Social Sustainability
#30Key Findings
Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the area of social sustainability.
The education system remains in crisis. Spending has declined, and the system has become more centralized. Curriculum has become strongly ideological. Education outcomes are below the EU average. Teachers have been in an ongoing dispute with the state over wages and working conditions.
Poverty rates are low by median income standards, but higher on the basis of purchasing power. Support programs are focused on pushing people into work rather than providing benefits. Healthcare spending is low, resulting in poor health outcomes. Many medical professionals have emigrated. The state has generated political hysteria around the danger of gender issues.
Family policies are extensive, but focus on financial aid rather than on enabling women to balance work and family. Gender inequality remains a major issue. The Orbán government takes a strongly antimigration stance, excepting Ukrainian refugees. The unemployment rate among migrants is lower than among the native-born population.
The education system remains in crisis. Spending has declined, and the system has become more centralized. Curriculum has become strongly ideological. Education outcomes are below the EU average. Teachers have been in an ongoing dispute with the state over wages and working conditions.
Poverty rates are low by median income standards, but higher on the basis of purchasing power. Support programs are focused on pushing people into work rather than providing benefits. Healthcare spending is low, resulting in poor health outcomes. Many medical professionals have emigrated. The state has generated political hysteria around the danger of gender issues.
Family policies are extensive, but focus on financial aid rather than on enabling women to balance work and family. Gender inequality remains a major issue. The Orbán government takes a strongly antimigration stance, excepting Ukrainian refugees. The unemployment rate among migrants is lower than among the native-born population.
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To what extent do policies and regulations in the education system hinder or facilitate high-quality education and training?
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9
9
Education policies are fully aligned with the goal of ensuring high-quality education and training.
8
7
6
7
6
Education policies are largely aligned with the goal of ensuring high-quality education and training.
5
4
3
4
3
Education policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of ensuring high-quality education and training.
2
1
1
Education policies are not at all aligned with the goal of ensuring high-quality education and training.
The education system has undergone major changes since the second Orbán government took office in 2010. Government spending on education fell from 4.6% of GDP in 2010 to 3.8% in 2020. During this period, competencies and monitoring duties were centralized, private and religious schools were strengthened, and secondary education was restructured to emphasize vocational training. Education outcomes remain below the EU average and show wide disparities, and the system obstructs social mobility (Radó and Mikola 2023). Teacher salaries are still low compared to other tertiary education graduates. Regular PISA surveys have shown a marked decline in the quality of education in Hungary. In 2022, the country ranked 29th out of 30 in mathematics, with a score of 12.39, a sharp decline from 2018’s score of 8.74. Overall, Hungary ranked 24th out of 30 countries in the PISA 2022 survey. Additionally, the content of school textbooks has been increasingly influenced by ideology. Pupils are educated in a nationalistic manner that celebrates the greatness of the Hungarian people and their “historic suffering,” while often denying historical facts.
Education suffered severely during the COVID-19 pandemic, exacerbating educational, psychological, social and political tensions. The government has tightened its control over universities by “privatizing” them, placing these institutions under the oversight of ostensibly private but actually state-controlled foundations, and securing these foundations through constitutional amendments.
Highly dissatisfied with low salaries (Hungary ranks next to last in OECD statistics), a heavy workload and an increasingly ideologized curriculum, teachers began protesting and striking in 2022. The government’s response was dismissive, rejecting the prospect of negotiation. It leveraged emergency powers to issue a decree limiting teachers’ ability to strike during the pandemic.
In 2023, the government introduced what teachers refer to as a “revenge law” or “vengeance law.” This law reclassified teachers from public employees to “public education employees,” intensified performance evaluations, and increased workloads instead of reducing them. Some teachers even faced termination.
This conflict is ongoing. In a typical populist move, Prime Minister Orbán linked the issue of teachers’ wage increases to the unblocking of European funds. Consequently, there was a significant average salary increase of 32% for teachers in early 2024 (About Hungary 2024). The situation in Hungary’s education system is dire. The regulatory environment is hostile, there is a severe teacher shortage and the teaching workforce is aging. The curriculum remains politicized and outdated, leading to a decline in the educational system’s performance.
Citations:
OECD. 2023. “Teacher’s Salaries.” https://data.oecd.org/teachers/teachers-salaries.htm
Radó, Péter and Bálint Mikola. 2023. Illiberalism in Power: Educational and Cultural Policies. AUTHLIB Working Papers 2. https://www.authlib.eu/authlib_wp_2023_02_rado-mikola/
About Hungary. 2024. “Gulyás: Teachers’ wages to rise by 32%.” https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/gulyas-teachers-wages-to-rise-by-32
Education suffered severely during the COVID-19 pandemic, exacerbating educational, psychological, social and political tensions. The government has tightened its control over universities by “privatizing” them, placing these institutions under the oversight of ostensibly private but actually state-controlled foundations, and securing these foundations through constitutional amendments.
Highly dissatisfied with low salaries (Hungary ranks next to last in OECD statistics), a heavy workload and an increasingly ideologized curriculum, teachers began protesting and striking in 2022. The government’s response was dismissive, rejecting the prospect of negotiation. It leveraged emergency powers to issue a decree limiting teachers’ ability to strike during the pandemic.
In 2023, the government introduced what teachers refer to as a “revenge law” or “vengeance law.” This law reclassified teachers from public employees to “public education employees,” intensified performance evaluations, and increased workloads instead of reducing them. Some teachers even faced termination.
This conflict is ongoing. In a typical populist move, Prime Minister Orbán linked the issue of teachers’ wage increases to the unblocking of European funds. Consequently, there was a significant average salary increase of 32% for teachers in early 2024 (About Hungary 2024). The situation in Hungary’s education system is dire. The regulatory environment is hostile, there is a severe teacher shortage and the teaching workforce is aging. The curriculum remains politicized and outdated, leading to a decline in the educational system’s performance.
Citations:
OECD. 2023. “Teacher’s Salaries.” https://data.oecd.org/teachers/teachers-salaries.htm
Radó, Péter and Bálint Mikola. 2023. Illiberalism in Power: Educational and Cultural Policies. AUTHLIB Working Papers 2. https://www.authlib.eu/authlib_wp_2023_02_rado-mikola/
About Hungary. 2024. “Gulyás: Teachers’ wages to rise by 32%.” https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/gulyas-teachers-wages-to-rise-by-32
To what extent does the current policy approach in the education system hinder or facilitate equitable access to high-quality education and training?
10
9
9
Education policies are fully aligned with the goal of ensuring equitable access to high-quality education and training.
8
7
6
7
6
Education policies are largely aligned with the goal of ensuring equitable access to high-quality education and training.
5
4
3
4
3
Education policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of ensuring equitable access to high-quality education and training.
2
1
1
Education policies are not at all aligned with the goal of ensuring equitable access to high-quality education and training.
Preprimary education in Hungary is traditionally very strong, with the country securing the top rank among OECD countries. Kindergarten attendance is compulsory from the age of three. However, the share of male teachers in this segment is extremely low.
