Diagonal Accountability
#30Key Findings
Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the area of diagonal accountability.
The public broadcaster is fully under government control. Private media is concentrated among firms allied with Fidesz. Independent media outlets have been pushed online, but still risk high fines if they receive foreign funding, and largely reach only the urban educated population.
The freedoms of assembly and association have been constrained. A pandemic-era state of emergency has been extended, allowing demonstrations to be restricted and the government to govern by decree.
Civil society organizations operate in an increasingly hostile environment, with foreign-funded groups treated as foreign agents. A new Office for the Defense of National Sovereignty will increase monitoring of groups not allied with Fidesz. The state consults largely with government-organized groups that support its policies.
The public broadcaster is fully under government control. Private media is concentrated among firms allied with Fidesz. Independent media outlets have been pushed online, but still risk high fines if they receive foreign funding, and largely reach only the urban educated population.
The freedoms of assembly and association have been constrained. A pandemic-era state of emergency has been extended, allowing demonstrations to be restricted and the government to govern by decree.
Civil society organizations operate in an increasingly hostile environment, with foreign-funded groups treated as foreign agents. A new Office for the Defense of National Sovereignty will increase monitoring of groups not allied with Fidesz. The state consults largely with government-organized groups that support its policies.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
10
9
9
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
2
1
1
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
Since Prime Minister Orbán regained office in 2010, media pluralism in Hungary has faced significant challenges. The country has seen increasing government control over the public media and a concentration of private media ownership among companies close to Orbán’s party, Fidesz. The public broadcaster (MTVA) is under absolute government control, and many pro-government private TV channels and radio stations exist.
The remaining independent media have been pushed out of traditional broadcasting channels (radio, TV, newspapers) and have taken refuge on the web. Even online, they face growing challenges regarding reach, financing and administrative hurdles. If foreign sources finance them, they are subject to the “foreign agent” law or the “law on protection of Hungarian sovereignty,” risking high fines and potential self-censorship. Overall, independent media reach only a portion of Hungarians, primarily the educated, cosmopolitan urban population, but not the segments of society upon which Fidesz has built its support (the elderly and residents of rural areas).
Additionally, the government uses social media and internet-based channels to conduct disinformation and smear campaigns funded by taxpayer money. Public advertisement budgets disproportionately favor pro-government outlets, while market advertisers’ fears of potential repercussions place independent outlets in a precarious financial position (see Bátorfy and Urbán 2019). The environment for journalists has become increasingly hostile, with harassment escalating since the “fake news paragraph” was included in the March 2020 Authorization Act adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic. This provision threatens journalists producing fake news with prison sentences of up to five years for “scaremongering.”
Cyberattacks on media outlets are not uncommon. Since 2022, and especially during the spring and summer of 2023, several attacks have been reported, rendering the webpages of critical media barely accessible. However, pro-government news sites have also been similarly attacked (Hungary Today 2022). Forensic studies show that these attacks were coordinated (International Press Studio 2023). Opposition parties’ web pages were affected as well. The Sovereignty Protection Act, adopted in 2023, is extensive in scope but vague in detail, and may be used by the government to target critical journalists. It also emerged that the government employed Pegasus spyware in the lead-up to the 2022 elections to monitor opposition politicians, journalists and NGO workers. All international observers in the field have raised concerns about the situation in Hungary. The Freedom House Freedom on the Net Report 2022 categorizes Hungary as only partly free (Freedom House 2023).
Citations:
Bátorfy, A., and Á. Urbán. 2020. “State Advertising as an Instrument of Transformation of the Media Market in Hungary.” East European Politics 36(1): 44-65.
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom on the Net 2022.” https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/FOTN2022Digital.pdf
International Press Studio. 2023. “https://ipi.media/ddos-ipi/”
Hungary Today. 2022. “Several Pro-Fidesz Websites Hacked by Anonymous.” 28 March. https://hungarytoday.hu/several-pro-fidesz-gvernment-websites-hacked-anonymous
The remaining independent media have been pushed out of traditional broadcasting channels (radio, TV, newspapers) and have taken refuge on the web. Even online, they face growing challenges regarding reach, financing and administrative hurdles. If foreign sources finance them, they are subject to the “foreign agent” law or the “law on protection of Hungarian sovereignty,” risking high fines and potential self-censorship. Overall, independent media reach only a portion of Hungarians, primarily the educated, cosmopolitan urban population, but not the segments of society upon which Fidesz has built its support (the elderly and residents of rural areas).
