Horizontal Accountability
#4Key Findings
In the category of horizontal accountability, Germany falls into the sample’s top group (rank 4).
The independent Court of Audit is responsible for reviewing public finances. The national data protection authority is also independent, advising lawmakers on data protection matters and responding to citizen complaints.
The judiciary is independent, enabling judges to interpret and review laws without outside interference. The Federal Constitutional Court acts only when a complaint is submitted. The Basic Law guarantees personal freedom and equality before the law, and the country is highly ranked for enforcement of civil justice.
Corruption is rare due to strong legal frameworks. Some cases have nevertheless emerged, for instance relating to pandemic-era procurement scandals. The parliament has sufficient resources and powers to monitor the executive and help guide policymaking.
The independent Court of Audit is responsible for reviewing public finances. The national data protection authority is also independent, advising lawmakers on data protection matters and responding to citizen complaints.
The judiciary is independent, enabling judges to interpret and review laws without outside interference. The Federal Constitutional Court acts only when a complaint is submitted. The Basic Law guarantees personal freedom and equality before the law, and the country is highly ranked for enforcement of civil justice.
Corruption is rare due to strong legal frameworks. Some cases have nevertheless emerged, for instance relating to pandemic-era procurement scandals. The parliament has sufficient resources and powers to monitor the executive and help guide policymaking.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
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9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
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3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no independent and effective audit office.
The Basic Law assigns the Federal Court of Audit (Bundesrechnungshof) the responsibility for public auditing in Germany, specifically auditing accounts and ensuring the federation properly and efficiently administers public finances. To carry out these duties, members of the court enjoy judicial independence (Article 114, Paragraph 2, Basic Law). As an independent body, the Federal Court of Audit is subject only to the law and holds the same status as the federal ministries, the Office of the Federal President, and the Federal Chancellery. It is autonomous and independent in its choice of audit methods, the depth of the audit, and has the legal authority to decide on the content of the audit (Seyfried, 2021).
During an audit, relevant bodies are required to provide information and cooperate, including sharing confidential or secret data. The Federal Court of Audit must simply state that the information is essential to fulfilling its mandate to obtain the necessary information (Article 28 Prüfungsordnung des Bundesrechnungshofes).
The president of the Federal Court of Audit is elected by parliament (Bundestag) and the Federal Council (Bundesrat) based on the federal government’s suggestion. After the election, the president is appointed by the federal president. There is no debate prior to the election, and the Bundestag vote is conducted in secret, requiring a majority of its members. This process ensures the independence of the court’s president, and reelection is not permitted (Article 5 Bundesrechnungshofgesetz). Given that the court’s members, including the president, enjoy judicial independence, the potential removal of the president adheres to Article 97 of the Basic Law, which outlines judicial independence. Thus, dismissal, whether permanent or temporary, is only possible through a judicial decision based on the law.
As a federal authority, the Federal Court of Audit’s financial and personnel resources are funded by the federal budget. The court submits its budget request, including estimates of the resources required to fulfill its mandate, to the federal government, where the final budget is then subject to political negotiations. Currently, the court has a staff of around 1,050 employees and an annual budget of €187 million (Bundesrechnungshof, 2023a). While these costs are low compared to the size of the federal budget (below 0.1%), the resources should be sufficient to effectively monitor the federal budget given the size of the institution.
According to the Open Budget Survey (2021), Germany’s budget oversight, comprising audit and legislative oversight, scores an impressive 91 out of 100 points, ranking it first in global budget oversight. The audit oversight alone is awarded a score of 95. Additionally, the survey rates public access to budgetary information at 73 out of 100, and the audit report – which examines the soundness and completeness of the government’s year-end accounts – at 67 points. Since these scores exceed 61 points, they indicate that Germany publishes sufficient information about the use of public resources to facilitate effective public debate.
Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Audit only examines, criticizes, or recommends cost-saving measures and does not have the authority to issue legally binding judgments. For media access, the Court publishes press releases, statements, and background information on its website. The Court further encourages the media to contact the designated press officer with any questions or requests for additional information (Bundesrechnungshof, 2023b). The legislature reviews the Court’s reports and regularly invites Court representatives to public hearings. If federal ministries receive critical remarks or suggestions for changes from the Court, they must adhere to the “comply or explain” principle. They may diverge from the Court’s guidance but must provide arguments to justify their disagreement with a particular view or suggestion.
Citations:
Bundesrechnungshof. 2023a. “https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/DE/5_ueber_uns/1_wer_wir_sind/wer_wir_sind_node.html”
Bundesrechnungshof. 2023b. “https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/DE/7_presse/presse_node.html” (accessed: 13.11.23)
International Budget Partnership. 2021. “Open Budget Survey 2021.” https://internationalbudget.org/sites/default/files/country-surveys-pdfs/2021/open-budget-survey-germany-2021-en.pdf
International Budget Partnership. 2021. “Open Budget Survey 2021. 8th Edition.” https://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Open-budget-survey-2021-1.pdf
Seyfried, M. 2021. “Bundesrechnungshof.” In Handwörterbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, eds. Andersen, U., Bogumil, J., Marschall, S., and Woyke, W. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
During an audit, relevant bodies are required to provide information and cooperate, including sharing confidential or secret data. The Federal Court of Audit must simply state that the information is essential to fulfilling its mandate to obtain the necessary information (Article 28 Prüfungsordnung des Bundesrechnungshofes).
The president of the Federal Court of Audit is elected by parliament (Bundestag) and the Federal Council (Bundesrat) based on the federal government’s suggestion. After the election, the president is appointed by the federal president. There is no debate prior to the election, and the Bundestag vote is conducted in secret, requiring a majority of its members. This process ensures the independence of the court’s president, and reelection is not permitted (Article 5 Bundesrechnungshofgesetz). Given that the court’s members, including the president, enjoy judicial independence, the potential removal of the president adheres to Article 97 of the Basic Law, which outlines judicial independence. Thus, dismissal, whether permanent or temporary, is only possible through a judicial decision based on the law.
As a federal authority, the Federal Court of Audit’s financial and personnel resources are funded by the federal budget. The court submits its budget request, including estimates of the resources required to fulfill its mandate, to the federal government, where the final budget is then subject to political negotiations. Currently, the court has a staff of around 1,050 employees and an annual budget of €187 million (Bundesrechnungshof, 2023a). While these costs are low compared to the size of the federal budget (below 0.1%), the resources should be sufficient to effectively monitor the federal budget given the size of the institution.
