Consensus-Building
#23Key Findings
France performs relatively poorly in international comparison (rank 23) with regard to consensus-building.
The top levels of the administration are highly elitist, and tend to marginalize input by outside experts. Use of research is mostly opportunistic except when expert opinions are generated in-house.
Macron’s government has regarded social partner organizations as being defenders of the status quo, and has not engaged in meaningful social consultation. Consequently, capital and labor groups have not been strongly involved in the policymaking process.
The government has not regularly included social welfare or environmental associations in the policymaking process. More radical environmental actions such as occupations and blockades have been met with strict police actions. The country is a trendsetter in providing access to public data, and in data reuse.
The top levels of the administration are highly elitist, and tend to marginalize input by outside experts. Use of research is mostly opportunistic except when expert opinions are generated in-house.
Macron’s government has regarded social partner organizations as being defenders of the status quo, and has not engaged in meaningful social consultation. Consequently, capital and labor groups have not been strongly involved in the policymaking process.
The government has not regularly included social welfare or environmental associations in the policymaking process. More radical environmental actions such as occupations and blockades have been met with strict police actions. The country is a trendsetter in providing access to public data, and in data reuse.
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To what extent is the government successful in effectively harnessing the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes?
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9
9
The government is able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
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7
6
In most cases, the government is able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
5
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3
4
3
Only rarely is the government able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
2
1
1
The government is not able to harness the best available scientific knowledge for policymaking purposes.
The influence of research on policymaking, and the development of evidence-based policymaking more generally, strongly varies across policy areas in France. Generally speaking, the highly elitist character of the upper echelons of French administration is not favorable to academic input. The central role of “énarques” – that is, ENA graduates – tends to marginalize scientists. The use of research under this regime is mostly opportunistic.
The COVID-19 crisis illustrated this rather well. The executive created a scientific council on 10 March 2020, six days before the beginning of the first lockdown. It met about 300 times and produced a total of about 74 notes and opinions. Yet in the early days of the crisis, several problems of miscommunication occurred, for example when Prime Minister Edouard Philippe explained that general mask mandates were useless, on March 13 on prime time TV. Thereafter, however, the government tended to follow the council’s advice rather closely, at least for a few months. In particular, the advice to limit individual mobility in September 2020 was delayed by more than a month. The advice to lock down again after the Alpha variant began spreading in January 2021 was not followed, and the publication of the note was delayed several months.
Things are probably better in those areas where expert opinions are generated in-house. This has historically been the case for members of the “grands corps” – that is, the most prestigious administrative departments – many of which are staffed by engineers from France’s top schools. This has been true for the energy sector, in particular, which is historically managed by the monopolistic public utilities firm EDF. Similarly, many major infrastructure projects and certain French success stories – such as the high-speed train TGV – were historically steered by this type of state engineer.
Things are much more complicated in the area of social sciences, where state appreciation of expertise is very limited. The exception is probably economics, as successive generations of economists appear to have had a continuing influence on policy within the critical ministries.
Citations:
Bezes, Philippe, and Patrick Le Lidec. 2016. “Politiques de l’organisation: Les nouvelles divisions du travail étatique.” Revue française de science politique 66 (3): 407-433.
Genieys, W., and P. Hassenteufel. 2015. “The Shaping of New State Elites: Healthcare Policymaking in France since 1981.” Comparative Politics 47 (3): 280-295.
Bergeron, H., Borraz, O., Castel, P., and Dedieu, F. 2020. Covid-19: une crise organisationnelle. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Aglietta, Michel, and Antoine Rebérioux. 2010. Dérives du capitalisme financier. Paris: Albin Michel.
The COVID-19 crisis illustrated this rather well. The executive created a scientific council on 10 March 2020, six days before the beginning of the first lockdown. It met about 300 times and produced a total of about 74 notes and opinions. Yet in the early days of the crisis, several problems of miscommunication occurred, for example when Prime Minister Edouard Philippe explained that general mask mandates were useless, on March 13 on prime time TV. Thereafter, however, the government tended to follow the council’s advice rather closely, at least for a few months. In particular, the advice to limit individual mobility in September 2020 was delayed by more than a month. The advice to lock down again after the Alpha variant began spreading in January 2021 was not followed, and the publication of the note was delayed several months.
