Horizontal Accountability
#30Key Findings
Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the area of horizontal accountability.
The State Audit Office has been criticized for political bias, and is viewed as complementing rather than overseeing the government. The data protection authority has not played a significant role in the public debate. It failed to address Fidesz’s misuse of public data during elections, and did not address the government’s use of spyware to target opposition figures.
Legal certainty has been undermined by rapidly changing legislation. Judicial independence has declined. While lower courts still make independent decisions, the Constitutional Court and other high-level judicial bodies have increasingly come under government control. Populations such as migrants and the LGBTQ+ community are scapegoated for the government’s benefit.
Corruption has become a systemic issue. Members of the Fidesz elite have rapidly accumulated wealth through informal political-business networks. The parliament’s formal powers have declined, and the executive’s comprehensive control of state organs, especially during the state of emergency, has sidelined the legislature as an oversight or policy-shaping body.
The State Audit Office has been criticized for political bias, and is viewed as complementing rather than overseeing the government. The data protection authority has not played a significant role in the public debate. It failed to address Fidesz’s misuse of public data during elections, and did not address the government’s use of spyware to target opposition figures.
Legal certainty has been undermined by rapidly changing legislation. Judicial independence has declined. While lower courts still make independent decisions, the Constitutional Court and other high-level judicial bodies have increasingly come under government control. Populations such as migrants and the LGBTQ+ community are scapegoated for the government’s benefit.
Corruption has become a systemic issue. Members of the Fidesz elite have rapidly accumulated wealth through informal political-business networks. The parliament’s formal powers have declined, and the executive’s comprehensive control of state organs, especially during the state of emergency, has sidelined the legislature as an oversight or policy-shaping body.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There is no independent and effective audit office.
The criticism faced by the Hungarian State Audit Office (ÁSZ) centers on the issues of administrative expertise, political bias, lack of transparency and potential conflicts of interest. Concerns have arisen that the office targets opposition parties and organizations with more rigorous audits while allegedly being more lenient with those aligned with the government. Additionally, there are transparency issues related to the publication of audit reports and the methodologies used in conducting audits. These criticisms highlight the challenges that independent institutions face in maintaining autonomy and public trust in a politically charged environment. For example, the Democratic Coalition (DK) and the Együtt parties were each fined HUF 16 million for renting office space below market rates. The Politics Can Be Different party (LMP) faced a similar fine of HUF 8.8 million for the same reason. These fines have raised concerns about selective enforcement, as there is no similar scrutiny of the ruling Fidesz party’s activities.
Furthermore, the government urged the Audit Office to fine several NGOs critical of the government under the new anti-NGO legislation. After a field trip to Hungary in 2023, the European Parliament’s budget control committee was particularly critical of the quality of the ÁSZ’s leadership and performance. Overall, the Audit Office is more of a complementary government body than one that oversees the government. In February 2024, just a few months before the European Parliament and municipal elections, the State Audit Office levied a record-breaking HUF 520 million (approximately €1.34 million) fine on opposition parties for allegedly using foreign funds during the 2022 general election campaign. This action put the opposition parties in a difficult position ahead of the next campaign period and further tilted the playing field in favor of Fidesz (Bloomberg 2024).
Citations:
Bloomberg. 2024. “Hungary Clamps Down on Orban’s Opponents With Hefty Fine.” 20 February. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-20/opposition-deprived-of-funding-as-orban-clamps-down-with-hefty-fine
Furthermore, the government urged the Audit Office to fine several NGOs critical of the government under the new anti-NGO legislation. After a field trip to Hungary in 2023, the European Parliament’s budget control committee was particularly critical of the quality of the ÁSZ’s leadership and performance. Overall, the Audit Office is more of a complementary government body than one that oversees the government. In February 2024, just a few months before the European Parliament and municipal elections, the State Audit Office levied a record-breaking HUF 520 million (approximately €1.34 million) fine on opposition parties for allegedly using foreign funds during the 2022 general election campaign. This action put the opposition parties in a difficult position ahead of the next campaign period and further tilted the playing field in favor of Fidesz (Bloomberg 2024).