In primary education, the socioeconomic background of pupils significantly impacts performance. The COVID-19 pandemic hit Hungary hard, causing already low numbers in 2018 to decline further in 2022, as shown by PISA surveys. The system tends to produce low achievers, and the number of early school leavers is comparatively high. Particular issues include a lack of digital and language skills. About 50% of early leavers aged 18-24 still find employment, which is average compared to other EU countries. The share of young people aged 24-29 who are neither employed nor in vocational training is relatively low. Vocational education and training programs often do not lead to tertiary education, necessitating bridging programs. Hungary provides opportunities to personalize the curriculum to individual needs and offers tools for the professional and social integration of vulnerable young people, but does less to reduce societal stigmatization (S2CENE 2022: 42). Incentives for teachers are provided to guide students to achieve outstanding results in academic competitions, but fewer incentives exist for teachers working with disadvantaged youth, whose efforts are not valued at the same level (S2CENE 2022: 51).
Providing teachers who work with underprivileged students, such as Roma children, with extra pay opportunities and incorporating inclusive education measures into teacher qualification procedures are steps in the right direction. However, efforts to tackle social exclusion, especially among Roma children and young migrants, remain underdeveloped and are somewhat hindered by government ideology. The regulatory framework does not tackle early school leaving with standalone regulation, but addresses the issue within the national strategy, the Public Education Strategy 2021 – 2030 (Köznevelési stratégia 2021 – 2030), adopted in 2020. The ministerial evaluation of the program’s predecessor (2015 – 2020) ecites successs and improving numbers, yet these improvements are not reflected in internationally comparable data. Institutionally, the Educational Authority (Oktatási Hivatal) has established a system for monitoring and controlling teachers’ work. Meanwhile, the Pedagogical Educational Centers (Pedagógiai Oktatási Központok) aim to coordinate, manage and monitor efforts at the local level. Despite some progress, national standards in this field are still underdeveloped, leaving it predominantly to individual schools to develop adequate frameworks. Nevertheless, awareness in this area is growing, as is the number of schools developing relevant schemes. On a macrolevel, schools will face significant challenges in the future due to the ongoing conflict between teachers and the government, which is expected to lead to higher quitting rates among teachers. Moreover, because of suboptimal performance in public schools and labor shortage issues, an increasing number of wealthy parents are opting for private alternatives. This trend exacerbates existing disparities in access to and quality of education (Radó 2018).
Citations:
Radó, P. 2019. “Market Reforms in the Hungarian School System: Impact of Changes in the Ownership Structure.” NESET Ad Hoc Report.
S2CENE. 2022. “Framework for Second Chance Schools in Europe.” Sofia: University of Sofia Press. https://s2cene.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/D.1.2-FRAMEWORK-FOR-SCS-IN-EUROPE-Report.pdf
In primary education, the socioeconomic background of pupils significantly impacts performance. The COVID-19 pandemic hit Hungary hard, causing already low numbers in 2018 to decline further in 2022, as shown by PISA surveys. The system tends to produce low achievers, and the number of early school leavers is comparatively high. Particular issues include a lack of digital and language skills. About 50% of early leavers aged 18-24 still find employment, which is average compared to other EU countries. The share of young people aged 24-29 who are neither employed nor in vocational training is relatively low. Vocational education and training programs often do not lead to tertiary education, necessitating bridging programs. Hungary provides opportunities to personalize the curriculum to individual needs and offers tools for the professional and social integration of vulnerable young people, but does less to reduce societal stigmatization (S2CENE 2022: 42). Incentives for teachers are provided to guide students to achieve outstanding results in academic competitions, but fewer incentives exist for teachers working with disadvantaged youth, whose efforts are not valued at the same level (S2CENE 2022: 51).
Providing teachers who work with underprivileged students, such as Roma children, with extra pay opportunities and incorporating inclusive education measures into teacher qualification procedures are steps in the right direction. However, efforts to tackle social exclusion, especially among Roma children and young migrants, remain underdeveloped and are somewhat hindered by government ideology. The regulatory framework does not tackle early school leaving with standalone regulation, but addresses the issue within the national strategy, the Public Education Strategy 2021 – 2030 (Köznevelési stratégia 2021 – 2030), adopted in 2020. The ministerial evaluation of the program’s predecessor (2015 – 2020) ecites successs and improving numbers, yet these improvements are not reflected in internationally comparable data. Institutionally, the Educational Authority (Oktatási Hivatal) has established a system for monitoring and controlling teachers’ work. Meanwhile, the Pedagogical Educational Centers (Pedagógiai Oktatási Központok) aim to coordinate, manage and monitor efforts at the local level. Despite some progress, national standards in this field are still underdeveloped, leaving it predominantly to individual schools to develop adequate frameworks. Nevertheless, awareness in this area is growing, as is the number of schools developing relevant schemes. On a macrolevel, schools will face significant challenges in the future due to the ongoing conflict between teachers and the government, which is expected to lead to higher quitting rates among teachers. Moreover, because of suboptimal performance in public schools and labor shortage issues, an increasing number of wealthy parents are opting for private alternatives. This trend exacerbates existing disparities in access to and quality of education (Radó 2018).
Citations:
Radó, P. 2019. “Market Reforms in the Hungarian School System: Impact of Changes in the Ownership Structure.” NESET Ad Hoc Report.
S2CENE. 2022. “Framework for Second Chance Schools in Europe.” Sofia: University of Sofia Press. https://s2cene.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/D.1.2-FRAMEWORK-FOR-SCS-IN-EUROPE-Report.pdf
Graph View
To what extent do existing institutions ensure equal access to essential services and basic income support for those in need?
10
9
9
Existing essential public services and basic income support are fully aligned with the goal of ensuring equal access for those in need.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing essential public services and basic income support are largely aligned with the goal of ensuring equal access for those in need.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing essential public services and basic income support are only somewhat aligned with the goal of ensuring equal access for those in need.
2
1
1
Existing essential public services and basic income support are not at all aligned with the goal of ensuring equal access for those in need.
The Hungarian poverty rate is relatively low when measured by income median, but in terms of purchasing power, Hungary faces significant challenges. Not surprisingly, levels of reported life satisfaction are also low. Guaranteed minimum income benefits are inadequate. Hungary ranks among the lowest 10% in international comparisons in this area. The most affected societal groups include the Roma population, the elderly and women, largely due to the significant gender pay gap (Takács and Vincze 2019).
Primarily, local administrations in Hungary ensure access to essential services, which still function relatively smoothly. The issue is not the institutional setup but the funding of these programs. Even these programs were stressed during the pandemic. While the Orbán government supported employees and pensioners during the crisis, it did little for nontraditional workers, the unemployed or the poor. The moratoria on mortgage and credit payments, along with the accompanying interest rate cap, have supported the middle class more than those experiencing poverty. Despite the substantial increase in unemployment, the government has kept unemployment benefits low and has not extended the maximum benefit period (Aidukaite et al. 2021). In September 2020, half of the 323,000 unemployed did not receive any government support (Györy et al. 2021: 64). Furthermore, the government failed to combat digital inequality, exacerbating the urban/rural and rich/poor divides, as well as the exclusion of the Roma. The share of the population that cannot afford internet access is comparably high in Hungary. Overall, the government prioritizes the labor market over social contributions, with most programs aiming to bring people to work. Under this scheme, dubbed by the government as a “work-based society,” there is a sharp distinction between “deserving” and “nondeserving” individuals in the distribution of welfare, with employment as the central criterion of deservingness (Szikra 2019).
