Diagonal Accountability
#26Key Findings
France scores relatively poorly in international comparison (rank 26) with regard to diagonal accountability.
The French media system is lively and supports public debate. The public media have a history of critical reporting, but recent appointments have cast a shadow over their independence. There is no evidence of effective government censorship. Private media concentration, especially under billionaire Vincent Bolloré, has raised pluralism concerns.
Associations can be simply created. Groups that provoke violence can be dissolved. Business associations are influential, and are capable of formulating policy proposals and lobbying the government. Unions have low membership rates and are politically divided. The Macron government has reduced economic organizations’ involvement in policymaking.
Social welfare organizations have limited influence on policymaking.
Environmental groups have shown some power to mobilize against public projects, but have not achieved substantial success in influencing government policies.
The French media system is lively and supports public debate. The public media have a history of critical reporting, but recent appointments have cast a shadow over their independence. There is no evidence of effective government censorship. Private media concentration, especially under billionaire Vincent Bolloré, has raised pluralism concerns.
Associations can be simply created. Groups that provoke violence can be dissolved. Business associations are influential, and are capable of formulating policy proposals and lobbying the government. Unions have low membership rates and are politically divided. The Macron government has reduced economic organizations’ involvement in policymaking.
Social welfare organizations have limited influence on policymaking.
Environmental groups have shown some power to mobilize against public projects, but have not achieved substantial success in influencing government policies.
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Graph View
To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
10
9
9
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
2
1
1
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
The media system is lively and contributes positively to public debate. In principle, the legal framework sufficiently guarantees media freedom and even provides for pluralism. The reality is somewhat more complex.
Public media have a history of critical reporting, and again in principle, public authorities have little or no direct capacity to intervene. However, these services are today facing an uncertain financial future, and recent appointments have called the independence of the public media into question. Emmanuel Macron’s administration abolished the “television tax” (redevance audiovisuelle) in 2022, possibly making public broadcasters more dependent on the good will of individual administrations. This adds to measures by the Sarkozy administration (2007 – 2012) that had curtailed those broadcasters’ access to advertising markets.
Relatedly, recent decisions concerning public radio and in particular Radio France – France’s largest radio service in terms of national audience – raised criticism regarding their possible political motivation. Specifically, the recent appointment of Adèle van Reeth as CEO of France Inter led to controversy after she canceled a popular daily comedy show, “C’est encore nous!” That show had regularly been very critical of the incumbent administration.
This said, there is no evidence of effective censorship or any form of constraints on critical journalism, despite a growing number of attempts by politicians to use legal channels to prevent the publication of news that could be politically costly.
Citations:
Aude Dassonville. 2023. “Adèle Van Reeth fait entendre sa différence à France Inter.” Le Monde September 3.
Claire Sécail. 2024. Touche pas à mon peuple. Paris: Seuil.
Public media have a history of critical reporting, and again in principle, public authorities have little or no direct capacity to intervene. However, these services are today facing an uncertain financial future, and recent appointments have called the independence of the public media into question. Emmanuel Macron’s administration abolished the “television tax” (redevance audiovisuelle) in 2022, possibly making public broadcasters more dependent on the good will of individual administrations. This adds to measures by the Sarkozy administration (2007 – 2012) that had curtailed those broadcasters’ access to advertising markets.
Relatedly, recent decisions concerning public radio and in particular Radio France – France’s largest radio service in terms of national audience – raised criticism regarding their possible political motivation. Specifically, the recent appointment of Adèle van Reeth as CEO of France Inter led to controversy after she canceled a popular daily comedy show, “C’est encore nous!” That show had regularly been very critical of the incumbent administration.
This said, there is no evidence of effective censorship or any form of constraints on critical journalism, despite a growing number of attempts by politicians to use legal channels to prevent the publication of news that could be politically costly.
Citations:
Aude Dassonville. 2023. “Adèle Van Reeth fait entendre sa différence à France Inter.” Le Monde September 3.
Claire Sécail. 2024. Touche pas à mon peuple. Paris: Seuil.
To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
There is a substantial diversity of opinions expressed in French media. Like elsewhere, there is considerable debate on the issue of media ownership and its consequences for media pluralism.
