Coordination
#6Key Findings
Germany performs well in international comparison (rank 6) in the category of coordination.
Communication between the Federal Chancellery and line ministries is robust, though this does not guarantee smooth cooperation, as conflicts within a coalition can cause tensions. The Chancellery has a large analytical staff, some of whom mirror line ministry responsibilities.
Line ministries largely design and prepare policy proposals, while the chancellor sets priorities. Formal and informal coordination mechanisms are meant to prevent major conflicts, but coalition parties occasionally seek to obtain political advantage by taking differences into the public. The coalition committee is the most important informal meeting venue.
Public service provision in Germany is well-organized across different levels of government, with subnational governments enjoying significant autonomy. Cooperation between the federal government and the states is highly institutionalized. States hold more power than the national government in areas such as education, and meet regularly to discuss issues.
Communication between the Federal Chancellery and line ministries is robust, though this does not guarantee smooth cooperation, as conflicts within a coalition can cause tensions. The Chancellery has a large analytical staff, some of whom mirror line ministry responsibilities.
Line ministries largely design and prepare policy proposals, while the chancellor sets priorities. Formal and informal coordination mechanisms are meant to prevent major conflicts, but coalition parties occasionally seek to obtain political advantage by taking differences into the public. The coalition committee is the most important informal meeting venue.
Public service provision in Germany is well-organized across different levels of government, with subnational governments enjoying significant autonomy. Cooperation between the federal government and the states is highly institutionalized. States hold more power than the national government in areas such as education, and meet regularly to discuss issues.
To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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7
6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
5
4
3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
Germany has a high level of intergovernmental communication, especially between the Federal Chancellery and the line ministries. This does not always lead to successful cooperation between the units. While the chancellor gives guidelines and direction to foster coherent policymaking across the line ministries, inter-party conflict – typical for German coalition governments and heightened under the current “Traffic Light Coalition” – still occasionally leads to intergovernmental tensions. However, formal and informal mechanisms of coordination often successfully calm or fully prevent outright conflict.
Coordination mechanisms between the German Federal Chancellery and the line ministries exist and are frequently used for both formal and informal coordination. The German Federal Chancellery employs around 620 staff members. Its policy units assess, filter, and analyze policies and current developments, supporting the German Chancellor (Olaf Scholz). Some of these units, known as “Spiegelreferate,” mirror the responsibilities of each line ministry in the chancellery and facilitate policy work in these areas (Busse and Hofmann, 2019).
The design and preparation of bills and policy proposals, following the “Ressortprinzip,” is largely the prerogative of the line ministries, while the chancellor should provide direction and priorities (“Richtlinienprinzip”).
Line ministries typically share policy proposals with officials from the chancellery before introducing them in the federal cabinet, where the chancellor must ultimately sign off on them. This process aligns priorities. Conflicts are often resolved in the weekly meetings between the head of the chancellery and the state secretaries. However, this mechanism frequently reaches its limits when coalition parties publicize their differences and seek to gain an advantage in political competition.
Weekly meetings occur between line ministries and the chancellery at various levels. These include meetings between the chief of the chancellery and the state secretaries, as well as lower-level meetings within interministerial working groups that include the chancellery.
During the observation period, conflicts between coalition partners emerged on almost all relevant issues, from support for Ukraine to the budget, from welfare programs for less wealthy families to energy policy. The chancellery was rarely able to mitigate these conflicts (see Zohlnhöfer and Engler 2024).
Citations:
Busse, V., Hofmann, H. 2019. Bundeskanzleramt und Bundesregierung. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium für Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html
Zohlnhöfer, Reimut, and Fabian Engler. 2024. “Fortschritt gewagt – und wie weit gekommen? Eine Halbzeitbilanz der Ampel-Koalition unter Olaf Scholz.” Gesellschaft. Wirtschaft. Politik 73(1): 55-67. https://doi.org/10.10.3224/gwp.v73i1.07
Coordination mechanisms between the German Federal Chancellery and the line ministries exist and are frequently used for both formal and informal coordination. The German Federal Chancellery employs around 620 staff members. Its policy units assess, filter, and analyze policies and current developments, supporting the German Chancellor (Olaf Scholz). Some of these units, known as “Spiegelreferate,” mirror the responsibilities of each line ministry in the chancellery and facilitate policy work in these areas (Busse and Hofmann, 2019).