According to the Open Budget Survey (2021), Germany’s budget oversight, comprising audit and legislative oversight, scores an impressive 91 out of 100 points, ranking it first in global budget oversight. The audit oversight alone is awarded a score of 95. Additionally, the survey rates public access to budgetary information at 73 out of 100, and the audit report – which examines the soundness and completeness of the government’s year-end accounts – at 67 points. Since these scores exceed 61 points, they indicate that Germany publishes sufficient information about the use of public resources to facilitate effective public debate.
Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Audit only examines, criticizes, or recommends cost-saving measures and does not have the authority to issue legally binding judgments. For media access, the Court publishes press releases, statements, and background information on its website. The Court further encourages the media to contact the designated press officer with any questions or requests for additional information (Bundesrechnungshof, 2023b). The legislature reviews the Court’s reports and regularly invites Court representatives to public hearings. If federal ministries receive critical remarks or suggestions for changes from the Court, they must adhere to the “comply or explain” principle. They may diverge from the Court’s guidance but must provide arguments to justify their disagreement with a particular view or suggestion.
Citations:
Bundesrechnungshof. 2023a. “https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/DE/5_ueber_uns/1_wer_wir_sind/wer_wir_sind_node.html”
Bundesrechnungshof. 2023b. “https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/DE/7_presse/presse_node.html” (accessed: 13.11.23)
International Budget Partnership. 2021. “Open Budget Survey 2021.” https://internationalbudget.org/sites/default/files/country-surveys-pdfs/2021/open-budget-survey-germany-2021-en.pdf
International Budget Partnership. 2021. “Open Budget Survey 2021. 8th Edition.” https://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/Open-budget-survey-2021-1.pdf
Seyfried, M. 2021. “Bundesrechnungshof.” In Handwörterbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, eds. Andersen, U., Bogumil, J., Marschall, S., and Woyke, W. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
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9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Following chapter four of the Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, BDSG), the national data protection authority in Germany is the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit, BfDI). The BfDI is considered a supreme federal authority responsible for protecting the fundamental right of informational self-determination. It functions as both a supervisory body and an advisor to the Bundestag regarding data protection issues. Additionally, the commissioner is independent in the performance of tasks and the exercise of power, thus free from both direct and indirect external influence (Article 10 BDSG).
While the BfDI operates independently and can choose which audits to undertake, citizens have the right to file a complaint with the commissioner if they believe their rights regarding data protection or access to information have been infringed (BfDI, n.d.). Furthermore, the BfDI has access to all necessary information, as each public authority is obligated to provide all data or information needed by the commissioner to fulfill the relevant tasks (Article 16 BDSG).
The BfDI is elected, without prior debate, by the Bundestag with more than half of the parliament’s statutory members at the proposal of the federal government. To be eligible for election, the candidate for the commissioner’s office must be at least 35 years old and possess sufficient qualifications, experience, and skills in the domain of data protection. If elected, the BfDI serves for five years; however, reelection for one additional term is possible. Although the dismissal of the federal commissioner is possible, the standards for removal are high. Thus, removal from office is only possible at the request of the president of the Bundestag due to the commitment of serious misconduct or by no longer fulfilling the necessary requirements (Article 11f. BDSG).
Similar to the previously examined Federal Court of Audit, the BfDI, as a federal body, is financed by the federal budget, with the final amount of financial resources depending on political considerations. For the financial year 2024, the federal commissioner is allocated €45 million, making up 0.01% of the total federal budget (Bundesmisterium der Finanzen, 2023). With 50 additional positions added in 2022, the BfDI had a personnel budget for 396.4 positions. Eighty percent of these positions were filled, meaning that 301 people worked for the BfDI in 2022 (BfDI, 2023). (Note that additional data protection authorities exist in each federal state, which significantly increases the budget and the number of people employed in this area)
The BfDI submits an annual report (Tätigkeitsreport) detailing its work to the federal government, parliament, and council. The report is also available to the public on the BfDI’s website. Additionally, the authority published 13 press releases in 2022. The media can also submit inquiries to the BfDI. In 2022, the commissioner responded to 413 requests by email and 406 by telephone.
Furthermore, in 2022, the authority was involved in 119 draft laws, 109 regulations, 33 directives, and 12 additional projects initiated either by the European Union or at the national level. While the commissioner criticized the often untimely inclusion of the BfDI, overall inclusion increased by almost 50% (BfDI, 2023a). However, as of April 2022, many recommendations made by the BfDI in his annual report have not been fully implemented or have not been implemented at all (BfDI, 2023b). Specifically, in his 2022 report, the BfDI criticized that none of the recommendations from the 2021 report were fully implemented. Regarding the legislature, the commissioner serves as an advisor to the parliament. This means the BfDI is included as an expert on data protection in parliamentary committees and supports the parliamentary consultation process through detailed statements on relevant issues (BfDI, 2023).
Citations:
BfDI. 2023. “Tätigkeitsbericht 2022, 31. Tätigkeitsbericht für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit.”
BfDI. 2023. “Nicht vollständig umgesetzte Empfehlungen des BfDI aus älteren Tätigkeitsberichte.” https://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Taetigkeitsberichte/Ausz%C3%BCge/alte-Empfehlungen.html
BfDI. n.d. “Aufgaben und Befugnisse des BfDI.” https://www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/DerBfDI/Inhalte/DerBfDI/AufgabenBFDI.html
Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 2023. “Sollwerte des Haushaltsjahres 2024.” https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/DE/Bundeshaushalt-digital/bundeshaushalt-digital.html
While the BfDI operates independently and can choose which audits to undertake, citizens have the right to file a complaint with the commissioner if they believe their rights regarding data protection or access to information have been infringed (BfDI, n.d.). Furthermore, the BfDI has access to all necessary information, as each public authority is obligated to provide all data or information needed by the commissioner to fulfill the relevant tasks (Article 16 BDSG).
The BfDI is elected, without prior debate, by the Bundestag with more than half of the parliament’s statutory members at the proposal of the federal government. To be eligible for election, the candidate for the commissioner’s office must be at least 35 years old and possess sufficient qualifications, experience, and skills in the domain of data protection. If elected, the BfDI serves for five years; however, reelection for one additional term is possible. Although the dismissal of the federal commissioner is possible, the standards for removal are high. Thus, removal from office is only possible at the request of the president of the Bundestag due to the commitment of serious misconduct or by no longer fulfilling the necessary requirements (Article 11f. BDSG).
