Hungary

Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the area of vertical accountability.

Under the Orbán governments (2010-2024), Hungary has transitioned into an electoral autocracy. Elections are typically free but not fair, with the ruling Fidesz party benefiting from large-scale gerrymandering, asymmetrical media access and the misuse of state assets.

Nontransparent campaign funding favors the governing party. Media organizations are openly biased toward Fidesz. The electoral system’s tendency to produce large majorities has allowed Fidesz to change legal norms in its favor. Opposition parties are ideologically and organizationally fragmented.

Economic control by Fidesz and its affiliates creates a form of reverse state capture in which the government steers economic interests. Fidesz’ overwhelming majority has made cross-party cooperation or consultation largely unnecessary. Operating with a continuously maintained state of emergency, the government threatens democratic values.

Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the area of diagonal accountability.

The public broadcaster is fully under government control. Private media is concentrated among firms allied with Fidesz. Independent media outlets have been pushed online, but still risk high fines if they receive foreign funding, and largely reach only the urban educated population.

The freedoms of assembly and association have been constrained. A pandemic-era state of emergency has been extended, allowing demonstrations to be restricted and the government to govern by decree.

Civil society organizations operate in an increasingly hostile environment, with foreign-funded groups treated as foreign agents. A new Office for the Defense of National Sovereignty will increase monitoring of groups not allied with Fidesz. The state consults largely with government-organized groups that support its policies.

Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the area of horizontal accountability.

The State Audit Office has been criticized for political bias, and is viewed as complementing rather than overseeing the government. The data protection authority has not played a significant role in the public debate. It failed to address Fidesz’s misuse of public data during elections, and did not address the government’s use of spyware to target opposition figures.

Legal certainty has been undermined by rapidly changing legislation. Judicial independence has declined. While lower courts still make independent decisions, the Constitutional Court and other high-level judicial bodies have increasingly come under government control. Populations such as migrants and the LGBTQ+ community are scapegoated for the government’s benefit.

Corruption has become a systemic issue. Members of the Fidesz elite have rapidly accumulated wealth through informal political-business networks. The parliament’s formal powers have declined, and the executive’s comprehensive control of state organs, especially during the state of emergency, has sidelined the legislature as an oversight or policy-shaping body.

In the category of coordination, Hungary performs relatively poorly in international comparison (rank 24).

The Orbán governments have expanded the power and resources of the Prime Minister’s Office and Cabinet Office. These bodies ensure that policies align with Orbán’s preferences and Fidesz’s ideology. Line ministries serve largely as executors of the core executive’s decisions. The number of ministries has been expanded, necessitating greater interministerial coordination.

Power is increasingly concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office and in Orbán’s person. This sometimes creates policymaking bottlenecks. The role of informal decision-making has expanded. Formal mechanisms serve largely to legalize and implement the prime minister’s improvised and hastily made decisions.

The core government has taken over some previously decentralized services. Public services left at the subnational level have suffered to due to a lack of financial resources and administrative capacities, conflicting legal norms and complex regulations. Strong politicization of funding means that resources are shifted from non-Fidesz administrations to Fidesz-controlled counties.

Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the area of consensus-building.

The Orbán governments have shown little interest in seeking independent advice. By limiting decision-making to an inner circle, they risk groupthink and low-quality decisions detached from societal realities. The government seeks to suppress groups with ideological or financial independence, limiting consultations with societal actors.

The government selectively consults with civil society organizations (CSOs) that align with its conservative worldview, particularly on issues like family matters, while excluding those with modern or feminist agendas. Organizations supporting the government receive funding and are co-opted, while others face smear campaigns.

Environmental CSOs are often internationally connected. As such, they are stigmatized, though less so than human rights or feminist groups, and have little ability to influence policy. Government openness is minimal. The administration is fearful of releasing information without the explicit consent of high-ranking officials. Public access to open data remains.

Hungary falls into the sample’s bottom group (rank 29) in the category of sensemaking.

Strategic foresight capabilities are centered within the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office, and are primarily aimed at advancing the prime minister’s illiberal agenda. The rapid pace of lawmaking often prevents the implementation of thorough scenario-building and impact assessments.

Regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) have suffered from sluggish and selective implementation. Consultation with stakeholders and sustainability checks are rare. During the persistent states of emergency, the government has been able to waive RIA requirements.

Ex post evaluations are carried out by ministries using social science methods, but the results are often not made public. The system remains underdeveloped due to the hectic pace of lawmaking, and due to the general aim of the government to reduce oversight mechanisms.

Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the category of economic sustainability.

Circularity economy strategies are underdeveloped and fragmented. Hungary’s energy policies focus on security, reducing fossil fuel use and affordable prices, with a goal of carbon neutrality by 2050, though progress toward this goal has been slow.

The labor market in Hungary is flexible, with a high employment rate above 80%. However, ideological policies have led to persistent gender pay gaps, anti-migration policies and poor labor-market integration among the Roma population. Oligarchs benefit from weak financial-market oversight.

The flat income tax and high VAT disproportionately benefit high-income earners. Corporate taxes are low, but companies struggle with frequent tax policy changes and policies favoring oligarchs connected to the government. While debt has fallen in recent rears, budget deficits remain high.

Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the area of social sustainability.

The education system remains in crisis. Spending has declined, and the system has become more centralized. Curriculum has become strongly ideological. Education outcomes are below the EU average. Teachers have been in an ongoing dispute with the state over wages and working conditions.

Poverty rates are low by median income standards, but higher on the basis of purchasing power. Support programs are focused on pushing people into work rather than providing benefits. Healthcare spending is low, resulting in poor health outcomes. Many medical professionals have emigrated. The state has generated political hysteria around the danger of gender issues.

Family policies are extensive, but focus on financial aid rather than on enabling women to balance work and family. Gender inequality remains a major issue. The Orbán government takes a strongly antimigration stance, excepting Ukrainian refugees. The unemployment rate among migrants is lower than among the native-born population.

Hungary falls into the sample’s bottom group (rank 29) with regard to environmental sustainability.

Environmental sustainability has been on the decline. The state’s commitment to climate neutrality by 2050 was largely due to external pressure. New objectives, such as a 50% emissions reduction by 2030 and a CO2 tax, have been introduced. Critics say these constitute lip service rather than genuine government commitment.

Life expectancy is comparatively low, and the country is rated poorly on measures of air quality, water quality and waste management. Public awareness of environmental health risks is low, and the national diet is unhealthy. The country’s record on biodiversity is mixed.

A campaign against “climate hysteria” highlighted Hungary’s hesitancy on environmental issues. The government has consistently opposed efforts to strengthen EU environmental policies, and was one of the countries that tried to block the EU’s plans to become carbon-neutral by 2050.