To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
10
Canada
Canada holds regular elections at the federal, provincial/territorial, and municipal levels and is generally considered to have a system that allows for free and fair political competition among candidates and political parties. Citizens and political parties are generally free to express their views, organize political activities, and participate in the political process without undue interference.
Laws and regulations governing elections aim to ensure fairness and equality among political actors. Each major jurisdiction has an independent election authority responsible to the legislature and the public for overseeing elections and ensuring that they are conducted transparently and according to established rules.
Electoral boundary commissions, typically staffed by judges and academics, review census data and set the boundaries for individual (single) member plurality constituencies (Qualter 1970). The Chief Electoral Officer must be satisfied that the information in the application is accurate and that the organization is a political party and may ask for additional documents, including the party’s constitution, by-laws, and program, if deemed necessary.
Several checks exist to ensure this system remains open and fair. First, Canada has a multiparty system with several political parties representing a range of ideologies and viewpoints, each monitoring compliance with election rules and regulations. A party that meets minimal administrative requirements is eligible for registration, and its registered status is granted when it nominates at least one candidate in an election. Second, the media are also open and free and monitor election conduct and results. Third, Canada has a strong tradition of protecting political freedoms, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association; these basic freedoms are incorporated into the federal Charter of Rights.
Funding and arrangements governing campaign and party expenses are generally transparent, equitable, and well-policed. Reforms to campaign finance regulations have been implemented in many jurisdictions to reduce the influence of private, especially corporate, donations in elections. These regulations limit individual donations and often ban corporate funding, replacing it with public funds provided to political parties to offset expenses.
However, parties and party leaders control candidate nominations in their constituencies and may block individuals from running for election for any reason they choose. This power is often exercised to silence internal critics within the party. Those individuals may still run for office under other party labels but have a very small chance of winning without major party support or having lost it. Finally, independent candidates (i.e., those not affiliated with a major political party) face a strong electoral disadvantage at both the federal and provincial levels and, under most conditions, are rarely elected.
Laws and regulations governing elections aim to ensure fairness and equality among political actors. Each major jurisdiction has an independent election authority responsible to the legislature and the public for overseeing elections and ensuring that they are conducted transparently and according to established rules.
Electoral boundary commissions, typically staffed by judges and academics, review census data and set the boundaries for individual (single) member plurality constituencies (Qualter 1970). The Chief Electoral Officer must be satisfied that the information in the application is accurate and that the organization is a political party and may ask for additional documents, including the party’s constitution, by-laws, and program, if deemed necessary.
Several checks exist to ensure this system remains open and fair. First, Canada has a multiparty system with several political parties representing a range of ideologies and viewpoints, each monitoring compliance with election rules and regulations. A party that meets minimal administrative requirements is eligible for registration, and its registered status is granted when it nominates at least one candidate in an election. Second, the media are also open and free and monitor election conduct and results. Third, Canada has a strong tradition of protecting political freedoms, including freedom of speech, assembly, and association; these basic freedoms are incorporated into the federal Charter of Rights.
Funding and arrangements governing campaign and party expenses are generally transparent, equitable, and well-policed. Reforms to campaign finance regulations have been implemented in many jurisdictions to reduce the influence of private, especially corporate, donations in elections. These regulations limit individual donations and often ban corporate funding, replacing it with public funds provided to political parties to offset expenses.
However, parties and party leaders control candidate nominations in their constituencies and may block individuals from running for election for any reason they choose. This power is often exercised to silence internal critics within the party. Those individuals may still run for office under other party labels but have a very small chance of winning without major party support or having lost it. Finally, independent candidates (i.e., those not affiliated with a major political party) face a strong electoral disadvantage at both the federal and provincial levels and, under most conditions, are rarely elected.
Citations:
Qualter, T. 1970. The Election Process in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Qualter, T. 1970. The Election Process in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Estonia
The principles of fair and free elections are laid out in the Estonian constitution. Estonia has a proportional representation electoral system, meaning that most candidates are registered within party lists. All 13 registered political parties can submit their list of candidates. The composition of party lists is determined by the internal procedures set by the statute of the political party. In addition to political parties, two or more citizens can form an election coalition to participate in municipal elections. Every citizen who has the right to stand as a candidate may nominate themselves as an independent candidate.
To be eligible as a candidate, a person must be an Estonian citizen. Any citizen of the European Union may stand as a candidate for a local government council or the European Parliament. Candidates for the Riigikogu and the European Parliament must be at least 21 years old, while candidates for local government councils must be at least 18 years old.
Individuals who are active members of the Defense Forces, have been divested of their active legal capacity with regard to the right to vote, or have been convicted of a crime and are serving a sentence in a penal institution cannot stand as candidates. However, individuals with conditional prison sentences may stand as candidates.
A deposit equal to the monthly minimum wage must be paid for each candidate. The eligibility of all candidates is reviewed by an independent body – the National Electoral Committee (NEC) – according to criteria set in the electoral laws.
The disputes that arise during the organization of elections are settled according to the procedures outlined in the election acts. Since election complaints must be resolved quickly, the election acts mandate a pre-judicial procedure. The right to review complaints has been granted to county electoral committees at the first instance and the NEC at the second instance. A resolution or act by the NEC can be contested directly in the Supreme Court. The law sets short time limits for the review of complaints.
Political parties are required to maintain accurate financial records, disclose the nature and value of received donations, and present their accounts quarterly to the Political Parties Financing Surveillance Committee (PPFSC). Additionally, parties and independent candidates must submit their reports on the funding of their election campaigns within one month after elections. All financing reports are publicly available on the PPFSC website. In the event of violations, sanctions are imposed. Illegal donations must be returned to the donor or – if this is impossible – paid to the State Treasury. For example, based on sanctions imposed by the PPFSC and the court ruling, the Center Party paid €843,000 to its former media partner, Midfield LLC, for campaign services in 2009 – 2015 (EPB 2022).
Candidates and parties have fair opportunities to access public and social media; there are no restrictions based on ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, language, religion or social origin. After the 2023 parliamentary elections, the issue of possible influence on election results by politically oriented NGOs has come into the public focus. Such NGOs advocate for particular ideologies by publishing opinion polls or research notes, which arguably may tilt voters’ choices. To date, organizations affiliated with political parties (think tanks, parties’ youth organizations) are not obliged to report to the PPFSC, meaning some services or benefits that parties receive are not duly declared in campaign reports. The PPFSC and the Riigikogu are expected to discuss relevant amendments to the Act on Political Parties (EPB 2023).
To be eligible as a candidate, a person must be an Estonian citizen. Any citizen of the European Union may stand as a candidate for a local government council or the European Parliament. Candidates for the Riigikogu and the European Parliament must be at least 21 years old, while candidates for local government councils must be at least 18 years old.
Individuals who are active members of the Defense Forces, have been divested of their active legal capacity with regard to the right to vote, or have been convicted of a crime and are serving a sentence in a penal institution cannot stand as candidates. However, individuals with conditional prison sentences may stand as candidates.
A deposit equal to the monthly minimum wage must be paid for each candidate. The eligibility of all candidates is reviewed by an independent body – the National Electoral Committee (NEC) – according to criteria set in the electoral laws.
The disputes that arise during the organization of elections are settled according to the procedures outlined in the election acts. Since election complaints must be resolved quickly, the election acts mandate a pre-judicial procedure. The right to review complaints has been granted to county electoral committees at the first instance and the NEC at the second instance. A resolution or act by the NEC can be contested directly in the Supreme Court. The law sets short time limits for the review of complaints.
Political parties are required to maintain accurate financial records, disclose the nature and value of received donations, and present their accounts quarterly to the Political Parties Financing Surveillance Committee (PPFSC). Additionally, parties and independent candidates must submit their reports on the funding of their election campaigns within one month after elections. All financing reports are publicly available on the PPFSC website. In the event of violations, sanctions are imposed. Illegal donations must be returned to the donor or – if this is impossible – paid to the State Treasury. For example, based on sanctions imposed by the PPFSC and the court ruling, the Center Party paid €843,000 to its former media partner, Midfield LLC, for campaign services in 2009 – 2015 (EPB 2022).
Candidates and parties have fair opportunities to access public and social media; there are no restrictions based on ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, language, religion or social origin. After the 2023 parliamentary elections, the issue of possible influence on election results by politically oriented NGOs has come into the public focus. Such NGOs advocate for particular ideologies by publishing opinion polls or research notes, which arguably may tilt voters’ choices. To date, organizations affiliated with political parties (think tanks, parties’ youth organizations) are not obliged to report to the PPFSC, meaning some services or benefits that parties receive are not duly declared in campaign reports. The PPFSC and the Riigikogu are expected to discuss relevant amendments to the Act on Political Parties (EPB 2023).
Citations:
Political Parties Financial Surveillance Committee. https://www.erjk.ee/en/financing-reports/election-campaigns
Estonian Public Broadcast. 2022. “Keskerakond tasus keelatud annetuse 843 000 eurot. May 2. https://www.err.ee/1608587518/keskerakond-tasus-keelatud-annetuse-843-000-eurot
Etonian Public Broadcast. 2023. “Valitsus kavatseb poliitiliste sihtasutuste tegevust reguleerida.” June 1. https://www.err.ee/1608995804/valitsus-kavatseb-poliitiliste-sihtasutuste-tegevust-reguleerida
Political Parties Financial Surveillance Committee. https://www.erjk.ee/en/financing-reports/election-campaigns
Estonian Public Broadcast. 2022. “Keskerakond tasus keelatud annetuse 843 000 eurot. May 2. https://www.err.ee/1608587518/keskerakond-tasus-keelatud-annetuse-843-000-eurot
Etonian Public Broadcast. 2023. “Valitsus kavatseb poliitiliste sihtasutuste tegevust reguleerida.” June 1. https://www.err.ee/1608995804/valitsus-kavatseb-poliitiliste-sihtasutuste-tegevust-reguleerida
Finland
The electoral process in Finland is free and fair, and the country’s constitution grants Finnish citizens the right to participate in national elections and referendums. The registration procedures for candidates and political parties meet standards of transparency and fairness, including requirements such as financial deposits, age, party affiliation and petition signatures (party-only). There are no exclusions based on insolvency, undischarged bankruptcy or criminal record/convictions.
No eligible candidate is prevented from being elected. No candidate is disqualified from registration in a manner that fails to adhere to objectively verifiable legal criteria. If a candidate is denied the right to be elected, they have the right to appeal to a competent jurisdiction capable of reviewing such decisions and correcting errors promptly and effectively.
Parties and candidates must maintain accurate financial records, disclose the nature and value of received donations, and regularly publish their accounts. This process is also carried out de facto. The State Accounting Office manages these activities and monitors party funding. There are no mechanisms that provide significant advantages to specific candidates or parties. Political competition is not affected or distorted by deliberate manipulation through the news media.
No eligible candidate is prevented from being elected. No candidate is disqualified from registration in a manner that fails to adhere to objectively verifiable legal criteria. If a candidate is denied the right to be elected, they have the right to appeal to a competent jurisdiction capable of reviewing such decisions and correcting errors promptly and effectively.
Parties and candidates must maintain accurate financial records, disclose the nature and value of received donations, and regularly publish their accounts. This process is also carried out de facto. The State Accounting Office manages these activities and monitors party funding. There are no mechanisms that provide significant advantages to specific candidates or parties. Political competition is not affected or distorted by deliberate manipulation through the news media.
Citations:
Orpo, Petteri. 2023. Government Program: A Strong and Committed Finland.
Publications of the Finnish Government. 2023. https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/governments/government-programme#/
Orpo, Petteri. 2023. Government Program: A Strong and Committed Finland.
Publications of the Finnish Government. 2023. https://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/governments/government-programme#/
Switzerland
There are no doubts that Switzerland’s formal procedures correspond closely to the democratic ideal. Registration procedures for candidates and political parties meet standards of transparency and fairness. New transparency regulations regarding financial support for political parties became effective for the last national election in 2023 (Federal Council 2022). This mitigates international critique of the opaque financing of political organizations (such as by Transparency International (2019) or GRECO (2017)), although there is still considerable room for improvement with regard to transparency. This lack of transparency can be explained by the liberal stance of the Swiss political system with regard to political-party financing – which in turn means that public authorities need more arguments than elsewhere to justify controlling party organizations. Eligible candidates are not prevented from being elected and are not disqualified from registration in a manner that does not adhere to objectively verifiable criteria set by law. To the best of our knowledge, candidates and parties have not been denied the right to be elected or registered. In any case, Switzerland is a state under the rule of law and decisions by public authorities can be challenged in court. There is no special law on political parties; parties are associations according to Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code, which says: “The articles of association must be done in writing and indicate the objects of the association, its resources and its organization” (on formal rules see: Schiess Rütimann 2011).
Candidates and parties enjoy fair opportunities to access the media and other communication channels without discrimination, for example, on the basis of ethnicity. The media landscape as a whole offers fair coverage of various political positions (Hänggli and Feddersen 2022, 2023).
The new rules on transparency, in effect since 2023, mandate that “the political parties represented in the Federal Assembly must annually disclose their income, the monetary and non-monetary donations received if their value exceeds CHF 15,000 per person per year, as well as the contributions made by individual mandate holders. The source of the contribution must also be disclosed. In the case of votes and National Council elections, the campaigners must disclose the financing of their campaigns before the vote or election if they have budgeted more than CHF 50,000 for these campaigns. After the vote or election, they must disclose the final accounts. In Council of States elections, the transparency rules only apply to those elected. Campaign leaders must disclose the final accounts. The final accounts must include all income, including any contribution of more than CHF 15,000 per person and campaign, which the campaigners have received to finance the campaign in the 12 months prior to the vote or election. The acceptance of anonymous donations and donations from abroad are now prohibited. Exceptions apply to donations from Swiss nationals abroad and for elections to the Council of States” (Federal Council 2022).
Party funding is monitored by the Swiss Federal Audit Office. There is no gerrymandering. However, in national elections, cantons serve as electoral districts. The smaller the number of seats within an electoral district, the lower the chances of small parties, and the larger the disproportionality of electoral rules. In the six cantons with only one seat in the National Council, the de facto proportional rule is replaced by a first-past-the-post mechanism. There is no evidence that political competition is affected or distorted by deliberate manipulation through new media.
Candidates and parties enjoy fair opportunities to access the media and other communication channels without discrimination, for example, on the basis of ethnicity. The media landscape as a whole offers fair coverage of various political positions (Hänggli and Feddersen 2022, 2023).
The new rules on transparency, in effect since 2023, mandate that “the political parties represented in the Federal Assembly must annually disclose their income, the monetary and non-monetary donations received if their value exceeds CHF 15,000 per person per year, as well as the contributions made by individual mandate holders. The source of the contribution must also be disclosed. In the case of votes and National Council elections, the campaigners must disclose the financing of their campaigns before the vote or election if they have budgeted more than CHF 50,000 for these campaigns. After the vote or election, they must disclose the final accounts. In Council of States elections, the transparency rules only apply to those elected. Campaign leaders must disclose the final accounts. The final accounts must include all income, including any contribution of more than CHF 15,000 per person and campaign, which the campaigners have received to finance the campaign in the 12 months prior to the vote or election. The acceptance of anonymous donations and donations from abroad are now prohibited. Exceptions apply to donations from Swiss nationals abroad and for elections to the Council of States” (Federal Council 2022).
Party funding is monitored by the Swiss Federal Audit Office. There is no gerrymandering. However, in national elections, cantons serve as electoral districts. The smaller the number of seats within an electoral district, the lower the chances of small parties, and the larger the disproportionality of electoral rules. In the six cantons with only one seat in the National Council, the de facto proportional rule is replaced by a first-past-the-post mechanism. There is no evidence that political competition is affected or distorted by deliberate manipulation through new media.
Citations:
Federal Council. 2022. “Neue Transparenzregeln bei der Politikfinanzierung gelten erstmals für die Nationalratswahlen 2023.” https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-90040.html
GRECO (Group of States against Corruption). 2017. Evaluation Report Switzerland. Strasbourg: GRECO. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806fceda
Hänggli, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2022. “Medien und politische Kommunikation.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, 7th ed., eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 491-516. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19
Schiess Rütimann, Patricia. 2011. Politische Parteien. Bern and Baden-Baden: Stämpfli/Nomos.
Transparency International. 2019. “Swiss Firms Give Over CHF5 Million a Year to Parties and Candidates.” https://transparency.ch/swiss-firms-give-over-chf5-million-a-year-to-parties-and-candidates
Federal Council. 2022. “Neue Transparenzregeln bei der Politikfinanzierung gelten erstmals für die Nationalratswahlen 2023.” https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-90040.html
GRECO (Group of States against Corruption). 2017. Evaluation Report Switzerland. Strasbourg: GRECO. https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806fceda
Hänggli, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2022. “Medien und politische Kommunikation.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, 7th ed., eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 491-516. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Hänggli Fricker, Regula, and Alexandra Feddersen. 2023. “Media and Political Communication.” In Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 372–388. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.19
Schiess Rütimann, Patricia. 2011. Politische Parteien. Bern and Baden-Baden: Stämpfli/Nomos.
Transparency International. 2019. “Swiss Firms Give Over CHF5 Million a Year to Parties and Candidates.” https://transparency.ch/swiss-firms-give-over-chf5-million-a-year-to-parties-and-candidates
9
Austria
Registration procedures for candidates and political parties in Austria meet established standards of transparency and fairness, including specific requirements such as financial deposits, age, party affiliation, and petition signatures. No eligible candidates have been prevented from being elected or disqualified from registration by undue or questionable criteria or practices.
However, it is significantly easier for parties already enjoying parliamentary representation to register for an upcoming election than for genuine newcomers. For example, parties holding seats in the Nationalrat need the signatures of just three members of parliament to launch another candidacy, while parties lacking any parliamentary representation need the signatures of 2,600 citizens for a nationwide candidacy. To be considered eligible for the office of federal president, a candidate needs the signatures of 6,000 Austrian citizens.
The presidential election of 2022 – which featured an incumbent seeking reelection – was widely considered to demonstrate the openness of competition even for the highest political office. Six other candidates secured between 1.6 and 17.7% of the vote, with three of them obtaining 8% or more of the total vote.
Electoral Commissions operate at various levels of the Austrian polity (national, state, and regional), deciding on issues concerning the eligibility of potential candidates. Parties and individual candidates can object to an electoral commission’s decision by taking their case to an administrative court. These courts have not hesitated to accept different types of claims and have ruled in favor of candidates.
While every Austrian citizen has an equal opportunity to run as a candidate – at a minimum age of 18 for all parliamentary elections and 35 for candidates competing for the office of federal president – there are significant de facto limitations reflecting the nature of a full-blown party government regime. Truly independent candidates tend to play no role in parliamentary elections at the national and state levels; Austrian parties hold an exceptionally powerful gatekeeper position.
Specifically, the Austrian electoral system requires parties to compete for votes and seats with party lists. Recent research on the composition of these lists has identified major shortcomings related to the under-representation of women, younger candidates, and particularly candidates “with a migration background.” In party list regimes, a latent form of discrimination against certain candidates involves their low ranking on a party list. The fact that this has not become a major issue in the public arena underscores the existence of unwritten rules of competition between different candidates, even within a given party.
Parties and candidates are required to maintain accurate financial records, disclose the nature and value of received donations, and publish their accounts regularly. In 2022, wide-ranging changes to the established party finance rules were introduced. These changes came into force on January 1, 2023, and January 1, 2024, respectively. In particular, parties now have several new obligations, such as publishing the names of their donors and the donations received. The threshold for donations not requiring public declaration has been lowered from €2,500 to €500 per year and donor. For funds received from membership fees, the name of the member must be disclosed for any amount exceeding €5,000 per year. Additionally, parties must provide the Austrian Court of Audit with a list of any debts exceeding €50,000 they may have with private loan givers, as well as a list of all organizations closely associated with the party (according to § 5 of the Party Finance Law). Furthermore, parties are required to disclose the exact size of shares they or any affiliated organizations hold in any company. Moreover, there is a new explicit duty for parties to store all records and files for potential inspection for at least seven years. Since January 1, 2023, parties must also report to the Austrian Court of Audit on a quarterly basis any individual donations exceeding €150, disclosing the name of the donor.
These recent changes have been urged and effectively triggered by the Austrian Court of Audit, which implies that Austrian parties have recurrently sought to exploit loopholes in the law to their benefit. The leeway of the Court of Audit has been expanded by recent reforms. Since 2023 the Court has not only the right to insist on a new report by a party if a report is found to be unsatisfactory, as in the past, but also the authority to take the initiative if it suspects any possible violation of the established party finance rules.
There is also a particular agency (unabhängiger Parteien-Transparenz-Senat, UPTS), located in the Federal Chancellor’s Office, that has the right to impose fines for violations of party finance rules. Fines can only be imposed after the Court of Audit has taken an initiative. However, the members of the UPTS – who are appointed by the federal president following a suggestion by the federal government – are independent and not subject to any instructions. The possible fines for certain violations have recently been increased. Delays in submitting accounting reports to the Court of Audit can also be fined.
Candidates and parties generally enjoy fair opportunities to access the media and other communication channels. Access to the media is neither restricted nor institutionally denied on the basis of ethnicity, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, birth, or other status. Also, the media landscape as a whole generally offers fair coverage of various political positions.
In constitutional practice, some limits to the idea of “perfect equality” can be identified. During electoral campaigns, all parties with parliamentary representation have the right to participate in unbiased debates hosted by a public broadcaster. However, this may disadvantage new parties that are not covered by this guarantee. Similarly, while there is an established practice of giving many different candidates – not just the top candidates of the major parties – a platform by organizing “one-on-one discussions” between candidates from different parties, there has been a strong bias toward candidates from parties enjoying parliamentary representation.
Research on media coverage of women candidates during the 2019 election campaign concluded that: “Throughout the last decade, women politicians in Austria have struggled with the media ceiling and changes have been minimal. A real gender bias still exists in Austrian campaign coverage: Women are considerably less visible in media coverage (…), they have fewer opportunities to impact the political agenda than their male counterparts (…), and they are assigned more often to speak about soft issues” (Hayek et al. 2022). However, the same study suggests that when women are their party’s top candidate – such as SPÖ-party leader Pamela Rendi-Wagner in 2019 – the observed gender-related differences tend to disappear.
