Coordination
#24Key Findings
In the category of coordination, Hungary performs relatively poorly in international comparison (rank 24).
The Orbán governments have expanded the power and resources of the Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Office. These bodies ensure that policies align with Orbán’s preferences and Fidesz’s ideology. Line ministries serve largely as executors of the core executive’s decisions. The number of ministries has been expanded, necessitating greater interministerial coordination.
Power is increasingly concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office and in Orbán’s person. This sometimes creates policymaking bottlenecks. The role of informal decision-making has expanded. Formal mechanisms serve largely to legalize and implement the prime minister’s improvised and hastily made decisions.
The core government has taken over some previously decentralized services. Public services left at the subnational level have suffered to due to a lack of financial resources and administrative capacities, conflicting legal norms and complex regulations. Strong politicization of funding means that resources are shifted from non-Fidesz administrations to Fidesz-controlled counties.
The Orbán governments have expanded the power and resources of the Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Office. These bodies ensure that policies align with Orbán’s preferences and Fidesz’s ideology. Line ministries serve largely as executors of the core executive’s decisions. The number of ministries has been expanded, necessitating greater interministerial coordination.
Power is increasingly concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office and in Orbán’s person. This sometimes creates policymaking bottlenecks. The role of informal decision-making has expanded. Formal mechanisms serve largely to legalize and implement the prime minister’s improvised and hastily made decisions.
The core government has taken over some previously decentralized services. Public services left at the subnational level have suffered to due to a lack of financial resources and administrative capacities, conflicting legal norms and complex regulations. Strong politicization of funding means that resources are shifted from non-Fidesz administrations to Fidesz-controlled counties.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
8
7
6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
5
4
3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
The Orbán governments have steadily expanded the competencies and resources of both the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office. The division of labor between the two offices, each led by a minister, is somewhat artificial. The Prime Minister’s Office is central to policy coordination, ensuring that policies align closely with the prime minister’s preferences and Fidesz’s ideological rhetoric. The Cabinet Office, headed by Antal Rogán, is primarily responsible for government coordination and communication, but its scope was extended after 2022 to oversee the secret services as well.
Under the Orbán governments, line ministries have mostly acted as executive agencies following priorities set by the core political executive. This represents a complete turnaround from most earlier governments in post-communist Hungary, when ministers functioned more as representatives of their ministries in the government than as representatives of the government in their ministries. Today, orders come from above, and ministerial activities are subject to detailed oversight by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). However, the pivotal role of the PMO has also made it a bottleneck in policymaking at times.
In this structure, the core executive may intervene in a ministry’s preparation of policy proposals at any time. As the Orbán V government increased the number of ministries, coordination functions shifted from within large ministries (Orbán IV) to the core executive, enhancing the need for broader coordination. Overall, the continuous growth of the core executive has been a feature of the informal presidentialization of the Hungarian government, in which the prime minister is the central political figure and the decision-maker of last resort. Aside from technical issues, coordination here is always a matter of command and control. Nevertheless, the cabinet holds weekly, biweekly and sometimes extraordinary meetings where ongoing policy issues are regularly discussed, with the participation of the prime minister and the ministers. These meetings are not public, but the most important decisions are announced through press conferences.
Under the Orbán governments, line ministries have mostly acted as executive agencies following priorities set by the core political executive. This represents a complete turnaround from most earlier governments in post-communist Hungary, when ministers functioned more as representatives of their ministries in the government than as representatives of the government in their ministries. Today, orders come from above, and ministerial activities are subject to detailed oversight by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). However, the pivotal role of the PMO has also made it a bottleneck in policymaking at times.
In this structure, the core executive may intervene in a ministry’s preparation of policy proposals at any time. As the Orbán V government increased the number of ministries, coordination functions shifted from within large ministries (Orbán IV) to the core executive, enhancing the need for broader coordination. Overall, the continuous growth of the core executive has been a feature of the informal presidentialization of the Hungarian government, in which the prime minister is the central political figure and the decision-maker of last resort. Aside from technical issues, coordination here is always a matter of command and control. Nevertheless, the cabinet holds weekly, biweekly and sometimes extraordinary meetings where ongoing policy issues are regularly discussed, with the participation of the prime minister and the ministers. These meetings are not public, but the most important decisions are announced through press conferences.
