Diagonal Accountability
#22Key Findings
Greece scores relatively poorly in international comparison (rank 22) with regard to diagonal accountability.
The government can influence the public media by appointing executives. This led effectively to government control from 2015 to 2019, but influence has since decreased. Journalists occasionally face pressure such as legal threats from government ministers. In an ongoing case, the national intelligence service has been accused of wiretapping journalists’ phones.
The private media sector features outlets expressing views across the political spectrum, but is dominated by a few large media conglomerates with wide-ranging external business interests. This creates an oligopoly with significant economic power. Civil society groups operate freely, and there are few restrictions on assembly or political rallies.
Economic organizations have lost influence over the past decade. They are invited to parliamentary sessions, and participate in negotiations to set minimum wages and salaries. However, labor associations in particular have also been obstructive, for instance using strikes to prevent policy adoption. Welfare and environmental groups have little ability to shape policy.
The government can influence the public media by appointing executives. This led effectively to government control from 2015 to 2019, but influence has since decreased. Journalists occasionally face pressure such as legal threats from government ministers. In an ongoing case, the national intelligence service has been accused of wiretapping journalists’ phones.
The private media sector features outlets expressing views across the political spectrum, but is dominated by a few large media conglomerates with wide-ranging external business interests. This creates an oligopoly with significant economic power. Civil society groups operate freely, and there are few restrictions on assembly or political rallies.
Economic organizations have lost influence over the past decade. They are invited to parliamentary sessions, and participate in negotiations to set minimum wages and salaries. However, labor associations in particular have also been obstructive, for instance using strikes to prevent policy adoption. Welfare and environmental groups have little ability to shape policy.
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To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
10
9
9
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
2
1
1
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
Media freedom in Greece is constitutionally guaranteed (Article 14). However, regulations governing public-owned media allow the government to appoint the Board of Directors and CEO of entities like the ERT television and radio company, including their regional branches. This appointment process grants the government considerable influence over media content. Despite this, opposition pressures and independent media reactions have led successive governments to gradually reduce their control over ERT.
In the 2010s, government control over ERT was particularly intense, highlighted by the abrupt closure of ERT in 2012 as part of economic austerity measures, followed by its reopening under full government control from 2015 to 2019. Currently, such control is less stringent.
Private media in Greece operate without censorship. The licensing and regulatory systems ensure their independence from government influence and political interference. However, during the COVID-19 crisis (2020–2022), the government faced accusations of attempting to influence the press by directing budget funds to selected media outlets. This funding supported public awareness campaigns for anti-COVID measures, such as vaccination drives. While some opposition media also received funding, certain newspapers known for their personal attacks against government officials were excluded.
Journalists in Greece work in a relatively free environment but periodically face significant pressures. In the previous decade and after 2020, some government ministers sued journalists accused of slander. Unlike during the Greek economic crisis, when a few prominent pro-EU journalists faced threats or even physical violence from anti-austerity protesters and political party officials, physical harassment of journalists is now rare.
The unresolved murder of a well-known reporter investigating mafia crime in 2021 remains a troubling case. In 2022, it was revealed that the cell phones of several journalists reporting on immigration were wiretapped, with Greece’s national intelligence service, the EYP, implicated in this surveillance case, which remains unresolved. During 2022–2023, the Greek justice system was slow to process these cases. Conversely, in the summer of 2022, some foreign journalists falsely reported the death of a young Syrian girl on the Greek-Turkish border, leading to accusations of government negligence, only for the story to later be debunked as a complete fabrication.
Overall, foreign correspondents have been less critical of the left-wing government in power from 2015 to 2019 compared to the center-right government since 2019. This shift has strained relations between the Greek government and the foreign press. As a result, Greece’s ranking in the World Press Freedom Index dropped from 65th in 2020 to 107th in 2023. In 2024, concerns about media freedom were highlighted in a European Parliament resolution (Klosidis, 2024), which the Greek government dismissed as a partisan attempt to undermine its progress in this area.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Greece.” https://rsf.org/en/country/greece
Deutsche Welle. 2022. “Mystery around alleged death of girl on Greek-Turkish border.” https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/45091/mystery-around-alleged-death-of-girl-on-greekturkish-border
Klosidis, K. 2024. “Parliament concerned about very serious threats to EU values in Greece.” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17312/parliament-concerned-about-very-serious-threats-to-eu-values-in-greece
In the 2010s, government control over ERT was particularly intense, highlighted by the abrupt closure of ERT in 2012 as part of economic austerity measures, followed by its reopening under full government control from 2015 to 2019. Currently, such control is less stringent.
