Coordination
#12Key Findings
France falls into the upper-middle ranks internationally (rank 12) in the area of coordination.
Government coordination is strongly centralized, with close collaboration between the President’s Office and the Prime Minister’s Office. The presidential office often initiates bills, and both offices have large staffs engaged in government oversight functions.
Line ministers have limited independence. Government coordination is tightly managed, and informal consultations are frequently held to ensure coherence in communication. To win support for proposals, line ministries must liaise with related ministries and agencies.
Though devolution has been ongoing for several decades, local governments in France have limited resources. State-region contracts are used to set goals and performance indicators. Mechanisms for national-local consultation remain underdeveloped, relying on ad hoc consultations rather than formal structures.
Government coordination is strongly centralized, with close collaboration between the President’s Office and the Prime Minister’s Office. The presidential office often initiates bills, and both offices have large staffs engaged in government oversight functions.
Line ministers have limited independence. Government coordination is tightly managed, and informal consultations are frequently held to ensure coherence in communication. To win support for proposals, line ministries must liaise with related ministries and agencies.
Though devolution has been ongoing for several decades, local governments in France have limited resources. State-region contracts are used to set goals and performance indicators. Mechanisms for national-local consultation remain underdeveloped, relying on ad hoc consultations rather than formal structures.
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To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
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9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
Policy coordination once a policy proposal has been forwarded to the prime minister is developed at three levels. The first is the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), the second is the President’s Office and the third, when the subject is either legislation or regulation, is the Council of State (Eymeri-Douzans 2022). This hierarchical organization gives the prime minister the option of modifying ministers’ draft bills. For important issues, this steering function is shared with the President’s Office, and entails strong cooperation and collaboration between the two secretaries-general – the directeur de cabinet for the PMO and the secrétaire général for the president – respectively at the Matignon and the Élysée. Both the president and the prime minister appoint civil servants from all ministries or from civil society as sectoral policy advisers. All ministerial domains are covered in this regard. Several hundred highly qualified people are involved in government steering, monitoring, oversight and advising functions.
However, it would probably be overstated to consider these various checks a method of evaluation. The PMO mainly coordinates and arbitrates between ministries, takes into consideration opinions and criticisms from involved interests and from the majority coalition, and balances political benefits and risks. The President’s Office does more or less the same in coordination with the PMO. It is also quite often the case that the initiative leading to a bill’s introduction comes from the presidential office. Rather than offering a thorough policy evaluation, these two institutions serve as a place where the ultimate political arbitrations between bureaucrats, party activists and vested interests are carried out. Evaluation is more implicit than explicit, since the impetus for reform tends to derive from dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs (Gaiti 2019).
Line ministers have limited independent room for maneuver. They have to inform the prime minister of all their projects. Strong discipline is imposed even at the level of public communication, and this rule is reinforced by the media, which tend to judge any slight policy difference as the expression of political tension or party divergence. As the Prime Minister’s Office oversees the policy process, the officeholder’s cabinet assistants in each area supervise, liaise and coordinate with their counterparts in line ministries about the content, timing and political sequences of a project.
The secretary-general of the PMO (as well as his counterpart at the Élysée) operates with some reserve. He or she can step in if the coordination or oversight process at that level has failed to stem the expression of differences within the government. Traditionally, the secretary-general is a member of the Council of State and – even though this figure could be fired at any time for any reason – there is a tradition of continuity and stability beyond the fluctuations and political vagaries of individual governments.
Given the presidential character of the Fifth Republic, the same type of control is exerted by the President’s Office in coordination with the PMO. In practice, the two secretaries-general are the most powerful civil servants whose opinions might often prevail on ministry choices. Today, the choice of secretaries-general for line ministries has to be negotiated with the President’s Office, when they are not imposed.
Coordination is strong across the French government. It is in the hands of the PMO and the President’s Office, which liaise constantly and make decisions on every issue. Coordination takes place at several levels. First, at the level of specialized civil servants who work as political appointees in the PMO (members of the cabinet, that is, political appointees belonging to the staff of the prime minister), then in meetings chaired by the secretary-general, and finally by the prime minister in case of permanent conflicts between ministers or over important issues. In many instances, conflicts place the powerful budget minister or minister of finance in opposition to other ministries. Appeals to the prime minister require either a powerful convincing argument or a situation in which the appealing party is a key member of the government coalition, as it is understood that the prime minister should not be bothered by anything but the highest-level issues. But the prime ministerial route often serves as a shortcut to a direct appeal for a decision by the president.
