Horizontal Accountability
#17Key Findings
In the category of horizontal accountability, France falls into the sample’s middle ranks (rank 17).
The Court of Auditors that monitors public spending is powerful, independent and highly prestigious. The data protection authority is also independent, with the power to issue warnings and fines. The Constitutional Court reviews draft laws for constitutionality, though only high-ranking officials can refer cases.
Civil rights in France are generally well protected. The government has resorted to long-lasting emergency powers after terrorist attacks. A crackdown on religious symbols in public has almost exclusively targeted the Muslim population. Corruption in politics remains a problem, with campaign finance scandals continuing to occur.
The parliament lacks a substantive research unit. While investigation rights exist, executive powers often evade scrutiny. Macron’s minority government has often resorted to passing legislation without majority support, diminishing parliament’s power to participate in policymaking.
The Court of Auditors that monitors public spending is powerful, independent and highly prestigious. The data protection authority is also independent, with the power to issue warnings and fines. The Constitutional Court reviews draft laws for constitutionality, though only high-ranking officials can refer cases.
Civil rights in France are generally well protected. The government has resorted to long-lasting emergency powers after terrorist attacks. A crackdown on religious symbols in public has almost exclusively targeted the Muslim population. Corruption in politics remains a problem, with campaign finance scandals continuing to occur.
The parliament lacks a substantive research unit. While investigation rights exist, executive powers often evade scrutiny. Macron’s minority government has often resorted to passing legislation without majority support, diminishing parliament’s power to participate in policymaking.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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1
There is no independent and effective audit office.
The national Court of Auditors (Cour des Comptes) is a powerful and independent institution. It monitors the accounts of any institution that spends public money. The court is independent in the choice of the audits it undertakes. Since 2008, the institution being monitored can “contradict” or corrected the audit. A decree-law from March 2023 creates an “appeal court of auditors,” with the Conseil d’Etat – the administrative high court – acting as the final appeal court.
The institution appears to possess the means necessary to exercise its powers. It is a very prestigious institution, representing one of the most preferred posts in French administration, especially for the best students leaving the elitist National School of Administration (ENA, now INSP).
The president of the court is named by the Council of Ministers (the president and the government). It is thus usually a rather visible political figure who fulfills the necessary credentials, such as some past linkage to the court, ideally being a member of that administration. Since 2020, the position has been held by Pierre Moscovici, a former minister of the economy under the Hollande presidency, and a European commissioner. Once named, the court president cannot be removed, granting the officeholder substantial autonomy. Typically, the fact that the president is a leading politician gives the court some public visibility. However, to date, no president of the court has attempted to return to politics afterward.
The institution appears to possess the means necessary to exercise its powers. It is a very prestigious institution, representing one of the most preferred posts in French administration, especially for the best students leaving the elitist National School of Administration (ENA, now INSP).
The president of the court is named by the Council of Ministers (the president and the government). It is thus usually a rather visible political figure who fulfills the necessary credentials, such as some past linkage to the court, ideally being a member of that administration. Since 2020, the position has been held by Pierre Moscovici, a former minister of the economy under the Hollande presidency, and a European commissioner. Once named, the court president cannot be removed, granting the officeholder substantial autonomy. Typically, the fact that the president is a leading politician gives the court some public visibility. However, to date, no president of the court has attempted to return to politics afterward.
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
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There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The country’s national data protection authority, the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), is an independent regulatory authority with several core functions. It advises the government regarding data privacy and the proper implementation of EU regulations in this area (such as the General Data Protection Regulation, or GDPR). It can take the initiative to inspect data controllers to monitor compliance. Finally, individuals can appeal to the CNIL in instances of data privacy infringements. The CNIL can issue warnings and fines, and can even order data controllers to cease their activity. It is thus well equipped to pursue its goals. Despite a modest staff of 225 employees (in 2020) with a budget of €17 million, the CNIL is today a highly respected institution that received 13,585 complaints in 2020 (an increase of more than 60% following the adoption of the EU regulations), leading to a total of 9,057 inquiries.