Additionally, the government uses social media and internet-based channels to conduct disinformation and smear campaigns funded by taxpayer money. Public advertisement budgets disproportionately favor pro-government outlets, while market advertisers’ fears of potential repercussions place independent outlets in a precarious financial position (see Bátorfy and Urbán 2019). The environment for journalists has become increasingly hostile, with harassment escalating since the “fake news paragraph” was included in the March 2020 Authorization Act adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic. This provision threatens journalists producing fake news with prison sentences of up to five years for “scaremongering.”
Cyberattacks on media outlets are not uncommon. Since 2022, and especially during the spring and summer of 2023, several attacks have been reported, rendering the webpages of critical media barely accessible. However, pro-government news sites have also been similarly attacked (Hungary Today 2022). Forensic studies show that these attacks were coordinated (International Press Studio 2023). Opposition parties’ web pages were affected as well. The Sovereignty Protection Act, adopted in 2023, is extensive in scope but vague in detail, and may be used by the government to target critical journalists. It also emerged that the government employed Pegasus spyware in the lead-up to the 2022 elections to monitor opposition politicians, journalists and NGO workers. All international observers in the field have raised concerns about the situation in Hungary. The Freedom House Freedom on the Net Report 2022 categorizes Hungary as only partly free (Freedom House 2023).
Citations:
Bátorfy, A., and Á. Urbán. 2020. “State Advertising as an Instrument of Transformation of the Media Market in Hungary.” East European Politics 36(1): 44-65.
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom on the Net 2022.” https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/FOTN2022Digital.pdf
International Press Studio. 2023. “https://ipi.media/ddos-ipi/”
Hungary Today. 2022. “Several Pro-Fidesz Websites Hacked by Anonymous.” 28 March. https://hungarytoday.hu/several-pro-fidesz-gvernment-websites-hacked-anonymous
To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
The competition of opinions in Hungary is distorted. The regulatory agency is not independent but is de facto bound to the government’s political will. Even the competition agency, long a beacon of Hungarian democracy and market economy, has become ineffective in combating the concentration of the media landscape. In June 2020, the Constitutional Court upheld a controversial 2018 government decree that prevented the Hungarian Competition Authority from examining the centralization of leadership and financing of about 500 media outlets under the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), a pro-government media conglomerate. Media surveillance by the responsible authority, the Nemzeti Média- és Hírközlési Hatóság (NMHH), is criticized as biased. The head of the agency serves an extensively long nine-year term and also heads the Media Council, an institution criticized for lacking proper controls. The Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom of the Robert Schuman Center, in its 2022 report, ranks the risks for Hungary as “high” (66%). Biased reporting by pro-government outlets and public media primarily affects older and rural residents with lower education levels. At the same time, some of the most-visited news sites operate independently and reach large segments of urban young and middle-aged readers who consume little legacy media.
According to Eurostat data, 87% of the population regularly reads news on the internet (Hungary Today 2022). Online media remain plural, and some of the highest-quality independent outlets have shifted toward subscription-based models, alleviating their dependence on advertising income. Recognizing the challenges of reaching online populations, the governing party has increased its spending on social media, partly by outsourcing its campaign messages to a social media agency called Megafon that distributes content on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and TikTok.
Citations:
Hungary Today. 2022. “Hungarians Are Hooked on Online News.” 26 August. https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarians-are-hooked-on-online-news/
According to Eurostat data, 87% of the population regularly reads news on the internet (Hungary Today 2022). Online media remain plural, and some of the highest-quality independent outlets have shifted toward subscription-based models, alleviating their dependence on advertising income. Recognizing the challenges of reaching online populations, the governing party has increased its spending on social media, partly by outsourcing its campaign messages to a social media agency called Megafon that distributes content on Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and TikTok.
