Vertical Accountability
#21Key Findings
France falls into the lower-middle ranks internationally (rank 21) with respect to vertical accountability.
Political competition in France is open and not systematically biased. Candidate financial activities must be reported, and are overseen by a national commission. Political parties and candidates range from the far left to the extreme right. Electoral swings are common.
Voting rights are fully guaranteed to all citizens aged 18 and older, and registration is easy. Elections are well-organized, usually running smoothly and transparently. There is no independent electoral management body. The majoritarian system tends to underrepresent minorities.
France’s party system has weakened substantially, especially after the 2017 political upheaval that favored Macron’s movement. Collaboration between parties has been the exception rather than the rule. Access to public information is guaranteed by law, with some restrictions.
Political competition in France is open and not systematically biased. Candidate financial activities must be reported, and are overseen by a national commission. Political parties and candidates range from the far left to the extreme right. Electoral swings are common.
Voting rights are fully guaranteed to all citizens aged 18 and older, and registration is easy. Elections are well-organized, usually running smoothly and transparently. There is no independent electoral management body. The majoritarian system tends to underrepresent minorities.
France’s party system has weakened substantially, especially after the 2017 political upheaval that favored Macron’s movement. Collaboration between parties has been the exception rather than the rule. Access to public information is guaranteed by law, with some restrictions.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
Political competition for access to power is open and not systematically biased. Overall, political practices and regulations both contribute to fair access and transparency.
Requirements to be a candidate in elections are generally limited (see Aceproject 2024). French nationality is required except for European and local elections; in such cases, being a citizen of an EU country is sufficient, as long as the potential candidate resides in France. The minimum age of eligibility has been 18 for all elections since 2011, except for the senatorial elections, for which the minimum age is 24. Potential candidates must not have been deprived of civic and voting rights, and must be registered on the electoral rolls. Residence within the electoral district is also expected – although this condition is generally limited to the obligation to pay local taxes in this territory. Candidates then have to deposit a file with the “préfecture” – the local office of the central government – or with the Constitutional Council (for the presidential election).
For presidential elections, this file includes a mandatory declaration of possible conflicts of interest as well as a disclosure of patrimony at the time of the election. Controversially, presidential candidates must also present 500 signatures by sponsors. These signatures can be given by officeholders at the local or national level, and are made public. Although some candidates fail to gather the requested number of signatures, this has not prevented a certain diversity, with 12 candidates participating in the first round of the presidential election of 2022 (Bendjaballah and Sauger 2023).
Over the course of the campaign, whatever the level, all candidate financial activities have to be registered and then reported (CNCCFP 2024). The National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Funding (Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques, CNCCFP) is an independent regulatory agency in charge of organizing the collection and dissemination of this data. The data are published in the Official Journal of the Republic. Candidate accounts also must be certified. Donations from firms and organizations to candidates have been banned since the 1990s. Donations from private individuals are still allowed, with a cap set at €4,600 per individual for an election. All donations above €3,000 lead to the disclosure of the name of the donor. Political parties have similar obligations, with the CNCCFP supervising both candidates and parties. For parties, maximum donations are set at €7,500 for an individual and €15,000 for the household as a whole.
In practice, the variety of the background of candidates and the spectrum of policy positions advocated by political parties is very large, from the radical Trotskyist left to the extreme neo-fascist right.
Access to the media is strictly monitored by the national independent agency in charge of mass and new media, Arcom (Authority of the Regulation of Audiovisual and Digital Communication, Autorité de régulation de la communication audiovisuelle et numérique). Media time accrued by all political actors is accounted for (Arcom 2024). Outside of electoral campaigns, Arcom imposes an allocation rule of one-third of the time for the president and the government, with the remaining two-thirds to be split in a “fair” manner among all parties. Fairness is based on the importance of parties, taking into account past electoral results, opinion polls and all relevant political dynamics. During election campaigns, media time allocation is even more strictly monitored. For presidential campaigns, during the official campaign – the last weeks of the race – Arcom switches its principle of fairness to a principle of strict equality of time granted to all candidates in the election.
Disproportionate media coverage of individual political actors because of their background characteristics has not recently led to long-lasting discussions. However, the surge of business leaders in the media landscape has triggered more reflections on their role. While many have invested in the written press, the most controversial case is Vincent Bolloré. This prominent businessman has bought print publications and TV groups in recent years, including Canal+. He has been accused of systematic interventions in these media, demanding a more conservative editorial line. The relative success of the radical right Eric Zemmour has largely been attributed to Bolloré’s support.