There are no formal mechanisms in place that provide significant advantages to specific candidates or parties regarding media access and coverage. However, there has been a long-standing “special relationship” between some top political office holders, or candidates seeking reelection, and the tabloid press. Chancellor Werner Faymann (SPÖ, 2008 – 2016) was well known for enjoying biased support from Austria’s largest tabloid newspaper, Die Kronenzeitung, both as a chancellor candidate in 2008 and throughout his chancellorship. More critical in terms of violating the rules of fair political competition were the practices observed under the chancellorship of Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP, 2017 – 2021; see Wodak 2022). As revealed through both parliamentary and judicial investigations, Kurz and his inner circle apparently bought “fake survey results” and friendly coverage by the widely read free newspaper Österreich using public funds to enhance their status and disadvantage key competitors from other parties.
New media play an increasingly important role in Austria, with different candidates using them in fundamentally different ways. Political parties have started to use new media platforms, including social media, private-party TV channels, and YouTube channels, to spread their messages. These platforms are widely read and are becoming more important over time, but systematic attempts to manipulate political competition in Austria through new media have not yet been proven.
However, it is significantly easier for parties already enjoying parliamentary representation to register for an upcoming election than for genuine newcomers. For example, parties holding seats in the Nationalrat need the signatures of just three members of parliament to launch another candidacy, while parties lacking any parliamentary representation need the signatures of 2,600 citizens for a nationwide candidacy. To be considered eligible for the office of federal president, a candidate needs the signatures of 6,000 Austrian citizens.
The presidential election of 2022 – which featured an incumbent seeking reelection – was widely considered to demonstrate the openness of competition even for the highest political office. Six other candidates secured between 1.6 and 17.7% of the vote, with three of them obtaining 8% or more of the total vote.
Electoral Commissions operate at various levels of the Austrian polity (national, state, and regional), deciding on issues concerning the eligibility of potential candidates. Parties and individual candidates can object to an electoral commission’s decision by taking their case to an administrative court. These courts have not hesitated to accept different types of claims and have ruled in favor of candidates.
While every Austrian citizen has an equal opportunity to run as a candidate – at a minimum age of 18 for all parliamentary elections and 35 for candidates competing for the office of federal president – there are significant de facto limitations reflecting the nature of a full-blown party government regime. Truly independent candidates tend to play no role in parliamentary elections at the national and state levels; Austrian parties hold an exceptionally powerful gatekeeper position.
Specifically, the Austrian electoral system requires parties to compete for votes and seats with party lists. Recent research on the composition of these lists has identified major shortcomings related to the under-representation of women, younger candidates, and particularly candidates “with a migration background.” In party list regimes, a latent form of discrimination against certain candidates involves their low ranking on a party list. The fact that this has not become a major issue in the public arena underscores the existence of unwritten rules of competition between different candidates, even within a given party.
Parties and candidates are required to maintain accurate financial records, disclose the nature and value of received donations, and publish their accounts regularly. In 2022, wide-ranging changes to the established party finance rules were introduced. These changes came into force on January 1, 2023, and January 1, 2024, respectively. In particular, parties now have several new obligations, such as publishing the names of their donors and the donations received. The threshold for donations not requiring public declaration has been lowered from €2,500 to €500 per year and donor. For funds received from membership fees, the name of the member must be disclosed for any amount exceeding €5,000 per year. Additionally, parties must provide the Austrian Court of Audit with a list of any debts exceeding €50,000 they may have with private loan givers, as well as a list of all organizations closely associated with the party (according to § 5 of the Party Finance Law). Furthermore, parties are required to disclose the exact size of shares they or any affiliated organizations hold in any company. Moreover, there is a new explicit duty for parties to store all records and files for potential inspection for at least seven years. Since January 1, 2023, parties must also report to the Austrian Court of Audit on a quarterly basis any individual donations exceeding €150, disclosing the name of the donor.
These recent changes have been urged and effectively triggered by the Austrian Court of Audit, which implies that Austrian parties have recurrently sought to exploit loopholes in the law to their benefit. The leeway of the Court of Audit has been expanded by recent reforms. Since 2023 the Court has not only the right to insist on a new report by a party if a report is found to be unsatisfactory, as in the past, but also the authority to take the initiative if it suspects any possible violation of the established party finance rules.
There is also a particular agency (unabhängiger Parteien-Transparenz-Senat, UPTS), located in the Federal Chancellor’s Office, that has the right to impose fines for violations of party finance rules. Fines can only be imposed after the Court of Audit has taken an initiative. However, the members of the UPTS – who are appointed by the federal president following a suggestion by the federal government – are independent and not subject to any instructions. The possible fines for certain violations have recently been increased. Delays in submitting accounting reports to the Court of Audit can also be fined.
Candidates and parties generally enjoy fair opportunities to access the media and other communication channels. Access to the media is neither restricted nor institutionally denied on the basis of ethnicity, sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, birth, or other status. Also, the media landscape as a whole generally offers fair coverage of various political positions.
In constitutional practice, some limits to the idea of “perfect equality” can be identified. During electoral campaigns, all parties with parliamentary representation have the right to participate in unbiased debates hosted by a public broadcaster. However, this may disadvantage new parties that are not covered by this guarantee. Similarly, while there is an established practice of giving many different candidates – not just the top candidates of the major parties – a platform by organizing “one-on-one discussions” between candidates from different parties, there has been a strong bias toward candidates from parties enjoying parliamentary representation.
Research on media coverage of women candidates during the 2019 election campaign concluded that: “Throughout the last decade, women politicians in Austria have struggled with the media ceiling and changes have been minimal. A real gender bias still exists in Austrian campaign coverage: Women are considerably less visible in media coverage (…), they have fewer opportunities to impact the political agenda than their male counterparts (…), and they are assigned more often to speak about soft issues” (Hayek et al. 2022). However, the same study suggests that when women are their party’s top candidate – such as SPÖ-party leader Pamela Rendi-Wagner in 2019 – the observed gender-related differences tend to disappear.
There are no formal mechanisms in place that provide significant advantages to specific candidates or parties regarding media access and coverage. However, there has been a long-standing “special relationship” between some top political office holders, or candidates seeking reelection, and the tabloid press. Chancellor Werner Faymann (SPÖ, 2008 – 2016) was well known for enjoying biased support from Austria’s largest tabloid newspaper, Die Kronenzeitung, both as a chancellor candidate in 2008 and throughout his chancellorship. More critical in terms of violating the rules of fair political competition were the practices observed under the chancellorship of Sebastian Kurz (ÖVP, 2017 – 2021; see Wodak 2022). As revealed through both parliamentary and judicial investigations, Kurz and his inner circle apparently bought “fake survey results” and friendly coverage by the widely read free newspaper Österreich using public funds to enhance their status and disadvantage key competitors from other parties.
New media play an increasingly important role in Austria, with different candidates using them in fundamentally different ways. Political parties have started to use new media platforms, including social media, private-party TV channels, and YouTube channels, to spread their messages. These platforms are widely read and are becoming more important over time, but systematic attempts to manipulate political competition in Austria through new media have not yet been proven.
Citations:
https://www.parlament.gv.at/fachinfos/rlw/Was-ist-neu-im-Bereich-der-Parteienfinanzierung
https://www.parlament.gv.at/fachinfos/rlw/Wie-und-von-wem-wird-die-Parteienfinanzierung-kontrolliert
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000130585529/rechnungshof-stellt-unregelmaessigkeiten-bei-spoe-parteifinanzen-fest
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/themen/unabhangiger-parteien-transparenz-senat.html
Hayek, Lore, Manuel Mayrl, and Uta Russmann. 2022. “Women Politicians in Austria: Still Not Breaking the Media Ceiling.” Communications. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2021-0128
Wodak, Ruth. 2022. “Shameless Normalization as a Result of Media Control: The Case of Austria.” Discourse & Society 33 (6): 788-804.
https://www.demokratiezentrum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/boese_minderheiten.pdf
https://www.parlament.gv.at/fachinfos/rlw/Was-ist-neu-im-Bereich-der-Parteienfinanzierung
https://www.parlament.gv.at/fachinfos/rlw/Was-ist-neu-im-Bereich-der-Parteienfinanzierung
https://www.parlament.gv.at/fachinfos/rlw/Wie-und-von-wem-wird-die-Parteienfinanzierung-kontrolliert
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000130585529/rechnungshof-stellt-unregelmaessigkeiten-bei-spoe-parteifinanzen-fest
https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/themen/unabhangiger-parteien-transparenz-senat.html
Hayek, Lore, Manuel Mayrl, and Uta Russmann. 2022. “Women Politicians in Austria: Still Not Breaking the Media Ceiling.” Communications. https://doi.org/10.1515/commun-2021-0128
Wodak, Ruth. 2022. “Shameless Normalization as a Result of Media Control: The Case of Austria.” Discourse & Society 33 (6): 788-804.
https://www.demokratiezentrum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/boese_minderheiten.pdf
https://www.parlament.gv.at/fachinfos/rlw/Was-ist-neu-im-Bereich-der-Parteienfinanzierung
Belgium
Belgium is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional representation system and two linguistic groups, Flemish and French-speaking. There are currently 11 parties sitting in the lower chamber of parliament (Pilet 2021), along with two independent MPs. This is testimony to Belgium’s fair and accessible electoral system, despite a 5% electoral threshold since early 2000 (Reuchamps et al. 2014).
Legal restrictions, such as requiring a certain number of signatures before an individual may run, are fair and are effective in controlling the number of candidates running for election. The same holds for parties, which can be relatively easily registered, possibly in a single district (or electoral “arrondissement”). In practice, of course, such restrictions may represent a higher de facto hurdle for smaller or local parties or candidates. Like in any country, established parties developed enhanced knowledge of registration procedures and of the law’s subtleties.
Given mandatory voting, established parties typically slate candidates with diverse backgrounds (e.g., regarding age and cultural origins). Additionally, there are strong and effective constraints on gender balance in electoral lists which increased the proportion of women MPs which reached 42.7% at the 2019s election (Talukder, 2023). While these rules are abided by the parties, there remains overall a higher proportion of male candidates at the top of party lists, implying a higher chance of being elected and the way candidates are selected is not that clear (see Vandeleeene and Van Haute 2021).
Legal restrictions, such as requiring a certain number of signatures before an individual may run, are fair and are effective in controlling the number of candidates running for election. The same holds for parties, which can be relatively easily registered, possibly in a single district (or electoral “arrondissement”). In practice, of course, such restrictions may represent a higher de facto hurdle for smaller or local parties or candidates. Like in any country, established parties developed enhanced knowledge of registration procedures and of the law’s subtleties.
Given mandatory voting, established parties typically slate candidates with diverse backgrounds (e.g., regarding age and cultural origins). Additionally, there are strong and effective constraints on gender balance in electoral lists which increased the proportion of women MPs which reached 42.7% at the 2019s election (Talukder, 2023). While these rules are abided by the parties, there remains overall a higher proportion of male candidates at the top of party lists, implying a higher chance of being elected and the way candidates are selected is not that clear (see Vandeleeene and Van Haute 2021).
Citations:
https://elections.fgov.be/toutes-les-faq
Delwit, P., and De Waele, J. M., eds. 2021. Les partis politiques en Belgique. Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles.
Reuchamps, M., Onclin, F., Caluwaerts, D., and Baudewyns, P. 2014. “Raising the Threshold, Fighting Fragmentation? Mechanical and Psychological Effects of the Legal Electoral Threshold in Belgium.” West European Politics 37 (5): 1087-1107.
Talukder, D. 2023. “Challenging Assumptions: Investigating Measurement Sensitivity in Substantive Representation and Its Effects on Policy Satisfaction.” European Journal of Politics and Gender 6 (3): 414-432.
Pilet, J. B. 2021. “Hard Times for Governing Parties: The 2019 Federal Elections in Belgium.” West European Politics 44 (2): 439-449.
Vandeleene, A., and Van Haute, E. 2021. “A Comparative Analysis of Selection Criteria of Candidates in Belgium.” Frontiers in Political Science 3: 777747.
https://elections.fgov.be/toutes-les-faq
Delwit, P., and De Waele, J. M., eds. 2021. Les partis politiques en Belgique. Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles.
Reuchamps, M., Onclin, F., Caluwaerts, D., and Baudewyns, P. 2014. “Raising the Threshold, Fighting Fragmentation? Mechanical and Psychological Effects of the Legal Electoral Threshold in Belgium.” West European Politics 37 (5): 1087-1107.
Talukder, D. 2023. “Challenging Assumptions: Investigating Measurement Sensitivity in Substantive Representation and Its Effects on Policy Satisfaction.” European Journal of Politics and Gender 6 (3): 414-432.
Pilet, J. B. 2021. “Hard Times for Governing Parties: The 2019 Federal Elections in Belgium.” West European Politics 44 (2): 439-449.
Vandeleene, A., and Van Haute, E. 2021. “A Comparative Analysis of Selection Criteria of Candidates in Belgium.” Frontiers in Political Science 3: 777747.
Czechia
Political competition is robust at both the national and subnational levels. Electoral registration procedures are fair and transparent. To establish a political party, three citizens aged 18 or over need to submit the new party’s statutes to authorities, backed by 1,000 signatures. The 1991 law on political parties and movements established conditions to exclude parties that lack democratically elected organs or aim to remove the democratic foundations of the state, restrict the freedoms of other parties, or threaten morality and public order.
Ten major parties, coalitions, movements, and many independent candidates competed in the first round of Senate elections in September 2022. There were no conflicts over the registration of candidates.
Since 2012, the president of Czechia has been elected by citizens in a direct election. Any citizen with the right to vote who has reached 40 years of age is eligible to run for a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms. The candidate must gain at least 50,000 confirmed signatures from citizens, 10 signatures from senators, or 20 signatures from MPs. Twelve proposed candidates were rejected for failing to meet these criteria.
According to the OSCE, the 2023 presidential elections were free and fair. Their report stated, “All candidates were able to campaign freely, both offline and online, and fundamental freedoms were respected. The campaign was competitive but divisive, and voters could make an informed choice in both rounds, although in the second round, the campaign became more confrontational, negative and tense” (OSCE, 2023).
The presidential election in January 2023 ended in a run-off between former prime minister and leader of ANO (Akce nespokojených občanů, Action of Discontented Citizens), Andrej Babiš, and independent candidate, former General Petr Pavel. Eight candidates – seven men and one woman – competed in the first round. The two with the highest votes proceeded to the second round.
A funding ceiling was set at CZK 40 million, and the two leading candidates reached this limit. Pavel raised money mostly from various businesses, while Babiš was funded entirely by his own company, the conglomerate Agrofert. Candidates with less financial backing were at a disadvantage. The trade union leader Josef Středula eventually raised CZK 9.7 million, most of which was donated by a businessman and member of the right-wing ODS (Občanská demokratická strana, Civic Democratic Party), who believed there should be some representation for alternative views.
The media landscape enables candidates to freely voice their opinions. In the fall of 2023, Andrej Babiš sold his media consortium Mafra to an entrepreneur. Before this, he had been widely accused of using media he controlled to support his political campaigning and denigrate opponents. He had owned large dailies Mladá fronta dnes and Lidové noviny, as well as internet portals.
Ten major parties, coalitions, movements, and many independent candidates competed in the first round of Senate elections in September 2022. There were no conflicts over the registration of candidates.
Since 2012, the president of Czechia has been elected by citizens in a direct election. Any citizen with the right to vote who has reached 40 years of age is eligible to run for a maximum of two consecutive five-year terms. The candidate must gain at least 50,000 confirmed signatures from citizens, 10 signatures from senators, or 20 signatures from MPs. Twelve proposed candidates were rejected for failing to meet these criteria.
According to the OSCE, the 2023 presidential elections were free and fair. Their report stated, “All candidates were able to campaign freely, both offline and online, and fundamental freedoms were respected. The campaign was competitive but divisive, and voters could make an informed choice in both rounds, although in the second round, the campaign became more confrontational, negative and tense” (OSCE, 2023).
The presidential election in January 2023 ended in a run-off between former prime minister and leader of ANO (Akce nespokojených občanů, Action of Discontented Citizens), Andrej Babiš, and independent candidate, former General Petr Pavel. Eight candidates – seven men and one woman – competed in the first round. The two with the highest votes proceeded to the second round.
A funding ceiling was set at CZK 40 million, and the two leading candidates reached this limit. Pavel raised money mostly from various businesses, while Babiš was funded entirely by his own company, the conglomerate Agrofert. Candidates with less financial backing were at a disadvantage. The trade union leader Josef Středula eventually raised CZK 9.7 million, most of which was donated by a businessman and member of the right-wing ODS (Občanská demokratická strana, Civic Democratic Party), who believed there should be some representation for alternative views.
The media landscape enables candidates to freely voice their opinions. In the fall of 2023, Andrej Babiš sold his media consortium Mafra to an entrepreneur. Before this, he had been widely accused of using media he controlled to support his political campaigning and denigrate opponents. He had owned large dailies Mladá fronta dnes and Lidové noviny, as well as internet portals.
Citations:
Lenka Bustikova and Petra Guasti. 2023. “The Czech Republic’s Flannel Revolution.” CEPA https://cepa.org/article/the-czech-republics-flannel-revolution
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The Czech Republic. Presidential Election. 13-14 and 27-28 January 2023. ODIHR Election Expert Team. Final Report.
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/0/545815.pdf
Lenka Buštíková and Petra Guasti. 2019. “The State as a Firm: Understanding the Autocratic Roots of Technocratic Populism.” East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 33 (2): 302-330.
Lenka Bustikova and Petra Guasti. 2023. “The Czech Republic’s Flannel Revolution.” CEPA https://cepa.org/article/the-czech-republics-flannel-revolution
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The Czech Republic. Presidential Election. 13-14 and 27-28 January 2023. ODIHR Election Expert Team. Final Report.
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/0/545815.pdf
Lenka Buštíková and Petra Guasti. 2019. “The State as a Firm: Understanding the Autocratic Roots of Technocratic Populism.” East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 33 (2): 302-330.
Denmark
The basic rule for candidacy procedures is laid out in Article 30 of the Danish constitution: “Any person who is entitled to vote at general (parliamentary) elections shall be eligible for membership of the Folketinget, unless he has been convicted of an act which in the eyes of the public makes him unworthy to be a member of the Folketinget.” It is the unicameral parliament (Folketinget) itself that ultimately decides whether a conviction renders someone unworthy of membership. Since the 1953 constitution, only twice have elected members been found unworthy to take office. Such a decision applies only to one electoral term, allowing the candidate to present themself in the next election. This occurred in 1987 when parliamentarian Mogens Glistrup was found worthy of taking office after serving a prison sentence for tax avoidance, which had rendered him unworthy after the 1982 election.
Political parties play a crucial role in selecting candidates for elections (Zahle 2005). Although it is possible to run in an election as an independent candidate, it is extremely difficult to win in that capacity. Given the relatively high number of political parties, it is reasonably easy to become a candidate for a party. There is also the option of forming a new party. To participate in general elections, a new party must collect at least 20,000 voter declarations, which are then verified and approved by the Ministry of the Interior and Health. Parties typically need at least 2% of the votes to gain representation in parliament. This threshold corresponds to four seats. If a party fails to secure enough votes to enter parliament, those votes are effectively lost.
At the regional and municipal level, access to the ballot is more lenient. To be on the ballot in a regional or municipal election, candidates have to secure 25 signatures from voters living in the municipality or region. Consequently, local lists and individuals are elected locally (Ministry of the Interior and Health 2024).
Parties are generously funded in Denmark. Currently, they receive DKK 37 per vote gained in the preceding national election, DKK 8.25 per vote obtained in a municipal election and DKK 5.25 per vote gained in a regional election (Ministry of the Interior and Health 2024b).
Party financing is relatively transparent in Denmark. According to the law, donations above DKK 25,000 cannot be made anonymously. There are press reports that donors partition their contributions into amounts lower than DKK 25,000 to avoid having to reveal their identities publicly. Another loophole exists in the form of party clubs, where donors pay a membership fee to gain access to top parliamentarians. These clubs are being discussed, but according to most press accounts, amounts flowing into parties are limited, probably due to the generous public funding of parties (Puguntke et al. 2016).
The Danish media landscape is dominated by the Danish Broadcasting Company (DR), which is publicly funded. Albæk et al. find that the reporting in DR is politically unbiased (Albæk et al. 2010). The print press is largely privately owned, and according to some commentators, these media lean to the right, with the exception of the daily Politiken, which self-declares as a center-left newspaper (Winter 2023). Even if the media coverage of electoral campaigns is not subject to strict regulations – for instance, in terms of equitable access – the coverage of issues and candidates before the 2022 general elections was “comprehensive and meaningful” (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2023, p. 9).
Political parties play a crucial role in selecting candidates for elections (Zahle 2005). Although it is possible to run in an election as an independent candidate, it is extremely difficult to win in that capacity. Given the relatively high number of political parties, it is reasonably easy to become a candidate for a party. There is also the option of forming a new party. To participate in general elections, a new party must collect at least 20,000 voter declarations, which are then verified and approved by the Ministry of the Interior and Health. Parties typically need at least 2% of the votes to gain representation in parliament. This threshold corresponds to four seats. If a party fails to secure enough votes to enter parliament, those votes are effectively lost.
At the regional and municipal level, access to the ballot is more lenient. To be on the ballot in a regional or municipal election, candidates have to secure 25 signatures from voters living in the municipality or region. Consequently, local lists and individuals are elected locally (Ministry of the Interior and Health 2024).
Parties are generously funded in Denmark. Currently, they receive DKK 37 per vote gained in the preceding national election, DKK 8.25 per vote obtained in a municipal election and DKK 5.25 per vote gained in a regional election (Ministry of the Interior and Health 2024b).
