To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
10
Finland
Electoral provisions stipulate universal suffrage for all adult Finnish citizens, including prisoners and mentally disabled people, with a secret-ballot voting method. The minimum voting age is 18, and voting is noncompulsory. Expatriated Finnish citizens are entitled to vote, while non-Finnish nationals residing in Finland are excluded from national elections. However, non-Finnish permanent residents may vote in municipal elections. The population registration center maintains a register of people eligible to vote and sends a notification to those included in the register. Citizens do not need to register separately to vote. A system of advance voting has been in place for several decades, and the proportion of ballots cast in advance has risen significantly.
It is fair to say that the legal aspects of the political system, such as electoral system features, do not hinder the representation of relevant societal interests through political parties.
Electronic voting was tested in three municipalities during the 2008 municipal elections but has not been adopted in subsequent elections. In its final report from 2017, a working group on the issue appointed by the Ministry of Justice stated that while technically feasible, an online voting system is not yet ready to be implemented, as the technology has not reached a sufficiently high level to meet all relevant requirements.
The major political parties have local branches to represent distinct local interests. However, local party branches have lost members, and the parties’ local representation has become weaker. It is still fair to say that the existing parties in the legislature fairly well represent significant societal interests in a programmatic manner, as opposed to relying on clientelism.
Party manifestos differ from one another and are publicly accessible.
It is fair to say that the legal aspects of the political system, such as electoral system features, do not hinder the representation of relevant societal interests through political parties.
Electronic voting was tested in three municipalities during the 2008 municipal elections but has not been adopted in subsequent elections. In its final report from 2017, a working group on the issue appointed by the Ministry of Justice stated that while technically feasible, an online voting system is not yet ready to be implemented, as the technology has not reached a sufficiently high level to meet all relevant requirements.
The major political parties have local branches to represent distinct local interests. However, local party branches have lost members, and the parties’ local representation has become weaker. It is still fair to say that the existing parties in the legislature fairly well represent significant societal interests in a programmatic manner, as opposed to relying on clientelism.
Party manifestos differ from one another and are publicly accessible.
Citations:
Dag Anckar and Carsten Anckar. “Finland.” In Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stöver, eds. Elections in Europe.
Data Handbook. 2010. Nomos.
https://vaalit.fi/en/electronic-voting1
Dag Anckar and Carsten Anckar. “Finland.” In Dieter Nohlen and Philip Stöver, eds. Elections in Europe.
Data Handbook. 2010. Nomos.
https://vaalit.fi/en/electronic-voting1
Norway
The electoral system at the national level consists of 19 election districts, each sending a fixed number of delegates to parliament under a proportional representation system. The distribution of the 169 delegates among parties and districts slightly favors large parties and rural districts. To address this imbalance, 19 of the 169 members of parliament are allocated based on national voting results. To secure any of these 19 “equalization mandates,” a party must receive at least 4.0% of the total national votes.
In elections to local authorities, each municipality functions as a single election district. Representatives are distributed among parties in proportion to their share of the votes. All major parties are organized as national organizations; no party exists with only regional presence. In local elections, ad hoc parties and interest groups may also participate.
The party system is typically described as a tripolar system: On the left, there are three parties (Labour, the Socialist Left, and the Red Party); on the right, there are two parties (the Conservative Party and the Progress Party); and clustered in the middle are the Agrarian Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party, and the Green Party. In sum, it is fair to say that all major social and economic interests are represented in the party system. Party manifestos are fairly similar in their commitment to a democratic polity. All parties have comprehensive homepages on the internet, and party programs and other relevant policy documents are easily accessible.
In elections to local authorities, each municipality functions as a single election district. Representatives are distributed among parties in proportion to their share of the votes. All major parties are organized as national organizations; no party exists with only regional presence. In local elections, ad hoc parties and interest groups may also participate.
The party system is typically described as a tripolar system: On the left, there are three parties (Labour, the Socialist Left, and the Red Party); on the right, there are two parties (the Conservative Party and the Progress Party); and clustered in the middle are the Agrarian Center Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party, and the Green Party. In sum, it is fair to say that all major social and economic interests are represented in the party system. Party manifestos are fairly similar in their commitment to a democratic polity. All parties have comprehensive homepages on the internet, and party programs and other relevant policy documents are easily accessible.
9
Austria
There are no legal barriers in the electoral system or other rules that would hinder the representation of relevant societal interests through political parties. There is a 4% threshold that parties must overcome to gain mandates at the federal level. Several states also have a 4% threshold, including Burgenland, Lower Austria, and Upper Austria. The majority of other states have a slightly higher 5% threshold, while Styria has no explicit minimum threshold for parliamentary state elections. However, by international standards, these rules cannot reasonably be considered to undermine the principle of democratic political competition and representation.
Austrian parties have a sophisticated organizational structure that reflects the federalist nature of the country as well as its lower regional units. The parties elected to parliament can be considered to represent a reasonably wide share of societal interests. The share of women members of parliament has risen more or less continuously and is currently at 40.1% in the Nationalrat, elected in 2019. However, migrants have remained strongly under-represented in parliament due to both a lack of voting rights and a tendency of most parties to place migrant candidates low on the party list.
All parties in parliament have detailed and reasonably distinct party manifestos, which are available to the public and enable voters to make an informed choice.
Austrian parties have a sophisticated organizational structure that reflects the federalist nature of the country as well as its lower regional units. The parties elected to parliament can be considered to represent a reasonably wide share of societal interests. The share of women members of parliament has risen more or less continuously and is currently at 40.1% in the Nationalrat, elected in 2019. However, migrants have remained strongly under-represented in parliament due to both a lack of voting rights and a tendency of most parties to place migrant candidates low on the party list.
All parties in parliament have detailed and reasonably distinct party manifestos, which are available to the public and enable voters to make an informed choice.
Citations:
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000110191221/mehr-bauern-als-migranten-und-wenige-frauen-im-neuen-nationalrat
https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000110191221/mehr-bauern-als-migranten-und-wenige-frauen-im-neuen-nationalrat
Belgium
Belgium’s proportional election system, combined with mandatory voting, ensures that many parties run in elections, representing a wide array of preferences. The consociational nature of Belgium, based on Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal pillars, includes nonprofit organizations, political parties, unions, and social security organizations. This system is associated with political parties representing the interests of a significant proportion of citizens in parliament and, although not always, in government (Delwi, 2022). However, the consociational nature can be questioned (Van Haute & Wauter, 2019) as eleven parties and two independent MPs have seats in the lower chamber of parliament. The presence of multiple parties, including far-right and far-left, allows a diversity of interests to be represented and to achieve societal integration in parliament, although it makes governing coalitions difficult (Pile, 2021).
Some parties with unique positions, such as the “Islam” party in 2012 or “DierAnimal” in 2019, ran for election but did not win seats. This reflects the main parties’ incentive to incorporate such positions into their platforms as they become salient (Meguid 2005). One growing criticism from elected representatives is that the power of party leaders and technocrats can become overbearing, with party discipline resulting in a top-down chain of command that sometimes restricts individual representatives’ freedom of expression.
V-Dem’s Democracy report 2023 ranks Belgium in the top 10% of most democratic countries, above the Netherlands, Germany, and France but below Denmark, Sweden, and Norway..
Some parties with unique positions, such as the “Islam” party in 2012 or “DierAnimal” in 2019, ran for election but did not win seats. This reflects the main parties’ incentive to incorporate such positions into their platforms as they become salient (Meguid 2005). One growing criticism from elected representatives is that the power of party leaders and technocrats can become overbearing, with party discipline resulting in a top-down chain of command that sometimes restricts individual representatives’ freedom of expression.
V-Dem’s Democracy report 2023 ranks Belgium in the top 10% of most democratic countries, above the Netherlands, Germany, and France but below Denmark, Sweden, and Norway..
Citations:
https://www.lesoir.be/551084/article/2023-11-23/laicite-et-democratie-interne-pourquoi-julien-uyttendaele-quitte-le-ps
https://www.lesoir.be/556046/article/2023-12-17/rachid-madrane-un-clan-decide-autour-dun-repas-de-la-confection-des-listes-du-ps
Delwit, P. 2022. La vie politique en Belgique de 1830 à nos jours. Bruxelles: UB Lire.
Meguid, B. M. 2005. “Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success.” American Political Science Review 99 (3): 347-359.
Pilet, J. B. 2021. “Hard Times for Governing Parties: The 2019 Federal Elections in Belgium.” West European Politics 44 (2): 439-449.
Van Haute, E., and B. Wauters. 2019. “Do Characteristics of Consociational Democracies Still Apply to Belgian Parties.” Politics of the Low Countries 1: 6.
https://www.lesoir.be/551084/article/2023-11-23/laicite-et-democratie-interne-pourquoi-julien-uyttendaele-quitte-le-ps
https://www.lesoir.be/556046/article/2023-12-17/rachid-madrane-un-clan-decide-autour-dun-repas-de-la-confection-des-listes-du-ps
Delwit, P. 2022. La vie politique en Belgique de 1830 à nos jours. Bruxelles: UB Lire.
Meguid, B. M. 2005. “Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success.” American Political Science Review 99 (3): 347-359.
Pilet, J. B. 2021. “Hard Times for Governing Parties: The 2019 Federal Elections in Belgium.” West European Politics 44 (2): 439-449.
Van Haute, E., and B. Wauters. 2019. “Do Characteristics of Consociational Democracies Still Apply to Belgian Parties.” Politics of the Low Countries 1: 6.
Canada
In Canada, political parties are free-forming and open to competition. There are no barriers to their creation, although creation does not imply success in electing candidates in future elections, where incumbents and party loyalties favor older, more well-established parties (Cross et al. 2022).
In the modern era in Canada, parties are not ethnically, religiously, or race-based, although some are regional. Currently, this is the case with the Bloc Québécois, a federal party that runs candidates only in the province of Quebec and supports its independence from the rest of Canada.
In general, political parties in Canada, both federal and provincial, make a determined effort to have a diverse candidate pool. This is due to the country’s significant regional and ethno-racial diversity. Parties also pay attention to the gender diversity of candidates; however, federally and provincially, legislative assemblies are currently male-dominated. For instance, in the federal House of Commons, only about 30% of the MPs are women. However, since late 2015, gender parity has been enforced within the federal ministerial cabinet.
Federal political parties are known for their “brokerage” qualities, especially as they seek to reconcile perspectives from English and French Canada. Nevertheless, there are modest programmatic differences between these parties, which can be seen in their publicly accessible manifestos.
In the modern era in Canada, parties are not ethnically, religiously, or race-based, although some are regional. Currently, this is the case with the Bloc Québécois, a federal party that runs candidates only in the province of Quebec and supports its independence from the rest of Canada.
In general, political parties in Canada, both federal and provincial, make a determined effort to have a diverse candidate pool. This is due to the country’s significant regional and ethno-racial diversity. Parties also pay attention to the gender diversity of candidates; however, federally and provincially, legislative assemblies are currently male-dominated. For instance, in the federal House of Commons, only about 30% of the MPs are women. However, since late 2015, gender parity has been enforced within the federal ministerial cabinet.
Federal political parties are known for their “brokerage” qualities, especially as they seek to reconcile perspectives from English and French Canada. Nevertheless, there are modest programmatic differences between these parties, which can be seen in their publicly accessible manifestos.
Citations:
HOUSE OF COMMONS PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
Edited by Robert Marleau and Camille Montpetit
https://www.ourcommons.ca/marleaumontpetit/DocumentViewer.aspx?Sec=Ch04&Seq=3&Language=E
Cross, William P., Scott Pruysers, and Rob Currie-Wood. 2022. The Political Party in Canada. Vancouver: UBC Press.
HOUSE OF COMMONS PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE
Edited by Robert Marleau and Camille Montpetit
https://www.ourcommons.ca/marleaumontpetit/DocumentViewer.aspx?Sec=Ch04&Seq=3&Language=E
Cross, William P., Scott Pruysers, and Rob Currie-Wood. 2022. The Political Party in Canada. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Denmark
Denmark employs a proportional electoral formula for elections at all levels of governance, ensuring that most societal interests can obtain representation. Consequently, it is rare for social movements unaffiliated with political parties to gain representation. Following the latest municipal election, Elklit and Kjær (2021) argued that some imbalances in the current electoral formula need to be addressed. These imbalances arise because political parties have the right to form electoral alliances, based on which seats are distributed. Without this right, the electoral system would be more proportional. According to Elklit and Kjær, the primary issue is that the ability to form pre-electoral coalitions distorts results, giving the biggest party in the coalition an advantage by awarding it more seats relative to the number of votes it has received.
Political parties are well represented across Denmark, with active local branches. Most parties also have youth organizations. There are some differences among parties regarding how independently local branches can nominate candidates without interference from national offices. Generally, the newer the party, the less autonomy local branches have in selecting candidates to run for office (Kosiara-Pedersen and Harre 2017).
A recent analysis of local party manifestos from the 2021 election shows that political parties offer policies adjusted to the local political environment without losing sight of their ideological outlook (Schrøder et al. 2021). Hence, political parties at the national and local levels are programmatic in their approach to policy. While parties have distinct political profiles, ideological distances between parties are relatively small in Denmark, with no evidence of strong positional polarization (Green-Pedersen and Kosiara-Pedersen 2020).
Party manifestos are publicly available at national, regional and municipal elections for most parties.
Political parties are well represented across Denmark, with active local branches. Most parties also have youth organizations. There are some differences among parties regarding how independently local branches can nominate candidates without interference from national offices. Generally, the newer the party, the less autonomy local branches have in selecting candidates to run for office (Kosiara-Pedersen and Harre 2017).
A recent analysis of local party manifestos from the 2021 election shows that political parties offer policies adjusted to the local political environment without losing sight of their ideological outlook (Schrøder et al. 2021). Hence, political parties at the national and local levels are programmatic in their approach to policy. While parties have distinct political profiles, ideological distances between parties are relatively small in Denmark, with no evidence of strong positional polarization (Green-Pedersen and Kosiara-Pedersen 2020).
Party manifestos are publicly available at national, regional and municipal elections for most parties.
Citations:
Green-Pedersen, C. and K. Kosiara-Hansen. 2020. “The Party System: Open yet Stable.” Oxford Handbook of Danish Politics, 554-579.
Elklit, J., and U. Kjær. 2021. “Er 1, 2, 3, 4 … virkelig bedre end 1, 3, 5, 7 …?.” https://www.ft.dk/samling/20222/almdel/INU/bilag/39/2739523/index.htm
Kosiara-Pedersen, K., and Harre, A. 2017. “Kandidatrekruttering i politiske partier.” Økonomi & Politik 90 (3).
Schrøder, et al. 2021. “Er der forskel på partiernes lokale valgprogrammer?” In Elklit Jørgen and Ulrik Kjær, eds., KV17: Analyser af kommunalvalget 2017, pp. 223-239.
Green-Pedersen, C. and K. Kosiara-Hansen. 2020. “The Party System: Open yet Stable.” Oxford Handbook of Danish Politics, 554-579.
Elklit, J., and U. Kjær. 2021. “Er 1, 2, 3, 4 … virkelig bedre end 1, 3, 5, 7 …?.” https://www.ft.dk/samling/20222/almdel/INU/bilag/39/2739523/index.htm
Kosiara-Pedersen, K., and Harre, A. 2017. “Kandidatrekruttering i politiske partier.” Økonomi & Politik 90 (3).
Schrøder, et al. 2021. “Er der forskel på partiernes lokale valgprogrammer?” In Elklit Jørgen and Ulrik Kjær, eds., KV17: Analyser af kommunalvalget 2017, pp. 223-239.
Estonia
Estonia uses a party-list proportional electoral system, which, unlike the winner-take-all system, allows for a more balanced representation of societal interests in local councils and the Riigikogu (parliament). In parliamentary elections, the threshold for eligibility is 5% of the national vote. In 2023, three such parties exceeded this mark. Six parties are represented in the current (15th) Riigikogu (National Electoral Committee 2023).
All main political parties have local branches, and their rights and autonomy are regulated by statutes. Since Estonia is a small country with a two-tier administrative system, regional political interests are not particularly salient. By and large, the extent to which local entities are able to voice local problems at the national level depends on the particular person or branch.