The Council of Ministers meets once a week. There are also a large number of interministerial committees chaired by the prime minister or the president. Most of these committees meet upon request. While many of them hold meetings every week, these are usually attended by the ministers dealing with the topics discussed.
Citations:
Eymeri-Douzans, J. M. 2022. “France: Under the Rule of a Contested Politico-Administrative Elite Whose Legitimacy Erodes.” In Handbook on the Politics of Public Administration, eds. 289-302. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Gaïti, B. 2019. “Gouverner le Gouvernement : les trajectoires des politiques de coordination gouvernementale en France (1935-2019).” Revue française d’administration publique 171: 565-585. Available at https://doi.org/10.3917/rfap.171.0565
However, it would probably be overstated to consider these various checks a method of evaluation. The PMO mainly coordinates and arbitrates between ministries, takes into consideration opinions and criticisms from involved interests and from the majority coalition, and balances political benefits and risks. The President’s Office does more or less the same in coordination with the PMO. It is also quite often the case that the initiative leading to a bill’s introduction comes from the presidential office. Rather than offering a thorough policy evaluation, these two institutions serve as a place where the ultimate political arbitrations between bureaucrats, party activists and vested interests are carried out. Evaluation is more implicit than explicit, since the impetus for reform tends to derive from dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs (Gaiti 2019).
Line ministers have limited independent room for maneuver. They have to inform the prime minister of all their projects. Strong discipline is imposed even at the level of public communication, and this rule is reinforced by the media, which tend to judge any slight policy difference as the expression of political tension or party divergence. As the Prime Minister’s Office oversees the policy process, the officeholder’s cabinet assistants in each area supervise, liaise and coordinate with their counterparts in line ministries about the content, timing and political sequences of a project.
The secretary-general of the PMO (as well as his counterpart at the Élysée) operates with some reserve. He or she can step in if the coordination or oversight process at that level has failed to stem the expression of differences within the government. Traditionally, the secretary-general is a member of the Council of State and – even though this figure could be fired at any time for any reason – there is a tradition of continuity and stability beyond the fluctuations and political vagaries of individual governments.
Given the presidential character of the Fifth Republic, the same type of control is exerted by the President’s Office in coordination with the PMO. In practice, the two secretaries-general are the most powerful civil servants whose opinions might often prevail on ministry choices. Today, the choice of secretaries-general for line ministries has to be negotiated with the President’s Office, when they are not imposed.
Coordination is strong across the French government. It is in the hands of the PMO and the President’s Office, which liaise constantly and make decisions on every issue. Coordination takes place at several levels. First, at the level of specialized civil servants who work as political appointees in the PMO (members of the cabinet, that is, political appointees belonging to the staff of the prime minister), then in meetings chaired by the secretary-general, and finally by the prime minister in case of permanent conflicts between ministers or over important issues. In many instances, conflicts place the powerful budget minister or minister of finance in opposition to other ministries. Appeals to the prime minister require either a powerful convincing argument or a situation in which the appealing party is a key member of the government coalition, as it is understood that the prime minister should not be bothered by anything but the highest-level issues. But the prime ministerial route often serves as a shortcut to a direct appeal for a decision by the president.
The Council of Ministers meets once a week. There are also a large number of interministerial committees chaired by the prime minister or the president. Most of these committees meet upon request. While many of them hold meetings every week, these are usually attended by the ministers dealing with the topics discussed.