Party financing is relatively transparent in Denmark. According to the law, donations above DKK 25,000 cannot be made anonymously. There are press reports that donors partition their contributions into amounts lower than DKK 25,000 to avoid having to reveal their identities publicly. Another loophole exists in the form of party clubs, where donors pay a membership fee to gain access to top parliamentarians. These clubs are being discussed, but according to most press accounts, amounts flowing into parties are limited, probably due to the generous public funding of parties (Puguntke et al. 2016).
The Danish media landscape is dominated by the Danish Broadcasting Company (DR), which is publicly funded. Albæk et al. find that the reporting in DR is politically unbiased (Albæk et al. 2010). The print press is largely privately owned, and according to some commentators, these media lean to the right, with the exception of the daily Politiken, which self-declares as a center-left newspaper (Winter 2023). Even if the media coverage of electoral campaigns is not subject to strict regulations – for instance, in terms of equitable access – the coverage of issues and candidates before the 2022 general elections was “comprehensive and meaningful” (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2023, p. 9).
Citations:
Albæk, E., Hopmann, D. N., and de Vreese, C. H. 2010. Kunsten at holde balancen: dækningen af folketingsvalgkampe i tv-nyhederne på DR1 og TV2, 1994-2007. Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag.
Ministry of the Interior and Health 2024. https://elections.im.dk
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 2023. Denmark – Early General Elections 1 November 2022. ODIHR Election Expert Team Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE ODIHR.
Poguntke, Thomas, et al. 2016. “Party Rules, Party Resources and the Politics of Parliamentary Democracies: How Parties Organize in the 21st Century.” Party Politics 22 (6): 661-678.
Winter, B. 2023. “Læserne vælger avis efter partifarve - CVAP i Berlingske.” https://cvap.polsci.ku.dk/forskning/valgkamp/presse/L_serne_v_lger_avis_efter_partifarve_-_CVAP_i_Berlingske.pdf
Zahle, H. 2005. Dansk forfatningsret I: Institutioner og regulering. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers’ Forlag.
Albæk, E., Hopmann, D. N., and de Vreese, C. H. 2010. Kunsten at holde balancen: dækningen af folketingsvalgkampe i tv-nyhederne på DR1 og TV2, 1994-2007. Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag.
Ministry of the Interior and Health 2024. https://elections.im.dk
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 2023. Denmark – Early General Elections 1 November 2022. ODIHR Election Expert Team Final Report. Warsaw: OSCE ODIHR.
Poguntke, Thomas, et al. 2016. “Party Rules, Party Resources and the Politics of Parliamentary Democracies: How Parties Organize in the 21st Century.” Party Politics 22 (6): 661-678.
Winter, B. 2023. “Læserne vælger avis efter partifarve - CVAP i Berlingske.” https://cvap.polsci.ku.dk/forskning/valgkamp/presse/L_serne_v_lger_avis_efter_partifarve_-_CVAP_i_Berlingske.pdf
Zahle, H. 2005. Dansk forfatningsret I: Institutioner og regulering. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers’ Forlag.
France
Political competition for access to power is open and not systematically biased. Overall, political practices and regulations both contribute to fair access and transparency.
Requirements to be a candidate in elections are generally limited (see Aceproject 2024). French nationality is required except for European and local elections; in such cases, being a citizen of an EU country is sufficient, as long as the potential candidate resides in France. The minimum age of eligibility has been 18 for all elections since 2011, except for the senatorial elections, for which the minimum age is 24. Potential candidates must not have been deprived of civic and voting rights, and must be registered on the electoral rolls. Residence within the electoral district is also expected – although this condition is generally limited to the obligation to pay local taxes in this territory. Candidates then have to deposit a file with the “préfecture” – the local office of the central government – or with the Constitutional Council (for the presidential election).
For presidential elections, this file includes a mandatory declaration of possible conflicts of interest as well as a disclosure of patrimony at the time of the election. Controversially, presidential candidates must also present 500 signatures by sponsors. These signatures can be given by officeholders at the local or national level, and are made public. Although some candidates fail to gather the requested number of signatures, this has not prevented a certain diversity, with 12 candidates participating in the first round of the presidential election of 2022 (Bendjaballah and Sauger 2023).
Over the course of the campaign, whatever the level, all candidate financial activities have to be registered and then reported (CNCCFP 2024). The National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Funding (Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques, CNCCFP) is an independent regulatory agency in charge of organizing the collection and dissemination of this data. The data are published in the Official Journal of the Republic. Candidate accounts also must be certified. Donations from firms and organizations to candidates have been banned since the 1990s. Donations from private individuals are still allowed, with a cap set at €4,600 per individual for an election. All donations above €3,000 lead to the disclosure of the name of the donor. Political parties have similar obligations, with the CNCCFP supervising both candidates and parties. For parties, maximum donations are set at €7,500 for an individual and €15,000 for the household as a whole.
In practice, the variety of the background of candidates and the spectrum of policy positions advocated by political parties is very large, from the radical Trotskyist left to the extreme neo-fascist right.
Access to the media is strictly monitored by the national independent agency in charge of mass and new media, Arcom (Authority of the Regulation of Audiovisual and Digital Communication, Autorité de régulation de la communication audiovisuelle et numérique). Media time accrued by all political actors is accounted for (Arcom 2024). Outside of electoral campaigns, Arcom imposes an allocation rule of one-third of the time for the president and the government, with the remaining two-thirds to be split in a “fair” manner among all parties. Fairness is based on the importance of parties, taking into account past electoral results, opinion polls and all relevant political dynamics. During election campaigns, media time allocation is even more strictly monitored. For presidential campaigns, during the official campaign – the last weeks of the race – Arcom switches its principle of fairness to a principle of strict equality of time granted to all candidates in the election.
Disproportionate media coverage of individual political actors because of their background characteristics has not recently led to long-lasting discussions. However, the surge of business leaders in the media landscape has triggered more reflections on their role. While many have invested in the written press, the most controversial case is Vincent Bolloré. This prominent businessman has bought print publications and TV groups in recent years, including Canal+. He has been accused of systematic interventions in these media, demanding a more conservative editorial line. The relative success of the radical right Eric Zemmour has largely been attributed to Bolloré’s support.
For digital media, the most acute issue stems from the intervention of Russian hackers in electoral campaigns. This has been proven, for instance, in the case of the 2017 election, in which the “Macron leaks” – the publication of several emails from Macron’s campaign team – was traced back to two groups of Russian hackers linked to Russian special operations (Vilmer 2020).
The fair media coverage principle and regulations on party and candidate funding are also mostly respected in practice. For instance, the public disclosure of financial accounts is centralized by the CNCCFP, and failure to meet its standards leads to the loss of state public funding, which is crucial for most significant parties. Of course, violations still take place. On the one hand, all pieces of legislation have their loopholes. For example, CNCCFP is currently working to track personal loans to candidates or parties, which are increasing and lack some transparency. On the other hand, scandals regarding the funding of campaigns have tainted several prominent candidates’ reputations. Nicolas Sarkozy was notably deemed guilty by courts of submitting fake invoices in his presidential campaign of 2012, and is awaiting trial for receiving funding from the state of Libya in his 2007 campaign. The participation of the audit firm McKinsey in Emmanuel Macron’s electoral campaigns of 2017 and 2022 is also currently under scrutiny by the National Judicial Prosecutor’s Office.
To some extent, the periodic losses by incumbents demonstrates the openness of the country’s political competition. Electoral swings are important, and new credible candidates can emerge in a matter of months at the national level. Even the politicization of the design of the political districts map – which is mostly in the hands of the Ministry of Interior – does not lead to massive gerrymandering but rather to inaction, as actors are worried by the possible accusation of manipulation (Sauger and Grofman 2016). Conversely, the ease of credibly entering political races could be seen as a potential problem in terms of political stability and effective accountability.
Requirements to be a candidate in elections are generally limited (see Aceproject 2024). French nationality is required except for European and local elections; in such cases, being a citizen of an EU country is sufficient, as long as the potential candidate resides in France. The minimum age of eligibility has been 18 for all elections since 2011, except for the senatorial elections, for which the minimum age is 24. Potential candidates must not have been deprived of civic and voting rights, and must be registered on the electoral rolls. Residence within the electoral district is also expected – although this condition is generally limited to the obligation to pay local taxes in this territory. Candidates then have to deposit a file with the “préfecture” – the local office of the central government – or with the Constitutional Council (for the presidential election).
For presidential elections, this file includes a mandatory declaration of possible conflicts of interest as well as a disclosure of patrimony at the time of the election. Controversially, presidential candidates must also present 500 signatures by sponsors. These signatures can be given by officeholders at the local or national level, and are made public. Although some candidates fail to gather the requested number of signatures, this has not prevented a certain diversity, with 12 candidates participating in the first round of the presidential election of 2022 (Bendjaballah and Sauger 2023).
Over the course of the campaign, whatever the level, all candidate financial activities have to be registered and then reported (CNCCFP 2024). The National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Funding (Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques, CNCCFP) is an independent regulatory agency in charge of organizing the collection and dissemination of this data. The data are published in the Official Journal of the Republic. Candidate accounts also must be certified. Donations from firms and organizations to candidates have been banned since the 1990s. Donations from private individuals are still allowed, with a cap set at €4,600 per individual for an election. All donations above €3,000 lead to the disclosure of the name of the donor. Political parties have similar obligations, with the CNCCFP supervising both candidates and parties. For parties, maximum donations are set at €7,500 for an individual and €15,000 for the household as a whole.
In practice, the variety of the background of candidates and the spectrum of policy positions advocated by political parties is very large, from the radical Trotskyist left to the extreme neo-fascist right.
Access to the media is strictly monitored by the national independent agency in charge of mass and new media, Arcom (Authority of the Regulation of Audiovisual and Digital Communication, Autorité de régulation de la communication audiovisuelle et numérique). Media time accrued by all political actors is accounted for (Arcom 2024). Outside of electoral campaigns, Arcom imposes an allocation rule of one-third of the time for the president and the government, with the remaining two-thirds to be split in a “fair” manner among all parties. Fairness is based on the importance of parties, taking into account past electoral results, opinion polls and all relevant political dynamics. During election campaigns, media time allocation is even more strictly monitored. For presidential campaigns, during the official campaign – the last weeks of the race – Arcom switches its principle of fairness to a principle of strict equality of time granted to all candidates in the election.
Disproportionate media coverage of individual political actors because of their background characteristics has not recently led to long-lasting discussions. However, the surge of business leaders in the media landscape has triggered more reflections on their role. While many have invested in the written press, the most controversial case is Vincent Bolloré. This prominent businessman has bought print publications and TV groups in recent years, including Canal+. He has been accused of systematic interventions in these media, demanding a more conservative editorial line. The relative success of the radical right Eric Zemmour has largely been attributed to Bolloré’s support.
For digital media, the most acute issue stems from the intervention of Russian hackers in electoral campaigns. This has been proven, for instance, in the case of the 2017 election, in which the “Macron leaks” – the publication of several emails from Macron’s campaign team – was traced back to two groups of Russian hackers linked to Russian special operations (Vilmer 2020).
The fair media coverage principle and regulations on party and candidate funding are also mostly respected in practice. For instance, the public disclosure of financial accounts is centralized by the CNCCFP, and failure to meet its standards leads to the loss of state public funding, which is crucial for most significant parties. Of course, violations still take place. On the one hand, all pieces of legislation have their loopholes. For example, CNCCFP is currently working to track personal loans to candidates or parties, which are increasing and lack some transparency. On the other hand, scandals regarding the funding of campaigns have tainted several prominent candidates’ reputations. Nicolas Sarkozy was notably deemed guilty by courts of submitting fake invoices in his presidential campaign of 2012, and is awaiting trial for receiving funding from the state of Libya in his 2007 campaign. The participation of the audit firm McKinsey in Emmanuel Macron’s electoral campaigns of 2017 and 2022 is also currently under scrutiny by the National Judicial Prosecutor’s Office.
To some extent, the periodic losses by incumbents demonstrates the openness of the country’s political competition. Electoral swings are important, and new credible candidates can emerge in a matter of months at the national level. Even the politicization of the design of the political districts map – which is mostly in the hands of the Ministry of Interior – does not lead to massive gerrymandering but rather to inaction, as actors are worried by the possible accusation of manipulation (Sauger and Grofman 2016). Conversely, the ease of credibly entering political races could be seen as a potential problem in terms of political stability and effective accountability.
Citations:
Aceproject. 2024. “France.” https://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/FR/default-fr?set_language=fr
Arcom. 2024. “Publication des relevés des temps de parole et d’antenne.” https://www.arcom.fr/actualites/election-presidentielle-2022-publication-des-releves-des-temps-de-parole-et-dantenne
Bendjaballah, S. and N. Sauger. 2023. “France: Political Developments and Data for 2022: Back to Normal?” European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook. Available at https://doi.org/10.1111/2047-8852.12403
CNCCFP. 2024. “Elections.” https://www.cnccfp.fr/elections
Sauger, N., and Bernard Grofman. 2016. “Partisan Bias and Redistricting in France.” Electoral Studies 44: 388-396. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.09.007
Vilmer, J. B. J. 2020. “Fighting Information Manipulation: The French Experience.” In Disinformation and Fake News, 75-89. Singapore: Springer.
Aceproject. 2024. “France.” https://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/FR/default-fr?set_language=fr
Arcom. 2024. “Publication des relevés des temps de parole et d’antenne.” https://www.arcom.fr/actualites/election-presidentielle-2022-publication-des-releves-des-temps-de-parole-et-dantenne
Bendjaballah, S. and N. Sauger. 2023. “France: Political Developments and Data for 2022: Back to Normal?” European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook. Available at https://doi.org/10.1111/2047-8852.12403
CNCCFP. 2024. “Elections.” https://www.cnccfp.fr/elections
Sauger, N., and Bernard Grofman. 2016. “Partisan Bias and Redistricting in France.” Electoral Studies 44: 388-396. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.09.007
Vilmer, J. B. J. 2020. “Fighting Information Manipulation: The French Experience.” In Disinformation and Fake News, 75-89. Singapore: Springer.
Germany
Both independent candidates and candidates from registered parties may run for election to the Bundestag. To qualify for the ballot, political parties and candidates must meet specific registration requirements outlined in the Political Parties Act (Parteigesetz). These requirements differ based on whether the qualification concerns a party or an independent candidate.
At the subnational level, the State Election Act of a state (Landeswahlgesetz) specifies the criteria for candidates and parties. Non-established parties – those that have not held at least five seats in the Bundestag or a state parliament (Landtag) continuously since the last election – must be assessed for eligibility by the Federal Election Committee (Bundeswahlausschuss) or, in the case of state elections, by the respective state’s Election Committee. These parties must submit various documents, such as a declaration of intent, their manifesto, and a demonstration of their status as a party (Parteieigenschaft, §2 Abs. 2 PartG).
Additionally, non-established parties and non-partisan candidates must provide a minimum number of signatures from eligible voters in the electoral district where they intend to run for election. Candidates are also required to submit personal information and details about their party affiliation (Bundeswahlleiterin, 2021). Rejected parties have the right to appeal the decision up to 75 days before the election (OSCE, 2022: 5).
The Basic Law (§ 21 Abs. 1 GG) mandates that parties disclose their assets and the origins of their financial resources. While parties must identify donors of contributions above €500, transparency is required only for donations exceeding €10,000 from a single donor within one year. In such cases, parties must disclose the donor’s name, address, and the total amount given. Furthermore, donations exceeding €50,000 must be reported to the president of the German parliament immediately, and these donations are also made available online (BMI, 2023).
Regarding media access for parties and candidates, the activities of broadcasting media are regulated by the laws of the Länder, with no general media-related regulations at the federal level. However, the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag) provides a general framework, ensuring the plurality of opinion and balanced coverage of all major political, ideological, and social forces.
All parties with a list in at least one federal state are to receive an “appropriate” amount of broadcasting time. The amount of airtime allocated to each party depends on its performance in the previous general election. While campaigning in public media is free of charge, private media charge for election airtime. The OSCE notes that this could make it difficult for smaller parties to afford airtime, especially for the 2023 Berlin elections, which included more than two elections in one cycle (OSCE, 2023: 9).
In addition to public and private media campaigns, an increasing number of parties and candidates are utilizing social media channels like Facebook and Instagram for electoral campaigns, with a substantial portion focusing on negative campaigning. During the federal elections in 2021, candidates often sought to discredit their opponents through disinformation and hate speech (Ruttloff et al., 2023). In Germany, as in other OECD countries, disinformation spread through social media has been shown to impact voter loyalty, leading to vote switching. For the 2017 federal election, the AfD in particular benefited from the fact that many CDU voters were receptive to disinformation distributed over social media (Zimmermann and Kohring, 2020).
At the subnational level, the State Election Act of a state (Landeswahlgesetz) specifies the criteria for candidates and parties. Non-established parties – those that have not held at least five seats in the Bundestag or a state parliament (Landtag) continuously since the last election – must be assessed for eligibility by the Federal Election Committee (Bundeswahlausschuss) or, in the case of state elections, by the respective state’s Election Committee. These parties must submit various documents, such as a declaration of intent, their manifesto, and a demonstration of their status as a party (Parteieigenschaft, §2 Abs. 2 PartG).
Additionally, non-established parties and non-partisan candidates must provide a minimum number of signatures from eligible voters in the electoral district where they intend to run for election. Candidates are also required to submit personal information and details about their party affiliation (Bundeswahlleiterin, 2021). Rejected parties have the right to appeal the decision up to 75 days before the election (OSCE, 2022: 5).
The Basic Law (§ 21 Abs. 1 GG) mandates that parties disclose their assets and the origins of their financial resources. While parties must identify donors of contributions above €500, transparency is required only for donations exceeding €10,000 from a single donor within one year. In such cases, parties must disclose the donor’s name, address, and the total amount given. Furthermore, donations exceeding €50,000 must be reported to the president of the German parliament immediately, and these donations are also made available online (BMI, 2023).
Regarding media access for parties and candidates, the activities of broadcasting media are regulated by the laws of the Länder, with no general media-related regulations at the federal level. However, the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag) provides a general framework, ensuring the plurality of opinion and balanced coverage of all major political, ideological, and social forces.
All parties with a list in at least one federal state are to receive an “appropriate” amount of broadcasting time. The amount of airtime allocated to each party depends on its performance in the previous general election. While campaigning in public media is free of charge, private media charge for election airtime. The OSCE notes that this could make it difficult for smaller parties to afford airtime, especially for the 2023 Berlin elections, which included more than two elections in one cycle (OSCE, 2023: 9).
In addition to public and private media campaigns, an increasing number of parties and candidates are utilizing social media channels like Facebook and Instagram for electoral campaigns, with a substantial portion focusing on negative campaigning. During the federal elections in 2021, candidates often sought to discredit their opponents through disinformation and hate speech (Ruttloff et al., 2023). In Germany, as in other OECD countries, disinformation spread through social media has been shown to impact voter loyalty, leading to vote switching. For the 2017 federal election, the AfD in particular benefited from the fact that many CDU voters were receptive to disinformation distributed over social media (Zimmermann and Kohring, 2020).
Citations:
BPB. 2014. “https://www.bpb.de/system/files/dokument_pdf/Wahlvorschl%C3%A4ge.pdf”
Bundesministerium des Inneren und für Heimat (BMI). 2023. “Parteifinanzierung.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/parteienrecht/parteienfinanzierung/parteienfinanzierung.html
Bundesministerium des Inneren und für Heimat. 2023. “Parteifinanzierung.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/parteienrecht/parteienfinanzierung/parteienfinanzierung.html
Bundeswahlleiterin. 2021. “www.bundeswahlleiterin.de”
OSCE. 2022. Federal Republic of Germany. Elections to the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) 26 September 2021. ODIHR Election Expert Team Final Report, 16 March. Available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/3/514048.pdf
OSCE. 2023. “Federal Republic of Germany: Re-Run of Elections to the Berlin House of Representatives and District Assemblies.”
12 February 2023. ODIHR NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT
9-12 January 2023. Available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/a/536410.pdf
Ruttloff, D. et al. 2023. “Desinformation, Hassrede und Fake News – Wie viel Negativität verbreiteten die Parteien im Wahlkampf auf Social Media?” In Korte, KR., Schiffers, M., von Schuckmann, A., Plümer, S., eds., Die Bundestagswahl 2021. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35758-0_22-1
Zimmermann, F., and M. Kohring. 2020. “Mistrust, Disinforming News, and Vote Choice: A Panel Survey on the Origins and Consequences of Believing Disinformation in the 2017 German Parliamentary Election.” Political Communication 37 (2): 215–237. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1686095
BPB. 2014. “https://www.bpb.de/system/files/dokument_pdf/Wahlvorschl%C3%A4ge.pdf”
Bundesministerium des Inneren und für Heimat (BMI). 2023. “Parteifinanzierung.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/parteienrecht/parteienfinanzierung/parteienfinanzierung.html
Bundesministerium des Inneren und für Heimat. 2023. “Parteifinanzierung.” https://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/themen/verfassung/parteienrecht/parteienfinanzierung/parteienfinanzierung.html
Bundeswahlleiterin. 2021. “www.bundeswahlleiterin.de”
OSCE. 2022. Federal Republic of Germany. Elections to the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) 26 September 2021. ODIHR Election Expert Team Final Report, 16 March. Available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/3/514048.pdf
OSCE. 2023. “Federal Republic of Germany: Re-Run of Elections to the Berlin House of Representatives and District Assemblies.”
12 February 2023. ODIHR NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT
9-12 January 2023. Available at https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/a/536410.pdf
Ruttloff, D. et al. 2023. “Desinformation, Hassrede und Fake News – Wie viel Negativität verbreiteten die Parteien im Wahlkampf auf Social Media?” In Korte, KR., Schiffers, M., von Schuckmann, A., Plümer, S., eds., Die Bundestagswahl 2021. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-35758-0_22-1
Zimmermann, F., and M. Kohring. 2020. “Mistrust, Disinforming News, and Vote Choice: A Panel Survey on the Origins and Consequences of Believing Disinformation in the 2017 German Parliamentary Election.” Political Communication 37 (2): 215–237. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2019.1686095
Greece
In Greek national and local government elections, there are de jure and de facto no barriers to political party competition. The process for registering political parties is straightforward, as outlined by Presidential Decree 96/2007. Party registration requires a simple statement signed by the party leader and submitted to Greece’s Supreme Court (Areios Pagos). The Supreme Court rarely excludes parties from participating in elections. The law establishes clear, objectively verifiable criteria for registration, including: a) avoiding the use of a party name already claimed by another party, b) refraining from using Greece’s national symbols or emblems as party insignia, and c) collecting at least 200 signatures from citizens supporting the party.
