Sensemaking
#29Key Findings
Hungary falls into the sample’s bottom group (rank 29) in the category of sensemaking.
Strategic foresight capabilities are centered within the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office, and are primarily aimed at advancing the prime minister’s illiberal agenda. The rapid pace of lawmaking often prevents the implementation of thorough scenario-building and impact assessments.
Regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) have suffered from sluggish and selective implementation. Consultation with stakeholders and sustainability checks are rare. During the persistent states of emergency, the government has been able to waive RIA requirements.
Ex post evaluations are carried out by ministries using social science methods, but the results are often not made public. The system remains underdeveloped due to the hectic pace of lawmaking, and due to the general aim of the government to reduce oversight mechanisms.
Strategic foresight capabilities are centered within the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office, and are primarily aimed at advancing the prime minister’s illiberal agenda. The rapid pace of lawmaking often prevents the implementation of thorough scenario-building and impact assessments.
Regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) have suffered from sluggish and selective implementation. Consultation with stakeholders and sustainability checks are rare. During the persistent states of emergency, the government has been able to waive RIA requirements.
Ex post evaluations are carried out by ministries using social science methods, but the results are often not made public. The system remains underdeveloped due to the hectic pace of lawmaking, and due to the general aim of the government to reduce oversight mechanisms.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent can the central government foster the capacity for strategic foresight and anticipatory innovation within its organization?
10
9
9
The central government can foster the capacity for strategic foresight and anticipatory innovation within its organization.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the central government can foster the capacity for strategic foresight and anticipatory innovation within its organization.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government is rarely capable of fostering the capacity for strategic foresight and anticipatory innovation within its organization.
2
1
1
The central government is not capable of fostering the capacity for strategic foresight and anticipatory innovation within its organization.
The institutional backbone of strategic foresight is located within the core executive, specifically the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office. The strategic aim here should be understood as the administration’s ability to advance the prime minister’s illiberal agenda, rather than proactively addressing policy challenges and changes in the political and economic environment. The open government tier is very underdeveloped and highly politicized. The digital agenda, however, is better organized, with several programs aimed at digitalizing the administration. Anticipatory innovation remains relatively weak, and the relevant programs and training methodologies are underdeveloped.
Due to the high pace of lawmaking in Hungary, there is often insufficient time for scenario-building and impact assessments. Nonetheless, the Cabinet Office regularly monitors public opinion through flash polls outsourced to pro-government think tanks such as the Századvég Institute or Nézőpont; therefore, it has a fairly precise evaluation of public opinion that frequently influences policymaking or political decisions. The selection of high-level civil servants is based on political nominations rather than merit, extending down to the middle-range ranks. Consequently, the best-trained civil servants do not always oversee policies.
Due to the high pace of lawmaking in Hungary, there is often insufficient time for scenario-building and impact assessments. Nonetheless, the Cabinet Office regularly monitors public opinion through flash polls outsourced to pro-government think tanks such as the Századvég Institute or Nézőpont; therefore, it has a fairly precise evaluation of public opinion that frequently influences policymaking or political decisions. The selection of high-level civil servants is based on political nominations rather than merit, extending down to the middle-range ranks. Consequently, the best-trained civil servants do not always oversee policies.
Graph View
To what extent does the government conduct high-quality impact assessments to evaluate the potential effects of prepared legislation before implementation?
10
9
9
The government draws on high-quality RIAs to assess the potential impact of prepared legislation before implementation.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, the government draws on high-quality RIAs to assess the potential impact of prepared legislation before implementation.
5
4
3
4
3
The government rarely draws on high-quality RIAs to assess the potential impact of prepared legislation before implementation.
2
1
1
The government does not draw on high-quality RIAs to assess the potential impact of prepared legislation before implementation.
Upon taking office, the second Orbán government amended provisions for regulatory impact assessments (RIAs). Legal sources include a 2010 law (Act on Lawmaking) and a 2011 government decree (No. 24/2011 VIII.9). In practice, RIAs have suffered from sluggish and selective implementation (Brenner/Fazekas 2020; Corruption Research Center 2017; Staroňová 2014). An amendment to the 2010 Act in March 2019 (OECD 2021) aimed to simplify and expedite legislation to avoid costs, legal obligations and administrative burdens. Another objective was to prevent overregulation and regulatory overlap (OECD 2022).
The core executive branch (government office) coordinates the RIA process. The quality of the RIA process in Hungary has been poor, at least until the 2019 reform (OECD 2021), and has not significantly improved since. It is often not well-considered, not sustainable, or not correctly implemented due to the fast pace of lawmaking in Hungary (Kührner 2021:83). Substantial stakeholder participation is often lacking because the idea of consultation is alien to the Orbán government.