Citations:
Bloomberg. 2024. “Hungary Clamps Down on Orban’s Opponents With Hefty Fine.” 20 February. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-20/opposition-deprived-of-funding-as-orban-clamps-down-with-hefty-fine
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
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There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The right to personal data protection and information freedom is regulated under the Act CXII of 2011, which was amended in 2018 to implement the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Since then, the GDPR has been incorporated into various sectoral laws, such as the labor code. In 2023, a “whistleblower law” came into force, introducing the EU’s 2019/1937 Whistleblower Directive into the Hungarian legal system. The 2014 law was found to be insufficient, as evidenced in the lead-up to the 2023 corruption trial against former Secretary of State Völner in the Ministry of Justice. However, the European-induced modification has faced criticism for a controversial article interpreted as enabling citizens to anonymously report same-sex families to authorities. This aspect of the legislation was particularly contentious, and led President Katalin Novák to veto the proposed law. Novák stated that the article weakened rather than strengthened the protection of fundamental values. This move was unusual for Novák, who generally supports Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. The law was revised after the veto, especially as the European Union Commission announced it would otherwise take legal action. The National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság, NAIH) is responsible for supervising and defending the data protection rights of Hungarian citizens. While it has not played a significant role in the public debate, there is still little experience with the new European regulation in this field. The NAIH has challenged the government in some COVID-19-related cases. For instance, it has criticized the fat that sensitive data required to register for vaccination is collected and saved not by the government but by a Fidesz-allied firm, IdomSoft Zrt. However, the NAIH has failed to speak out against the misuse of public data for Fidesz’s election campaigns, and has not addressed the Pegasus surveillance scandal, in which the government used Pegasus spyware to target opposition politicians and public figures. Additionally, the NAIH has been reluctant to take proactive measures on freedom of information practices, whereby the government routinely classifies documents of strategic importance for national security reasons, and fails to respond to public information queries from independent journalists (see Láncos 2019).
Citations:
Láncos, P.L. 2019. “Freedom of Information in Hungary: A Shifting Landscape.” In Dragos, D.C., Kovač, P., and Marseille, A.T., eds., The Laws of Transparency in Action. Governance and Public Management. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76460-3_10
Citations:
Láncos, P.L. 2019. “Freedom of Information in Hungary: A Shifting Landscape.” In Dragos, D.C., Kovač, P., and Marseille, A.T., eds., The Laws of Transparency in Action. Governance and Public Management. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76460-3_10
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
The state of the rule of law and judiciary policy in Hungary is highly contested, and has been subject to strong criticism from international organizations, NGOs and policy experts. As in other countries with authoritarian tendencies, the Orbán government believes that the law is subordinate to government policies, which it claims reflect the “national interest,” a term exclusively defined by the government majority.
Due to the Orbán government’s voluntarist approach toward lawmaking, legal certainty has been undermined by chaotic and rapidly changing legislation. The hasty legislative process has regularly violated the Act on Legislation, which mandates a process of social consultation if the government presents a draft law. Since the 2015 “refugee crisis,” the government has increasingly relied on special decree powers. On 20 March 2020, the government’s two-thirds supermajority in parliament adopted the so-called Coronavirus Defense Act, also known as the Authorization or Enabling Act, which came into force the next day. The act gave the government the right to suspend or override any law. In mid-June 2020, the state of emergency, which stirred massive criticism both domestically and internationally, was lifted but then transformed into a “medical emergency.” In November 2020, parliament declared a new state of emergency, which was later extended several times, most recently justified with reference to the war in Ukraine. During the first lockdown, proceedings at ordinary courts were officially suspended due to fears of spreading the virus, preventing ordinary people from initiating cases that could reach the Constitutional Court. Under these circumstances, only one-quarter of the members of parliament were able to call on the Constitutional Court, which would have required the far right and the left to act together. The Constitutional Court has refused many requests for constitutional reviews, and did not challenge the Orbán government’s power grab during the COVID-19 pandemic. In October 2020, the government consolidated its control over the Kúria (previously the Supreme Court), as the Fidesz supermajority in parliament elected Zsolt András Varga, a member of the Constitutional Court without any experience as an ordinary judge, as its new president. This elicited broad and angry reactions among judges and their professional organizations, and the National Judicial Council issued a negative opinion on the issue. The 2011 constitution (Basic Law) left the rules for selecting members of the Constitutional Court untouched. Justices are still elected by parliament with a two-thirds majority. As Fidesz regained a two-thirds majority in the 2018 parliamentary elections and defended it in 2022, it has since had complete control over the appointment of Constitutional Court justices. In 2023, parliament elected four new members to the Constitutional Court, all of whom are close to Fidesz.
