Het Vlaams Parlement wordt meer en meer een praatbarak’ | De Standaard: https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20230319_97203506
Denmark
Parliament is entitled to access most government documents. However, some internal ministry documents are not made available. This practice is occasionally criticized by some politicians, especially from the opposition. Nevertheless, ministers and ministries understand the political importance of responding to parliamentary requests. While some documents may be stamped confidential, most committee documents are generally publicly available.
Committees regularly summon ministers for meetings called consultations (samråd). These meetings are key elements of the Danish parliamentary system. Consultations play an important role in the legislative process for members of parliament while also allowing them to exercise control over the government.
Most committee meetings occur behind closed doors. However, committees can choose to hold open meetings – including those without the minister present – and invite external experts, civil servants and representatives from interest organizations to explore and discuss issues. These meetings are also open to the press.
Committees may also decide to conduct larger hearings, occasionally in cooperation with other organizations. These hearings usually take place in the room where the former second chamber of the Danish parliament, the Landsting, met until it was abolished by the new constitution in 1953. To learn more about the issues they legislate, members of parliament also go on study trips and participate in conferences.
Committees regularly summon ministers for meetings called consultations (samråd). These meetings are key elements of the Danish parliamentary system. Consultations play an important role in the legislative process for members of parliament while also allowing them to exercise control over the government.
Most committee meetings occur behind closed doors. However, committees can choose to hold open meetings – including those without the minister present – and invite external experts, civil servants and representatives from interest organizations to explore and discuss issues. These meetings are also open to the press.
Committees may also decide to conduct larger hearings, occasionally in cooperation with other organizations. These hearings usually take place in the room where the former second chamber of the Danish parliament, the Landsting, met until it was abolished by the new constitution in 1953. To learn more about the issues they legislate, members of parliament also go on study trips and participate in conferences.
Finland
In Finland’s parliament, legislative committees can exercise oversight of government activities effectively. They have a legislated right to acquire the necessary documents from the government. Although they cannot summon ministers to committee meetings and hold them accountable by posing relevant questions, individual parliamentarians have the right to pose written and oral questions to ministers. The ministers are required to respond to these questions.
Germany
As the Bundestag is a “working parliament,” parliamentary committees play a crucial role in the legislative process. Germany has several permanent committees established by the Basic Law (Article 44ff) that significantly influence policymaking (V-Dem, 2023). In addition to their legislative influence, these committees oversee government activities.
When investigating a subject, committees generally have the right to take evidence, and the executive branch is required to provide requested documents. However, the government sometimes attempts to withhold information. In such cases, the responsible minister must present reasons for the refusal. Additionally, the committee can appeal the decision to the Federal Constitutional Court or the Federal Court of Justice (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).
Additionally, following Article 43 of the Basic Law, the legislature has the right to require presence. This means parliament and its committees can require members of the executive to attend committee meetings for questioning. If summoned witnesses are absent without excuse, the committee can order their compulsory appearance without a court order or impose a fine of up to €10,000 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).
According to the V-Dem index (2023), the legislature regularly questions members of the executive branch, requiring ministers or the head of government to explain policies or testify regarding various issues. Committees specifically set up to investigate misconduct – so-called committees of inquiry – will be discussed in the next text on legislative investigations. It cannot be determined, however, if the answers provided are satisfactory to the committee.
When investigating a subject, committees generally have the right to take evidence, and the executive branch is required to provide requested documents. However, the government sometimes attempts to withhold information. In such cases, the responsible minister must present reasons for the refusal. Additionally, the committee can appeal the decision to the Federal Constitutional Court or the Federal Court of Justice (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).
Additionally, following Article 43 of the Basic Law, the legislature has the right to require presence. This means parliament and its committees can require members of the executive to attend committee meetings for questioning. If summoned witnesses are absent without excuse, the committee can order their compulsory appearance without a court order or impose a fine of up to €10,000 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).
According to the V-Dem index (2023), the legislature regularly questions members of the executive branch, requiring ministers or the head of government to explain policies or testify regarding various issues. Committees specifically set up to investigate misconduct – so-called committees of inquiry – will be discussed in the next text on legislative investigations. It cannot be determined, however, if the answers provided are satisfactory to the committee.
Citations:
Deutscher Bundestag. 2016. “Sachstand, Befugnisse des Untersuchungsausschusses zur Beweiserhebung, WD 3 - 3000 - 265/16.” https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/493600/869bf4ce24e8f566ccc0c5fb4327112d/WD-3-265-16-pdf-data.pdf
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph
Deutscher Bundestag. 2016. “Sachstand, Befugnisse des Untersuchungsausschusses zur Beweiserhebung, WD 3 - 3000 - 265/16.” https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/493600/869bf4ce24e8f566ccc0c5fb4327112d/WD-3-265-16-pdf-data.pdf
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph
Greece
Greek parliamentary committees have the authority to obtain necessary documents from the government and summon ministers to committee meetings to hold them accountable. These powers are guaranteed by the standing orders of parliament and are regularly exercised.
When documents are requested, the relevant ministry must provide them within one month, except for sensitive information related to diplomacy, military matters, or national security. Even in these cases, committees can request to inspect such documents. Ministers typically comply with these requests, as MPs are often demanding and can leverage the pressure from opposition media.
Ministers are also obliged to appear before committees if summoned by two-fifths of the committee members. While the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs may limit the information they provide depending on the issue, they must still present information and engage in debates with the opposition. These exchanges can range from rational argumentation to more performative displays, especially when covered by the media.
When documents are requested, the relevant ministry must provide them within one month, except for sensitive information related to diplomacy, military matters, or national security. Even in these cases, committees can request to inspect such documents. Ministers typically comply with these requests, as MPs are often demanding and can leverage the pressure from opposition media.
Ministers are also obliged to appear before committees if summoned by two-fifths of the committee members. While the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Foreign Affairs may limit the information they provide depending on the issue, they must still present information and engage in debates with the opposition. These exchanges can range from rational argumentation to more performative displays, especially when covered by the media.
Citations:
The supply of government documents to the parliament is regulated by article 133 of the Standing Orders of the Parliament.
Legislative oversight that requires the presence and responses of government ministers is regulated by articles 124-132 of the Standing Orders of the Parliament.
The Standing Orders of the Parliament are available at:
https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/%CE%9A%CE%91%CE%9D%CE%9F%CE%9D%CE%99%CE%A3%CE%9C%CE%9F%CE%A3%20%CE%9A%CE%9F%CE%99%CE%9D%CE%9F%CE%92%CE%9F%CE%A5%CE%9B%CE%95%CE%A5%CE%A4%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%9F%20%CE%9A%CE%A9%CE%94%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%9F%CE%A0%CE%9F%CE%99%CE%97%CE%A3%CE%97%202021_3_F.pdf
The supply of government documents to the parliament is regulated by article 133 of the Standing Orders of the Parliament.
Legislative oversight that requires the presence and responses of government ministers is regulated by articles 124-132 of the Standing Orders of the Parliament.
The Standing Orders of the Parliament are available at:
https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/%CE%9A%CE%91%CE%9D%CE%9F%CE%9D%CE%99%CE%A3%CE%9C%CE%9F%CE%A3%20%CE%9A%CE%9F%CE%99%CE%9D%CE%9F%CE%92%CE%9F%CE%A5%CE%9B%CE%95%CE%A5%CE%A4%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%9F%20%CE%9A%CE%A9%CE%94%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%9F%CE%A0%CE%9F%CE%99%CE%97%CE%A3%CE%97%202021_3_F.pdf
Italy
Italian parliamentary committees, in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, are powerful bodies with significant influence over legislation and government oversight. They have the authority to request documents from the executive branch, compel ministerial appearances for hearings, and summon experts for specialized insights. These powers underscore the prominent role of committees in the Italian legislative process, distinguishing it from other European parliamentary systems.