In practice, the CNIL has not refrained from taking on powerful adversaries, such as Google or Facebook. It has been very effective over the past 40 years and showed particular strengths during the COVID-19 crisis. Its role is widely supported by the public and political elites. In 2020, the authority conducted 247 review processes and imposed 14 penalties entailing financial sums amounting to nearly €140 million. Perhaps the most visible recent example of the CNIL’s power is a €50 million fine imposed in January 2019 against Google for the violation of GDPR principles.
The primary limits to the CNIL data privacy protection efforts are its limited means and the challenges presented by a constantly changing information landscape.
Citations:
CNIL. 2021. “La CNIL en bref.” https://www.cnil.fr/fr/cnil-direct/question/la-cnil-cest-quoi
In practice, the CNIL has not refrained from taking on powerful adversaries, such as Google or Facebook. It has been very effective over the past 40 years and showed particular strengths during the COVID-19 crisis. Its role is widely supported by the public and political elites. In 2020, the authority conducted 247 review processes and imposed 14 penalties entailing financial sums amounting to nearly €140 million. Perhaps the most visible recent example of the CNIL’s power is a €50 million fine imposed in January 2019 against Google for the violation of GDPR principles.
The primary limits to the CNIL data privacy protection efforts are its limited means and the challenges presented by a constantly changing information landscape.
Citations:
CNIL. 2021. “La CNIL en bref.” https://www.cnil.fr/fr/cnil-direct/question/la-cnil-cest-quoi
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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3
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
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1
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
Judicial oversight and review efforts are rather powerful in France, even if the caseload is comparatively low. This function is exercised by a specialized court – the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Court). The caseload has increased significantly since the court’s beginnings in 1959, but remains modest compared to other European courts serving comparable functions. In the past 20 years, there has been an average of 173 decisions per year. However, this number is driven by post-electoral and electoral decisions, as the court is tasked with overseeing presidential and parliamentary elections. Outside election years, the caseload falls to less than 100 cases a year.
This comparatively low number is mostly due to the limited triggers for constitutional review. The only figures with the power to refer a case are the president, the prime minister, the presidents of the two chambers, and 60 senators or members of the National Assembly. Since 2008, the two supreme courts have also been able to raise constitutional questions raised by defendants before their courts. This procedure – a sort of preliminary constitutional ruling – now accounts for the vast majority of the caseload.
For traditional rulings, the Constitutional Court has to make a decision before a law comes into force. The underlying idea is that no unconstitutional bill should ever become law. While the caseload in this area remains small, the rulings that have invalidated all or parts of laws have been relatively important. This procedure has proven rather reliable, and the public image of the Constitutional Court is very positive despite the fact that the judges mostly have a background within politics.
One issue that may present a challenge for the court’s work is the strategic use of constitutional oversight by politicians. In some cases, invalidation can be anticipated, but the government may still prefer to pass the law for electoral or coalition-related reasons. This is a way of shifting the blame for non-adoption to the court, which may have the effect of undermining the court’s legitimacy. For example, this happened when the National Assembly voted on a highly controversial immigration bill in December 2023. The government accepted amendments from right and extreme-right groups despite regarding them as unconstitutional (and hoped these amendments would be rejected by the court). In January 2024, the court rejected substantial portions of the bill passed by the legislature in December 2023, declaring them to be incompatible with the constitution. The court’s president, Laurent Fabius (2024), publicly criticized this governmental tactic, declaring that “the court’s role was not to offer political services.”
Citations:
Brouard, S. 2016. “Constitutional Politics.” In R. Elgie, E. Grossman, and A. Mazur, eds., The Oxford Handbook of French Politics, 220-242. Oxford: OUP.
Fabius, Laurent. 2024. “Interview.” https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/immigration/loi-immigration-le-conseil-constitutionnel-est-la-non-pas-pour-rendre-des-services-politiques-mais-pour-rendre-une-decision-juridique-justifie-son-president-laurent-fabius_6327135.html
This comparatively low number is mostly due to the limited triggers for constitutional review. The only figures with the power to refer a case are the president, the prime minister, the presidents of the two chambers, and 60 senators or members of the National Assembly. Since 2008, the two supreme courts have also been able to raise constitutional questions raised by defendants before their courts. This procedure – a sort of preliminary constitutional ruling – now accounts for the vast majority of the caseload.