Political parties in the legislature represent significant societal interests, the main cleavage being between liberalism/openness and conservatism/nationalism. Some specific interests, such as those of farmers, are not explicitly represented by any political party. Similarly, the Greens and parties representing national minorities, including Russian speakers, are not popular enough to enter the legislature. Nonetheless, these interests are represented to some extent by other parliamentary parties, notably the Social Democrats and the Center Party.
Party manifestos are publicly available on party websites and attract significant media attention. Because the political climate has become more tense in the last decade, party manifestos have become more distinct, especially in relation to “soft” values such as gender equality, sexual orientation, marriage, religious issues and freedom of speech.
All main political parties have local branches, and their rights and autonomy are regulated by statutes. Since Estonia is a small country with a two-tier administrative system, regional political interests are not particularly salient. By and large, the extent to which local entities are able to voice local problems at the national level depends on the particular person or branch.
Political parties in the legislature represent significant societal interests, the main cleavage being between liberalism/openness and conservatism/nationalism. Some specific interests, such as those of farmers, are not explicitly represented by any political party. Similarly, the Greens and parties representing national minorities, including Russian speakers, are not popular enough to enter the legislature. Nonetheless, these interests are represented to some extent by other parliamentary parties, notably the Social Democrats and the Center Party.
Party manifestos are publicly available on party websites and attract significant media attention. Because the political climate has become more tense in the last decade, party manifestos have become more distinct, especially in relation to “soft” values such as gender equality, sexual orientation, marriage, religious issues and freedom of speech.
Citations:
National Electoral Committee. 2023. “Votes and Seats by Political Parties.” https://rk2023.valimised.ee/et/election-result/index.html
National Electoral Committee. 2023. “Votes and Seats by Political Parties.” https://rk2023.valimised.ee/et/election-result/index.html
Germany
Legal aspects of the German political system only moderately hinder the representation of legal aspects of the German political system only moderately hinder the representation of relevant societal interests. For example, political parties can be prevented from representing undemocratic interests. According to Article 21 of the Basic Law, parties must adhere to democratic principles and are deemed unconstitutional if they impair these principles. If the Federal Constitutional Court determines a party is unconstitutional, it can be dissolved and prohibited from being re-established.
However, prohibiting a party is not easily achieved. The rejection of democratic principles in a party’s manifesto is insufficient for a ban; the party must threaten democracy through its concrete actions. This requirement poses a significant obstacle because it is difficult to differentiate between the actions of individual party members and the actions of the party as an entity. Additionally, any ruling must consider the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which allows prohibition only if a party has realistic chances of being elected and implementing goals that threaten democracy.
Due to these strong barriers, only two parties have ever been banned in Germany: the SRP and the KPD. The NPD, which was determined to be unconstitutional, was not banned because the Federal Constitutional Court ruled it did not have the potential to enforce its anti-democratic goals (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2017).
The German electoral system includes a five percent threshold for political parties to gain seats in parliament and thus represent specific societal interests. This threshold was implemented in 1949 to ensure the operability of the parliament and to form a stable government. In the 2021 federal elections, 8.7% of the votes were for parties that did not surpass the 5% threshold and, hence, did not receive seats in the German parliament (Statista, 2023). A similar trend can be found in various state elections in 2023. In Bavaria, 9.7% of the votes – including those for the FDP and The Left – did not exceed 5% (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2023). In Hesse, 12.1% of the votes, including those for The Left, did not meet the threshold (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2023). In Berlin, the percentage was 13.7%, with the FDP included in this figure (Tagesschau, 2023a). Therefore, an increasing share of votes is not represented in the parliament.
In June 2023, German Federal President Steinmeier signed a new law for electoral reform (Wahlrechtsreform) to decrease the size of the Bundestag to 630 members. The Bundestag currently consists of 736 representatives (Tagesschau, 2023b). The reform abolishes the so-called “Grundmandatsklausel.” Previously, a party could be represented in the Bundestag if it won at least three constituencies (Direktmandat), even if the party itself did not exceed the five percent threshold. Under the new law, candidates with a Direktmandat will receive a seat in parliament only if their party exceeds the five percent threshold.
This change will likely lead to the elimination of The Left party from the Bundestag because it’s current presence in the chamber is a function of the three-constituency rule. Moreover, the parliamentary representation of the CSU is in jeopardy. This party runs only in one of the 16 states, Bavaria, where it wins almost all constituencies; nonetheless, its overall nationwide vote share was just 5.2% in 2021. A loss of 0.3 percentage points would eliminate this party from the Bundestag as well. Thus, the change in the electoral law clearly has the potential to hinder the representation of relevant societal interests.
In October 2023, the citizens’ association Mehr Demokratie filed a complaint against the reform with the Constitutional Court, worrying that millions of votes would be invalidated (Tagesschau, 2023c).
During the last federal election in 2021, almost all political parties published manifestos that are publicly accessible on their websites and are relatively distinct from one another (V-Dem, 2023). A majority of parties also published additional manifestos formulated in simple language. Moreover, since 2002, the Federal Agency for Civic Education has provided the “Wahl-O-Mat,” which allows voters to determine how closely their preferences on relevant topics align with the manifestos of various parties running for election (BpB, 2021).
Additionally, a majority of Germany’s major political parties have permanent local branches to support local interests (V-Dem, 2023). This practice stems from German federalism, where the responsibility for some tasks lies with the states rather than the federal government (§73ff. Basic Law). Some state-level responsibilities are delegated to municipalities, making local party branches relevant as well.
The Varieties of Democracy data shows a value of 3.76 for the party linkages indicator, suggesting that constituents mainly respond to a party’s program and its ideas for society. The value also indicates that, to a lesser extent, voters are rewarded with local collective goods. Clientelism, however, does not appear to be very present in political parties (V-Dem, 2023).
Regarding the different societal interests represented through the major political parties, left, center, and right positions are present in the parliament. According to the Manifesto Project (2023), which uses a right-left position scale derived from party manifestos, The Left, the SPD, the South Schleswig Voter’s Union, and the Greens are classified as left-wing parties. The FDP and CDU are positioned in the middle of the scale, making them center parties. The AfD is classified as a right-wing party.
However, prohibiting a party is not easily achieved. The rejection of democratic principles in a party’s manifesto is insufficient for a ban; the party must threaten democracy through its concrete actions. This requirement poses a significant obstacle because it is difficult to differentiate between the actions of individual party members and the actions of the party as an entity. Additionally, any ruling must consider the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which allows prohibition only if a party has realistic chances of being elected and implementing goals that threaten democracy.
Due to these strong barriers, only two parties have ever been banned in Germany: the SRP and the KPD. The NPD, which was determined to be unconstitutional, was not banned because the Federal Constitutional Court ruled it did not have the potential to enforce its anti-democratic goals (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2017).
The German electoral system includes a five percent threshold for political parties to gain seats in parliament and thus represent specific societal interests. This threshold was implemented in 1949 to ensure the operability of the parliament and to form a stable government. In the 2021 federal elections, 8.7% of the votes were for parties that did not surpass the 5% threshold and, hence, did not receive seats in the German parliament (Statista, 2023). A similar trend can be found in various state elections in 2023. In Bavaria, 9.7% of the votes – including those for the FDP and The Left – did not exceed 5% (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2023). In Hesse, 12.1% of the votes, including those for The Left, did not meet the threshold (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, 2023). In Berlin, the percentage was 13.7%, with the FDP included in this figure (Tagesschau, 2023a). Therefore, an increasing share of votes is not represented in the parliament.
In June 2023, German Federal President Steinmeier signed a new law for electoral reform (Wahlrechtsreform) to decrease the size of the Bundestag to 630 members. The Bundestag currently consists of 736 representatives (Tagesschau, 2023b). The reform abolishes the so-called “Grundmandatsklausel.” Previously, a party could be represented in the Bundestag if it won at least three constituencies (Direktmandat), even if the party itself did not exceed the five percent threshold. Under the new law, candidates with a Direktmandat will receive a seat in parliament only if their party exceeds the five percent threshold.
This change will likely lead to the elimination of The Left party from the Bundestag because it’s current presence in the chamber is a function of the three-constituency rule. Moreover, the parliamentary representation of the CSU is in jeopardy. This party runs only in one of the 16 states, Bavaria, where it wins almost all constituencies; nonetheless, its overall nationwide vote share was just 5.2% in 2021. A loss of 0.3 percentage points would eliminate this party from the Bundestag as well. Thus, the change in the electoral law clearly has the potential to hinder the representation of relevant societal interests.
In October 2023, the citizens’ association Mehr Demokratie filed a complaint against the reform with the Constitutional Court, worrying that millions of votes would be invalidated (Tagesschau, 2023c).
During the last federal election in 2021, almost all political parties published manifestos that are publicly accessible on their websites and are relatively distinct from one another (V-Dem, 2023). A majority of parties also published additional manifestos formulated in simple language. Moreover, since 2002, the Federal Agency for Civic Education has provided the “Wahl-O-Mat,” which allows voters to determine how closely their preferences on relevant topics align with the manifestos of various parties running for election (BpB, 2021).
Additionally, a majority of Germany’s major political parties have permanent local branches to support local interests (V-Dem, 2023). This practice stems from German federalism, where the responsibility for some tasks lies with the states rather than the federal government (§73ff. Basic Law). Some state-level responsibilities are delegated to municipalities, making local party branches relevant as well.
The Varieties of Democracy data shows a value of 3.76 for the party linkages indicator, suggesting that constituents mainly respond to a party’s program and its ideas for society. The value also indicates that, to a lesser extent, voters are rewarded with local collective goods. Clientelism, however, does not appear to be very present in political parties (V-Dem, 2023).
Regarding the different societal interests represented through the major political parties, left, center, and right positions are present in the parliament. According to the Manifesto Project (2023), which uses a right-left position scale derived from party manifestos, The Left, the SPD, the South Schleswig Voter’s Union, and the Greens are classified as left-wing parties. The FDP and CDU are positioned in the middle of the scale, making them center parties. The AfD is classified as a right-wing party.
Citations:
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2017. “Kein Verbot der NPD wegen fehlender Anhaltspunkte für eine erfolgreiche Durchsetzung ihrer verfassungsfeindlichen Ziele.” Pressemitteilung Nr. 4/2017 vom 17. Januar 2017. https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/bvg17-004.html
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 2021. “Wie funktioniert der Wahl-O-Mat?” https://www.bpb.de/themen/wahl-o-mat/294576/wie-funktioniert-der-wahl-o-mat/
Deutscher Bundestag. 2013. “Aktueller Begriff Sperrklausel im Wahlrecht, Nr. 48/13.” December 19.
Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt. 2023. “Landtagswahlen in Hessen: Vorläufige Ergebnisse.” https://statistik.hessen.de/presse/landtagswahl-2023-in-hessen-vorlaeufige-ergebnisse
Manifesto Project. 2023. “Manifesto Project Data Dashboard.” https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/
Niedermayer, O. 2022. “Voraussetzungen, Rechte und Pflichten von Parteien in Deutschland.” https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/197278/voraussetzungen-rechte-und-pflichten-von-parteien-in-deutschland/#node-content-title-1
Tagesschau. 2023a. “Abgeordnetenhauswahl 2023.” https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2023-02-12-LT-DE-BE/index.shtml
Tagesschau. 2023b. “Steinmeier unterschreibt Gesetz zur Wahlrechtsreform.” https://www.tagesschau.de/eilmeldung/steinmeier-wahlrecht-100.html
Tagesschau. 2023. “Bürgerverein klagt gegen Wahlrechtsreform der Ampel.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/wahlrechtsreform-sperrklausel-klage-100.html
Statista. 2023. “Ergebnisse der Bundestagswahl am 26. September 2021.” https://de.statista.com/themen/3999/bundestagswahlen-in-deutschland/#topicOverview
Süddeutsche Zeitung. 2023. “Stimmkreise und Direktmandate: Alle Ergebnisse im Überblick.” https://www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/landtagswahl-bayern-2023-ergebnisse-csu-afd-die-gruenen-stimmkreise-freie-waehler-1.6278958
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2017. “Kein Verbot der NPD wegen fehlender Anhaltspunkte für eine erfolgreiche Durchsetzung ihrer verfassungsfeindlichen Ziele.” Pressemitteilung Nr. 4/2017 vom 17. Januar 2017. https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2017/bvg17-004.html
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 2021. “Wie funktioniert der Wahl-O-Mat?” https://www.bpb.de/themen/wahl-o-mat/294576/wie-funktioniert-der-wahl-o-mat/
Deutscher Bundestag. 2013. “Aktueller Begriff Sperrklausel im Wahlrecht, Nr. 48/13.” December 19.
Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt. 2023. “Landtagswahlen in Hessen: Vorläufige Ergebnisse.” https://statistik.hessen.de/presse/landtagswahl-2023-in-hessen-vorlaeufige-ergebnisse
Manifesto Project. 2023. “Manifesto Project Data Dashboard.” https://visuals.manifesto-project.wzb.eu/mpdb-shiny/cmp_dashboard_dataset/
Niedermayer, O. 2022. “Voraussetzungen, Rechte und Pflichten von Parteien in Deutschland.” https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/parteien-in-deutschland/197278/voraussetzungen-rechte-und-pflichten-von-parteien-in-deutschland/#node-content-title-1
Tagesschau. 2023a. “Abgeordnetenhauswahl 2023.” https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2023-02-12-LT-DE-BE/index.shtml
Tagesschau. 2023b. “Steinmeier unterschreibt Gesetz zur Wahlrechtsreform.” https://www.tagesschau.de/eilmeldung/steinmeier-wahlrecht-100.html
Tagesschau. 2023. “Bürgerverein klagt gegen Wahlrechtsreform der Ampel.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/wahlrechtsreform-sperrklausel-klage-100.html
Statista. 2023. “Ergebnisse der Bundestagswahl am 26. September 2021.” https://de.statista.com/themen/3999/bundestagswahlen-in-deutschland/#topicOverview
Süddeutsche Zeitung. 2023. “Stimmkreise und Direktmandate: Alle Ergebnisse im Überblick.” https://www.sueddeutsche.de/bayern/landtagswahl-bayern-2023-ergebnisse-csu-afd-die-gruenen-stimmkreise-freie-waehler-1.6278958
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/CountryGraph/
Slovenia
The electoral system is based on proportional representation with a 4% threshold for entry into the National Assembly of the RS (lower house of parliament). Slovenia is divided into eight constituencies, each subdivided into 11 sub-constituencies (districts). In practice, due to the seat distribution model, not every district always has its representative. Representatives of the Hungarian and Italian national minorities compete for a reserved seat, one for each group. The electoral system allows several parties to enter parliament – in practice, between 7 and 9. However, in 2022, only five parties passed the threshold, mainly due to tactical voting favoring the winning party. These parties represent important and diverse interests in society.
As the Manifesto Project shows, the manifestos of political parties differ in length, policy domains and policies addressed, importance, and solutions offered. The manifestos of the parties competing in the 2022 elections were publicly accessible, mainly via the parties’ websites. Both libertarian-authoritarian (GAL-TAN) and left-right economic cleavages are evident in the party system. Some parties in this system have significant populist elements. There is also considerable polarization caused by certain political parties (e.g., SDS) that have contributed to the tactical voting of center-left voters to defeat the former ruling party and its government in the 2022 elections. Established parties have developed a territorial organizational structure, although there is an important difference between the established and institutionalized and the new political parties in this respect.
As the Manifesto Project shows, the manifestos of political parties differ in length, policy domains and policies addressed, importance, and solutions offered. The manifestos of the parties competing in the 2022 elections were publicly accessible, mainly via the parties’ websites. Both libertarian-authoritarian (GAL-TAN) and left-right economic cleavages are evident in the party system. Some parties in this system have significant populist elements. There is also considerable polarization caused by certain political parties (e.g., SDS) that have contributed to the tactical voting of center-left voters to defeat the former ruling party and its government in the 2022 elections. Established parties have developed a territorial organizational structure, although there is an important difference between the established and institutionalized and the new political parties in this respect.