Similar to the previously examined Federal Court of Audit, the BfDI, as a federal body, is financed by the federal budget, with the final amount of financial resources depending on political considerations. For the financial year 2024, the federal commissioner is allocated €45 million, making up 0.01% of the total federal budget (Bundesmisterium der Finanzen, 2023). With 50 additional positions added in 2022, the BfDI had a personnel budget for 396.4 positions. Eighty percent of these positions were filled, meaning that 301 people worked for the BfDI in 2022 (BfDI, 2023). (Note that additional data protection authorities exist in each federal state, which significantly increases the budget and the number of people employed in this area)
The BfDI submits an annual report (Tätigkeitsreport) detailing its work to the federal government, parliament, and council. The report is also available to the public on the BfDI’s website. Additionally, the authority published 13 press releases in 2022. The media can also submit inquiries to the BfDI. In 2022, the commissioner responded to 413 requests by email and 406 by telephone.
Furthermore, in 2022, the authority was involved in 119 draft laws, 109 regulations, 33 directives, and 12 additional projects initiated either by the European Union or at the national level. While the commissioner criticized the often untimely inclusion of the BfDI, overall inclusion increased by almost 50% (BfDI, 2023a). However, as of April 2022, many recommendations made by the BfDI in his annual report have not been fully implemented or have not been implemented at all (BfDI, 2023b). Specifically, in his 2022 report, the BfDI criticized that none of the recommendations from the 2021 report were fully implemented. Regarding the legislature, the commissioner serves as an advisor to the parliament. This means the BfDI is included as an expert on data protection in parliamentary committees and supports the parliamentary consultation process through detailed statements on relevant issues (BfDI, 2023).
Citations:
BfDI. 2023. “Tätigkeitsbericht 2022, 31. Tätigkeitsbericht für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit.”
BfDI. 2023. “Nicht vollständig umgesetzte Empfehlungen des BfDI aus älteren Tätigkeitsberichte.” https://www.bfdi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Taetigkeitsberichte/Ausz%C3%BCge/alte-Empfehlungen.html
BfDI. n.d. “Aufgaben und Befugnisse des BfDI.” https://www.bfdi.bund.de/DE/DerBfDI/Inhalte/DerBfDI/AufgabenBFDI.html
Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 2023. “Sollwerte des Haushaltsjahres 2024.” https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/DE/Bundeshaushalt-digital/bundeshaushalt-digital.html
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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7
6
The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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3
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
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1
1
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
The separation of powers in Germany, which ensures an independent judiciary, is regulated by the Basic Law (Article 20, Paragraph 2; Article 92ff.). Judicial power is vested in judges and courts, including the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) and other specialized federal courts. A similar structure exists at the subnational state level. Notably, judges are independent and exclusively bound by the law, meaning they possess the legal autonomy to interpret and review existing laws and decide on issues without outside interference. However, the BVerfG does not initiate legal proceedings; it only becomes active once a complaint is submitted.
Next to the framework conditions set by the law, additional measures ensure the exercise of independent judicial review. For instance, judges must swear an oath (Richtereid) to fulfill their positions true to the law and with the purpose of only truth and justice (Article 38 Deutsches Richtergesetz, DRiG). Additionally, the German Association of Judges has outlined multiple theses for judicial ethics in Germany, including independence, impartiality, and integrity (Deutscher Richterbund, 2018).
Still, the capacity to exercise independent judicial review is restricted by the required legal education, which is offered only by universities (Article 5f. DRiG). In principle, access to a sufficient legal education is open to everyone, provided they hold a higher education entrance qualification (Abitur) with minimum grades. However, in Germany, school performance and the likelihood of achieving a university degree are significantly influenced by socioeconomic background. In this respect, an indirect selection bias might exist.
The members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, with each body electing half of the members. Elections are conducted based on a two-thirds majority (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2023a). While the standard majority for votes in the Bundestag or Bundesrat is a simple majority, the vote for appointing judges to the BVerfG requires a higher majority, which increases the likelihood of politically unbiased justices. Additionally, judges are appointed for a limited term of 12 years and are not eligible for reelection.
Generally, citizens in Germany have secure and effective access to justice (V-Dem, 2023) and can challenge government action through a constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court if they claim the action violated their fundamental rights or rights equivalent to fundamental rights. While any person may lodge a constitutional complaint, there are preconditions. All legal remedies must be exhausted before a complaint can be lodged. Additionally, the complaint must meet the deadline of one month after a court or administrative decision and adhere to certain requirements in its content and form (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2023b).
The judicial independence established by law holds for the majority of rulings by the Federal Constitutional Court. For instance, the Freedom House Index considers Germany’s judiciary to be independent. Further, the index indicates that the court seldom makes decisions that disregard its actual views and merely reflect the government’s decisions. Nevertheless, some criticism focuses on the regular meetings between the Federal Constitutional Court and the federal government, with allegations that these meetings affect the judges’ impartiality. The BVerfG dismissed these complaints as unfounded (FAZ, 2023).
Finally, the government and parliament accept rulings by the FCC and act accordingly.
Citations:
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2023a. “Die Richterinnen und Richter des Bundesverfassungsgerichts.” https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/DE/Richter/richter_node.html
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2023b. “How to Lodge a Constitutional Complaint.” https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Homepage/_zielgruppeneinstieg/Merkblatt/Merkblatt_node.html
Deutscher Richterbund. 2018. “Judicial Ethics in Germany.” https://www.drb.de/fileadmin/DRB/pdf/Ethik/1901_DRB-Broschuere_Richterethik_EN_Judicial_Ethics.pdf
FAZ. 2023. “Karlsruhe bespricht Krisenpolitik mit Bundesregierung.” https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/bundesverfassungsgericht-redet-mit-bundesregierung-19295577.html
Freedom House. 2023. “Germany.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2023#PR
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/
Next to the framework conditions set by the law, additional measures ensure the exercise of independent judicial review. For instance, judges must swear an oath (Richtereid) to fulfill their positions true to the law and with the purpose of only truth and justice (Article 38 Deutsches Richtergesetz, DRiG). Additionally, the German Association of Judges has outlined multiple theses for judicial ethics in Germany, including independence, impartiality, and integrity (Deutscher Richterbund, 2018).
Still, the capacity to exercise independent judicial review is restricted by the required legal education, which is offered only by universities (Article 5f. DRiG). In principle, access to a sufficient legal education is open to everyone, provided they hold a higher education entrance qualification (Abitur) with minimum grades. However, in Germany, school performance and the likelihood of achieving a university degree are significantly influenced by socioeconomic background. In this respect, an indirect selection bias might exist.
The members of the Federal Constitutional Court are elected by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, with each body electing half of the members. Elections are conducted based on a two-thirds majority (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2023a). While the standard majority for votes in the Bundestag or Bundesrat is a simple majority, the vote for appointing judges to the BVerfG requires a higher majority, which increases the likelihood of politically unbiased justices. Additionally, judges are appointed for a limited term of 12 years and are not eligible for reelection.