For traditional rulings, the Constitutional Court has to make a decision before a law comes into force. The underlying idea is that no unconstitutional bill should ever become law. While the caseload in this area remains small, the rulings that have invalidated all or parts of laws have been relatively important. This procedure has proven rather reliable, and the public image of the Constitutional Court is very positive despite the fact that the judges mostly have a background within politics.
One issue that may present a challenge for the court’s work is the strategic use of constitutional oversight by politicians. In some cases, invalidation can be anticipated, but the government may still prefer to pass the law for electoral or coalition-related reasons. This is a way of shifting the blame for non-adoption to the court, which may have the effect of undermining the court’s legitimacy. For example, this happened when the National Assembly voted on a highly controversial immigration bill in December 2023. The government accepted amendments from right and extreme-right groups despite regarding them as unconstitutional (and hoped these amendments would be rejected by the court). In January 2024, the court rejected substantial portions of the bill passed by the legislature in December 2023, declaring them to be incompatible with the constitution. The court’s president, Laurent Fabius (2024), publicly criticized this governmental tactic, declaring that “the court’s role was not to offer political services.”
Citations:
Brouard, S. 2016. “Constitutional Politics.” In R. Elgie, E. Grossman, and A. Mazur, eds., The Oxford Handbook of French Politics, 220-242. Oxford: OUP.
Fabius, Laurent. 2024. “Interview.” https://www.francetvinfo.fr/societe/immigration/loi-immigration-le-conseil-constitutionnel-est-la-non-pas-pour-rendre-des-services-politiques-mais-pour-rendre-une-decision-juridique-justifie-son-president-laurent-fabius_6327135.html
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
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There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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1
There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
Civil rights and political liberties are in principle well protected in France. This was not always the case: Until the 1980s, France’s record in this area was more mediocre. Since that time, however, France’s judicial system has become a reliable defender of civil rights. The Constitutional Court unilaterally extended its competence to the protection of civil liberties in a famous ruling in 1971. The European Court of Justice and, more importantly, the European Court of Human Rights have played an active role in this process, and the growing independence of the judiciary has helped this evolution.
There have been several critical debates in recent years nonetheless. Following the terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015, the government enacted a state of emergency that allowed for house searches and house arrests, among other elements. The state of emergency was regularly extended until 2017, when several critical measures were voted into law and thus extended indefinitely. A new anti-terrorism bill in 2021 moreover curtailed the scope of data privacy.
Many issues regarding civil liberties came back to the forefront of public debate during the pandemic. While there was quite a bit of debate, the vast majority of the population was ultimately supportive of restrictions such as distancing, mask mandates and curfews. Although some parties and other political actors voiced opposition, this was not comparable to the protests mounted in Germany or the Netherlands.
Finally, a recurring debate in French society concerns the role of religion in the public space. A law from 1905 establishes the principle of separation (laïcité). In recent years, this law has been regularly questioned as debates have emerged concerning headscarves, halal food and other religious signifiers, especially in public schools. With little or no exception, this debate concerns the Muslim population. In this context, and more generally, Amnesty International has reported that “racial and religious discrimination persisted, especially targeting Muslim individuals and associations” and blamed “excessive use of force by police continued without accountability” (Amnesty International 2023).
Citations:
Peretti-Watel, Patrick, et al. 2020. “The French General Population’s Attitudes toward Lockdown against COVID-19: A Fragile Consensus.” BMC Public Health 20 (1): 1-8.
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23, France report.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2023/02/amnesty-international-report-2022-23
https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/report-france/
There have been several critical debates in recent years nonetheless. Following the terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015, the government enacted a state of emergency that allowed for house searches and house arrests, among other elements. The state of emergency was regularly extended until 2017, when several critical measures were voted into law and thus extended indefinitely. A new anti-terrorism bill in 2021 moreover curtailed the scope of data privacy.
Many issues regarding civil liberties came back to the forefront of public debate during the pandemic. While there was quite a bit of debate, the vast majority of the population was ultimately supportive of restrictions such as distancing, mask mandates and curfews. Although some parties and other political actors voiced opposition, this was not comparable to the protests mounted in Germany or the Netherlands.