For digital media, the most acute issue stems from the intervention of Russian hackers in electoral campaigns. This has been proven, for instance, in the case of the 2017 election, in which the “Macron leaks” – the publication of several emails from Macron’s campaign team – was traced back to two groups of Russian hackers linked to Russian special operations (Vilmer 2020).
The fair media coverage principle and regulations on party and candidate funding are also mostly respected in practice. For instance, the public disclosure of financial accounts is centralized by the CNCCFP, and failure to meet its standards leads to the loss of state public funding, which is crucial for most significant parties. Of course, violations still take place. On the one hand, all pieces of legislation have their loopholes. For example, CNCCFP is currently working to track personal loans to candidates or parties, which are increasing and lack some transparency. On the other hand, scandals regarding the funding of campaigns have tainted several prominent candidates’ reputations. Nicolas Sarkozy was notably deemed guilty by courts of submitting fake invoices in his presidential campaign of 2012, and is awaiting trial for receiving funding from the state of Libya in his 2007 campaign. The participation of the audit firm McKinsey in Emmanuel Macron’s electoral campaigns of 2017 and 2022 is also currently under scrutiny by the National Judicial Prosecutor’s Office.
To some extent, the periodic losses by incumbents demonstrates the openness of the country’s political competition. Electoral swings are important, and new credible candidates can emerge in a matter of months at the national level. Even the politicization of the design of the political districts map – which is mostly in the hands of the Ministry of Interior – does not lead to massive gerrymandering but rather to inaction, as actors are worried by the possible accusation of manipulation (Sauger and Grofman 2016). Conversely, the ease of credibly entering political races could be seen as a potential problem in terms of political stability and effective accountability.
Citations:
Aceproject. 2024. “France.” https://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/FR/default-fr?set_language=fr
Arcom. 2024. “Publication des relevés des temps de parole et d’antenne.” https://www.arcom.fr/actualites/election-presidentielle-2022-publication-des-releves-des-temps-de-parole-et-dantenne
Bendjaballah, S. and N. Sauger. 2023. “France: Political Developments and Data for 2022: Back to Normal?” European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook. Available at https://doi.org/10.1111/2047-8852.12403
CNCCFP. 2024. “Elections.” https://www.cnccfp.fr/elections
Sauger, N., and Bernard Grofman. 2016. “Partisan Bias and Redistricting in France.” Electoral Studies 44: 388-396. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.09.007
Vilmer, J. B. J. 2020. “Fighting Information Manipulation: The French Experience.” In Disinformation and Fake News, 75-89. Singapore: Springer.
Requirements to be a candidate in elections are generally limited (see Aceproject 2024). French nationality is required except for European and local elections; in such cases, being a citizen of an EU country is sufficient, as long as the potential candidate resides in France. The minimum age of eligibility has been 18 for all elections since 2011, except for the senatorial elections, for which the minimum age is 24. Potential candidates must not have been deprived of civic and voting rights, and must be registered on the electoral rolls. Residence within the electoral district is also expected – although this condition is generally limited to the obligation to pay local taxes in this territory. Candidates then have to deposit a file with the “préfecture” – the local office of the central government – or with the Constitutional Council (for the presidential election).
For presidential elections, this file includes a mandatory declaration of possible conflicts of interest as well as a disclosure of patrimony at the time of the election. Controversially, presidential candidates must also present 500 signatures by sponsors. These signatures can be given by officeholders at the local or national level, and are made public. Although some candidates fail to gather the requested number of signatures, this has not prevented a certain diversity, with 12 candidates participating in the first round of the presidential election of 2022 (Bendjaballah and Sauger 2023).
Over the course of the campaign, whatever the level, all candidate financial activities have to be registered and then reported (CNCCFP 2024). The National Commission for Campaign Accounts and Political Funding (Commission nationale des comptes de campagne et des financements politiques, CNCCFP) is an independent regulatory agency in charge of organizing the collection and dissemination of this data. The data are published in the Official Journal of the Republic. Candidate accounts also must be certified. Donations from firms and organizations to candidates have been banned since the 1990s. Donations from private individuals are still allowed, with a cap set at €4,600 per individual for an election. All donations above €3,000 lead to the disclosure of the name of the donor. Political parties have similar obligations, with the CNCCFP supervising both candidates and parties. For parties, maximum donations are set at €7,500 for an individual and €15,000 for the household as a whole.