Things are probably better in those areas where expert opinions are generated in-house. This has historically been the case for members of the “grands corps” – that is, the most prestigious administrative departments – many of which are staffed by engineers from France’s top schools. This has been true for the energy sector, in particular, which is historically managed by the monopolistic public utilities firm EDF. Similarly, many major infrastructure projects and certain French success stories – such as the high-speed train TGV – were historically steered by this type of state engineer.
Things are much more complicated in the area of social sciences, where state appreciation of expertise is very limited. The exception is probably economics, as successive generations of economists appear to have had a continuing influence on policy within the critical ministries.
Citations:
Bezes, Philippe, and Patrick Le Lidec. 2016. “Politiques de l’organisation: Les nouvelles divisions du travail étatique.” Revue française de science politique 66 (3): 407-433.
Genieys, W., and P. Hassenteufel. 2015. “The Shaping of New State Elites: Healthcare Policymaking in France since 1981.” Comparative Politics 47 (3): 280-295.
Bergeron, H., Borraz, O., Castel, P., and Dedieu, F. 2020. Covid-19: une crise organisationnelle. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
Aglietta, Michel, and Antoine Rebérioux. 2010. Dérives du capitalisme financier. Paris: Albin Michel.
Graph View
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of trade unions and business organizations in policymaking?
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The government is able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
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Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
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3
The government is rarely able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
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1
The government is not able to effectively involve trade unions and business organizations in policy development.
The need to involve capital and labor organizations more regularly in policymaking processes has been discussed for decades. Over the past two decades, governments have sought the consultation of interest groups more systematically, and these practices have to some extent been adopted as legal obligations, creating institutional mechanisms of concertation between government, business organizations and trade unions. Moreover, the rules of social negotiations were modernized, notably by the Larcher law of 2007. This law required the government to present plans for social and labor legislation to the social partners, giving them an opportunity to negotiate and agree on possible solutions that could then be transformed into law.
This attempt to rejuvenate social dialogue and social concertation produced limited results. The problem is twofold: First, only some of the trade unions (the CFDT, UNSA) seek a constructive role in negotiating social reforms with the government; others (CGT, FO) tend to reject this sort of negotiation, sticking to their role of mobilizing social forces against governmental plans. Second, governments have not regularly sought social concertation, and often have not taken the positions of the capital and labor organizations into account.
If President Macron, who came to power in 2017, seemed to follow this approach at the beginning of his first mandate, it gradually became clear that he was particularly reluctant to concede the social partner organizations a role in the policymaking process. Regarding these organizations as defenders of the status quo, and thus hostile to his reform ideas, he often relied on his parliamentary majority to pass his reform bills without real social consultation. For instance, during his first mandate, he ignored an unemployment insurance agreement that had been negotiated by the social partner organizations and adopted a government bill instead (2021). The pension reform in 2023, which was submitted to parliament without previous social consultation, led to months of protests and created a rare united front among trade unions. The government was able to overcome resistance on the streets and in parliament only by forcing the bill through parliament, resorting to the 49.3 procedure (see “Effective Cross-Party Cooperation”). This attitude by Macron has led the majority of capital and labor organizations to express their deep dissatisfaction with this “solitary” method of governing without allowing a voice to the representatives of civil society.
In summary, the government does not involve capital and labor CSOs strongly in policymaking processes, and does not seek to moderate disputes between capital and labor. If attempts to enhance the consultation process are made after deep social unrest (JDD 2023), they remain piecemeal.