Private media in Greece operate without censorship. The licensing and regulatory systems ensure their independence from government influence and political interference. However, during the COVID-19 crisis (2020–2022), the government faced accusations of attempting to influence the press by directing budget funds to selected media outlets. This funding supported public awareness campaigns for anti-COVID measures, such as vaccination drives. While some opposition media also received funding, certain newspapers known for their personal attacks against government officials were excluded.
Journalists in Greece work in a relatively free environment but periodically face significant pressures. In the previous decade and after 2020, some government ministers sued journalists accused of slander. Unlike during the Greek economic crisis, when a few prominent pro-EU journalists faced threats or even physical violence from anti-austerity protesters and political party officials, physical harassment of journalists is now rare.
The unresolved murder of a well-known reporter investigating mafia crime in 2021 remains a troubling case. In 2022, it was revealed that the cell phones of several journalists reporting on immigration were wiretapped, with Greece’s national intelligence service, the EYP, implicated in this surveillance case, which remains unresolved. During 2022–2023, the Greek justice system was slow to process these cases. Conversely, in the summer of 2022, some foreign journalists falsely reported the death of a young Syrian girl on the Greek-Turkish border, leading to accusations of government negligence, only for the story to later be debunked as a complete fabrication.
Overall, foreign correspondents have been less critical of the left-wing government in power from 2015 to 2019 compared to the center-right government since 2019. This shift has strained relations between the Greek government and the foreign press. As a result, Greece’s ranking in the World Press Freedom Index dropped from 65th in 2020 to 107th in 2023. In 2024, concerns about media freedom were highlighted in a European Parliament resolution (Klosidis, 2024), which the Greek government dismissed as a partisan attempt to undermine its progress in this area.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Greece.” https://rsf.org/en/country/greece
Deutsche Welle. 2022. “Mystery around alleged death of girl on Greek-Turkish border.” https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/45091/mystery-around-alleged-death-of-girl-on-greekturkish-border
Klosidis, K. 2024. “Parliament concerned about very serious threats to EU values in Greece.” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240202IPR17312/parliament-concerned-about-very-serious-threats-to-eu-values-in-greece
To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
There are no significant legal impediments preventing media outlets from representing the full spectrum of political perspectives in Greek society. Media outlets express views across the entire right-left political spectrum.
Currently, Greece has 21 newspapers with national circulation, along with dozens of regional and local newspapers. The left-wing opposition is supported by its party-controlled press and radio outlets, with at least three newspapers articulating the views of various left-wing opposition parties. Similarly, there are newspapers representing far-right political parties, often espousing traditionalist and chauvinistic views.
Approximately one-third of all national circulation newspapers can be classified as yellow press, frequently publishing unsubstantiated accusations against public figures such as celebrities, journalists, and government officials.
In addition to the three publicly owned TV channels (ERT 1, 2, and 3), seven private TV channels operate nationwide, supplemented by numerous private regional TV channels spread across Greece’s 13 regions. This landscape ensures that there is, in practice, pluralism in the private media sector.
A few large media conglomerates dominate the private media landscape, owning both nationwide TV channels and newspapers. These conglomerates also have significant business interests in sectors such as construction and shipping, and they often own Greece’s most competitive soccer and basketball teams. As a result, the largest private media outlets operate as part of an oligopoly with substantial economic influence (Papathanassopoulos et al., 2021).
Media owners occasionally attempt to influence public policymaking. However, instances of policy capture are mitigated by fierce competition among business conglomerates, and Greek governments typically rely on strong single-party parliamentary majorities.
Citations:
Papathanassopoulos, S., Karadimitriou, A., Kostopoulos, C., and Archontaki, I. 2021. “Greece: Media concentration and independent journalism between austerity and digital disruption.” In J. Trappel and T. Tomaz, eds.