In practice, the variety of the background of candidates and the spectrum of policy positions advocated by political parties is very large, from the radical Trotskyist left to the extreme neo-fascist right.
Access to the media is strictly monitored by the national independent agency in charge of mass and new media, Arcom (Authority of the Regulation of Audiovisual and Digital Communication, Autorité de régulation de la communication audiovisuelle et numérique). Media time accrued by all political actors is accounted for (Arcom 2024). Outside of electoral campaigns, Arcom imposes an allocation rule of one-third of the time for the president and the government, with the remaining two-thirds to be split in a “fair” manner among all parties. Fairness is based on the importance of parties, taking into account past electoral results, opinion polls and all relevant political dynamics. During election campaigns, media time allocation is even more strictly monitored. For presidential campaigns, during the official campaign – the last weeks of the race – Arcom switches its principle of fairness to a principle of strict equality of time granted to all candidates in the election.
Disproportionate media coverage of individual political actors because of their background characteristics has not recently led to long-lasting discussions. However, the surge of business leaders in the media landscape has triggered more reflections on their role. While many have invested in the written press, the most controversial case is Vincent Bolloré. This prominent businessman has bought print publications and TV groups in recent years, including Canal+. He has been accused of systematic interventions in these media, demanding a more conservative editorial line. The relative success of the radical right Eric Zemmour has largely been attributed to Bolloré’s support.
For digital media, the most acute issue stems from the intervention of Russian hackers in electoral campaigns. This has been proven, for instance, in the case of the 2017 election, in which the “Macron leaks” – the publication of several emails from Macron’s campaign team – was traced back to two groups of Russian hackers linked to Russian special operations (Vilmer 2020).
The fair media coverage principle and regulations on party and candidate funding are also mostly respected in practice. For instance, the public disclosure of financial accounts is centralized by the CNCCFP, and failure to meet its standards leads to the loss of state public funding, which is crucial for most significant parties. Of course, violations still take place. On the one hand, all pieces of legislation have their loopholes. For example, CNCCFP is currently working to track personal loans to candidates or parties, which are increasing and lack some transparency. On the other hand, scandals regarding the funding of campaigns have tainted several prominent candidates’ reputations. Nicolas Sarkozy was notably deemed guilty by courts of submitting fake invoices in his presidential campaign of 2012, and is awaiting trial for receiving funding from the state of Libya in his 2007 campaign. The participation of the audit firm McKinsey in Emmanuel Macron’s electoral campaigns of 2017 and 2022 is also currently under scrutiny by the National Judicial Prosecutor’s Office.
To some extent, the periodic losses by incumbents demonstrates the openness of the country’s political competition. Electoral swings are important, and new credible candidates can emerge in a matter of months at the national level. Even the politicization of the design of the political districts map – which is mostly in the hands of the Ministry of Interior – does not lead to massive gerrymandering but rather to inaction, as actors are worried by the possible accusation of manipulation (Sauger and Grofman 2016). Conversely, the ease of credibly entering political races could be seen as a potential problem in terms of political stability and effective accountability.
Citations:
Aceproject. 2024. “France.” https://aceproject.org/regions-en/countries-and-territories/FR/default-fr?set_language=fr
Arcom. 2024. “Publication des relevés des temps de parole et d’antenne.” https://www.arcom.fr/actualites/election-presidentielle-2022-publication-des-releves-des-temps-de-parole-et-dantenne
Bendjaballah, S. and N. Sauger. 2023. “France: Political Developments and Data for 2022: Back to Normal?” European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook. Available at https://doi.org/10.1111/2047-8852.12403
CNCCFP. 2024. “Elections.” https://www.cnccfp.fr/elections
Sauger, N., and Bernard Grofman. 2016. “Partisan Bias and Redistricting in France.” Electoral Studies 44: 388-396. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.09.007
Vilmer, J. B. J. 2020. “Fighting Information Manipulation: The French Experience.” In Disinformation and Fake News, 75-89. Singapore: Springer.
To what extent can all citizens, both in legal terms (de jure) and in practice (de facto), exercise their right to vote?
10
9
9
There are no significant barriers, by law or in practice, that hinder citizens or specific groups in society from exercising their right to vote.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to voting.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to voting.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles that substantially hinder voting.