Citations:
Luc Rouban. 2018. La double fracture du dialogue social. https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/Dialogue_social_Luc_Rouban_note1-5.pdf
Rapport Chertier. 2006. “Pour une modernisation du dialogue social. Rapport au Premier ministre.” https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/28224-pour-une-modernisation-du-dialogue-social-rapport-au-premier-ministre
Gilbert Cette, Guy Groux, and Richard Robert. 2023. “Une démocratie sociale hésitante.” telos-eu. https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/societe/une-democratie-sociale-hesitante.html
Duval. 2023. “Pourquoi la France est-elle incapable de passer des compromis sociaux et comment en sortir?” Fondation Jean Jaurès, June 18. https://www.jean-jaures.org/publication/pourquoi-la-france-est-elle-incapable-de-passer-des-compromis-sociaux-et-comment-en-sortir/
JDD. 2023. “Emmanuel Macron appelle les syndicats à un « dialogue social responsable ».” lejdd.fr June 5. https://www.lejdd.fr/politique/emmanuel-macron-appelle-les-syndicats-un-dialogue-social-responsable-135440
This attempt to rejuvenate social dialogue and social concertation produced limited results. The problem is twofold: First, only some of the trade unions (the CFDT, UNSA) seek a constructive role in negotiating social reforms with the government; others (CGT, FO) tend to reject this sort of negotiation, sticking to their role of mobilizing social forces against governmental plans. Second, governments have not regularly sought social concertation, and often have not taken the positions of the capital and labor organizations into account.
If President Macron, who came to power in 2017, seemed to follow this approach at the beginning of his first mandate, it gradually became clear that he was particularly reluctant to concede the social partner organizations a role in the policymaking process. Regarding these organizations as defenders of the status quo, and thus hostile to his reform ideas, he often relied on his parliamentary majority to pass his reform bills without real social consultation. For instance, during his first mandate, he ignored an unemployment insurance agreement that had been negotiated by the social partner organizations and adopted a government bill instead (2021). The pension reform in 2023, which was submitted to parliament without previous social consultation, led to months of protests and created a rare united front among trade unions. The government was able to overcome resistance on the streets and in parliament only by forcing the bill through parliament, resorting to the 49.3 procedure (see “Effective Cross-Party Cooperation”). This attitude by Macron has led the majority of capital and labor organizations to express their deep dissatisfaction with this “solitary” method of governing without allowing a voice to the representatives of civil society.
In summary, the government does not involve capital and labor CSOs strongly in policymaking processes, and does not seek to moderate disputes between capital and labor. If attempts to enhance the consultation process are made after deep social unrest (JDD 2023), they remain piecemeal.
Citations:
Luc Rouban. 2018. La double fracture du dialogue social. https://www.sciencespo.fr/cevipof/sites/sciencespo.fr.cevipof/files/Dialogue_social_Luc_Rouban_note1-5.pdf
Rapport Chertier. 2006. “Pour une modernisation du dialogue social. Rapport au Premier ministre.” https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/28224-pour-une-modernisation-du-dialogue-social-rapport-au-premier-ministre
Gilbert Cette, Guy Groux, and Richard Robert. 2023. “Une démocratie sociale hésitante.” telos-eu. https://www.telos-eu.com/fr/societe/une-democratie-sociale-hesitante.html
Duval. 2023. “Pourquoi la France est-elle incapable de passer des compromis sociaux et comment en sortir?” Fondation Jean Jaurès, June 18. https://www.jean-jaures.org/publication/pourquoi-la-france-est-elle-incapable-de-passer-des-compromis-sociaux-et-comment-en-sortir/
JDD. 2023. “Emmanuel Macron appelle les syndicats à un « dialogue social responsable ».” lejdd.fr June 5. https://www.lejdd.fr/politique/emmanuel-macron-appelle-les-syndicats-un-dialogue-social-responsable-135440
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of leading social welfare CSOs in policymaking?
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The government is able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
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Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
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The government is rarely able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
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The government is not able to effectively involve leading social welfare CSOs in policy development.