The Media for Democracy Monitor 2021: How leading news media survive digital transformation (Vol. 2)
(pp. 177–230). Nordicom, University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.48335/9789188855428-5
Currently, Greece has 21 newspapers with national circulation, along with dozens of regional and local newspapers. The left-wing opposition is supported by its party-controlled press and radio outlets, with at least three newspapers articulating the views of various left-wing opposition parties. Similarly, there are newspapers representing far-right political parties, often espousing traditionalist and chauvinistic views.
Approximately one-third of all national circulation newspapers can be classified as yellow press, frequently publishing unsubstantiated accusations against public figures such as celebrities, journalists, and government officials.
In addition to the three publicly owned TV channels (ERT 1, 2, and 3), seven private TV channels operate nationwide, supplemented by numerous private regional TV channels spread across Greece’s 13 regions. This landscape ensures that there is, in practice, pluralism in the private media sector.
A few large media conglomerates dominate the private media landscape, owning both nationwide TV channels and newspapers. These conglomerates also have significant business interests in sectors such as construction and shipping, and they often own Greece’s most competitive soccer and basketball teams. As a result, the largest private media outlets operate as part of an oligopoly with substantial economic influence (Papathanassopoulos et al., 2021).
Media owners occasionally attempt to influence public policymaking. However, instances of policy capture are mitigated by fierce competition among business conglomerates, and Greek governments typically rely on strong single-party parliamentary majorities.
Citations:
Papathanassopoulos, S., Karadimitriou, A., Kostopoulos, C., and Archontaki, I. 2021. “Greece: Media concentration and independent journalism between austerity and digital disruption.” In J. Trappel and T. Tomaz, eds.
The Media for Democracy Monitor 2021: How leading news media survive digital transformation (Vol. 2)
(pp. 177–230). Nordicom, University of Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.48335/9789188855428-5
Graph View
To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
The Greek constitution guarantees freedom of assembly (Article 11) and association, including the establishment of labor unions, athletic clubs, and other organizations (Articles 12, 23, and 16, para. 9). Political rallies are common, and numerous associations operate freely without unwarranted state intrusion or interference. The courts, rather than the government, evaluate requests for permits to associate or assemble, applying transparent and nondiscriminatory criteria. However, legal restrictions prohibit fascist or racist organizations from participating in parliamentary elections.
In 2022, Greece ranked 42nd out of 140 countries according to the World Justice Project, placing it above average (World Justice Project, 2022). Amnesty International reported in 2022 that, in some instances, police used excessive force against protesters, and security forces engaged in pushbacks against incoming migrants and refugees (Amnesty International, 2022).
In some cases, associations are restricted when foreign policy issues arise. For example, Greek courts, based on the Lausanne Treaty signed between Greece and Turkey in 2023, prohibit associations established by members of the Muslim minority near the Greek-Turkish border in Northern Greece from using the term “Turkish” in their names. The courts argue that this term indicates a collective ethnic identity, while the treaty only recognizes a collective religious identity.
Few restrictions on assembly exist, except when high-ranking foreign dignitaries visit Greece’s capital. There is no intimidation, harassment, or threat of retaliation against citizens exercising their rights to legally assemble and associate.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2022. “Greece.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/greece/report-greece/
US Department of State. 2022. “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Greece.” https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/greece/
World Justice Project. 2022. “Greece- Factor 4, Fundamental Rights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Greece/Fundamental%20Rights
In 2022, Greece ranked 42nd out of 140 countries according to the World Justice Project, placing it above average (World Justice Project, 2022). Amnesty International reported in 2022 that, in some instances, police used excessive force against protesters, and security forces engaged in pushbacks against incoming migrants and refugees (Amnesty International, 2022).
In some cases, associations are restricted when foreign policy issues arise. For example, Greek courts, based on the Lausanne Treaty signed between Greece and Turkey in 2023, prohibit associations established by members of the Muslim minority near the Greek-Turkish border in Northern Greece from using the term “Turkish” in their names. The courts argue that this term indicates a collective ethnic identity, while the treaty only recognizes a collective religious identity.