The design and preparation of bills and policy proposals, following the “Ressortprinzip,” is largely the prerogative of the line ministries, while the chancellor should provide direction and priorities (“Richtlinienprinzip”).
Line ministries typically share policy proposals with officials from the chancellery before introducing them in the federal cabinet, where the chancellor must ultimately sign off on them. This process aligns priorities. Conflicts are often resolved in the weekly meetings between the head of the chancellery and the state secretaries. However, this mechanism frequently reaches its limits when coalition parties publicize their differences and seek to gain an advantage in political competition.
Weekly meetings occur between line ministries and the chancellery at various levels. These include meetings between the chief of the chancellery and the state secretaries, as well as lower-level meetings within interministerial working groups that include the chancellery.
During the observation period, conflicts between coalition partners emerged on almost all relevant issues, from support for Ukraine to the budget, from welfare programs for less wealthy families to energy policy. The chancellery was rarely able to mitigate these conflicts (see Zohlnhöfer and Engler 2024).
Citations:
Busse, V., Hofmann, H. 2019. Bundeskanzleramt und Bundesregierung. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium für Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html
Zohlnhöfer, Reimut, and Fabian Engler. 2024. “Fortschritt gewagt – und wie weit gekommen? Eine Halbzeitbilanz der Ampel-Koalition unter Olaf Scholz.” Gesellschaft. Wirtschaft. Politik 73(1): 55-67. https://doi.org/10.10.3224/gwp.v73i1.07
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
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9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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6
7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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3
4
3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
2
1
1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Policy proposals often affect the responsibilities of several line ministries and require coordination. The German ministerial bureaucracy provides some incentives and established mechanisms for coordination across ministries. However, in most cases, one line ministry leads a policy proposal, and coordination with other ministries is secondary. Given the political differences among the three coalition partners of the Traffic Light Coalition, tensions and power struggles between line ministries have regularly occurred in the policymaking process.
Interministerial working groups exist at all hierarchical levels, though their permanence and formalization vary.
Digital coordination and digital administration are explicit goals of German governance. Although intranets and digital platforms for interministerial exchanges are in use, digital administration has not yet reached its full potential. According to the “Digital Check” implemented by the Bundestag in 2022 and performed yearly by the Norm Control Council (NKR), there is ample room for improvement in development, utilization, and education related to digital coordination tools (“Digitalcheck,” 2023).
In accordance with the “Rotationsbeschluss,” a decision by the government in 1995, regular exchanges of employees between the chancellery and the line ministries are encouraged and mandatory. This is an established practice in both agencies (Busse and Hofmann, 2019). Often, employees who have completed a stint at the chancellery are later promoted to make use of their increased oversight and experience, providing incentives for job rotation and encouraging information exchanges across ministerial boundaries.
According to the GGO (Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien), line ministries are required to cooperate and coordinate on policy designs before presenting them in the federal cabinet. However, this process is usually not enforced (“Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien,” 2020).
Political practice and precedent ensure that ministries generally avoid making proposals that might be blocked by other ministries and that conflicts between ministries are often resolved before cabinet meetings. Policy proposals in specific areas cannot be made without the involvement of the responsible ministry, such as budgetary decisions, which must involve the Federal Ministry of Finance. However, the Traffic Light Coalition and their respective ministries often clash on topics where party lines do not align, occasionally resulting in public conflict and conflicting policy proposals reaching the media. This has, in some cases, mitigated fluidity in coordination. The root of these issues lies more in party politics than in organizational structure.
Citations:
Busse, V., and H. Hofmann. 2019. Bundeskanzleramt und Bundesregierung. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium für Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html
Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien. 2020. www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-internet.de/bsvwvbund_21072009_O11313012.htm
Interministerial working groups exist at all hierarchical levels, though their permanence and formalization vary.
Digital coordination and digital administration are explicit goals of German governance. Although intranets and digital platforms for interministerial exchanges are in use, digital administration has not yet reached its full potential. According to the “Digital Check” implemented by the Bundestag in 2022 and performed yearly by the Norm Control Council (NKR), there is ample room for improvement in development, utilization, and education related to digital coordination tools (“Digitalcheck,” 2023).