Citations:
Chapel Hill Expert Survey. 2024. “Chess Interactive.” https://chesdata.shinyapps.io/Shiny-CHES/
Krašovec, A., and Lajh, D. 2024. “Ali je ‘slon v prostoru‘? Evropska unija in strankarsko tekmovanje.” In M. Novak and E. Nacevska, eds., Parlamentarne volitve 2022. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede (in print).
Manifesto Project. 2024. “Manifesto Project Database.” https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu
The PopuList. 2024. “Country Reports.” https://popu-list.org/applications/
Chapel Hill Expert Survey. 2024. “Chess Interactive.” https://chesdata.shinyapps.io/Shiny-CHES/
Krašovec, A., and Lajh, D. 2024. “Ali je ‘slon v prostoru‘? Evropska unija in strankarsko tekmovanje.” In M. Novak and E. Nacevska, eds., Parlamentarne volitve 2022. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede (in print).
Manifesto Project. 2024. “Manifesto Project Database.” https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu
The PopuList. 2024. “Country Reports.” https://popu-list.org/applications/
Spain
Each major political party in Spain has local branches that allowing them to represent local interests and maintain a presence in communities. Several nationalist parties, which have significant national impact, focus on specific local interests or are pro-independence, maintaining a permanent presence of party activists in particular communities. Left-wing parties are noticeable but primarily concentrated in urban areas. The organizational hierarchy varies significantly among major political parties. For instance, the new Sumar party is a loose alliance of regional and local groups, whereas Vox is highly organized.
During the observation period, party leadership structures increased their control over major decisions, including the appointment of local and regional party leaders. However, the decline in party membership in recent years has weakened the connection between parties, new voters, and civil society actors.
Most parties and their candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a minor extent. During the past legislative term, 19 parties were represented in the Spanish parliament, some with very specific programs and others with predominantly regional interests focused on particular goods and benefits.
According to the V-Dem project, party manifestos differ widely. For example, on immigration, some manifestos strongly oppose almost all forms of immigration, while others strongly support most forms (V-Dem Project, 2023). Similar variations exist in minority policies and the territorial organization of the state, among others. All party manifestos are publicly accessible.
During the observation period, party leadership structures increased their control over major decisions, including the appointment of local and regional party leaders. However, the decline in party membership in recent years has weakened the connection between parties, new voters, and civil society actors.
Most parties and their candidates provide targeted goods and benefits to a minor extent. During the past legislative term, 19 parties were represented in the Spanish parliament, some with very specific programs and others with predominantly regional interests focused on particular goods and benefits.
According to the V-Dem project, party manifestos differ widely. For example, on immigration, some manifestos strongly oppose almost all forms of immigration, while others strongly support most forms (V-Dem Project, 2023). Similar variations exist in minority policies and the territorial organization of the state, among others. All party manifestos are publicly accessible.
Citations:
V-Dem Project, https://www.v-dem.net/about/v-dem-project/
V-Dem Project, https://www.v-dem.net/about/v-dem-project/
Sweden
Political parties are at the heart of modern representative democracy in Sweden. They are large, powerful organizations that recruit future political leaders and train current political activists. They have local chapters and, in theory, they are in tune with issues that are salient at both the local and national levels.
Erlingsson et al. (2016) identify three main developments in party organizations. First, Swedish party organizations have become professionalized and appear to be less connected with their grassroots base and civil society organizations. As a consequence, they risk providing less relevant solutions at the local level. Second, as party membership declines, parties are increasingly dependent on state subsidies. This may further disconnect them from the will of the citizens they are supposed to represent. Third, Erlingsson et al. (2016) find that although political parties are not a particularly trusted institution in Sweden, their reputation is improving, and there is little to suggest they are becoming internally less democratic.
Party manifestos are available online in an easy-to-read format. In the 2022 elections, there was significantly less focus on ideology in these documents compared to the 2018 elections. Parties either presented detailed policy proposals or conveyed a general message on safety – to address the issue of gang violence, which is currently a major concern on the political agenda (Demker, 2022).
Erlingsson et al. (2016) identify three main developments in party organizations. First, Swedish party organizations have become professionalized and appear to be less connected with their grassroots base and civil society organizations. As a consequence, they risk providing less relevant solutions at the local level. Second, as party membership declines, parties are increasingly dependent on state subsidies. This may further disconnect them from the will of the citizens they are supposed to represent. Third, Erlingsson et al. (2016) find that although political parties are not a particularly trusted institution in Sweden, their reputation is improving, and there is little to suggest they are becoming internally less democratic.
Party manifestos are available online in an easy-to-read format. In the 2022 elections, there was significantly less focus on ideology in these documents compared to the 2018 elections. Parties either presented detailed policy proposals or conveyed a general message on safety – to address the issue of gang violence, which is currently a major concern on the political agenda (Demker, 2022).
Citations:
Demker, M. 2022. “Demokratins grindvakter.” In Snabbtänkt: 2.022. Reflektioner från valet 2022 av ledande forskare, eds. N. Bolin, K. Falasca, M. Grusell, and Lars Nord. https://www.miun.se/globalassets/forskning/center-och-institut/demicom/snabbtankt_2022_12okt.pdf
Erlingsson, G. Ó., A.-K. Kölln, and P. Öhberg. 2016. “The Party Organizations.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics, ed. J. Pierre, 169-187. Oxford: OUP.
Demker, M. 2022. “Demokratins grindvakter.” In Snabbtänkt: 2.022. Reflektioner från valet 2022 av ledande forskare, eds. N. Bolin, K. Falasca, M. Grusell, and Lars Nord. https://www.miun.se/globalassets/forskning/center-och-institut/demicom/snabbtankt_2022_12okt.pdf
Erlingsson, G. Ó., A.-K. Kölln, and P. Öhberg. 2016. “The Party Organizations.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics, ed. J. Pierre, 169-187. Oxford: OUP.
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
8
Greece
In Greece, a 3% electoral threshold must be surpassed by a political party to gain parliamentary representation. While this threshold acts as a barrier, it ensures that the vast majority of societal interests are represented without fragmenting parliamentary representation excessively. Parties failing to meet this threshold do not elect MPs. There are no minority parties representing ethnic, regional, or other specific constituencies. Over the past 30 years, the Muslim minority of Western Thrace (in northwest Greece) has been represented by MPs who have aligned with major parties such as New Democracy, Pasok, and Syriza.
The largest political parties, including New Democracy, Pasok, and Syriza, maintain local branches across cities and towns nationwide without promoting localism or distinctly regional interests. Party manifestos once differed significantly during periods of intense polarization in the Greek party system, such as in the 1980s (New Democracy vs. Pasok) and again during the recent economic crisis in the 2010s (New Democracy and Pasok vs. Syriza). Although ideological differences persist, particularly regarding state intervention in the economy and labor market, the major parties have converged on key policy areas such as foreign policy, EU-Greece relations, and macroeconomic and fiscal policies.
Moreover, all three major parties reject the revolutionary approach to state socialism advocated by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Despite this exception, the largest parties have reached consensus on significant policy issues.
The largest political parties, including New Democracy, Pasok, and Syriza, maintain local branches across cities and towns nationwide without promoting localism or distinctly regional interests. Party manifestos once differed significantly during periods of intense polarization in the Greek party system, such as in the 1980s (New Democracy vs. Pasok) and again during the recent economic crisis in the 2010s (New Democracy and Pasok vs. Syriza). Although ideological differences persist, particularly regarding state intervention in the economy and labor market, the major parties have converged on key policy areas such as foreign policy, EU-Greece relations, and macroeconomic and fiscal policies.
Moreover, all three major parties reject the revolutionary approach to state socialism advocated by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Despite this exception, the largest parties have reached consensus on significant policy issues.
Citations:
Links to party manifestos (2023):
Νew Democracy (ND): https://nd.gr/ekloges-2023
Panhellenic Socialist Party (Pasok): https://digitalsociety.gr/programma.pdf
Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza): https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/144470/To-kybernhtiko-programma-toy-SYRIZA – Proodeytikh-Symmachia.html#
Communist Party of Greece (KKE): https://www.kke.gr/arxes-stoxoi/programma/
Links to party manifestos (2023):
Νew Democracy (ND): https://nd.gr/ekloges-2023
Panhellenic Socialist Party (Pasok): https://digitalsociety.gr/programma.pdf
Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza): https://www.syriza.gr/article/id/144470/To-kybernhtiko-programma-toy-SYRIZA – Proodeytikh-Symmachia.html#
Communist Party of Greece (KKE): https://www.kke.gr/arxes-stoxoi/programma/
Ireland
The institutional and policy context is characterized by the paradox of a strongly centralized state and weak local government, alongside a political culture dominated by strong localism that is reinforced by a proportional national electoral system organized around 43 constituencies (in the next election). An unusual number of independent candidates (up to 20%) can group (usually ex ante) into political groups supporting coalition governments (potentially reinforcing local over societal interests). An ongoing innovation to ensure better representation of societal interests is the gender candidate quotas which have significantly changed candidate selection processes in general elections. The Electoral (Amendment) (Political Funding) Act 2012 encourages political parties to select at least 30% female candidates in national elections with the threshold rising to 40% by the next general election, and there is demand to extend this to local elections. While successfully implemented, gender disparity continues alongside poor representation of ethnic groups and migrants, including people of color and the Traveller Community (Cullen and Gough 2022). Major political parties organize through local branches (cumann) to represent distinct local interests albeit not all have full geographical coverage. Existing parties in the legislature comprehensively represent significant societal interests in a programmatic manner, but also serve local constituencies in a manner similar to clientelism (servants of the people). Party manifestos are distinctive from one another and are publicly accessible. The “Populist” database is out of date and erroneous for Ireland, but The Manifesto Project has 2016 data for all relevant parties and political scientists in Ireland have published work analyzing public political party manifestos.
Citations:
Carty, K. 2021. “The Electoral Framework and the Politics of Representation.” In D.M. Farrell and N. Hardiman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, 297-310. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cullen, P. and Gough, S. 2022. Different Paths, Shared Experiences, Ethnic Minority Women and Local Government in Ireland. Maynooth: Maynooth University.
Carty, K. 2021. “The Electoral Framework and the Politics of Representation.” In D.M. Farrell and N. Hardiman, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, 297-310. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cullen, P. and Gough, S. 2022. Different Paths, Shared Experiences, Ethnic Minority Women and Local Government in Ireland. Maynooth: Maynooth University.
Lithuania
Political parties, coalitions and independent candidates participating in national, municipal and European Parliament elections represent a wide range of ideologies. The vote threshold of 5% for political parties and 7% for party coalitions for entry to the Seimas might pose a barrier for smaller fringe parties. However, the mixed electoral system of the Seimas – with 71 members elected based on single-member constituencies and 70 members elected through proportional representation – increases the possibilities for representing distinct local interests.
The political parties elected to the Seimas represent a spectrum of ideologies ranging from left to right, as well as GAL (green, alternative, libertarian) and TAN (traditional, authoritarian, nationalist). Since the reestablishment of independence in the 1990s, no single party has been able to secure a majority of seats in the parliament. Ruling coalitions, typically comprising three or four parties, have generally been dominated by either centrist conservative or social-democratic parties, alternating with each election cycle. These parties also have the most developed organizational structures, with local branches. Amost every parliamentary election has featured the emergence of a newly established political party in the Seimas.
In practice, the political divide between the ruling coalition and the opposition often dictates voting patterns more than ideological cleavages. These ideological differences are further blurred by the presence of informal groups representing GAL and TAN attitudes in major political parties, including the conservative Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, Lithuanian Social Democrats and the Liberal Movement, with those representing TAN attitudes typically elected in single-member districts.
The political parties elected to the Seimas represent a spectrum of ideologies ranging from left to right, as well as GAL (green, alternative, libertarian) and TAN (traditional, authoritarian, nationalist). Since the reestablishment of independence in the 1990s, no single party has been able to secure a majority of seats in the parliament. Ruling coalitions, typically comprising three or four parties, have generally been dominated by either centrist conservative or social-democratic parties, alternating with each election cycle. These parties also have the most developed organizational structures, with local branches. Amost every parliamentary election has featured the emergence of a newly established political party in the Seimas.
In practice, the political divide between the ruling coalition and the opposition often dictates voting patterns more than ideological cleavages. These ideological differences are further blurred by the presence of informal groups representing GAL and TAN attitudes in major political parties, including the conservative Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, Lithuanian Social Democrats and the Liberal Movement, with those representing TAN attitudes typically elected in single-member districts.
Citations:
The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. “Seimas 2020-2024.” https://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=35354&p_k=2
The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. “Seimas 2020-2024.” https://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=35354&p_k=2
New Zealand
Generally speaking, political parties in New Zealand perform their democratic functions of social interest aggregation and articulation in an adequate fashion.
Parties seek to mobilize voters through programmatic platforms rather than particularistic appeals, and they can be distinguished based on their policy priorities. The party system is structured not only along a left-right economic policy divide, but also along a post-material cleavage that separates socially liberal parties from socially authoritarian parties (Ford 2021).
The mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system is designed to represent diverse social interests more proportionately compared to some other electoral systems. Under MMP, coalition governments are common in New Zealand, meaning parties representing diverse social interests often have to collaborate in Parliament. Meanwhile, the Māori electoral roll and dedicated Māori electorates are intended to ensure that the Indigenous Māori community has political representation that acknowledges and addresses its specific cultural, social and political interests within the parliamentary system.
However, there are several challenges related to the aggregation and articulation of social interests.
As in other industrialized democracies, the programmatic manifestos of the two major parties have lost much of their distinctiveness. In particular, on the left-right economic spectrum, Labour has moved very close to the National Party since the 1980s (Aimer 2015).
Moreover, in a manner similar to other democracies, political parties have seen a significant decline in grassroots membership. There is also an imbalance in organizational complexity: While the two major parties maintain a dense network of local branches, minor parties’ organizations are more limited. With the exception of the Green Party, New Zealand’s mainstream parliamentary parties tend to restrict participation by ordinary members in the selection of candidates for general elections (Miller 2015: 176-182).
Parties seek to mobilize voters through programmatic platforms rather than particularistic appeals, and they can be distinguished based on their policy priorities. The party system is structured not only along a left-right economic policy divide, but also along a post-material cleavage that separates socially liberal parties from socially authoritarian parties (Ford 2021).
The mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system is designed to represent diverse social interests more proportionately compared to some other electoral systems. Under MMP, coalition governments are common in New Zealand, meaning parties representing diverse social interests often have to collaborate in Parliament. Meanwhile, the Māori electoral roll and dedicated Māori electorates are intended to ensure that the Indigenous Māori community has political representation that acknowledges and addresses its specific cultural, social and political interests within the parliamentary system.
However, there are several challenges related to the aggregation and articulation of social interests.
As in other industrialized democracies, the programmatic manifestos of the two major parties have lost much of their distinctiveness. In particular, on the left-right economic spectrum, Labour has moved very close to the National Party since the 1980s (Aimer 2015).
Moreover, in a manner similar to other democracies, political parties have seen a significant decline in grassroots membership. There is also an imbalance in organizational complexity: While the two major parties maintain a dense network of local branches, minor parties’ organizations are more limited. With the exception of the Green Party, New Zealand’s mainstream parliamentary parties tend to restrict participation by ordinary members in the selection of candidates for general elections (Miller 2015: 176-182).
Citations:
Aimer, P. 2015. “The Labour Party.” In J. Hayward, ed., Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th ed. Oxford University Press.
Ford, G. 2021. “Political Parties.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, 7th edition, J. Hayward, et al. Oxford University Press.
Miller, R. 2015. Democracy in New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Aimer, P. 2015. “The Labour Party.” In J. Hayward, ed., Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th ed. Oxford University Press.
Ford, G. 2021. “Political Parties.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, 7th edition, J. Hayward, et al. Oxford University Press.
Miller, R. 2015. Democracy in New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Portugal
The expression of broader societal interests through political parties is somewhat hindered by certain features of the Portuguese electoral system, as previously discussed. In legislative elections, 226 seats are distributed proportionally to the number of voters in the 20 electoral districts of Portugal: 18 mainland districts and two districts for each Autonomous Region. In addition, there are two districts for Portuguese citizens residing abroad, one for those in Europe and another for those outside Europe, with two seats each. This generates a total of 230 seats in parliament.