Citations:
Eymeri-Douzans, J. M. 2022. “France: Under the Rule of a Contested Politico-Administrative Elite Whose Legitimacy Erodes.” In Handbook on the Politics of Public Administration, eds. 289-302. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Gaïti, B. 2019. “Gouverner le Gouvernement : les trajectoires des politiques de coordination gouvernementale en France (1935-2019).” Revue française d’administration publique 171: 565-585. Available at https://doi.org/10.3917/rfap.171.0565
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
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9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
If a line ministry wishes to get its proposals accepted or passed, it must liaise and coordinate with other ministries or agencies involved in the area of this legislation. If this consultation has not taken place, objections expressed by other ministers or by the Council of State might serve to kill a project. All ministries are equal, but some are more equal than others: For example, the finance minister is a crucial and indispensable actor consulted on virtually all projects. Usually, the coordination and consultation processes are placed under the responsibility of a “rapporteur” – usually a lawyer from the ministerial bureaucracy (which is also in charge of arguing for and defending the draft bill before the Council of State, whose intervention is crucial even beyond the purely legal point of view). The dossier is always followed by a member of the minister’s staff who communicates with his counterparts and tries to smooth the process as much as possible.
France is doing comparatively well in terms of digital government, according to a recent OECD (2020) study. Overall, the country receives above-average scores and is ranked 10th among the OECD countries, outperforming countries including Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Several digital information platforms have been built, but have had only mixed success (Cabut et al. 2022).
In 2011, an interministerial Directorate for State Information Systems and Communication was established. In 2014, to strengthen its capacity to steer and influence the sectoral administrations, the directorate was placed under the authority of the prime minister. A further impulse has been given to the directorate by the Macron administration’s emphasis on the technological revolution. In parallel, a report of the Court of Accounts, in support of past actions, recommended a major effort to improve investment and personnel training. The new secretariat is building on these actions with a view to providing users with a single identification number that would provide access to all public services. Several experiences have already been quite successful. For example, the digitalization of tax declarations, processes and payments has been so successful that for most taxpayers, the use of printed documents is no longer possible. Various efforts to improve coordination between administrations have been implemented. For instance, public procurement processes that involve several administrations have been streamlined, and private companies can access the system using their registration number. Nonetheless, exchanges of information across minister portfolios still need to be more systematic.
In general, it is still quite often the case that governmental “couac” (i.e., mixed signals) happens, with ministries trying to push an initiative without prior clear consultation within the government. Marlène Schiappa, former secretary of state for gender equality, was thus nicknamed “Madam Controversy” before she finally resigned.
Citations:
Cabut, S., Piquard, A., and Untersinger, M. 2022. “Controversé et retardé, le Health Data Hub veut pourtant faire ses preuves dans la santé.” Le Monde, January 26.
OECD. 2020. “OECD Digital Government Index (DGI) 2019.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government-index-4de9f5bb-en.htm
France is doing comparatively well in terms of digital government, according to a recent OECD (2020) study. Overall, the country receives above-average scores and is ranked 10th among the OECD countries, outperforming countries including Estonia, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Several digital information platforms have been built, but have had only mixed success (Cabut et al. 2022).
In 2011, an interministerial Directorate for State Information Systems and Communication was established. In 2014, to strengthen its capacity to steer and influence the sectoral administrations, the directorate was placed under the authority of the prime minister. A further impulse has been given to the directorate by the Macron administration’s emphasis on the technological revolution. In parallel, a report of the Court of Accounts, in support of past actions, recommended a major effort to improve investment and personnel training. The new secretariat is building on these actions with a view to providing users with a single identification number that would provide access to all public services. Several experiences have already been quite successful. For example, the digitalization of tax declarations, processes and payments has been so successful that for most taxpayers, the use of printed documents is no longer possible. Various efforts to improve coordination between administrations have been implemented. For instance, public procurement processes that involve several administrations have been streamlined, and private companies can access the system using their registration number. Nonetheless, exchanges of information across minister portfolios still need to be more systematic.
In general, it is still quite often the case that governmental “couac” (i.e., mixed signals) happens, with ministries trying to push an initiative without prior clear consultation within the government. Marlène Schiappa, former secretary of state for gender equality, was thus nicknamed “Madam Controversy” before she finally resigned.
Citations:
Cabut, S., Piquard, A., and Untersinger, M. 2022. “Controversé et retardé, le Health Data Hub veut pourtant faire ses preuves dans la santé.” Le Monde, January 26.