Finally, a recurring debate in French society concerns the role of religion in the public space. A law from 1905 establishes the principle of separation (laïcité). In recent years, this law has been regularly questioned as debates have emerged concerning headscarves, halal food and other religious signifiers, especially in public schools. With little or no exception, this debate concerns the Muslim population. In this context, and more generally, Amnesty International has reported that “racial and religious discrimination persisted, especially targeting Muslim individuals and associations” and blamed “excessive use of force by police continued without accountability” (Amnesty International 2023).
Citations:
Peretti-Watel, Patrick, et al. 2020. “The French General Population’s Attitudes toward Lockdown against COVID-19: A Fragile Consensus.” BMC Public Health 20 (1): 1-8.
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23, France report.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2023/02/amnesty-international-report-2022-23
https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/france/report-france/
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
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Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Corruption has historically been an issue in French politics, associated especially with low levels of campaign financing. Throughout the 1990s, a series of scandals led to lawsuits and sometimes to the conviction of leading politicians. Things have improved, but scandals continue to play a role in French politics. Most importantly, the leading candidate of the conservative camp in 2017, François Fillon, would probably have had a serious chance at winning the presidential election had it not been for two parallel scandals that clearly alienated a nontrivial share of his voters.
The first bill introduced by Emmanuel Macron’s government after the 2017 election dealt with the “moralization of politics,” barring parliamentarians from employing family members, and increasing oversight of their travel and representation budgets. This has apparently led to new and more in-depth monitoring of candidates to government positions.
There are nonetheless several ongoing issues. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy received guilty verdicts in two different cases in 2021, one concerning campaign finance and the other corruption. He has appealed both decisions, and new rulings were expected in the first quarter of 2024.
The Macron government has not been free of scandals, and Macron put an end to the traditional convention that indicted ministers would be expected to step down from government. Two ministers have recently faced trial. Minister of Labor Olivier Dussopt stood trial in November 2023 due to irregularities in public contracting when he was mayor of the city of Annonay. Minister of Justice Eric Dupond-Moretti was recently acquitted of charges of conflict of interest.
Overall, the situation appears to have improved over the long term, but the government has provided sometimes contradictory signals. A study by French Anti-corruption Agency (AFA), a state agency attached to the Ministry of Justice, shows an increase in recorded abuses between 2016 and 2020. At the same time, this recently created agency (December 2016) certainly has had a beneficial effect.
However, the failure to renew the public service status of Anticor (Le Monde 2023), the reference anti-corruption NGO in France, sent a contradictory sign. Thanks to this status, the NGO could easily intervene in civil lawsuits and force national prosecutors to take action.
Citations:
Le Monde. 2023. “Anticor: comprendre les raisons du non-renouvellement de l’agrément et ses conséquences.” December 28. https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2023/12/28/anticor-comprendre-les-raisons-du-non-renouvellement-de-l-agrement-et-ses-consequences_6208149_4355770.html
The first bill introduced by Emmanuel Macron’s government after the 2017 election dealt with the “moralization of politics,” barring parliamentarians from employing family members, and increasing oversight of their travel and representation budgets. This has apparently led to new and more in-depth monitoring of candidates to government positions.
There are nonetheless several ongoing issues. Former President Nicolas Sarkozy received guilty verdicts in two different cases in 2021, one concerning campaign finance and the other corruption. He has appealed both decisions, and new rulings were expected in the first quarter of 2024.
The Macron government has not been free of scandals, and Macron put an end to the traditional convention that indicted ministers would be expected to step down from government. Two ministers have recently faced trial. Minister of Labor Olivier Dussopt stood trial in November 2023 due to irregularities in public contracting when he was mayor of the city of Annonay. Minister of Justice Eric Dupond-Moretti was recently acquitted of charges of conflict of interest.
Overall, the situation appears to have improved over the long term, but the government has provided sometimes contradictory signals. A study by French Anti-corruption Agency (AFA), a state agency attached to the Ministry of Justice, shows an increase in recorded abuses between 2016 and 2020. At the same time, this recently created agency (December 2016) certainly has had a beneficial effect.