One evolution that has sparked some concern in the media landscape is the increasing influence of billionaire Vincent Bolloré. Having made a fortune in marine transport, he started expanding into the media sector 20 years ago. He now owns the largest private radio broadcaster, Europe 1; the TV channels CNews and Canal+; and a host of weekly and monthly magazines since the acquisition of Vivendi in May 2021. These takeovers have regularly been followed by a significant reorientation of the editorial line. In particular, two of Bolloré’s TV channels, CNews and C8, have regularly been accused of overrepresenting the far right or even actively promoting far right candidates like Eric Zemmour. In the summer of 2022, the takeover of the Journal du Dimanche (JDD), a Sunday weekly, was followed by the appointment of one of Zemmour’s main supporters to head of the journal, leading to a months-long strike.
A more recent player in the media landscape is Czech billionaire Daniel Kretinsky, who bought a minority share of quality newspaper Le Monde. He has since acquired a minority share in the most important French TV network, TF1, and 45% of online media company Loopsider. He recently sold his stake in Le Monde. His motivations seem to be more commercial than political.
Public media are regularly criticized for their left-leaning orientation, while commercial media are supposed to be more conservative. A recent study has put these accusations into perspective. These differences are usually exaggerated, according to Cagé and colleagues.
Citations:
Claudia Cohen and Marie Bartnik. 2023. “Médias, distribution, informatique… L’empire tentaculaire de Daniel Kretinsky en France.” Le Figaro, August 1.
“Comment Vincent Bolloré construit un empire médiatique par la force et l’argent.” Sud Ouest, June 24.
Julia Cagé, Moritz Hengel, Nicolas Hervé, and Camille Urvoy. “Hosting Media Bias: Evidence from the Universe of French Broadcasts, 2002-2020.” SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036211
One evolution that has sparked some concern in the media landscape is the increasing influence of billionaire Vincent Bolloré. Having made a fortune in marine transport, he started expanding into the media sector 20 years ago. He now owns the largest private radio broadcaster, Europe 1; the TV channels CNews and Canal+; and a host of weekly and monthly magazines since the acquisition of Vivendi in May 2021. These takeovers have regularly been followed by a significant reorientation of the editorial line. In particular, two of Bolloré’s TV channels, CNews and C8, have regularly been accused of overrepresenting the far right or even actively promoting far right candidates like Eric Zemmour. In the summer of 2022, the takeover of the Journal du Dimanche (JDD), a Sunday weekly, was followed by the appointment of one of Zemmour’s main supporters to head of the journal, leading to a months-long strike.
A more recent player in the media landscape is Czech billionaire Daniel Kretinsky, who bought a minority share of quality newspaper Le Monde. He has since acquired a minority share in the most important French TV network, TF1, and 45% of online media company Loopsider. He recently sold his stake in Le Monde. His motivations seem to be more commercial than political.
Public media are regularly criticized for their left-leaning orientation, while commercial media are supposed to be more conservative. A recent study has put these accusations into perspective. These differences are usually exaggerated, according to Cagé and colleagues.
Citations:
Claudia Cohen and Marie Bartnik. 2023. “Médias, distribution, informatique… L’empire tentaculaire de Daniel Kretinsky en France.” Le Figaro, August 1.
“Comment Vincent Bolloré construit un empire médiatique par la force et l’argent.” Sud Ouest, June 24.
Julia Cagé, Moritz Hengel, Nicolas Hervé, and Camille Urvoy. “Hosting Media Bias: Evidence from the Universe of French Broadcasts, 2002-2020.” SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036211
Graph View
To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
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6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
Freedom of association has been granted since the passage of the 1901 law on associations. Since a famous ruling of the Constitutional Court in 1971, this freedom constitutes one aspect of the constitutional freedoms. Associations may be created by citizens without any previous authorization; a simple declaration to the prefecture – the local authority representing the state – is sufficient to gain the status of a moral person. The only restrictions concern illegal behaviors, for instance those that may undermine national security, the integrity of the national territory or the republican character of the government.
Some restrictions have been added by the law on republican principles (24 August 2021), which was enacted in response to the increasing frequency of terrorist actions and the rise of movements backing such actions. The law allows for the dissolution of associations that provoke violence against persons or properties. However, any dissolution is subject to legal control by the courts. In a ruling made on 9 November 2023, the Council of State stated precisely the criteria that would be used to judge such a dissolution. Another restriction may be seen in the obligation for any association that applies for state subsidies to sign a moral contract in favor of the country’s republican principles.
During the Macron era (2018 – 2024), 26 associations have been dissolved, an increase compared to seven during the era of President François Hollande (2012 – 2017).