Few restrictions on assembly exist, except when high-ranking foreign dignitaries visit Greece’s capital. There is no intimidation, harassment, or threat of retaliation against citizens exercising their rights to legally assemble and associate.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2022. “Greece.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/greece/report-greece/
US Department of State. 2022. “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Greece.” https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/greece/
World Justice Project. 2022. “Greece- Factor 4, Fundamental Rights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2022/Greece/Fundamental%20Rights
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Civil society organization (CSO) participation in Greek policymaking follows global trends, becoming less frequent and substantive. In Greece, CSO involvement is also episodic and highly partisan. While labor unions were once more involved in negotiating sectoral agreements, their role has diminished since the bailout era of the 2010s, under the guise of austerity measures. This trend continued under the radical left-right coalition led by SYRIZA and persists under the current conservative government. Although CSOs participate in parliamentary debates and have access to draft bills, their recent contributions have primarily been obstructive, often in the form of strikes to prevent policy adoption.
Legislation generally supports the development of CSOs defending capital and labor interests. The government provides public funding to major labor confederations, such as the GSEE (private sector unions) and ADEDY (civil service unions). However, business associations, including those representing industrialists (SEV), shipowners (EEE), and liberal professionals like lawyers, engineers, and doctors, do not receive government funding. In some associations, such as the strong bank employee unions, membership dues are compulsorily deducted from employees’ salaries.
The two aforementioned confederations have established associated think tanks, providing expertise for participation in the policymaking process. However, since the economic crisis of 2010, union input has been less influential in policy formulation.
Public participation in labor CSOs has also declined, with only a small proportion of the population expressing trust in labor unions (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2021). Despite this, unions frequently organize strikes, which have the capacity to disrupt policy implementation rather than policy formulation. Nonetheless, the government remains responsive to policy proposals from major CSOs. Representatives of capital and labor, along with other interest groups, are invited to parliamentary committee sessions to debate bills and participate in social partner negotiations to set minimum wages and salaries.
Citations:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 2021. “The Situation of Trade Unions in Greece.” FES Briefing compiled by G. Bythimitris, September. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/athen/18276.pdf
Legislation generally supports the development of CSOs defending capital and labor interests. The government provides public funding to major labor confederations, such as the GSEE (private sector unions) and ADEDY (civil service unions). However, business associations, including those representing industrialists (SEV), shipowners (EEE), and liberal professionals like lawyers, engineers, and doctors, do not receive government funding. In some associations, such as the strong bank employee unions, membership dues are compulsorily deducted from employees’ salaries.
The two aforementioned confederations have established associated think tanks, providing expertise for participation in the policymaking process. However, since the economic crisis of 2010, union input has been less influential in policy formulation.
Public participation in labor CSOs has also declined, with only a small proportion of the population expressing trust in labor unions (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2021). Despite this, unions frequently organize strikes, which have the capacity to disrupt policy implementation rather than policy formulation. Nonetheless, the government remains responsive to policy proposals from major CSOs. Representatives of capital and labor, along with other interest groups, are invited to parliamentary committee sessions to debate bills and participate in social partner negotiations to set minimum wages and salaries.
Citations:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. 2021. “The Situation of Trade Unions in Greece.” FES Briefing compiled by G. Bythimitris, September. https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/athen/18276.pdf
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
The Greek constitution enshrines the principle of the “Welfare State of Law” (Article 25), including rights to education, health, and social security. The constitution mandates that state authorities must not obstruct the exercise of these rights, and citizens are required to uphold social solidarity (Paragraph 4, Article 25).
However, few CSOs possess the organizational strength necessary to influence public policies. The responsibility for shaping welfare policies primarily lies with the government, public administration, and parliament. While many CSOs engage in social welfare activities, their role in policy formulation is limited.
Additionally, many CSOs in Greece rely on the state (e.g., the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, local municipalities) and, to some extent, on private donations for financial support and infrastructure, such as state-owned buildings.
Even the largest CSOs often lack the expertise required to contribute to public policymaking. When welfare policy bills are submitted to parliament, CSO representatives are invited to participate in parliamentary debates and testify before the parliament’s Permanent Committee on Social Affairs (Parliament, 2024).
In the past, CSOs faced public suspicion due to involvement in misappropriating public funds allocated by relevant ministries. For example, in December 2022, criminal investigations were launched against the child charity “Arc of the World,” headed by a well-known low-ranking Greek Orthodox priest, who, along with 10 others, was investigated on four felony charges (Keep Talking Greece, 2022). This case remained unresolved in 2023.