Citations:
Aidukaite, J., S. Saxonberg, D. Szelewa, and D. Szikra. 2021. “Social Policy in the Face of a Global Pandemic.”
Policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis in Central and Eastern Europe, in: Social Policy & Administration
55(2): 358-373 (https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12704)
Györi, G. et al. 2021. Hungarian Politics in 2020. Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/ Policy Solutions.
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/17181.pdfSzikra, D. 2019. “Ideology or Pragmatism.” Brave New Hungary: Mapping the “System of National Cooperation.” 225-240.
Takács, O., and J. Vincze. 2019. The Gender Pay Gap in Hungary. Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
Primarily, local administrations in Hungary ensure access to essential services, which still function relatively smoothly. The issue is not the institutional setup but the funding of these programs. Even these programs were stressed during the pandemic. While the Orbán government supported employees and pensioners during the crisis, it did little for nontraditional workers, the unemployed or the poor. The moratoria on mortgage and credit payments, along with the accompanying interest rate cap, have supported the middle class more than those experiencing poverty. Despite the substantial increase in unemployment, the government has kept unemployment benefits low and has not extended the maximum benefit period (Aidukaite et al. 2021). In September 2020, half of the 323,000 unemployed did not receive any government support (Györy et al. 2021: 64). Furthermore, the government failed to combat digital inequality, exacerbating the urban/rural and rich/poor divides, as well as the exclusion of the Roma. The share of the population that cannot afford internet access is comparably high in Hungary. Overall, the government prioritizes the labor market over social contributions, with most programs aiming to bring people to work. Under this scheme, dubbed by the government as a “work-based society,” there is a sharp distinction between “deserving” and “nondeserving” individuals in the distribution of welfare, with employment as the central criterion of deservingness (Szikra 2019).
Citations:
Aidukaite, J., S. Saxonberg, D. Szelewa, and D. Szikra. 2021. “Social Policy in the Face of a Global Pandemic.”
Policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis in Central and Eastern Europe, in: Social Policy & Administration
55(2): 358-373 (https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12704)
Györi, G. et al. 2021. Hungarian Politics in 2020. Budapest: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/ Policy Solutions.
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/17181.pdfSzikra, D. 2019. “Ideology or Pragmatism.” Brave New Hungary: Mapping the “System of National Cooperation.” 225-240.
Takács, O., and J. Vincze. 2019. The Gender Pay Gap in Hungary. Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
To what extent do existing institutions and policies ensure high-quality services and basic income support?
10
9
9
Existing essential public services and basic income support are fully aligned with the goal of satisfying basic human needs.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing essential public services and basic income support are largely aligned with the goal of satisfying basic human needs.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing essential public services and basic income support are only somewhat aligned with the goal of satisfying basic human needs.
2
1
1
Existing essential public services and basic income support are not at all aligned with the goal of satisfying basic human needs.
Hungary has several programs targeting the quality of essential services, but most are underfinanced and do not guarantee safe living conditions. Regarding access to water facilities, Hungary ranks 23rd out of 27 among EU countries, and Hungarians have to dedicate a large share of their income to gaining access to such services. A government program exists to support people in poverty through price reductions, such as price caps on utilities, which the government has communicated as one of its main achievements and a demonstration of its sovereignty. Regarding energy supply, vulnerability in Hungary is comparably high due to a strong reliance on Russian imports. As Hungarians spend much of their income on energy, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and rising prices have had a significant impact. Some programs to counter this exist, such as aid for buying firewood. Still, many measures applied by other countries are not used in Hungary. The number of people at risk of poverty in Hungary who report they are unable to use public transport is the highest in the EU (European Commission 2023a: 34). The share of Hungarians unable to access the internet is also high in the EU, surpassed only in Bulgaria and Romania. Hungary’s median expenditure on digital communications across households is the EU’s highest (European Commission 2023: 44). To address this, Hungary supports affected individuals with reduced tariffs.
Additionally, informational support is provided. Reform and increased funding are needed for special services for Hungarians who are in or threatened by poverty. One problem is that many programs rely on European funds, and freezing such funds for Hungary poses significant challenges for the government. Regional disparities in providing basic services are also significant, with GDP per capita in Budapest being three times higher than in the country’s four least developed NUTS-2 regions (European Commission 2023b: 6).
Citations:
European Commission. 2023a. “Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion.” https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&furtherNews=yes&newsId=10595&pk_source=newsletter&pk_medium=email&pk_campaign=eu_social_newsletter
European Commission. 2023. “2023 Country Report - Hungary - Economic and Financial Affairs Secretariat-General Recovery and Resilience Task Force.” INSTITUTIONAL PAPER 241 | JUNE 2023. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/ip241_en.pdf
Additionally, informational support is provided. Reform and increased funding are needed for special services for Hungarians who are in or threatened by poverty. One problem is that many programs rely on European funds, and freezing such funds for Hungary poses significant challenges for the government. Regional disparities in providing basic services are also significant, with GDP per capita in Budapest being three times higher than in the country’s four least developed NUTS-2 regions (European Commission 2023b: 6).
Citations:
European Commission. 2023a. “Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion.” https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&furtherNews=yes&newsId=10595&pk_source=newsletter&pk_medium=email&pk_campaign=eu_social_newsletter
European Commission. 2023. “2023 Country Report - Hungary - Economic and Financial Affairs Secretariat-General Recovery and Resilience Task Force.” INSTITUTIONAL PAPER 241 | JUNE 2023. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/ip241_en.pdf
Graph View
To what extent does current health policy hinder or facilitate health system resilience?
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Health policies are fully aligned with the goal of achieving a resilient health system.
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Health policies are largely aligned with the goal of achieving a resilient health system.
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Health policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of achieving a resilient health system.
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1
Health policies are not at all aligned with the goal of achieving a resilient health system.
Health outcomes in Hungary lag behind most other EU member states due to the low performance of the healthcare system and unhealthy lifestyles. In OECD comparisons, Hungary is below average on almost all indicators. Life expectancy in Hungary is lower than in most of the country’s EU neighbors, and disparities across gender and socioeconomic groups are substantial. Hungary has one of the highest avoidable death rates in the European Union, and child mortality rates are also high. Healthy life expectancy is very low, and perceived health status reflects these numbers accurately; that is, Hungarians are aware of the problem. Healthcare in Hungary has suffered from limited budgets, with spending per capita at around 50% of the EU average. Many medical doctors and nurses have emigrated to the West for better salaries. The ratio of practicing doctors is 3.3 per 1,000 population (OECD average 3.7), and the ratio of practicing nurses is 5.3 per 1,000 population (OECD average 9.2). In terms of available hospital beds (6.8 per 1,000 population), Hungary exceeds the OECD average of 4.3. The healthcare system remains excessively hospital-centric, and the country ranks in the lowest third with regard to unmet need for medical care. Those who can afford it often seek treatment from private healthcare institutions, which have been multiplying under the Orbán regime. This shift has provided medical staff with significant opportunities to earn extra income in addition to their poorly paid positions in state-run hospitals. However, out-of-pocket payments have remained high for the less well-off, even though previously problematic informal payments have been criminalized since 2021 (Gaal et al. 2021). Policymaking has suffered from the absence of a separate ministry tasked with addressing healthcare issues. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the weaknesses of the Hungarian health system, prompting a hectic response. This reaction can be characterized as the militarization of healthcare. The Medical Service Act transformed the governance system of healthcare (Albert 2021). The newly created National Hospital Chief Directorate (Országos Kórházi Főigazgatóság, Okfö) has become the centralized point of governance for all medical institutions. As a result, hospital directors have lost their primary decision-making powers, especially with regard to budgeting and employment matters. While public sector physicians have seen a significant wage increase, they have also been placed under a new, almost military employment regime. This regime allows Okfö and/or hospital directors to send physicians to work at other hospitals on short notice and limits their opportunities to operate private practices and work part-time in the private healthcare sector. The tremendous pressure of the pandemic on the weak and underfinanced healthcare system has led to exhaustion among medical staff and further accelerated the country’s brain-drain problem. Despite these issues, the OECD resilience indicator shows relatively high levels of resilience for Hungary, comparable to countries like Japan, Portugal and the Netherlands. This is unsurprising, as maintaining resilience from a low base is more manageable than upholding high quality standards.