Generally, citizens in Germany have secure and effective access to justice (V-Dem, 2023) and can challenge government action through a constitutional complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court if they claim the action violated their fundamental rights or rights equivalent to fundamental rights. While any person may lodge a constitutional complaint, there are preconditions. All legal remedies must be exhausted before a complaint can be lodged. Additionally, the complaint must meet the deadline of one month after a court or administrative decision and adhere to certain requirements in its content and form (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2023b).
The judicial independence established by law holds for the majority of rulings by the Federal Constitutional Court. For instance, the Freedom House Index considers Germany’s judiciary to be independent. Further, the index indicates that the court seldom makes decisions that disregard its actual views and merely reflect the government’s decisions. Nevertheless, some criticism focuses on the regular meetings between the Federal Constitutional Court and the federal government, with allegations that these meetings affect the judges’ impartiality. The BVerfG dismissed these complaints as unfounded (FAZ, 2023).
Finally, the government and parliament accept rulings by the FCC and act accordingly.
Citations:
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2023a. “Die Richterinnen und Richter des Bundesverfassungsgerichts.” https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/DE/Richter/richter_node.html
Bundesverfassungsgericht. 2023b. “How to Lodge a Constitutional Complaint.” https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Homepage/_zielgruppeneinstieg/Merkblatt/Merkblatt_node.html
Deutscher Richterbund. 2018. “Judicial Ethics in Germany.” https://www.drb.de/fileadmin/DRB/pdf/Ethik/1901_DRB-Broschuere_Richterethik_EN_Judicial_Ethics.pdf
FAZ. 2023. “Karlsruhe bespricht Krisenpolitik mit Bundesregierung.” https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/bundesverfassungsgericht-redet-mit-bundesregierung-19295577.html
Freedom House. 2023. “Germany.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2023#PR
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
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9
There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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7
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There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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3
4
3
There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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1
1
There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
Civil rights in Germany are governed by the basic rights (Grundrechte) that are safeguarded by the Basic Law. According to Article 1 of the Basic Law, these rights act as defenses against the state and bind the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches. In principle, only the state must adhere to these rights. However, derived from Article 1, the state has a protective duty, obligating it to shield citizens from threats arising from the unlawful activities of third parties, i.e., non-state actors (Belling, Herold and Kneis, 2014).
The Basic Law ensures both personal freedom (Article 2) and equality before the law (Article 3), stating that all people are equal before the law and that everyone has the right to personal development, life, and physical integrity. Additionally, the so-called basic judicial rights guarantee Constitutional Court proceedings (Article 101ff.). They prohibit capital punishment, torture, and inhumane treatment of those in custody. Imprisonment not based on a judicial order is possible for a maximum of one day. Furthermore, the judicial basic rights ensure a fair trial, meaning that everyone is entitled to a hearing in accordance with the law. Due to the specifications “all” or “every person,” these rights apply not only to citizens but to everyone.
According to the Rule of Law Index, Germany ranks fourth globally for civil justice. The index’s score of 0.85 indicates that civil justice is effectively and timely enforced in practice. Consistent with this, Germany is considered free based on the Civil Liberties Index (Freedom House, 2023). However, there is concern regarding the individual expression of religious faith, sexual orientation, or gender identity due to a rise in hate crimes related to antisemitism, Islamophobia, sexual orientation, and gender (Amnesty International, 2023). Another significant concern is the continuing increase in politically motivated crimes.
Discrimination remains a significant issue in various diverse areas of Germany. Preventive measures include an action plan against right-wing extremism introduced by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community in March 2023. However, the plan neither recognizes nor addresses systemic and institutional racism. Additionally, there are proposals for a law that would allow transgender, intersex, and non-binary individuals to legally change their gender and name through a simple declaration at a registration office. This would eliminate the current requirement for a psychological expert opinion and court decision (Amnesty International, 2023). Further measures addressing gender discrimination are discussed in the section on gender equality (Policy Efforts and Commitment to Achieving Gender Equality).
Lastly, due process generally prevails in criminal and civil matters (Freedom House 2023), with the Rule of Law Index (2023) allocating a score of 0.76. This score indicates that most people have and can afford equal access to justice, including advice and representation. The score further implies there are no significant barriers in the form of linguistic obstacles or unreasonable procedural hurdles.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/#:~:text=Across%20the%20world%2C%20authorities%20continued,the%20hardest%2C%20and%20inequality%20rose
Belling, D. W., A. Herold, and M. Kneis. 2014. “Die Wirkung der Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten zwischen Privaten.” Rechtsentwicklungen aus europäischer Perspektive im 21. Jahrhundert 2: 53-111. https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/opus4-ubp/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/7455/file/S53-111_aiup02.pdf
BMFSJ. 2021. Zweites Führungspositionen-Gesetz – FüPoG II. https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/service/gesetze/zweites-fuehrungspositionengesetz-fuepog-2-164226
Freedom House. 2023. “Germany.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2023#CL
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2023. “Gender Pay Gap 2022: Frauen verdienten pro Stunde 18 % weniger als Männer.” https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/01/PD23_036_621.html#:~:text=Dieser%20unerkl%C3%A4rte%20Teil%20entspricht%20dem,%25%2C%20Ostdeutschland%3A%209%20%25
World Justice Project. 2023. “WJP Rule of Law Index, Germany, Civil Justice.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/factors/2023/Germany/Civil%20Justice/
The Basic Law ensures both personal freedom (Article 2) and equality before the law (Article 3), stating that all people are equal before the law and that everyone has the right to personal development, life, and physical integrity. Additionally, the so-called basic judicial rights guarantee Constitutional Court proceedings (Article 101ff.). They prohibit capital punishment, torture, and inhumane treatment of those in custody. Imprisonment not based on a judicial order is possible for a maximum of one day. Furthermore, the judicial basic rights ensure a fair trial, meaning that everyone is entitled to a hearing in accordance with the law. Due to the specifications “all” or “every person,” these rights apply not only to citizens but to everyone.
According to the Rule of Law Index, Germany ranks fourth globally for civil justice. The index’s score of 0.85 indicates that civil justice is effectively and timely enforced in practice. Consistent with this, Germany is considered free based on the Civil Liberties Index (Freedom House, 2023). However, there is concern regarding the individual expression of religious faith, sexual orientation, or gender identity due to a rise in hate crimes related to antisemitism, Islamophobia, sexual orientation, and gender (Amnesty International, 2023). Another significant concern is the continuing increase in politically motivated crimes.