In accordance with the “Rotationsbeschluss,” a decision by the government in 1995, regular exchanges of employees between the chancellery and the line ministries are encouraged and mandatory. This is an established practice in both agencies (Busse and Hofmann, 2019). Often, employees who have completed a stint at the chancellery are later promoted to make use of their increased oversight and experience, providing incentives for job rotation and encouraging information exchanges across ministerial boundaries.
According to the GGO (Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien), line ministries are required to cooperate and coordinate on policy designs before presenting them in the federal cabinet. However, this process is usually not enforced (“Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien,” 2020).
Political practice and precedent ensure that ministries generally avoid making proposals that might be blocked by other ministries and that conflicts between ministries are often resolved before cabinet meetings. Policy proposals in specific areas cannot be made without the involvement of the responsible ministry, such as budgetary decisions, which must involve the Federal Ministry of Finance. However, the Traffic Light Coalition and their respective ministries often clash on topics where party lines do not align, occasionally resulting in public conflict and conflicting policy proposals reaching the media. This has, in some cases, mitigated fluidity in coordination. The root of these issues lies more in party politics than in organizational structure.
Citations:
Busse, V., and H. Hofmann. 2019. Bundeskanzleramt und Bundesregierung. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium für Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html
Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien. 2020. www.verwaltungsvorschriften-im-internet.de/bsvwvbund_21072009_O11313012.htm
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal interministerial coordination. The most important informal meeting often occurs in the coalition committee, which consists of the chancellor, the vice-chancellor, and the heads of each party in the coalition (“Koalitionsvertrag 2021,” 2021). In general, informal meetings support formal coordination between the chancellery and line ministries.
The informal meetings between the head of the chancellery and the state secretaries reportedly resolve many intergovernmental disagreements before they reach more formal channels (Busse and Hofmann, 2019; Hebestreit and Korte, 2022). These informal coordination processes seem to be less effective in the current coalition than in previous governments (Deutschlandfunk 2023).
Citations:
Deutschlandfunk. 2023. “Knatsch-Koalition. Warum die Ampel so oft streitet.” https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/koalition-ampel-streit-100.html
Hebestreit, R., and K.-R. Korte. 2022. “The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service.” In The Oxford Handbook of German Politics, eds. K. Larres, H. Moroff, and R. Wittlinger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koalitionsvertrag. 2021. www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/koalitionsvertrag-2021-1990800
The informal meetings between the head of the chancellery and the state secretaries reportedly resolve many intergovernmental disagreements before they reach more formal channels (Busse and Hofmann, 2019; Hebestreit and Korte, 2022). These informal coordination processes seem to be less effective in the current coalition than in previous governments (Deutschlandfunk 2023).
Citations:
Deutschlandfunk. 2023. “Knatsch-Koalition. Warum die Ampel so oft streitet.” https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/koalition-ampel-streit-100.html
Hebestreit, R., and K.-R. Korte. 2022. “The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service.” In The Oxford Handbook of German Politics, eds. K. Larres, H. Moroff, and R. Wittlinger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koalitionsvertrag. 2021. www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/koalitionsvertrag-2021-1990800
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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9
The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
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The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
The provision of public services in Germany, including education, housing, healthcare, waste management, public transport, and land use, is generally well-organized among various levels of governance. Due to the country’s federal constitution, subnational governments enjoy a relatively high level of autonomy and decision-making power. Consequently, defining nationwide standards can be challenging in some areas. However, according to the constitutional understanding of German federalism, full harmonization of standards through central guidance is not desirable.
Public services are split among the federal, subnational, and communal levels and, in some cases, outsourced to nonprofit institutions or indirect public administrations (such as social security). In certain instances, minimum standards are decided at the federal level, such as the BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) minimum standard for IT security, while in others, subnational governments impose rules (Hebestreit and Korte, 2022; Hegele and Behnke, 2017).
Environmental standards are defined at the national level. For education, federal states have the authority to set standards but coordinate to some extent through the committee of state ministers for culture and education (Kultusministerkonferenz). Compared to a centralized governance system, this leads to greater differences in school organization and educational attainment. Healthcare is organized nationally and divided into a two-tier mandatory healthcare system that generally functions well at high costs and is mainly controlled by independent national agencies.
Frequent assessments and reports on compliance with minimum standards are provided by ministries, responsible providers, intergovernmental agencies, and independent nonprofit institutions. Subnational governments function as supervisory bodies, taking on sanctioning and oversight roles in the provision of public services.