Additionally, there is no independent evaluation of RIAs. Many RIAs are conducted by local affiliates of the “Big Four” accounting firms, and the findings are rarely or only partially made available to political actors on the special website for RIAs (hatasvizsgalat.kormany.hu). Public information requests from the media to access RIAs are in most cases rejected by the government, and in some instances already published RIAs have become unavailable (for an example in the case of an RIA relating to a battery plant; see Spirk 2024). Similarly, the annual report on RIAs prepared by the Prime Minister’s Office is not publicly available. The relevant decree removes the need to conclude RIAs during a state of emergency, which has been the norm in Hungary since the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Constitutionally, therefore, the government can easily waive the obligation if it so desires.
Citations:
Brenner, D., and M. Fazekas. 2020. “Legislative Effects of Regulatory Impact Assessment: A Comparative Event History Analysis of Modifications of Law in France, Italy, Hungary and the UK.” Government Transparency Institute. 2020. Working Paper 2020-3. http://www.govtransparency.eu/legislativeeffects-of-regulatory-impact-assessment-a-comparative-event-history-analysis-of-modifications-of-law-in-
france-italy-hungary-and-the-uk/).
Corruption Research Center. 2017. Report on the Quality of Hungarian Legislation – 2011-2016. Budapest.
Kührner, László. 2021. “Így vizsgáltok ti - A magyar hatásvizsgálati rendszer hiányosságai.” PSz 2021 (2): 83-94.OECD. 2021. Hungary: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021. Paris.
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/hungary-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdfOECD. 2022. Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance Europe 22, Hungary. Paris: OECD. https://web-archive.oecd.org/2022-08-03/638930-Hungary-country-profile-EU-report-2022.pdf
Staroňová, K. 2014. “L’institutionnalisation des études d’impact en Europe centrale et orientale.” Revue Française D’ Administration Publique. 149(1): 123-143.
Spirk, J. 2024. “Eltüntették a debreceni akkumulátorgyárról készült szakértői tanulmányt, amelyben óriási vízfogyasztásról írtak.” 24.hu, February 3. https://24.hu/belfold/2023/02/03/debrecen-catl-akkumulatorgyar-szorolap-hazugsag-vizfogyasztas/
The core executive branch (government office) coordinates the RIA process. The quality of the RIA process in Hungary has been poor, at least until the 2019 reform (OECD 2021), and has not significantly improved since. It is often not well-considered, not sustainable, or not correctly implemented due to the fast pace of lawmaking in Hungary (Kührner 2021:83). Substantial stakeholder participation is often lacking because the idea of consultation is alien to the Orbán government.
Additionally, there is no independent evaluation of RIAs. Many RIAs are conducted by local affiliates of the “Big Four” accounting firms, and the findings are rarely or only partially made available to political actors on the special website for RIAs (hatasvizsgalat.kormany.hu). Public information requests from the media to access RIAs are in most cases rejected by the government, and in some instances already published RIAs have become unavailable (for an example in the case of an RIA relating to a battery plant; see Spirk 2024). Similarly, the annual report on RIAs prepared by the Prime Minister’s Office is not publicly available. The relevant decree removes the need to conclude RIAs during a state of emergency, which has been the norm in Hungary since the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Constitutionally, therefore, the government can easily waive the obligation if it so desires.
Citations:
Brenner, D., and M. Fazekas. 2020. “Legislative Effects of Regulatory Impact Assessment: A Comparative Event History Analysis of Modifications of Law in France, Italy, Hungary and the UK.” Government Transparency Institute. 2020. Working Paper 2020-3. http://www.govtransparency.eu/legislativeeffects-of-regulatory-impact-assessment-a-comparative-event-history-analysis-of-modifications-of-law-in-
france-italy-hungary-and-the-uk/).
Corruption Research Center. 2017. Report on the Quality of Hungarian Legislation – 2011-2016. Budapest.
Kührner, László. 2021. “Így vizsgáltok ti - A magyar hatásvizsgálati rendszer hiányosságai.” PSz 2021 (2): 83-94.OECD. 2021. Hungary: Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance 2021. Paris.
https://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/hungary-country-profile-regulatory-policy-2021.pdfOECD. 2022. Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance Europe 22, Hungary. Paris: OECD. https://web-archive.oecd.org/2022-08-03/638930-Hungary-country-profile-EU-report-2022.pdf
Staroňová, K. 2014. “L’institutionnalisation des études d’impact en Europe centrale et orientale.” Revue Française D’ Administration Publique. 149(1): 123-143.
Spirk, J. 2024. “Eltüntették a debreceni akkumulátorgyárról készült szakértői tanulmányt, amelyben óriási vízfogyasztásról írtak.” 24.hu, February 3. https://24.hu/belfold/2023/02/03/debrecen-catl-akkumulatorgyar-szorolap-hazugsag-vizfogyasztas/
To what extent does the government effectively incorporate sustainability assessments within the framework of RIAs?
10
9
9
High-quality sustainability assessments are incorporated within regulatory impact assessments.
8
7
6
7
6
High-quality sustainability assessments are, for the most part, incorporated within regulatory impact assessments.