Political parties that surpass the 3% electoral threshold in national parliamentary elections, or obtain at least 1.5% of the vote in European Parliament elections, are granted equal opportunities for media access. Media ownership may influence political alignments, with media owners occasionally shifting their support between the government and the opposition, depending on their business interests. However, during electoral campaigns, laws are enforced to ensure that candidates and parties have relatively equal access to the media.
Party financing is governed by a law first adopted in 2002 and subsequently amended, with all relevant regulations codified most recently in 2022. In practice, parties and candidates are required to maintain financial records, disclose the value of donations received, and regularly publish their accounts. However, the accuracy of these records is sometimes disputed, and some donations are made off the books, evading detection by the independent committee responsible for overseeing party financing (known as the “Control Committee”).
The Control Committee is composed of 11 members – three members of parliament and eight senior judges and administrators. Despite its oversight role, the committee rarely imposes strict penalties for violations of party financing regulations. This leniency reflects the broader context of the Greek economy, where tax evasion and undeclared income are widespread.
Political competition in Greece is somewhat distorted by the access of parties and candidates to undeclared funding sources. However, it is not affected by gerrymandering, as the government does not arbitrarily redraw electoral districts. In terms of new media, political parties actively use campaign managers to exploit platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok. Media pluralism in these domains allows for the verification and debunking of fake news circulated by any single source, as other sources work to confirm the authenticity of the information.
In summary, over the last half-century (1974–2024), despite the often intense polarization in Greece’s two-party system, elections have been conducted legally and fairly, without significant challenges being posed to the system by parties or candidates.
Political parties that surpass the 3% electoral threshold in national parliamentary elections, or obtain at least 1.5% of the vote in European Parliament elections, are granted equal opportunities for media access. Media ownership may influence political alignments, with media owners occasionally shifting their support between the government and the opposition, depending on their business interests. However, during electoral campaigns, laws are enforced to ensure that candidates and parties have relatively equal access to the media.
Party financing is governed by a law first adopted in 2002 and subsequently amended, with all relevant regulations codified most recently in 2022. In practice, parties and candidates are required to maintain financial records, disclose the value of donations received, and regularly publish their accounts. However, the accuracy of these records is sometimes disputed, and some donations are made off the books, evading detection by the independent committee responsible for overseeing party financing (known as the “Control Committee”).
The Control Committee is composed of 11 members – three members of parliament and eight senior judges and administrators. Despite its oversight role, the committee rarely imposes strict penalties for violations of party financing regulations. This leniency reflects the broader context of the Greek economy, where tax evasion and undeclared income are widespread.
Political competition in Greece is somewhat distorted by the access of parties and candidates to undeclared funding sources. However, it is not affected by gerrymandering, as the government does not arbitrarily redraw electoral districts. In terms of new media, political parties actively use campaign managers to exploit platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok. Media pluralism in these domains allows for the verification and debunking of fake news circulated by any single source, as other sources work to confirm the authenticity of the information.
In summary, over the last half-century (1974–2024), despite the often intense polarization in Greece’s two-party system, elections have been conducted legally and fairly, without significant challenges being posed to the system by parties or candidates.
Citations:
ACE project. n.d. “Registration requirements for parties – Greece.” https://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDTable?view=country&question=PC001
The law regulating party financing, first adopted in 2022, was Law 3023/2002. The law’s regulations and subsequent amendments were codified in 2022 by Presidential Decree 15/2022.
ACE project. n.d. “Registration requirements for parties – Greece.” https://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDTable?view=country&question=PC001
The law regulating party financing, first adopted in 2022, was Law 3023/2002. The law’s regulations and subsequent amendments were codified in 2022 by Presidential Decree 15/2022.
Ireland
Political competition between and among candidates and political parties in Ireland is free and fair, largely due to the Proportional Representation Single Transferable Voting (PRSTV) system. This system facilitates competition for individual independents, small parties and larger parties. Irish electoral law mandates that only candidates stand for election (ACE 2023). While it is not compulsory for a political party to register, registration is required to access state funding. Registration procedures for candidates and political parties meet standards of transparency and fairness, including small financial deposits, age requirements, no party affiliation requirement and no exclusions for insolvency, undischarged bankruptcy or criminal record convictions.
To run as a candidate in Irish elections, individuals must be citizens and over 21. Political parties typically hold competitive selection conventions to choose candidates for each constituency through local ‘one member one vote’ systems, with some variations. National parties accept such nominations and sometimes add to local lists at their discretion. Independent candidates must present a nomination paper to the returning officer in the constituency where they want to stand. Eligible candidates are not prevented from being elected or disqualified from registration except by objectively verifiable criteria set by law. Candidates and parties denied the right to be elected or registered have the right to appeal to a competent jurisdiction capable of reviewing such decisions and correcting errors promptly. Candidates and parties must maintain accurate financial records, disclose the nature and value of received donations and regularly publish their accounts (SIPO 2024).
The Electoral Reform Bill 2021 regulates online political advertising (Lynch, 2017). Candidates and parties generally have fair access to the media and other communication channels, though smaller parties, local or independent candidates, ethnic minorities and women may face uneven access. The media landscape covers various political positions but tends to privilege economic discourse and actors. Party funding is transparently monitored by the Standards in Public Office Commission (SIPO), which imposes sanctions for violations and reports after each election cycle. A Registrar of Political Parties accepts notices and applications for party registration, monitored by the Chief Executive of An Coimisiún Toghcháin, the Electoral Commission, who is also the Registrar of Political Parties. Decisions take effect after a 21-day appeal period and are formally notified in the official Irish state newspaper, Iris Oifigiúil.
In the next election, there will be 174 members of Parliament, a decrease from 166 to 160 in 2020, then up by 14, representing 43 constituencies, reflecting population growth (Electoral (Amendment Act 2023). Boundary Commission processes ensure accountable constituency revisions, avoiding significant advantages for specific candidates or parties and preventing gerrymandering. Since 2023, this function is managed by the Electoral Commission. Political competition is influenced and can be distorted by social media tactics as smaller far-right parties use social media to project fake news and distort debates (HCC 2023).
To run as a candidate in Irish elections, individuals must be citizens and over 21. Political parties typically hold competitive selection conventions to choose candidates for each constituency through local ‘one member one vote’ systems, with some variations. National parties accept such nominations and sometimes add to local lists at their discretion. Independent candidates must present a nomination paper to the returning officer in the constituency where they want to stand. Eligible candidates are not prevented from being elected or disqualified from registration except by objectively verifiable criteria set by law. Candidates and parties denied the right to be elected or registered have the right to appeal to a competent jurisdiction capable of reviewing such decisions and correcting errors promptly. Candidates and parties must maintain accurate financial records, disclose the nature and value of received donations and regularly publish their accounts (SIPO 2024).
The Electoral Reform Bill 2021 regulates online political advertising (Lynch, 2017). Candidates and parties generally have fair access to the media and other communication channels, though smaller parties, local or independent candidates, ethnic minorities and women may face uneven access. The media landscape covers various political positions but tends to privilege economic discourse and actors. Party funding is transparently monitored by the Standards in Public Office Commission (SIPO), which imposes sanctions for violations and reports after each election cycle. A Registrar of Political Parties accepts notices and applications for party registration, monitored by the Chief Executive of An Coimisiún Toghcháin, the Electoral Commission, who is also the Registrar of Political Parties. Decisions take effect after a 21-day appeal period and are formally notified in the official Irish state newspaper, Iris Oifigiúil.
In the next election, there will be 174 members of Parliament, a decrease from 166 to 160 in 2020, then up by 14, representing 43 constituencies, reflecting population growth (Electoral (Amendment Act 2023). Boundary Commission processes ensure accountable constituency revisions, avoiding significant advantages for specific candidates or parties and preventing gerrymandering. Since 2023, this function is managed by the Electoral Commission. Political competition is influenced and can be distorted by social media tactics as smaller far-right parties use social media to project fake news and distort debates (HCC 2023).
Citations:
ACE. 2023. Electoral Acts 1992 - 2011, Art. 25.
Electoral Commission. 2023. “Ireland’s Statutory, Independent Electoral Commission.” https://www.electoralcommission.ie/
Lynch, C. 2017. “The Effect of Parliamentary Reforms (2011-2016) on the Oireachtas Committee System.” Administration 65 (2): 59-87.
SIPO. 2023. https://www.sipo.ie/acts-and-codes/guidelines/donations/index.xml
HCC. 2023. Greater than Fear. Dublin: Hope and Courage Collective. https://tortoiseshack.ie/312-hope-and-courage-how-to-counter-hate-fear/https://www.irishtimes.com/life-style/2023/09/09/combating-the-far-right-they-shopping-for-anything-that-whips-up-fear-and-division/
Stone, P. 2021. “Democracy in Ireland: Theory and Practice.” In Farrell and Hardiman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, 89-106. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
ACE. 2023. Electoral Acts 1992 - 2011, Art. 25.
Electoral Commission. 2023. “Ireland’s Statutory, Independent Electoral Commission.” https://www.electoralcommission.ie/
Lynch, C. 2017. “The Effect of Parliamentary Reforms (2011-2016) on the Oireachtas Committee System.” Administration 65 (2): 59-87.
SIPO. 2023. https://www.sipo.ie/acts-and-codes/guidelines/donations/index.xml
HCC. 2023. Greater than Fear. Dublin: Hope and Courage Collective. https://tortoiseshack.ie/312-hope-and-courage-how-to-counter-hate-fear/https://www.irishtimes.com/life-style/2023/09/09/combating-the-far-right-they-shopping-for-anything-that-whips-up-fear-and-division/
Stone, P. 2021. “Democracy in Ireland: Theory and Practice.” In Farrell and Hardiman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, 89-106. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Italy
The Italian constitution and laws establish the conditions for free, fair, and competitive elections that adhere to the principles of a liberal democracy. According to the latest V-Dem data (2022), Italy scores relatively high on the Clean Elections index. This indicates that experts consider Italian elections free from registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote-buying, and electoral violence. Additionally, all parties, including the opposition, can operate freely and participate in elections. Indicators of freedom of expression suggest that the media are generally unbiased and that all parties have access to national broadcasts. Overall, Italy’s data is comparable to other European liberal democracies.
The constitution specifies that active and passive electorates do not coincide. Membership in the Chamber of Deputies requires a minimum age of 25, while the Senate of the Republic requires a minimum age of 40 (Articles 56 and 58). These rules reflect the idea that members of the upper chamber should possess different competencies and skills than those of the lower chamber to help improve the quality of legislation. High civil servants, high-ranking military officers, magistrates, and mayors of municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants are ineligible for the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and Legislative Decree 533/1993).
Moreover, the offices of deputy or senator are incompatible with positions in elected assemblies at the local or supranational level (European Parliament) (Law 60/1953 and subsequent amendments). Lastly, citizens convicted (after all levels of judgment) of certain crimes and sentenced to more than two years in prison cannot be candidates (Legislative Decree 235/2012).
Parties must submit their symbol to the Ministry of the Interior between 44 and 42 days before the election date (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and subsequent amendments), along with a copy of their statute, a declaration of transparency, and the party manifesto (Law 165/2017). Since the 2018 general election, these documents are published on a Ministry of the Interior website accessible to all citizens. Party lists may be excluded from the competition if the symbol does not meet legal standards. In such cases, they can appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation, which decides on their admission. In the September 2022 general election, 101 symbols were presented, of which 75 were accepted (Ministry of Interior 2022).
After submitting their symbols, parties must submit their list of candidates. For both chambers, the list must be signed by at least 1,500 and no more than 2,000 voters for each multi-member district into which the territory is divided (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and subsequent amendments; see also ACE project data).
Following the 2020 constitutional revision, which reduced the number of members of the Chamber of Deputies from 630 to 400 and senators from 315 to 200, there are now 49 districts for the lower house and 26 for the upper house. Therefore, approximately 73,500 signatures are required to present lists nationwide in both houses. However, in early elections, such as those in September 2022, this figure is halved.
Starting in 2022, political parties established as a parliamentary group in at least one of the two chambers by December 31, 2021, are exempt from collecting signatures (Decree Law 41/2022). This rule poses an obstacle to new parties entering electoral competition, although they can circumvent it by allying with existing parties. Similar obstacles to curbing the proliferation of party lists are common in other democracies. Signatures must be authenticated by several institutional authorities (Law 21/1990). Occasionally, there have been disagreements about the legitimacy of signatures collected by the most prominent political parties, but not during the most recent elections, as most significant parties were exempted from collecting them.
Beginning with the 2022 elections, candidates must submit their CVs and a certificate certifying no pending criminal convictions. These documents are then posted on a Ministry of the Interior website, accessible to all citizens (Law 9/2019). Although this requirement provides voters with better tools to evaluate candidates’ competencies and quality, it is ineffective. Voters cannot express a preference for individual candidates because lists are blocked. Additionally, the CV information is highly inconsistent, with some CVs being extraordinarily detailed and others relatively succinct. Selection methods vary from party to party according to their statutes. Only the Five Stars Movement used online closed primaries to select candidates in multi-member districts for both chambers.
To guarantee female representation, Italian electoral law (Law 165/2017) mandates that candidate lists include at least 40% female candidates, following the so-called zipper system, which requires parties to alternate between women and men on their candidate lists. Despite this, women remain underrepresented in both chambers. On one hand, legal sanctions for noncompliance with this rule are relatively soft (see also the International IDEA Gender Quotas Database). On the other hand, parties can easily circumvent the norm by strategically using the possibility of nominating the same candidate in multiple multi-member districts (up to five, according to the electoral law). Female candidates are usually nominated in multiple districts; however, they often opt for only one district, freeing up seats for male candidates further down the list.
For the election campaign, candidates can spend a fixed amount of €52,000 plus a variable amount depending on the size (in terms of registered voters) of the multi-member constituency in which they compete. Parties may spend a maximum of €1 multiplied by the total number of registered voters in all districts where the party competes (Law 515/1993 and subsequent amendments). Candidate and party expenditures are monitored by the Court of Appeals and the Court of Auditors, respectively. For irregularities, there are mainly financial penalties. The 2014 reform eliminated all public funding for parties (Law 13/2014) (see also the IDEA International Political Finance Database). Transparency issues remain concerning the increasingly influential but less visible role of political foundations.
Social media played a significant role in political communication during the campaign leading up to the September 2022 elections, compared to traditional media such as television and newspapers. This trend can be understood in the context of the specific nature of the most recent general election.
First, these were early elections, giving parties little time to organize their campaigns. Second, the campaign took place during the summer, when citizens traditionally engage less in political matters and watch less television. Finally, all polls had long suggested a victory for the center-right coalition, particularly for Brothers of Italy.
These factors contributed to the campaign’s low profile in both public and political debates..
The constitution specifies that active and passive electorates do not coincide. Membership in the Chamber of Deputies requires a minimum age of 25, while the Senate of the Republic requires a minimum age of 40 (Articles 56 and 58). These rules reflect the idea that members of the upper chamber should possess different competencies and skills than those of the lower chamber to help improve the quality of legislation. High civil servants, high-ranking military officers, magistrates, and mayors of municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants are ineligible for the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and Legislative Decree 533/1993).
Moreover, the offices of deputy or senator are incompatible with positions in elected assemblies at the local or supranational level (European Parliament) (Law 60/1953 and subsequent amendments). Lastly, citizens convicted (after all levels of judgment) of certain crimes and sentenced to more than two years in prison cannot be candidates (Legislative Decree 235/2012).
Parties must submit their symbol to the Ministry of the Interior between 44 and 42 days before the election date (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and subsequent amendments), along with a copy of their statute, a declaration of transparency, and the party manifesto (Law 165/2017). Since the 2018 general election, these documents are published on a Ministry of the Interior website accessible to all citizens. Party lists may be excluded from the competition if the symbol does not meet legal standards. In such cases, they can appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation, which decides on their admission. In the September 2022 general election, 101 symbols were presented, of which 75 were accepted (Ministry of Interior 2022).
After submitting their symbols, parties must submit their list of candidates. For both chambers, the list must be signed by at least 1,500 and no more than 2,000 voters for each multi-member district into which the territory is divided (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and subsequent amendments; see also ACE project data).
Following the 2020 constitutional revision, which reduced the number of members of the Chamber of Deputies from 630 to 400 and senators from 315 to 200, there are now 49 districts for the lower house and 26 for the upper house. Therefore, approximately 73,500 signatures are required to present lists nationwide in both houses. However, in early elections, such as those in September 2022, this figure is halved.
Starting in 2022, political parties established as a parliamentary group in at least one of the two chambers by December 31, 2021, are exempt from collecting signatures (Decree Law 41/2022). This rule poses an obstacle to new parties entering electoral competition, although they can circumvent it by allying with existing parties. Similar obstacles to curbing the proliferation of party lists are common in other democracies. Signatures must be authenticated by several institutional authorities (Law 21/1990). Occasionally, there have been disagreements about the legitimacy of signatures collected by the most prominent political parties, but not during the most recent elections, as most significant parties were exempted from collecting them.
Beginning with the 2022 elections, candidates must submit their CVs and a certificate certifying no pending criminal convictions. These documents are then posted on a Ministry of the Interior website, accessible to all citizens (Law 9/2019). Although this requirement provides voters with better tools to evaluate candidates’ competencies and quality, it is ineffective. Voters cannot express a preference for individual candidates because lists are blocked. Additionally, the CV information is highly inconsistent, with some CVs being extraordinarily detailed and others relatively succinct. Selection methods vary from party to party according to their statutes. Only the Five Stars Movement used online closed primaries to select candidates in multi-member districts for both chambers.
To guarantee female representation, Italian electoral law (Law 165/2017) mandates that candidate lists include at least 40% female candidates, following the so-called zipper system, which requires parties to alternate between women and men on their candidate lists. Despite this, women remain underrepresented in both chambers. On one hand, legal sanctions for noncompliance with this rule are relatively soft (see also the International IDEA Gender Quotas Database). On the other hand, parties can easily circumvent the norm by strategically using the possibility of nominating the same candidate in multiple multi-member districts (up to five, according to the electoral law). Female candidates are usually nominated in multiple districts; however, they often opt for only one district, freeing up seats for male candidates further down the list.
For the election campaign, candidates can spend a fixed amount of €52,000 plus a variable amount depending on the size (in terms of registered voters) of the multi-member constituency in which they compete. Parties may spend a maximum of €1 multiplied by the total number of registered voters in all districts where the party competes (Law 515/1993 and subsequent amendments). Candidate and party expenditures are monitored by the Court of Appeals and the Court of Auditors, respectively. For irregularities, there are mainly financial penalties. The 2014 reform eliminated all public funding for parties (Law 13/2014) (see also the IDEA International Political Finance Database). Transparency issues remain concerning the increasingly influential but less visible role of political foundations.
Social media played a significant role in political communication during the campaign leading up to the September 2022 elections, compared to traditional media such as television and newspapers. This trend can be understood in the context of the specific nature of the most recent general election.
First, these were early elections, giving parties little time to organize their campaigns. Second, the campaign took place during the summer, when citizens traditionally engage less in political matters and watch less television. Finally, all polls had long suggested a victory for the center-right coalition, particularly for Brothers of Italy.
These factors contributed to the campaign’s low profile in both public and political debates..
Citations:
Political finance database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/country?country=110&database_theme=302
Gender quotas database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas-database
Ace project: https://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDCountry?set_language=en&topic=PC&country=IT#PC001
V-Dem: https://v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf
Ministry of Interior: https://dait.interno.gov.it/elezioni/trasparenza/elezioni-politiche-2022
Political finance database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/country?country=110&database_theme=302
Gender quotas database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas-database
Ace project: https://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDCountry?set_language=en&topic=PC&country=IT#PC001
V-Dem: https://v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf
Ministry of Interior: https://dait.interno.gov.it/elezioni/trasparenza/elezioni-politiche-2022
Latvia
All electoral registration procedures provide equal opportunities for each candidate in elections for the European Parliament, the national parliament, and local bodies. These procedures adhere to standards of transparency and fairness.
Only political parties are authorized to submit candidate lists for EU, parliamentary, and local elections. A political party with at least 500 members or an alliance of political parties can submit a list. An alliance must have been established at least a year before the elections and have a minimum of 500 members.
Any Latvian citizen over the age of 21 is eligible to be a candidate in national elections. However, there are restrictions related to historical justice and the Soviet occupation period. Individuals who served in the Soviet Secret Services are ineligible to be candidates, a restriction that must be substantiated with a certificate from the court.
To ensure compliance with the Saeima Election Law and its candidacy restrictions, registered candidate lists are reviewed by the Directorate of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, the Information Center of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Center for Documenting the Consequences of Totalitarianism. Decisions by the Central Election Commission (CVK) to register or reject a candidate list, or to remove a nominated candidate from a registered list, can be appealed in court within three working days. Once registered, candidate lists cannot be withdrawn. The Central Election Commission can only amend lists to delete candidates who do not meet the Saeima Election Law requirements, based on opinions or court judgments, or to make technical corrections.
The Central Election Commission also oversees and establishes procedures for local elections. Local election commissions handle the submission of candidate lists for these elections.
Latvia’s media landscape is pluralistic, with election campaigns covered by TV, radio, online news platforms, social media, and print media, ensuring equal access for all candidates and political parties. There are increasing numbers of public debates between political party leaders, especially for parties polling around and above the 5% threshold.
In 2022, several amendments were made to the Law on Electronic Mass Media, allowing the National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP) to suspend access to websites that post disinformation or threats to national security. This measure aims to prevent the use of disinformation, inaccurate information, or media manipulation during pre-election campaigns.
The Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) independently monitors the funding and expenses of political parties transparently and imposes sanctions in cases of violations.
Only political parties are authorized to submit candidate lists for EU, parliamentary, and local elections. A political party with at least 500 members or an alliance of political parties can submit a list. An alliance must have been established at least a year before the elections and have a minimum of 500 members.
Any Latvian citizen over the age of 21 is eligible to be a candidate in national elections. However, there are restrictions related to historical justice and the Soviet occupation period. Individuals who served in the Soviet Secret Services are ineligible to be candidates, a restriction that must be substantiated with a certificate from the court.
To ensure compliance with the Saeima Election Law and its candidacy restrictions, registered candidate lists are reviewed by the Directorate of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, the Information Center of the Ministry of the Interior, and the Center for Documenting the Consequences of Totalitarianism. Decisions by the Central Election Commission (CVK) to register or reject a candidate list, or to remove a nominated candidate from a registered list, can be appealed in court within three working days. Once registered, candidate lists cannot be withdrawn. The Central Election Commission can only amend lists to delete candidates who do not meet the Saeima Election Law requirements, based on opinions or court judgments, or to make technical corrections.
The Central Election Commission also oversees and establishes procedures for local elections. Local election commissions handle the submission of candidate lists for these elections.
Latvia’s media landscape is pluralistic, with election campaigns covered by TV, radio, online news platforms, social media, and print media, ensuring equal access for all candidates and political parties. There are increasing numbers of public debates between political party leaders, especially for parties polling around and above the 5% threshold.
In 2022, several amendments were made to the Law on Electronic Mass Media, allowing the National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP) to suspend access to websites that post disinformation or threats to national security. This measure aims to prevent the use of disinformation, inaccurate information, or media manipulation during pre-election campaigns.
The Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) independently monitors the funding and expenses of political parties transparently and imposes sanctions in cases of violations.
Citations:
The Law on Elections of Saeima. Adopted May 25,1995. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/35261-law-on-the-election-of-the-isaeimai
OSCE. 2023. Latvia, Parliamentary Elections, 1 October 2022: Final Report. ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/latvia/541053
Law on the Election of Local Government Councils. Adopted Jan. 13, 1994. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/57839-law-on-the-election-of-local-government-councils
Pre-election Campaign Law. Adopted Nov. 29, 2012. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/253543-pre-election-campaign-law
Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties). Adopted July 19, 1995. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/36189-law-on-financing-of-political-organisations-parties
NEPLP. 2022. “Vadlīnijas elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu darbībai priekšvēlēšanu aģitācijas perioda laikā.” https://www.neplp.lv/lv/vadlinijas-elektronisko-plassazinas-lidzeklu-darbibai-prieksvelesanu-agitacijas-perioda-laika
The Law on Elections of Saeima. Adopted May 25,1995. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/35261-law-on-the-election-of-the-isaeimai
OSCE. 2023. Latvia, Parliamentary Elections, 1 October 2022: Final Report. ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/latvia/541053
Law on the Election of Local Government Councils. Adopted Jan. 13, 1994. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/57839-law-on-the-election-of-local-government-councils
Pre-election Campaign Law. Adopted Nov. 29, 2012. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/253543-pre-election-campaign-law
Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties). Adopted July 19, 1995. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/36189-law-on-financing-of-political-organisations-parties
NEPLP. 2022. “Vadlīnijas elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu darbībai priekšvēlēšanu aģitācijas perioda laikā.” https://www.neplp.lv/lv/vadlinijas-elektronisko-plassazinas-lidzeklu-darbibai-prieksvelesanu-agitacijas-perioda-laika
Lithuania
Lithuania’s laws ensure free and fair political competition in national, municipal and European Parliament elections. For a political party to be established, it must have at least 2,000 members. There are minimum deposit requirements for the registration of candidates for all elections and a minimum number of candidates for the Seimas elections. While these requirements might favor established political parties, they are relatively low – starting with a deposit equal to the average monthly wage – and are based on objectively verifiable criteria.
Political parties are eligible to receive state funding if they collected at least 2% of votes during the most recent municipal, parliamentary and European Parliament elections. Taxpayers can also donate up to 0.6% of their personal income tax to political parties. To be eligible to participate in the Seimas elections, candidates must be at least 21 years old; they face additional restrictions related to employment in statutory institutions, criminal records and so on.
Additionally, to be eligible to participate in the presidential elections, candidates must be at least 40 years old and have resided in Lithuania for the last three years. They also have to collect at least 20,000 signatures supporting their candidacy.
Candidates and parties who are denied registration have the right to appeal, and their appeals are reviewed promptly. Parties and candidates must maintain accurate financial records. There is a requirement for a double deposit for any party that in the last elections to the Seimas, municipal councils or the European Parliament nominated candidates but did not furnish a copy of that political campaign’s funding reports and the previous calendar year’s financial statements in compliance with the relevant laws.
Either independent candidates or party-affiliated candidates can stand for election. The so-called public electoral committees, which have been able to participate in municipal and European Parliament elections and compete with political parties since 2015, initially faced less demanding requirements for registration and financial accountability. However, in 2022 these requirements were made stricter to bring them closer to those applied to political parties. Since then, at least 1,000 members have been needed to establish a public electoral committee for participation in European Parliament elections, and at least 0.1% of the population of a particular municipality is required in order to participate in municipal elections.
The territorial boundaries of electoral constituencies have been redrawn based on objective criteria related to demographic changes. In general, neither individual candidates nor parties are discriminated against. The relatively low requirements for establishing a political party and registering candidacies produce a large number of candidates and a broad choice of political alternatives in national, municipal and European Parliament elections. This was again the case in the last municipal elections in March 2023, when 16 parties and 32 public electoral committees were registered for participation, although the number of candidates representing public electoral committees declined compared to the 2019 municipal elections, when 97 were registered (Central Electoral Commission 2023).
Parties and independent candidates have fair opportunities to access the media, particularly through the state-funded Lithuanian public broadcaster, Lithuanian National Radio and Television, which is mandated by law to provide equal access for all candidates to debate and present their election programs. However, the fact that more than half of the mayors in the 60 municipalities were reelected suggests that incumbents may have practical advantages over new candidates in terms of access to local media and other networks that enhance their visibility.
Political parties are eligible to receive state funding if they collected at least 2% of votes during the most recent municipal, parliamentary and European Parliament elections. Taxpayers can also donate up to 0.6% of their personal income tax to political parties. To be eligible to participate in the Seimas elections, candidates must be at least 21 years old; they face additional restrictions related to employment in statutory institutions, criminal records and so on.
Additionally, to be eligible to participate in the presidential elections, candidates must be at least 40 years old and have resided in Lithuania for the last three years. They also have to collect at least 20,000 signatures supporting their candidacy.
Candidates and parties who are denied registration have the right to appeal, and their appeals are reviewed promptly. Parties and candidates must maintain accurate financial records. There is a requirement for a double deposit for any party that in the last elections to the Seimas, municipal councils or the European Parliament nominated candidates but did not furnish a copy of that political campaign’s funding reports and the previous calendar year’s financial statements in compliance with the relevant laws.
Either independent candidates or party-affiliated candidates can stand for election. The so-called public electoral committees, which have been able to participate in municipal and European Parliament elections and compete with political parties since 2015, initially faced less demanding requirements for registration and financial accountability. However, in 2022 these requirements were made stricter to bring them closer to those applied to political parties. Since then, at least 1,000 members have been needed to establish a public electoral committee for participation in European Parliament elections, and at least 0.1% of the population of a particular municipality is required in order to participate in municipal elections.
The territorial boundaries of electoral constituencies have been redrawn based on objective criteria related to demographic changes. In general, neither individual candidates nor parties are discriminated against. The relatively low requirements for establishing a political party and registering candidacies produce a large number of candidates and a broad choice of political alternatives in national, municipal and European Parliament elections. This was again the case in the last municipal elections in March 2023, when 16 parties and 32 public electoral committees were registered for participation, although the number of candidates representing public electoral committees declined compared to the 2019 municipal elections, when 97 were registered (Central Electoral Commission 2023).
Parties and independent candidates have fair opportunities to access the media, particularly through the state-funded Lithuanian public broadcaster, Lithuanian National Radio and Television, which is mandated by law to provide equal access for all candidates to debate and present their election programs. However, the fact that more than half of the mayors in the 60 municipalities were reelected suggests that incumbents may have practical advantages over new candidates in terms of access to local media and other networks that enhance their visibility.
Citations:
The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. 1992. https://lrkt.lt/en/about-the-court/legal-information/the-constitution/192
Republic of Lithuania, Law on the Elections to the Seimas. 1992. (last amended on 22 March 2016 – No XII-2265). art. 37(2), 41(1-3).
Republic of Lithuania, Law on Political Parties. 1990. No I-606, as last amended on 6 November 2014, No XII-1292.
Republic of Lithuania, Law on the Lithuanian National Radio and Television. 2020. No. I-1571, XIII-2929, art. 5.
The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania. 2023. “The Results of the Elections to Municipal Councils in March 2023.” https://www.vrk.lt/en/savivaldybiu-tarybu-ir-meru-2023/rezultatai
The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. 1992. https://lrkt.lt/en/about-the-court/legal-information/the-constitution/192
Republic of Lithuania, Law on the Elections to the Seimas. 1992. (last amended on 22 March 2016 – No XII-2265). art. 37(2), 41(1-3).
Republic of Lithuania, Law on Political Parties. 1990. No I-606, as last amended on 6 November 2014, No XII-1292.
Republic of Lithuania, Law on the Lithuanian National Radio and Television. 2020. No. I-1571, XIII-2929, art. 5.
The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania. 2023. “The Results of the Elections to Municipal Councils in March 2023.” https://www.vrk.lt/en/savivaldybiu-tarybu-ir-meru-2023/rezultatai
New Zealand
New Zealand is widely considered to have a high degree of fairness and freedom in political competition among candidates and parties (e.g., Garnett et al. 2022).
Electoral registration procedures for candidates and political parties are designed to uphold transparency and fairness. The Electoral Act sets clear criteria and guidelines for registering political parties and candidates. Information regarding the registration process, requirements and deadlines is publicly available.
Political parties and candidates must maintain accurate financial records, disclose the nature and value of the donations received, and regularly publish their accounts. This requirement is governed by the Electoral Act 1993 and subsequent amendments, as well as the Electoral Finance Act 2007 and the Electoral Amendment Act 2010.
Under these laws, political parties and candidates must keep detailed records on their financial transactions, including on donations received and expenditures made. They are also required to disclose certain information about their donors, including the nature and value of donations above a certain threshold. Large donations must be disclosed publicly, and donors must be identified in financial reports. The Electoral Commission oversees and audits these financial reports to ensure compliance with the law. Failure to comply with reporting requirements can result in penalties or fines.
If a voter believes they have been unjustly excluded from registration or elections, they can appeal to the Electoral Commission, which oversees elections and maintains the electoral roll. The Electoral Commission has procedures to handle appeals and ensure voters are treated fairly and in accordance with the law.
Candidates and political parties generally have fair opportunities to access the media. Public broadcasters Radio New Zealand (RNZ) and Television New Zealand (TVNZ) are expected to provide fair and balanced coverage to all political parties. However, the media landscape is comparatively small, with privately owned newspapers and online news services, as well as privately owned radio stations, outperforming the reach and ratings of public media.
Public debates continue to focus on the fairness of elections, political donations and leaders’ debates. For instance, the Independent Electoral Review, published in June 2023, recommended lowering the 5% threshold to 3.5% to make it easier for smaller parties to enter Parliament, among other points (Daalder 2023). With the arrival of a new government, it is unclear how many of these will be implemented. Additionally, ongoing discussions persist about whether and how to guarantee Māori political representation at the national and subnational levels (e.g., Trafford 2023).
Electoral registration procedures for candidates and political parties are designed to uphold transparency and fairness. The Electoral Act sets clear criteria and guidelines for registering political parties and candidates. Information regarding the registration process, requirements and deadlines is publicly available.
Political parties and candidates must maintain accurate financial records, disclose the nature and value of the donations received, and regularly publish their accounts. This requirement is governed by the Electoral Act 1993 and subsequent amendments, as well as the Electoral Finance Act 2007 and the Electoral Amendment Act 2010.
Under these laws, political parties and candidates must keep detailed records on their financial transactions, including on donations received and expenditures made. They are also required to disclose certain information about their donors, including the nature and value of donations above a certain threshold. Large donations must be disclosed publicly, and donors must be identified in financial reports. The Electoral Commission oversees and audits these financial reports to ensure compliance with the law. Failure to comply with reporting requirements can result in penalties or fines.
If a voter believes they have been unjustly excluded from registration or elections, they can appeal to the Electoral Commission, which oversees elections and maintains the electoral roll. The Electoral Commission has procedures to handle appeals and ensure voters are treated fairly and in accordance with the law.
Candidates and political parties generally have fair opportunities to access the media. Public broadcasters Radio New Zealand (RNZ) and Television New Zealand (TVNZ) are expected to provide fair and balanced coverage to all political parties. However, the media landscape is comparatively small, with privately owned newspapers and online news services, as well as privately owned radio stations, outperforming the reach and ratings of public media.
Public debates continue to focus on the fairness of elections, political donations and leaders’ debates. For instance, the Independent Electoral Review, published in June 2023, recommended lowering the 5% threshold to 3.5% to make it easier for smaller parties to enter Parliament, among other points (Daalder 2023). With the arrival of a new government, it is unclear how many of these will be implemented. Additionally, ongoing discussions persist about whether and how to guarantee Māori political representation at the national and subnational levels (e.g., Trafford 2023).
Citations:
Daalder, M. 2023. “Electoral review recommends 3.5% threshold, voting age of 16.” Newsroom June 5. https://newsroom.co.nz/2023/06/05/electoral-review-recommends-35-threshold-voting-age-of-16/
Garnett, H. A., et al. 2022. “Electoral Integrity Global Report 2019-2021.” https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/globalreport2019-2021
Trafford, W. 2023. “National Eyes Repeal of Māori Wards.” Te Ao Māori News, August 28. https://www.teaonews.co.nz/2023/08/28/national-eyes-repeal-of-maori-wards
Daalder, M. 2023. “Electoral review recommends 3.5% threshold, voting age of 16.” Newsroom June 5. https://newsroom.co.nz/2023/06/05/electoral-review-recommends-35-threshold-voting-age-of-16/
Garnett, H. A., et al. 2022. “Electoral Integrity Global Report 2019-2021.” https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/globalreport2019-2021
Trafford, W. 2023. “National Eyes Repeal of Māori Wards.” Te Ao Māori News, August 28. https://www.teaonews.co.nz/2023/08/28/national-eyes-repeal-of-maori-wards
Norway
Any person or group able to mobilize 5,000 petition signatures from eligible voters is entitled to form a political party. The party is registered in a national register and may receive donations from private citizens. All donations and donors are registered and transparent to the public. Any political party that receives at least 500 votes in a single district or more than 5,000 votes nationally will receive economic support from the state. The support level is determined by parliament and is proportionate to the number of votes. Party representatives may run for office in national and local elections with no specific qualifying conditions if they have the right to vote. All members of parliament and government are required to report any economic interest they may have as owners or shareholders.
Citations:
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/political-parties-act/id440680/
https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/political-parties-act/id440680/
Portugal
By law, presidential candidates in Portugal must disclose specific information, such as criminal records and declarations of income and assets. In contrast, candidates for legislative and local elections are only required to provide basic information, including party or group identification, age, address, and party affiliation. Rejected candidates and parties have the right to appeal to the Constitutional Court within two days after the publication of the list (Lei n.º 14/79, art. 30).
Financial transparency is mandated, requiring parties to conduct internal audits of their activities and campaign accounts. The Constitutional Court, along with the independent body Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos (ECFP), monitors party funding and audits political parties’ accounts and electoral campaigns (Lei n.º 19/2003, art. 24). Although there were significant delays in previous years in providing account reports, recent reports up to 2022 are now available on the ECFP website. These delays were primarily due to the ECFP’s ongoing lack of essential and adequate human resources (ECFP, 2023).
Regarding media access, all candidates and parties theoretically enjoy equal rights and opportunities. Electoral propaganda is distributed through public and private radio and television stations, including Radio and Television of Portugal (RTP) (Lei n.º 14/79, art. 62). However, the growing use of new media, particularly among Portuguese youth, raises concerns about disinformation and fake news campaigns (MediaLAB Iscte, 2019). Despite high trust in traditional media and a low risk of external disinformation campaigns among the Portuguese population (MediaLAB Iscte, 2019), the potential impact of distorted public opinion perceptions on political competition is a real concern. The misuse of AI models and the creation of fake content are alarming examples (Pereira, 2023).
Obstacles to the representativeness of all parties still exist within the electoral system. The combination of low-magnitude districts and the D’Hondt system creates a majoritarian bonus, hindering new parties and strengthening the two largest ones (PS and PSD). While there is no legal electoral threshold, smaller parties polling below 5% can only aspire to win seats in the largest electoral circles: Lisbon and Porto (Serra-Silva & Santos 2023: 131).
Financial transparency is mandated, requiring parties to conduct internal audits of their activities and campaign accounts. The Constitutional Court, along with the independent body Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos (ECFP), monitors party funding and audits political parties’ accounts and electoral campaigns (Lei n.º 19/2003, art. 24). Although there were significant delays in previous years in providing account reports, recent reports up to 2022 are now available on the ECFP website. These delays were primarily due to the ECFP’s ongoing lack of essential and adequate human resources (ECFP, 2023).
Regarding media access, all candidates and parties theoretically enjoy equal rights and opportunities. Electoral propaganda is distributed through public and private radio and television stations, including Radio and Television of Portugal (RTP) (Lei n.º 14/79, art. 62). However, the growing use of new media, particularly among Portuguese youth, raises concerns about disinformation and fake news campaigns (MediaLAB Iscte, 2019). Despite high trust in traditional media and a low risk of external disinformation campaigns among the Portuguese population (MediaLAB Iscte, 2019), the potential impact of distorted public opinion perceptions on political competition is a real concern. The misuse of AI models and the creation of fake content are alarming examples (Pereira, 2023).
Obstacles to the representativeness of all parties still exist within the electoral system. The combination of low-magnitude districts and the D’Hondt system creates a majoritarian bonus, hindering new parties and strengthening the two largest ones (PS and PSD). While there is no legal electoral threshold, smaller parties polling below 5% can only aspire to win seats in the largest electoral circles: Lisbon and Porto (Serra-Silva & Santos 2023: 131).
Citations:
Law No. 14/79. 1979. Lei Eleitoral da Assembleia da República. https://www.cne.pt/sites/default/files/dl/legis_lear_consolidada_2020-11.pdf
Law No. 19/2003. 2003. Financing of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns (Financiamento dos Partidos Políticos e das Campanhas Eleitorais). https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/FinanciamentoPartidosPoliticosCampanhasEleitorais_Anotado.pdf
ECFP. 2023. “Relatório de Atividades 2022.” https://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/file/RelatoriodeAtividades2022d.pdf?src=1&mid=7157&bid=5806
MediaLAB Iscte. 2019. “Disinformation Risk in Portugal’s Election – More Brazil than Europe?”. https://democracyreporting.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/images/27942019-10-01-Portugal_Disinformation_Risk-Assessment.pdf
Sapo. 2023. “Como o áudio Deepfake pode interferir nas eleições: Governos e cidadãos devem estar atentos à desinformação.” https://tek.sapo.pt/noticias/computadores/artigos/como-o-audio-deepfake-pode-interferir-nas-eleicoes-governos-e-cidadaos-devem-estar-atentos-a-desinformacao
Serra-Silva, Bruno, and João Crespo Santos. 2023. “Continuity and Change in Portuguese Politics: Towards a More Polarized Party System?” In Portugal Since the 2008 Economic Crisis: Resilience and Change, ed. António Costa Pinto, 129-155. New York: Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351046916
Law No. 14/79. 1979. Lei Eleitoral da Assembleia da República. https://www.cne.pt/sites/default/files/dl/legis_lear_consolidada_2020-11.pdf
Law No. 19/2003. 2003. Financing of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns (Financiamento dos Partidos Políticos e das Campanhas Eleitorais). https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/FinanciamentoPartidosPoliticosCampanhasEleitorais_Anotado.pdf
ECFP. 2023. “Relatório de Atividades 2022.” https://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/file/RelatoriodeAtividades2022d.pdf?src=1&mid=7157&bid=5806
MediaLAB Iscte. 2019. “Disinformation Risk in Portugal’s Election – More Brazil than Europe?”. https://democracyreporting.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/images/27942019-10-01-Portugal_Disinformation_Risk-Assessment.pdf
Sapo. 2023. “Como o áudio Deepfake pode interferir nas eleições: Governos e cidadãos devem estar atentos à desinformação.” https://tek.sapo.pt/noticias/computadores/artigos/como-o-audio-deepfake-pode-interferir-nas-eleicoes-governos-e-cidadaos-devem-estar-atentos-a-desinformacao
Serra-Silva, Bruno, and João Crespo Santos. 2023. “Continuity and Change in Portuguese Politics: Towards a More Polarized Party System?” In Portugal Since the 2008 Economic Crisis: Resilience and Change, ed. António Costa Pinto, 129-155. New York: Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351046916
Slovakia
Slovak legislation enshrines all standard elements of free and fair elections. Legal provisions regarding the registration of parties and candidates are liberal and ensure a fair process. Registered political parties, movements, and coalitions can nominate candidate lists for parliamentary elections. These nominating organizations must obtain 10,000 signatures and deposit €17,000, which is returned only if they receive at least 2% of the vote. Eligible parties and candidates are not disqualified from registration without adhering to objectively verifiable legal criteria. Those denied the right to be elected or registered can appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court.
The State Commission for Elections and Control of Financing of Political Parties (Štátna komisia pre voľby a kontrolu financovania politických strán) supervises national elections. This commission has 14 members: ten nominated by political parties in parliament, and one member each delegated by the president of the Constitutional Court, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, the prosecutor general, and the president of the Supreme Audit Office. Parties must maintain accurate financial records, disclose donations, and regularly publish accounts. The State Commission monitors party funding, and each party must submit an annual report to parliament. Although the law on political parties stipulates various fines for noncompliance, these are infrequently enforced, as not all political parties use transparent accounts during elections.