Citations:
Hungary Today. 2022. “Hungarians Are Hooked on Online News.” 26 August. https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarians-are-hooked-on-online-news/
Graph View
To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
The Hungarian Basic Law guarantees freedom of assembly and association. However, in recent years, both rights have been challenged from multiple sides. During the migration crisis, the right to assembly was constrained, and these limitations expanded during the pandemic. The transition from justifying the state of emergency (as of the time of writing prolonged until May 2024) with reference to COVID-19 to a reference to the war in Ukraine indicates that these limitations serve as means of support for government policies. For instance, demonstrations by teachers against the government’s education policies have been harshly restricted, leading teachers to challenge the government legally. The government is currently able to govern by decree. Organizations such as Transparency International Hungary (Mikola 2021) and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union have heavily criticized the situation. Since the 2016 – 2017 period, when the Orbán government implemented several measures targeting civil society organizations, NGOs have faced an increasingly hostile environment. CSO sustainability has been impeded (United States Agency for International Development 2022: 2). CSO face threats with respect to the legal environment, their organizational capacity and finances, and the public image of CSOs overall. The “lex NGO” treats foreign-financed organizations in a way similar to Russia’s foreign-agent law, putting them under a registration obligation, especially if they are publicly funded or registered as nonprofit organizations. Noncompliance can result in fines or dissolution, although these penalties are used more as intimidation and are rarely enforced in practice. Other discriminatory measures, such as the “Stop Soros Law,” impose punitive fines on organizations that support migration.
The European Court of Justice deemed the “lex NGO” incompatible with EU norms. It took significant pressure from the EU to prompt the government to change the law (Law XLIX/2021). However, the changes that have been made are largely cosmetic, such as varying thresholds and granting exemptions for religious communities, sports associations and ethnic minority bodies. The amended law bypasses the government’s responsibility to the Audit Office, turning the agency into a political body beyond its constitutionally given scope, whose reports cannot be legally challenged. Not surprisingly, the State Audit Office has imposed some highly dubious fines on the issue. Eight affected NGOs have complained about the amended law to the Constitutional Court. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee considers the law to be a violation of freedom of association and expression (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2022).
Not deterred by these challenges, the government opened a new front in November 2023 by adopting a Sovereignty Protection Act. The act aims to establish an Office for the Defense of National Sovereignty. The law reads like a frontal offense to international organizations, and even mentions the combination of international organizations and the left-liberal political camp as a “threat to Hungarian sovereignty.” The office could be used to supervise the political and financial activities of people and organizations not sharing Orbán’s illiberal, nationalistic and populist view of the world. This constitutes yet another step in Hungary’s deviation from basic standards of Western democracies, even though it formally has a mandate only to investigate foreign-funded activities aimed at influencing election outcomes. Intimidating communication campaigns targeting organized LGBTQ+ communities add to insecurities. Civil society organizations have reacted to the threat by forming the Civilizáció (Civilisation) platform, uniting several prominent CSOs with international networks to combat democratic backsliding in Hungary. Compared to the money the government uses to further its narratives, this attempt is small but noteworthy.
Citations:
Hungarian Helsinki Committee. 2022. https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/05/HHC_LexNGO2021_info_note.pdf
United States Agency for International Development. 2022. “2021 Civil Society Organization Index Hungary.” October. https://okotars.hu/sites/default/files/downloads/hungary_2021.pdf
Mikola, Bálint. 2021. “Hungary’s Rule of Law Backsliding Continues Amidst the COVID-19 Crisis.” Transparency International February 18. https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/hungarys-rule-of-law-backsliding-continues-amidst-the-covid-19-crisis
The European Court of Justice deemed the “lex NGO” incompatible with EU norms. It took significant pressure from the EU to prompt the government to change the law (Law XLIX/2021). However, the changes that have been made are largely cosmetic, such as varying thresholds and granting exemptions for religious communities, sports associations and ethnic minority bodies. The amended law bypasses the government’s responsibility to the Audit Office, turning the agency into a political body beyond its constitutionally given scope, whose reports cannot be legally challenged. Not surprisingly, the State Audit Office has imposed some highly dubious fines on the issue. Eight affected NGOs have complained about the amended law to the Constitutional Court. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee considers the law to be a violation of freedom of association and expression (Hungarian Helsinki Committee 2022).