The Hungarian judiciary performs well in terms of the length of proceedings and has a high level of digitalization. However, its independence has drastically declined under the Orbán government (European Commission 2021). While the lower courts, in most cases, still make independent decisions, the Constitutional Court, the Kúria and the National Office of the Judiciary (OBH) have increasingly come under government control and have often been criticized for making biased decisions. Likewise, Péter Polt, the chief public prosecutor and a former Fidesz politician, has persistently refrained from investigating the corrupt practices of prominent Fidesz oligarchs. As a result of the declining independence and quality of the Hungarian judiciary, trust in the Hungarian legal system among the general public has dropped over time. More court proceedings have ended at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. Hungary is among the countries generating the most cases at that body, and the Hungarian state often loses these lawsuits. Judiciary reforms have also been among the main prerequisites for Hungary to access a portion of its EU funds locked under the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism adopted by the European Commission (2023).
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. “Commission considers that Hungary’s judicial reform addressed deficiencies in judicial independence, but maintains measures on budget conditionality” December 13. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6465
Due to the Orbán government’s voluntarist approach toward lawmaking, legal certainty has been undermined by chaotic and rapidly changing legislation. The hasty legislative process has regularly violated the Act on Legislation, which mandates a process of social consultation if the government presents a draft law. Since the 2015 “refugee crisis,” the government has increasingly relied on special decree powers. On 20 March 2020, the government’s two-thirds supermajority in parliament adopted the so-called Coronavirus Defense Act, also known as the Authorization or Enabling Act, which came into force the next day. The act gave the government the right to suspend or override any law. In mid-June 2020, the state of emergency, which stirred massive criticism both domestically and internationally, was lifted but then transformed into a “medical emergency.” In November 2020, parliament declared a new state of emergency, which was later extended several times, most recently justified with reference to the war in Ukraine. During the first lockdown, proceedings at ordinary courts were officially suspended due to fears of spreading the virus, preventing ordinary people from initiating cases that could reach the Constitutional Court. Under these circumstances, only one-quarter of the members of parliament were able to call on the Constitutional Court, which would have required the far right and the left to act together. The Constitutional Court has refused many requests for constitutional reviews, and did not challenge the Orbán government’s power grab during the COVID-19 pandemic. In October 2020, the government consolidated its control over the Kúria (previously the Supreme Court), as the Fidesz supermajority in parliament elected Zsolt András Varga, a member of the Constitutional Court without any experience as an ordinary judge, as its new president. This elicited broad and angry reactions among judges and their professional organizations, and the National Judicial Council issued a negative opinion on the issue. The 2011 constitution (Basic Law) left the rules for selecting members of the Constitutional Court untouched. Justices are still elected by parliament with a two-thirds majority. As Fidesz regained a two-thirds majority in the 2018 parliamentary elections and defended it in 2022, it has since had complete control over the appointment of Constitutional Court justices. In 2023, parliament elected four new members to the Constitutional Court, all of whom are close to Fidesz.
The Hungarian judiciary performs well in terms of the length of proceedings and has a high level of digitalization. However, its independence has drastically declined under the Orbán government (European Commission 2021). While the lower courts, in most cases, still make independent decisions, the Constitutional Court, the Kúria and the National Office of the Judiciary (OBH) have increasingly come under government control and have often been criticized for making biased decisions. Likewise, Péter Polt, the chief public prosecutor and a former Fidesz politician, has persistently refrained from investigating the corrupt practices of prominent Fidesz oligarchs. As a result of the declining independence and quality of the Hungarian judiciary, trust in the Hungarian legal system among the general public has dropped over time. More court proceedings have ended at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. Hungary is among the countries generating the most cases at that body, and the Hungarian state often loses these lawsuits. Judiciary reforms have also been among the main prerequisites for Hungary to access a portion of its EU funds locked under the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism adopted by the European Commission (2023).