Candidates and parties have fair opportunities to access public media. The public broadcaster, Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS), is legally required to introduce candidates and present their campaigns. Political broadcasting on private media outlets is free. No official bodies overseeing election campaign fairness reported media manipulation. However, a few days before the elections, a deepfake audio was posted on social media to discredit the leader of Progressive Slovakia (Kőváry, 2023).
Transparency International Slovakia evaluated the transparency and accuracy of financial records of political parties during the 2023 elections. The SaS party performed best in terms of transparency, while the Hlas party performed the worst. The National Criminal Agency (NAKA) is investigating possible manipulation of the 2023 parliamentary elections, particularly concerning the unrealistically high percentage of votes given to OĽANO and its allies in some Roma settlements.
The State Commission for Elections and Control of Financing of Political Parties (Štátna komisia pre voľby a kontrolu financovania politických strán) supervises national elections. This commission has 14 members: ten nominated by political parties in parliament, and one member each delegated by the president of the Constitutional Court, the president of the Supreme Administrative Court, the prosecutor general, and the president of the Supreme Audit Office. Parties must maintain accurate financial records, disclose donations, and regularly publish accounts. The State Commission monitors party funding, and each party must submit an annual report to parliament. Although the law on political parties stipulates various fines for noncompliance, these are infrequently enforced, as not all political parties use transparent accounts during elections.
Candidates and parties have fair opportunities to access public media. The public broadcaster, Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS), is legally required to introduce candidates and present their campaigns. Political broadcasting on private media outlets is free. No official bodies overseeing election campaign fairness reported media manipulation. However, a few days before the elections, a deepfake audio was posted on social media to discredit the leader of Progressive Slovakia (Kőváry, 2023).
Transparency International Slovakia evaluated the transparency and accuracy of financial records of political parties during the 2023 elections. The SaS party performed best in terms of transparency, while the Hlas party performed the worst. The National Criminal Agency (NAKA) is investigating possible manipulation of the 2023 parliamentary elections, particularly concerning the unrealistically high percentage of votes given to OĽANO and its allies in some Roma settlements.
Citations:
Zákon o podmienkach výkonu volebného práva a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2014-180
Vančo, M., and Kozinková, K. 2023. “Bez Rómov by OĽaNO nebolo v parlamente. Ako Matovič získal desaťtisíce rómskych hlasov?” https://domov.sme.sk/c/23226885/romovia-olano-matovic-pollak-hlasy-volby-2023.html
Transparency International Slovensko. 2023. “Monitoring volebných kampaní.” https://volby.transparency.sk/parlament2023/aktuality/v-predvolebnej-kampani-su-uz-statisice-s-transparentnostou-si-davaju-strany-nacas
OSCE. 2023. Slovak Republic. Early parliamentary elections 30 September 2023. ODHIR needs assessment mission report. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/c/548809_0.pdf
Daniška, J. 2023. “Slovenské voľby nerozhodli médiá, ale voliči. Našťastie.” https://echo24.cz/a/H86fN/komentar-daniska-slovenske-volby-nerozhodly-media-ale-volici
Kőváry, K. 2023. “Slovakia: Deepfake Audio of Denník N Journalist Offers Worrying Example of AI Abuse.” https://ipi.media/slovakia-deepfake-audio-of-dennik-n-journalist-offers-worrying-example-of-ai-abuse
Smer-SSD. 2023. “Smer-SSD odmieta byť súčasťou manipulatívnych politických diskusií TV Markíza.”(Smer-SSD rejects to take part in a manipulative political debates of TV Markíza). https://www.facebook.com/smersd/posts/pfbid0jz9XjLiwyDKfFoQYsenptzS3zgxuN1QcvhnKqynDEfvcjcQ2WsZxcnXP4MTvGXt2l
Zákon o podmienkach výkonu volebného práva a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2014-180
Vančo, M., and Kozinková, K. 2023. “Bez Rómov by OĽaNO nebolo v parlamente. Ako Matovič získal desaťtisíce rómskych hlasov?” https://domov.sme.sk/c/23226885/romovia-olano-matovic-pollak-hlasy-volby-2023.html
Transparency International Slovensko. 2023. “Monitoring volebných kampaní.” https://volby.transparency.sk/parlament2023/aktuality/v-predvolebnej-kampani-su-uz-statisice-s-transparentnostou-si-davaju-strany-nacas
OSCE. 2023. Slovak Republic. Early parliamentary elections 30 September 2023. ODHIR needs assessment mission report. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/c/548809_0.pdf
Daniška, J. 2023. “Slovenské voľby nerozhodli médiá, ale voliči. Našťastie.” https://echo24.cz/a/H86fN/komentar-daniska-slovenske-volby-nerozhodly-media-ale-volici
Kőváry, K. 2023. “Slovakia: Deepfake Audio of Denník N Journalist Offers Worrying Example of AI Abuse.” https://ipi.media/slovakia-deepfake-audio-of-dennik-n-journalist-offers-worrying-example-of-ai-abuse
Smer-SSD. 2023. “Smer-SSD odmieta byť súčasťou manipulatívnych politických diskusií TV Markíza.”(Smer-SSD rejects to take part in a manipulative political debates of TV Markíza). https://www.facebook.com/smersd/posts/pfbid0jz9XjLiwyDKfFoQYsenptzS3zgxuN1QcvhnKqynDEfvcjcQ2WsZxcnXP4MTvGXt2l
Slovenia
In Slovenia, the right to vote is universal and equal. Every citizen aged 18 or older is eligible to vote and run for election, regardless of social, ethnic, economic, or other affiliations. No financial deposit is necessary for registration or candidacy, and citizens are automatically enrolled upon reaching voting age. Slovenia ranked eighth globally in voter registration quality from 2012 to 2022, according to the Electoral Integrity Project (2023).
Political parties and voter groups can nominate candidates for various elections. For the National Assembly, a party may submit lists of candidates in all eight constituencies with the support of at least three National Assembly members or submit a list in a single constituency with backing from at least 100 voters. Alternatively, voters may propose a list in a single constituency with the support of at least 1,000 residents. Objections regarding the nomination process can be raised with the constituency electoral commission, and decisions are subject to review by the state electoral commission. Similar procedures apply to presidential elections.
In municipal elections, candidates for mayor or council members can be nominated by political parties or voters, with the required support contingent on the municipality’s size. The law regulates campaign financing for electoral and referendum campaigns, mandating financial transparency through reporting to the Slovenian Agency for Public Law and Related Services, with oversight from the Court of Audit. However, challenges persist, particularly concerning the regulation of third-party campaigning, including foreign entities.
Public broadcasting must provide equal access to all parties and candidate lists for debates and presentations, although non-parliamentary parties often have limited media access compared to established parties. While television remains a primary source of political information, printed media influence is waning, and online platforms are gaining prominence. Slovenian public television tends to create formats that favor the frontrunners. Media coverage in 2022 faced criticism for political bias, especially following personnel changes in public broadcasting. Nonetheless, media pluralism ensures voters have access to diverse political perspectives.
Political parties and voter groups can nominate candidates for various elections. For the National Assembly, a party may submit lists of candidates in all eight constituencies with the support of at least three National Assembly members or submit a list in a single constituency with backing from at least 100 voters. Alternatively, voters may propose a list in a single constituency with the support of at least 1,000 residents. Objections regarding the nomination process can be raised with the constituency electoral commission, and decisions are subject to review by the state electoral commission. Similar procedures apply to presidential elections.
In municipal elections, candidates for mayor or council members can be nominated by political parties or voters, with the required support contingent on the municipality’s size. The law regulates campaign financing for electoral and referendum campaigns, mandating financial transparency through reporting to the Slovenian Agency for Public Law and Related Services, with oversight from the Court of Audit. However, challenges persist, particularly concerning the regulation of third-party campaigning, including foreign entities.
Public broadcasting must provide equal access to all parties and candidate lists for debates and presentations, although non-parliamentary parties often have limited media access compared to established parties. While television remains a primary source of political information, printed media influence is waning, and online platforms are gaining prominence. Slovenian public television tends to create formats that favor the frontrunners. Media coverage in 2022 faced criticism for political bias, especially following personnel changes in public broadcasting. Nonetheless, media pluralism ensures voters have access to diverse political perspectives.
Citations:
Electoral Integrity Project. 2023. “Electoral Integrity Global Report 2023.” https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/global-report-2023?rq=Slovenia
Electoral Integrity Project. 2023. “Register Every Voter.” https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58533f31bebafbe99c85dc9b/t/65664c9fe91d017b11f8752e/1701203104332/Register%2BEvery%2BVoter%2BReport_DIGITAL.pdf
OSCE. 2022. “Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2022, Slovenia.” https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/slovenia/514078
Državni zbor Republike Slovenije. 2024. “Preiskovalna komisija o ugotavljanju politične odgovornosti nosilcev javnih funkcij zaradi domnevnega nezakonitega financiranja političnih strank in strankarske politične propagande v medijih pred in med volitvami poslancev v Državni zbor leta 2022 s finančnimi sredstvi podjetij v državni lasti, državnih institucij ter subjektov iz tujine (Commission of Inquiry on establishing the political responsibility of public office holders for the alleged illegal financing of political parties and party political propaganda in the media before and during the 2022 elections to the National Assembly with the financial resources of state-owned enterprises, state institutions and foreign entities).” https://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/Home/pos/dt/izbranDT/!ut/p/z1/jY9NC4JAFEV_iwu3vqemfexGIkkrSjFtNqExjYI6MlpCv76wVVDS293LORceUEiA1um94GlXiDotX_lE7bOzC6y17-rohvoKD9PjMSCurePegngAvLlPvAEwAgsPS8PZhmjixEGg__j448if_ghAx-c9oLwU2ftVUmfmjAOV7Mokk9pNvuq865p2oaKKfd9rXAheMu0iKhW_KbloO0g-SWiqKEoeGxYTRXkC991ZmA
RTVSLO.si. 2023. “Poročilo komisije o financiranju političnih strank ‘se bere kot politični triler’.” https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/porocilo-komisije-o-financiranju-politicnih-strank-se-bere-kot-politicni-triler/689451
European Parliament. 2022. “EU Youth Survey; The Source of Information of Young Slovenes about Politics.” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/youth-survey-2021
Electoral Integrity Project. 2023. “Electoral Integrity Global Report 2023.” https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/global-report-2023?rq=Slovenia
Electoral Integrity Project. 2023. “Register Every Voter.” https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58533f31bebafbe99c85dc9b/t/65664c9fe91d017b11f8752e/1701203104332/Register%2BEvery%2BVoter%2BReport_DIGITAL.pdf
OSCE. 2022. “Parliamentary Elections, 24 April 2022, Slovenia.” https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/slovenia/514078
Državni zbor Republike Slovenije. 2024. “Preiskovalna komisija o ugotavljanju politične odgovornosti nosilcev javnih funkcij zaradi domnevnega nezakonitega financiranja političnih strank in strankarske politične propagande v medijih pred in med volitvami poslancev v Državni zbor leta 2022 s finančnimi sredstvi podjetij v državni lasti, državnih institucij ter subjektov iz tujine (Commission of Inquiry on establishing the political responsibility of public office holders for the alleged illegal financing of political parties and party political propaganda in the media before and during the 2022 elections to the National Assembly with the financial resources of state-owned enterprises, state institutions and foreign entities).” https://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/Home/pos/dt/izbranDT/!ut/p/z1/jY9NC4JAFEV_iwu3vqemfexGIkkrSjFtNqExjYI6MlpCv76wVVDS293LORceUEiA1um94GlXiDotX_lE7bOzC6y17-rohvoKD9PjMSCurePegngAvLlPvAEwAgsPS8PZhmjixEGg__j448if_ghAx-c9oLwU2ftVUmfmjAOV7Mokk9pNvuq865p2oaKKfd9rXAheMu0iKhW_KbloO0g-SWiqKEoeGxYTRXkC991ZmA
RTVSLO.si. 2023. “Poročilo komisije o financiranju političnih strank ‘se bere kot politični triler’.” https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/porocilo-komisije-o-financiranju-politicnih-strank-se-bere-kot-politicni-triler/689451
European Parliament. 2022. “EU Youth Survey; The Source of Information of Young Slovenes about Politics.” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/en/be-heard/eurobarometer/youth-survey-2021
Spain
Registration procedures for candidates and political parties meet international standards of transparency and fairness. Candidates disqualified from registration or prevented from being elected have the right to appeal to a competent jurisdiction. Parties and candidates are required to maintain accurate financial records, and recent elections have not seen significant exclusion or discrimination. Only those convicted in certain criminal cases, always by a court, may lose their political rights. Candidates and parties denied registration or election rights can appeal to the administrative court, whose decisions can further be appealed to the Constitutional Court. Finalized lists are published in the official gazette.
All Congress of Deputies electoral candidate lists must ensure a minimum representation of 40% for each gender. Parliamentary parties are exempt from collecting signatures for candidate nominations, while non-parliamentary parties must gather signatures from at least 0.1% of voters in the respective constituency for their proposed lists. Radiotelevisión Española (RTVE), the major national public broadcaster, is obligated to inform voters about upcoming elections, providing proportional coverage of all contestants and organizing election debates.
All political parties with parliamentary representation have access to public media during electoral campaigns. They are covered by news reports and can participate in candidate debates. However, new parties face restricted access, with airtime in news and elections-related programming distributed based on past electoral performance. This has sparked controversy, particularly regarding the limitations faced by new parties in their first electoral campaign before entering parliament. According to the OSCE, the 2023 elections had fair media access and coverage, but challenges related to disinformation were noted. Concerns have also been raised about certain regional governments’ influence over regional public media.
The party financing law was reformed in 2015 as part of an anti-corruption plan to increase transparency and impose sanctions following numerous scandals. It imposes spending limits in electoral campaigns, and business contributions are theoretically subject to limits and conditions. Despite this, recent controversies have emerged regarding certain political parties attempting to evade legal scrutiny. Campaign spending is limited, and third-party financing of election campaigns is strictly prohibited. Candidates must submit a comprehensive report to the audit office detailing campaign income and expenditures within 100 to 125 days post-election. The legislation does not provide for interim reporting.
The Central Election Commission monitors compliance with campaign finance rules. The audit office, responsible for auditing party accounts, is empowered to undertake investigations on its own initiative and upon complaint. The OSCE noted that the audit office has strengthened its capacity for auditing political parties and developed internal regulations, including online submission of annual party and campaign finance reports. Among other initiatives, the audit office launched a public website providing information on the economic and financial activities of political parties and related entities. In January 2022, the audit office urged parliament to revise the legislation governing party financing, focusing on thresholds for sanctions and issues of disproportionality, but the law remains unchanged.
The OSCE expressed confidence in the legal framework during the 2023 elections, considering it conducive to holding democratic elections. The organization acknowledged widespread confidence in the efficacy of remedies offered by the election administration and courts in addressing election disputes. However, the OSCE recommended reviewing the balance between public and private funding to ensure the system does not disproportionately favor larger, established parties over smaller, local ones. Other recommendations, including enhancing transparency in election administration meetings, reviewing candidate eligibility restrictions, and establishing an independent media oversight authority, remain unimplemented (OSCE, 2023).
The national elections in 2023 faced logistical challenges primarily due to tight deadlines and the holiday season, resulting in difficulties recruiting sufficient polling staff.
All Congress of Deputies electoral candidate lists must ensure a minimum representation of 40% for each gender. Parliamentary parties are exempt from collecting signatures for candidate nominations, while non-parliamentary parties must gather signatures from at least 0.1% of voters in the respective constituency for their proposed lists. Radiotelevisión Española (RTVE), the major national public broadcaster, is obligated to inform voters about upcoming elections, providing proportional coverage of all contestants and organizing election debates.
All political parties with parliamentary representation have access to public media during electoral campaigns. They are covered by news reports and can participate in candidate debates. However, new parties face restricted access, with airtime in news and elections-related programming distributed based on past electoral performance. This has sparked controversy, particularly regarding the limitations faced by new parties in their first electoral campaign before entering parliament. According to the OSCE, the 2023 elections had fair media access and coverage, but challenges related to disinformation were noted. Concerns have also been raised about certain regional governments’ influence over regional public media.
The party financing law was reformed in 2015 as part of an anti-corruption plan to increase transparency and impose sanctions following numerous scandals. It imposes spending limits in electoral campaigns, and business contributions are theoretically subject to limits and conditions. Despite this, recent controversies have emerged regarding certain political parties attempting to evade legal scrutiny. Campaign spending is limited, and third-party financing of election campaigns is strictly prohibited. Candidates must submit a comprehensive report to the audit office detailing campaign income and expenditures within 100 to 125 days post-election. The legislation does not provide for interim reporting.
The Central Election Commission monitors compliance with campaign finance rules. The audit office, responsible for auditing party accounts, is empowered to undertake investigations on its own initiative and upon complaint. The OSCE noted that the audit office has strengthened its capacity for auditing political parties and developed internal regulations, including online submission of annual party and campaign finance reports. Among other initiatives, the audit office launched a public website providing information on the economic and financial activities of political parties and related entities. In January 2022, the audit office urged parliament to revise the legislation governing party financing, focusing on thresholds for sanctions and issues of disproportionality, but the law remains unchanged.
The OSCE expressed confidence in the legal framework during the 2023 elections, considering it conducive to holding democratic elections. The organization acknowledged widespread confidence in the efficacy of remedies offered by the election administration and courts in addressing election disputes. However, the OSCE recommended reviewing the balance between public and private funding to ensure the system does not disproportionately favor larger, established parties over smaller, local ones. Other recommendations, including enhancing transparency in election administration meetings, reviewing candidate eligibility restrictions, and establishing an independent media oversight authority, remain unimplemented (OSCE, 2023).
The national elections in 2023 faced logistical challenges primarily due to tight deadlines and the holiday season, resulting in difficulties recruiting sufficient polling staff.
Citations:
OSCE/ODHIR. 2023. “Spain Early Parliamentary Elections on 23 July 2023.” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/2/547184.pdf
OSCE/ODHIR. 2023. “Spain Early Parliamentary Elections on 23 July 2023.” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/2/547184.pdf
Sweden
There is no formal party registration in Sweden, though political parties may register their name to avoid misuse. Candidates are selected and ranked within party organizations with essentially no public rules guiding the process. Political representation in Sweden is overwhelmingly collective representation (Karlsson and Gilljam, 2014). Swedish voters predominantly vote for parties, not individual candidates, as only approximately 25% of the electorate used the personal vote option in the 2022 general election (Gadd et al. 2022).
The Election Authority (Valmyndigheten) is responsible for planning and coordinating general elections, and this planning does not include practices such as gerrymandering. At the subnational level, elections are administered by County Administrative Boards, Municipal Elections Commissions, and Polling Boards.
Both public and private funding is permitted, and parties that participated in elections and received public funding must disclose private donations in a report to the Legal, Financial, and Administrative Services [Kammarkollegiet]. Notably, these reports concern only income; parties are not required to report their expenses, assets, and debts, so public scrutiny has a limited scope.
This practice does not fully comply with international standards and guidelines issued by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (OSCE, 2018). Despite intense debate, this rule has not changed. According to the latest data published in 2021, the eight parties of the Riksdag and the Feminist Initiative received a total of SEK 167,955,204, or approximately €15 million. The women’s groups of the eight Riksdag parties received financial support amounting to SEK 14,999,660, or approximately €1.3 million (Sveriges Riksdag 2024).
There is no legal regulation regarding media time allocated to political parties; rather, this is a matter for voluntary self-regulation. Publicly funded TV channels and newspapers are expected to host and promote political debate but also to remain impartial. Private media are not legally obligated to follow this line, but they normally do (OCSE, 2022).
The Election Authority (Valmyndigheten) is responsible for planning and coordinating general elections, and this planning does not include practices such as gerrymandering. At the subnational level, elections are administered by County Administrative Boards, Municipal Elections Commissions, and Polling Boards.
Both public and private funding is permitted, and parties that participated in elections and received public funding must disclose private donations in a report to the Legal, Financial, and Administrative Services [Kammarkollegiet]. Notably, these reports concern only income; parties are not required to report their expenses, assets, and debts, so public scrutiny has a limited scope.
This practice does not fully comply with international standards and guidelines issued by the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) (OSCE, 2018). Despite intense debate, this rule has not changed. According to the latest data published in 2021, the eight parties of the Riksdag and the Feminist Initiative received a total of SEK 167,955,204, or approximately €15 million. The women’s groups of the eight Riksdag parties received financial support amounting to SEK 14,999,660, or approximately €1.3 million (Sveriges Riksdag 2024).
There is no legal regulation regarding media time allocated to political parties; rather, this is a matter for voluntary self-regulation. Publicly funded TV channels and newspapers are expected to host and promote political debate but also to remain impartial. Private media are not legally obligated to follow this line, but they normally do (OCSE, 2022).
Citations:
Gadd, Elin et al. 2022. Energivalet 2022, Rapport 2022:9, Valforskningsprogrammet Göteborgs universitet. https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2022-10/2022_9_Energivalet_2022.pdf
Karlsson, D., and Gilljam, M. 2014. Svenska politiker. Om de folkvalda i riksdag, landsting och kommun. Stockholm: Santérus.
OSCE. 2018. Sweden: General Elections 2018: ODIHR Election Expert Team Final Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/403760.pdf
OSCE. 2022. Sweden. General Elections 11 September 2022. ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report 31 May-2 June 2022. Warsaw: OSCE ODIHR. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/0/523500.pdf
Oscarsson, H., and S. Holmberg. 2014. Svenska väljare. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer.
Sveriges Riksdag. 2024. “Verksamhetsredogörelse för Partibidragsnämnden 2020.” https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/redogorelse/verksamhetsredogorelse-for-partibidragsnamnden_h804pn1/
Gadd, Elin et al. 2022. Energivalet 2022, Rapport 2022:9, Valforskningsprogrammet Göteborgs universitet. https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2022-10/2022_9_Energivalet_2022.pdf
Karlsson, D., and Gilljam, M. 2014. Svenska politiker. Om de folkvalda i riksdag, landsting och kommun. Stockholm: Santérus.