OECD. 2020. “OECD Digital Government Index (DGI) 2019.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/digital-government-index-4de9f5bb-en.htm
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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9
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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3
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal coordination is generally efficient in achieving coherence in the government’s communication. More than his predecessors, President Macron has used the format of a “government seminar” to prepare for key events, such as the preparation of the new government plan for action in summer 2022. Governments commonly refer to ad hoc committees tasked with providing information on crucial issues. In rare cases, a report is requested from a single person. Committee members are mainly high-level civil servants, former or active politicians, or academics, and are often chosen based on their sympathy for the government in office at the time. Most reports are made public, but a few remain unpublished, particularly when the report’s proposals appear too provocative to be accepted by social partners.
More generally, most decisions with high political stakes lead to informal consultation organized by the president or the prime minister. Recently, the presidential party has generally been considered to be too weak to extend beyond the role of transmitter of the executive’s instructions. Yet the situation of minority government since 2022 has shed new light on informal consultations with other parties – mostly in this case with the Republicans. The pension reform and the bill on immigration demonstrated how complex such negotiations can be.
A crucial factor and essentially an invisible coordination mechanism is the “old-boy network” built by former students from the elitist “grandes écoles” (École Nationale d’Administration (ENA), École Polytechnique, Mines, ParisTech, etc.), or by members of the same “grands corps” (prestigious bureaucracies such as Inspection Générale des Finances, the diplomatic services, the Council of State and so on). Most ministries (except perhaps the least powerful or those considered as marginal) include one or several persons from this high civil servant super-elite who know each other or are bound by informal bonds of solidarity. These high civil servants – especially “énarques” from ENA – also work in the PMO and the president’s office, further strengthening this informal connection. The system is efficient but lacks transparency, from a procedural point of view (Gervais 2022). Reform of the ENA, which has now been transformed into the Institut National du Service Public (INSP), as well as the “grands corps,” leading toward more professional experience before accessing this body, may change the situation in the long run (Gally 2022). In the short term, no visible effect has been perceptible beyond the protests of those directly concerned.
Citations:
Gally, N. 2022. “Le marché des hauts fonctionnaires: de l’ENA à l’INSP.” Esprit 6: 105-113.
Gervais, J. 2022. L’impératif managérial: désirs privés et devoirs publics d’un grand corps d’Etat. Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
More generally, most decisions with high political stakes lead to informal consultation organized by the president or the prime minister. Recently, the presidential party has generally been considered to be too weak to extend beyond the role of transmitter of the executive’s instructions. Yet the situation of minority government since 2022 has shed new light on informal consultations with other parties – mostly in this case with the Republicans. The pension reform and the bill on immigration demonstrated how complex such negotiations can be.
A crucial factor and essentially an invisible coordination mechanism is the “old-boy network” built by former students from the elitist “grandes écoles” (École Nationale d’Administration (ENA), École Polytechnique, Mines, ParisTech, etc.), or by members of the same “grands corps” (prestigious bureaucracies such as Inspection Générale des Finances, the diplomatic services, the Council of State and so on). Most ministries (except perhaps the least powerful or those considered as marginal) include one or several persons from this high civil servant super-elite who know each other or are bound by informal bonds of solidarity. These high civil servants – especially “énarques” from ENA – also work in the PMO and the president’s office, further strengthening this informal connection. The system is efficient but lacks transparency, from a procedural point of view (Gervais 2022). Reform of the ENA, which has now been transformed into the Institut National du Service Public (INSP), as well as the “grands corps,” leading toward more professional experience before accessing this body, may change the situation in the long run (Gally 2022). In the short term, no visible effect has been perceptible beyond the protests of those directly concerned.
Citations:
Gally, N. 2022. “Le marché des hauts fonctionnaires: de l’ENA à l’INSP.” Esprit 6: 105-113.
Gervais, J. 2022. L’impératif managérial: désirs privés et devoirs publics d’un grand corps d’Etat. Lille: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.