Social welfare CSOs play a critical role in France. They participate significantly in the implementation of welfare programs, and several major associations are relatively powerful. This includes the French Red Cross, Emmaus and the Secours Catholique. Historically, some associations, such as the Fondation Abbé Pierre on housing rights and anti-poverty policy, have been able to exercise an effective influence on policymaking. This is, however, exceptional. Generally speaking, CSOs in this area – especially the most visible ones – are sometimes able to raise awareness of certain issues and thus influence public opinion. For instance, Restos du Coeur, a very popular CSO that provides free food to the needy, has regularly drawn attention to the issue of poverty. In the context of rising inflation in recent years, it regularly signaled that the organization’s projects were overwhelmed by demand, and unable to keep up. In 2003, its director announced that the organization was close to bankruptcy, leading to considerable public reactions but no major political initiative.
However, there are no institutional mechanisms ensuring active involvement of welfare CSOs in policymaking. Governments do not usually bring any of these CSOs into the policymaking process, even if they may be part of advisory groups or participate in parliamentary hearings. They have been influential only on specific occasions, for example when they attract considerable media attention, as illustrated by a recent study on access to healthcare for migrants by Pursch and colleagues (2020).
Citations:
Pursch, Benita, et al. 2020. “Health for all? A qualitative study of NGO support to migrants affected by structural violence in northern France.” Social Science & Medicine 248: 112838.
Lafore, Robert. 2010. “Le rôle des associations dans la mise en œuvre des politiques d’action sociale.” Informations sociales 2010/6 (162): 64-71.
Gallois, Florence. 2023. “Les associations du secteur social et médico-social: une analyse par les médiations institutionnelles.” Revue de la régulation Spring 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2024 from https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/22081
However, there are no institutional mechanisms ensuring active involvement of welfare CSOs in policymaking. Governments do not usually bring any of these CSOs into the policymaking process, even if they may be part of advisory groups or participate in parliamentary hearings. They have been influential only on specific occasions, for example when they attract considerable media attention, as illustrated by a recent study on access to healthcare for migrants by Pursch and colleagues (2020).
Citations:
Pursch, Benita, et al. 2020. “Health for all? A qualitative study of NGO support to migrants affected by structural violence in northern France.” Social Science & Medicine 248: 112838.
Lafore, Robert. 2010. “Le rôle des associations dans la mise en œuvre des politiques d’action sociale.” Informations sociales 2010/6 (162): 64-71.
Gallois, Florence. 2023. “Les associations du secteur social et médico-social: une analyse par les médiations institutionnelles.” Revue de la régulation Spring 2023. Retrieved 7 March 2024 from https://journals.openedition.org/regulation/22081
To what extent does the government facilitate the participation of leading environmental CSOs in policymaking?
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The government is able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
8
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7
6
Most of the time, the government is able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
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The government is rarely able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
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1
The government is not able to effectively involve leading environmental CSOs in policy development.
Some environmental CSOs are very visible in France, including Greenpeace, Réseau Action Climat and Les Amis de la Terre. Cécile Duflot, a former leading green politician and minister under François Hollande, became director-general of Oxfam France in 2017, initiating a “green” turn for this association. Most of these associations rely on the propagation of their positions in the public, public events and the generation of expert reports to influence policymaking. Case-study research has shown that many of these organizations show signs of increasing professionalization and institutionalization (Berny 2018).
In recent years, new CSOs have emerged that are often more attractive to younger people, and are frequently much more radical than older counterparts. This includes the French chapter of Extinction Rebellion, Soulèvement de la Terre and Dernière Rénovation. They respond to the perceived inaction of public actors and the ineffectiveness of older organizations, and employ more radical methods of gaining public attention.
Though some cooperation between public actors and environmental associations takes place (Flahault, Robic 2007), governments have not regularly included them in policymaking. More radical actions – including the occupations and blockades carried out by newer organizations – have been met with a rather strict police reaction. Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin has regularly called them “eco-terrorists.” Ultimately, this has served to scale back the environmental program of the current government.
Citations:
Berny, Nathalie. 2018. “Institutionalisation and Distinctive Competences of Environmental NGOs: The Expansion of French Organisations.” Environmental Politics 27 (6): 1033-1056.
Flahault, Érika and Paulette Robic. 2007. “Les associations d’environnement partenaires privilégiés des pouvoirs publics : un paradoxe qui dynamise la gestion de l’environnement.” In L’économie sociale entre formel et informel, eds. Annie Dussuet and Jean-Marc Lauzanas. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 183-198.