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. “Commission considers that Hungary’s judicial reform addressed deficiencies in judicial independence, but maintains measures on budget conditionality” December 13. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_6465
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
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There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
Generally, civil rights in Hungary are protected by the constitution (Basic Law), but subordinate laws and practical applications often blur these constitutional provisions. During the Orbán era, several severe and systematic issues have arisen, reflecting the illiberal regime’s logic and the democratic decline the government is engaging in to cover and maintain the corrupt practices of the Fidesz elite. Ideologically, same-sex marriages and feminism are incompatible with the conservative, traditional view of society upheld by the regime. Consequently, LGBTQ+ issues are alien to the regime. Provisions in the constitution (e.g., marriage as a bond between men and women, the heteronormative nuclear family model enshrined in the constitution – see Takács et al. 2022) and laws like the Lex NGO and the Sovereignty Protection Act significantly reduce legal certainty for these communities and their ability to organize. Rather than preventing discrimination, the government fosters it in this respect.
Furthermore, the Child Protection Act of 2021 conflated homosexuality with pedophilia and led to absurd measures, such as obliging bookstores to sell LGBTQ+ books in sealed packages (Rédai 2023). Migrants are another group in society that faces legal and practical restrictions. All these groups are subject to othering in the narrative pushed by the populist government. The scapegoating of minority groups for domestic problems and the us-and-them narrative aims to secure power. With checks and balances having largely been removed from the system and the government having secured a two-thirds supermajority in the 2022 parliamentary election, only the EU can prevent the government from continuing and widening its attack on these groups. The former head of state, Katalin Novák (who resigned in February 2024 due to public outrage caused by offering a presidential pardon in a pedophilia case), once turned against the government when vetoing a highly controversial law on whistleblowing that aimed to restrict the rights of homosexual and transgender people. Novák referred to the potential increase in mistrust among community members and criticized the fact that the law did not meet EU requirements. Despite these instances, the government has continued to target these communities.
Citations:
Rédai, D. 2023. “Lesbian Resistance Through Fairytales. The Story of a Children’s Book Clashing with an Authoritarian Anti-Gender Regime in Hungary.” Journal of Lesbian Studies (1-17).
Takács, J., Fobear, K., and Schmitsek, S. 2022. “Resisting Genderphobia in Hungary.” Politics and Governance 10(4): 38-48.
Furthermore, the Child Protection Act of 2021 conflated homosexuality with pedophilia and led to absurd measures, such as obliging bookstores to sell LGBTQ+ books in sealed packages (Rédai 2023). Migrants are another group in society that faces legal and practical restrictions. All these groups are subject to othering in the narrative pushed by the populist government. The scapegoating of minority groups for domestic problems and the us-and-them narrative aims to secure power. With checks and balances having largely been removed from the system and the government having secured a two-thirds supermajority in the 2022 parliamentary election, only the EU can prevent the government from continuing and widening its attack on these groups. The former head of state, Katalin Novák (who resigned in February 2024 due to public outrage caused by offering a presidential pardon in a pedophilia case), once turned against the government when vetoing a highly controversial law on whistleblowing that aimed to restrict the rights of homosexual and transgender people. Novák referred to the potential increase in mistrust among community members and criticized the fact that the law did not meet EU requirements. Despite these instances, the government has continued to target these communities.
Citations:
Rédai, D. 2023. “Lesbian Resistance Through Fairytales. The Story of a Children’s Book Clashing with an Authoritarian Anti-Gender Regime in Hungary.” Journal of Lesbian Studies (1-17).
Takács, J., Fobear, K., and Schmitsek, S. 2022. “Resisting Genderphobia in Hungary.” Politics and Governance 10(4): 38-48.