Discrimination remains a significant issue in various diverse areas of Germany. Preventive measures include an action plan against right-wing extremism introduced by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community in March 2023. However, the plan neither recognizes nor addresses systemic and institutional racism. Additionally, there are proposals for a law that would allow transgender, intersex, and non-binary individuals to legally change their gender and name through a simple declaration at a registration office. This would eliminate the current requirement for a psychological expert opinion and court decision (Amnesty International, 2023). Further measures addressing gender discrimination are discussed in the section on gender equality (Policy Efforts and Commitment to Achieving Gender Equality).
Lastly, due process generally prevails in criminal and civil matters (Freedom House 2023), with the Rule of Law Index (2023) allocating a score of 0.76. This score indicates that most people have and can afford equal access to justice, including advice and representation. The score further implies there are no significant barriers in the form of linguistic obstacles or unreasonable procedural hurdles.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/#:~:text=Across%20the%20world%2C%20authorities%20continued,the%20hardest%2C%20and%20inequality%20rose
Belling, D. W., A. Herold, and M. Kneis. 2014. “Die Wirkung der Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten zwischen Privaten.” Rechtsentwicklungen aus europäischer Perspektive im 21. Jahrhundert 2: 53-111. https://publishup.uni-potsdam.de/opus4-ubp/frontdoor/deliver/index/docId/7455/file/S53-111_aiup02.pdf
BMFSJ. 2021. Zweites Führungspositionen-Gesetz – FüPoG II. https://www.bmfsfj.de/bmfsfj/service/gesetze/zweites-fuehrungspositionengesetz-fuepog-2-164226
Freedom House. 2023. “Germany.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2023#CL
Statistisches Bundesamt. 2023. “Gender Pay Gap 2022: Frauen verdienten pro Stunde 18 % weniger als Männer.” https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2023/01/PD23_036_621.html#:~:text=Dieser%20unerkl%C3%A4rte%20Teil%20entspricht%20dem,%25%2C%20Ostdeutschland%3A%209%20%25
World Justice Project. 2023. “WJP Rule of Law Index, Germany, Civil Justice.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/factors/2023/Germany/Civil%20Justice/
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
It is generally assumed that corruption is relatively rare in Germany. This implies that cases of corruption are nonetheless detected, such as the procurement of masks for the pandemic (Handelsblatt, 2021) or the case of overspending and bribery at the public broadcaster RBB (Tagesschau, 2022).
Germany has robust legal frameworks to combat corruption. Relevant laws include the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), which criminalizes corruption-related offenses such as bribery, embezzlement, and fraud. Germany is also a signatory of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Corruption Risk, 2023). Additionally, the Lobbying Register Act, which requires representatives of special interests to register at the Bundestag, came into force in January 2022. Regulatory bodies such as the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority and the Federal Court of Audit oversee financial institutions, auditors, and accounting practices to ensure compliance with regulatory standards.
As for party financing regulations aimed at preventing corruption, parties are required to report their finances annually. However, there are very few limitations on procuring private income. For instance, only donations from corporations and anonymous donations over a certain amount are banned, and income sources such as political foundations are prohibited. Public funding is allocated based on the results of the previous elections, with no specific regulations on how the funds should be distributed. Parties are banned from vote buying, which constitutes the only regulation on party spending. Sanctions for violating the laws include fines or the loss of public funding (EuroPam, 2017).
Regarding the regulations for officeholders, including ministers and members of parliament, they are required to declare interests in a company, gifts, further remunerated activities, and stocks that come with more than 25% of voting rights. Members of parliament must also declare additional income sources and positions on advisory bodies of companies and foundations. Members of parliament only face sanctions for late or non-filing of their declarations with the president of the parliament. The head of state, in contrast, is not bound by the financial disclosure legislation (EuroPam, 2017).
Both the financial reports by political parties and the declarations by officeholders are made public. While Germany receives a full score for its de jure transparency, it has a de facto transparency score of 9.5 out of 14, which is below the regional average. This score results from the fact that some public financial data is only partially accessible or available (Corruption Risk, 2023).
The Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) made 14 recommendations, raising various issues regarding the implementation of integrity mechanisms. The 2022 GRECO report considers only one of these recommendations to be implemented satisfactorily: the training on integrity for the Federal Police. Still, GRECO criticizes Germany for not enhancing the monitoring capacities of the Federal Police. The other recommendations have either been only partly implemented or not implemented at all. The report specifically criticizes that many representatives of special interests are not affected by the Lobby Register Act and that further rules should be implemented to disclose more detailed information about lobbyist contacts (GRECO, 2022).
Citations:
Corruption Risk. 2023. “Germany.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=DEU#transparency
EuroPam. 2017. “Germany.” https://www.europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Germany
GRECO. 2022. “Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption, Fifth Evaluation Round, Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies, Compliance Report Germany.” https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680aa89ee
Handelsblatt. 2021. “Millionen aus der Maskenaffäre: Das haben die Unions-Politiker mit ihren Corona-Provisionen gemacht.” https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/pandemie-profiteure-millionen-aus-der-maskenaffaere-das-haben-die-unions-politiker-mit-ihren-corona-provisionen-gemacht/27200534.html
Tagesschau. 2022. “Falsche Abrechnungen und fehlerhafte Verträge.” https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/kontraste/rbb-zwischenbericht-101.html
Germany has robust legal frameworks to combat corruption. Relevant laws include the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), which criminalizes corruption-related offenses such as bribery, embezzlement, and fraud. Germany is also a signatory of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Corruption Risk, 2023). Additionally, the Lobbying Register Act, which requires representatives of special interests to register at the Bundestag, came into force in January 2022. Regulatory bodies such as the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority and the Federal Court of Audit oversee financial institutions, auditors, and accounting practices to ensure compliance with regulatory standards.
As for party financing regulations aimed at preventing corruption, parties are required to report their finances annually. However, there are very few limitations on procuring private income. For instance, only donations from corporations and anonymous donations over a certain amount are banned, and income sources such as political foundations are prohibited. Public funding is allocated based on the results of the previous elections, with no specific regulations on how the funds should be distributed. Parties are banned from vote buying, which constitutes the only regulation on party spending. Sanctions for violating the laws include fines or the loss of public funding (EuroPam, 2017).
Regarding the regulations for officeholders, including ministers and members of parliament, they are required to declare interests in a company, gifts, further remunerated activities, and stocks that come with more than 25% of voting rights. Members of parliament must also declare additional income sources and positions on advisory bodies of companies and foundations. Members of parliament only face sanctions for late or non-filing of their declarations with the president of the parliament. The head of state, in contrast, is not bound by the financial disclosure legislation (EuroPam, 2017).
Both the financial reports by political parties and the declarations by officeholders are made public. While Germany receives a full score for its de jure transparency, it has a de facto transparency score of 9.5 out of 14, which is below the regional average. This score results from the fact that some public financial data is only partially accessible or available (Corruption Risk, 2023).
The Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) made 14 recommendations, raising various issues regarding the implementation of integrity mechanisms. The 2022 GRECO report considers only one of these recommendations to be implemented satisfactorily: the training on integrity for the Federal Police. Still, GRECO criticizes Germany for not enhancing the monitoring capacities of the Federal Police. The other recommendations have either been only partly implemented or not implemented at all. The report specifically criticizes that many representatives of special interests are not affected by the Lobby Register Act and that further rules should be implemented to disclose more detailed information about lobbyist contacts (GRECO, 2022).
Citations:
Corruption Risk. 2023. “Germany.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=DEU#transparency
EuroPam. 2017. “Germany.” https://www.europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Germany
GRECO. 2022. “Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption, Fifth Evaluation Round, Preventing corruption and promoting integrity in central governments (top executive functions) and law enforcement agencies, Compliance Report Germany.” https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680aa89ee
Handelsblatt. 2021. “Millionen aus der Maskenaffäre: Das haben die Unions-Politiker mit ihren Corona-Provisionen gemacht.” https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/pandemie-profiteure-millionen-aus-der-maskenaffaere-das-haben-die-unions-politiker-mit-ihren-corona-provisionen-gemacht/27200534.html
Tagesschau. 2022. “Falsche Abrechnungen und fehlerhafte Verträge.” https://www.tagesschau.de/investigativ/kontraste/rbb-zwischenbericht-101.html
Graph View
Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
10
9
9
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
8
7
6
7
6
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
5
4
3
4
3
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
2
1
1
The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The legislature in Germany includes the Federal Parliament (Bundestag), the state parliaments (Landtage), and the Federal Council (Bundesrat).
The finances of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat are part of the federal budget. For 2023, €1.141 billion was allocated for parliament, constituting 0.24% of the overall budget. The budget for the Council was set at €39.7 million, which is 0.01% of the total budget (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2023). According to the V-Dem Index (2023) score of 0.99, the legislature controls the resources that finance its internal operations and the perquisites of its members.
While the federal budget is designed by the Federal Ministry of Finance and decided on by the government, parliament holds the budgetary right, meaning the budget draft must secure a majority in parliament. Consequently, the budget must be submitted to the Bundestag and Bundesrat for discussion and frequent revision before it can take effect (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.). The budgeting process at the state level follows the same procedure.
The Bundestag has additional resources in the form of administrative support staff, totaling 3,200 employees. The administration consists of multiple departments. For example, the central division of the administration is responsible for financial and personnel resources. Specifically, it draws up the budget and financial plan and handles public procurement. This means that the legislative body exercises control over its own resources.
Additionally, as part of the administration, the Bundestag has a library and documentation directorate responsible for collecting documents necessary for parliamentary work starting from 1949. Furthermore, the Bundestag has a research service directorate, which is divided into ten thematic research sections. These research sections are intended to strengthen the decision-making ability of individual members of parliament and parliamentary committees in the legislative process by compiling and preparing information in a way that covers, if possible, all opinions or alternatives on an issue (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023a).
According to the federal budget for 2023, the legislature has approximately €4.5 million allocated to parliamentary committees and citizens’ councils. However, the budget does not make it clear how much of that allowance is spent on independent research (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2023).
Even though the exact monetary allowance available for the research unit is unclear, the legislative research unit produces a significant number of reports each month. For instance, in October 2022, 28 reports were published, while in September, the different thematic units published 59 reports. Moreover, the research unit provides internal briefing documents to parliamentarians. Nevertheless, most of the publications were reports and not studies (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023b).
Citations:
Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 2023. “Sollwerte des Haushalts 2024.” https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/DE/Bundeshaushalt-digital/bundeshaushalt-digital.html
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Der Bundeshaushalt.” https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/haushalt_neu
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023. “Die Verwaltung des Deutschen Bundestages.” https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/verwaltung
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023. “Dokumente, Gutachten und Ausarbeitungen.” https://www.bundestag.de/analysen
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. “Variable Graph.” https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/
The finances of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat are part of the federal budget. For 2023, €1.141 billion was allocated for parliament, constituting 0.24% of the overall budget. The budget for the Council was set at €39.7 million, which is 0.01% of the total budget (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2023). According to the V-Dem Index (2023) score of 0.99, the legislature controls the resources that finance its internal operations and the perquisites of its members.
While the federal budget is designed by the Federal Ministry of Finance and decided on by the government, parliament holds the budgetary right, meaning the budget draft must secure a majority in parliament. Consequently, the budget must be submitted to the Bundestag and Bundesrat for discussion and frequent revision before it can take effect (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.). The budgeting process at the state level follows the same procedure.
The Bundestag has additional resources in the form of administrative support staff, totaling 3,200 employees. The administration consists of multiple departments. For example, the central division of the administration is responsible for financial and personnel resources. Specifically, it draws up the budget and financial plan and handles public procurement. This means that the legislative body exercises control over its own resources.
Additionally, as part of the administration, the Bundestag has a library and documentation directorate responsible for collecting documents necessary for parliamentary work starting from 1949. Furthermore, the Bundestag has a research service directorate, which is divided into ten thematic research sections. These research sections are intended to strengthen the decision-making ability of individual members of parliament and parliamentary committees in the legislative process by compiling and preparing information in a way that covers, if possible, all opinions or alternatives on an issue (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023a).
According to the federal budget for 2023, the legislature has approximately €4.5 million allocated to parliamentary committees and citizens’ councils. However, the budget does not make it clear how much of that allowance is spent on independent research (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 2023).
Even though the exact monetary allowance available for the research unit is unclear, the legislative research unit produces a significant number of reports each month. For instance, in October 2022, 28 reports were published, while in September, the different thematic units published 59 reports. Moreover, the research unit provides internal briefing documents to parliamentarians. Nevertheless, most of the publications were reports and not studies (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023b).
Citations:
Bundesministerium der Finanzen. 2023. “Sollwerte des Haushalts 2024.” https://www.bundeshaushalt.de/DE/Bundeshaushalt-digital/bundeshaushalt-digital.html
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Der Bundeshaushalt.” https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/haushalt_neu
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023. “Die Verwaltung des Deutschen Bundestages.” https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/verwaltung
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023. “Dokumente, Gutachten und Ausarbeitungen.” https://www.bundestag.de/analysen
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. “Variable Graph.” https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
As the Bundestag is a “working parliament,” parliamentary committees play a crucial role in the legislative process. Germany has several permanent committees established by the Basic Law (Article 44ff) that significantly influence policymaking (V-Dem, 2023). In addition to their legislative influence, these committees oversee government activities.