While Amnesty International (2023: 168) has identified instances of religious or racist discrimination or restriction against associations, these rare cases concern associations engaged in illegal actions. All such measures are overseen and if necessary modified or canceled by the courts or the Council of State, and do not alter the general assessment of a large and real guarantee of the freedom of association (Vie publique 2024).
Contemporary France is characterized by a thriving civil society and a significant number of civil society organizations (CSOs). According to official data, there are currently 1.3 million different CSOs with 23 million members aged 14 or above. An average of 70,000 new CSOs are created every year. On the whole, the CSO sector employs about 1.8 million people.
While CSOs are massively subsidized by the state, the share of public funding is going down, forcing CSOs to look for alternative funding sources.
Citations:
Edith Archambault, Lionel Prouteau. 2020. “France: A Large and Diverse Civil Society Faced with Significant Concerns.” European Union-Russia Civil Society ForumReport, halshs-02884061.
https://www.associations.gouv.fr/les-associations-en-france.html
Prouteau, Lionel, and Valérie Tchernonog. 2022. Le paysage associatif français. Paris: Dalloz.
Vie publique. 2024. “La liberté d’association en France: un état des lieux.” Vie publique.fr, April 23. Retrieved March 7, 2024, from https://www.vie-publique.fr/eclairage/292065-la-liberte-dassociation-en-france-un-etat-des-lieux
Some restrictions have been added by the law on republican principles (24 August 2021), which was enacted in response to the increasing frequency of terrorist actions and the rise of movements backing such actions. The law allows for the dissolution of associations that provoke violence against persons or properties. However, any dissolution is subject to legal control by the courts. In a ruling made on 9 November 2023, the Council of State stated precisely the criteria that would be used to judge such a dissolution. Another restriction may be seen in the obligation for any association that applies for state subsidies to sign a moral contract in favor of the country’s republican principles.
During the Macron era (2018 – 2024), 26 associations have been dissolved, an increase compared to seven during the era of President François Hollande (2012 – 2017).
While Amnesty International (2023: 168) has identified instances of religious or racist discrimination or restriction against associations, these rare cases concern associations engaged in illegal actions. All such measures are overseen and if necessary modified or canceled by the courts or the Council of State, and do not alter the general assessment of a large and real guarantee of the freedom of association (Vie publique 2024).
Contemporary France is characterized by a thriving civil society and a significant number of civil society organizations (CSOs). According to official data, there are currently 1.3 million different CSOs with 23 million members aged 14 or above. An average of 70,000 new CSOs are created every year. On the whole, the CSO sector employs about 1.8 million people.
While CSOs are massively subsidized by the state, the share of public funding is going down, forcing CSOs to look for alternative funding sources.
Citations:
Edith Archambault, Lionel Prouteau. 2020. “France: A Large and Diverse Civil Society Faced with Significant Concerns.” European Union-Russia Civil Society ForumReport, halshs-02884061.
https://www.associations.gouv.fr/les-associations-en-france.html
Prouteau, Lionel, and Valérie Tchernonog. 2022. Le paysage associatif français. Paris: Dalloz.
Vie publique. 2024. “La liberté d’association en France: un état des lieux.” Vie publique.fr, April 23. Retrieved March 7, 2024, from https://www.vie-publique.fr/eclairage/292065-la-liberte-dassociation-en-france-un-etat-des-lieux
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Business associations can formulate policy proposals and contribute to agenda setting. They have their own research capabilities and can successfully lobby government and parliamentarians. Two organizations have significant influence. The major employers union, the Mouvement des Entreprises de France (MEDEF), is a peak association federating sector-level associations. It represents 750,000 major firms. The other major organization is the Confédération Générale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (CGPME), whose membership base includes around 1.7 million small- and medium-size firms. This association often complains that the specific interests of small businesses are marginalized by larger national groups and the government.
Trade unions suffer from various shortcomings. First, membership rates are among the lowest in the circle of Western democracies, encompassing only about 8% of the workforce (5% in the private sector). A second problem is that the relatively small membership is split between several different and rival trade unions. The split within the trade union movement is political but also concerns different approaches to the role of trade unions in policymaking. Two corporatist and “conservative” unions – the CGT and FO – have taken advantage of their footing in the civil service and public sector, and tend to resist or reject any serious change. They have relied upon mass mobilization to block reforms, even if their ability to mobilize is diminishing except in a few sectors such as public transport. Whereas these organizations refuse negotiations and compromises with the government, two other trade unions – CFDT and UNSA – have adopted more moderate positions, and try to balance advocacy for workers’ interests with a constructive role in negotiating reforms.