The right to participate in elections is fully guaranteed. Every citizen age 18 or older enjoys voting rights provided by the constitution. This includes expatriates and convicts, if no specific deprivation of civic capacity has been pronounced. There is no option to vote by mail, but those not living in France can either vote abroad (in consulates or embassies) or by delegating power to a designated person in France. No progress has been made with regard to extending this right to vote to residents holding foreign citizenship, except in the case of EU citizens for both local and European elections (Service-Public 2024).
Voter registration is easy. It is almost automatic when young people register for the first time. Registration requires only an ID. It is usually estimated that some 10% of the electorate is not registered. This concerns two main groups: those who refuse to vote and those who have changed residence and subsequently neglected to register in their new place of residence. The monitoring of voter rolls has largely improved since 2016, with the creation of the “Répertoire électoral unique” (INSEE 2024) – a national integrated file for electoral registers. The National Statistical Institute oversees the maintenance of this file, a task it performs quite efficiently.
Voting operations are organized at the municipal level under the scrutiny of the Ministry of Interior, which is in charge of the organization of elections. Voting stations are usually easily accessible by foot for most people, but no individualized service is available for those with disabilities. Local authorities sometimes organize stations for institutionalized persons (mostly for those in retirement homes). Prisoners have yet to vote by proxy in most cases.
Proxy voting is the only way to cast a vote without doing so in person. This has been made easier over the years. In 2022, 6.7% of registered voters had voted at least once by proxy voting (Stéphan 2022).
In practice, the organization of elections goes smoothly in most cases. Elections are organized on time and on the basis of well-established directives. Although the COVID-19 pandemic made local organization tasks more complicated, elections were held with limited difficulties even then, aside from concerns about further virus spread. Voting stations are open on Sundays from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. (up to 8 p.m. in large cities). Cheating at the voting booth may exist, but is not widespread. The only actual troubles encountered recently have stemmed from the use of electronic voting devices especially for those living abroad (Conseil Constitutionnel 2024). Major anomalies – such as the fact that a majority of validation codes were been distributed – led the Constitutional Council to nullify results in two districts in the legislative elections of 2022.
The simplicity of the electoral system, the fact that elections are in most cases held one at a time, and the involvement of local authorities and citizen volunteers (especially for counting votes) in the organization of the operations all contribute to making the electoral process transparent and uncontroversial. The absence of an impartial and independent electoral management body has not proved problematic in this regard to date. The decline observed in electoral turnout rates should not be attributed to issues relating to the organization of elections, but rather to more general social and political dynamics.
Citations:
Conseil Constitutionnel. 2024. “Le Conseil constitutionnel annule, en raison des dysfonctionnements intervenus lors du vote électronique.” https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/actualites/le-conseil-constitutionnel-annule-en-raison-des-dysfonctionnements-intervenus-lors-du-vote
INSEE. 2024. “Le répertoire électoral unique.” https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/3539086
Service-Public. 2024. “Élections : droit de vote d’un citoyen européen en France.” https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F1937
Stéphan, N. 2022. “3,3 millions d’électeurs ont établi au moins une procuration pour les élections de 2022.” INSEE Focus 273. Available at https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6480276
Voter registration is easy. It is almost automatic when young people register for the first time. Registration requires only an ID. It is usually estimated that some 10% of the electorate is not registered. This concerns two main groups: those who refuse to vote and those who have changed residence and subsequently neglected to register in their new place of residence. The monitoring of voter rolls has largely improved since 2016, with the creation of the “Répertoire électoral unique” (INSEE 2024) – a national integrated file for electoral registers. The National Statistical Institute oversees the maintenance of this file, a task it performs quite efficiently.
Voting operations are organized at the municipal level under the scrutiny of the Ministry of Interior, which is in charge of the organization of elections. Voting stations are usually easily accessible by foot for most people, but no individualized service is available for those with disabilities. Local authorities sometimes organize stations for institutionalized persons (mostly for those in retirement homes). Prisoners have yet to vote by proxy in most cases.
Proxy voting is the only way to cast a vote without doing so in person. This has been made easier over the years. In 2022, 6.7% of registered voters had voted at least once by proxy voting (Stéphan 2022).