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To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
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The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
Mitigating a long tradition of state centralization, a broad near-consensus on the need for decentralization has influenced political debates for decades. This has taken the form of devolution of power to local governments (regions, departments, cities) as well as de-concentration – that is, distributing state authorities’ representatives throughout the territory (rather than only in Paris), and giving more power to the local representatives of these national authorities, especially the prefects (Biard 2007). In all cases, the central state continues to set objectives and define the possible ways of achieving them. If local experiments have been authorized and become more widespread, such as today’s experiments regarding the distribution of a minimal income, the national authorities oversee the definition of the design and process for these experiments. For instance, in the case of the minimal wage, national authorities have granted the possibility of conditioning the minimal income on a specific number of hours worked for the public service. Departments mainly were presented with the option of opting in for this.
Overall, standards and objectives set by the state are largely respected because of strict procedural obligations. The prefects and regional courts of account closely monitor local governments’ actions, and can denounce and – as has happened in several cases – either prosecute local officials or go over their heads in cases of insubordination. Moreover, local governments still have limited resources at their disposal. Local expenditures represent only 20% of total public expenditures in France, compared to the average of 31% in Europe overall (Ecale and Turban 2019). State-region contracts are also systematically used to define key targets and key performance indicators. Regions also use these indicators when subcontracting, for instance with regional train lines.
Resistance to the central authorities’ positions exists in different forms. Calls for more autonomy for local governments are frequent. Overseas territories as well as Corsica benefit from a large de facto room for maneuver. Resistance has also taken the form of direct opposition to legislation such as the law of net zero soil artificialization, which was vehemently opposed by Laurent Wauquiez, president of the Regional Council of Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes.
Citations:
Biard, M. 2007. Les lilliputiens de la centralisation: des intendants aux préfets, les hésitations d’un modèle français. Seyssel: Editions Champ Vallon.
Ecalle, F., and S. Turban. 2019. “Autonomie des collectivités territoriales : une comparaison européenne.” Note d’analyse France Stratégie 80. Retrieved 15 January 2024 from https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/autonomie-collectivites-territoriales-une-comparaison-europeenne.
Overall, standards and objectives set by the state are largely respected because of strict procedural obligations. The prefects and regional courts of account closely monitor local governments’ actions, and can denounce and – as has happened in several cases – either prosecute local officials or go over their heads in cases of insubordination. Moreover, local governments still have limited resources at their disposal. Local expenditures represent only 20% of total public expenditures in France, compared to the average of 31% in Europe overall (Ecale and Turban 2019). State-region contracts are also systematically used to define key targets and key performance indicators. Regions also use these indicators when subcontracting, for instance with regional train lines.
Resistance to the central authorities’ positions exists in different forms. Calls for more autonomy for local governments are frequent. Overseas territories as well as Corsica benefit from a large de facto room for maneuver. Resistance has also taken the form of direct opposition to legislation such as the law of net zero soil artificialization, which was vehemently opposed by Laurent Wauquiez, president of the Regional Council of Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes.
Citations:
Biard, M. 2007. Les lilliputiens de la centralisation: des intendants aux préfets, les hésitations d’un modèle français. Seyssel: Editions Champ Vallon.
Ecalle, F., and S. Turban. 2019. “Autonomie des collectivités territoriales : une comparaison européenne.” Note d’analyse France Stratégie 80. Retrieved 15 January 2024 from https://www.strategie.gouv.fr/publications/autonomie-collectivites-territoriales-une-comparaison-europeenne.
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
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National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
The Fifth Republic reinstated the Senate as the formal institution for the representation of “territories.” Its designation through mainly local officeholders was designed to give local governments a say on national politics. The holding of political mandates at both the local and national levels, also a rule until 2014, was seen as a means for consultation. Mechanisms for actual consultation and coordination of local governments by national authorities, however, remained few and far between. Most such dialogue has either taken place through ad hoc consultations when, for instance, President Emmanuel Macron invited 220 mayors to the Élysée to talk about urban violence after the riots of June 2023. In many cases, however, local officeholders complain about the lack of understanding from national authorities. Lobbying by the big associations representing local officeholders, such as the Association of the Mayors of France, is often intense. In 2022 and 2023, the absence of the president at this group’s congresses was seen as a sign of disdain and deep misunderstanding. Top-down approaches remain largely dominant. This being said, according to the self-rule index established by the EU and covering 57 countries (EU 2021), France is placed within the group of countries with the highest degree of local autonomy.