Standing committees, in particular, hold legislative, investigative, policy-setting, and control functions. During their legislative activities, committees may acquire data and information from the government and carry out fact-finding missions. While the government may not always respond to document requests immediately, there is no substantial evidence suggesting it consistently fails to comply.
In exercising their oversight functions, committees may summon ministers or undersecretaries for hearings and investigative inquiries. Hearings can be formal or informal, with formal hearings subject to a specific publicity regime and their verbatim records published. Summoning members of the executive branch for hearings is common practice, and they typically comply.
Committees also have the power to conduct investigative inquiries on matters within their respective competencies to gather useful information for their work and for the work of the Chamber or the Senate. The verbatim records of sessions held by committees during investigative inquiries are published.
Standing committees, in particular, hold legislative, investigative, policy-setting, and control functions. During their legislative activities, committees may acquire data and information from the government and carry out fact-finding missions. While the government may not always respond to document requests immediately, there is no substantial evidence suggesting it consistently fails to comply.
In exercising their oversight functions, committees may summon ministers or undersecretaries for hearings and investigative inquiries. Hearings can be formal or informal, with formal hearings subject to a specific publicity regime and their verbatim records published. Summoning members of the executive branch for hearings is common practice, and they typically comply.
Committees also have the power to conduct investigative inquiries on matters within their respective competencies to gather useful information for their work and for the work of the Chamber or the Senate. The verbatim records of sessions held by committees during investigative inquiries are published.
Lithuania
Members of the Seimas have the right to obtain information not only from the government but also from various government agencies, enterprises and other public sector organizations. When carrying out their oversight function, parliamentary committees can request information and relevant documents from ministries and other state institutions. These documents are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame. Opposition members frequently seek the government’s position on politically salient policy issues. However, there are restrictions on accessing information considered sensitive for state security reasons. Additionally, information from ongoing pretrial investigations and other investigations cannot be provided if it could harm the investigations.
Parliamentary committees can summon ministers and the heads of most other state institutions, with the exception of court judges. Invited individuals, who also attend parliamentary commissions and other groups, generally answer questions posed by members of parliament and provide other relevant information. In some cases, vice ministers or other authorized civil servants may substitute for ministers. However, this instrument of parliamentary control is often used to explain government activities on an ex post basis rather than serving as a forward-looking mechanism. During times of crisis – such as the management of pandemics or geopolitical crises – the more frequent practice of vice ministers substituting for ministers preoccupied with crisis management has sometimes led to friction among members of parliament and particular ministers.
Parliamentary committees can summon ministers and the heads of most other state institutions, with the exception of court judges. Invited individuals, who also attend parliamentary commissions and other groups, generally answer questions posed by members of parliament and provide other relevant information. In some cases, vice ministers or other authorized civil servants may substitute for ministers. However, this instrument of parliamentary control is often used to explain government activities on an ex post basis rather than serving as a forward-looking mechanism. During times of crisis – such as the management of pandemics or geopolitical crises – the more frequent practice of vice ministers substituting for ministers preoccupied with crisis management has sometimes led to friction among members of parliament and particular ministers.
UK
The House of Commons has a permanent Select Committee for every government department, complemented by cross-cutting committees such as the Public Accounts Committee and the Environmental Audit Committee, which can scrutinize any government department. The Liaison Committee, composed of the chairs of all other committees, notably questions the Prime Minister about policy, usually three times a year.
Committee chairs are elected by MPs, with some positions reserved for opposition MPs. These chairs can select topics for inquiries and call for evidence from the government, requiring witnesses, including ministers, to appear before them. However, the government may sometimes resist or delay in responding. The government is required to respond in writing to any inquiry. Special advisers are often appointed to assist committee members in formulating questions for witnesses and interpreting evidence.
Committees are known for their robust questioning of ministers and sometimes produce highly critical reports of the government. They also question business leaders, public servants, and other witnesses, such as senior representatives from the Bank of England. Additionally, committees hold hearings for candidates for public appointments, such as the Treasury Committee’s examination of candidates for the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, though they do not have veto power.
The devolved legislatures have equivalent roles and powers concerning devolved government ministers but do not have the authority to compel UK government ministers to engage.
Committee chairs are elected by MPs, with some positions reserved for opposition MPs. These chairs can select topics for inquiries and call for evidence from the government, requiring witnesses, including ministers, to appear before them. However, the government may sometimes resist or delay in responding. The government is required to respond in writing to any inquiry. Special advisers are often appointed to assist committee members in formulating questions for witnesses and interpreting evidence.
Committees are known for their robust questioning of ministers and sometimes produce highly critical reports of the government. They also question business leaders, public servants, and other witnesses, such as senior representatives from the Bank of England. Additionally, committees hold hearings for candidates for public appointments, such as the Treasury Committee’s examination of candidates for the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, though they do not have veto power.
The devolved legislatures have equivalent roles and powers concerning devolved government ministers but do not have the authority to compel UK government ministers to engage.
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
8
Austria
All parliamentary committees of the Austrian Nationalrat have the authority to request any type of document. However, documents classified as “secret” can only be viewed in a special parliamentary room and cannot be copied.
The Nationalrat – similar to the Bundesrat as the second chamber – is entitled to examine the administration of affairs by the government, interrogate its members about all subjects pertaining to execution, demand all relevant information, and articulate in resolutions their wishes about the exercise of executive power.
Every parliamentarian is entitled to ask brief oral questions to members of the government during plenary sessions. The deadline for responding to an oral question tabled in the plenary sitting is the end of the same day. A debate takes place whenever it is requested. Parliamentarians also have the right to submit written questions to the president of the House and the chairpersons of committees. The individual to whom a question is addressed replies in writing. If they are not in a position to answer, their reply must indicate the reason. In practice, however, many questions are answered superficially or evasively, without any consequences for the officeholders obliged to respond.
When summoned, ministers, or their state secretaries, attend the respective meetings. The legal ability to summon ministers is, in practice, limited by the majority that the governing parties enjoy in all committees. As the majority party groups tend to follow the policy defined by the cabinet, there typically is limited interest in summoning cabinet members, at least not against a minister’s will. While this de facto limitation can be seen as part of the logic of a parliamentary system in which the government and the parliamentary majority are essentially a single political entity, this limitation is a major one in Austria given the established high level of party discipline.
The chancellor rarely attends the collective question time, sometimes less than once a year. As Serban (2022: 164) notes, “correspondence with officials indicated that this mechanism is considered perfunctory; instead, parliamentarians use urgent questions to summon the chancellor to answer questions on specific issues.”
The Nationalrat – similar to the Bundesrat as the second chamber – is entitled to examine the administration of affairs by the government, interrogate its members about all subjects pertaining to execution, demand all relevant information, and articulate in resolutions their wishes about the exercise of executive power.
Every parliamentarian is entitled to ask brief oral questions to members of the government during plenary sessions. The deadline for responding to an oral question tabled in the plenary sitting is the end of the same day. A debate takes place whenever it is requested. Parliamentarians also have the right to submit written questions to the president of the House and the chairpersons of committees. The individual to whom a question is addressed replies in writing. If they are not in a position to answer, their reply must indicate the reason. In practice, however, many questions are answered superficially or evasively, without any consequences for the officeholders obliged to respond.
When summoned, ministers, or their state secretaries, attend the respective meetings. The legal ability to summon ministers is, in practice, limited by the majority that the governing parties enjoy in all committees. As the majority party groups tend to follow the policy defined by the cabinet, there typically is limited interest in summoning cabinet members, at least not against a minister’s will. While this de facto limitation can be seen as part of the logic of a parliamentary system in which the government and the parliamentary majority are essentially a single political entity, this limitation is a major one in Austria given the established high level of party discipline.