Citations:
Keep Talking Greece. 2022. “Father Antonios and another ten investigated for charity’s financial management.” https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2022/12/02/child-charity-financial-investigation
Parliament. 2024. “Permanent Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs.” https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Koinovouleftikes-Epitropes/CommiteeDetailView?CommitteeId=583b7a49-8542-41c0-8e16-e1c22246bfa6
However, few CSOs possess the organizational strength necessary to influence public policies. The responsibility for shaping welfare policies primarily lies with the government, public administration, and parliament. While many CSOs engage in social welfare activities, their role in policy formulation is limited.
Additionally, many CSOs in Greece rely on the state (e.g., the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, local municipalities) and, to some extent, on private donations for financial support and infrastructure, such as state-owned buildings.
Even the largest CSOs often lack the expertise required to contribute to public policymaking. When welfare policy bills are submitted to parliament, CSO representatives are invited to participate in parliamentary debates and testify before the parliament’s Permanent Committee on Social Affairs (Parliament, 2024).
In the past, CSOs faced public suspicion due to involvement in misappropriating public funds allocated by relevant ministries. For example, in December 2022, criminal investigations were launched against the child charity “Arc of the World,” headed by a well-known low-ranking Greek Orthodox priest, who, along with 10 others, was investigated on four felony charges (Keep Talking Greece, 2022). This case remained unresolved in 2023.
Citations:
Keep Talking Greece. 2022. “Father Antonios and another ten investigated for charity’s financial management.” https://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2022/12/02/child-charity-financial-investigation
Parliament. 2024. “Permanent Parliamentary Committee on Social Affairs.” https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Koinovouleftikes-Epitropes/CommiteeDetailView?CommitteeId=583b7a49-8542-41c0-8e16-e1c22246bfa6
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
The Greek constitution mandates state protection of the natural environment and citizens’ rights to enjoy it (Article 24).
However, most environmental CSOs lack the organizational strength to influence environmental policy, apart from a few local branches of international NGOs like Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund.
Representatives of environmental CSOs are invited to present their views at sessions of the parliament’s “Special Permanent Committee on Environmental Protection.” These CSOs also participate in public deliberations on prospective environmental policies launched by the relevant ministry before submitting a bill to parliament.
Few CSOs have the financial and human resources needed to shape environmental public policies. This responsibility primarily falls to the Ministry of Environment and Energy. Although attempts to organize collective action on sustainable development issues exist, they are often incipient and periodic (Hellenic Platform for Development, 2024).
As a result, while many CSOs are active in environmental protection, their activities are often localized, and they do not contribute significantly to the formulation of environmental policies. Given Greece’s vulnerability to climate change, the relative weakness of environmental CSOs in this Mediterranean country is surprising (van Versendaal 2023).
Citations:
Hellenic Platform for Development. 2024. “https://sdgwatcheurope.org/hellenic-platform-greece/”
Van Versendaal, H. 2023. “Why Green Parties in Greece Are Failing to Bloom.” Green European Journal, August 4. https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/why-greeces-green-parties-are-failing-to-bloom/
However, most environmental CSOs lack the organizational strength to influence environmental policy, apart from a few local branches of international NGOs like Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund.
Representatives of environmental CSOs are invited to present their views at sessions of the parliament’s “Special Permanent Committee on Environmental Protection.” These CSOs also participate in public deliberations on prospective environmental policies launched by the relevant ministry before submitting a bill to parliament.
Few CSOs have the financial and human resources needed to shape environmental public policies. This responsibility primarily falls to the Ministry of Environment and Energy. Although attempts to organize collective action on sustainable development issues exist, they are often incipient and periodic (Hellenic Platform for Development, 2024).
As a result, while many CSOs are active in environmental protection, their activities are often localized, and they do not contribute significantly to the formulation of environmental policies. Given Greece’s vulnerability to climate change, the relative weakness of environmental CSOs in this Mediterranean country is surprising (van Versendaal 2023).
Citations:
Hellenic Platform for Development. 2024. “https://sdgwatcheurope.org/hellenic-platform-greece/”
Van Versendaal, H. 2023. “Why Green Parties in Greece Are Failing to Bloom.” Green European Journal, August 4. https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/why-greeces-green-parties-are-failing-to-bloom/