Citations:
Albert, F. 2021. “Hungary Reforms Its Healthcare System: A Useful Step Forward but Which Raises Some Concerns.” European Social Policy Network. 2021. ESPN Flash Report 2021/14. Brussels: European Commission.
OECD. 2023. “Health at a Glance 2023 Country Note Hungary.” https://www.oecd.org/hungary/health-at-a-glance-Hungary-EN.pdf
Gaal, P., Velkey, Z., Szerencses, V., and Webb, E. 2021. “The 2020 Reform of the Employment Status of Hungarian Health Workers: Will It Eliminate Informal Payments and Separate the Public and Private Sectors from Each Other?” Health Policy 125(7): 833-840.
Citations:
Albert, F. 2021. “Hungary Reforms Its Healthcare System: A Useful Step Forward but Which Raises Some Concerns.” European Social Policy Network. 2021. ESPN Flash Report 2021/14. Brussels: European Commission.
OECD. 2023. “Health at a Glance 2023 Country Note Hungary.” https://www.oecd.org/hungary/health-at-a-glance-Hungary-EN.pdf
Gaal, P., Velkey, Z., Szerencses, V., and Webb, E. 2021. “The 2020 Reform of the Employment Status of Hungarian Health Workers: Will It Eliminate Informal Payments and Separate the Public and Private Sectors from Each Other?” Health Policy 125(7): 833-840.
To what extent does current health policy hinder or facilitate achieving high-quality healthcare?
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Health policies are fully aligned with the goal of achieving high-quality healthcare.
8
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Health policies are largely aligned with the goal of achieving high-quality healthcare.
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Health policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of achieving high-quality healthcare.
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1
Health policies are not at all aligned with the goal of achieving high-quality healthcare.
Hungarians are on average more obese and smoke more than the European average (OECD 2023). The country performs well in preventing alcohol misuse, maintaining a zero-tolerance policy for intoxicated driving, with noticeable effects. Hungary also shows strong performance in vaccination rates. However, in most of the other prevention indicators, Hungary ranks below the OECD average.
A healthy lifestyle and the Hungarian way of life often exclude each other, and although regular physical activity is increasingly popular among younger urban populations, strong regional differences persist (Welk et al. 2015). Improving high-quality services within the state health system would require more financial resources, but this does not occur. High-quality healthcare in Hungary is often privatized, as strong profits have made healthcare a lucrative business opportunity for Fidesz oligarchs. Consequently, high-quality healthcare in Hungary is available if it is financed privately. The state-directed healthcare system is becoming increasingly complementary.
Citations:
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 2023. “Hungary: Country Health Profile 2023, State of Health in the EU.” Paris: OECD Publishing/Brussels: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/2023_chp_hu_english.pdf
Welk, G. J., Saint-Maurice, P. F., and Csányi, T. 2015. “Health-related Physical Fitness in Hungarian Youth: Age, Sex and Regional Profiles.” Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 86(sup1): S45-S57.
A healthy lifestyle and the Hungarian way of life often exclude each other, and although regular physical activity is increasingly popular among younger urban populations, strong regional differences persist (Welk et al. 2015). Improving high-quality services within the state health system would require more financial resources, but this does not occur. High-quality healthcare in Hungary is often privatized, as strong profits have made healthcare a lucrative business opportunity for Fidesz oligarchs. Consequently, high-quality healthcare in Hungary is available if it is financed privately. The state-directed healthcare system is becoming increasingly complementary.
Citations:
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 2023. “Hungary: Country Health Profile 2023, State of Health in the EU.” Paris: OECD Publishing/Brussels: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/2023_chp_hu_english.pdf
Welk, G. J., Saint-Maurice, P. F., and Csányi, T. 2015. “Health-related Physical Fitness in Hungarian Youth: Age, Sex and Regional Profiles.” Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 86(sup1): S45-S57.
To what extent does current health policy hinder or facilitate equitable access to high-quality healthcare?
10
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9
Health policies are fully aligned with the goal of achieving equitable access to high-quality healthcare.
8
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Health policies are largely aligned with the goal of achieving equitable access to high-quality healthcare.
5
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Health policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of achieving equitable access to high-quality healthcare.
2
1
1
Health policies are not at all aligned with the goal of achieving equitable access to high-quality healthcare.
The share of Hungarians reporting unmet needs for medical examinations was surprisingly low, below the EU average in 2022. The difference in self-reported unmet health needs between high-income and low-income groups in Hungary was much smaller than the EU average in 2022. However, these numbers can be misleading as essential services are provided to everyone in an acceptable timeframe. Nevertheless, long waiting lists exist for certain nonessential surgeries. Approximately 40,000 people are registered on waiting lists for specific surgeries, with cataract, knee and hip surgeries being the most requested. The average waiting time for a knee replacement surgery in 2023 reached 230 days (Szopkó 2023). Specialized treatment is often outsourced to private providers, where income disparity significantly impacts access. Moreover, certain services, such as urgent care, are unavailable under private schemes.
Issues related to gender gaps or ethnicity-based disparities in essential services are not present. Services are accessible across the entire country, but many small hospitals in rural areas are maintained despite being unprofitable. Public opinion hinders substantial reform efforts. The Hungarian population is aging fast, and the health status of older people is poor. A significant number of older Hungarians live with chronic conditions and disabilities, and the rates of multimorbidity and limitations in daily life are among the highest in the EU (OECD European Observer 2023:6).
Citations:
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 2023. Hungary: Country Health Profile 2023. Paris: OECD Publishing/Brussels: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/2023_chp_hu_english.pdf
Szopkó, Z. 2023. “Some patients wait almost a year for treatment – Hungarian hospital waiting lists in infographics.” Atlatszo.hu, April 20. https://english.atlatszo.hu/2023/04/20/some-patients-wait-almost-a-year-for-treatment-hungarian-hospital-waiting-lists-in-infographics/
Issues related to gender gaps or ethnicity-based disparities in essential services are not present. Services are accessible across the entire country, but many small hospitals in rural areas are maintained despite being unprofitable. Public opinion hinders substantial reform efforts. The Hungarian population is aging fast, and the health status of older people is poor. A significant number of older Hungarians live with chronic conditions and disabilities, and the rates of multimorbidity and limitations in daily life are among the highest in the EU (OECD European Observer 2023:6).