Nonetheless, this lack of representativeness is somewhat compensated for by the support they get in the “professional elections” that take place every five years. The turnout rate for the last “professional elections” reached 43.7% in the public sector and 38.2% in the private sector in 2022. This explains why these elections are so crucial. For the past two elections, the CFDT has led the polls, tightly followed by the more radical CGT. Furthermore, the government regularly validates partial agreements for entire economic sectors, with the result that collective bargaining agreements cover 98% of workers in France.
In general, the unions seek to compensate for their membership weakness at the company level by negotiating at the sectoral level or even at the national level, as well as through their capacity for social mobilization, quite frequently organizing mass protests in the streets. In so doing, they rarely manage to overcome their political split and rivalries; however, the opposition to pension reform in 2023 created a rare united front across the eight major trade unions. Despite the massive rejection by voters and trade unions and the absence of a legislative majority, President Macron signed the reform into law on April 15, 2023. The unions’ campaign thus ultimately failed, but the unitary approach improved their image, and a slight increase in membership was evident in the wake of the debates.
Government attitudes toward CSO proposals have not been constant. Over the last 20 years, governments have called for more involvement of social partner CSOs in the field of social and labor policies. and have been willing to take into account their proposals. Governments have also endorsed new rules enhancing the role of social negotiation and concertation. However, governmental practice has not always been in line with this rhetorical commitment. Moreover, since 2017, President Macron has tended to drastically reduce the role of economic and social CSOs in the policymaking process, stressing the monopoly of the political institutions – government, parliament – in policymaking.
Citations:
Tristan Haute. 2020. “Les logiques plurielles d’une très faible participation : retour sur les scrutins auprès des salariés des très petites entreprises.” La Revue de l’Ires 2020/2-3 (101-102): 3-27.
Woll, Cornelia. 2006. “La réforme du Medef: chronique des difficultés de l’action collective patronale.” Revue française de science politique 56 (2): 255-279.
Trade unions suffer from various shortcomings. First, membership rates are among the lowest in the circle of Western democracies, encompassing only about 8% of the workforce (5% in the private sector). A second problem is that the relatively small membership is split between several different and rival trade unions. The split within the trade union movement is political but also concerns different approaches to the role of trade unions in policymaking. Two corporatist and “conservative” unions – the CGT and FO – have taken advantage of their footing in the civil service and public sector, and tend to resist or reject any serious change. They have relied upon mass mobilization to block reforms, even if their ability to mobilize is diminishing except in a few sectors such as public transport. Whereas these organizations refuse negotiations and compromises with the government, two other trade unions – CFDT and UNSA – have adopted more moderate positions, and try to balance advocacy for workers’ interests with a constructive role in negotiating reforms.
Nonetheless, this lack of representativeness is somewhat compensated for by the support they get in the “professional elections” that take place every five years. The turnout rate for the last “professional elections” reached 43.7% in the public sector and 38.2% in the private sector in 2022. This explains why these elections are so crucial. For the past two elections, the CFDT has led the polls, tightly followed by the more radical CGT. Furthermore, the government regularly validates partial agreements for entire economic sectors, with the result that collective bargaining agreements cover 98% of workers in France.
In general, the unions seek to compensate for their membership weakness at the company level by negotiating at the sectoral level or even at the national level, as well as through their capacity for social mobilization, quite frequently organizing mass protests in the streets. In so doing, they rarely manage to overcome their political split and rivalries; however, the opposition to pension reform in 2023 created a rare united front across the eight major trade unions. Despite the massive rejection by voters and trade unions and the absence of a legislative majority, President Macron signed the reform into law on April 15, 2023. The unions’ campaign thus ultimately failed, but the unitary approach improved their image, and a slight increase in membership was evident in the wake of the debates.
Government attitudes toward CSO proposals have not been constant. Over the last 20 years, governments have called for more involvement of social partner CSOs in the field of social and labor policies. and have been willing to take into account their proposals. Governments have also endorsed new rules enhancing the role of social negotiation and concertation. However, governmental practice has not always been in line with this rhetorical commitment. Moreover, since 2017, President Macron has tended to drastically reduce the role of economic and social CSOs in the policymaking process, stressing the monopoly of the political institutions – government, parliament – in policymaking.