It should be noted that this diaspora is substantial, with around 1.5 million registered electors in 2022 (Setenta e Quatro, 2022); however, the proportion of these who actually vote is very small. Turnout was only 11% in these two districts in the 2022 elections.
Previous elections reveal challenges in representing districts with much lower population density, primarily due to the limited number of seats they elect, which favors major political parties. For instance, in Portalegre, a district that elects only two members for parliament, the 2022 legislative elections showed that more than half of the valid votes cast in this district (51.82%) did not result in the election of any representatives (Expresso, 2022).
Despite these challenges, the traditionally stable Portuguese party system has recently undergone significant changes, moving away from the long-standing dominance of the same five parties that have controlled representation since 1999. However, it remains to be seen whether this shift has made the system more representative of broader social and political interests.
The January 2022 legislative elections saw 22 different lists competing, one more than in 2019, marking the highest total since democratization and reflecting increased inter-party differentiation and diverse societal representations (Serra-Silva & Santos, 2023). The upcoming snap election scheduled for March 2024 is likely to maintain this level of partisan diversity, potentially encompassing more societal interests. Furthermore, the two mainstream parties – PS and PSD – which historically shared substantial programmatic agreement, have experienced increased ideological divergence in recent years (Serra-Silva & Santos, 2023).
Portugal’s main political parties have a formally decentralized structure at local and regional levels. However, these structures are predominantly mobilized for elections rather than articulating local interests and fostering grassroots engagement.
It should be noted that this diaspora is substantial, with around 1.5 million registered electors in 2022 (Setenta e Quatro, 2022); however, the proportion of these who actually vote is very small. Turnout was only 11% in these two districts in the 2022 elections.
Previous elections reveal challenges in representing districts with much lower population density, primarily due to the limited number of seats they elect, which favors major political parties. For instance, in Portalegre, a district that elects only two members for parliament, the 2022 legislative elections showed that more than half of the valid votes cast in this district (51.82%) did not result in the election of any representatives (Expresso, 2022).
Despite these challenges, the traditionally stable Portuguese party system has recently undergone significant changes, moving away from the long-standing dominance of the same five parties that have controlled representation since 1999. However, it remains to be seen whether this shift has made the system more representative of broader social and political interests.
The January 2022 legislative elections saw 22 different lists competing, one more than in 2019, marking the highest total since democratization and reflecting increased inter-party differentiation and diverse societal representations (Serra-Silva & Santos, 2023). The upcoming snap election scheduled for March 2024 is likely to maintain this level of partisan diversity, potentially encompassing more societal interests. Furthermore, the two mainstream parties – PS and PSD – which historically shared substantial programmatic agreement, have experienced increased ideological divergence in recent years (Serra-Silva & Santos, 2023).
Portugal’s main political parties have a formally decentralized structure at local and regional levels. However, these structures are predominantly mobilized for elections rather than articulating local interests and fostering grassroots engagement.
Citations:
Setenta e Quatro. 2022. “Todos os votos são iguais, mas alguns são mais iguais do que outros.” https://setentaequatro.pt/ensaio/todos-os-votos-sao-iguais-mas-alguns-sao-mais-iguais-do-que-outros
Expresso. 2022. “Mais de 671 mil votos foram ‘para o lixo’ nestas legislativas. Foi um em cada sete.” https://expresso.pt/eleicoes/legislativas-2022/2022-01-31-Mais-de-671-mil-votos-foram-para-o-lixo-nestas-legislativas.-Foi-um-em-cada-sete-c2760589
Serra-Silva, A., and M. Santos. 2023. “Continuity and Change in Portuguese Politics: Towards a More Polarized Party System?” In A. Costa Pinto eds., Portugal Since the 2008 Economic Crisis: Resilience and Change, 1st ed., 129-155. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351046916
Setenta e Quatro. 2022. “Todos os votos são iguais, mas alguns são mais iguais do que outros.” https://setentaequatro.pt/ensaio/todos-os-votos-sao-iguais-mas-alguns-sao-mais-iguais-do-que-outros
Expresso. 2022. “Mais de 671 mil votos foram ‘para o lixo’ nestas legislativas. Foi um em cada sete.” https://expresso.pt/eleicoes/legislativas-2022/2022-01-31-Mais-de-671-mil-votos-foram-para-o-lixo-nestas-legislativas.-Foi-um-em-cada-sete-c2760589
Serra-Silva, A., and M. Santos. 2023. “Continuity and Change in Portuguese Politics: Towards a More Polarized Party System?” In A. Costa Pinto eds., Portugal Since the 2008 Economic Crisis: Resilience and Change, 1st ed., 129-155. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351046916
Switzerland
The major Swiss political parties offer clearly distinctive programmatic positions, with some considerable overlap in the case of the Social Democratic and Green parties. The Swiss party system is one of the programmatically most polarized systems in Western Europe (Zollinger 2022: 6; Zollinger and Traber 2023). These distinctive party manifestos are easily publicly accessible, in particular via the websites of the parties.
While party identification (respondents saying that they are close to a political party) has decreased from about 60% in 1971 to 30% in 2019 (Lutz 2022: 542; Vatter 2018: 146), party voters identify very strongly in terms of positive feelings with their chosen party. At the same time, their degree of dislike of other parties is at the lower end of the distribution of 20 established democracies (Häusermann and Bornschier 2023: 24).
Given the proportional electoral rule in elections to the House of Representatives (Nationalrat), the representation of relevant societal interests through political parties is not hindered. Furthermore, in the bicameral parliamentary system, the Council of States (Ständerat) ensures the representation of cantonal-level representatives at the national level, thus allowing for the integration of regional interests into the institutional political structure. There have been recent debates about whether this gives excessive weight to the more conservative voice of non-urban cantons, as opposed to the political preferences of the cities in which a large proportion of the population is clustered. At the level of the federal government, the historically instituted “formule magique” (since 1959) mandates stability in the party representation of the seven members of the Federal Council (Bundesrates) (Burgos et al. 2009). Here again, there have been political discussions as to whether the Federal Council still reflects the composition of the parliament, as there has never been a representative of the Green Party in the Federal Council.
Historically, the Swiss party system has been very decentralized both programmatically and organizationally. Rather than one national party system, there have been 26 cantonal systems. In recent decades, some programmatic centralization has taken place; however, parties still have strong regional and local organizations (Ladner et al. 2022). The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) has historically strong links to farmers and small traders, with its policymaking clearly offering benefits for this electorate. In that regard, there may be some clientelism; however, in general, parties comprehensively represent significant societal interests programmatically.
While party identification (respondents saying that they are close to a political party) has decreased from about 60% in 1971 to 30% in 2019 (Lutz 2022: 542; Vatter 2018: 146), party voters identify very strongly in terms of positive feelings with their chosen party. At the same time, their degree of dislike of other parties is at the lower end of the distribution of 20 established democracies (Häusermann and Bornschier 2023: 24).
Given the proportional electoral rule in elections to the House of Representatives (Nationalrat), the representation of relevant societal interests through political parties is not hindered. Furthermore, in the bicameral parliamentary system, the Council of States (Ständerat) ensures the representation of cantonal-level representatives at the national level, thus allowing for the integration of regional interests into the institutional political structure. There have been recent debates about whether this gives excessive weight to the more conservative voice of non-urban cantons, as opposed to the political preferences of the cities in which a large proportion of the population is clustered. At the level of the federal government, the historically instituted “formule magique” (since 1959) mandates stability in the party representation of the seven members of the Federal Council (Bundesrates) (Burgos et al. 2009). Here again, there have been political discussions as to whether the Federal Council still reflects the composition of the parliament, as there has never been a representative of the Green Party in the Federal Council.
Historically, the Swiss party system has been very decentralized both programmatically and organizationally. Rather than one national party system, there have been 26 cantonal systems. In recent decades, some programmatic centralization has taken place; however, parties still have strong regional and local organizations (Ladner et al. 2022). The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) has historically strong links to farmers and small traders, with its policymaking clearly offering benefits for this electorate. In that regard, there may be some clientelism; however, in general, parties comprehensively represent significant societal interests programmatically.
Citations:
Burgos, Elie, Oscar Mazzoleni, and Hervé Rayner. 2009. “Le gouvernement de tous faute de mieux. Institutionnalisation et transformation de la ‘formule magique’ en Suisse (1959-2003).” Politix 88 (4): 39-61.
Häusermann, Silja, and Simon Bornschier. 2023. Democratic Conflict and Polarization: Healthy or Harmful? UBS Center Public Paper #1. Zürich: UBS Center for Economics in Society.
Ladner, Andreas, Daniel Schwarz, and Jan Fivaz. 2022. “Parteien und Parteiensystem.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 403-438.
Ladner, Andreas, Daniel Schwarz, and Jan Fivaz. 2023. “Parties and Party Systems.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford:Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.16. pp. 317-336
Lutz, Georg, and Anke Tresch. 2022. “Die nationalen Wahlen in der Schweiz.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. 7th ed., eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 519-557. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).
Zollinger, Delia. 2022. “Cleavage Identities in Voters’ Own Words: Harnessing Open-Ended Survey Responses.” American Journal of Political Science. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12743
Zollinger, Delia, and Denise Traber. 2023. “The Ideological Space in Swiss Politics: Voters, Parties, and Realignment.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.1. pp. 116-136.
Burgos, Elie, Oscar Mazzoleni, and Hervé Rayner. 2009. “Le gouvernement de tous faute de mieux. Institutionnalisation et transformation de la ‘formule magique’ en Suisse (1959-2003).” Politix 88 (4): 39-61.
Häusermann, Silja, and Simon Bornschier. 2023. Democratic Conflict and Polarization: Healthy or Harmful? UBS Center Public Paper #1. Zürich: UBS Center for Economics in Society.
Ladner, Andreas, Daniel Schwarz, and Jan Fivaz. 2022. “Parteien und Parteiensystem.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati. Zürich: NZZ Libro, 403-438.
Ladner, Andreas, Daniel Schwarz, and Jan Fivaz. 2023. “Parties and Party Systems.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford:Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.16. pp. 317-336
Lutz, Georg, and Anke Tresch. 2022. “Die nationalen Wahlen in der Schweiz.” In Handbuch der Schweizer Politik. 7th ed., eds. Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, Adrian Vatter, Silja Häusermann, Patrick Emmenegger, and Flavia Fossati, 519-557. Zürich: NZZ Libro.
Vatter, Adrian. 2018. Das politische System der Schweiz. 3rd edition. Baden-Baden: Nomos (UTB).
Zollinger, Delia. 2022. “Cleavage Identities in Voters’ Own Words: Harnessing Open-Ended Survey Responses.” American Journal of Political Science. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12743
Zollinger, Delia, and Denise Traber. 2023. “The Ideological Space in Swiss Politics: Voters, Parties, and Realignment.” In The Oxford Handbook of Swiss Politics, eds. Patrick Emmenegger, Flavia Fossati, Silja Häusermann, Yannis Papadopoulos, Pascal Sciarini, and Adrian Vatter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192871787.013.1. pp. 116-136.
UK
For the Westminster Parliament, the “first-past-the-post” system has been in place for several generations. This system almost always results in a majority for either the Conservative or Labour parties, which have been the dominant political forces over the past century. Although there was a coalition government between 2010 and 2015, and instances where the party with the largest number of Members of Parliament had to rely on less formal arrangements to remain in power, these are exceptions.
The Conservatives are right-of-center, encompassing a range from hard right to soft right, while the Labour Party is center-left, typically including some hard left members of Parliament. This internal diversity is a feature of the system. In 2015, the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn was from the hard left, but a significant defeat in the 2019 election likely discourages the selection of another leader from that wing of the party. The current leader, Keir Starmer, emphasizes competence over ideology. Similarly, the Conservatives underwent a rebalancing in 2022 following Liz Truss’s brief and problematic tenure as Prime Minister, during which she pursued right-wing economic reforms.
Political parties present manifestos, which are publicly available, and they are expected to broadly attempt to fulfill these commitments, although the realities of governance often lead to some promises being shelved. The differences between the main parties’ manifestos can vary, depending on the internal dynamics within each party. In practice, smaller parties have minimal influence except in rare instances when the leading party has no majority or a very small one.
The situation is quite different for the devolved governments in Scotland and Wales. Both use the mixed-member proportional system, which reduces the likelihood of a single-party majority, allows smaller parties to secure more representation, and increases the likelihood of coalition governments. However, since 2007, the Scottish National Party has defied this expectation by forming single-party governments, either as a minority (2007-2011, 2016-present) or a majority (2011-2016). In Wales, since 1999, Welsh Labour has formed minority single-party governments or majority coalition governments, including the current minority single-party government since 2021.
In Northern Ireland, the 1998 Belfast Agreement mandates a power-sharing executive with representatives from both the Nationalist and Unionist communities. After the 2021 election, which resulted in a narrow Nationalist majority, Sinn Fein had the right to nominate the First Minister for the first time. However, a Unionist boycott, partly in protest of Brexit’s impact, delayed the formation of the executive until 2024.
Overall, representation of different interests is achieved over time, provided there is a change in the governing party. Long periods of one party in power can favor certain interests, but shifts in governance help balance representation.
The Conservatives are right-of-center, encompassing a range from hard right to soft right, while the Labour Party is center-left, typically including some hard left members of Parliament. This internal diversity is a feature of the system. In 2015, the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn was from the hard left, but a significant defeat in the 2019 election likely discourages the selection of another leader from that wing of the party. The current leader, Keir Starmer, emphasizes competence over ideology. Similarly, the Conservatives underwent a rebalancing in 2022 following Liz Truss’s brief and problematic tenure as Prime Minister, during which she pursued right-wing economic reforms.
Political parties present manifestos, which are publicly available, and they are expected to broadly attempt to fulfill these commitments, although the realities of governance often lead to some promises being shelved. The differences between the main parties’ manifestos can vary, depending on the internal dynamics within each party. In practice, smaller parties have minimal influence except in rare instances when the leading party has no majority or a very small one.
The situation is quite different for the devolved governments in Scotland and Wales. Both use the mixed-member proportional system, which reduces the likelihood of a single-party majority, allows smaller parties to secure more representation, and increases the likelihood of coalition governments. However, since 2007, the Scottish National Party has defied this expectation by forming single-party governments, either as a minority (2007-2011, 2016-present) or a majority (2011-2016). In Wales, since 1999, Welsh Labour has formed minority single-party governments or majority coalition governments, including the current minority single-party government since 2021.
In Northern Ireland, the 1998 Belfast Agreement mandates a power-sharing executive with representatives from both the Nationalist and Unionist communities. After the 2021 election, which resulted in a narrow Nationalist majority, Sinn Fein had the right to nominate the First Minister for the first time. However, a Unionist boycott, partly in protest of Brexit’s impact, delayed the formation of the executive until 2024.
Overall, representation of different interests is achieved over time, provided there is a change in the governing party. Long periods of one party in power can favor certain interests, but shifts in governance help balance representation.
7
Australia
The wide range of views presented by the parties in the Australian party system facilitates effective social integration, supported by preferential voting. However, the low and declining membership of parties indicates weakening societal penetration and relevance.
The Australian party system comprises two major parties/coalitions, Labor and the Liberal-National coalition, alongside several minor parties (with the Greens being the largest) and an increasing number of independent MPs and Senators. At the national level, the Liberal-National coalition, which had governed continuously since 2013, was defeated in the 2022 federal election, resulting in a Labor majority. Various competitive arrangements exist at the state level, such as in Victoria and Queensland, where Labor has been dominant for extended periods.
Labor is traditionally associated with left-wing politics, combining economic priorities with social and cultural policies. The Liberal-National coalition advocates conservative policies across economic, social, and cultural matters. Although the Liberals and Nationals are independent parties, they do not compete against each other in elections and generally operate as a cohesive coalition. The National party primarily draws support from regional and rural voters, making Australia unique internationally for having a significant agrarian party. Smaller parties and independents cater to niche electoral markets, including environmentalism, nativism, and integrity.
A wide range of ideological positions and manifestos are presented to voters at election time. For example, significant differences between the major parties were apparent in the 2022 federal election regarding aged care policy, corruption and the federal integrity commission, childcare policy, climate change policy, housing policy, the Voice and Indigenous recognition, and health policy (Guardian staff 2022).