In practice, the organization of elections goes smoothly in most cases. Elections are organized on time and on the basis of well-established directives. Although the COVID-19 pandemic made local organization tasks more complicated, elections were held with limited difficulties even then, aside from concerns about further virus spread. Voting stations are open on Sundays from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. (up to 8 p.m. in large cities). Cheating at the voting booth may exist, but is not widespread. The only actual troubles encountered recently have stemmed from the use of electronic voting devices especially for those living abroad (Conseil Constitutionnel 2024). Major anomalies – such as the fact that a majority of validation codes were been distributed – led the Constitutional Council to nullify results in two districts in the legislative elections of 2022.
The simplicity of the electoral system, the fact that elections are in most cases held one at a time, and the involvement of local authorities and citizen volunteers (especially for counting votes) in the organization of the operations all contribute to making the electoral process transparent and uncontroversial. The absence of an impartial and independent electoral management body has not proved problematic in this regard to date. The decline observed in electoral turnout rates should not be attributed to issues relating to the organization of elections, but rather to more general social and political dynamics.
Citations:
Conseil Constitutionnel. 2024. “Le Conseil constitutionnel annule, en raison des dysfonctionnements intervenus lors du vote électronique.” https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/actualites/le-conseil-constitutionnel-annule-en-raison-des-dysfonctionnements-intervenus-lors-du-vote
INSEE. 2024. “Le répertoire électoral unique.” https://www.insee.fr/fr/information/3539086
Service-Public. 2024. “Élections : droit de vote d’un citoyen européen en France.” https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F1937
Stéphan, N. 2022. “3,3 millions d’électeurs ont établi au moins une procuration pour les élections de 2022.” INSEE Focus 273. Available at https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/6480276
Graph View
To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
2
1
1
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
The Fifth Republic is constructed as a majoritarian political system, with a two-round majority-based system for both direct presidential and legislative elections. As such, this system tends to create a significant imbalance between the expression of preferences by citizens and the political representation in practice (Grossman and Sauger 2009). The minority is systematically underrepresented in institutions, starting with the presidential office – which is by definition held singly. This has led to France being characterized as one of the most disproportional countries in Europe in terms of political representation. In the first round of the vote, there are few constraints on citizens’ expression. Twelve candidates competed in the 2022 presidential race. But the mechanical effect of the runoff drastically reduces the political offerings.
This imbalance has been reinforced by various second-order elections that have been introduced in recent decades (Parodi 1997). These have tended to further open the competition to a variety of actors through, for instance, a proportional component for municipal, regional and European elections. But they also involve strict majority logic, especially with the bonus system for municipal and regional elections (Bedock and Sauger 2014).
The electoral system nevertheless also offers incentives for societal representation. Parity laws have either introduced strict rules for equal representation between men and women for all list systems or monetary penalties if parties do not field as many women as men in legislative elections. The first female president has yet to be elected. In the same way, the districting system for legislative elections fosters local representation. Senators, indirectly elected, even have an explicit mandate to represent “territories.” Decentralization and autonomy processes have pushed this local representation a step further, especially in Corsica and in overseas territories. There, local party systems have often been created to better represent local issues and specific aspirations to independence or resistance to such a move.
French parties, as organizations, remain weak compared to many of their European counterparts. The entire party system fell to pieces after the 2017 political earthquake. While this destructive phase has permitted Macron to sweep away the old political forces to the advantage of his new movement, it has also contributed to the weakening of the traditional mediatory institutions. This is true even of the president’s own movement, La République en Marche (since renamed Renaissance), which has been unable to transform itself into a truly developed party with a full-scale organization and capable of fulfilling a mediatory role. Its roots at the local level remain strictly limited, all the more so since the party has managed at most limited successes in local elections. Over the last few years, the situation has not improved; on the contrary, the Macron movement has lost appeal, and finds itself already in a structural crisis due to internal competition in the quest for a new presidential leader. The leftist parties are weaker and more divided than ever, while the extreme-right movements are flourishing. The hard-right National Rally, whose ambition was to appear more responsible and moderate, now has to compete with a newcomer, Éric Zemmour, whose radical rhetoric is based on the “French decline” and the invasion of migrants. The National Rally presently looks like the overall winner of this situation, embodying the only structured opposition to a weak governmental party (Rouban 2022).