When investigating a subject, committees generally have the right to take evidence, and the executive branch is required to provide requested documents. However, the government sometimes attempts to withhold information. In such cases, the responsible minister must present reasons for the refusal. Additionally, the committee can appeal the decision to the Federal Constitutional Court or the Federal Court of Justice (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).
Additionally, following Article 43 of the Basic Law, the legislature has the right to require presence. This means parliament and its committees can require members of the executive to attend committee meetings for questioning. If summoned witnesses are absent without excuse, the committee can order their compulsory appearance without a court order or impose a fine of up to €10,000 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).
According to the V-Dem index (2023), the legislature regularly questions members of the executive branch, requiring ministers or the head of government to explain policies or testify regarding various issues. Committees specifically set up to investigate misconduct – so-called committees of inquiry – will be discussed in the next text on legislative investigations. It cannot be determined, however, if the answers provided are satisfactory to the committee.
Citations:
Deutscher Bundestag. 2016. “Sachstand, Befugnisse des Untersuchungsausschusses zur Beweiserhebung, WD 3 - 3000 - 265/16.” https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/493600/869bf4ce24e8f566ccc0c5fb4327112d/WD-3-265-16-pdf-data.pdf
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph
When investigating a subject, committees generally have the right to take evidence, and the executive branch is required to provide requested documents. However, the government sometimes attempts to withhold information. In such cases, the responsible minister must present reasons for the refusal. Additionally, the committee can appeal the decision to the Federal Constitutional Court or the Federal Court of Justice (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).
Additionally, following Article 43 of the Basic Law, the legislature has the right to require presence. This means parliament and its committees can require members of the executive to attend committee meetings for questioning. If summoned witnesses are absent without excuse, the committee can order their compulsory appearance without a court order or impose a fine of up to €10,000 (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016).
According to the V-Dem index (2023), the legislature regularly questions members of the executive branch, requiring ministers or the head of government to explain policies or testify regarding various issues. Committees specifically set up to investigate misconduct – so-called committees of inquiry – will be discussed in the next text on legislative investigations. It cannot be determined, however, if the answers provided are satisfactory to the committee.
Citations:
Deutscher Bundestag. 2016. “Sachstand, Befugnisse des Untersuchungsausschusses zur Beweiserhebung, WD 3 - 3000 - 265/16.” https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/493600/869bf4ce24e8f566ccc0c5fb4327112d/WD-3-265-16-pdf-data.pdf
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
As previously mentioned, parliamentary committees exercise oversight of the government. Specifically, committees of inquiry function to investigate possible misconduct by the executive branch. A committee must be set up at the request of at least one-quarter of the members of parliament, regardless of their party (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d). Thus, the opposition can, in principle, initiate the setup of a committee of inquiry, even against the will of the governing coalition. As of 2020, around three-quarters of the 46 committees of inquiry set up since 1949 were based on a request from the opposition (Knelagen, 2021).
Nonetheless, in July 2023, a committee of inquiry requested by the CDU to examine the CumEx Scandal was denied by the governing coalition on the premise that the issue was not within the government’s competence. It was argued that, as a federal committee of inquiry can only examine misconduct covered by the government’s competence, the committee would be unconstitutional. However, Article 44 of the Basic Law does not stipulate that a committee of inquiry can only deal with issues covered by the government’s competence. Moreover, this was the first time in the Federal Republic’s history that a majority denied a committee of inquiry despite at least 25% of members of parliament demanding it. The CDU filed a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court (Kohnert and Kornmeier, 2023).
Regarding the actual capacity of committees to investigate unconstitutional or illegal government activities, the V-Dem index (2023) estimates that it is nearly certain the legislature would conduct an investigation resulting in an unfavorable decision or report to the executive if the executive were engaged in unconstitutional or illegal activity.
As committees of inquiry are primarily an instrument of parliamentary control designed to hold the government accountable, the outcomes of such investigations do not necessarily have severe consequences for the government. Depending on the extent of an investigation’s success, its outcome can have political consequences, such as damaging the reputation of government members or leading to changes in policy content. Additionally, the outcome can have legal consequences if illegal actions are uncovered. However, the impact of an investigation largely depends on two factors: whether the committee can expose illegal or unconstitutional activities and the amount of media attention the investigation receives, which creates additional public pressure on the government (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010).
Citations:
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Untersuchungsausschuss.” https://www.bundestag.de/services/glossar/glossar/U/unters_aussch-245546
Deutscher Bundestag. 2010. “Das schärfste Schwer der Opposition.” https://www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/textarchiv/2010/29580373_untersuchungsausschuesse-201648
Knelagen, W. 2021. “Untersuchungsausschüsse.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/511480/untersuchungsausschuesse/
Kohnert, N., Kornmeier, C. 2023. “Union treibt Scholz mit Klage vor sich her.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/union-scholz-warburg-cumex-100.html
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph
Nonetheless, in July 2023, a committee of inquiry requested by the CDU to examine the CumEx Scandal was denied by the governing coalition on the premise that the issue was not within the government’s competence. It was argued that, as a federal committee of inquiry can only examine misconduct covered by the government’s competence, the committee would be unconstitutional. However, Article 44 of the Basic Law does not stipulate that a committee of inquiry can only deal with issues covered by the government’s competence. Moreover, this was the first time in the Federal Republic’s history that a majority denied a committee of inquiry despite at least 25% of members of parliament demanding it. The CDU filed a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court (Kohnert and Kornmeier, 2023).
Regarding the actual capacity of committees to investigate unconstitutional or illegal government activities, the V-Dem index (2023) estimates that it is nearly certain the legislature would conduct an investigation resulting in an unfavorable decision or report to the executive if the executive were engaged in unconstitutional or illegal activity.
As committees of inquiry are primarily an instrument of parliamentary control designed to hold the government accountable, the outcomes of such investigations do not necessarily have severe consequences for the government. Depending on the extent of an investigation’s success, its outcome can have political consequences, such as damaging the reputation of government members or leading to changes in policy content. Additionally, the outcome can have legal consequences if illegal actions are uncovered. However, the impact of an investigation largely depends on two factors: whether the committee can expose illegal or unconstitutional activities and the amount of media attention the investigation receives, which creates additional public pressure on the government (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010).