However, the failure to renew the public service status of Anticor (Le Monde 2023), the reference anti-corruption NGO in France, sent a contradictory sign. Thanks to this status, the NGO could easily intervene in civil lawsuits and force national prosecutors to take action.
Citations:
Le Monde. 2023. “Anticor: comprendre les raisons du non-renouvellement de l’agrément et ses conséquences.” December 28. https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2023/12/28/anticor-comprendre-les-raisons-du-non-renouvellement-de-l-agrement-et-ses-consequences_6208149_4355770.html
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Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
French legislators usually have two members of personal staff each. They also benefit from the staff of legislative committees, who are usually highly qualified and selected through competitive exams. Finally, they may draw on the resources and staff of the Court of Auditors if needed. There is no substantive parliamentary research unit, but there is a library, and parliamentarians are increasingly resorting to hearings, even if the number of hearings remains modest in comparative terms. Generally speaking, the 2008 constitutional reform has improved the parliament’s prerogatives.
Each legislature produces several thousand legislative reports, and the number has been increasing over recent legislatures.
Citations:
Rozenberg, Olivier, et al. 2017. “La révision constitutionnelle du 23 juillet 2008 a-t-elle renforcé le Parlement français?.” Débats du LIEPP 3: En-ligne
Each legislature produces several thousand legislative reports, and the number has been increasing over recent legislatures.
Citations:
Rozenberg, Olivier, et al. 2017. “La révision constitutionnelle du 23 juillet 2008 a-t-elle renforcé le Parlement français?.” Débats du LIEPP 3: En-ligne
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
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3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
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1
The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
Committees generally have free access to all requested documents. However, areas such as national security, the secret service or military issues are deemed sensitive, with access thus being more restricted. In such cases, the government might be reluctant to pass on information, or even tempted to use information-access limitations to cover up potential malpractices. For instance, in the past, the Prime Minister’s Office has had substantial amounts of cash at its disposal that could partially be used for the electoral activities of the party in power. No information was available about where the money actually went. In the same vein, it is only since the Sarkozy presidency that the president’s office budget has become transparent and accessible to parliamentary inquiry.
Committees can summon ministers for hearings, and frequently make use of this right. Ministers can refuse to attend but this is rather exceptional. Given the supremacy and the discipline of the majority party in parliament during the Fifth Republic, such a refusal does not result in serious consequences
Committees can summon ministers for hearings, and frequently make use of this right. Ministers can refuse to attend but this is rather exceptional. Given the supremacy and the discipline of the majority party in parliament during the Fifth Republic, such a refusal does not result in serious consequences
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
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The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
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The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
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The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
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The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
The right to initiate investigations exists, but the executive has historically had the ability to evade the scrutiny of unwanted commissions. Since 2009 – following the constitutional amendment of 2008 – the opposition has had the right to form one investigative commission (“Commission d’enquête”) per year in the lower house. In the upper house, each group can nominate a commission every year.
These commissions have to fulfill a certain number of conditions detailed in the internal rules of the two chambers. In particular, such a commission must not interfere with judicial investigations, which usually means that a commission is not created after a judicial process is initiated, or is dismantled within six months of this time. The commission can have up to 30 members whose political affiliation must mirror the share of parliamentary groups in the plenary.
Commissions have the right to summon ministers and can call upon the Court of Auditors to assist them. In principle, noncompliance or refusal to appear may lead to fines and other judicial sanctions. This is very rare, however.
While these commissions undeniably have power, it is worth mentioning that several major issues in the past few years, such as the handling of the yellow vest crisis or the pandemic, did not lead to the initiation of investigative committees. Moreover, the general impression is that the principle of noninterference with judicial investigations – in the name of the separation of powers – ultimately prevents the creation of investigative committees on the issues with the most political importance. For the same reasons, the effects of these committees, which regularly produce lengthy reports, are rather minor, and they are very rarely critical of government action. Interestingly, the last serious study of these committees is more than 20 years old (Vallet 2003).
Citations:
VALLET, Élisabeth. 2003. “Les commissions d’enquête parlementaires sous la Cinquième République.” Revue française de droit constitutionnel 2003 (2): 249-278.