The weakness of party organization and institutionalization does not prevent parties from innovating ideologically and attempting to respond to citizens’ expectations. The range is broad, from the radical Trotskyist left to the far right, ranging as well from environmental to nationalist parties. The overall positioning of these parties is generally clear. This was somewhat blurred by Macron’s move in 2017 to bridge the moderate left and moderate right traditions. More generally, precise party programs are scarce, and when they do exist, they are not intensively used in party communications. To some extent, all parties address the majority, broadly defined by the working or middle class. The “enemy” is what differs most between the parties. This is liberalism for the left, the extremes for the center, and immigrants for the radical right. Parties do not seem willing to build on group consultation or seek academic expertise, despite some isolated initiatives in this area. Most key decisions appear to be the result of leaders’ initiatives or based on short-term opinion poll feedback.
The variety of choices between parties does not generally preclude a feeling of disconnect between the population and its political elite. Part of this feeling might be attributable to the observation of significant differences between what is promised and what is actually delivered once in government. Even if pledges are often respected, the general outcomes of governmental actions too often fall short of citizens’ expectations.
Citations:
Bedock, C., and N. Sauger. 2014. “Electoral Systems with a Majority Bonus as Unconventional Mixed Systems.” Representation 50 (1): 99-112. Available at 10.1080/00344893.2014.902220
Grossman, E., and Sauger, N. 2009. “The End of Ambiguity? Presidents Versus Parties or the Four Phases of the Fifth Republic.” West European Politics 32 (2): 423-437. Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802670743
Parodi, J.-L. 1997. “Proportionnalisation périodique, cohabitation, atomisation partisane: un triple défi pour le régime semi-présidentiel de la Cinquième République.” Revue Française de Science Politique 47 (3/4): 292–312.
Rouban, Luc. 2022. La vraie victoire du RN. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
This imbalance has been reinforced by various second-order elections that have been introduced in recent decades (Parodi 1997). These have tended to further open the competition to a variety of actors through, for instance, a proportional component for municipal, regional and European elections. But they also involve strict majority logic, especially with the bonus system for municipal and regional elections (Bedock and Sauger 2014).
The electoral system nevertheless also offers incentives for societal representation. Parity laws have either introduced strict rules for equal representation between men and women for all list systems or monetary penalties if parties do not field as many women as men in legislative elections. The first female president has yet to be elected. In the same way, the districting system for legislative elections fosters local representation. Senators, indirectly elected, even have an explicit mandate to represent “territories.” Decentralization and autonomy processes have pushed this local representation a step further, especially in Corsica and in overseas territories. There, local party systems have often been created to better represent local issues and specific aspirations to independence or resistance to such a move.
French parties, as organizations, remain weak compared to many of their European counterparts. The entire party system fell to pieces after the 2017 political earthquake. While this destructive phase has permitted Macron to sweep away the old political forces to the advantage of his new movement, it has also contributed to the weakening of the traditional mediatory institutions. This is true even of the president’s own movement, La République en Marche (since renamed Renaissance), which has been unable to transform itself into a truly developed party with a full-scale organization and capable of fulfilling a mediatory role. Its roots at the local level remain strictly limited, all the more so since the party has managed at most limited successes in local elections. Over the last few years, the situation has not improved; on the contrary, the Macron movement has lost appeal, and finds itself already in a structural crisis due to internal competition in the quest for a new presidential leader. The leftist parties are weaker and more divided than ever, while the extreme-right movements are flourishing. The hard-right National Rally, whose ambition was to appear more responsible and moderate, now has to compete with a newcomer, Éric Zemmour, whose radical rhetoric is based on the “French decline” and the invasion of migrants. The National Rally presently looks like the overall winner of this situation, embodying the only structured opposition to a weak governmental party (Rouban 2022).
The weakness of party organization and institutionalization does not prevent parties from innovating ideologically and attempting to respond to citizens’ expectations. The range is broad, from the radical Trotskyist left to the far right, ranging as well from environmental to nationalist parties. The overall positioning of these parties is generally clear. This was somewhat blurred by Macron’s move in 2017 to bridge the moderate left and moderate right traditions. More generally, precise party programs are scarce, and when they do exist, they are not intensively used in party communications. To some extent, all parties address the majority, broadly defined by the working or middle class. The “enemy” is what differs most between the parties. This is liberalism for the left, the extremes for the center, and immigrants for the radical right. Parties do not seem willing to build on group consultation or seek academic expertise, despite some isolated initiatives in this area. Most key decisions appear to be the result of leaders’ initiatives or based on short-term opinion poll feedback.