OSCE. 2018. Sweden: General Elections 2018: ODIHR Election Expert Team Final Report. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/403760.pdf
OSCE. 2022. Sweden. General Elections 11 September 2022. ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report 31 May-2 June 2022. Warsaw: OSCE ODIHR. Available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/0/523500.pdf
Oscarsson, H., and S. Holmberg. 2014. Svenska väljare. Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer.
Sveriges Riksdag. 2024. “Verksamhetsredogörelse för Partibidragsnämnden 2020.” https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/redogorelse/verksamhetsredogorelse-for-partibidragsnamnden_h804pn1/
UK
There are limited restrictions on who can run for election as a member of Parliament, notably excluding serving members of the police, the civil service and the armed forces, as well as judges, although if someone in one of these groups resigns, they are free to stand. People subject to bankruptcy are also excluded, and any candidate for election must post a £500 deposit, which will be lost if an insufficient share of the vote is not obtained.
In practice, there is lively political competition, and, on occasion, a long list of “fringe” candidates will appear on ballot papers in addition to representatives of the main political parties. Systems are in place to record donations and monitor compliance. Although the media tend to focus most on the established parties, there is no evident bias against any form of minority in coverage. As in many countries, there is concern about social media manipulation. It is also now common for political parties to use social media to criticize their treatment on broadcast media (Ford et al. 2021, 306).
Broadly similar rules apply for subnational government and the devolved administrations (Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales), with an Electoral Commission overseeing the process.
A “returning officer” has responsibility for ensuring the fair conduct of elections.
In practice, there is lively political competition, and, on occasion, a long list of “fringe” candidates will appear on ballot papers in addition to representatives of the main political parties. Systems are in place to record donations and monitor compliance. Although the media tend to focus most on the established parties, there is no evident bias against any form of minority in coverage. As in many countries, there is concern about social media manipulation. It is also now common for political parties to use social media to criticize their treatment on broadcast media (Ford et al. 2021, 306).
Broadly similar rules apply for subnational government and the devolved administrations (Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales), with an Electoral Commission overseeing the process.
A “returning officer” has responsibility for ensuring the fair conduct of elections.
Citations:
https://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-lords/members/electing-mps/candidates/
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/2023-03/Part%201%20Can%20you%20stand%20for%20election%20LGE.pdf
Ford, R., Bale, T., Jennings, W., and Surridge, P. 2021. “Fragmented and Polarised: Broadcasting and Social Media.” In Ford, R., Bale, T., Jennings, W., and Surridge, P., eds. The British General Election of 2019. London: Palgrave.
https://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-lords/members/electing-mps/candidates/
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/2023-03/Part%201%20Can%20you%20stand%20for%20election%20LGE.pdf
Ford, R., Bale, T., Jennings, W., and Surridge, P. 2021. “Fragmented and Polarised: Broadcasting and Social Media.” In Ford, R., Bale, T., Jennings, W., and Surridge, P., eds. The British General Election of 2019. London: Palgrave.
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
8
Australia
Elections in Australia are fundamentally competitive. The major parties, Labor and the Liberal-Nationals, contend on a relatively balanced playing field. This should be seen as the outcome of long-term processes of bargaining, anticipation and risk mitigation by the major parties.
While barriers to effective political competition are low, some do exist. A significant example is political financing, where minor parties face disadvantages both formally and informally. The primary instrument of electoral regulation, the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, has undergone several amendments, the latest in 2019. This act provides registered political parties with public funding at each election (see Australian Electoral Commission 2023). Parties and candidates who secure 4% of first-preference votes in an electorate are eligible for a fixed-sum payment, set at AUD10,656 in the 2022 federal election. Parties and candidates can also receive substantial top-up payments beyond that based on the number of votes they receive. The rate is set by legislation (Commonwealth Electoral Act, Section 321) and indexed every six months. For the 2022 federal election, this rate was AUD2.914 per eligible vote.
Overall, competitive conditions are more challenging for minor parties and independent candidates, who face higher formal and informal hurdles in areas like political financing and media exposure compared to major parties and their candidates. The increase in the number of independents at the 2019 federal election indicates that long-standing assumptions about party competition and its regulation in Australia are evolving. Reforms reflecting the growing significance of these minor players are actively debated. Currently, the Restoring Trust Bill, under discussion in the federal parliament, proposes substantial reforms to the electoral landscape, particularly regarding political financing. Proposed changes include lowering the disclosure threshold (the donation amount that must be publicly declared), introducing real-time donation disclosures, banning donations from government contractors, and limiting taxpayer-funded government advertising before elections (Orr 2023). According to Kate Chaney, Independent Member for Curtin, these reforms will “improve transparency, reduce financial influence and level the playing field in Australia’s elections” (Chaney 2023).
In addition to the balance of competition between major and minor parties, other challenges include transparency issues (such as high national-level disclosure thresholds) and difficulties in combating disinformation during election campaigns (Zhang and Johnson 2023). The political finance bill under consideration in the federal parliament aims to address these and other outstanding issues.
While the ongoing debate has focused on national conditions, the states have been relatively innovative. Political finance disclosure laws are more stringent at the federal level than in any subnational jurisdiction. South Australia has pioneered truth in political advertising laws to tackle disinformation in election campaigns.
While barriers to effective political competition are low, some do exist. A significant example is political financing, where minor parties face disadvantages both formally and informally. The primary instrument of electoral regulation, the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, has undergone several amendments, the latest in 2019. This act provides registered political parties with public funding at each election (see Australian Electoral Commission 2023). Parties and candidates who secure 4% of first-preference votes in an electorate are eligible for a fixed-sum payment, set at AUD10,656 in the 2022 federal election. Parties and candidates can also receive substantial top-up payments beyond that based on the number of votes they receive. The rate is set by legislation (Commonwealth Electoral Act, Section 321) and indexed every six months. For the 2022 federal election, this rate was AUD2.914 per eligible vote.
Overall, competitive conditions are more challenging for minor parties and independent candidates, who face higher formal and informal hurdles in areas like political financing and media exposure compared to major parties and their candidates. The increase in the number of independents at the 2019 federal election indicates that long-standing assumptions about party competition and its regulation in Australia are evolving. Reforms reflecting the growing significance of these minor players are actively debated. Currently, the Restoring Trust Bill, under discussion in the federal parliament, proposes substantial reforms to the electoral landscape, particularly regarding political financing. Proposed changes include lowering the disclosure threshold (the donation amount that must be publicly declared), introducing real-time donation disclosures, banning donations from government contractors, and limiting taxpayer-funded government advertising before elections (Orr 2023). According to Kate Chaney, Independent Member for Curtin, these reforms will “improve transparency, reduce financial influence and level the playing field in Australia’s elections” (Chaney 2023).
In addition to the balance of competition between major and minor parties, other challenges include transparency issues (such as high national-level disclosure thresholds) and difficulties in combating disinformation during election campaigns (Zhang and Johnson 2023). The political finance bill under consideration in the federal parliament aims to address these and other outstanding issues.
While the ongoing debate has focused on national conditions, the states have been relatively innovative. Political finance disclosure laws are more stringent at the federal level than in any subnational jurisdiction. South Australia has pioneered truth in political advertising laws to tackle disinformation in election campaigns.
Citations:
Australian Electoral Commission. 2023. “2022 Federal Election: Election Funding Payments Finalised.” https://www.aec.gov.au/media/2022/12-21.htm#:~:text=Parties%20and%20candidates%20who%20received,and%20is%20an%20indexed%20figure
Chaney, K. 2023. “Restoring Trust Bill.” https://www.katechaney.com.au/rtb
Orr, G. 2023. “Proposed Spending and Donations Caps May at Last Bring Genuine Reform to National Election Rules.” The Conversation June 20. https://theconversation.com/proposed-spending-and-donations-caps-may-at-last-bring-genuine-reform-to-national-election-rules-208031
Zhang, A. and Jonson, B. 2023. “Spotting Misinformation and Disinformation in Australia’s Voice to Parliament Referendum.” The Strategist September 28. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/spotting-misinformation-and-disinformation-in-australias-voice-to-parliament-referendum/
Australian Electoral Commission. 2023. “2022 Federal Election: Election Funding Payments Finalised.” https://www.aec.gov.au/media/2022/12-21.htm#:~:text=Parties%20and%20candidates%20who%20received,and%20is%20an%20indexed%20figure
Chaney, K. 2023. “Restoring Trust Bill.” https://www.katechaney.com.au/rtb
Orr, G. 2023. “Proposed Spending and Donations Caps May at Last Bring Genuine Reform to National Election Rules.” The Conversation June 20. https://theconversation.com/proposed-spending-and-donations-caps-may-at-last-bring-genuine-reform-to-national-election-rules-208031
Zhang, A. and Jonson, B. 2023. “Spotting Misinformation and Disinformation in Australia’s Voice to Parliament Referendum.” The Strategist September 28. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/spotting-misinformation-and-disinformation-in-australias-voice-to-parliament-referendum/
Israel
The registration procedures for candidates and parties meet the transparency and fairness criteria. Any party can register with the registrar of political parties as long as the party has 100 or more supporters who are aged over 18 and are Israeli citizens. The registration fee is small (ILS 2,400), which enables broad participation. De jure, there are several limitations; a party is not allowed to register if the party’s goals or activities reject the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish, democratic state; incite racism; support the armed struggle of an enemy state or terrorist organization against the State of Israel; or hint at covering illegal activity (Party Registrar).
Before each election, each party submits its list of candidates to the Central Election Committee. Any citizen over the age of 21 can run for office unless a court disqualifies them for promoting racism or denying the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish and democratic state. Additionally, a citizen who has been convicted cannot run for office for seven years.
De facto, there have been very few cases of candidates or parties being disqualified from running. However, in the last couple of years, members of the Knesset have increasingly attempted to disqualify candidates from Arab minority parties, arguing that they support terror (Shani and Fuchs, 2022). Several cases have arisen in which the Central Elections Committee decided to disqualify Arab candidates, but these decisions were later overruled by the Supreme Court, which reviews Central Elections Committee decisions.
In the most recent coalition agreement, signed in December 2022, the parties agreed to amend the Basic Law: The Knesset clause that defines eligibility for running for office, eliminating racism as a disqualifying factor. To date, the government has not attempted to pass this amendment.
Each party must submit its financial records for inspection by the government comptroller, who publishes reports after every election detailing the violations of each party and the fines they need to pay. The parties are required to provide all information on donations and finances to the comptroller. Parties that violate the party finance law can be sanctioned by the comptroller. However, in many cases, these sanctions are not imposed (State Comptroller).
All parties enjoy free access to the media. However, some candidates often receive more attention than others. In recent elections, the extreme right-wing party leader Itamar Ben Gvir received significantly more media attention than other candidates. This was not due to discrimination but rather the media’s interest in extreme views and sensationalism.
In the last few election cycles, the media has focused more on personal issues than the policy positions of candidates. As a result, more policy-oriented parties have received little coverage.
The Israeli electoral system is a single-district proportional system. Therefore, there are no institutional limitations on political participation.
In the November 2022 elections, the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) warned decision-makers about Iranian and Russian interference through social media. However, during the elections, there was no concrete evidence of such intervention (Shuker and Siboni, 2019).
Before each election, each party submits its list of candidates to the Central Election Committee. Any citizen over the age of 21 can run for office unless a court disqualifies them for promoting racism or denying the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish and democratic state. Additionally, a citizen who has been convicted cannot run for office for seven years.
De facto, there have been very few cases of candidates or parties being disqualified from running. However, in the last couple of years, members of the Knesset have increasingly attempted to disqualify candidates from Arab minority parties, arguing that they support terror (Shani and Fuchs, 2022). Several cases have arisen in which the Central Elections Committee decided to disqualify Arab candidates, but these decisions were later overruled by the Supreme Court, which reviews Central Elections Committee decisions.
In the most recent coalition agreement, signed in December 2022, the parties agreed to amend the Basic Law: The Knesset clause that defines eligibility for running for office, eliminating racism as a disqualifying factor. To date, the government has not attempted to pass this amendment.
Each party must submit its financial records for inspection by the government comptroller, who publishes reports after every election detailing the violations of each party and the fines they need to pay. The parties are required to provide all information on donations and finances to the comptroller. Parties that violate the party finance law can be sanctioned by the comptroller. However, in many cases, these sanctions are not imposed (State Comptroller).
All parties enjoy free access to the media. However, some candidates often receive more attention than others. In recent elections, the extreme right-wing party leader Itamar Ben Gvir received significantly more media attention than other candidates. This was not due to discrimination but rather the media’s interest in extreme views and sensationalism.
In the last few election cycles, the media has focused more on personal issues than the policy positions of candidates. As a result, more policy-oriented parties have received little coverage.
The Israeli electoral system is a single-district proportional system. Therefore, there are no institutional limitations on political participation.
In the November 2022 elections, the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) warned decision-makers about Iranian and Russian interference through social media. However, during the elections, there was no concrete evidence of such intervention (Shuker and Siboni, 2019).
Citations:
Registrar of Political Parties www.gov.il/en/departments/topics/the_registrar_of_political_parties/govil-landing-page
Shani, Yuval, and Amir Fuchs. 2022. “Disqualification of Knesset Lists and Candidates: Q&A.” The Israeli Democracy Institute. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/29669
Shuker, Pnina, and Gavbi Soiboni. 2019. “The Threat of Foreign Interference in the 2019 Elections in Israel and Ways of Handling it.” INSS 3 (1). www.inss.org.il/publication/the-threat-of-foreign-interference-in-the-2019-elections-in-israel-and-ways-of-handling-it
State Comptroller. “Elections financing – The role of auditing.” https://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/mimun/Pages/default.aspx
Registrar of Political Parties www.gov.il/en/departments/topics/the_registrar_of_political_parties/govil-landing-page
Shani, Yuval, and Amir Fuchs. 2022. “Disqualification of Knesset Lists and Candidates: Q&A.” The Israeli Democracy Institute. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/29669
Shuker, Pnina, and Gavbi Soiboni. 2019. “The Threat of Foreign Interference in the 2019 Elections in Israel and Ways of Handling it.” INSS 3 (1). www.inss.org.il/publication/the-threat-of-foreign-interference-in-the-2019-elections-in-israel-and-ways-of-handling-it
State Comptroller. “Elections financing – The role of auditing.” https://www.mevaker.gov.il/En/mimun/Pages/default.aspx
Japan
Political competition in Japan is generally fair and transparent. Only persons who are under guardianship and deemed “incompetent,” those sentenced to prison, and persons who have been found guilty of violating the Public Office Election Law may be banned from standing in elections. The minimum age for candidates ranges from 25 (lower house, city council) to 30 (upper house, governor). The financial deposit required to become a candidate amounts to JPY 3 million (approximately €18,500) in constituency voting and JPY 6 million (approximately €37,000) in proportional representation. Although the deposit is returned after exceeding a certain threshold of votes (in most cases 10%), it constitutes an obstacle for smaller parties and unaffiliated candidates. In April 2023, a pipe bomb was thrown toward Prime Minister Kishida Fumio by a man apparently frustrated he had been denied the right to run in an upper house election for failing to comply with formal requirements.
Japan’s electoral system comprises 289 single-seat constituencies and 189 members elected through proportional representation for the House of Representatives, as well as a mix of single, non-transferable votes and proportional representation for the House of Councilors. While the introduction of the mixed system to the lower house in 1994 aimed to strengthen competition between the two major parties, the LDP has nonetheless won all but one election for the lower house since 1996. The LDP still enjoys some advantage under the new system, and Komeito, its junior coalition partner for over two decades, can reliably mobilize and instruct the members of Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist sect, to vote for LDP candidates in swing districts, which has further fortified the LDP’s position. In the 2021 election, the two parties won a combined 63% of seats, with 47% of votes. The combination of single-seat constituencies and write-in ballots has also exacerbated the problem of hereditary parliamentarianism (Punendra 2023). At present, about 30% of Diet members inherited their constituencies. The advantage of name recognition plus personalized voter support groups incentivizes the LDP to nominate the sons (and in rare cases daughters) of retired lawmakers. This practice has limited opportunities for politicians without familial connections and wealth to gain seats in the Diet as members of the dominant party. Moreover, the government and the Supreme Court of Japan have been reluctant to address the disparity in the value of one vote between rural and urban districts – which exceeds three-to-one – favoring conservative candidates.
A major electoral problem at all levels is the gross underrepresentation of women. Only about 10% of members of the lower house are women, while the number of female cabinet ministers rarely exceeds this threshold. In local elections, female candidates make up only 15% of candidates (NHK 2023). Their representation has been helped by the fact that municipalities play a large role in the expansion of childcare facilities (Tsuji 2017). Another problem of subnational elections is that they fail to attract candidates, and assemblies are increasingly sidelined by mayors or governors (Nikkei Asia). In the unified April 2013 local elections, 40.2% of mayoral posts, as well as 14% of assembly posts in 2023, went uncontested.
Both political parties and politicians are required to disclose their spending and sources of revenue. Nevertheless, incidents of illegal donations remain frequent. The Political Fund Control Law does not require the consolidation of reports from various committees charged with the financial matters of one politician, which decreases the transparency of political funds. Moreover, not all reports are digitized, their preservation period is only three years and individual contributions below JPY 50,000 (below JPY 200,000 in the case of tickets for fundraising events) do not have to be reported.
Although there are no legal restrictions on media access for candidates, government officials enjoy greater media coverage, especially in public media. The legalization of social media use in electoral campaigns in 2013 somewhat improved access to voters for non-mainstream candidates.
Japan’s electoral system comprises 289 single-seat constituencies and 189 members elected through proportional representation for the House of Representatives, as well as a mix of single, non-transferable votes and proportional representation for the House of Councilors. While the introduction of the mixed system to the lower house in 1994 aimed to strengthen competition between the two major parties, the LDP has nonetheless won all but one election for the lower house since 1996. The LDP still enjoys some advantage under the new system, and Komeito, its junior coalition partner for over two decades, can reliably mobilize and instruct the members of Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist sect, to vote for LDP candidates in swing districts, which has further fortified the LDP’s position. In the 2021 election, the two parties won a combined 63% of seats, with 47% of votes. The combination of single-seat constituencies and write-in ballots has also exacerbated the problem of hereditary parliamentarianism (Punendra 2023). At present, about 30% of Diet members inherited their constituencies. The advantage of name recognition plus personalized voter support groups incentivizes the LDP to nominate the sons (and in rare cases daughters) of retired lawmakers. This practice has limited opportunities for politicians without familial connections and wealth to gain seats in the Diet as members of the dominant party. Moreover, the government and the Supreme Court of Japan have been reluctant to address the disparity in the value of one vote between rural and urban districts – which exceeds three-to-one – favoring conservative candidates.
A major electoral problem at all levels is the gross underrepresentation of women. Only about 10% of members of the lower house are women, while the number of female cabinet ministers rarely exceeds this threshold. In local elections, female candidates make up only 15% of candidates (NHK 2023). Their representation has been helped by the fact that municipalities play a large role in the expansion of childcare facilities (Tsuji 2017). Another problem of subnational elections is that they fail to attract candidates, and assemblies are increasingly sidelined by mayors or governors (Nikkei Asia). In the unified April 2013 local elections, 40.2% of mayoral posts, as well as 14% of assembly posts in 2023, went uncontested.
Both political parties and politicians are required to disclose their spending and sources of revenue. Nevertheless, incidents of illegal donations remain frequent. The Political Fund Control Law does not require the consolidation of reports from various committees charged with the financial matters of one politician, which decreases the transparency of political funds. Moreover, not all reports are digitized, their preservation period is only three years and individual contributions below JPY 50,000 (below JPY 200,000 in the case of tickets for fundraising events) do not have to be reported.
Although there are no legal restrictions on media access for candidates, government officials enjoy greater media coverage, especially in public media. The legalization of social media use in electoral campaigns in 2013 somewhat improved access to voters for non-mainstream candidates.
Citations:
Harris, Tobias, and John McLaughlin. 2021. “The Small Pacifist Party That Could Shape Japan’s Future.” Foreign Policy, November 5. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/04/komeito-ldp-japan-elections-defense-policy-china/
Hayashi, Masao, and Yuki Nikaido. 2023. “Vicious Cycle Leads to More ‘Triple no-Contest’ Local Elections.” The Asahi Shimbun, June 5. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14925299
“Japan’s hollowing out of regional legislatures deepens.” NikkeiAsia, February 10.
Kôshoku Senkyo-hô [Public Office Election Law]. 1970, revised in 2022. e-Gov. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=325AC1000000100
Noguchi, Yo. 2021. “Loopholes Keep Voters in the Dark in Japan.” https://archive.investigativereportingworkshop.org/news/loopholes-keep-voters-in-the-dark-in-japan/
Purnendra Jain. 2023. “Hereditary Politicians Remain Dominant in Japan.” East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/02/28/hereditary-politicians-remain-dominant-in-japan/
Tsuji, Yuki. 2017. “Explaining the Increase in Female Mayors: Gender-Segregated Employment and Pathways to Local Political Leadership.” Social Science Japan Journal 20 (1): 37-57.
“Top Court Fails to Recognize the Harm of Vote Value Disparity.” The Asahi Shinbun, October 19. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15032404
“Women on the Frontline: 15% of Japan’s Politicians.” NHK World, June 10, 2023. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/3016155/
Yamaguchi, Mari. 2023. “Suspect in Japan PM Attack May Have Had Election Grudge.” AP News April 19. https://apnews.com/article/japan-kishida-explosion-suspect-motive-13382736b2532e8aaa54a7e5ec3bf636
Harris, Tobias, and John McLaughlin. 2021. “The Small Pacifist Party That Could Shape Japan’s Future.” Foreign Policy, November 5. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/04/komeito-ldp-japan-elections-defense-policy-china/
Hayashi, Masao, and Yuki Nikaido. 2023. “Vicious Cycle Leads to More ‘Triple no-Contest’ Local Elections.” The Asahi Shimbun, June 5. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14925299
“Japan’s hollowing out of regional legislatures deepens.” NikkeiAsia, February 10.