Not deterred by these challenges, the government opened a new front in November 2023 by adopting a Sovereignty Protection Act. The act aims to establish an Office for the Defense of National Sovereignty. The law reads like a frontal offense to international organizations, and even mentions the combination of international organizations and the left-liberal political camp as a “threat to Hungarian sovereignty.” The office could be used to supervise the political and financial activities of people and organizations not sharing Orbán’s illiberal, nationalistic and populist view of the world. This constitutes yet another step in Hungary’s deviation from basic standards of Western democracies, even though it formally has a mandate only to investigate foreign-funded activities aimed at influencing election outcomes. Intimidating communication campaigns targeting organized LGBTQ+ communities add to insecurities. Civil society organizations have reacted to the threat by forming the Civilizáció (Civilisation) platform, uniting several prominent CSOs with international networks to combat democratic backsliding in Hungary. Compared to the money the government uses to further its narratives, this attempt is small but noteworthy.
Citations:
Hungarian Helsinki Committee. 2022. https://helsinki.hu/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2022/05/HHC_LexNGO2021_info_note.pdf
United States Agency for International Development. 2022. “2021 Civil Society Organization Index Hungary.” October. https://okotars.hu/sites/default/files/downloads/hungary_2021.pdf
Mikola, Bálint. 2021. “Hungary’s Rule of Law Backsliding Continues Amidst the COVID-19 Crisis.” Transparency International February 18. https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/hungarys-rule-of-law-backsliding-continues-amidst-the-covid-19-crisis
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
After the systemic change in 1990, civil society in Hungary developed quickly, fueled by the internationalization of Hungarian society and the introduction of tax deductions for civil society organizations. This development was steady until 2010, when Fidesz and Orbán retook power, after which the number of CSOs stagnated and dropped slightly. At the same time, NGOs’ income and employees’ earnings grew significantly (KSH 2024). The number of employees remained relatively stable. Since 2016, civil society organizations engaged with the political system in the broadest sense have operated in an increasingly hostile environment. The background is the so-called Lex NGO of 2017, which aimed to bring CSOs under government control. The infighting between civil society and the government has forced CSOs to divert resources from their original tasks to ensure proper operation.
The government has entered this battle by creating numerous government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) to further its illiberal and nationalist narrative. As a result, “only organizations friendly and close to the government can effectively engage in lobbying” (United States Agency for International Development 2022: 5). Many of these organizations are involved in the distribution of financial resources from government and EU funds and are vulnerable to corruption. Instruments for managing state support for CSOs include the National Cooperation Fund and the Village and Town Civil Funds. The operation of these funds is rather opaque and benefits the Fidesz nomenclature (Civic Forum 2023: 12).
The politicization of civil society has had negative consequences for NGOs, as bridging the ideological rift between the illiberal and liberal camps is nearly impossible without losing the support of the home camp. The weakness of organized interests in the labor sector is not new. Attempts by former left-wing governments to organize tripartite consultations were unsuccessful, and trade unions and employee associations remain fragmented. Not surprisingly, Hungary ranks extremely low within the EU in terms of the number of strikes (European Trade Union Institute 2024).
Teachers’ strikes directed at the government’s educational policies were made impossible by a government decree issued in February 2022. Combined with the employer-oriented economic policy of the Orbán governments, trade unions, which are weak in membership and organizational capacity, fail to exert relevant influence. Overall, the ability of major civil society organizations to shape public policies in their fields is relatively low. This holds even for the most significant employers’ association, the MGYOSZ. Anti-corruption NGOs Transparency International Hungary and K-Monitor have been involved in the Anti-Corruption Task Force of the Integrity Authority, a state agency created in 2022 under pressure from the European Commission (Telex 2022). However, they have failed to exert significant influence with regard to improving the transparency of public procurement or politicians’ wealth declarations.