Citations:
OECD/European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. 2023. Hungary: Country Health Profile 2023. Paris: OECD Publishing/Brussels: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies. https://health.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-12/2023_chp_hu_english.pdf
Szopkó, Z. 2023. “Some patients wait almost a year for treatment – Hungarian hospital waiting lists in infographics.” Atlatszo.hu, April 20. https://english.atlatszo.hu/2023/04/20/some-patients-wait-almost-a-year-for-treatment-hungarian-hospital-waiting-lists-in-infographics/
Graph View
How committed is the government to ensuring gender equality in all respects?
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9
9
The government is clearly committed to the goal of ensuring gender equality.
8
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6
7
6
The government is largely committed to the goal of ensuring gender equality.
5
4
3
4
3
The government is only somewhat committed to the goal of ensuring gender equality.
2
1
1
The government is not at all committed to the goal of ensuring gender equality.
Hungary’s approach to gender equality has been complex and contentious. Despite some progress, Hungary continues to face significant challenges and criticisms regarding gender equality. One of the primary concerns is the underrepresentation of women in politics and, to a lesser extent, corporate leadership circles. In Hungary, women’s representation in political leadership positions remains notably low compared to other European Union countries, even though the country had a female president until she was forced to step down in February 2024 and was replaced by a male. None of the 16 government members in the Orbán V cabinet is female.
Hungary ranks next to last among OECD countries regarding the number of female members of parliament. This disparity is also evident in the corporate sector, where female leadership is limited. Reports indicate that women hold a significantly smaller percentage of managerial and decision-making roles than men. However, the gender disparity in the corporate sector is not as pronounced as in politics. Hungary’s society appears to be more modern than its government. In terms of wage equality, Hungary shows a pronounced gender pay gap, which is strongest in higher-paying sectors and senior positions. The government’s efforts to address wage inequality are inadequate and lack effective enforcement mechanisms. Women earn substantially less than their male counterparts for equivalent work, with Hungary ranking 17th among all 30 SGI countries in terms of gender pay gaps, as measured by the OECD. However, this gender pay gap does not extend to a pension gap. The Hungarian pension system supports mothers and protects them to a certain extent from poverty induced by low pensions.
Hungary performs relatively well in other indicators such as differences in the poverty rate between women and men, the unmet need for medical help, early leavers from education or training, and the social exclusion rate. Societal attitudes in Hungary often emphasize traditional gender roles, and government policies have been reinforcing these norms rather than challenging them. For example, certain family policies and public narratives emphasize women’s roles as mothers and caregivers (Fodor 2022), contributing to the perpetuation of gender stereotypes and limiting women’s opportunities in other spheres. Hungary needs more robust legal and policy frameworks to combat gender-based violence and discrimination. Although laws are in place, their implementation and the support systems for victims are often insufficient. While there are policies aimed at improving gender equality, Hungary’s approach is often inconsistent with international standards and fails to address the systemic nature of gender inequality fully. If there is policy action, it is generally driven by factors stemming from global or European commitments.
The regulatory framework is based on Act CXXV of 2003 on Equal Treatment and the Promotion of Equal Opportunities. Gender mainstreaming efforts in Hungary are promoted through the National Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality and the Empowering Women in the Family and Society Action Plan. Sectoral efforts are also underway. In the National Strategy for Research, Development, and Innovation (RDI) (2021 – 2030) (Government Decree 1456/2021 VII. 13.), for instance, gender equality is targeted as one of six horizontal objectives. The country receives a score of 54.2 out of 100 in the Gender Equality Index, but with significant differences between the 24.8 points awarded in the category of power and the 87.3 points in health (European Institute for Gender Equality 2022).
Compared to other nations, Hungary ranks 25th out of 27 in the index (26th place out of 27 countries in 2023), showing only minimal improvement over the last decade. Highlighting these deficiencies, the Hungarian parliament’s refusal to ratify the Istanbul Convention (Nagy 2020) – a legally binding international instrument for preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence – further emphasizes the issue. The parliament cited existing Hungarian legal protections for women in its refusal. This move represents another attempt by the government to diminish the influence of international organizations on domestic politics.
Citations:
European Institute for Gender Equality. 2022. “Gender Equality Index 2022, Hungary.” https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2022/HU
Fodor, E. 2022. “More Babies for the State: The ‘Carefare’ Regime of Anti-Liberal Hungary.” New Labor Forum 31 (1): 34-41.
Nagy, A. 2020. “The Non-Ratification of the Istanbul Convention–Gender Inequality in Hungary.” V4 Human Rights Review 2(3): 19-22.
Hungary ranks next to last among OECD countries regarding the number of female members of parliament. This disparity is also evident in the corporate sector, where female leadership is limited. Reports indicate that women hold a significantly smaller percentage of managerial and decision-making roles than men. However, the gender disparity in the corporate sector is not as pronounced as in politics. Hungary’s society appears to be more modern than its government. In terms of wage equality, Hungary shows a pronounced gender pay gap, which is strongest in higher-paying sectors and senior positions. The government’s efforts to address wage inequality are inadequate and lack effective enforcement mechanisms. Women earn substantially less than their male counterparts for equivalent work, with Hungary ranking 17th among all 30 SGI countries in terms of gender pay gaps, as measured by the OECD. However, this gender pay gap does not extend to a pension gap. The Hungarian pension system supports mothers and protects them to a certain extent from poverty induced by low pensions.
Hungary performs relatively well in other indicators such as differences in the poverty rate between women and men, the unmet need for medical help, early leavers from education or training, and the social exclusion rate. Societal attitudes in Hungary often emphasize traditional gender roles, and government policies have been reinforcing these norms rather than challenging them. For example, certain family policies and public narratives emphasize women’s roles as mothers and caregivers (Fodor 2022), contributing to the perpetuation of gender stereotypes and limiting women’s opportunities in other spheres. Hungary needs more robust legal and policy frameworks to combat gender-based violence and discrimination. Although laws are in place, their implementation and the support systems for victims are often insufficient. While there are policies aimed at improving gender equality, Hungary’s approach is often inconsistent with international standards and fails to address the systemic nature of gender inequality fully. If there is policy action, it is generally driven by factors stemming from global or European commitments.
The regulatory framework is based on Act CXXV of 2003 on Equal Treatment and the Promotion of Equal Opportunities. Gender mainstreaming efforts in Hungary are promoted through the National Strategy for the Promotion of Gender Equality and the Empowering Women in the Family and Society Action Plan. Sectoral efforts are also underway. In the National Strategy for Research, Development, and Innovation (RDI) (2021 – 2030) (Government Decree 1456/2021 VII. 13.), for instance, gender equality is targeted as one of six horizontal objectives. The country receives a score of 54.2 out of 100 in the Gender Equality Index, but with significant differences between the 24.8 points awarded in the category of power and the 87.3 points in health (European Institute for Gender Equality 2022).
Compared to other nations, Hungary ranks 25th out of 27 in the index (26th place out of 27 countries in 2023), showing only minimal improvement over the last decade. Highlighting these deficiencies, the Hungarian parliament’s refusal to ratify the Istanbul Convention (Nagy 2020) – a legally binding international instrument for preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence – further emphasizes the issue. The parliament cited existing Hungarian legal protections for women in its refusal. This move represents another attempt by the government to diminish the influence of international organizations on domestic politics.