The variety of choices between parties does not generally preclude a feeling of disconnect between the population and its political elite. Part of this feeling might be attributable to the observation of significant differences between what is promised and what is actually delivered once in government. Even if pledges are often respected, the general outcomes of governmental actions too often fall short of citizens’ expectations.
Citations:
Bedock, C., and N. Sauger. 2014. “Electoral Systems with a Majority Bonus as Unconventional Mixed Systems.” Representation 50 (1): 99-112. Available at 10.1080/00344893.2014.902220
Grossman, E., and Sauger, N. 2009. “The End of Ambiguity? Presidents Versus Parties or the Four Phases of the Fifth Republic.” West European Politics 32 (2): 423-437. Available at https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802670743
Parodi, J.-L. 1997. “Proportionnalisation périodique, cohabitation, atomisation partisane: un triple défi pour le régime semi-présidentiel de la Cinquième République.” Revue Française de Science Politique 47 (3/4): 292–312.
Rouban, Luc. 2022. La vraie victoire du RN. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
2
1
1
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
With France’s diverse party system, it is no surprise that several parties can be considered as challenging the existing institutional order. While almost no party directly contests liberal democratic principles, France is home to populist and radical parties on both the left and the right of the political spectrum. Populist parties received about half of the votes in the legislative elections of 2022. This results from both the continuing progress of the radical right and the new dominance of La France Insoumise on the left, working through the NUPES alliance. What is more surprising is that almost all parties have contested the established order in one way or another. Macron’s success was built on denouncing the incumbent elite’s incapacity. Both the Socialist Party and the Republicans, once the dominant governmental parties, have not only lost most of their influence, but are also now under the influence of the more radical parties. PS has happily participated in the NUPES alliance. The Republicans have increasingly considered not only coming closer to the position of the National Rally, but even directly collaborating with it.
Since the elections of 2022, France has been governed by a minority government. This is the result both of the mediocre performance of the presidential party in the legislative elections and the incapacity to forge a governmental coalition that extends beyond the president’s supporters. Despite several attempts to negotiate a more structured and durable agreement with the Republicans, both during the formation of the government and during the pension reform process, these efforts have failed. The government has considered no alternative to this coalition.
This more generally reflects the workings of a polarized party system. France has a long tradition of polarization. The divide between left and right has been a constant feature of French politics, reflecting ideological and social tensions as well as tensions between the center and periphery. All this has contributed to the country’s antagonistic political and social structure. Consensual collaboration has been the exception rather than the rule.
Things may have changed following the 2017 presidential election, since the new president managed to form a coalition with elements from the center-right and center-left, pushing the remaining parties to the extremes of the political spectrum. But the idea of overcoming the sterile left-right polarization for the benefit of more consensual progressive policymaking seems to have failed. Macron’s strategy has even increased polarization between his movement and the extreme right, marginalizing all other parties as he has tried to force moderates to rally around his flag. The result is that moderates have been split between rallying to Macron and rallying to more radical alternatives. This, in turn, weakens one of the constraining rules of the game in French politics – the so-called cordon sanitaire around the far right.
Zemmour’s surge has helped in this regard, but it reflects more generally the evolution toward a three-bloc politics, not unlike the situation of the Fourth Republic, with centrist parties opposed to radicals on both extremes.
In the end, this process has failed in several respects. On one hand, reform has proved to be increasingly difficult. The pension reform and the bill on immigration have shown that the only ways to act have been either through the so-called 49.3 procedure – which allows measures to be passed though the National Assembly without a vote – or with a drift in bill content toward the positions of the radical right. On the other hand, it has also contributed to the “normalization” of the hard-right National Rally, and has created the option of explicit collaborations if not coalitions with it.
Since the elections of 2022, France has been governed by a minority government. This is the result both of the mediocre performance of the presidential party in the legislative elections and the incapacity to forge a governmental coalition that extends beyond the president’s supporters. Despite several attempts to negotiate a more structured and durable agreement with the Republicans, both during the formation of the government and during the pension reform process, these efforts have failed. The government has considered no alternative to this coalition.
This more generally reflects the workings of a polarized party system. France has a long tradition of polarization. The divide between left and right has been a constant feature of French politics, reflecting ideological and social tensions as well as tensions between the center and periphery. All this has contributed to the country’s antagonistic political and social structure. Consensual collaboration has been the exception rather than the rule.