The preferential voting system used in Australian elections allows voters to rank-order parties/candidates, enabling them to express complex preferences. Left-leaning supporters often give their first preference vote to Labor or the Greens and their second preference to the other left-leaning party. Right-leaning voters may distribute their preferences between the Liberal-National Coalition and right-leaning minor parties like One Nation. To capitalize on preferential voting, parties issue ‘how to vote’ cards to guide their supporters on allocating preferences.
While natural affinities exist between parties on the same side of the ideological spectrum, conflicts can arise among these ‘ideological friends.’ For example, relations between Labor and the Greens have been strained over their disagreement on addressing the housing affordability crisis (Speers 2023). Labor proposed a housing fund to build 30,000 social and affordable homes over three years, while the Greens called for more urgent action, including a rent freeze. Similar tensions have occurred on the right. During the 2022 federal election, the Liberal-National Coalition placed One Nation below Jacquie Lambie on its how-to-vote card for the Tasmanian senate elections. One Nation responded by directing its supporters to preference Labor ahead of the Liberal-National Coalition in five seats (Karp and Hinchliffe 2022).
Although parties present a wide range of positions, there has been some weakening of the connection between these positions and the demands and preferences of ordinary citizens. One reason may be the low and declining levels of party membership across the system (Oliver 2014), as party members traditionally played a key role in conveying grassroots views to party elites. The tenor of political discourse, in parliament and the media, may also have accelerated disillusionment and disengagement.
The Australian party system comprises two major parties/coalitions, Labor and the Liberal-National coalition, alongside several minor parties (with the Greens being the largest) and an increasing number of independent MPs and Senators. At the national level, the Liberal-National coalition, which had governed continuously since 2013, was defeated in the 2022 federal election, resulting in a Labor majority. Various competitive arrangements exist at the state level, such as in Victoria and Queensland, where Labor has been dominant for extended periods.
Labor is traditionally associated with left-wing politics, combining economic priorities with social and cultural policies. The Liberal-National coalition advocates conservative policies across economic, social, and cultural matters. Although the Liberals and Nationals are independent parties, they do not compete against each other in elections and generally operate as a cohesive coalition. The National party primarily draws support from regional and rural voters, making Australia unique internationally for having a significant agrarian party. Smaller parties and independents cater to niche electoral markets, including environmentalism, nativism, and integrity.
A wide range of ideological positions and manifestos are presented to voters at election time. For example, significant differences between the major parties were apparent in the 2022 federal election regarding aged care policy, corruption and the federal integrity commission, childcare policy, climate change policy, housing policy, the Voice and Indigenous recognition, and health policy (Guardian staff 2022).
The preferential voting system used in Australian elections allows voters to rank-order parties/candidates, enabling them to express complex preferences. Left-leaning supporters often give their first preference vote to Labor or the Greens and their second preference to the other left-leaning party. Right-leaning voters may distribute their preferences between the Liberal-National Coalition and right-leaning minor parties like One Nation. To capitalize on preferential voting, parties issue ‘how to vote’ cards to guide their supporters on allocating preferences.
While natural affinities exist between parties on the same side of the ideological spectrum, conflicts can arise among these ‘ideological friends.’ For example, relations between Labor and the Greens have been strained over their disagreement on addressing the housing affordability crisis (Speers 2023). Labor proposed a housing fund to build 30,000 social and affordable homes over three years, while the Greens called for more urgent action, including a rent freeze. Similar tensions have occurred on the right. During the 2022 federal election, the Liberal-National Coalition placed One Nation below Jacquie Lambie on its how-to-vote card for the Tasmanian senate elections. One Nation responded by directing its supporters to preference Labor ahead of the Liberal-National Coalition in five seats (Karp and Hinchliffe 2022).
Although parties present a wide range of positions, there has been some weakening of the connection between these positions and the demands and preferences of ordinary citizens. One reason may be the low and declining levels of party membership across the system (Oliver 2014), as party members traditionally played a key role in conveying grassroots views to party elites. The tenor of political discourse, in parliament and the media, may also have accelerated disillusionment and disengagement.
Citations:
Guardian staff. 2022. “Who should I vote for? Guide to seven key policies in the 2022 Australian federal election where Labor and Coalition differ.” The Guardian, May 20. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/may/20/australia-federal-election-2022-labor-liberal-coalition-australian-policy-guide-who-should-can-i-vote-for-aged-care-icac-childcare-climate-change
Karp, P., and Hinchliffe, J. 2023. “One Nation Directs Preferences to Labor in Five Seats Targeting Left-leaning Liberals.” The Guardian April 28. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/apr/28/one-nation-directs-preferences-to-labor-in-five-seats-targeting-left-leaning-liberals
Speers, D. 2023. “Labor and the Greens aren’t strangers to conflict. But in this week’s housing stand-off, something snapped.” ABC News June 22. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-06-22/greens-playing-politics-housing-bill-double-dissolution/102505478
Oliver, A. 2014. Are Australians Disenchanted with Democracy? Papers on Parliament No. 62. https://www.aph.gov.au/senate/~/~/link.aspx?_id=01FD7901F7E14E9A86A44F9C217BFEC6&_z=z
Guardian staff. 2022. “Who should I vote for? Guide to seven key policies in the 2022 Australian federal election where Labor and Coalition differ.” The Guardian, May 20. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/may/20/australia-federal-election-2022-labor-liberal-coalition-australian-policy-guide-who-should-can-i-vote-for-aged-care-icac-childcare-climate-change
Karp, P., and Hinchliffe, J. 2023. “One Nation Directs Preferences to Labor in Five Seats Targeting Left-leaning Liberals.” The Guardian April 28. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/apr/28/one-nation-directs-preferences-to-labor-in-five-seats-targeting-left-leaning-liberals
Speers, D. 2023. “Labor and the Greens aren’t strangers to conflict. But in this week’s housing stand-off, something snapped.” ABC News June 22. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-06-22/greens-playing-politics-housing-bill-double-dissolution/102505478
Oliver, A. 2014. Are Australians Disenchanted with Democracy? Papers on Parliament No. 62. https://www.aph.gov.au/senate/~/~/link.aspx?_id=01FD7901F7E14E9A86A44F9C217BFEC6&_z=z
Czechia
The party system in the Czech Republic allows for the aggregation of preferences from the grassroots level, and many small parties have emerged in the past. However, parties must cross a 5% threshold to gain entry into parliament. In the 2021 elections, which determine the current composition of parliament, many smaller parties failed to meet this threshold. For the first time since 1989, no left-wing party secured parliamentary seats. Consequently, more than one million votes, mostly from less well-off Czechs, are currently unrepresented in parliament (Guasti and Buštíková, CEPS, 2022).
Parties represent societal interests only to a limited degree. The connection between citizens and parties is weak and has become even more tenuous due to the rise of direct communication methods, flexible working arrangements that undermine union formation, and identity politics. Political parties generally lack extensive networks of local branches, though this varies among parties. The ODS, the party of Prime Minister Fiala, established in 1992, has eliminated local branches but maintains branches at the regional level.
The main opposition party, ANO, has no members and relies financially on its leader, Andrej Babiš, owner of the Agrofert conglomerate. Babiš has described ANO as both a catch-all party and a right-wing party with a social conscience, the latter description serving as a strategy to garner political support and undermine left-wing parties. In the European Parliament, ANO belongs to the ALDE group. It won 27.2% of the votes in the 2021 parliamentary elections.
The far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy party (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD), which received 9.6% of the votes in 2021, is highly personalized and lacks a network of local branches. The Pirate Party, a member of the coalition government, has a very open structure and a plebiscitary decision-making process. It does not have institutionalized local branches and is a member of the Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament. Although it appears socially liberal, it leans more to the right on economic issues. The Pirate Party is allied with STAN (Starostové a Nezávislí, Mayors and Independents), which is a member of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament. STAN is economically liberal and concerned with environmental issues. This alliance won 15.6% of the votes in 2021.
The main force in the government is a three-party coalition that received 27.8% of the votes in the 2021 parliamentary elections. Its largest member, the ODS, is socially conservative and economically liberal. It belongs to the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament, along with Poland’s PiS. The ODS retains a membership of 12,000, and the prime minister, Petr Fiala, is a member.
Parties represent societal interests only to a limited degree. The connection between citizens and parties is weak and has become even more tenuous due to the rise of direct communication methods, flexible working arrangements that undermine union formation, and identity politics. Political parties generally lack extensive networks of local branches, though this varies among parties. The ODS, the party of Prime Minister Fiala, established in 1992, has eliminated local branches but maintains branches at the regional level.
The main opposition party, ANO, has no members and relies financially on its leader, Andrej Babiš, owner of the Agrofert conglomerate. Babiš has described ANO as both a catch-all party and a right-wing party with a social conscience, the latter description serving as a strategy to garner political support and undermine left-wing parties. In the European Parliament, ANO belongs to the ALDE group. It won 27.2% of the votes in the 2021 parliamentary elections.
The far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy party (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD), which received 9.6% of the votes in 2021, is highly personalized and lacks a network of local branches. The Pirate Party, a member of the coalition government, has a very open structure and a plebiscitary decision-making process. It does not have institutionalized local branches and is a member of the Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament. Although it appears socially liberal, it leans more to the right on economic issues. The Pirate Party is allied with STAN (Starostové a Nezávislí, Mayors and Independents), which is a member of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament. STAN is economically liberal and concerned with environmental issues. This alliance won 15.6% of the votes in 2021.
The main force in the government is a three-party coalition that received 27.8% of the votes in the 2021 parliamentary elections. Its largest member, the ODS, is socially conservative and economically liberal. It belongs to the European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament, along with Poland’s PiS. The ODS retains a membership of 12,000, and the prime minister, Petr Fiala, is a member.
Citations:
Petra Guasti and Lenka Buštíková. 2022. “Czech Government Wobbled by Mass Protests.” CEPA. https://cepa.org/article/czech-government-wobbled-by-mass-protests/
Petra Guasti and Lenka Buštíková. 2022. “Czech Government Wobbled by Mass Protests.” CEPA. https://cepa.org/article/czech-government-wobbled-by-mass-protests/
Italy
The Italian electoral system introduced by Law 165/2017 is a mixed system with two-thirds of representatives elected in multi-member districts (MMD) by a proportional formula (PR) and one-third in single-member districts (SMD) with plurality rule. Since the Italian bicameral system gives identical powers to both branches of parliament, the main elements that characterize the electoral rules have been harmonized between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate to avoid different outcomes and ensure governability.
Legal thresholds of representation are essential for both individual parties and coalitions. For individual parties, the threshold is 3% of valid votes at the national level. This threshold does not apply to parties representing linguistic and ethnic minorities. Coalitions are eligible for proportional representation seats only if they obtain at least 10% of the votes nationwide and include a party with at least 3%. If these conditions are met, the coalition can count on the votes of all member parties that get at least 1% of the votes nationwide. However, only parties in the coalition with at least 3% of the votes can get a proportional share of the PR seats allocated to the coalition.
The presence of SMDs and legal thresholds of representation can potentially lead to disproportionate results, thus hindering an adequate representation of all social groups. The results of the September 2022 elections confirm a high level of disproportionality, as the center-right coalition won almost all SMDs (121 out of 146 in the chamber; 56 out of 67 in the Senate) (Chiaramonte et al. 2023).
The territorial distribution of the vote reveals important links between parties or coalitions and local interests. Italy’s electoral map has changed dramatically from its traditional layout for the third election in a row. Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), which has acquired the same territorial profile as the League – from which it has drawn many voters – has become the most popular party in the Center-North. At the same time, the Five Star Movement (M5S) has remained by far the most popular party in southern Italy. More generally, center-right parties dominate Italy’s small municipalities, where most voters live. The center-left coalition prevails in large cities in Central and Northern Italy. Finally, in the South, the M5S is the dominant party (Chiaramonte et al. 2023).
The vote distribution between North and South Italy, as well as between rural and urban areas, partly reveals the cultural divide between GAL (Green, Alternative, Libertarian) and TAN (Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist) parties. It also shows the connection of some parties or coalitions with specific local interests: taxation, deregulation, and protectionism for artisans and small and medium enterprises in Northern Italy, and income support policies for southern Italy. The rapid growth of M5S support in southern Italy after introducing citizenship income when it was in government – whose recipients are mainly located in southern regions – is emblematic.
The electoral law requires that party manifestos be published in a special section of the election website maintained by the Ministry of the Interior. This allows them to be consulted by all citizens. Extensive publicity is also given to the manifestos through the main parties’ websites and social media. In the 2022 elections, the manifestos varied widely in length and detail, with those of the League and M5S among the longest. According to quantitative textual analyses (Trastulli and Mastroianni 2023), references to environmental and energy issues – two main topics of Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) – are present in almost all manifestos. Alongside these high-valence issues, parties have continued to emphasize those that traditionally define their ideological profiles in terms of credibility. Specifically, center-left parties focus on labor policies and social issues, while right-wing parties emphasize nationalism, defense, and security. Overall, the manifestos are rather generalist and cover a broad range of themes.
Legal thresholds of representation are essential for both individual parties and coalitions. For individual parties, the threshold is 3% of valid votes at the national level. This threshold does not apply to parties representing linguistic and ethnic minorities. Coalitions are eligible for proportional representation seats only if they obtain at least 10% of the votes nationwide and include a party with at least 3%. If these conditions are met, the coalition can count on the votes of all member parties that get at least 1% of the votes nationwide. However, only parties in the coalition with at least 3% of the votes can get a proportional share of the PR seats allocated to the coalition.
The presence of SMDs and legal thresholds of representation can potentially lead to disproportionate results, thus hindering an adequate representation of all social groups. The results of the September 2022 elections confirm a high level of disproportionality, as the center-right coalition won almost all SMDs (121 out of 146 in the chamber; 56 out of 67 in the Senate) (Chiaramonte et al. 2023).
The territorial distribution of the vote reveals important links between parties or coalitions and local interests. Italy’s electoral map has changed dramatically from its traditional layout for the third election in a row. Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), which has acquired the same territorial profile as the League – from which it has drawn many voters – has become the most popular party in the Center-North. At the same time, the Five Star Movement (M5S) has remained by far the most popular party in southern Italy. More generally, center-right parties dominate Italy’s small municipalities, where most voters live. The center-left coalition prevails in large cities in Central and Northern Italy. Finally, in the South, the M5S is the dominant party (Chiaramonte et al. 2023).
The vote distribution between North and South Italy, as well as between rural and urban areas, partly reveals the cultural divide between GAL (Green, Alternative, Libertarian) and TAN (Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist) parties. It also shows the connection of some parties or coalitions with specific local interests: taxation, deregulation, and protectionism for artisans and small and medium enterprises in Northern Italy, and income support policies for southern Italy. The rapid growth of M5S support in southern Italy after introducing citizenship income when it was in government – whose recipients are mainly located in southern regions – is emblematic.
The electoral law requires that party manifestos be published in a special section of the election website maintained by the Ministry of the Interior. This allows them to be consulted by all citizens. Extensive publicity is also given to the manifestos through the main parties’ websites and social media. In the 2022 elections, the manifestos varied widely in length and detail, with those of the League and M5S among the longest. According to quantitative textual analyses (Trastulli and Mastroianni 2023), references to environmental and energy issues – two main topics of Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) – are present in almost all manifestos. Alongside these high-valence issues, parties have continued to emphasize those that traditionally define their ideological profiles in terms of credibility. Specifically, center-left parties focus on labor policies and social issues, while right-wing parties emphasize nationalism, defense, and security. Overall, the manifestos are rather generalist and cover a broad range of themes.
Citations:
Electoral results:https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/
Trastulli, F., and L. Mastroianni. 2023. “What’s New Under the Sun? A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of the 2022 Italian Election Campaign Themes in Party Manifestos.” Modern Italy 1–22. DOI:10.1017/mit.2023.45
Chiaramonte, A., Emanuele, V., Maggini, N., and Paparo, A. 2023. “Radical-Right Surge in a Deinstitutionalised Party System: The 2022 Italian General Election.” South European Society and Politics 00(00): 1–29.