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
8
7
6
7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
5
4
3
4
3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
2
1
1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Under the present government, the number of ministries has increased to a more adequate number of 14, compared to the relatively low number in previous terms. This shift necessitates the replacement of intraministerial coordination with interministerial coordination. The Orbán governments have occasionally set up cabinet committees. However, these committees have to date played a subordinate role in interministerial coordination, primarily because of the limited number of ministries and the strong coordination from above. In the current parliamentary term, there are four cabinets: an economic cabinet; a strategy cabinet (a mixed shop); a cabinet on “nation-policy” (nemzetpolitika) dealing with state-church relations, national minorities and questions of the Hungarian nation such as citizenship; and a national security cabinet (defense council). In the Hungarian system, vertical coordination is stronger than horizontal coordination. Most horizontal conflicts arise when certain responsibilities are moved from one ministry to another or when new ministries are established. For example, the supervision of secret services was transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office in 2022. Another instance is the establishment of the Ministry of Construction and Transport, led by a highly conflict-seeking minister (János Lázár). The political impetus stemming from the prime minister’s convictions is highly prioritized, and the line ministries are executors of this political will. Consequently, skirmishes between ministries about policy options and sectoral interests are rare. Still, the pivotal role of the Prime Minister’s Office has sometimes resulted in it becoming a bottleneck in policymaking.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
The strong top-down formal role of Prime Minister Orbán and his Prime Minister’s Office is complemented by informal coordination mechanisms. As power concentration has increased in the fourth Orbán government, so has the role of informal decision-making. Orbán regularly gathers officials from his larger circle to issue instructions. In effect, formal mechanisms only serve to legalize and implement the prime minister’s improvised and hastily made decisions.
From the bottom-up perspective, civil servants have very limited capacity to influence policymaking either formally or informally. Given the high level of politicization in Hungary and the high levels of patronage and political control over the bureaucracy, any deviation from the core government’s line is perilous. In small groups, mind guards are often present.
As a consequence, self-censorship and groupthink occur regularly. Informal “coordination” exists through top-down channels through which the core government makes it clear to civil servants where the political will is situated, often without issuing formal orders, as such orders might be legally questionable. As a result, much of the fragmentary informal coordination is defunct. It does not improve the quality of policymaking but hinders the implementation of objectively preferable solutions to problems. Information between the political and implementation-oriented spheres of public administration under the Orbán government flows only unidirectionally and through legal texts rather than personal interaction (European Commission 2018). The problem is not that informal communication negatively impacts administrative procedures, but vice versa.
From the bottom-up perspective, civil servants have very limited capacity to influence policymaking either formally or informally. Given the high level of politicization in Hungary and the high levels of patronage and political control over the bureaucracy, any deviation from the core government’s line is perilous. In small groups, mind guards are often present.
As a consequence, self-censorship and groupthink occur regularly. Informal “coordination” exists through top-down channels through which the core government makes it clear to civil servants where the political will is situated, often without issuing formal orders, as such orders might be legally questionable. As a result, much of the fragmentary informal coordination is defunct. It does not improve the quality of policymaking but hinders the implementation of objectively preferable solutions to problems. Information between the political and implementation-oriented spheres of public administration under the Orbán government flows only unidirectionally and through legal texts rather than personal interaction (European Commission 2018). The problem is not that informal communication negatively impacts administrative procedures, but vice versa.
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
10
9
9
The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
2
1
1
The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
In Hungary, the discussion about decentralization, the moderation of the Budapest-centered economy and public life, and the creation of a meso-level containing urban centers with relevant administrative tasks was intensive during the first 20 years after the democratic transition, but yielded no substantive results. Regions were established above the classical administrative meso-level, in the form of the counties (megyék). However, they remained largely statistical units without substantive institutional underpinning, even though counties do have regional-level assemblies. Still, the level of decentralization in Hungary, as a unitary state, was relatively high, and the system of self-governance was substantive. Under the Orbán governments II through V (2010 – present), the situation changed considerably, not toward an empowered meso-level, but toward strengthening the core. Due to the reforms, the quality of subnational public services in some areas has suffered because of organizational change in subnational self-governance structures and severe underfinancing. Generally, the reform initiated under the second Orbán government (2010 – 2014) preferred concentration over decentralization.