The chancellor rarely attends the collective question time, sometimes less than once a year. As Serban (2022: 164) notes, “correspondence with officials indicated that this mechanism is considered perfunctory; instead, parliamentarians use urgent questions to summon the chancellor to answer questions on specific issues.”
Citations:
http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2017_F.htm#contradmin
Serban, Ruxandra. 2022. “How Are Prime Ministers Held to Account? Exploring Procedures and Practices in 31 Parliamentary Democracies.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 28 (2): 155-178.
http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2017_F.htm#contradmin
Serban, Ruxandra. 2022. “How Are Prime Ministers Held to Account? Exploring Procedures and Practices in 31 Parliamentary Democracies.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 28 (2): 155-178.
Czechia
As specified in the rules of procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, Czech parliamentary committees may request nearly all government documents and information from government members, heads of administrative authorities, and local authority bodies necessary for performing their functions.
These requests are usually respected, and documents are delivered on time. Ministers and the top personnel of major state institutions are obliged to attend committee meetings and answer questions when asked. According to the rules, ministers are also required to present draft bills to appropriate committees. If the ministers send officials below the rank of deputy minister, committees may – and often do – refuse to discuss a legislative proposal.
These requests are usually respected, and documents are delivered on time. Ministers and the top personnel of major state institutions are obliged to attend committee meetings and answer questions when asked. According to the rules, ministers are also required to present draft bills to appropriate committees. If the ministers send officials below the rank of deputy minister, committees may – and often do – refuse to discuss a legislative proposal.
Estonia
Parliamentary committees have the legal right to obtain from the government and other executive agencies the materials and data necessary to draft legal acts and evaluate draft law proposals made by the government. The committees can also invite civil servants from the ministries to participate in commission meetings to provide additional information or explain government positions. Permanent committees have the right to request the participation of ministers in committee meetings to obtain information. Additionally, members of parliament can individually forward written questions and information requests to ministers. These must be answered publicly at one of the national parliament’s plenary sessions within 20 days.
As a rule, ministers comply with invitations and provide satisfactory answers to the questions posed. However, in 2023, when relations between the government and opposition parties became tense, both sides accused each other of destructive behavior, and the summoning practice broke down. In August 2023, the prime minister was invited to meetings of various parliamentary committees to explain cuts to the President’s Office budget, and to explain her involvement with her husband’s business activities in Russia – the so-called Eastern Transit scandal – but she repeatedly refused on various grounds. Similarly, the minister of finance ignored the invitation. Eventually the prime minister appeared at the committee meeting, and the conflict was resolved (ERR, 30. Aug. 2023).
As a rule, ministers comply with invitations and provide satisfactory answers to the questions posed. However, in 2023, when relations between the government and opposition parties became tense, both sides accused each other of destructive behavior, and the summoning practice broke down. In August 2023, the prime minister was invited to meetings of various parliamentary committees to explain cuts to the President’s Office budget, and to explain her involvement with her husband’s business activities in Russia – the so-called Eastern Transit scandal – but she repeatedly refused on various grounds. Similarly, the minister of finance ignored the invitation. Eventually the prime minister appeared at the committee meeting, and the conflict was resolved (ERR, 30. Aug. 2023).
Citations:
ERR. 2023. https://www.err.ee/1609082321/kallas-laheb-riigikogu-komisjonide-ette-aru-andma
ERR. 2023. https://www.err.ee/1609082321/kallas-laheb-riigikogu-komisjonide-ette-aru-andma
France
Committees generally have free access to all requested documents. However, areas such as national security, the secret service or military issues are deemed sensitive, with access thus being more restricted. In such cases, the government might be reluctant to pass on information, or even tempted to use information-access limitations to cover up potential malpractices. For instance, in the past, the Prime Minister’s Office has had substantial amounts of cash at its disposal that could partially be used for the electoral activities of the party in power. No information was available about where the money actually went. In the same vein, it is only since the Sarkozy presidency that the president’s office budget has become transparent and accessible to parliamentary inquiry.
Committees can summon ministers for hearings, and frequently make use of this right. Ministers can refuse to attend but this is rather exceptional. Given the supremacy and the discipline of the majority party in parliament during the Fifth Republic, such a refusal does not result in serious consequences
Committees can summon ministers for hearings, and frequently make use of this right. Ministers can refuse to attend but this is rather exceptional. Given the supremacy and the discipline of the majority party in parliament during the Fifth Republic, such a refusal does not result in serious consequences
New Zealand
Legislative committees in New Zealand play a significant role in overseeing government activities. Each parliament establishes several “subject” select committees that correspond to specific areas of government activity (the 2023 – 2026 parliament has 12 subject select committees).
Select committees not only review proposed legislation, but also have the authority to conduct inquiries on specific issues or areas of concern. The Finance and Expenditure Committee scrutinizes the government’s budget proposals, expenditure plans and financial reports.
Committees can formally request documents and information from government agencies or departments. They can also summon government officials or relevant individuals to testify and provide information related to their inquiries. The extent to which documents are provided in their entirety and within a reasonable time frame depends on several factors, such as the nature of the information and the volume of documents requested.
A fundamental issue is that New Zealand’s Parliament – due to its relatively small size of 123 MPs during the current legislative period – is notoriously overworked. To manage the resulting legislative logjams, governments frequently resort to “urgency” motions that accelerate the usual processes, giving select committees less time to scrutinize legislation (Martin 2015). For instance, after the October 2023 election, the new National government invoked urgency to pass seven pieces of legislation in the six days it had left for lawmaking between Parliament restarting and the Christmas break (McConnell 2023). This problem is exacerbated by the three-year term currently in place.
Select committees not only review proposed legislation, but also have the authority to conduct inquiries on specific issues or areas of concern. The Finance and Expenditure Committee scrutinizes the government’s budget proposals, expenditure plans and financial reports.
Committees can formally request documents and information from government agencies or departments. They can also summon government officials or relevant individuals to testify and provide information related to their inquiries. The extent to which documents are provided in their entirety and within a reasonable time frame depends on several factors, such as the nature of the information and the volume of documents requested.
A fundamental issue is that New Zealand’s Parliament – due to its relatively small size of 123 MPs during the current legislative period – is notoriously overworked. To manage the resulting legislative logjams, governments frequently resort to “urgency” motions that accelerate the usual processes, giving select committees less time to scrutinize legislation (Martin 2015). For instance, after the October 2023 election, the new National government invoked urgency to pass seven pieces of legislation in the six days it had left for lawmaking between Parliament restarting and the Christmas break (McConnell 2023). This problem is exacerbated by the three-year term currently in place.
Citations:
McConnell, G. 2023. “Every bill the Government has passed under urgency.” Stuff, 22 December. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/133493748/every-bill-the-government-has-passed-under-urgency
Martin, J. E. 2015. “Parliament.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McConnell, G. 2023. “Every bill the Government has passed under urgency.” Stuff, 22 December. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/133493748/every-bill-the-government-has-passed-under-urgency
Martin, J. E. 2015. “Parliament.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Portugal
In assessing whether legislative committees effectively oversee government activities, the situation presents a mixed picture. According to the Assembleia da República (2023), parliamentary committees and members of parliament have the right to request information from the government, which is legally required to respond within 30 days. Although there is no specific dataset tracking the government’s responsiveness to committee inquiries, individual parliament members frequently report experiencing delays or receiving incomplete information. This issue is highlighted in the most recent SGI report.
Nonetheless, there is evidence of progress in government responsiveness. Data from the first session of the 15th legislature (March 25, 2022 – July 20, 2023) reveals that 86% of inquiries made by parliament members were answered. This figure represents an improvement over previous periods and is detailed in the latest Assessment of Parliamentary Activity report by the Portuguese parliament (Assembleia da República, 2023).