Electoral results:https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/
Trastulli, F., and L. Mastroianni. 2023. “What’s New Under the Sun? A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of the 2022 Italian Election Campaign Themes in Party Manifestos.” Modern Italy 1–22. DOI:10.1017/mit.2023.45
Chiaramonte, A., Emanuele, V., Maggini, N., and Paparo, A. 2023. “Radical-Right Surge in a Deinstitutionalised Party System: The 2022 Italian General Election.” South European Society and Politics 00(00): 1–29.
Japan
There are few legal restrictions on establishing a political party, and the frequent formation and re-formation of parties on the national level indicates that the lack of organizational cohesion and stability, especially on the part of the opposition, is of greater concern for the functioning of representative democracy in Japan.
Apart from the LDP, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Komeito, most parties have only weak organizational structures on the local level. LDP politicians traditionally rely on personal support networks, called kôenkai, which organize campaigns and are loyal to individual politicians rather than party branches, while the Komeito relies on the Sôka Gakkai Buddhist sect to mobilize voters. Only the JCP features a nationwide party structure, which has allowed it to consistently field candidates in all electoral districts. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), currently the main opposition party, maintains close ties with the moderate trade union umbrella organization Rengô. However, it is not a traditional labor party in the Western European sense. Opposition parties tend to rely more on urban voters than the LDP but are disadvantaged due to the malapportionment of electoral districts.
On the prefectural and local level, formally independent candidates who are supported by multiple parties are most common. In national elections, larger opposition parties often recruit and field candidates from outside the party. This has made them somewhat more inclusive of underrepresented societal groups. But even left and left-of-center parties field more male than female candidates. The LDP, on the other hand, is dominated by factional politics in which tenure and party membership play a large role. The LDP has few young and few female candidates. Also conspicuous is the absence of an avowedly environmental party, even though support for environmental policies is generally high.
Japan’s postwar political system has long been described as clientelistic (Scheiner 2007) and deeply rooted in interest group politics. In the pre-1994 electoral system, LDP candidates were incentivized to “specialize” on specific interest groups so large parties could get two or more members elected in multi-member districts. This often involved pork-barrel spending and organizing a personal vote with relatively weak party ties. This is said to have contributed to massive public works spending. Although many institutions and laws have been reformed with the goal of reining in clientelism, it is noticeable that public works spending has increased again (Statistics Bureau 2023: 32).
All major parties publish manifestos before elections, which make programmatic choices fairly transparent.
Apart from the LDP, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Komeito, most parties have only weak organizational structures on the local level. LDP politicians traditionally rely on personal support networks, called kôenkai, which organize campaigns and are loyal to individual politicians rather than party branches, while the Komeito relies on the Sôka Gakkai Buddhist sect to mobilize voters. Only the JCP features a nationwide party structure, which has allowed it to consistently field candidates in all electoral districts. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), currently the main opposition party, maintains close ties with the moderate trade union umbrella organization Rengô. However, it is not a traditional labor party in the Western European sense. Opposition parties tend to rely more on urban voters than the LDP but are disadvantaged due to the malapportionment of electoral districts.
On the prefectural and local level, formally independent candidates who are supported by multiple parties are most common. In national elections, larger opposition parties often recruit and field candidates from outside the party. This has made them somewhat more inclusive of underrepresented societal groups. But even left and left-of-center parties field more male than female candidates. The LDP, on the other hand, is dominated by factional politics in which tenure and party membership play a large role. The LDP has few young and few female candidates. Also conspicuous is the absence of an avowedly environmental party, even though support for environmental policies is generally high.
Japan’s postwar political system has long been described as clientelistic (Scheiner 2007) and deeply rooted in interest group politics. In the pre-1994 electoral system, LDP candidates were incentivized to “specialize” on specific interest groups so large parties could get two or more members elected in multi-member districts. This often involved pork-barrel spending and organizing a personal vote with relatively weak party ties. This is said to have contributed to massive public works spending. Although many institutions and laws have been reformed with the goal of reining in clientelism, it is noticeable that public works spending has increased again (Statistics Bureau 2023: 32).
All major parties publish manifestos before elections, which make programmatic choices fairly transparent.
Citations:
Hijino, Ken, and Victor Leonard. 2021. “What Drives Japanese Regional Elections? Multilevel Factors and Partisan Independents.” Regional and Federal Studies 31 (3): 419-432.
Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2011. The Rise and Fall of Japan’s LDP. Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Scheiner, Ethan. 2007. “Clientelism in Japan: The Importance and Limits of Institutional Explanations.” In Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, eds. Kitschelt, H., and S.I. Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 276-297.
Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan. 2023. The Statistical Handbook of Japan. Tokyo: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan.
Hijino, Ken, and Victor Leonard. 2021. “What Drives Japanese Regional Elections? Multilevel Factors and Partisan Independents.” Regional and Federal Studies 31 (3): 419-432.
Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2011. The Rise and Fall of Japan’s LDP. Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Scheiner, Ethan. 2007. “Clientelism in Japan: The Importance and Limits of Institutional Explanations.” In Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, eds. Kitschelt, H., and S.I. Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 276-297.
Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan. 2023. The Statistical Handbook of Japan. Tokyo: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan.
Poland
In general, most societal interests are reflected in the political spectrum present in the parliament. The Sejm, consisting of 460 members, is elected for a four-year term using proportional representation and the d’Hondt method, with a 5% threshold for entry (8% for coalitions, waived for national minorities). This rule has eliminated most minor parties from the Polish political scene; they have either disappeared or merged with larger parties, such as the Greens, who joined the Civic Platform in 2023 along with Nowoczesna and Inicjatywa Polska. Most major parties – aside from the newly constituted Polska 2050 – have well-organized local branches based mainly on state administrative divisions. Regional and local party branches report regional challenges to party leaders and are active during party conventions.
With 100 members, the Senate is elected for a four-year term via single-member constituencies and a first-past-the-post voting model. In the 2023 elections, only a few independent candidates not rooted in party politics entered the Senate, and most joined the liberal Senate Pact. The age requirements of 21 for the Sejm and 30 for the Senate do not infringe on the representation of various age groups in parliament. A rule introduced in 2011 requires all parties to allocate at least 35% of places on election lists to women, resulting in steady growth in the number of female parliamentarians, reaching a record 29.6% in the 2023 Sejm elections.
In 2023, all parties published political manifestos in anticipation of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The PiS party called for new spending on social and military causes; Konfederacja advocated for tax cuts; the Civic Platform proposed changes in education and an increase in public sector salaries; the Third Way focused on green development and healthcare; and the New Left centered on restoring reproductive rights and women’s rights. In general, all parties from the democratic opposition advocated reversing unconstitutional reforms of the judiciary system and restoring closer ties with the European Union (Łada-Konefał 2023).
With 100 members, the Senate is elected for a four-year term via single-member constituencies and a first-past-the-post voting model. In the 2023 elections, only a few independent candidates not rooted in party politics entered the Senate, and most joined the liberal Senate Pact. The age requirements of 21 for the Sejm and 30 for the Senate do not infringe on the representation of various age groups in parliament. A rule introduced in 2011 requires all parties to allocate at least 35% of places on election lists to women, resulting in steady growth in the number of female parliamentarians, reaching a record 29.6% in the 2023 Sejm elections.
In 2023, all parties published political manifestos in anticipation of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The PiS party called for new spending on social and military causes; Konfederacja advocated for tax cuts; the Civic Platform proposed changes in education and an increase in public sector salaries; the Third Way focused on green development and healthcare; and the New Left centered on restoring reproductive rights and women’s rights. In general, all parties from the democratic opposition advocated reversing unconstitutional reforms of the judiciary system and restoring closer ties with the European Union (Łada-Konefał 2023).
Citations:
Łada-Konefał, A. 2023. “Poland’s Pivotal Elections – High Stakes and an Uncertain Outcome.” https://globaleurope.eu/europes-future/polands-pivotal-elections-high-stakes-and-an-uncertain-outcome/
Łada-Konefał, A. 2023. “Poland’s Pivotal Elections – High Stakes and an Uncertain Outcome.” https://globaleurope.eu/europes-future/polands-pivotal-elections-high-stakes-and-an-uncertain-outcome/
USA
The United States party system has undergone substantial internal transformation in recent decades, even though on the surface it appears much the same as it has since the mid-19th century. Since the 1850s, U.S. politics has been dominated by two main parties: the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. These parties have historically been large, varied coalitions. For example, in the early 20th century, the Democratic Party was a coalition of urban Catholic immigrants in the North and anti-immigrant rural Protestants in the South (Abramowitz 2018). Federalism and the decentralization of American politics allowed the parties to maintain electoral coalitions that contained voters with quite divergent perspectives.
From the 1930s, American politics began to “nationalize” as the federal government became more involved in policy areas that had once been largely left to the states (Hopkins 2018). This was especially true of social policy, which had largely been a state competence until the massive expansion of federal welfare provision in the 1930s and again in the 1960s. For the first time, the Democratic Party came to be seen at the national level as the party of the “left” and the Republican Party as the party of the “right” (Levendusky 2009).
However, voters were still able to distinguish between the national party and their state parties. Political scientist Nelson Polsby famously said that the United States is not a country of two parties but of 102 parties. Each state’s Democratic and Republican parties had their own set of policy priorities, which, in turn, differed from the national parties’ agendas.
Party loyalty was guided by a variety of factors, including clientelism and patronage. Often, voters supported a particular party because the local party was seen as aligned with the interests of a specific local group. These alignments were frequently based on historic reasons and only loosely connected to policy programs (Polsby 1983).
Today, this is no longer the case. The American party system has nationalized. The policy priorities of Democrats in Massachusetts and Mississippi are more similar to each other than ever before. In turn, the parties’ ideological character has finally crystallized in the eyes of the electorate at all levels.
In this respect, American political parties “look” more like conventional political parties in the rest of the developed democratic world. They are ideologically coherent, programmatic parties. Voters support these parties, for the most part, on the basis of policy alignment rather than on non-policy reasons like religion, local history or geography.
By their very nature, U.S. political parties need to be “big tent” or “broad church” parties. They must still accommodate a wide set of interests, but these interests are now more closely sorted according to ideology than they ever have been. Nonetheless, there is space for “moderates” and “extremists” of the left and right within both parties’ coalitions.
From the 1930s, American politics began to “nationalize” as the federal government became more involved in policy areas that had once been largely left to the states (Hopkins 2018). This was especially true of social policy, which had largely been a state competence until the massive expansion of federal welfare provision in the 1930s and again in the 1960s. For the first time, the Democratic Party came to be seen at the national level as the party of the “left” and the Republican Party as the party of the “right” (Levendusky 2009).
However, voters were still able to distinguish between the national party and their state parties. Political scientist Nelson Polsby famously said that the United States is not a country of two parties but of 102 parties. Each state’s Democratic and Republican parties had their own set of policy priorities, which, in turn, differed from the national parties’ agendas.
Party loyalty was guided by a variety of factors, including clientelism and patronage. Often, voters supported a particular party because the local party was seen as aligned with the interests of a specific local group. These alignments were frequently based on historic reasons and only loosely connected to policy programs (Polsby 1983).
Today, this is no longer the case. The American party system has nationalized. The policy priorities of Democrats in Massachusetts and Mississippi are more similar to each other than ever before. In turn, the parties’ ideological character has finally crystallized in the eyes of the electorate at all levels.
In this respect, American political parties “look” more like conventional political parties in the rest of the developed democratic world. They are ideologically coherent, programmatic parties. Voters support these parties, for the most part, on the basis of policy alignment rather than on non-policy reasons like religion, local history or geography.
By their very nature, U.S. political parties need to be “big tent” or “broad church” parties. They must still accommodate a wide set of interests, but these interests are now more closely sorted according to ideology than they ever have been. Nonetheless, there is space for “moderates” and “extremists” of the left and right within both parties’ coalitions.
Citations:
Alan Abramowitz. 2018. The Great Alignment. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Daniel Hopkins. 2018. The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Politics Nationalized. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Matthew Levendusky. 2009. The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nelson Polsby. 1983. Consequences of Party Reform. Oxford: University Press.
Alan Abramowitz. 2018. The Great Alignment. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Daniel Hopkins. 2018. The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Politics Nationalized. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Matthew Levendusky. 2009. The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nelson Polsby. 1983. Consequences of Party Reform. Oxford: University Press.
6
France
The Fifth Republic is constructed as a majoritarian political system, with a two-round majority-based system for both direct presidential and legislative elections. As such, this system tends to create a significant imbalance between the expression of preferences by citizens and the political representation in practice (Grossman and Sauger 2009). The minority is systematically underrepresented in institutions, starting with the presidential office – which is by definition held singly. This has led to France being characterized as one of the most disproportional countries in Europe in terms of political representation. In the first round of the vote, there are few constraints on citizens’ expression. Twelve candidates competed in the 2022 presidential race. But the mechanical effect of the runoff drastically reduces the political offerings.
This imbalance has been reinforced by various second-order elections that have been introduced in recent decades (Parodi 1997). These have tended to further open the competition to a variety of actors through, for instance, a proportional component for municipal, regional and European elections. But they also involve strict majority logic, especially with the bonus system for municipal and regional elections (Bedock and Sauger 2014).
The electoral system nevertheless also offers incentives for societal representation. Parity laws have either introduced strict rules for equal representation between men and women for all list systems or monetary penalties if parties do not field as many women as men in legislative elections. The first female president has yet to be elected. In the same way, the districting system for legislative elections fosters local representation. Senators, indirectly elected, even have an explicit mandate to represent “territories.” Decentralization and autonomy processes have pushed this local representation a step further, especially in Corsica and in overseas territories. There, local party systems have often been created to better represent local issues and specific aspirations to independence or resistance to such a move.
French parties, as organizations, remain weak compared to many of their European counterparts. The entire party system fell to pieces after the 2017 political earthquake. While this destructive phase has permitted Macron to sweep away the old political forces to the advantage of his new movement, it has also contributed to the weakening of the traditional mediatory institutions. This is true even of the president’s own movement, La République en Marche (since renamed Renaissance), which has been unable to transform itself into a truly developed party with a full-scale organization and capable of fulfilling a mediatory role. Its roots at the local level remain strictly limited, all the more so since the party has managed at most limited successes in local elections. Over the last few years, the situation has not improved; on the contrary, the Macron movement has lost appeal, and finds itself already in a structural crisis due to internal competition in the quest for a new presidential leader. The leftist parties are weaker and more divided than ever, while the extreme-right movements are flourishing. The hard-right National Rally, whose ambition was to appear more responsible and moderate, now has to compete with a newcomer, Éric Zemmour, whose radical rhetoric is based on the “French decline” and the invasion of migrants. The National Rally presently looks like the overall winner of this situation, embodying the only structured opposition to a weak governmental party (Rouban 2022).
The weakness of party organization and institutionalization does not prevent parties from innovating ideologically and attempting to respond to citizens’ expectations. The range is broad, from the radical Trotskyist left to the far right, ranging as well from environmental to nationalist parties. The overall positioning of these parties is generally clear. This was somewhat blurred by Macron’s move in 2017 to bridge the moderate left and moderate right traditions. More generally, precise party programs are scarce, and when they do exist, they are not intensively used in party communications. To some extent, all parties address the majority, broadly defined by the working or middle class. The “enemy” is what differs most between the parties. This is liberalism for the left, the extremes for the center, and immigrants for the radical right. Parties do not seem willing to build on group consultation or seek academic expertise, despite some isolated initiatives in this area. Most key decisions appear to be the result of leaders’ initiatives or based on short-term opinion poll feedback.
The variety of choices between parties does not generally preclude a feeling of disconnect between the population and its political elite. Part of this feeling might be attributable to the observation of significant differences between what is promised and what is actually delivered once in government. Even if pledges are often respected, the general outcomes of governmental actions too often fall short of citizens’ expectations.
This imbalance has been reinforced by various second-order elections that have been introduced in recent decades (Parodi 1997). These have tended to further open the competition to a variety of actors through, for instance, a proportional component for municipal, regional and European elections. But they also involve strict majority logic, especially with the bonus system for municipal and regional elections (Bedock and Sauger 2014).