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
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Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Corruption is one of Hungary’s central problems (European Commission 2021: 10-14), and the level of corruption perceptions in Hungary is very high. The country ranks 77th out of 180 countries in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2022, behind neighbors such as Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and Romania. Widespread corruption has been a systemic feature of the Orbán government, with benefits and influence growing through Fidesz informal political-business networks. Members of the Fidesz elite have been involved in several large-scale corruption scandals, with many people accumulating substantial wealth in a short period. Such individuals have enjoyed protection from portions of the judiciary. Hungary has for some time led OLAF’s list of member states in which irregularities in the use of EU funding have been identified, and has conspicuously failed to cooperate with the European Union’s anti-fraud agency. In 2021, the legal anti-corruption framework was further weakened by a narrowing of the scope of application for public procurement rules. The government implemented no specific measures to limit corruption during the COVID-19 pandemic, and special procurement rules have been applied. Only after the strong intervention of the European Union (Article 7 procedure) and the freezing of EU assets did the government engage in procedural and institutional changes. An investigatory report by the Budgetary Control Commission of the European Parliament labeled these reforms as a kind of Potemkin Village, whereby the reforms as officially described do not translate into sustainable reform. What is missing is the political will to fight corruption. The fact that Hungary still refuses to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office shows where the government stands. Joining the Office would make many expensive institutional reforms completely unnecessary. In 2022, bowing to pressure from the European Commission, the government set up a new institution called the Integrity Authority. However, this has a weak mandate, and little power beyond issuing periodic reports on its observations. Nevertheless, the Integrity Authority has been critical of the lack of transparency in public procurement, and has flagged several issues related to businesspeople with close ties to the government. The system of asset declarations has been reformed several times in recent years and is relatively stringent on paper. However, there is no associated oversight mechanism, so false statements or underreporting may not be detected, rendering the system almost useless (K-Monitor 2023).
Citations:
Citations:
European Commission. 2021. “2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Hungary.” SWD (2021) 714 final, Brussels. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:5201SC0714&from=
ENK-Monitor. 2023. “Hungarian MP’s Assets: Less Declared And Still Not Monitored.” 15 February. https://k.blog.hu/2023/02/15/hungarian_mp_s_assets_less_declared_and_still_not_monitored?layout=5
Transparency International. 2024. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2022.” https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022
Citations:
Citations:
European Commission. 2021. “2021 Rule of Law Report. Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Hungary.” SWD (2021) 714 final, Brussels. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:5201SC0714&from=
ENK-Monitor. 2023. “Hungarian MP’s Assets: Less Declared And Still Not Monitored.” 15 February. https://k.blog.hu/2023/02/15/hungarian_mp_s_assets_less_declared_and_still_not_monitored?layout=5
Transparency International. 2024. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2022.” https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022
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Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
With its budgetary rights, the Hungarian parliament has the de jure right to control its budget. De facto, the parliamentary majority usually follows the policies set by the core executive. According to the standing orders of the Hungarian parliament, all parliamentary party groups can invite experts, and committee sessions are open to the public. In practice, however, Fidesz’s overwhelming majority, reinforced in the 2022 elections, as well as the hectic pace of legislation, have reduced the involvement of experts to a mere formality. While the rights are in place, and there are few legal obstacles to the summoning of experts, the consultation of experts does not play a significant role in policymaking. The reduction in the number of parliamentary seats from 386 to 199 made the parliament better fitted to a country the size of Hungary, and made the legislature more cost-effective. Still, it reduced the amount of experts and assistants, who are essential to parliament’s work in general. Today, the parliament has a support staff of 741 people. Compared to parliaments of the same size (Austria: 250 legislators, 460 staffers; Czechia: 200/460), the Hungarian ratio is excellent and maybe even indicates overstaffing. At the same time, it should be noted that due to the governing party’s direct access to public funds through its control over the administration, it has a sizable advantage over opposition parties when it comes to employing staff and experts (Susánszky et al. 2020). Opposition parties try to compensate by reallocating the more generous funds provided for their European Parliament members.