Moreover, the rules mandate that government members must appear before committees at least four times each legislative session. Committees and parliamentary groups also have the authority to request additional hearings, although for committees, this requires agreement across different political parties. This mechanism is designed to facilitate greater oversight of government activities by the legislative branch.
Nonetheless, there is evidence of progress in government responsiveness. Data from the first session of the 15th legislature (March 25, 2022 – July 20, 2023) reveals that 86% of inquiries made by parliament members were answered. This figure represents an improvement over previous periods and is detailed in the latest Assessment of Parliamentary Activity report by the Portuguese parliament (Assembleia da República, 2023).
Moreover, the rules mandate that government members must appear before committees at least four times each legislative session. Committees and parliamentary groups also have the authority to request additional hearings, although for committees, this requires agreement across different political parties. This mechanism is designed to facilitate greater oversight of government activities by the legislative branch.
Citations:
Assembleia da República. 2023. “Balanço da Atividade Parlamentar – 1.ª Sessão Legislativa da XV Legislatura.” https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Documents/RelatorioActidadeAR/RA_AR_XV_1_final.pdf
Assembleia da República. 2023. “Balanço da Atividade Parlamentar – 1.ª Sessão Legislativa da XV Legislatura.” https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Documents/RelatorioActidadeAR/RA_AR_XV_1_final.pdf
Slovenia
Within the scope of their competencies and areas of work, the parliamentary working bodies also directly and indirectly control the government and its ministries. These working bodies can request that the government and other institutions provide all necessary documents and explanations to fulfill this function. The government must supply the requested information and documents unless it is against the law. However, governments have sometimes provided documents only at the last moment or with considerable delay, thereby compromising the Assembly’s ability to fulfill its oversight role.
Ministers generally honor the invitations of the National Assembly and the working bodies. If ministers cannot attend a meeting, State Secretaries may be authorized to represent the ministries. Ministers are also obliged to answer questions from members of parliament either orally or in writing, which is largely honored in practice. Additionally, the prime minister must personally answer four questions from members of the National Assembly at each regular parliamentary session. Notably, both Prime Minister Janša and Prime Minister Golob tended to avoid certain meetings of some parliamentary bodies and did not attend despite being invited.
In 2022, 372 questions and initiatives were put forward: eight to the prime minister, the largest number to the government as a whole – 140, followed by the minister of health with 40 questions and initiatives. Twenty-five remained unanswered.
Ministers generally honor the invitations of the National Assembly and the working bodies. If ministers cannot attend a meeting, State Secretaries may be authorized to represent the ministries. Ministers are also obliged to answer questions from members of parliament either orally or in writing, which is largely honored in practice. Additionally, the prime minister must personally answer four questions from members of the National Assembly at each regular parliamentary session. Notably, both Prime Minister Janša and Prime Minister Golob tended to avoid certain meetings of some parliamentary bodies and did not attend despite being invited.
In 2022, 372 questions and initiatives were put forward: eight to the prime minister, the largest number to the government as a whole – 140, followed by the minister of health with 40 questions and initiatives. Twenty-five remained unanswered.
Citations:
Državni zbor. 2022. “Poročilo o delu državnega zbora v mandatnem obdobju 2018-2022.” https://fotogalerija.dz-rs.si/datoteke/Publikacije/PorocilaDZ/Mandat_2018%E2%80%932022/Porocilo_o_delu_Drzavnega_zbora_v_mandatnem_obdobju_2018%E2%80%932022__.pdf
N1. 2023. “Goloba ni bilo na sejo Knovsa, za prisilno privedbo nimajo pristojnosti.” https://n1info.si/novice/slovenija/goloba-ni-bilo-na-sejo-knovsa-za-prisilno-privedbo-nimajo-pristojnosti/
Delo. 2021. “Težave z dvigovanjem pošte.” https://www.delo.si/novice/slovenija/tezave-z-dvigovanjem-poste/
Državni zbor. 2022. “Poročilo o delu državnega zbora v mandatnem obdobju 2018-2022.” https://fotogalerija.dz-rs.si/datoteke/Publikacije/PorocilaDZ/Mandat_2018%E2%80%932022/Porocilo_o_delu_Drzavnega_zbora_v_mandatnem_obdobju_2018%E2%80%932022__.pdf
N1. 2023. “Goloba ni bilo na sejo Knovsa, za prisilno privedbo nimajo pristojnosti.” https://n1info.si/novice/slovenija/goloba-ni-bilo-na-sejo-knovsa-za-prisilno-privedbo-nimajo-pristojnosti/
Delo. 2021. “Težave z dvigovanjem pošte.” https://www.delo.si/novice/slovenija/tezave-z-dvigovanjem-poste/
Spain
Article 110 of the constitution allows committees of either the Congress of Deputies or the Senate to summon government members to answer questions, provided the request comes from at least 70 deputies or one-fifth of the committee members. The Bureau of Congress and the Board of Spokespersons must vote on the request. The ruling party may attempt to reject opposition requests, but if approved, ministers are obliged to respond. Ministers often comply with these invitations and even request to report on their departments’ matters.
The power to request information is a specific aspect of the Cortes Generales’ control function under Article 66.2 of the constitution. The government must provide requested information within 30 days in the most suitable manner. This legal framework allows the government some flexibility, such as withholding documents on grounds of secrecy or delivering them incompletely or late. Access to documents may vary by ministry. According to parliamentary sources, the government generally provides the requested documents in full and within a reasonable time, though delays and shortcomings prompt parliamentary claims of rights violations.
The power to request information is a specific aspect of the Cortes Generales’ control function under Article 66.2 of the constitution. The government must provide requested information within 30 days in the most suitable manner. This legal framework allows the government some flexibility, such as withholding documents on grounds of secrecy or delivering them incompletely or late. Access to documents may vary by ministry. According to parliamentary sources, the government generally provides the requested documents in full and within a reasonable time, though delays and shortcomings prompt parliamentary claims of rights violations.
Citations:
Constitutional Court. 2023. Judgement 165/2023 of 21 November 2023.
Constitutional Court. 2023. Judgement 165/2023 of 21 November 2023.
USA
Congressional committees routinely compel executive branch agencies to furnish documents about their functions as a form of oversight. Some of this oversight occurs through regularly scheduled reports submitted to relevant congressional committees (Kornberg 2023). However, Congress can also direct these agencies to provide information on an ad hoc basis (McCubbins and Schwartz 1987).
The executive branch sometimes attempts to withhold information by claiming executive privilege (LaPira et al 2020). The Supreme Court has confirmed the existence of this privilege, though it is qualified. The privilege is most clearly defined in cases where confidentiality is considered a matter of national security. The judicial branch can, albeit infrequently, evaluate whether information held by the executive should be deemed materially important for legislative or judicial oversight.
The executive branch sometimes attempts to withhold information by claiming executive privilege (LaPira et al 2020). The Supreme Court has confirmed the existence of this privilege, though it is qualified. The privilege is most clearly defined in cases where confidentiality is considered a matter of national security. The judicial branch can, albeit infrequently, evaluate whether information held by the executive should be deemed materially important for legislative or judicial oversight.
Citations:
Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science.
Kornberg, Maya. 2023. Inside Congressional Committees: Function and Dysfunction in the Legislative Process. Columbia: Columbia University Press.
Timothy LaPira, Lee Drutman, and Kevin Kosar, eds. 2020. Congress Overwhelmed: The Decline of Congressional Capacity and Prospects for Reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science.
Kornberg, Maya. 2023. Inside Congressional Committees: Function and Dysfunction in the Legislative Process. Columbia: Columbia University Press.