The electoral system nevertheless also offers incentives for societal representation. Parity laws have either introduced strict rules for equal representation between men and women for all list systems or monetary penalties if parties do not field as many women as men in legislative elections. The first female president has yet to be elected. In the same way, the districting system for legislative elections fosters local representation. Senators, indirectly elected, even have an explicit mandate to represent “territories.” Decentralization and autonomy processes have pushed this local representation a step further, especially in Corsica and in overseas territories. There, local party systems have often been created to better represent local issues and specific aspirations to independence or resistance to such a move.
French parties, as organizations, remain weak compared to many of their European counterparts. The entire party system fell to pieces after the 2017 political earthquake. While this destructive phase has permitted Macron to sweep away the old political forces to the advantage of his new movement, it has also contributed to the weakening of the traditional mediatory institutions. This is true even of the president’s own movement, La République en Marche (since renamed Renaissance), which has been unable to transform itself into a truly developed party with a full-scale organization and capable of fulfilling a mediatory role. Its roots at the local level remain strictly limited, all the more so since the party has managed at most limited successes in local elections. Over the last few years, the situation has not improved; on the contrary, the Macron movement has lost appeal, and finds itself already in a structural crisis due to internal competition in the quest for a new presidential leader. The leftist parties are weaker and more divided than ever, while the extreme-right movements are flourishing. The hard-right National Rally, whose ambition was to appear more responsible and moderate, now has to compete with a newcomer, Éric Zemmour, whose radical rhetoric is based on the “French decline” and the invasion of migrants. The National Rally presently looks like the overall winner of this situation, embodying the only structured opposition to a weak governmental party (Rouban 2022).
The weakness of party organization and institutionalization does not prevent parties from innovating ideologically and attempting to respond to citizens’ expectations. The range is broad, from the radical Trotskyist left to the far right, ranging as well from environmental to nationalist parties. The overall positioning of these parties is generally clear. This was somewhat blurred by Macron’s move in 2017 to bridge the moderate left and moderate right traditions. More generally, precise party programs are scarce, and when they do exist, they are not intensively used in party communications. To some extent, all parties address the majority, broadly defined by the working or middle class. The “enemy” is what differs most between the parties. This is liberalism for the left, the extremes for the center, and immigrants for the radical right. Parties do not seem willing to build on group consultation or seek academic expertise, despite some isolated initiatives in this area. Most key decisions appear to be the result of leaders’ initiatives or based on short-term opinion poll feedback.
The variety of choices between parties does not generally preclude a feeling of disconnect between the population and its political elite. Part of this feeling might be attributable to the observation of significant differences between what is promised and what is actually delivered once in government. Even if pledges are often respected, the general outcomes of governmental actions too often fall short of citizens’ expectations.
Citations:
Bedock, C., and N. Sauger. 2014. “Electoral Systems with a Majority Bonus as Unconventional Mixed Systems.” Representation 50 (1): 99-112. Available at 10.1080/00344893.2014.902220
Grossman, E., and Sauger, N. 2009. “The End of Ambiguity? Presidents Versus Parties or the Four Phases of the Fifth Republic.” West European Politics 32 (2): 423-437. Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802670743
Parodi, J.-L. 1997. “Proportionnalisation périodique, cohabitation, atomisation partisane: un triple défi pour le régime semi-présidentiel de la Cinquième République.” Revue Française de Science Politique 47 (3/4): 292–312.
Rouban, Luc. 2022. La vraie victoire du RN. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Bedock, C., and N. Sauger. 2014. “Electoral Systems with a Majority Bonus as Unconventional Mixed Systems.” Representation 50 (1): 99-112. Available at 10.1080/00344893.2014.902220
Grossman, E., and Sauger, N. 2009. “The End of Ambiguity? Presidents Versus Parties or the Four Phases of the Fifth Republic.” West European Politics 32 (2): 423-437. Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802670743
Parodi, J.-L. 1997. “Proportionnalisation périodique, cohabitation, atomisation partisane: un triple défi pour le régime semi-présidentiel de la Cinquième République.” Revue Française de Science Politique 47 (3/4): 292–312.
Rouban, Luc. 2022. La vraie victoire du RN. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Latvia
Latvia has a multiparty system. Although there are many ethnic groups in Latvia – such as Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles, and Lithuanians – the legal framework does not give advantages to any particular group. All citizens and non-citizens can be members of political parties, but only citizens can vote and be elected. Legally, all relevant social interests are represented through political party programs and later in the election process. The legal framework provides a sufficient base for democratic elections.
Political parties in Latvia are often perceived as representing either Latvian or Russian speakers. This ethnic and linguistic divide also aligns with a left-right political spectrum, where parties representing Russians generally lean left (e.g., Stabilitatei). Another cleavage is observed along social values, such as perceptions of the traditional family and political positions on the Istanbul Convention. Overall, political parties elected to parliament or local councils can achieve communication for agreement, though it may occasionally necessitate compromise.
The governing coalition in parliament and the government is dominated by right-wing parties with a liberal approach to the economy and support for the EU. The current government, in power since September 2023, consists of the Jauna Vienotība (a liberal and right-wing party), ZZS – Union of Farmers and Green (a centrist party), and Progresivie (Progressives) (social democrats). Programs and political manifestos are publicly available.
However, the membership size is small for all political parties. At the beginning of 2023, the most significant political parties had membership numbers above 1,000. For example, the Union of Farmers had 1,351 members, Saskaņa (Harmony) had 1,347 members, and Vienotība (Unity) had 2,166 members (Uzņēmumu reģistrs, 2024). The average membership size for regional parties participating in local elections ranges from 200 to 500 (Uzņēmumu reģistrs, 2024). This small membership size hinders political parties from effectively representing societal interests between elections. Consequently, they tend to focus on broad “umbrella type” issues to attract the electorate’s attention during pre-election campaigns.
The major political parties have local branches in the regions of Latvia. However, no distinct local interests shape the parties’ political manifestos. As Latvia is a small, unitary country with a proportional election system, coalitions form the government.
Political parties in Latvia are often perceived as representing either Latvian or Russian speakers. This ethnic and linguistic divide also aligns with a left-right political spectrum, where parties representing Russians generally lean left (e.g., Stabilitatei). Another cleavage is observed along social values, such as perceptions of the traditional family and political positions on the Istanbul Convention. Overall, political parties elected to parliament or local councils can achieve communication for agreement, though it may occasionally necessitate compromise.
The governing coalition in parliament and the government is dominated by right-wing parties with a liberal approach to the economy and support for the EU. The current government, in power since September 2023, consists of the Jauna Vienotība (a liberal and right-wing party), ZZS – Union of Farmers and Green (a centrist party), and Progresivie (Progressives) (social democrats). Programs and political manifestos are publicly available.
However, the membership size is small for all political parties. At the beginning of 2023, the most significant political parties had membership numbers above 1,000. For example, the Union of Farmers had 1,351 members, Saskaņa (Harmony) had 1,347 members, and Vienotība (Unity) had 2,166 members (Uzņēmumu reģistrs, 2024). The average membership size for regional parties participating in local elections ranges from 200 to 500 (Uzņēmumu reģistrs, 2024). This small membership size hinders political parties from effectively representing societal interests between elections. Consequently, they tend to focus on broad “umbrella type” issues to attract the electorate’s attention during pre-election campaigns.
The major political parties have local branches in the regions of Latvia. However, no distinct local interests shape the parties’ political manifestos. As Latvia is a small, unitary country with a proportional election system, coalitions form the government.
Citations:
The Law on Elections of Saeima. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/35261-law-on-the-election-of-the-isaeimai
OSCE. 2023. Latvia, Parliamentary Elections, 1 October 2022: Final Report. ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/latvia/541053
Uzņēmumu reģistrs. 2024. “Informācija par politisko partiju biedru skaitu.” https://www.ur.gov.lv/lv/specializeta-informacija/informacija-par-politisko-partiju-biedru-skaitu/
The Law on Elections of Saeima. https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/35261-law-on-the-election-of-the-isaeimai
OSCE. 2023. Latvia, Parliamentary Elections, 1 October 2022: Final Report. ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/latvia/541053
Uzņēmumu reģistrs. 2024. “Informācija par politisko partiju biedru skaitu.” https://www.ur.gov.lv/lv/specializeta-informacija/informacija-par-politisko-partiju-biedru-skaitu/
Netherlands
The Netherlands has a system of full proportional representation with no threshold requirements. A seat in parliament is guaranteed for any party which gains at least 0.67% of the national vote; this is between 69,000 and 88,000 votes, depending on the election turnout. In the 2023 national parliamentary elections, 26 political parties competed; during the 2021 – 2023 parliamentary sessions, 26 members of parliament changed their party affiliation, resulting in 21 political parties with serving legislators, the highest number ever. Only the major political parties have local branches, but there are hundreds of strictly local political parties both with and without formal affiliations with national political parties. Most strictly local political parties are protest parties. It is plausible to expect that many voters for local protest parties vote for national protest parties, like PVV, FvD, BBB and NSC, in national elections. Only one local political party, Lijst De Mos (The Hague), has been accused engaging in illegal clientelist practices. However, it was acquitted by court. National political party platforms are normally available months before the election date. Several well-used voter guides or electoral “compasses” help voters distinguish between the platforms of so many political parties.
Interestingly, parties have no status in the law. Legislation on political parties in the Netherlands is extremely weak and inconsistent (see Krouwel 2004, WRR 2004). In Dutch law, the existence of political parties is hardly recognized, and they have an almost “extra legem” status (Elzinga 1990). In the constitution, the existence of political parties is totally ignored. Parties have no separate status under Dutch law and are entirely subject to civil law. As a result, parliamentarians are formally considered citizens with an individual mandate, and formally vote “without burden” (Art. 67.3 Constitution). Dutch law does not require political parties to take a specific organizational form, and does not mandate internal democratic procedures. Registration based on Article 2 of the Commercial Register Act is sufficient (Elections Act Art. G1). Parties are recognized in the parliament’s Rules of Procedure (Art.11), which regulate the allocation of speaking time, while the Elections Act (Art. G andH) and the Media Act (Art. 39g) also recognize a number of party functions. However, parties here are called “political groupings,” and the requirements for recognition of that label remain unclear. The only direct legal recognition of political parties is found in the Law on Party Finance, where parties are defined as associations registered under Article G1 of the Elections Act. This legal denial of the existence of political parties also leads to problems in cases when a party violates the democratic rules of the game
There are numerous political parties with distinct social roots. In a 2023 research report, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research distinguishes between seven clearly differentiated “social classes” based on combined indicators of economic, social, cultural and political capital. Each is linked to a small set of preferred political parties – except for the working middle class, which makes up a floating vote of a quarter of all voters. Four of these classes and their share as part of the population are as follows:
Working upper layer (>40, high-educated, high income, in good health, life satisfaction score 8.1 (out of 10). Conservative (VVD) and Social Liberals (D66) and Green Left (GL): 19%
Younger with promising but uncertain prospects (60, middle-to-lower income, unemployed or retired, limited network, less healthy, 7.7). CDA, Labor (PvdA): 8.6%
Insecure workers (flexible/temporary jobs, non-western 33% migration background, lower educated, less healthy, most ‘unhappy’: 6.6.). Party for Freedom (PVV), Socialist Party (SP): 10%
Precariat (>60, little political, economic, social and political capital, 45% primary education only, no social network, 70% mild/severe health problems, 6.8) PVV, PvdA, DENK: 6.3% (author’s summary derived from SCP, Rapport Eigentijdse ongelijkheid).
It is this 25% of highly volatile floating voters that have produced the wildly fluctuating election results of the last years – providing strong totals in 2019 for the ultra-right-wing Forum for Democracy (in provincial elections), next for Labor (in European elections), for the VVD in 2021 (in national parliamentary elections), for the BBB in March 2023 (in provincial elections), and in the most recent shocking surprise, for the extremist right-wing PVV in the November 2023 national elections. One highly respected political analyst termed this: “Voters as bargain hunters.”
The large number of parties that participate in elections and enter parliament due to the low threshold provide for a wide range of political orientations and policy proposals. Coalition governments often span a substantial proportion of the Dutch political landscape. For example, the two most recent coalitions included the economically centrist and culturally progressive D66, the orthodox religious Christian Union, the right-wing liberal VVD and the center-right Christian Democratic CDA.
In terms of representation, studies show that voters’ proximity to parties tends to be higher on issues that parties emphasize more strongly. As these are the issues where parties typically have the greatest policy impact, this implies that the quality of representation is highest where it matters most. Research also shows that the congruence between voter preferences and party policy offerings is better for the niche and extremist parties than for the mainstream parties in the Netherlands (Costello et al 2021).
Interestingly, parties have no status in the law. Legislation on political parties in the Netherlands is extremely weak and inconsistent (see Krouwel 2004, WRR 2004). In Dutch law, the existence of political parties is hardly recognized, and they have an almost “extra legem” status (Elzinga 1990). In the constitution, the existence of political parties is totally ignored. Parties have no separate status under Dutch law and are entirely subject to civil law. As a result, parliamentarians are formally considered citizens with an individual mandate, and formally vote “without burden” (Art. 67.3 Constitution). Dutch law does not require political parties to take a specific organizational form, and does not mandate internal democratic procedures. Registration based on Article 2 of the Commercial Register Act is sufficient (Elections Act Art. G1). Parties are recognized in the parliament’s Rules of Procedure (Art.11), which regulate the allocation of speaking time, while the Elections Act (Art. G andH) and the Media Act (Art. 39g) also recognize a number of party functions. However, parties here are called “political groupings,” and the requirements for recognition of that label remain unclear. The only direct legal recognition of political parties is found in the Law on Party Finance, where parties are defined as associations registered under Article G1 of the Elections Act. This legal denial of the existence of political parties also leads to problems in cases when a party violates the democratic rules of the game
There are numerous political parties with distinct social roots. In a 2023 research report, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research distinguishes between seven clearly differentiated “social classes” based on combined indicators of economic, social, cultural and political capital. Each is linked to a small set of preferred political parties – except for the working middle class, which makes up a floating vote of a quarter of all voters. Four of these classes and their share as part of the population are as follows:
Working upper layer (>40, high-educated, high income, in good health, life satisfaction score 8.1 (out of 10). Conservative (VVD) and Social Liberals (D66) and Green Left (GL): 19%
Younger with promising but uncertain prospects (60, middle-to-lower income, unemployed or retired, limited network, less healthy, 7.7). CDA, Labor (PvdA): 8.6%
Insecure workers (flexible/temporary jobs, non-western 33% migration background, lower educated, less healthy, most ‘unhappy’: 6.6.). Party for Freedom (PVV), Socialist Party (SP): 10%
Precariat (>60, little political, economic, social and political capital, 45% primary education only, no social network, 70% mild/severe health problems, 6.8) PVV, PvdA, DENK: 6.3% (author’s summary derived from SCP, Rapport Eigentijdse ongelijkheid).
It is this 25% of highly volatile floating voters that have produced the wildly fluctuating election results of the last years – providing strong totals in 2019 for the ultra-right-wing Forum for Democracy (in provincial elections), next for Labor (in European elections), for the VVD in 2021 (in national parliamentary elections), for the BBB in March 2023 (in provincial elections), and in the most recent shocking surprise, for the extremist right-wing PVV in the November 2023 national elections. One highly respected political analyst termed this: “Voters as bargain hunters.”
The large number of parties that participate in elections and enter parliament due to the low threshold provide for a wide range of political orientations and policy proposals. Coalition governments often span a substantial proportion of the Dutch political landscape. For example, the two most recent coalitions included the economically centrist and culturally progressive D66, the orthodox religious Christian Union, the right-wing liberal VVD and the center-right Christian Democratic CDA.
In terms of representation, studies show that voters’ proximity to parties tends to be higher on issues that parties emphasize more strongly. As these are the issues where parties typically have the greatest policy impact, this implies that the quality of representation is highest where it matters most. Research also shows that the congruence between voter preferences and party policy offerings is better for the niche and extremist parties than for the mainstream parties in the Netherlands (Costello et al 2021).
Citations:
Social Cultureel Planbureau. 2023. Eigentijdse Ongelijkheid.
NRC-H. 2023. “BBB-kiezer is relatief oud en gemiddeld lager opgeleid.” Pim van den Dool, March 17.
Julien van Ostaaijen, eds. n.d. Lokale partijen in de praktijk.
