Vertical Accountability
#30Key Findings
Hungary is the SGI 2024’s lowest scorer (rank 30) in the area of vertical accountability.
Under the Orbán governments (2010-2024), Hungary has transitioned into an electoral autocracy. Elections are typically free but not fair, with the ruling Fidesz party benefiting from large-scale gerrymandering, asymmetrical media access and the misuse of state assets.
Nontransparent campaign funding favors the governing party. Media organizations are openly biased toward Fidesz. The electoral system’s tendency to produce large majorities has allowed Fidesz to change legal norms in its favor. Opposition parties are ideologically and organizationally fragmented.
Economic control by Fidesz and its affiliates creates a form of reverse state capture in which the government steers economic interests. Fidesz’ overwhelming majority has made cross-party cooperation or consultation largely unnecessary. Operating with a continuously maintained state of emergency, the government threatens democratic values.
Under the Orbán governments (2010-2024), Hungary has transitioned into an electoral autocracy. Elections are typically free but not fair, with the ruling Fidesz party benefiting from large-scale gerrymandering, asymmetrical media access and the misuse of state assets.
Nontransparent campaign funding favors the governing party. Media organizations are openly biased toward Fidesz. The electoral system’s tendency to produce large majorities has allowed Fidesz to change legal norms in its favor. Opposition parties are ideologically and organizationally fragmented.
Economic control by Fidesz and its affiliates creates a form of reverse state capture in which the government steers economic interests. Fidesz’ overwhelming majority has made cross-party cooperation or consultation largely unnecessary. Operating with a continuously maintained state of emergency, the government threatens democratic values.
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To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
During the years of the successive Orbán governments (2010 – 2024), the political system in Hungary shifted toward an illiberal regime. Hungary is considered an electoral autocracy, where even the minimum standards of a fully-fledged democracy, such as free and fair elections, are flawed. Legally, there are few obstacles for candidates wishing to run for election and for voters wishing to vote. However, fair political competition is hindered by asymmetrical access to resources such as campaign funds and media access. The primary issue is not campaigning via new media, but rather government control over old media. Moreover, the governing party allocates more resources to buying social media advertisements, which are loosely regulated. In the state-owned or state-controlled media, opposition candidates do not benefit from the same amount of additional airtime as government candidates, despite a guaranteed minimum airtime quota of five minutes for all candidates (Bátorfy et al. 2021). “Journalists” and moderators are often openly biased toward Fidesz. The lack of transparency with regard to donations to candidates and parties is a weak point in electoral law, and has been criticized by the OECD since 2018. Opposition candidates have limited access to traditional Hungarian media due to state dominance over public TV, radio and large parts of the print media. As a result, opposition candidates often have to rely on social media for their campaigns, making it challenging to reach the elderly and less-educated populations.
Election results show that government candidates perform the strongest. Large-scale gerrymandering has been allowed within the terms of the electoral law. The new mixed system of first-past-the-post elements in constituencies and proportional representation in party lists clearly favors the government side, which usually wins almost all constituencies outside Budapest. Consequently, the popular vote won clearly by Fidesz in 2022 often gets blurred, allowing the government to secure a two-thirds majority with half of the votes. The picture is much more balanced in local and European elections, which have stronger proportional leanings.
Citations:
Bátorfy, A., Bleyer-Simon, K., Szabó, K., and Galambosi, E. 2022. “Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Hungary.” Florence: European University Institute.
Election results show that government candidates perform the strongest. Large-scale gerrymandering has been allowed within the terms of the electoral law. The new mixed system of first-past-the-post elements in constituencies and proportional representation in party lists clearly favors the government side, which usually wins almost all constituencies outside Budapest. Consequently, the popular vote won clearly by Fidesz in 2022 often gets blurred, allowing the government to secure a two-thirds majority with half of the votes. The picture is much more balanced in local and European elections, which have stronger proportional leanings.