Timothy LaPira, Lee Drutman, and Kevin Kosar, eds. 2020. Congress Overwhelmed: The Decline of Congressional Capacity and Prospects for Reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
7
Australia
Parliamentary committees are critical to the Australian accountability architecture. These committees have the power to call witnesses and demand documents for review. While governments can attempt to stall committees’ efforts, a bigger constraint is the executive’s power to influence committee membership. The majority party has disproportionate influence in this process, posing problems for oversight committees. For example, the parliamentary committee overseeing the new National Anticorruption Commission was proposed to be chaired by a non-government politician, but this was rejected (Public Integrity 2022).
Citations:
Public Integrity. 2022. “Media Release: Independent Oversight Key to Effective National Anti-Corruption Commission.” Centre for Public Integrity. https://publicintegrity.org.au/media-release-independent-oversight-key-to-effective-national-anti-corruption-commission/
Public Integrity. 2022. “Media Release: Independent Oversight Key to Effective National Anti-Corruption Commission.” Centre for Public Integrity. https://publicintegrity.org.au/media-release-independent-oversight-key-to-effective-national-anti-corruption-commission/
Canada
In the Canadian version of Westminster government, legislative committees should play a crucial role in scrutinizing government actions, policies, and legislation. While committees were originally intended to operate independently, the government – typically formed by the majority party or coalition in the legislature – can exert influence over committees in various ways (Savoie 1999).
Committee members, particularly those from opposition parties, often strive to scrutinize government actions, policies, and legislation but may not be able to do so.
The majority party or coalition in the legislature typically maintains a dominant position in committee assignments. Members of the majority party chair committees, and their members typically outnumber those from opposition parties. This structural advantage impacts the committee’s agenda and decisions. By controlling these leadership positions, the government can shape the direction and priorities of the committee’s work. Governments strategically place members on committees who are more likely to support government positions.
And while committees have the authority to set their own agendas, the government may attempt to influence the topics and issues taken up by committees. This can be done through informal channels, discussions with committee leaders, or public statements expressing government priorities. Party whips play a role in ensuring party discipline and use their influence to guide committee members in line with the party’s position. Members may be expected to adhere to party policy and vote in a manner consistent with the government’s preferences.
Parliamentary committees have the right to receive government documents during their deliberations, and committee members frequently ask ministers and officials who give testimony to provide additional information in writing.
However, these requests may be ignored or delayed by the government. Ministers, for example, are normally expected to appear before parliamentary committees, but they too may decline a committee invitation or send a representative, even when receiving a formal summons approved through a committee motion. A deputy minister may appear instead of a minister for questions linked to departmental operations. Alternatively, a parliamentary secretary may stand in for the minister if the matter at hand is legislative in nature.
The government has the ability to influence committee proceedings by suggesting or providing witnesses for committee hearings or refusing to do so. This impacts the information presented to the committee and shapes the narrative around government policies. Additionally, the scheduling of committee meetings is influenced by the government.
Committee members, particularly those from opposition parties, often strive to scrutinize government actions, policies, and legislation but may not be able to do so.
The majority party or coalition in the legislature typically maintains a dominant position in committee assignments. Members of the majority party chair committees, and their members typically outnumber those from opposition parties. This structural advantage impacts the committee’s agenda and decisions. By controlling these leadership positions, the government can shape the direction and priorities of the committee’s work. Governments strategically place members on committees who are more likely to support government positions.
And while committees have the authority to set their own agendas, the government may attempt to influence the topics and issues taken up by committees. This can be done through informal channels, discussions with committee leaders, or public statements expressing government priorities. Party whips play a role in ensuring party discipline and use their influence to guide committee members in line with the party’s position. Members may be expected to adhere to party policy and vote in a manner consistent with the government’s preferences.
Parliamentary committees have the right to receive government documents during their deliberations, and committee members frequently ask ministers and officials who give testimony to provide additional information in writing.
However, these requests may be ignored or delayed by the government. Ministers, for example, are normally expected to appear before parliamentary committees, but they too may decline a committee invitation or send a representative, even when receiving a formal summons approved through a committee motion. A deputy minister may appear instead of a minister for questions linked to departmental operations. Alternatively, a parliamentary secretary may stand in for the minister if the matter at hand is legislative in nature.
The government has the ability to influence committee proceedings by suggesting or providing witnesses for committee hearings or refusing to do so. This impacts the information presented to the committee and shapes the narrative around government policies. Additionally, the scheduling of committee meetings is influenced by the government.
Citations:
Savoie, Donald J. 1999. “The Rise of Court Government in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 32 (4): 635–64.
Savoie, Donald J. 1999. “The Rise of Court Government in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 32 (4): 635–64.
Ireland
The system of legislative scrutiny in Ireland involves each bill passing through five stages between both houses and relevant committees before approval. This process allows the legislature to exercise its oversight function. However, it can become ineffective when the government controls committees, guillotines debates, rejects amendments and exerts excessive control through party whips. Local government in Ireland has long been considered weak by international standards, with highly centralized controls (Torney and O’Mahony, 2023; Collins and Quilivan, 2010). This centralization results in national legislators focusing less on national policy, which is detrimental to good governance (Murphy, 2019).
The financial crisis that emerged in 2008 highlighted the shortcomings of an ineffective committee system and related weaknesses in policymaking, analysis and scrutiny. Since then, significant improvements have been made in legislative committee capacity and practice, enhancing effective oversight of the government (Connaughton 2021). Reforms include the establishment of a new business committee and a budget oversight committee, an increase in the number of committees and the time allocated to committee hearings, the extension of pre-legislative scrutiny to non-government bills, the introduction of a formal post-legislative scrutiny process, and increased scheduled time for private members’ bills. Parliamentary committees now have the power to acquire documents from the government, summon ministers to committee meetings, and hold them accountable by posing relevant questions. Generally, documents are provided in their entirety and within a reasonable timeframe, and ministers comply with invitations and provide relatively satisfactory answers. However, in practice, evasive answers are common, and there is often a need to ask precise questions to avoid uncomfortable conclusions.
The financial crisis that emerged in 2008 highlighted the shortcomings of an ineffective committee system and related weaknesses in policymaking, analysis and scrutiny. Since then, significant improvements have been made in legislative committee capacity and practice, enhancing effective oversight of the government (Connaughton 2021). Reforms include the establishment of a new business committee and a budget oversight committee, an increase in the number of committees and the time allocated to committee hearings, the extension of pre-legislative scrutiny to non-government bills, the introduction of a formal post-legislative scrutiny process, and increased scheduled time for private members’ bills. Parliamentary committees now have the power to acquire documents from the government, summon ministers to committee meetings, and hold them accountable by posing relevant questions. Generally, documents are provided in their entirety and within a reasonable timeframe, and ministers comply with invitations and provide relatively satisfactory answers. However, in practice, evasive answers are common, and there is often a need to ask precise questions to avoid uncomfortable conclusions.
Citations:
Connaughton, B. 2021. Committees and the Legislature: Policy Analysis in Ireland. Bristol: Policy Press.
Murphy, M. P. 2019. “More Power to You – Democracy Works If You Let It.” Fórsa Report. https://www.forsa.ie/morepower/more-power-to-you-launch-and-report/
Collins, N., and A. Quinlivan. 2010. “Multilevel Governance.” In Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 5th edition, eds. J. Coakley and M. Gallagher. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203869505
Torney, D., and O’Mahony, T. 2023. “Transforming Governance and Policy.” Volume 4 of Irish Climate Change Assessment. https://www.epa.ie/publications/monitoring–assessment/climate-change/ICCA_Volume-4.pdf
Connaughton, B. 2021. Committees and the Legislature: Policy Analysis in Ireland. Bristol: Policy Press.