Citations:
KSH. 2022. https://www.ksh.hu/s/helyzetkep-2022/#/kiadvany/nonprofit-szektor
European Trade Union Institute. 2024. “Strike Map.” https://www.etui.org/strikes-map
Civic Forum. 2023. “Civic Space Report 2023, Hungary.” https://civic-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Civic-Space-Report-2023-HUNGARY-European-Civic-Forum.pdf
United States Agency for International Development. 2022. “2021 Civil Society Organization Index Hungary, October.” https://okotars.hu/sites/default/files/downloads/hungary_2021.pdf
Telex.hu. 2022. “Transparency International willing to join Anti-Corruption Task Force under certain conditions.” October 6. https://telex.hu/english/2022/10/06/transparency-international-willing-to-join-anti-corruption-task-force-under-certain-conditions
The government has entered this battle by creating numerous government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) to further its illiberal and nationalist narrative. As a result, “only organizations friendly and close to the government can effectively engage in lobbying” (United States Agency for International Development 2022: 5). Many of these organizations are involved in the distribution of financial resources from government and EU funds and are vulnerable to corruption. Instruments for managing state support for CSOs include the National Cooperation Fund and the Village and Town Civil Funds. The operation of these funds is rather opaque and benefits the Fidesz nomenclature (Civic Forum 2023: 12).
The politicization of civil society has had negative consequences for NGOs, as bridging the ideological rift between the illiberal and liberal camps is nearly impossible without losing the support of the home camp. The weakness of organized interests in the labor sector is not new. Attempts by former left-wing governments to organize tripartite consultations were unsuccessful, and trade unions and employee associations remain fragmented. Not surprisingly, Hungary ranks extremely low within the EU in terms of the number of strikes (European Trade Union Institute 2024).
Teachers’ strikes directed at the government’s educational policies were made impossible by a government decree issued in February 2022. Combined with the employer-oriented economic policy of the Orbán governments, trade unions, which are weak in membership and organizational capacity, fail to exert relevant influence. Overall, the ability of major civil society organizations to shape public policies in their fields is relatively low. This holds even for the most significant employers’ association, the MGYOSZ. Anti-corruption NGOs Transparency International Hungary and K-Monitor have been involved in the Anti-Corruption Task Force of the Integrity Authority, a state agency created in 2022 under pressure from the European Commission (Telex 2022). However, they have failed to exert significant influence with regard to improving the transparency of public procurement or politicians’ wealth declarations.
Citations:
KSH. 2022. https://www.ksh.hu/s/helyzetkep-2022/#/kiadvany/nonprofit-szektor
European Trade Union Institute. 2024. “Strike Map.” https://www.etui.org/strikes-map
Civic Forum. 2023. “Civic Space Report 2023, Hungary.” https://civic-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Civic-Space-Report-2023-HUNGARY-European-Civic-Forum.pdf
United States Agency for International Development. 2022. “2021 Civil Society Organization Index Hungary, October.” https://okotars.hu/sites/default/files/downloads/hungary_2021.pdf
Telex.hu. 2022. “Transparency International willing to join Anti-Corruption Task Force under certain conditions.” October 6. https://telex.hu/english/2022/10/06/transparency-international-willing-to-join-anti-corruption-task-force-under-certain-conditions
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
During the successive Orbán governments, the share of GDP dedicated to social welfare decreased from 21.8% in 2010 to 16% in 2022 (KSH 2024). This reduction makes CSOs important partners in addressing social issues. NGOs often provide services and support in areas where the state is unable or unwilling to do so. These organizations work in various fields, including homelessness, poverty reduction, disability services, elderly care, child protection and support for marginalized communities such as the Roma. Their activities range from direct service provision to advocacy and policy influence. In some cases, partnerships exist between the government and NGOs or CSOs, wherein the government may contract with these organizations to deliver certain social services. However, the organizational incapacity of Hungarian social welfare organizations to organize and advocate effectively makes them relatively minor players in the system. Foreign-based NGOs often face government-induced work limitations based on the Lex NGO and the Sovereignty Protection Act. This is especially true regarding migration issues and social issues surrounding LGBTQ+ rights.
Although most NGOs are organizationally weak with respect to membership, their social support, as expressed through 1% personal income tax donations, reached record-high levels in 2023 (Népszava 2023). This indicates that an increasing share of the population finds their work important and worthy of support.
Citations:
KSH (Hungarian Statistical Office). 2024. www.ksh.hu
Népszava. 2023. “Rekordot döntöttek az idei év adó 1 százalékos felajánlásai, a Partizán behúzta a harmadik helyet.” 15 September. https://nepszava.hu/3208783_rekordot-dontottek-az-idei-ev-ado-1-szazalekos-felajanlasai-a-partizan-behuzta-a-harmadik-helyet
Although most NGOs are organizationally weak with respect to membership, their social support, as expressed through 1% personal income tax donations, reached record-high levels in 2023 (Népszava 2023). This indicates that an increasing share of the population finds their work important and worthy of support.