Citations:
Susánszky, P., Unger, A., and Kopper, Á. 2020. “Hungary’s Over-Powerful Government Party and the Desperate Opposition.” European Review 28(5): 761-777.
Citations:
Susánszky, P., Unger, A., and Kopper, Á. 2020. “Hungary’s Over-Powerful Government Party and the Desperate Opposition.” European Review 28(5): 761-777.
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
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The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
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The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
Until 2012, parliamentary committees in Hungary enjoyed extensive access to government documents. However, the standing orders of the Hungarian parliament were significantly altered under the 2012 Act on Parliament. These changes do not regulate the access of parliamentary committees to public documents. Subsequent Orbán governments have used their parliamentary majority to restrict access to public documents, even for discussions within parliamentary committees. Additionally, the minutes of committee meetings on sensitive issues, such as national security, are often classified, limiting opportunities for public scrutiny in cases as critical as the Pegasus wiretapping scandal. The parliament’s oversight function is formally regulated by the right to summon ministers, among other things. The standing orders of the Hungarian parliament require ministers to report personally to the relevant parliamentary committees at least once a year. However, these orders do not guarantee parliamentary committees the right to summon ministers for other hearings. Additionally, ministerial hearings suffer from severe time restrictions, with individual members of parliament allotted only two minutes to speak. Overall, the number of interpellations is declining. During the 2018 – 2022 term, the number of interpellations fell to 484, down from 820 in 2014 – 2018. The decline occurred in both government and opposition-initiated cases, indicating that even the opposition is losing trust in this instrument. In contrast, the number of prompt questions remained stable, while oral questions dropped by 50%, returning to the level they were before 2014. Written questions remained consistently high during the last two terms.
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
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The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
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The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
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The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
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The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
In socialist Hungary, the parliament was de jure the highest and strongest institution in the political system; de facto, it was utterly impotent. After 1990, the Hungarian parliament became a stronghold of democracy and the central site for political debate. Since 2010, successive Orbán governments have constantly diminished the parliament’s role, easily achieving this through a two-thirds supermajority and centralized control over Prime Minister Orbán’s party ranks. The government can tailor regulations to fit its policy agenda without fearing opposition in parliament. In parliament, the opposition faces significant challenges in seeking to oppose the Fidesz supermajority. This difficulty has led even prominent politicians to use public media and the streets instead of parliament to set their political agendas. The government majority often changes the constitution or the house order. Since the government side controls agenda-setting and all parliamentary committees, the opposition has little opportunity to push reports through parliament if the government wants to prevent this, not to mention the severe consequences that might arise from such reports. Both de lege and de facto, the legislature faces strong constraints in fulfilling its obligation to oversee the government, especially since the government announced the pandemic-era state of emergency (which has persisted ever since), during which it has governed extensively through decrees, bypassing parliament. Moreover, due to the immunity enjoyed by members of parliament, criminal investigations against any legislator may be launched only once there is a majority vote in favor of suspending their immunity, something that rarely happens with Fidesz parliamentarians or members of the government (although there have been such precedents). Potential investigations against the prime minister or members of his family are especially unlikely to occur under these circumstances. Overall, there is a certain danger that the parliament will be pushed back into a position resembling its state before the democratic transition.
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
Since the 2010 reduction in the number of ministries, there has been a significant mismatch between the task areas of ministries and committees. The fact that ministries are covered not by a single committee but by several has complicated the monitoring of ministries. Moreover, the decision-making centers – the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office – are not covered by any parliamentary committee. Since 2022, the number of ministers (15 plus the prime minister) mirrors the number of committees, but area alignment has not yet been completely established. Several important policy areas with a designated parliamentary committee, such as sustainability and culture, do not have a separate ministry, but are represented at the state secretary level. The government controls most of the committees due to its two-thirds majority. Currently, five out of 15 committees are controlled by the opposition, not counting the exceptional committee for national minorities, reflecting the electoral outcome. Government-allied politicians control key committees for foreign policy and European integration, as well as the judicial committee. The only exceptions are the Budgetary Committee and the National Security Committee, which opposition politicians lead.