Murphy, M. P. 2019. “More Power to You – Democracy Works If You Let It.” Fórsa Report. https://www.forsa.ie/morepower/more-power-to-you-launch-and-report/
Collins, N., and A. Quinlivan. 2010. “Multilevel Governance.” In Politics in the Republic of Ireland, 5th edition, eds. J. Coakley and M. Gallagher. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203869505
Torney, D., and O’Mahony, T. 2023. “Transforming Governance and Policy.” Volume 4 of Irish Climate Change Assessment. https://www.epa.ie/publications/monitoring–assessment/climate-change/ICCA_Volume-4.pdf
Japan
All parliamentarians may pose questions in written form to the cabinet, which have to be answered within seven days. If an answer cannot be given on time, the cabinet has to clarify a reason and the time by when the answer will be provided. Questions of an urgent nature may be posed orally by a resolution of the house. Since the abolishment of the government commissioner system in 1999, cabinet members cannot be replaced by bureaucrats when answering questions in the Diet, though the answers are prepared by ministerial administrative staff. Answers tend to cite the general policy of the government without addressing the contents of questions in any detail.
Traditionally, the budget committees of both houses serve as the prime venues for the interrogation of the prime minister and ministers by the opposition. Cabinet members are often faced with difficult questions and the deliberations are broadcast live. Prime ministers generally comply with requests to participate in budget committee proceedings, but there have been cases of procedural maneuvers with the goal of avoiding having to face criticism in the committees.
The Board of Oversight and the Review of Specially Designated Secrets were established in 2014 to assess the appropriateness of the designation of “special secrets” by the government. However, the heads of administrative organs may decline board requests for document submissions if the cabinet clarifies why such an act would endanger national security. In practice, often only the lists of “specially designated secrets” – not their contents – are provided to the boards.
Traditionally, the budget committees of both houses serve as the prime venues for the interrogation of the prime minister and ministers by the opposition. Cabinet members are often faced with difficult questions and the deliberations are broadcast live. Prime ministers generally comply with requests to participate in budget committee proceedings, but there have been cases of procedural maneuvers with the goal of avoiding having to face criticism in the committees.
The Board of Oversight and the Review of Specially Designated Secrets were established in 2014 to assess the appropriateness of the designation of “special secrets” by the government. However, the heads of administrative organs may decline board requests for document submissions if the cabinet clarifies why such an act would endanger national security. In practice, often only the lists of “specially designated secrets” – not their contents – are provided to the boards.
Citations:
House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. “The Diet Law.” https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/diet/index.htm
Zakowski, Karol. 2023. “The Parliamentary Administration of Japan: The Kokkai.” In The Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations, eds. Thomas Christiansen, Elena Griglio, and Nicola Lupo. London – New York: Routledge, 656-665.
House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. “The Diet Law.” https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/diet/index.htm
Zakowski, Karol. 2023. “The Parliamentary Administration of Japan: The Kokkai.” In The Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations, eds. Thomas Christiansen, Elena Griglio, and Nicola Lupo. London – New York: Routledge, 656-665.
Latvia
The Saeima holds certain powers and resources to exercise oversight of government activities. The assessment of these capabilities can be divided into de jure (legal) and de facto (practical) aspects.
Legally, the Saeima has the right to request and receive information and documents from the government. This is a fundamental aspect of parliamentary oversight and is typically enshrined in the national constitution or in the Rules of Order of the Saeima.
Parliamentary committees have the legal authority to summon ministers to committee meetings. This allows them to hold ministers accountable and ask pertinent questions regarding their departments and actions. Deputies can submit a request to the minister or prime minister to answer questions raised by members. The Rules of Order of Saeima regulate the procedure.
In practice, the effectiveness of the provision process can vary. There might be instances where documents are provided in full and on time, but there can also be delays or instances where the information is incomplete or redacted. The extent to which ministers comply with invitations and provide satisfactory answers can vary. While some ministers may fully engage with the process, others offer limited or evasive responses.
In 2022, the 13th Saeima submitted 11 requests to the prime minister and ministers. No requests were submitted by members of the 14th Saeima in 2022.
Members of the Saeima may also submit questions to the prime minister, their deputy, a minister, and the president of the Bank of Latvia on matters within the competence of these officials. The concerned official shall give the answer in writing or orally at a sitting scheduled to answer members’ questions. In 2022, 91 members’ questions were submitted. The 13th Saeima had 77 questions, and the 14th Saeima had 14 questions. The parliament’s website, www.saeima.lv, provides access to members’ questions and the answers provided by the Cabinet of Ministers.
The parliament is somewhat hesitant to use instruments for government oversight.
Legally, the Saeima has the right to request and receive information and documents from the government. This is a fundamental aspect of parliamentary oversight and is typically enshrined in the national constitution or in the Rules of Order of the Saeima.
Parliamentary committees have the legal authority to summon ministers to committee meetings. This allows them to hold ministers accountable and ask pertinent questions regarding their departments and actions. Deputies can submit a request to the minister or prime minister to answer questions raised by members. The Rules of Order of Saeima regulate the procedure.
In practice, the effectiveness of the provision process can vary. There might be instances where documents are provided in full and on time, but there can also be delays or instances where the information is incomplete or redacted. The extent to which ministers comply with invitations and provide satisfactory answers can vary. While some ministers may fully engage with the process, others offer limited or evasive responses.
In 2022, the 13th Saeima submitted 11 requests to the prime minister and ministers. No requests were submitted by members of the 14th Saeima in 2022.
Members of the Saeima may also submit questions to the prime minister, their deputy, a minister, and the president of the Bank of Latvia on matters within the competence of these officials. The concerned official shall give the answer in writing or orally at a sitting scheduled to answer members’ questions. In 2022, 91 members’ questions were submitted. The 13th Saeima had 77 questions, and the 14th Saeima had 14 questions. The parliament’s website, www.saeima.lv, provides access to members’ questions and the answers provided by the Cabinet of Ministers.
The parliament is somewhat hesitant to use instruments for government oversight.
Citations:
Saeima. 1994. “Rules of Order of Saeima.” https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/57517-rules-of-order-of-saeima
Saeima. 2010. “Saeimas komisija rīt uz sēdi aicinājusi labklājības ministri.” https://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/17830-saeimas-komisija-rit-uz-sedi-aicinajusi-labklajibas-ministri
Saeima. 2023. “Saeimas gada pārskats 2022. gads.” https://www.saeima.lv/files/PP/Saeimasgadaparskats2022.pdf
Saeima. 1994. “Rules of Order of Saeima.” https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/57517-rules-of-order-of-saeima
Saeima. 2010. “Saeimas komisija rīt uz sēdi aicinājusi labklājības ministri.” https://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/17830-saeimas-komisija-rit-uz-sedi-aicinajusi-labklajibas-ministri
Saeima. 2023. “Saeimas gada pārskats 2022. gads.” https://www.saeima.lv/files/PP/Saeimasgadaparskats2022.pdf
6
Israel
In general, Knesset committees in Israel are considered weak compared to parliamentary committees in other countries. Each member of the Knesset is a member of several committees, which is problematic because they cannot attend all the meetings, making it more difficult to professionalize. The norm that committees are chaired by members of the opposition has been violated in the last four years. This further reduces committee powers (Hazan 2001).
Knesset committees can summon any official in the executive and request any information. While representatives of the executive are not legally obligated to appear before a committee or present documents, they have typically appeared before committees. However, in recent years, there have been increasing instances of ministers instructing their officials not to appear before a committee, which has weakened the Knesset’s oversight power.
Each committee holds at least one meeting a year with the respective minister, during which the minister introduces the ministry’s work plan for the upcoming year. This usually occurs during deliberations for the annual budget. The minister answers the committee’s questions and high-ranking officials always accompany the minister to address additional inquiries.