Kôshoku Senkyo-hô [Public Office Election Law]. 1970, revised in 2022. e-Gov. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=325AC1000000100
Noguchi, Yo. 2021. “Loopholes Keep Voters in the Dark in Japan.” https://archive.investigativereportingworkshop.org/news/loopholes-keep-voters-in-the-dark-in-japan/
Purnendra Jain. 2023. “Hereditary Politicians Remain Dominant in Japan.” East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/02/28/hereditary-politicians-remain-dominant-in-japan/
Tsuji, Yuki. 2017. “Explaining the Increase in Female Mayors: Gender-Segregated Employment and Pathways to Local Political Leadership.” Social Science Japan Journal 20 (1): 37-57.
“Top Court Fails to Recognize the Harm of Vote Value Disparity.” The Asahi Shinbun, October 19. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15032404
“Women on the Frontline: 15% of Japan’s Politicians.” NHK World, June 10, 2023. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/3016155/
Yamaguchi, Mari. 2023. “Suspect in Japan PM Attack May Have Had Election Grudge.” AP News April 19. https://apnews.com/article/japan-kishida-explosion-suspect-motive-13382736b2532e8aaa54a7e5ec3bf636
Netherlands
Individual voter registration is passive and based on the unified population register maintained by municipalities. Voters residing abroad who wish to vote are required to actively register once. Over 1 million citizens reside outside of the Netherlands, but only some 109,000 requested to be registered for the 2023 elections. With a score of 78 out of 100 points in the 2023 Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index, the Netherlands – after other European countries like Finland (89) and Denmark (score 87) – was ranked 12th among 42 European countries. In 2018, its highest scores came in the categories of electoral laws and electoral procedures; somewhat lower scores were given for voter and party and candidacy registration. Some argue that party membership and selection by party caucus strongly diminish formal equality with regard to accessibility. Political parties with elected members receive state subsidies, while qualifying as a new party necessitates payment of a considerable entry fee. In the November 2023 national elections, two new political parties, the Farmer-Citizen Movement (Boeren Burger Beweging, BBB) and New Social Contract (NSC) participated and entered parliament, respectively winning seven and 20 seats in a 150-seat parliament. Two existing parties, Labor and Green Left, merged.
By buying commercial media time and microtargeting through social media, political parties have some influence on media attention and coverage. In the 2023 national elections, parties spent a total of approximately €2.5 million on microtargeting, mainly based on “lifestyle” cues. Extreme-right parties Forum for Democracy (Baudet) and Party for Freedom (Wilders) relied on the algorithms of general platforms like TikTok and YouTube. Microtargeting through “influencers” on social media platforms opens the door for free publicity by “fans” and possible organized foreign, especially Russian-origin, propaganda.
There are significant problems with the party financing system. Even though minor improvements have been implemented, substantial issues remain, according to the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the anti-corruption watchdog. Party funding is not transparently monitored, and there is no independent body tasked with reviewing and auditing party finances. The members of the Political Parties Finance Oversight Committee, which advises the minister of the interior on party finance issues, are appointed by the same minister, who is also a partisan. Sanctions are rarely imposed, as much party finance can be hidden by political parties. Foreign donations can still be given to parties through Dutch entities and local branches. Parties do not need to declare expenditures, only formal income. Major parties, including the PVV, currently the largest party, are dependent on foreign funding. The PVV has no membership organization and receives no state subsidies, yet voters cannot verify who funds this major party. Anonymous gifts are still allowed, leaving the system open to foreign influence. Political parties, such as the major right-wing liberal VVD, organize meetings at which wealthy donors can buy time to sit down with ministers. Gifts in kind are not reported by parties, and local parties and branches/chapters are not covered by the Party Finance Law. Parties can hide sources of income and resources through these branches and ancillary organizations.
By buying commercial media time and microtargeting through social media, political parties have some influence on media attention and coverage. In the 2023 national elections, parties spent a total of approximately €2.5 million on microtargeting, mainly based on “lifestyle” cues. Extreme-right parties Forum for Democracy (Baudet) and Party for Freedom (Wilders) relied on the algorithms of general platforms like TikTok and YouTube. Microtargeting through “influencers” on social media platforms opens the door for free publicity by “fans” and possible organized foreign, especially Russian-origin, propaganda.
There are significant problems with the party financing system. Even though minor improvements have been implemented, substantial issues remain, according to the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the anti-corruption watchdog. Party funding is not transparently monitored, and there is no independent body tasked with reviewing and auditing party finances. The members of the Political Parties Finance Oversight Committee, which advises the minister of the interior on party finance issues, are appointed by the same minister, who is also a partisan. Sanctions are rarely imposed, as much party finance can be hidden by political parties. Foreign donations can still be given to parties through Dutch entities and local branches. Parties do not need to declare expenditures, only formal income. Major parties, including the PVV, currently the largest party, are dependent on foreign funding. The PVV has no membership organization and receives no state subsidies, yet voters cannot verify who funds this major party. Anonymous gifts are still allowed, leaving the system open to foreign influence. Political parties, such as the major right-wing liberal VVD, organize meetings at which wealthy donors can buy time to sit down with ministers. Gifts in kind are not reported by parties, and local parties and branches/chapters are not covered by the Party Finance Law. Parties can hide sources of income and resources through these branches and ancillary organizations.
Citations:
Follow the Money. 2022. “Toezichthouder partijfinanciën: Geld is te belangrijk geworden in de politiek.” June 24.
Krouwel, A. 2021. “Wij zijn het Wilde Westen van het politieke geld.” NRC March 19.
https://nos.nl/artikel/2371252-tonnen-aan-giften-voor-partijen-donateur-wordt-zo-beetje-werkgever-van-politici
https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2304406-nederland-is-het-wilde-westen-van-de-partijfinanciering
https://www.transparency.nl/nieuws/2019/10/nederlandse-regels-partijfinanciering-werken-corruptie-lokale-partijen-in-de-hand/
https://nos.nl/artikel/2372814-onderzoek-rechts-domineert-de-verkiezingscampagne-op-radio-en-tv
https://mediasuitedatastories.clariah.nl/nl/elections-2021-first-results/
Groene Amsterdammer. 30 November. “Online campagnes. De genegeerde burger.”
Follow the Money. 2022. “Toezichthouder partijfinanciën: Geld is te belangrijk geworden in de politiek.” June 24.
Krouwel, A. 2021. “Wij zijn het Wilde Westen van het politieke geld.” NRC March 19.
https://nos.nl/artikel/2371252-tonnen-aan-giften-voor-partijen-donateur-wordt-zo-beetje-werkgever-van-politici
https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2304406-nederland-is-het-wilde-westen-van-de-partijfinanciering
https://www.transparency.nl/nieuws/2019/10/nederlandse-regels-partijfinanciering-werken-corruptie-lokale-partijen-in-de-hand/
https://nos.nl/artikel/2372814-onderzoek-rechts-domineert-de-verkiezingscampagne-op-radio-en-tv
https://mediasuitedatastories.clariah.nl/nl/elections-2021-first-results/
Groene Amsterdammer. 30 November. “Online campagnes. De genegeerde burger.”
7
USA
The United States is characterized by a highly decentralized and fragmented system of electoral administration. The Constitution provides broad criteria for federal candidate eligibility, the general structure of the electoral process, and protections for certain categories of voters. Beyond this, however, further electoral criteria and election administration are left to the 50 state governments.
The U.S. Constitution has fairly basic criteria for eligibility to stand for federal office. Specifically, candidates for the House of Representatives must be at least 25 years old, candidates for the Senate must be at least 30, and candidates for the presidency must be at least 35. Additionally, candidates for the presidency must be “natural born” citizens, which has been interpreted to mean that a person must be a U.S. citizen at birth. They must also have been a U.S. resident for at least 14 years. The Constitution specifies that the number of senators per state must be equal (two), and federal statute regulates the size of the House of Representatives and broad features of the system of congressional representation (for example, mandating that each member of the House represents a single-member district).
In addition, the U.S. Constitution guarantees individuals’ political participation, both in their ability to vote and in their ability to run for office. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is generally taken as a guarantee that a person cannot be barred from running for office based on arbitrary characteristics such as race. The Religious Test Clause prohibits the exclusion of candidates on the basis of religion or lack thereof. There are also protections against voting discrimination based on race (Fifteenth Amendment), sex (Nineteenth Amendment), failure to pay taxes (Twenty-Fourth Amendment), and age (Twenty-Sixth Amendment).
The formal constitutional criteria to stand for national office in the United States are quite broad and generous. There is no bar, for example, against a criminal or even a prisoner from standing for office. The Supreme Court has confirmed in multiple rulings that additional formal requirements, such as term limits, cannot be placed on candidates for federal office by state governments.
States, however, have greater leeway in restricting the voting franchise. For example, a small number of states impose a lifetime ban on people convicted of crimes from voting (Johnson 2019).
State governments are entrusted with carrying out elections. They also manage ballot access criteria. Since the 20th century, ballots have been printed by states, and parties and candidates have different levels of entitlement to appear on the ballot depending on the state. Some states are extremely inhospitable to minor party candidates. In Alabama, a party must secure a petition equivalent to 3% of the total number of votes cast in the previous gubernatorial election to appear on the ballot. The deadline for submitting this petition is in March. Additionally, the party must win at least 20% of the vote in a statewide election every time to remain qualified on the ballot (https://www.sos.alabama.gov/alabama-votes/candidates/qualifications-public-office).
A key challenge to U.S. democracy is widespread gerrymandering, particularly in states where elected officials revise the boundaries of electoral and congressional districts, favoring partisan influence in the process. Redistricting occurs once a decade, and there is strong evidence that it has a deeply corrosive impact on U.S. democracy, including in Congress at the federal level (Kirschenbaum and Li, 2021).
Finally, the last time a third party – not the Democrats or Republicans – appeared on the presidential ballot in Alabama was in 2000. In contrast, Louisiana has one of the easiest routes to ballot access. A party need only submit a filing fee of $1,125 to run for president in that state. Not surprisingly, Louisiana had 32 candidates on its 2016 presidential ballot.
The U.S. Constitution has fairly basic criteria for eligibility to stand for federal office. Specifically, candidates for the House of Representatives must be at least 25 years old, candidates for the Senate must be at least 30, and candidates for the presidency must be at least 35. Additionally, candidates for the presidency must be “natural born” citizens, which has been interpreted to mean that a person must be a U.S. citizen at birth. They must also have been a U.S. resident for at least 14 years. The Constitution specifies that the number of senators per state must be equal (two), and federal statute regulates the size of the House of Representatives and broad features of the system of congressional representation (for example, mandating that each member of the House represents a single-member district).
In addition, the U.S. Constitution guarantees individuals’ political participation, both in their ability to vote and in their ability to run for office. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is generally taken as a guarantee that a person cannot be barred from running for office based on arbitrary characteristics such as race. The Religious Test Clause prohibits the exclusion of candidates on the basis of religion or lack thereof. There are also protections against voting discrimination based on race (Fifteenth Amendment), sex (Nineteenth Amendment), failure to pay taxes (Twenty-Fourth Amendment), and age (Twenty-Sixth Amendment).
The formal constitutional criteria to stand for national office in the United States are quite broad and generous. There is no bar, for example, against a criminal or even a prisoner from standing for office. The Supreme Court has confirmed in multiple rulings that additional formal requirements, such as term limits, cannot be placed on candidates for federal office by state governments.
States, however, have greater leeway in restricting the voting franchise. For example, a small number of states impose a lifetime ban on people convicted of crimes from voting (Johnson 2019).
State governments are entrusted with carrying out elections. They also manage ballot access criteria. Since the 20th century, ballots have been printed by states, and parties and candidates have different levels of entitlement to appear on the ballot depending on the state. Some states are extremely inhospitable to minor party candidates. In Alabama, a party must secure a petition equivalent to 3% of the total number of votes cast in the previous gubernatorial election to appear on the ballot. The deadline for submitting this petition is in March. Additionally, the party must win at least 20% of the vote in a statewide election every time to remain qualified on the ballot (https://www.sos.alabama.gov/alabama-votes/candidates/qualifications-public-office).
A key challenge to U.S. democracy is widespread gerrymandering, particularly in states where elected officials revise the boundaries of electoral and congressional districts, favoring partisan influence in the process. Redistricting occurs once a decade, and there is strong evidence that it has a deeply corrosive impact on U.S. democracy, including in Congress at the federal level (Kirschenbaum and Li, 2021).
Finally, the last time a third party – not the Democrats or Republicans – appeared on the presidential ballot in Alabama was in 2000. In contrast, Louisiana has one of the easiest routes to ballot access. A party need only submit a filing fee of $1,125 to run for president in that state. Not surprisingly, Louisiana had 32 candidates on its 2016 presidential ballot.
Citations:
https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_access_requirements_for_presidential_candidates_in_Louisiana
https://sos.oregon.gov/elections/Pages/voteinor.aspx
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?f=0&year=2000&fips=1
https://vip.sos.nd.gov/civics101.aspx
https://www.sos.alabama.gov/alabama-votes/candidates/qualifications-public-office
Richard Johnson and Lisa Miller. 2022. “The Conservative Policy Bias of US Senate Malapportionment.” PS: Political Science and Politics.
Richard Johnson. 2020. “Low-Resource Candidates and Fundraising Appeals.” In B Grofman, E Suchay, and A Treschel, eds., Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Richard Johnson. 2019. “Racial Policy Under Trump.” In The Trump Presidency: From Campaign Trail to World Stage, eds. M Oliva and M Shanahan. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Julia Kirschenbaum and Michael Li. 2021. “Gerrymandering Explained.” https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/gerrymandering-explained
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?f=0&year=2000&fips=1
https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_access_requirements_for_presidential_candidates_in_Louisiana
https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_access_requirements_for_presidential_candidates_in_Louisiana
https://sos.oregon.gov/elections/Pages/voteinor.aspx
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?f=0&year=2000&fips=1
https://vip.sos.nd.gov/civics101.aspx
https://www.sos.alabama.gov/alabama-votes/candidates/qualifications-public-office
Richard Johnson and Lisa Miller. 2022. “The Conservative Policy Bias of US Senate Malapportionment.” PS: Political Science and Politics.
Richard Johnson. 2020. “Low-Resource Candidates and Fundraising Appeals.” In B Grofman, E Suchay, and A Treschel, eds., Oxford Handbook of Electoral Persuasion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Richard Johnson. 2019. “Racial Policy Under Trump.” In The Trump Presidency: From Campaign Trail to World Stage, eds. M Oliva and M Shanahan. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Julia Kirschenbaum and Michael Li. 2021. “Gerrymandering Explained.” https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/gerrymandering-explained
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/state.php?f=0&year=2000&fips=1
https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_access_requirements_for_presidential_candidates_in_Louisiana
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
5
Poland
On October 15, 2023, Poland held parliamentary elections that were free but lacked full competitiveness. Despite a diverse range of parties and candidates, the ruling Law and Justice party had a significant advantage by using state resources, including public companies and media, to support its campaign. Additionally, a government-initiated referendum aimed to amplify the ruling coalition’s campaign messages, involving support from state-controlled companies and blurring the line between state and party, potentially bypassing campaign finance regulations.
The Electoral Code forms the comprehensive legal framework for parliamentary elections, but despite recommendations from OSCE/ODHIR, no changes have been made to constituency boundaries since 2011. This lack of adjustment, coupled with the inclusion of all votes from abroad in the Warsaw constituency, raises concerns about the equality of votes.
In March 2023, significant revisions to the Electoral Code included reducing the minimum number of residents per precinct, establishing a Central Register of Voters, and modifying the eligibility criteria for Constituency Election Commission members. However, challenges arose, such as the rejection of some candidate lists due to formal issues, including problems with supporter addresses in the newly implemented Central Register of Voters.
The regulations on electoral campaign financing, as outlined in the Election Code and the Political Parties Act, require political parties to submit annual financial information to the National Election Commission. In 2023, five political parties faced the potential deprivation of public subsidies due to unfavorable verdicts. During the 2023 elections, three factors negatively impacted the accountability and clarity of campaign finances: a lack of detailed financial reporting before election day, unrestrained third-party campaigning and insufficient campaign finance regulations for the referendum.
Public television and radio stations ostensibly met their legal obligations to provide free airtime to all electoral committees. However, the OSCE reported that the public broadcaster failed to ensure balanced and impartial coverage during the presidential (2020) and parliamentary (2023) elections. Additionally, the ruling coalition leveraged Catholic media, including Telewizja Trwam and Radio Maryja, to appeal to traditional conservative voters. The acquisition of Polska Press by PKN Orlen in 2020 granted the PiS party significant influence over regional media. Despite these developments, the Polish media landscape remains diverse, with public television (TVP), TVN and Polsat dominating the television sector.
Most political campaigns occur online, with politicians and parties using platforms like X and Facebook for promotion and commentary. However, the tone of media content – both online and offline – was generally negative, offensive and radical. While unauthorized new media usage and the spread of fake information were present, they did not majorly impact political competition.
The Electoral Code forms the comprehensive legal framework for parliamentary elections, but despite recommendations from OSCE/ODHIR, no changes have been made to constituency boundaries since 2011. This lack of adjustment, coupled with the inclusion of all votes from abroad in the Warsaw constituency, raises concerns about the equality of votes.
In March 2023, significant revisions to the Electoral Code included reducing the minimum number of residents per precinct, establishing a Central Register of Voters, and modifying the eligibility criteria for Constituency Election Commission members. However, challenges arose, such as the rejection of some candidate lists due to formal issues, including problems with supporter addresses in the newly implemented Central Register of Voters.
The regulations on electoral campaign financing, as outlined in the Election Code and the Political Parties Act, require political parties to submit annual financial information to the National Election Commission. In 2023, five political parties faced the potential deprivation of public subsidies due to unfavorable verdicts. During the 2023 elections, three factors negatively impacted the accountability and clarity of campaign finances: a lack of detailed financial reporting before election day, unrestrained third-party campaigning and insufficient campaign finance regulations for the referendum.
Public television and radio stations ostensibly met their legal obligations to provide free airtime to all electoral committees. However, the OSCE reported that the public broadcaster failed to ensure balanced and impartial coverage during the presidential (2020) and parliamentary (2023) elections. Additionally, the ruling coalition leveraged Catholic media, including Telewizja Trwam and Radio Maryja, to appeal to traditional conservative voters. The acquisition of Polska Press by PKN Orlen in 2020 granted the PiS party significant influence over regional media. Despite these developments, the Polish media landscape remains diverse, with public television (TVP), TVN and Polsat dominating the television sector.
Most political campaigns occur online, with politicians and parties using platforms like X and Facebook for promotion and commentary. However, the tone of media content – both online and offline – was generally negative, offensive and radical. While unauthorized new media usage and the spread of fake information were present, they did not majorly impact political competition.
Citations:
OSCE. 2020. Republic Of Poland Presidential Election 28 June and 12 July 2020 ODIHR Special Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/464601.pdf
OSCE. 2023. “International Election Observation Mission Republic of Poland, Parliamentary Elections, 15 October 2023.” Warsaw https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/4/555048.pdf
https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2242509,1,jak-przeprowadzac-wybory-zeby-naprawde-byly-rowne-trzeba-dzialac-juz-i-dwutorowo.read
OSCE. 2020. Republic Of Poland Presidential Election 28 June and 12 July 2020 ODIHR Special Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/464601.pdf
OSCE. 2023. “International Election Observation Mission Republic of Poland, Parliamentary Elections, 15 October 2023.” Warsaw https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/4/555048.pdf
https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2242509,1,jak-przeprowadzac-wybory-zeby-naprawde-byly-rowne-trzeba-dzialac-juz-i-dwutorowo.read
4
Hungary
During the years of the successive Orbán governments (2010 – 2024), the political system in Hungary shifted toward an illiberal regime. Hungary is considered an electoral autocracy, where even the minimum standards of a fully-fledged democracy, such as free and fair elections, are flawed. Legally, there are few obstacles for candidates wishing to run for election and for voters wishing to vote. However, fair political competition is hindered by asymmetrical access to resources such as campaign funds and media access. The primary issue is not campaigning via new media, but rather government control over old media. Moreover, the governing party allocates more resources to buying social media advertisements, which are loosely regulated. In the state-owned or state-controlled media, opposition candidates do not benefit from the same amount of additional airtime as government candidates, despite a guaranteed minimum airtime quota of five minutes for all candidates (Bátorfy et al. 2021). “Journalists” and moderators are often openly biased toward Fidesz. The lack of transparency with regard to donations to candidates and parties is a weak point in electoral law, and has been criticized by the OECD since 2018. Opposition candidates have limited access to traditional Hungarian media due to state dominance over public TV, radio and large parts of the print media. As a result, opposition candidates often have to rely on social media for their campaigns, making it challenging to reach the elderly and less-educated populations.
Election results show that government candidates perform the strongest. Large-scale gerrymandering has been allowed within the terms of the electoral law. The new mixed system of first-past-the-post elements in constituencies and proportional representation in party lists clearly favors the government side, which usually wins almost all constituencies outside Budapest. Consequently, the popular vote won clearly by Fidesz in 2022 often gets blurred, allowing the government to secure a two-thirds majority with half of the votes. The picture is much more balanced in local and European elections, which have stronger proportional leanings.
Election results show that government candidates perform the strongest. Large-scale gerrymandering has been allowed within the terms of the electoral law. The new mixed system of first-past-the-post elements in constituencies and proportional representation in party lists clearly favors the government side, which usually wins almost all constituencies outside Budapest. Consequently, the popular vote won clearly by Fidesz in 2022 often gets blurred, allowing the government to secure a two-thirds majority with half of the votes. The picture is much more balanced in local and European elections, which have stronger proportional leanings.
Citations:
Bátorfy, A., Bleyer-Simon, K., Szabó, K., and Galambosi, E. 2022. “Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Hungary.” Florence: European University Institute.
Bátorfy, A., Bleyer-Simon, K., Szabó, K., and Galambosi, E. 2022. “Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Hungary.” Florence: European University Institute.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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