Citations:
European Institute for Gender Equality. 2022. “Gender Equality Index 2022, Hungary.” https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2022/HU
Fodor, E. 2022. “More Babies for the State: The ‘Carefare’ Regime of Anti-Liberal Hungary.” New Labor Forum 31 (1): 34-41.
Nagy, A. 2020. “The Non-Ratification of the Istanbul Convention–Gender Inequality in Hungary.” V4 Human Rights Review 2(3): 19-22.
Graph View
To what extent does the current family policy approach support or hinder unpaid family care work?
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9
9
Family policies are fully aligned with the goal of creating the conditions for strong families.
8
7
6
7
6
Family policies are largely aligned with the goal of creating the conditions for strong families.
5
4
3
4
3
Family policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of creating the conditions for strong families.
2
1
1
Family policies are not at all aligned with the goal of creating family-friendly conditions.
The Orbán government has strongly emphasized family policy in a broad sense, spending 6.2% of GDP on this policy area, which is very high compared to international standards. Still, the government has done little to enable women to combine child care and careers. Most of the government’s measures have been financial, providing assistance to families purchasing real estate or larger cars for families with many children. By contrast, few measures – most notably one that allows grandparents to take “parental” leave – have helped young parents combine work and family duties. The background of these measures is a decline in the size of Hungary’s population and the government’s refusal to balance low birth rates and brain drain with immigration. So far, the measures have not stopped this trend, and have favored high-income families over poorer ones. Recent data show that family sizes have stabilized only within the highest income groups (Vida 2021).
Support for and protection of families has figured prominently in the Fidesz agenda for some time. After Katalin Novák, the former family minister without portfolio, ascended to the office of Hungarian president in 2022, her responsibilities were transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office. The Orbán government’s family policy has emphasized traditional Christian values and the primary role of women as caretakers, leading it to be labeled a “carefare regime” (Fodor 2021). The government has generated political hysteria around the perceived danger of gender issues for Hungarian families, particularly focusing on the alleged Western practice of gender-affirming surgeries on young children. The Orbán government has presented these controversies as a primary reason for its clash with the European Union over recovery funds. In Hungarian family policy, the illiberal narrative of the government is very present (Grzebalska and Pető 2018).
Interestingly, family policy is one of the priorities of the Hungarian presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2024. Domestically, Hungary announced a “family policy 2.0” initiative aimed at increasing childbirth rates and fostering home ownership among families, with a particular focus on mothers. One of the measures is tax exemptions for mothers with at least three children (previously: four).
Citations:
Vida, C. 2021. “Jövedelmi tizedek, avagy a hazai családpolitika hatásai a háztartások létszámának alakulására.” In: Magyar Közgazdasági Társaság, December 15. http://fejlodesgazdasagtan.hu/2021/12/15/jovedelmi-tizedek-avagy-a-hazai-csaladpolitika-hatasai-ahaztartasok-letszamanak-alakulasara/
Grzebalska, W., and A. Pető. 2018. “The Gendered Modus Operandi of the Illiberal Transformation in Hungary and Poland.” Women’s Studies International Forum 68: 164-172.
Fodor, E. 2021. “A Carefare Regime.” In: The Gender Regime of Anti-Liberal Hungary, 29-64. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Support for and protection of families has figured prominently in the Fidesz agenda for some time. After Katalin Novák, the former family minister without portfolio, ascended to the office of Hungarian president in 2022, her responsibilities were transferred to the Prime Minister’s Office. The Orbán government’s family policy has emphasized traditional Christian values and the primary role of women as caretakers, leading it to be labeled a “carefare regime” (Fodor 2021). The government has generated political hysteria around the perceived danger of gender issues for Hungarian families, particularly focusing on the alleged Western practice of gender-affirming surgeries on young children. The Orbán government has presented these controversies as a primary reason for its clash with the European Union over recovery funds. In Hungarian family policy, the illiberal narrative of the government is very present (Grzebalska and Pető 2018).
Interestingly, family policy is one of the priorities of the Hungarian presidency of the Council of the EU in the second half of 2024. Domestically, Hungary announced a “family policy 2.0” initiative aimed at increasing childbirth rates and fostering home ownership among families, with a particular focus on mothers. One of the measures is tax exemptions for mothers with at least three children (previously: four).
Citations:
Vida, C. 2021. “Jövedelmi tizedek, avagy a hazai családpolitika hatásai a háztartások létszámának alakulására.” In: Magyar Közgazdasági Társaság, December 15. http://fejlodesgazdasagtan.hu/2021/12/15/jovedelmi-tizedek-avagy-a-hazai-csaladpolitika-hatasai-ahaztartasok-letszamanak-alakulasara/
Grzebalska, W., and A. Pető. 2018. “The Gendered Modus Operandi of the Illiberal Transformation in Hungary and Poland.” Women’s Studies International Forum 68: 164-172.
Fodor, E. 2021. “A Carefare Regime.” In: The Gender Regime of Anti-Liberal Hungary, 29-64. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Graph View
To what extent does the current pension policy approach prevent poverty among senior citizens?
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9
9
Pension policies are fully aligned with the goal of preventing old-age poverty.
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7
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Pension policies are largely aligned with the goal of preventing old-age poverty.
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Pension policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of preventing old-age poverty.
2
1
1
Pension policies are not at all aligned with the goal of preventing old-age poverty.
Although international comparisons place Hungary relatively well regarding senior-citizen poverty rates, the reality is misleading. Even if the indicator assessing median equivalized disposable income with a cut-off point 50% ranks Hungary in the upper midfield at ninth place, the underlying conditions of low incomes, high prices and inflation indicate a high threat of poverty for pensioners. The average monthly pension is €539, which is insufficient given the economic conditions. Government policies have exacerbated the problem, necessitating reform.
Retirement entry ages in Hungary are currently 65 for men and 62 for women (OECD 2023). However, these ages are slated to increase to 65 for both genders. In 1997, Hungary introduced a three-pillar pension system following World Bank guidelines, featuring a mandatory, fully funded second pillar. Upon taking office, the second Orbán government abolished this second pillar and confiscated its assets. Additionally, it moved disability pensions to the social assistance scheme and eliminated certain early retirement options. While these measures have limited pension growth and undermined trust in pension policy reliability, they have improved the financial status of the public pension scheme. Public spending on pensions decreased from 11% of GDP in 2010 to 8% in 2020. The growing disparity between wage growth and pensions has left pensioners among the most disadvantaged groups. To mitigate electoral fallout, the government has introduced discretionary pension increases before elections. In 2020 – 2021, it gradually reintroduced the 13th-month pension, widely perceived as an election campaign strategy for the 2022 parliamentary elections (Gál 2020). In the election, Fidesz performed well among pensioners. In 2022, a somewhat larger-than-planned pension increase took place.