Committees often ask for documents, which are frequently not provided on time. This is either because the ministry does not have the information or because it is trying to delay the response. In most cases, however, the information is eventually provided, even when it is uncomfortable for the government.
Members of the Knesset frequently use parliamentary questions as a tool to obtain information. However, ministers often do not provide answers in a reasonable timeframe and some ignore the questions altogether. There is no mechanism to compel ministers to respond.
Knesset committees can summon any official in the executive and request any information. While representatives of the executive are not legally obligated to appear before a committee or present documents, they have typically appeared before committees. However, in recent years, there have been increasing instances of ministers instructing their officials not to appear before a committee, which has weakened the Knesset’s oversight power.
Each committee holds at least one meeting a year with the respective minister, during which the minister introduces the ministry’s work plan for the upcoming year. This usually occurs during deliberations for the annual budget. The minister answers the committee’s questions and high-ranking officials always accompany the minister to address additional inquiries.
Committees often ask for documents, which are frequently not provided on time. This is either because the ministry does not have the information or because it is trying to delay the response. In most cases, however, the information is eventually provided, even when it is uncomfortable for the government.
Members of the Knesset frequently use parliamentary questions as a tool to obtain information. However, ministers often do not provide answers in a reasonable timeframe and some ignore the questions altogether. There is no mechanism to compel ministers to respond.
Citations:
Hazan, Reuven. 2001. Reforming Parliamentary Committees: Israel in Comparative Perspective. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Hazan, Reuven. 2001. Reforming Parliamentary Committees: Israel in Comparative Perspective. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Netherlands
Public trust in the House of Representatives is at its lowest level in a decade, according to research by CBS. By the end of 2022, only a quarter of people aged 15 or above reported having confidence in parliament, the lowest such level since the survey began in 2012. This decline reflects a public perception that the legislative and oversight functions of both chambers (the lower house and the upper house or Senate) have diminished in quality.
Several factors have contributed to this decline, including the government’s conduct toward parliament. Pieter Omtzigt, a prominent legislator and founder of the new political party Nieuw Sociaal Contract, which gained 20 seats in the 22 November 2023 national elections, highlighted several government-related issues in his Thorbecke lecture: 1) Decisions are made by selective parts of the Council of Ministers in the prime minister’s official residence or office, at climate “tables” with stakeholders or lobbyists, bypassing the full cabinet and parliament, thereby diminishing parliamentary control; 2) Budget rights are being eroded by labeling initiatives as “emergency” programs with special budgets; 3) The government has a problematic habit of allowing laws adopted by parliament to enter into force only partially or not at all; and 4) Insufficient information is being provided to the legislature, as parliamentary inquiries and investigations often reveal that the chamber has been incorrectly, belatedly or incompletely informed on crucial issues. For example, the childcare alloWwance scandal would have been uncovered three years earlier if the government had properly informed the chamber, Omtzigt said.
Another significant contributor to the decline in trust is the fragmentation of political parties, driven by voter behavior and the highly proportional electoral system. When the Rutte IV government took office in March 2021, 17 parties entered the new House of Representatives. By 2023, due to party splits, the lower house had 20 political groups, a record. This fragmentation hampers the ability of MPs to thoroughly review laws, leading to insufficiently debated and increasingly complex legislation. Additionally, parliamentary support staff must spread their attention across too many topics. The importance of the co-legislation function has also declined as policy is increasingly shaped through other means, such as covenants or policy frameworks. The parliamentary agenda has become more varied, requiring attention to a broader range of subjects.
Tabling motions, even if they have not been financially reviewed, has become a trend among smaller groups. It is an easy way to score points during televised plenary sessions. In the parliamentary year 2022, more than 5,000 motions were submitted, compared to just a few hundred per year in the 1990s. This abundance of motions causes essential proposals to get lost in the noise. In a media climate where serious politics are overlooked and opportunistic politics are rewarded, resisting the temptation to table such motions is difficult.
Fragmentation also affects the constitutional relations between the House and Senate. Since 2010, Rutte cabinets have not had a clear majority in the Senate, even though every bill must pass both chambers. As a result, the government seeks support from Senate factions, compromising the Senate’s role as a “chambre de réflexion” with a focus on the quality, consistency and enforceability of legislation.
There is currently a proposal by two small parties to increase the number of chamber members from 150 to 250, aligning with European standards. However, this change would take years to implement, as it would require a constitutional amendment in two separate sessions.
Several factors have contributed to this decline, including the government’s conduct toward parliament. Pieter Omtzigt, a prominent legislator and founder of the new political party Nieuw Sociaal Contract, which gained 20 seats in the 22 November 2023 national elections, highlighted several government-related issues in his Thorbecke lecture: 1) Decisions are made by selective parts of the Council of Ministers in the prime minister’s official residence or office, at climate “tables” with stakeholders or lobbyists, bypassing the full cabinet and parliament, thereby diminishing parliamentary control; 2) Budget rights are being eroded by labeling initiatives as “emergency” programs with special budgets; 3) The government has a problematic habit of allowing laws adopted by parliament to enter into force only partially or not at all; and 4) Insufficient information is being provided to the legislature, as parliamentary inquiries and investigations often reveal that the chamber has been incorrectly, belatedly or incompletely informed on crucial issues. For example, the childcare alloWwance scandal would have been uncovered three years earlier if the government had properly informed the chamber, Omtzigt said.
Another significant contributor to the decline in trust is the fragmentation of political parties, driven by voter behavior and the highly proportional electoral system. When the Rutte IV government took office in March 2021, 17 parties entered the new House of Representatives. By 2023, due to party splits, the lower house had 20 political groups, a record. This fragmentation hampers the ability of MPs to thoroughly review laws, leading to insufficiently debated and increasingly complex legislation. Additionally, parliamentary support staff must spread their attention across too many topics. The importance of the co-legislation function has also declined as policy is increasingly shaped through other means, such as covenants or policy frameworks. The parliamentary agenda has become more varied, requiring attention to a broader range of subjects.
Tabling motions, even if they have not been financially reviewed, has become a trend among smaller groups. It is an easy way to score points during televised plenary sessions. In the parliamentary year 2022, more than 5,000 motions were submitted, compared to just a few hundred per year in the 1990s. This abundance of motions causes essential proposals to get lost in the noise. In a media climate where serious politics are overlooked and opportunistic politics are rewarded, resisting the temptation to table such motions is difficult.
Fragmentation also affects the constitutional relations between the House and Senate. Since 2010, Rutte cabinets have not had a clear majority in the Senate, even though every bill must pass both chambers. As a result, the government seeks support from Senate factions, compromising the Senate’s role as a “chambre de réflexion” with a focus on the quality, consistency and enforceability of legislation.
There is currently a proposal by two small parties to increase the number of chamber members from 150 to 250, aligning with European standards. However, this change would take years to implement, as it would require a constitutional amendment in two separate sessions.
Citations:
Omtzigt. 2023. “Thorbecke lezing, Zwolle.”
NOS Nieuws dinsdag 9 mei 2023
CBS: vertrouwen in Tweede Kamer in tien jaar tijd niet zo laag als nu
Th.J. van den Berg. 2022. “Ongemak over gedragscode TK.” Parlement. com, October 21.
B. van de Braak. 2022. “Nutteloze debatten.” Parlement.com October 28.
Groene Adammer. 2023. “Veel kleine fracties zorgen voor slechtere wetten.” 16 november.
De Correspondent, Jesse Frederik, 29 september 2022 Moties indienen, doorgerekend of niet, is een sport geworden in de Tweede Kamer.
Chavannes. 2023. “Pop-up verkiezingen voor de Eerste Kamer (en o ja, de provincie).” De Correspondent, March 3.