These commissions have to fulfill a certain number of conditions detailed in the internal rules of the two chambers. In particular, such a commission must not interfere with judicial investigations, which usually means that a commission is not created after a judicial process is initiated, or is dismantled within six months of this time. The commission can have up to 30 members whose political affiliation must mirror the share of parliamentary groups in the plenary.
Commissions have the right to summon ministers and can call upon the Court of Auditors to assist them. In principle, noncompliance or refusal to appear may lead to fines and other judicial sanctions. This is very rare, however.
While these commissions undeniably have power, it is worth mentioning that several major issues in the past few years, such as the handling of the yellow vest crisis or the pandemic, did not lead to the initiation of investigative committees. Moreover, the general impression is that the principle of noninterference with judicial investigations – in the name of the separation of powers – ultimately prevents the creation of investigative committees on the issues with the most political importance. For the same reasons, the effects of these committees, which regularly produce lengthy reports, are rather minor, and they are very rarely critical of government action. Interestingly, the last serious study of these committees is more than 20 years old (Vallet 2003).
Citations:
VALLET, Élisabeth. 2003. “Les commissions d’enquête parlementaires sous la Cinquième République.” Revue française de droit constitutionnel 2003 (2): 249-278.
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
There is no congruence between the structures of ministries and those of parliamentary committees. The number of parliamentary committees is limited to eight (up from six in 2008) while there are 25 to 30 ministries or state secretaries. This rule, introduced in 1958, was meant as, and resulted in, a limitation of deputies’ power to follow and oversee each ministry’s activities closely and precisely. The 2007 – 2008 constitutional reform permitted a slight increase in the number of committees and allowed the establishment of committees dealing with European affairs.
Since 2009, the chair of the Finance Committee is given to the opposition. It is virtually impossible for an opposition politician to preside over any of the other seven permanent committees.
The influence on lawmaking is important to the extent that this provides backbenchers the opportunity to negotiate with the executive. However, the executive has several instruments to enforce the passage of its original proposal. It may reject any amendments that reduce government income or increase expenditure (Art. 40 of the constitution). Moreover, it may, use a “package” vote (Art. 44.3) – a procedure that is no longer used very often.
The 2022 legislative election did not yield a clear majority for the presidential camp. This situation had not been experienced since the 8th legislature (1988 – 1993). Rather than strengthening the influence of committees on draft legislation, the situation repeatedly led to situations of gridlock, with the government having a hard time adapting. As a consequence, Macron’s government repeatedly resorted to the procedure specified in Article 49.3, which allows the government to declare a bill adopted unless the government is removed by a no-confidence vote. Prime Minister Borne had used this procedure 20 times at the time of writing (January 2024), illustrating how governments may have their way in the legislature even without a majority.
Citations:
Brouard, S. 2013. “France: Systematic Institutional Advantage of Government in Lawmaking.” In S. Brouard, ed., The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting, 38-52. London: Routledge.
Since 2009, the chair of the Finance Committee is given to the opposition. It is virtually impossible for an opposition politician to preside over any of the other seven permanent committees.
The influence on lawmaking is important to the extent that this provides backbenchers the opportunity to negotiate with the executive. However, the executive has several instruments to enforce the passage of its original proposal. It may reject any amendments that reduce government income or increase expenditure (Art. 40 of the constitution). Moreover, it may, use a “package” vote (Art. 44.3) – a procedure that is no longer used very often.
The 2022 legislative election did not yield a clear majority for the presidential camp. This situation had not been experienced since the 8th legislature (1988 – 1993). Rather than strengthening the influence of committees on draft legislation, the situation repeatedly led to situations of gridlock, with the government having a hard time adapting. As a consequence, Macron’s government repeatedly resorted to the procedure specified in Article 49.3, which allows the government to declare a bill adopted unless the government is removed by a no-confidence vote. Prime Minister Borne had used this procedure 20 times at the time of writing (January 2024), illustrating how governments may have their way in the legislature even without a majority.
Citations:
Brouard, S. 2013. “France: Systematic Institutional Advantage of Government in Lawmaking.” In S. Brouard, ed., The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting, 38-52. London: Routledge.