Citations:
OECD. 2023. “Pensions at a Glance.” https://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-pensions-at-a-glance-19991363.htm
Retirement entry ages in Hungary are currently 65 for men and 62 for women (OECD 2023). However, these ages are slated to increase to 65 for both genders. In 1997, Hungary introduced a three-pillar pension system following World Bank guidelines, featuring a mandatory, fully funded second pillar. Upon taking office, the second Orbán government abolished this second pillar and confiscated its assets. Additionally, it moved disability pensions to the social assistance scheme and eliminated certain early retirement options. While these measures have limited pension growth and undermined trust in pension policy reliability, they have improved the financial status of the public pension scheme. Public spending on pensions decreased from 11% of GDP in 2010 to 8% in 2020. The growing disparity between wage growth and pensions has left pensioners among the most disadvantaged groups. To mitigate electoral fallout, the government has introduced discretionary pension increases before elections. In 2020 – 2021, it gradually reintroduced the 13th-month pension, widely perceived as an election campaign strategy for the 2022 parliamentary elections (Gál 2020). In the election, Fidesz performed well among pensioners. In 2022, a somewhat larger-than-planned pension increase took place.
Citations:
OECD. 2023. “Pensions at a Glance.” https://www.oecd.org/publications/oecd-pensions-at-a-glance-19991363.htm
To what extent does the current pension policy approach hinder or promote intergenerational equity?
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9
9
Pension policies are fully aligned with the goal of achieving intergenerational equity.
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7
6
Pension policies are largely aligned with the goal of achieving intergenerational equity.
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3
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3
Pension policies are only somewhat aligned with the goal of achieving intergenerational equity.
2
1
1
Pension policies are not at all aligned with the goal of achieving intergenerational equity.
Hungary has an aging population, and older people are active supporters of the Fidesz party of Prime Minister Orbán. It is no surprise, therefore, that pensions play an essential role in the government’s social policy. The Hungarian pension system, primarily state-funded and operating on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, has faced several challenges and criticisms, particularly regarding its long-term sustainability and impact on intergenerational equity. One key aspect of the Hungarian pension system is its reliance on state funding, with private pension schemes playing a lesser role. The Hungarian government has committed to aligning pension increases with inflation rates. In 2023, pensions were raised by 15% to offset inflation, with the potential for additional supplementation if inflation exceeds expectations. This approach is part of the government’s broader strategy to maintain the purchasing power of pensions amidst economic fluctuations.
Despite these measures, there are critical predictions about the sustainability of the Hungarian pension system. Hungary needs more flexible retirement options, such as partial retirement for employees aged 62 – 66. This flexibility is required to address the growing strain on the pension system due to the aging population and a decreasing ratio of workers to pensioners. The aging demographic trend suggests that by 2070, the number of pensioners per employee could double from current levels.
Moreover, a noted decline in the average pension-to-income ratio indicates a potential decrease in the relative pension value over time. It is expected that the retirement age limit may increase in the coming years, aligning with rising life expectancy and efforts to address the gender gap in retirement age, which currently strongly favors women. Although working beyond the pension age is not specifically incentivized by the government, many healthcare and education professionals continue working to offset labor shortages after reaching the pension age. The average age of general practitioners in medical practice is well above 50 years (Papp et al. 2019).
Citations:
Papp, M., Kőrösi, L., Sándor, J., Nagy, C., Juhász, A., and Ádány, R. 2019. “Workforce Crisis in Primary Healthcare Worldwide: Hungarian Example in a Longitudinal Follow-up Study.” BMJ Open 9(7): e024957.
Despite these measures, there are critical predictions about the sustainability of the Hungarian pension system. Hungary needs more flexible retirement options, such as partial retirement for employees aged 62 – 66. This flexibility is required to address the growing strain on the pension system due to the aging population and a decreasing ratio of workers to pensioners. The aging demographic trend suggests that by 2070, the number of pensioners per employee could double from current levels.
Moreover, a noted decline in the average pension-to-income ratio indicates a potential decrease in the relative pension value over time. It is expected that the retirement age limit may increase in the coming years, aligning with rising life expectancy and efforts to address the gender gap in retirement age, which currently strongly favors women. Although working beyond the pension age is not specifically incentivized by the government, many healthcare and education professionals continue working to offset labor shortages after reaching the pension age. The average age of general practitioners in medical practice is well above 50 years (Papp et al. 2019).
Citations:
Papp, M., Kőrösi, L., Sándor, J., Nagy, C., Juhász, A., and Ádány, R. 2019. “Workforce Crisis in Primary Healthcare Worldwide: Hungarian Example in a Longitudinal Follow-up Study.” BMJ Open 9(7): e024957.
Graph View
To what extent does the current policy approach hinder or facilitate the inclusion of migrants into society and the labor market?
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Integration policies are fully aligned with achieving the sustainable inclusion of migrants in society.
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Integration policies are largely aligned with achieving the sustainable inclusion of migrants in society.
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Integration policies are only somewhat aligned with achieving the sustainable inclusion of migrants in society.
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1
Integration policies are not at all aligned with achieving the sustainable inclusion of migrants in society.
Migration is a highly controversial topic in Hungary. The government generally adopts an anti-migration stance, citing the need to protect the Hungarian nation and Christianity. This issue plays a central role in the illiberal narrative the government promotes. The migration of Hungarians from neighboring countries intensified after the democratic transition, and among non-European migrants, Asians are the dominant group. During the migration crisis in 2015, Hungary was a hard-liner against granting access to EU territory (Bocskor 2018). However, concerning Ukrainian refugees, Hungary’s approach is much more liberal. Generally, Hungary does not fulfill its international obligations in asylum policies. Nevertheless, it recognizes the need to counter labor market shortages with targeted and medium-term recruitment to address the ongoing brain drain and population decline. Surprisingly, migration to Hungary consists largely of highly educated workers. The ratio of foreign-born to native-born individuals with at least upper secondary attainment (25 – 64 years old) ranks third among OECD countries, right behind Canada and Israel. Additionally, the unemployment rate among the foreign-born population is substantially lower than among the native-born population, making unemployment among migrants in Hungary almost negligible.
Integration policies in Hungary are considered restrictive and less developed than in many other European countries. Funding for supporting migrants in Hungary primarily comes from European programs such as the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the European Social Fund. However, due to a partial suspension of the AMIF national program, the funding has been partially interrupted since 2018.
Hungary’s Migration Strategy for 2014 – 2020 focused on providing support services, legal assistance and representation in all phases of the asylum procedure, but failed to introduce a comprehensive integration program. A renewed strategy was not developed. A support system for beneficiaries of international protection and persons under subsidiary protection, established in 2014, was canceled during the migration crisis of 2016. Aid provided via civil society organizations is constrained by the Lex NGO, which criminalizes NGOs that help migrants. The Sovereignty Protection Act adopted in 2023 intensifies stigmatization. As a result, the implementation of migration policies is weak, as there is no real consultation mechanism. Overall, the Hungarian system distinguishes between asylum-seekers – for which the respective laws have been hardened several times, and recognition numbers are virtually zero (only 40 applications in 2022) (Eurostat 2024), ranking Hungary last among EU countries with regard to the number of first-time asylum applications – and migration into labor markets, for which the government is more proactive.
Citations:
Eurostat. 2004. “Annual Asylum Statistics.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics&oldid=558844
Bocskor, Á. 2018. “Anti-immigration Discourses in Hungary During the ‘Crisis’ Year: The Orbán Government’s ‘National Consultation’ Campaign of 2015.” Sociology 52(3): 551-568.
Integration policies in Hungary are considered restrictive and less developed than in many other European countries. Funding for supporting migrants in Hungary primarily comes from European programs such as the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the European Social Fund. However, due to a partial suspension of the AMIF national program, the funding has been partially interrupted since 2018.