NRC-H, Valk. 2023. “Volt en ChristenUnie willen Tweede Kamer uitbreiden naar 250 zetels.” 29 August.
Omtzigt. 2023. “Thorbecke lezing, Zwolle.”
NOS Nieuws dinsdag 9 mei 2023
CBS: vertrouwen in Tweede Kamer in tien jaar tijd niet zo laag als nu
Th.J. van den Berg. 2022. “Ongemak over gedragscode TK.” Parlement. com, October 21.
B. van de Braak. 2022. “Nutteloze debatten.” Parlement.com October 28.
Groene Adammer. 2023. “Veel kleine fracties zorgen voor slechtere wetten.” 16 november.
De Correspondent, Jesse Frederik, 29 september 2022 Moties indienen, doorgerekend of niet, is een sport geworden in de Tweede Kamer.
Chavannes. 2023. “Pop-up verkiezingen voor de Eerste Kamer (en o ja, de provincie).” De Correspondent, March 3.
NRC-H, Valk. 2023. “Volt en ChristenUnie willen Tweede Kamer uitbreiden naar 250 zetels.” 29 August.
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
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Hungary
Until 2012, parliamentary committees in Hungary enjoyed extensive access to government documents. However, the standing orders of the Hungarian parliament were significantly altered under the 2012 Act on Parliament. These changes do not regulate the access of parliamentary committees to public documents. Subsequent Orbán governments have used their parliamentary majority to restrict access to public documents, even for discussions within parliamentary committees. Additionally, the minutes of committee meetings on sensitive issues, such as national security, are often classified, limiting opportunities for public scrutiny in cases as critical as the Pegasus wiretapping scandal. The parliament’s oversight function is formally regulated by the right to summon ministers, among other things. The standing orders of the Hungarian parliament require ministers to report personally to the relevant parliamentary committees at least once a year. However, these orders do not guarantee parliamentary committees the right to summon ministers for other hearings. Additionally, ministerial hearings suffer from severe time restrictions, with individual members of parliament allotted only two minutes to speak. Overall, the number of interpellations is declining. During the 2018 – 2022 term, the number of interpellations fell to 484, down from 820 in 2014 – 2018. The decline occurred in both government and opposition-initiated cases, indicating that even the opposition is losing trust in this instrument. In contrast, the number of prompt questions remained stable, while oral questions dropped by 50%, returning to the level they were before 2014. Written questions remained consistently high during the last two terms.
Poland
Alongside the marshal of the Sejm, the Presidium of the Sejm and the Council of Elders, committees constitute one of the primary organs of the Sejm, and their existence is constitutionally guaranteed. There are three types of committees: mandatory standing; ad hoc, which are established in exceptional situations; and investigative, which are designed to examine specific matters.
Parliamentary commissions serve both legislative and oversight functions. Governmental bodies and officials must answer questions and provide documents requested by commissions. However, this form of oversight is limited because opposition parties rarely hold a majority on such commissions, and the government often fails to support members of parliament with the necessary documents or timely responses. Ministers and leaders of the highest state administration bodies, or their representatives, are required to attend committee meetings when issues within their jurisdiction are being discussed.
In the Polish parliament, only investigative committees have powers that could be described as quasi-prosecutorial, as they can summon witnesses, appoint experts and order individuals to appear before the committee. However, in the 2022 – 2023 period, they were used only to interrogate former officeholders. On May 26, 2023, the Sejm adopted a law on the “State Commission for the Examination of Russian Interference in the Internal Security of Poland,” nicknamed “Lex Tusk,” alluding to the leader of the opposition in the upcoming parliamentary elections (Jałoszewski 2023). Initially, the commission was empowered to decide whether a person should be deprived of the right to hold public office in connection with the management of public funds for up to 10 years. As a result of strong pressure from the EU Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, the power to impose a ban on holding office was amended. After the 2023 elections, the incoming governing majority established three new bodies to scrutinize mail-in votes in 2020, the visa scandal and surveillance through the spyware program Pegasus.
Parliamentary commissions serve both legislative and oversight functions. Governmental bodies and officials must answer questions and provide documents requested by commissions. However, this form of oversight is limited because opposition parties rarely hold a majority on such commissions, and the government often fails to support members of parliament with the necessary documents or timely responses. Ministers and leaders of the highest state administration bodies, or their representatives, are required to attend committee meetings when issues within their jurisdiction are being discussed.
In the Polish parliament, only investigative committees have powers that could be described as quasi-prosecutorial, as they can summon witnesses, appoint experts and order individuals to appear before the committee. However, in the 2022 – 2023 period, they were used only to interrogate former officeholders. On May 26, 2023, the Sejm adopted a law on the “State Commission for the Examination of Russian Interference in the Internal Security of Poland,” nicknamed “Lex Tusk,” alluding to the leader of the opposition in the upcoming parliamentary elections (Jałoszewski 2023). Initially, the commission was empowered to decide whether a person should be deprived of the right to hold public office in connection with the management of public funds for up to 10 years. As a result of strong pressure from the EU Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, the power to impose a ban on holding office was amended. After the 2023 elections, the incoming governing majority established three new bodies to scrutinize mail-in votes in 2020, the visa scandal and surveillance through the spyware program Pegasus.
Citations:
Jałoszewski, M. 2023. “Lex Tusk is Violating EU Law, the European Commission has to Intervene [Analysis].” https://ruleoflaw.pl/lex-tusk-is-violating-eu-law-the-european-commission-has-to-intervene-analysis
Jałoszewski, M. 2023. “Lex Tusk is Violating EU Law, the European Commission has to Intervene [Analysis].” https://ruleoflaw.pl/lex-tusk-is-violating-eu-law-the-european-commission-has-to-intervene-analysis
Slovakia
The National Assembly and parliamentary committees have the full ability to acquire documents from the government; they also have the exclusive right to summon ministers to committee meetings and hold them accountable. However, the ruling majority also holds the majority in these committees, which weakens accountability. Generally, documents are provided in their entirety and delivered within a reasonable timeframe. Ministers and other officials invited to parliamentary committee meetings normally comply with invitations and provide answers to the questions posed.
There are a few instances where ministers did not appear, or members of parliament from the ruling coalition parties did not participate, rendering the committees unable to even open the meeting. Opposition members of parliament are often not satisfied with the responses (see for example Jabúrková, 2023). The competition between the government and the opposition hinders effective oversight.
There are a few instances where ministers did not appear, or members of parliament from the ruling coalition parties did not participate, rendering the committees unable to even open the meeting. Opposition members of parliament are often not satisfied with the responses (see for example Jabúrková, 2023). The competition between the government and the opposition hinders effective oversight.
Citations:
Mackie, I. et al. 2022. Quality of Legislative Process: Building a Conceptual Model and Developing Indicators. Luxembourg: European Union.
Jabúrková, N. 2023. “Mimoriadny ústavný výbor sa mal zaoberať ministrom vnútra, nakoniec však bol neuznášaniaschopný.” Noviny PLUS, November 10. https://plus.noviny.sk/855454-mimoriadny-ustavny-vybor-sa-mal-zaoberat-ministrom-vnutra-nakoniec-vsak-bol-neuznasaniaschopny
Mackie, I. et al. 2022. Quality of Legislative Process: Building a Conceptual Model and Developing Indicators. Luxembourg: European Union.
Jabúrková, N. 2023. “Mimoriadny ústavný výbor sa mal zaoberať ministrom vnútra, nakoniec však bol neuznášaniaschopný.” Noviny PLUS, November 10. https://plus.noviny.sk/855454-mimoriadny-ustavny-vybor-sa-mal-zaoberat-ministrom-vnutra-nakoniec-vsak-bol-neuznasaniaschopny
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The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
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