5
4
3
4
3
High-quality sustainability assessments are rarely incorporated within regulatory impact assessments.
2
1
1
Sustainability assessments are not incorporated within regulatory impact assessments.
In Hungary, the strategic environmental assessment (SEA) approach aligns with the stipulations of the European Union Directive 2001/42/EC and the UNECE’s SEA Protocol under the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. This assessment process is obligatory when crafting local spatial strategies and territorial development frameworks. The Hungarian parliament passed a National Sustainability Strategy in March 2013 and a National Energy Strategy in 2019. After the adoption of the National Sustainability Strategy, the parliament’s environmental committee was transformed into the Committee of Sustainable Development, consisting of parliamentarians and supported by the National Sustainability Council. The National Sustainability Strategy and regulatory impact assessment (RIA) processes have not yet been coordinated, and sustainability checks (SEAs) happen infrequently during the RIA process. The system of sustainability checks in the government was recently reformed with government decree 1262/2023 VII.4., specifically in the field of public spending, after severe criticism of the low standards of sustainability checks in procurement procedures. The government has no environmental ministry. This portfolio is represented only at an inferior administrative level, as a state secretariat subordinated to the Ministry of Agriculture. A regional authority, the Government Office of Pest County (Pest Megyei Kormányhivatal), carries out the National Environmental Impact Assessment. At the subnational level, county government offices (megyei kormányhivatalok) are responsible for the issue, and there is no functional equivalent at the local level. For cross-border issues, the Department of Environmental Protection of the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for performing sustainability checks and any required public hearings. Strategic environmental assessment (SEA) aligns with the European Union Directive 2001/42/EC stipulations and the UNECE’s SEA Protocol under the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. This assessment process is obligatory for crafting local spatial strategies and territorial development frameworks. While SEA is a routine practice in larger and medium-sized urban areas, particularly those with county rights, its application is less consistent in smaller towns (OECD 2018).
Furthermore, SEAs are prerequisites for formulating policies and plans across various sectors. The regulatory environment for environmental impact assessments (EIAs) is fragmented and lacks coherence. However, the issue has gained more prominence in public discourse due to the government’s rushed attempt to attract foreign direct investment by subsidizing the establishment of new battery plants in 2023. This initiative led to popular protests in several locations and may increase pressure on the government to conduct and publish EIAs more transparently.
Citations:
OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Hungary 2018, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/9789264298613-9-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/9789264298613-9-en
Furthermore, SEAs are prerequisites for formulating policies and plans across various sectors. The regulatory environment for environmental impact assessments (EIAs) is fragmented and lacks coherence. However, the issue has gained more prominence in public discourse due to the government’s rushed attempt to attract foreign direct investment by subsidizing the establishment of new battery plants in 2023. This initiative led to popular protests in several locations and may increase pressure on the government to conduct and publish EIAs more transparently.
Citations:
OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Hungary 2018, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/9789264298613-9-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/9789264298613-9-en
To what extent do government ministries utilize ex post evaluations to improve existing policies?
10
9
9
High-quality ex post evaluations serve as the basis for making adjustments to public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
High-quality ex post evaluations frequently serve as the basis for making adjustments to public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
High-quality ex post evaluations rarely serve as the basis for making adjustments to public policies.
2
1
1
High-quality ex post evaluations are not utilized to make adjustments to public policies.
On the government side, ex post evaluation in Hungary is a task assigned to the core executive, the Government Office. It is based on a 2010 law regulating lawmaking and the law on the task areas of the ministries, and was implemented by the 2016 government decree (12/2016 IV29). Ministers are required to report to the Government Office once a year about practices and attend an annual hearing of their corresponding parliamentary committees to report on their achievements and respond to queries from committee members. The procedure includes internal ministerial and external stakeholder consultations before the evaluation reaches the Cabinet Office for approval. The ex post evaluation relies on social science methods. The material produced by the ministries is often not publicly available; however, the proceedings of the parliamentary committee hearings are routinely reported by the press, except when they concern national security issues. Even stakeholders do not always have access to all relevant information. Initially, the appropriate unit in the administration was understaffed, and clear organizational information was not provided (Gajduschek 2016:813). The lack of oversight instruments has long been an issue with the European Commission’s criticism of Hungarian management of projects using European funds. Current modifications of the 2010 Act on Lawmaking include a reference to ex post evaluation. The underdeveloped system is still in place due to the hectic pace of lawmaking and the general aim of the government to reduce oversight mechanisms.
Citations:
Gajduschek, G. 2016. “Előkészítetlenség és utólagos hatásvizsgálat hiánya.” In A. Jakab and G. Gajduschek, eds.
A magyar jogrendszer állapota. 2016. Budapest: MTA TK.
Citations:
Gajduschek, G. 2016. “Előkészítetlenség és utólagos hatásvizsgálat hiánya.” In A. Jakab and G. Gajduschek, eds.
A magyar jogrendszer állapota. 2016. Budapest: MTA TK.