Citations:
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Untersuchungsausschuss.” https://www.bundestag.de/services/glossar/glossar/U/unters_aussch-245546
Deutscher Bundestag. 2010. “Das schärfste Schwer der Opposition.” https://www.bundestag.de/webarchiv/textarchiv/2010/29580373_untersuchungsausschuesse-201648
Knelagen, W. 2021. “Untersuchungsausschüsse.” https://www.bpb.de/kurz-knapp/lexika/handwoerterbuch-politisches-system/511480/untersuchungsausschuesse/
Kohnert, N., Kornmeier, C. 2023. “Union treibt Scholz mit Klage vor sich her.” https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/union-scholz-warburg-cumex-100.html
Varieties of Democracy. 2023. https://v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
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9
9
The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
2
1
1
The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
Committees in the Bundestag play a crucial role in guiding policies. Based on consultations within a committee and public hearings of experts, stakeholders and other relevant actors providing information on the issues, committees then give a recommendation to the plenary session (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016). Each legislative term, the legislature can independently decide on the number of its committees, with the exception of four committees defined in Basic Law. These are a committee on the European Union (Art. 45), a committee on foreign affairs and a defense committee (Art. 45a), and a petitions committee (Art. 45c).
For the 20th electoral term, the legislature set up 25 committees, whereby slightly more committees than ministries exist. Generally, the parliamentary committees for most policy areas fully align with the ministries’ areas. For example, the corresponding committee for the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is the Committee of Labor and Social Affairs. In some cases, the overall policy areas of a ministry are split into two committees. This is the case, for instance, for the Economic Committee and the Committee on Climate Protection and Energy, which coincide with the responsibilities of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, or for the Ministry of Finance, which is covered by the Committee of Finance and the Committee of Budget.
Additionally, it is possible that multiple committees can bear the responsibility for the policy areas of one ministry or that one committee handles issues not clearly assigned to a single ministry. Nevertheless, the division into diverse parliamentary committees still allows for effective monitoring of the executive and guiding of the development of legislative proposals (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023a).
Generally, the sizes of the committees differ, but the distribution of seats is always proportional to the majority ratio in parliament. For the 20th electoral term specifically, committee sizes range from 19 to 49 members, with the Committee on Labor and Social Affairs being the largest (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023a). Every year, parliament has at least 20 session weeks that are mandatory for members of parliament. During those weeks, committees meet every Wednesday, while some committees also meet on Thursdays. To manage the workload, additional meetings for hearings are often held on Mondays (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023b).
Opposition parties regularly hold chairs of legislative committees. The number of committee chairs held by opposition parties is proportional to their seat shares. Out of the 25 committees, opposition parties hold the chairs of eleven committees. The opposition always holds the chair of the budget committee. In the current term, the CDU/CSU holds the chairs of the Economic and Finance committees, while Die Linke holds the chair for the Committee on Climate Protection and Energy (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023a).
Bills are routinely revised during the committee phase, although to varying degrees (Ismayr 2012). Generally, parliament makes its final decision based on the recommendations of the responsible committees (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.), and only rarely does the final decision deviate from the committee recommendation.
Citations:
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Beschlussempfehlung.” https://www.bundestag.de/services/glossar/glossar/B/beschl_empf-245344
Deutscher Bundestag. 2016. “Ausarbeitung, Struktur und Aufgaben der ständigen Ausschüsse Ein Vergleich zwischen dem Deutschen Bundestag, der französischen Assemblée nationale und dem britischen House of Commons.” https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/413430/415104a9c385a42db463e68c00b37d92/WD-3-255-14-pdf-data.pdf
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023. “Die Ausschüsse des Deutschen Bundestages, Neuauflage 2023 20. Wahlperiode.” https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/20061000.pdf
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023b. “Die Arbeit der Bundestagsausschüsse – Fragen und Antworten.” https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/881160/681403d8f9c599f696cadb3cb5d737cd/arbeit_ausschuesse-data.pdf
Ismayr, Wolfgang. 2012. Der Deutsche Bundestag. 3rd ed. Wiesbaden: SpringerVS.
For the 20th electoral term, the legislature set up 25 committees, whereby slightly more committees than ministries exist. Generally, the parliamentary committees for most policy areas fully align with the ministries’ areas. For example, the corresponding committee for the Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is the Committee of Labor and Social Affairs. In some cases, the overall policy areas of a ministry are split into two committees. This is the case, for instance, for the Economic Committee and the Committee on Climate Protection and Energy, which coincide with the responsibilities of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, or for the Ministry of Finance, which is covered by the Committee of Finance and the Committee of Budget.
Additionally, it is possible that multiple committees can bear the responsibility for the policy areas of one ministry or that one committee handles issues not clearly assigned to a single ministry. Nevertheless, the division into diverse parliamentary committees still allows for effective monitoring of the executive and guiding of the development of legislative proposals (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023a).
Generally, the sizes of the committees differ, but the distribution of seats is always proportional to the majority ratio in parliament. For the 20th electoral term specifically, committee sizes range from 19 to 49 members, with the Committee on Labor and Social Affairs being the largest (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023a). Every year, parliament has at least 20 session weeks that are mandatory for members of parliament. During those weeks, committees meet every Wednesday, while some committees also meet on Thursdays. To manage the workload, additional meetings for hearings are often held on Mondays (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023b).
Opposition parties regularly hold chairs of legislative committees. The number of committee chairs held by opposition parties is proportional to their seat shares. Out of the 25 committees, opposition parties hold the chairs of eleven committees. The opposition always holds the chair of the budget committee. In the current term, the CDU/CSU holds the chairs of the Economic and Finance committees, while Die Linke holds the chair for the Committee on Climate Protection and Energy (Deutscher Bundestag, 2023a).
Bills are routinely revised during the committee phase, although to varying degrees (Ismayr 2012). Generally, parliament makes its final decision based on the recommendations of the responsible committees (Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.), and only rarely does the final decision deviate from the committee recommendation.
Citations:
Deutscher Bundestag. n.d. “Beschlussempfehlung.” https://www.bundestag.de/services/glossar/glossar/B/beschl_empf-245344
Deutscher Bundestag. 2016. “Ausarbeitung, Struktur und Aufgaben der ständigen Ausschüsse Ein Vergleich zwischen dem Deutschen Bundestag, der französischen Assemblée nationale und dem britischen House of Commons.” https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/413430/415104a9c385a42db463e68c00b37d92/WD-3-255-14-pdf-data.pdf
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023. “Die Ausschüsse des Deutschen Bundestages, Neuauflage 2023 20. Wahlperiode.” https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/20061000.pdf
Deutscher Bundestag. 2023b. “Die Arbeit der Bundestagsausschüsse – Fragen und Antworten.” https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/881160/681403d8f9c599f696cadb3cb5d737cd/arbeit_ausschuesse-data.pdf
Ismayr, Wolfgang. 2012. Der Deutsche Bundestag. 3rd ed. Wiesbaden: SpringerVS.