With these reforms, the government’s ability to push through centrally set political agendas improved at the expense of the self-governance of spatial units. The principle of subsidiarity was weakened. In 2023, the meso-level and counties were renamed “vármegye” following historical precedents in a typical Fidesz-identitarian move. Overall, during Orbán’s tenure, the countries have lost competencies and financial and human resources. However, the state administration’s new subnational tiers have gradually gained experience in providing services, leading to several improvements for citizens, such as the government windows (kormányablakok), where state services are provided locally.
Public services left with the subnational self-governments have suffered due to a lack of financial resources and administrative capacities, conflicting legal norms, and complex regulations. The central government has exercised strong control, resulting in the undermining of national standards, especially in healthcare, education and social services.
However, as central deconcentrated authorities have taken over some administrative tasks, the duties of smaller villages have been bundled with those of smaller cities. Between 2010 and 2020, there was a concentration and fusion of local agencies. These agencies were partly merged and elevated to the county level (Barta 2021), significantly reducing the number of institutions. National standards have been strengthened to some extent, at the cost of local and regional autonomy. Local autonomy, in particular, was reduced more significantly. The central government’s relationship with the local council of Budapest, led by influential opposition leader Gergely Karácsony, has been especially tense. The central government has threatened not to finance key infrastructural projects, such as the renovation of the city’s emblematic Chain Bridge, and has created overriding competencies in the area of public transport. In 2023, the government levied a special “solidarity tax” on wealthy municipalities to redirect local business taxes toward more underdeveloped areas, which the local council of Budapest has found unfair and has partially refused to pay (Budapest Business Journal, 2023). The government often awards direct subventions to specific municipalities on a political basis through ad hoc support schemes. The decentralization index of the Committee of Regions of the EU (2024) ranks Hungary in the midfield at 15th place out of 27 in the area of regional decentralization and relatively low at 21st out of 27 for local decentralization.
Citations:
Barta, A. 2021. “Innovative Solutions in Hungary’s Deconcentrated State Administration.” Curentul Juridic 85(2): 37-51.
Budapest Business Journal. 2023. “Budapest to Withhold Part of Central Gov’t ‘Solidarity’ Tax.” 20 April. https://bbj.hu/politics/domestic/government/budapest-to-withhold-part-of-central-gov-t-solidarity-tax
European Union Committee of the Regions. 2024. “Decentralization Index Hungary.” https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/Pages/Decentralization-Index.aspx?countryName=hungary
With these reforms, the government’s ability to push through centrally set political agendas improved at the expense of the self-governance of spatial units. The principle of subsidiarity was weakened. In 2023, the meso-level and counties were renamed “vármegye” following historical precedents in a typical Fidesz-identitarian move. Overall, during Orbán’s tenure, the countries have lost competencies and financial and human resources. However, the state administration’s new subnational tiers have gradually gained experience in providing services, leading to several improvements for citizens, such as the government windows (kormányablakok), where state services are provided locally.
Public services left with the subnational self-governments have suffered due to a lack of financial resources and administrative capacities, conflicting legal norms, and complex regulations. The central government has exercised strong control, resulting in the undermining of national standards, especially in healthcare, education and social services.
However, as central deconcentrated authorities have taken over some administrative tasks, the duties of smaller villages have been bundled with those of smaller cities. Between 2010 and 2020, there was a concentration and fusion of local agencies. These agencies were partly merged and elevated to the county level (Barta 2021), significantly reducing the number of institutions. National standards have been strengthened to some extent, at the cost of local and regional autonomy. Local autonomy, in particular, was reduced more significantly. The central government’s relationship with the local council of Budapest, led by influential opposition leader Gergely Karácsony, has been especially tense. The central government has threatened not to finance key infrastructural projects, such as the renovation of the city’s emblematic Chain Bridge, and has created overriding competencies in the area of public transport. In 2023, the government levied a special “solidarity tax” on wealthy municipalities to redirect local business taxes toward more underdeveloped areas, which the local council of Budapest has found unfair and has partially refused to pay (Budapest Business Journal, 2023). The government often awards direct subventions to specific municipalities on a political basis through ad hoc support schemes. The decentralization index of the Committee of Regions of the EU (2024) ranks Hungary in the midfield at 15th place out of 27 in the area of regional decentralization and relatively low at 21st out of 27 for local decentralization.
Citations:
Barta, A. 2021. “Innovative Solutions in Hungary’s Deconcentrated State Administration.” Curentul Juridic 85(2): 37-51.