In recent years, new CSOs have emerged that are often more attractive to younger people, and are frequently much more radical than older counterparts. This includes the French chapter of Extinction Rebellion, Soulèvement de la Terre and Dernière Rénovation. They respond to the perceived inaction of public actors and the ineffectiveness of older organizations, and employ more radical methods of gaining public attention.
Though some cooperation between public actors and environmental associations takes place (Flahault, Robic 2007), governments have not regularly included them in policymaking. More radical actions – including the occupations and blockades carried out by newer organizations – have been met with a rather strict police reaction. Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin has regularly called them “eco-terrorists.” Ultimately, this has served to scale back the environmental program of the current government.
Citations:
Berny, Nathalie. 2018. “Institutionalisation and Distinctive Competences of Environmental NGOs: The Expansion of French Organisations.” Environmental Politics 27 (6): 1033-1056.
Flahault, Érika and Paulette Robic. 2007. “Les associations d’environnement partenaires privilégiés des pouvoirs publics : un paradoxe qui dynamise la gestion de l’environnement.” In L’économie sociale entre formel et informel, eds. Annie Dussuet and Jean-Marc Lauzanas. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 183-198.
Graph View
To what extent does the government publish data and information that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable?
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The government publishes data and information in a manner that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable.
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Most of the time, the government publishes data and information in a manner that empowers citizens to hold the government accountable.
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The government rarely publishes data and information in a manner that strengthens citizens to hold the government accountable.
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The government does not publish data and information in a manner that strengthens citizens’ capacity to hold the government accountable.
France has made remarkable progress in the area of open government under the past two governments. According to a study commissioned by the European Commission in 2018, France comes third in terms of “open data maturity” and “quality,” after Ireland and Spain.
This is largely related to the success of the official data platform data.gouv.fr. According to government information, it currently contains 35,000 datasets shared by over 2,200 organizations. These are contributed by local actors, national administrations and universities, as well as private actors.
Following a report by the national Court of Auditors, the government pledged in March 2022 that all access to public data should be made free within a year. Moreover, the National Assembly, which has made available most of its transcripts of plenary sessions, will make more data available, merging its own infrastructure with data.gouv.fr. Different ministries have similarly pledged to make new datasets available in the near future.
Finally, data reuse has increased dramatically. The platform data.gouv.fr recorded more than 8 million visits in 2022 for close to 40,000 recorded data reuses.
Overall, progress in this area is very important, and France appears to be a trendsetter in this particular area (OECD 2023).
Citations:
European Commission. 2018. “Impact Assessment Support Study for the Revision of the Public Sector Information Directive.” https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/impact-assessment-support-study-revision-public-sector-information-directive
OECD. 2023. “Open, Useful and Re-Usable Data Index.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/a37f51c3-en.pdf?expires=1706724363&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=7144D57CB27EF22312A488590DECECD2
This is largely related to the success of the official data platform data.gouv.fr. According to government information, it currently contains 35,000 datasets shared by over 2,200 organizations. These are contributed by local actors, national administrations and universities, as well as private actors.
Following a report by the national Court of Auditors, the government pledged in March 2022 that all access to public data should be made free within a year. Moreover, the National Assembly, which has made available most of its transcripts of plenary sessions, will make more data available, merging its own infrastructure with data.gouv.fr. Different ministries have similarly pledged to make new datasets available in the near future.
Finally, data reuse has increased dramatically. The platform data.gouv.fr recorded more than 8 million visits in 2022 for close to 40,000 recorded data reuses.
Overall, progress in this area is very important, and France appears to be a trendsetter in this particular area (OECD 2023).
Citations:
European Commission. 2018. “Impact Assessment Support Study for the Revision of the Public Sector Information Directive.” https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/impact-assessment-support-study-revision-public-sector-information-directive
OECD. 2023. “Open, Useful and Re-Usable Data Index.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/a37f51c3-en.pdf?expires=1706724363&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=7144D57CB27EF22312A488590DECECD2