Hungary’s Migration Strategy for 2014 – 2020 focused on providing support services, legal assistance and representation in all phases of the asylum procedure, but failed to introduce a comprehensive integration program. A renewed strategy was not developed. A support system for beneficiaries of international protection and persons under subsidiary protection, established in 2014, was canceled during the migration crisis of 2016. Aid provided via civil society organizations is constrained by the Lex NGO, which criminalizes NGOs that help migrants. The Sovereignty Protection Act adopted in 2023 intensifies stigmatization. As a result, the implementation of migration policies is weak, as there is no real consultation mechanism. Overall, the Hungarian system distinguishes between asylum-seekers – for which the respective laws have been hardened several times, and recognition numbers are virtually zero (only 40 applications in 2022) (Eurostat 2024), ranking Hungary last among EU countries with regard to the number of first-time asylum applications – and migration into labor markets, for which the government is more proactive.
Citations:
Eurostat. 2004. “Annual Asylum Statistics.” https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_statistics&oldid=558844
Bocskor, Á. 2018. “Anti-immigration Discourses in Hungary During the ‘Crisis’ Year: The Orbán Government’s ‘National Consultation’ Campaign of 2015.” Sociology 52(3): 551-568.
Graph View
How committed is the government to helping build the capacity to reduce poverty and provide social protection in low- and middle-income countries?
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9
The government’s development cooperation strategy is fully aligned with the goal of improving capacity-building for poverty reduction in low- and middle-income countries.
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The government’s development cooperation strategy is largely aligned with the goal of improving capacity-building for poverty reduction in low- and middle-income countries.
5
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3
4
3
The government’s development cooperation strategy is only somewhat aligned with the goal of improving capacity-building in poverty reduction in low- and middle-income countries.
2
1
1
The government’s development cooperation strategy is not all aligned with the goal of improving capacity-building for poverty reduction in low- and middle-income countries.
Hungary paid little attention to developing countries and joined the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee only in 2016. However, the government adopted a new development strategy in 2019.
The Hungarian government gradually increased its development assistance (ODA) until the COVID-19 pandemic. Since then, the curve has flattened. Development aid amounted to 0.28% of gross domestic income in 2022 ($428 million), less than the average for DAC countries but substantially above the share in 2010 (0.09%). Approximately 41.8% of total ODA was channeled through multilateral organizations, and 77% was supplied via the European Union. Although Hungarian development policy targets areas in the Middle East and Africa, the primary focus is on Europe, especially the Western Balkans and, recently, Ukraine. In 2022, $14.8 million went to aid Ukraine, making the country the biggest beneficiary. Beyond Europe, Syria, Vietnam, Jordan and Cabo Verde are the countries receiving the most funding. At the end of 2023, the Hungarian parliament approved sending 200 troops to Chad as part of a new mission (defence.hu 2023). The first OECD-DAC peer review (2023) acknowledges progress in Hungary’s contribution, especially in sustainable water management, one of Hungary’s development assistance priorities. Still, it also urged Hungary to reduce tensions between domestic and global objectives and called for institutional reform. A significant portion of the contribution is dedicated to scholarships, underscoring education as a central instrument and target. As project partners, particularly the Hungarian public sector, are involved, the share of NGOs as partners has been continuously reduced since 2019. This reduction pertains to the involvement of Hungarian CSOs, not CSOs in the targeted countries. Their involvement is growing. At the same time, the share devoted to public-private partnerships and the private sector is also increasing. These shifts in the program implementation landscape must be seen against the backdrop of the Hungarian government’s struggle with internationally financed CSOs and the Lex NGO, which has driven many CSOs away from state-directed programs. These developments are counterproductive for Hungarian development aid. Institutionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Department for Development Policy, staffed with around 150 civil servants, is responsible for brokering the policy. Since 2022, humanitarian assistance has also been institutionally located here. Implementing agencies are the Hungary Helps Agency and the Export-Import Bank. An interministerial coordination platform exists, but there is no consultation mechanism for stakeholders. Some consultations take place with the help of an umbrella body, the Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid. Here, reform and independent evaluations are needed.
Citations:
Hungarian Government. 2019. “A Magyar Kormány Nemzetközi Fejlesztési Együttműködési Stratégiáj a 2020 és 2025 közötti időszakra NEFE2025.” Budapest https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/7/8d/82000/NEFE2025%20-%20Strat%C3%A9gia.pdf
OECD. 2024. “Development Co-operation Profiles – Hungary.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/a80b014d-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/a80b014d-en
defence.hu. 2023. “Parliament approves sending of Hungarian military mission to Chad.” https://defence.hu/news/parliament-approves-sending-of-hungarian-military-mission-to-chad.html
The Hungarian government gradually increased its development assistance (ODA) until the COVID-19 pandemic. Since then, the curve has flattened. Development aid amounted to 0.28% of gross domestic income in 2022 ($428 million), less than the average for DAC countries but substantially above the share in 2010 (0.09%). Approximately 41.8% of total ODA was channeled through multilateral organizations, and 77% was supplied via the European Union. Although Hungarian development policy targets areas in the Middle East and Africa, the primary focus is on Europe, especially the Western Balkans and, recently, Ukraine. In 2022, $14.8 million went to aid Ukraine, making the country the biggest beneficiary. Beyond Europe, Syria, Vietnam, Jordan and Cabo Verde are the countries receiving the most funding. At the end of 2023, the Hungarian parliament approved sending 200 troops to Chad as part of a new mission (defence.hu 2023). The first OECD-DAC peer review (2023) acknowledges progress in Hungary’s contribution, especially in sustainable water management, one of Hungary’s development assistance priorities. Still, it also urged Hungary to reduce tensions between domestic and global objectives and called for institutional reform. A significant portion of the contribution is dedicated to scholarships, underscoring education as a central instrument and target. As project partners, particularly the Hungarian public sector, are involved, the share of NGOs as partners has been continuously reduced since 2019. This reduction pertains to the involvement of Hungarian CSOs, not CSOs in the targeted countries. Their involvement is growing. At the same time, the share devoted to public-private partnerships and the private sector is also increasing. These shifts in the program implementation landscape must be seen against the backdrop of the Hungarian government’s struggle with internationally financed CSOs and the Lex NGO, which has driven many CSOs away from state-directed programs. These developments are counterproductive for Hungarian development aid. Institutionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Department for Development Policy, staffed with around 150 civil servants, is responsible for brokering the policy. Since 2022, humanitarian assistance has also been institutionally located here. Implementing agencies are the Hungary Helps Agency and the Export-Import Bank. An interministerial coordination platform exists, but there is no consultation mechanism for stakeholders. Some consultations take place with the help of an umbrella body, the Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid. Here, reform and independent evaluations are needed.
Citations:
Hungarian Government. 2019. “A Magyar Kormány Nemzetközi Fejlesztési Együttműködési Stratégiáj a 2020 és 2025 közötti időszakra NEFE2025.” Budapest https://nefe.kormany.hu/download/7/8d/82000/NEFE2025%20-%20Strat%C3%A9gia.pdf
OECD. 2024. “Development Co-operation Profiles – Hungary.” https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/a80b014d-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/a80b014d-en
defence.hu. 2023. “Parliament approves sending of Hungarian military mission to Chad.” https://defence.hu/news/parliament-approves-sending-of-hungarian-military-mission-to-chad.html