Citations:
Hebestreit, R., and Korte, K.-R. 2022. “The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service.” In The Oxford Handbook of German Politics, eds. K. Larres, H. Moroff, and R. Wittlinger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hegele, Y., and N. Behnke. 2017. “Horizontal Coordination in Cooperative Federalism: The Purpose of Ministerial Conferences in Germany.” Regional and Federal Studies 27 (5): 529-548.
Public services are split among the federal, subnational, and communal levels and, in some cases, outsourced to nonprofit institutions or indirect public administrations (such as social security). In certain instances, minimum standards are decided at the federal level, such as the BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) minimum standard for IT security, while in others, subnational governments impose rules (Hebestreit and Korte, 2022; Hegele and Behnke, 2017).
Environmental standards are defined at the national level. For education, federal states have the authority to set standards but coordinate to some extent through the committee of state ministers for culture and education (Kultusministerkonferenz). Compared to a centralized governance system, this leads to greater differences in school organization and educational attainment. Healthcare is organized nationally and divided into a two-tier mandatory healthcare system that generally functions well at high costs and is mainly controlled by independent national agencies.
Frequent assessments and reports on compliance with minimum standards are provided by ministries, responsible providers, intergovernmental agencies, and independent nonprofit institutions. Subnational governments function as supervisory bodies, taking on sanctioning and oversight roles in the provision of public services.
Citations:
Hebestreit, R., and Korte, K.-R. 2022. “The Executive: The German Government and Civil Service.” In The Oxford Handbook of German Politics, eds. K. Larres, H. Moroff, and R. Wittlinger. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hegele, Y., and N. Behnke. 2017. “Horizontal Coordination in Cooperative Federalism: The Purpose of Ministerial Conferences in Germany.” Regional and Federal Studies 27 (5): 529-548.
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
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National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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7
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In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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1
There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Cooperation between the Bund and the Länder is integral to the German federal system and generally functions well to ensure the provision of public goods and public services. Subnational governments are represented at the national level in the Bundesrat, and weekly meetings are held – both formally and informally – between members of parliament and members of the Bundesrat. This frequent exchange is supported by formal structures. Due to the relatively high independence and power of subnational governments in Germany, the Länder often serve as checks and balances for national policymaking. They also enjoy more power than the national government in areas such as education and other domains that primarily affect the state level.
All states have representatives in Berlin, and both state and national governments have expanded institutions for horizontal and vertical coordination.
State prime ministers meet quarterly in the “Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz,” where state-level issues are discussed among states, and foundational political questions regarding the states are discussed among ministers. Twice a year, this is followed by talks with the chancellor. The “Fachministerkonferenzen” – conferences of area ministers – consolidate and support coordination within departments. Additionally, many smaller working units focused on specialized issues facilitate coordination among ministerial and administrative bodies.
Local governments also enjoy relatively high power over their jurisdictions. They are integrated into a tightly woven system of constituencies and are responsible for providing some public goods themselves.
One aspect where German horizontal coordination struggles is digitalization. This is often criticized at all levels (“Digitalcheck,” 2023). Backlogs and a lack of technology and expertise at the local level often prevent advances in information and coordination between levels of government.
Citations:
Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium der Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html
(Unfortunately, the URL is not operational anymore)
All states have representatives in Berlin, and both state and national governments have expanded institutions for horizontal and vertical coordination.
State prime ministers meet quarterly in the “Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz,” where state-level issues are discussed among states, and foundational political questions regarding the states are discussed among ministers. Twice a year, this is followed by talks with the chancellor. The “Fachministerkonferenzen” – conferences of area ministers – consolidate and support coordination within departments. Additionally, many smaller working units focused on specialized issues facilitate coordination among ministerial and administrative bodies.
Local governments also enjoy relatively high power over their jurisdictions. They are integrated into a tightly woven system of constituencies and are responsible for providing some public goods themselves.
One aspect where German horizontal coordination struggles is digitalization. This is often criticized at all levels (“Digitalcheck,” 2023). Backlogs and a lack of technology and expertise at the local level often prevent advances in information and coordination between levels of government.
Citations:
Digitalcheck. 2023. “Bundesministerium der Justiz.” www.normenkontrollrat.bund.de/Webs/NKR/DE/weniger-buerokratie-und-besseres-recht/digitalcheck/digitalcheck.html
(Unfortunately, the URL is not operational anymore)