Things may have changed following the 2017 presidential election, since the new president managed to form a coalition with elements from the center-right and center-left, pushing the remaining parties to the extremes of the political spectrum. But the idea of overcoming the sterile left-right polarization for the benefit of more consensual progressive policymaking seems to have failed. Macron’s strategy has even increased polarization between his movement and the extreme right, marginalizing all other parties as he has tried to force moderates to rally around his flag. The result is that moderates have been split between rallying to Macron and rallying to more radical alternatives. This, in turn, weakens one of the constraining rules of the game in French politics – the so-called cordon sanitaire around the far right.
Zemmour’s surge has helped in this regard, but it reflects more generally the evolution toward a three-bloc politics, not unlike the situation of the Fourth Republic, with centrist parties opposed to radicals on both extremes.
In the end, this process has failed in several respects. On one hand, reform has proved to be increasingly difficult. The pension reform and the bill on immigration have shown that the only ways to act have been either through the so-called 49.3 procedure – which allows measures to be passed though the National Assembly without a vote – or with a drift in bill content toward the positions of the radical right. On the other hand, it has also contributed to the “normalization” of the hard-right National Rally, and has created the option of explicit collaborations if not coalitions with it.
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To what extent can citizens and residents access official information?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose many/various significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
The right of access to information is solidly assured since it was strengthened in 1978 through the establishment of an independent agency, the Commission d’Accès aux Documents Administratifs (CADA). This body guarantees that any private or public entity is entitled to be given any document requested from a public administration or service – regardless of the legal status of the organization (private or public) – if the institution operates a public service.
However, some restrictions have been established, mainly in relation to issues regarding the private sphere, the protection of intellectual property, or business information relevant to safeguarding competition between companies (Marique and Slautsky 2019). The main and more controversial issue is the refusal to issue documents by citing security or defense concerns – a concept that can be applied broadly, with limited room for court challenges.
The institution in question must deliver the requested document within a month. After that deadline, inaction is considered to be a rejection that can be challenged in court and/or by submitting a request to the Défenseur des Droits (Defender of Civic Rights, effectively the ombudsman). In some cases, the solutions adopted reflect political elites’ inability to adopt clear-cut policies; for instance, it is possible to review the declarations submitted by members of parliament of revenues and property, but divulging this information is considered to be a criminal offense. This is a telling illustration of the reluctance to set up a full transparency policy.
In general, a large range of governmental (or public bodies’) information, including official drafts, reports and audits, are freely accessible via the internet and on a dedicated platform, data.gouv.fr. Beyond the legal rules, two media outlets in particular – Canard enchaîné and Mediapart – have specialized in leaking information that public authorities would prefer to keep secret. This has become an important part of the transparency process.
Citations:
Marique, Y., and E. Slautsky. 2019. “Freedom of Information in France: Law and Practice.” In The Laws of Transparency in Action: A European Perspective, eds. D. Dragos, B. Marseille, and P. Kovac, 73-118. Palgrave. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3033917
However, some restrictions have been established, mainly in relation to issues regarding the private sphere, the protection of intellectual property, or business information relevant to safeguarding competition between companies (Marique and Slautsky 2019). The main and more controversial issue is the refusal to issue documents by citing security or defense concerns – a concept that can be applied broadly, with limited room for court challenges.
The institution in question must deliver the requested document within a month. After that deadline, inaction is considered to be a rejection that can be challenged in court and/or by submitting a request to the Défenseur des Droits (Defender of Civic Rights, effectively the ombudsman). In some cases, the solutions adopted reflect political elites’ inability to adopt clear-cut policies; for instance, it is possible to review the declarations submitted by members of parliament of revenues and property, but divulging this information is considered to be a criminal offense. This is a telling illustration of the reluctance to set up a full transparency policy.
In general, a large range of governmental (or public bodies’) information, including official drafts, reports and audits, are freely accessible via the internet and on a dedicated platform, data.gouv.fr. Beyond the legal rules, two media outlets in particular – Canard enchaîné and Mediapart – have specialized in leaking information that public authorities would prefer to keep secret. This has become an important part of the transparency process.
Citations:
Marique, Y., and E. Slautsky. 2019. “Freedom of Information in France: Law and Practice.” In The Laws of Transparency in Action: A European Perspective, eds. D. Dragos, B. Marseille, and P. Kovac, 73-118. Palgrave. Available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3033917