Een overzicht van kennis over het functioneren van lokale partijen in Nederland
https://lokale-democratie.nl/file/download/c8290e6e-6ae6-462d-8696-c7a5cab72a30
Senay Boztas. 2023. “Dutch Parties Vie for Voters with No Faith in Government after String of Scandals.” The Guardian November 23.
Human/VPRO. 2023. “Argos Wie zit er achter de stemhulpen in Nederland?” November 11.
Parlement.com, van den Braak. 2023. “De grillige kiezers.” https://www.parlement.com.
Tom-Jan Meeus. 2023. “De winst van radicaal-rechts maakt duidelijk: dit land is bezig zichzelf af te schaffen.” NRC, November 24.
De staat van de democratie. Democratie voorbij de staat. 2004. WRR-Verkenningen nr.4.
Krouwel, A. 2004. Partisan States. Legal Regulation of Political Parties in France, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri/Wolf Legal Publishers.
Costello, R., Toshkov, D., Bos, B., and Krouwel, A. 2021. “Congruence Between Voters and Parties: The Role of Party-Level Issue Salience.” European Journal of Political Research 60 (1): 92-113. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12388
Social Cultureel Planbureau. 2023. Eigentijdse Ongelijkheid.
NRC-H. 2023. “BBB-kiezer is relatief oud en gemiddeld lager opgeleid.” Pim van den Dool, March 17.
Julien van Ostaaijen, eds. n.d. Lokale partijen in de praktijk.
Een overzicht van kennis over het functioneren van lokale partijen in Nederland
https://lokale-democratie.nl/file/download/c8290e6e-6ae6-462d-8696-c7a5cab72a30
Senay Boztas. 2023. “Dutch Parties Vie for Voters with No Faith in Government after String of Scandals.” The Guardian November 23.
Human/VPRO. 2023. “Argos Wie zit er achter de stemhulpen in Nederland?” November 11.
Parlement.com, van den Braak. 2023. “De grillige kiezers.” https://www.parlement.com.
Tom-Jan Meeus. 2023. “De winst van radicaal-rechts maakt duidelijk: dit land is bezig zichzelf af te schaffen.” NRC, November 24.
De staat van de democratie. Democratie voorbij de staat. 2004. WRR-Verkenningen nr.4.
Krouwel, A. 2004. Partisan States. Legal Regulation of Political Parties in France, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri/Wolf Legal Publishers.
Costello, R., Toshkov, D., Bos, B., and Krouwel, A. 2021. “Congruence Between Voters and Parties: The Role of Party-Level Issue Salience.” European Journal of Political Research 60 (1): 92-113. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12388
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
5
Hungary
The Hungarian electoral system produces distorting effects. The mixed system, with a strong first-past-the-post element, generally produces large majorities; two-thirds majorities are more the rule than the exception. This has opened the door for the ruling party – for many years Fidesz under Prime Minister Orbán – to establish tailor-made legal norms. As a result, the already-deep rift in society deepens, as parties outside the two organized camps have few opportunities to be represented in parliament. Moreover, the opposition bloc is ideologically and organizationally fragmented. However, the electoral system favors the existence of two blocs of similar size. As a result, opposition parties face significant coordination challenges in finding a strategy compatible with the electoral system and the ability to represent their voters. Few newcomers successfully pass the electoral threshold (5% of the popular vote). For example, the far-right Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) secured some seats as a nonaligned party in the 2022 elections. Most parties feature local and regional bodies, though few establish a strong local presence due to low membership figures and insufficient state funding (Susánszky et al. 2020). Local party chapters are often organized alongside election constituencies. Some parties, especially among the opposition, have difficulties organizing themselves in rural areas, as their programs address urban centers more than those of Fidesz. This weakness is an essential factor in the inability of the opposition to score well outside Budapest. Still, in local and regional elections, this weakness appears to be smaller, as the distorting effects of the national electoral system are absent here, and the number of independent mayors is traditionally relatively high. In the government camp, decision-making is highly centralized, and there is little room for regional interests due to the dominance of top-down political communication. The power of the mayors was diminished a long time ago by the Fidesz government by preventing individuals from simultaneously holding a mayoral position and a mandate in parliament. Most Hungarian parties perceive themselves as catchall parties. However, the discourse on policy is hardly visible. Instead, parties’ rhetoric follows a perpetual clash between different worldviews, especially aligned around cosmopolitan versus national views. As a result, parties compete with each other less over political solutions and more with regard to a cultural clash between identity issues such as migration or sexuality (LGBTQ+). In this standoff of “hipsters” versus “rednecks,” parties remain programmatically vague, and major interests are not explicitly represented in the political discourse. The government counters many opposition attempts to address particular issues and problems with an avalanche of populism and disinformation. The latest example is the “discourse” relating to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Clientelism, in a classical sense, is not strong in Hungary, partly because economic interests are not only steered but also owned by the central core of Fidesz and party members’ wider families. The pattern is not clientelism, in which economic interests steer the government, but rather the government steering economic interests, also referred to as “reverse state capture” (Bozóki and Hegedüs 2018). Societal interests beyond the government-economic complex are generally underrepresented. The publicly articulated anger of healthcare system or education-sector employees demonstrates that the government neglects such central interests. Not surprisingly, party manifestos, although publicly accessible, provide little enlightenment about the parties’ policy preferences, and are instead used to consolidate political camps by stressing the issues that create rifts between the camps. Certain sizable minorities, such as the Roma community, do not have effective representation through political parties, and their associations are routinely co-opted by major political parties, most recently by Fidesz.
Citations:
Bozóki, A., and D. Hegedűs. 2018. “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union.” Democratization 25(7): 1173-1189.
Susánszky, P., Unger, A., and Kopper, Á. 2020. “Hungary’s Over-Powerful Government Party and the Desperate Opposition.” European Review 28(5): 761-777.
Bozóki, A., and D. Hegedűs. 2018. “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union.” Democratization 25(7): 1173-1189.
Susánszky, P., Unger, A., and Kopper, Á. 2020. “Hungary’s Over-Powerful Government Party and the Desperate Opposition.” European Review 28(5): 761-777.
Israel
The electoral system in Israel is proportional, allowing multiple parties representing various groups and interests to participate. In the last election, 49 parties and 40 lists appeared on the ballot. However, since 2014, the electoral threshold has been increased to 3.25%. As a result, parties now need to win at least five out of the 120 seats to enter the Knesset. This change limits the representation of many groups and forces parties to join lists to ensure their entry into the Knesset. It is well known that the intention behind raising the threshold was to prevent smaller, Arab parties from entering the Knesset. Notably, one of these parties, Balad, failed to surpass the threshold in the last election.
Israel’s traditional major parties have local branches, but their activities have been limited in recent years. Additionally, parties with primaries have reserved candidate slots for representatives of various minorities (women, immigrants, Arabs) and localities (Southern, Northern, Jerusalem and Kibutz districts). However, in most parties, representatives elected by a specific group or region compete in the general list. Therefore, their incentive to address the needs of their constituency is relatively low. The constituency link in the Israeli system is perceived to be relatively weak for the main parties, which lack an electoral incentive to promote their constituencies’ interests (Itzkovitch-Malka, 2021). This is not true for sectoral parties, which by definition represent specific groups, such as ultraorthodox Jews, immigrants and settlers. Nowadays, more mainstream parties also tend to lack effective internal democratic mechanisms (Shapira and Fridman 2019).
Not all parties publish manifestos (Manifesto Project). Currently, the parties in opposition have detailed manifestos representing the diverse concerns of their electorates. However, Likud, the formateur party, has not published a manifesto since 2013. This omission makes it difficult to judge Likud’s agenda and the extent to which it represents the interests of its voters. Ultraorthodox parties also do not publish manifestos, and their voters are guided by community leaders to vote for the party, regardless of the party’s agenda or achievements in government.
While it is challenging for voters to evaluate a party based on its pledges, it is safe to say that the sectoral parties that entered the coalition represent their constituencies through coalition agreements. These agreements outline the issues the parties consider most significant (Moury 2011). According to data from the Israeli Agenda Project (Cavari et al. 2022), coalition agreements contain numerous clauses on key issues, including education for ultraorthodox students, state and religious issues, and settlements in the West Bank – all of which are typically crucial to the parties forming the coalition.
The problem remains for the formateur party, Likud, which lacks a party manifesto or a coalition agreement. Likud’s 2022 election campaign focused on security and cost of living issues. However, the party subsequently made judicial reform the main issue on the government’s agenda. For example, the coalition agreement stated that judicial reform would be the first issue the government would address during its tenure. Notably, this is in spite of the fact that Most Important Problem surveys conducted before the elections did not find the issue to be among the most important issues for the public or Likud voters (INES, 2022). Consequently, despite the representative system and the variety of parties, it is unclear to what extent the major parties represent their voters.
Israel’s traditional major parties have local branches, but their activities have been limited in recent years. Additionally, parties with primaries have reserved candidate slots for representatives of various minorities (women, immigrants, Arabs) and localities (Southern, Northern, Jerusalem and Kibutz districts). However, in most parties, representatives elected by a specific group or region compete in the general list. Therefore, their incentive to address the needs of their constituency is relatively low. The constituency link in the Israeli system is perceived to be relatively weak for the main parties, which lack an electoral incentive to promote their constituencies’ interests (Itzkovitch-Malka, 2021). This is not true for sectoral parties, which by definition represent specific groups, such as ultraorthodox Jews, immigrants and settlers. Nowadays, more mainstream parties also tend to lack effective internal democratic mechanisms (Shapira and Fridman 2019).
Not all parties publish manifestos (Manifesto Project). Currently, the parties in opposition have detailed manifestos representing the diverse concerns of their electorates. However, Likud, the formateur party, has not published a manifesto since 2013. This omission makes it difficult to judge Likud’s agenda and the extent to which it represents the interests of its voters. Ultraorthodox parties also do not publish manifestos, and their voters are guided by community leaders to vote for the party, regardless of the party’s agenda or achievements in government.
While it is challenging for voters to evaluate a party based on its pledges, it is safe to say that the sectoral parties that entered the coalition represent their constituencies through coalition agreements. These agreements outline the issues the parties consider most significant (Moury 2011). According to data from the Israeli Agenda Project (Cavari et al. 2022), coalition agreements contain numerous clauses on key issues, including education for ultraorthodox students, state and religious issues, and settlements in the West Bank – all of which are typically crucial to the parties forming the coalition.
The problem remains for the formateur party, Likud, which lacks a party manifesto or a coalition agreement. Likud’s 2022 election campaign focused on security and cost of living issues. However, the party subsequently made judicial reform the main issue on the government’s agenda. For example, the coalition agreement stated that judicial reform would be the first issue the government would address during its tenure. Notably, this is in spite of the fact that Most Important Problem surveys conducted before the elections did not find the issue to be among the most important issues for the public or Likud voters (INES, 2022). Consequently, despite the representative system and the variety of parties, it is unclear to what extent the major parties represent their voters.
Citations:
Israel National Election Studies (INES) https://socsci4.tau.ac.il/mu2/ines/
Cavari, Amnon, Maoz Rosenthal, and Ilan Shpaizman. 2022. “Introducing a New Dataset: The Israeli Political Agendas Project.” Israel Studies Review 37 (1): 1-30.
Moury, Chatherine. 2011. “Coalition Agreement and Party Mandate: How Coalition Agreements Constrain the Ministers.” Party Politics 17 (3): 385-404.
Manifesto Project Database https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu
Itzkovitch-Malka, Reut. 2021. “MPs’ Constituency Orientation in the Absence of Electoral Districts: The Case of Extreme Proportional Electoral Systems.” Parliamentary Affairs 74 (2): 421-442.
Shapira, Assaf, and Avital Fridman. 2019. The Intra-Party Democracy Index 2019 (in Hebrew). The Israel Democracy Institute. https://www.idi.org.il/articles/26503
Israel National Election Studies (INES) https://socsci4.tau.ac.il/mu2/ines/
Cavari, Amnon, Maoz Rosenthal, and Ilan Shpaizman. 2022. “Introducing a New Dataset: The Israeli Political Agendas Project.” Israel Studies Review 37 (1): 1-30.
Moury, Chatherine. 2011. “Coalition Agreement and Party Mandate: How Coalition Agreements Constrain the Ministers.” Party Politics 17 (3): 385-404.
Manifesto Project Database https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu
Itzkovitch-Malka, Reut. 2021. “MPs’ Constituency Orientation in the Absence of Electoral Districts: The Case of Extreme Proportional Electoral Systems.” Parliamentary Affairs 74 (2): 421-442.
Shapira, Assaf, and Avital Fridman. 2019. The Intra-Party Democracy Index 2019 (in Hebrew). The Israel Democracy Institute. https://www.idi.org.il/articles/26503
4
Slovakia
Some legal aspects of Slovakia’s political system hinder the representation of important societal interests. The proportional representation system, which operates with a single electoral district and a 5% threshold, leads to the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities and underdeveloped regions. This setup undermines fair representation and governance. For instance, most major foreign investments are located in western Slovakia, and since the 2020 elections, none of the Hungarian minority parties have been represented in parliament.
These legal provisions have influenced the organization of political parties. Many parties in Slovakia are highly centralized and effectively owned by their political leaders and founders, lacking local and regional structures. An extreme example is OĽaNO (recently renamed “Slovensko”), which Igor Matovič fully controls. Since its foundation in 2011, this party has had no registered members or regional and local structures. The absence of party structure led SNS leader Andrej Danko to change the law on political parties after the 2016 elections, increasing regulation on party organization and membership transparency. Due to these requirements, political entities elected to parliament in 2023 have some membership and minimal regional and local structures. However, Slovensko remains a “non-standard” entity in terms of party organization (see Malý and Nemec, 2023).
All major political entities running for national elections publish their party manifestos. However, these texts do not comprehensively represent significant societal interests programmatically and do not rely much on clientelism. Instead, they are predominantly populist, aimed at attracting voters with often unrealistic promises (see Rossi, 2020).
These legal provisions have influenced the organization of political parties. Many parties in Slovakia are highly centralized and effectively owned by their political leaders and founders, lacking local and regional structures. An extreme example is OĽaNO (recently renamed “Slovensko”), which Igor Matovič fully controls. Since its foundation in 2011, this party has had no registered members or regional and local structures. The absence of party structure led SNS leader Andrej Danko to change the law on political parties after the 2016 elections, increasing regulation on party organization and membership transparency. Due to these requirements, political entities elected to parliament in 2023 have some membership and minimal regional and local structures. However, Slovensko remains a “non-standard” entity in terms of party organization (see Malý and Nemec, 2023).
All major political entities running for national elections publish their party manifestos. However, these texts do not comprehensively represent significant societal interests programmatically and do not rely much on clientelism. Instead, they are predominantly populist, aimed at attracting voters with often unrealistic promises (see Rossi, 2020).
Citations:
Michael Rossi. 2020. “Slovakia after Fico: Systemic Change or More of the Same?” Czech Journal of Political Science 27 (3): 235-258.
Zákon o podmienkach výkonu volebného práva a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2014-180
Malý, I., and Nemec, J. 2023. “‘Non-Standard’ Political Parties and The Capacity to Govern in Turbulent Times: Slovakia 2020-2022.” Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences Special issue: 101-117.
Dolný, B. and Malová, D. 2016. “Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Slovakia: Parties Not for Members.” In Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries, eds. Sobolewska-Myslik, K., Kosowska-Gąstoł, B., and Borowiec, P. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press.
Michael Rossi. 2020. “Slovakia after Fico: Systemic Change or More of the Same?” Czech Journal of Political Science 27 (3): 235-258.
Zákon o podmienkach výkonu volebného práva a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov. https://www.zakonypreludi.sk/zz/2014-180
Malý, I., and Nemec, J. 2023. “‘Non-Standard’ Political Parties and The Capacity to Govern in Turbulent Times: Slovakia 2020-2022.” Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences Special issue: 101-117.
Dolný, B. and Malová, D. 2016. “Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Slovakia: Parties Not for Members.” In Organizational Structures of Political Parties in Central and Eastern European Countries, eds. Sobolewska-Myslik, K., Kosowska-Gąstoł, B., and Borowiec, P. Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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