Citations:
KSH (Hungarian Statistical Office). 2024. www.ksh.hu
Népszava. 2023. “Rekordot döntöttek az idei év adó 1 százalékos felajánlásai, a Partizán behúzta a harmadik helyet.” 15 September. https://nepszava.hu/3208783_rekordot-dontottek-az-idei-ev-ado-1-szazalekos-felajanlasai-a-partizan-behuzta-a-harmadik-helyet
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Like other CSOs in Hungary, those focusing on the environment and sustainability face hostile legal challenges and are targeted by laws, regulations and campaigns critical of such organizations. Laws including the Lex NGO and the Sovereignty Protection Act (SPA) create a legally unstable environment. While Hungary’s environmental policies are less politicized than others, such as those addressing migration, the government is not a leader in the area of environmental sustainability. There is a strong bias toward fossil fuels and nuclear energy, coupled with efforts to develop foreign policy ties with Russia, to which Budapest is bound concerning gas, oil and fuel rods for the Nuclear Energy Plant in Paks.
Many CSOs in the environmental field are funded by foreign donors, making them particularly vulnerable to the Lex NGO and the SPA. Additionally, the close involvement of Fidesz cadres with the construction industry often leads to clashes surrounding new construction projects, such as those around Lake Balaton. In this context, the ruling party views environmental CSOs as a threat, significantly reducing these organizations’ advocacy capacities. Consequently, many environmental CSOs collaborate with other CSOs to address the democratic decline in Hungary. EU direct support to CSOs in the member states – through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) program – is extremely helpful as a means of circumventing the obstacles established by the government and countering the monopoly held by government-friendly NGOs (GONGOs) on access to funds.
The most salient environmental conflicts during 2023 revolved around establishing new battery plants to serve the electric vehicle industry at several sites across the country, mostly financed by Asian companies. Public concerns centered on these factories’ potential failure to meet pollution requirements and possible depletion of resources such as fresh water. Despite the minimal impact of national-level CSOs, several local grassroots initiatives have emerged near potential sites, such as the Mothers of Mikepércs for the Environment Association. These spontaneous civic groups have organized influential protest events and mobilized public opinion against battery plants, although they did not secure any concessions from local authorities (Inotai 2023).
Citations:
Inotai, Edit. 2023. “Locals Fear Battery Wasteland Nightmare in Hungary.” Balkan Insight, October 19. https://balkaninsight.com/2023/10/19/locals-fear-battery-wasteland-nightmare-in-hungary
Many CSOs in the environmental field are funded by foreign donors, making them particularly vulnerable to the Lex NGO and the SPA. Additionally, the close involvement of Fidesz cadres with the construction industry often leads to clashes surrounding new construction projects, such as those around Lake Balaton. In this context, the ruling party views environmental CSOs as a threat, significantly reducing these organizations’ advocacy capacities. Consequently, many environmental CSOs collaborate with other CSOs to address the democratic decline in Hungary. EU direct support to CSOs in the member states – through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) program – is extremely helpful as a means of circumventing the obstacles established by the government and countering the monopoly held by government-friendly NGOs (GONGOs) on access to funds.
The most salient environmental conflicts during 2023 revolved around establishing new battery plants to serve the electric vehicle industry at several sites across the country, mostly financed by Asian companies. Public concerns centered on these factories’ potential failure to meet pollution requirements and possible depletion of resources such as fresh water. Despite the minimal impact of national-level CSOs, several local grassroots initiatives have emerged near potential sites, such as the Mothers of Mikepércs for the Environment Association. These spontaneous civic groups have organized influential protest events and mobilized public opinion against battery plants, although they did not secure any concessions from local authorities (Inotai 2023).
Citations:
Inotai, Edit. 2023. “Locals Fear Battery Wasteland Nightmare in Hungary.” Balkan Insight, October 19. https://balkaninsight.com/2023/10/19/locals-fear-battery-wasteland-nightmare-in-hungary