Budapest Business Journal. 2023. “Budapest to Withhold Part of Central Gov’t ‘Solidarity’ Tax.” 20 April. https://bbj.hu/politics/domestic/government/budapest-to-withhold-part-of-central-gov-t-solidarity-tax
European Union Committee of the Regions. 2024. “Decentralization Index Hungary.” https://portal.cor.europa.eu/divisionpowers/Pages/Decentralization-Index.aspx?countryName=hungary
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
10
9
9
National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
2
1
1
There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
In Hungary, citizens generally trust municipalities more than the national government, and this gap continues to grow (Kákai/Kovács 2023). Since Fidesz lost control of Hungary’s major cities, including the capital and many smaller settlements, in the municipal elections in October 2019, the government has sought to further disempower opposition-led municipalities. The Orbán government instrumentalized the COVID-19 pandemic in this respect, drawing on the state of emergency to further curtail municipal competencies. It has deprived them of important revenue sources, including vehicle taxes, car parking fees and business taxes. It has also prohibited them from raising taxes to cope with the hardships of the pandemic.
The government has also canceled several local development projects, most in opposition-led municipalities, and has misused anti-crisis legislation that provides for the creation of “special economic areas” by transferring tax revenues from opposition-led municipalities to Fidesz-controlled counties. Some observers have called the attack on opposition-run municipalities “the real COVID-19 coup in Hungary” (Györi et al. 2021:31). While the government’s measures have hit opposition-led municipalities hardest, Fidesz-ruled settlements have also been affected, prompting even leaders loyal to Fidesz to protest against the draining of local public administration resources.
Municipalities, in general, are vulnerable to the central government’s political will, as checks and balances have been removed over time and self-governing rights have been curtailed. Left-leaning municipalities may receive little or even negative attention from the government, while those within the Fidesz camp might receive an excess of scrutiny. It is at the municipal level where the redistribution of EU funds partly occurs.
As a consequence, these political spaces are highly vulnerable to corruption. The freezing of EU funds has harshly struck municipalities and Fidesz-led cities. The government must expect criticism here. To tackle the biased use of funds, the European Union is increasingly working on programs where financial transfers are distributed directly to municipalities, including opposition-led cities and towns. In parallel, the Association of Hungarian Municipalities (MÖSZ), led by the opposition mayor of a suburb of Budapest (Gödöllő), is lobbying for increased financial autonomy for local self-governments. However, due to political tensions, these efforts have been disregarded by the central government, even though some Fidesz mayors have also raised concerns regarding specific measures, such as the “solidarity tax” levied in 2023 to redistribute local business tax revenue toward poorer municipalities.
Citations:
Kákai, L., and I. P. Kovács. “Cui Prodest? Why Local Governance Came to a Deadlock in Hungary.” Politics in Central Europe 19(1): 21-42.
The government has also canceled several local development projects, most in opposition-led municipalities, and has misused anti-crisis legislation that provides for the creation of “special economic areas” by transferring tax revenues from opposition-led municipalities to Fidesz-controlled counties. Some observers have called the attack on opposition-run municipalities “the real COVID-19 coup in Hungary” (Györi et al. 2021:31). While the government’s measures have hit opposition-led municipalities hardest, Fidesz-ruled settlements have also been affected, prompting even leaders loyal to Fidesz to protest against the draining of local public administration resources.
Municipalities, in general, are vulnerable to the central government’s political will, as checks and balances have been removed over time and self-governing rights have been curtailed. Left-leaning municipalities may receive little or even negative attention from the government, while those within the Fidesz camp might receive an excess of scrutiny. It is at the municipal level where the redistribution of EU funds partly occurs.
As a consequence, these political spaces are highly vulnerable to corruption. The freezing of EU funds has harshly struck municipalities and Fidesz-led cities. The government must expect criticism here. To tackle the biased use of funds, the European Union is increasingly working on programs where financial transfers are distributed directly to municipalities, including opposition-led cities and towns. In parallel, the Association of Hungarian Municipalities (MÖSZ), led by the opposition mayor of a suburb of Budapest (Gödöllő), is lobbying for increased financial autonomy for local self-governments. However, due to political tensions, these efforts have been disregarded by the central government, even though some Fidesz mayors have also raised concerns regarding specific measures, such as the “solidarity tax” levied in 2023 to redistribute local business tax revenue toward poorer municipalities.
Citations:
Kákai, L., and I. P. Kovács. “Cui Prodest? Why Local Governance Came to a Deadlock in Hungary.” Politics in Central Europe 19(1): 21-42.