Citations:
Tristan Haute. 2020. “Les logiques plurielles d’une très faible participation : retour sur les scrutins auprès des salariés des très petites entreprises.” La Revue de l’Ires 2020/2-3 (101-102): 3-27.
Woll, Cornelia. 2006. “La réforme du Medef: chronique des difficultés de l’action collective patronale.” Revue française de science politique 56 (2): 255-279.
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Social welfare CSOs are particularly active among the poorest sectors of society, including migrants, youth, the elderly and the disabled.
The decrease in subsidized jobs has hit the welfare sector particularly hard. In addition, the abolishment of the wealth tax – another major measure of the first Macron administration – also diminished donations, as these were previously used to reduce taxes. The pandemic years have created additional difficulties, with considerably more demand for services and a lower number of volunteers.
The major challenge such organizations face today is the need to find new funding in the context of declining public contributions. At the same time, public oversight has tended to become stricter, especially in the health sector, with the creation of regional oversight agencies that behave in a rather interventionist manner.
Social welfare CSOs’ influence on policymaking is limited, and there are no signs that it has increased in recent years. Rather, they are policy takers, subject to changing government priorities in a strongly centralized country. Only the largest associations, such as the Red Cross and a few others, have the effective ability to influence public decision-making.
Citations:
Bolleyer, Nicole. 2018. The State and Civil Society: Regulating Interest Groups, Parties, and Public Benefit Organizations in Contemporary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ewald, F. 2020. The Birth of Solidarity: The History of the French Welfare State. Durham: Duke University Press.
The decrease in subsidized jobs has hit the welfare sector particularly hard. In addition, the abolishment of the wealth tax – another major measure of the first Macron administration – also diminished donations, as these were previously used to reduce taxes. The pandemic years have created additional difficulties, with considerably more demand for services and a lower number of volunteers.
The major challenge such organizations face today is the need to find new funding in the context of declining public contributions. At the same time, public oversight has tended to become stricter, especially in the health sector, with the creation of regional oversight agencies that behave in a rather interventionist manner.
Social welfare CSOs’ influence on policymaking is limited, and there are no signs that it has increased in recent years. Rather, they are policy takers, subject to changing government priorities in a strongly centralized country. Only the largest associations, such as the Red Cross and a few others, have the effective ability to influence public decision-making.
Citations:
Bolleyer, Nicole. 2018. The State and Civil Society: Regulating Interest Groups, Parties, and Public Benefit Organizations in Contemporary Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ewald, F. 2020. The Birth of Solidarity: The History of the French Welfare State. Durham: Duke University Press.
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
There has been considerable activism in the environmental field these past few years. French youth mobilized strongly in 2019’s Fridays for Future movement. In the following years, French chapters of Extinction Rebellion and Last Generation appeared.
Perhaps the most visible mobilization took place in opposition to the planned construction of a water reservoir near the town of Sainte-Soline in the department of Deux-Sèvres. Water reservoirs are viewed critically by environmental associations, but also by many locals, due to their consequences on the local environment. This movement led to two major demonstrations ‒ accompanied by a massive police presence ‒ in October 2022 and March 2023. Both demonstrations turned out to be very violent, while protesters accused the police of violently attacking them.
Following this demonstration, Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin ordered the dissolution of one of the most active movements behind the mobilization. The construction of the Deux-Sèvres reservoir was eventually authorized by the French administrative high court – the Conseil d’Etat – in April 2023.
These examples show that beyond a certain power of mobilization against public projects – mostly without success – environmental CSOs do not have substantial capacity to cooperate, form alliances, or help draft or shape public policies in this field. Nor have governments or the administration shown any willingness to grant them such a role.
Perhaps the most visible mobilization took place in opposition to the planned construction of a water reservoir near the town of Sainte-Soline in the department of Deux-Sèvres. Water reservoirs are viewed critically by environmental associations, but also by many locals, due to their consequences on the local environment. This movement led to two major demonstrations ‒ accompanied by a massive police presence ‒ in October 2022 and March 2023. Both demonstrations turned out to be very violent, while protesters accused the police of violently attacking them.
Following this demonstration, Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin ordered the dissolution of one of the most active movements behind the mobilization. The construction of the Deux-Sèvres reservoir was eventually authorized by the French administrative high court – the Conseil d’Etat – in April 2023.
These examples show that beyond a certain power of mobilization against public projects – mostly without success – environmental CSOs do not have substantial capacity to cooperate, form alliances, or help draft or shape public policies in this field. Nor have governments or the administration shown any willingness to grant them such a role.