Citations:
Bátorfy, A., Bleyer-Simon, K., Szabó, K., and Galambosi, E. 2022. “Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era: Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, Albania, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey in the Year 2021. Country Report: Hungary.” Florence: European University Institute.
To what extent can all citizens, both in legal terms (de jure) and in practice (de facto), exercise their right to vote?
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There are no significant barriers, by law or in practice, that hinder citizens or specific groups in society from exercising their right to vote.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles that substantially hinder voting.
Voting rights in Hungary are granted to nearly the entire population of Hungarians, including those living abroad. The voter registry generally meets democratic standards. Elections are held at national, regional, local and European levels in an orderly fashion. While elections are usually free and properly administered, they are far from fair.
The electoral law distinguishes between diaspora citizens without a Hungarian residence and Hungarian citizens temporarily living abroad with a registered address in Hungary. The former group, mainly ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, Slovakia and neighboring countries, can vote by mail (Tóka 2019). However, mail-in ballots are not available to Hungarians who study or work abroad; they must travel to capital cities and endure long queues at embassies to cast their votes. This discrepancy creates inequality in access. Additionally, the mail ballot system is vulnerable to fraud due to lenient identification protocols and delays in updating the voter registry (see, e.g., Bozzay 2022). The electoral law has undergone frequent and sometimes radical, changes and gerrymandering has occurred to the ruling Fidesz party’s advantage. De jure, the voting process is administered professionally, but, as noted in the relevant election observation report by the OECD, it does not take place on a level playing field. A lack of transparency in campaign funding, for instance with regard to weak regulation of campaign finance disclosure, asymmetrical access to media outlets favoring government-allied candidates and the misuse of state funds for campaigning, have made it difficult for opposition parties and candidates to match the resources of those running on behalf of Fidesz or the allied Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP).
Additionally, opposition politicians have often been subject to smear campaigns initiated via the government’s misuse of state assets. These structural disadvantages were only partially countered by the opposition through the coverage of the party’s internal primaries, held in autumn 2021. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 2022, the imbalance between the government and the opposition concerning campaign funding, access to media outlets and organizational capacity became evident.
Against this background, it is unsurprising that Fidesz secured a two-thirds majority with 135 seats out of 199. Fidesz won the popular vote by a large margin of 54.13%. The United Opposition grouping could not replicate the success of the last local elections, in which they were on par with the government.
In addition to the two major political formations, a new party, Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland), secured six seats despite the government’s amendments to the electoral law in 2020. The amendment increased the requirement for a party to run nationally from presenting 27 constituency candidates in at least nine counties to 71 candidates in at least 14 counties. An exception to this rule is granted for ethnic minority representations, and the German minority representative won one seat in the elections.
Citations:
Tóka, G. 2019. “The 2018 Hungarian National Elections.” Social Report 314-340.
Bozzay, B. 2022. “Thrown Out Hungarian Mail-In Ballots Found Near Târgu Mureș, Romania.” Telex.hu, March 31. https://telex.hu/english/2022/03/31/thrown-out-hungarian-mail-in-ballots-found-near-targu-mures-romania
The electoral law distinguishes between diaspora citizens without a Hungarian residence and Hungarian citizens temporarily living abroad with a registered address in Hungary. The former group, mainly ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, Slovakia and neighboring countries, can vote by mail (Tóka 2019). However, mail-in ballots are not available to Hungarians who study or work abroad; they must travel to capital cities and endure long queues at embassies to cast their votes. This discrepancy creates inequality in access. Additionally, the mail ballot system is vulnerable to fraud due to lenient identification protocols and delays in updating the voter registry (see, e.g., Bozzay 2022). The electoral law has undergone frequent and sometimes radical, changes and gerrymandering has occurred to the ruling Fidesz party’s advantage. De jure, the voting process is administered professionally, but, as noted in the relevant election observation report by the OECD, it does not take place on a level playing field. A lack of transparency in campaign funding, for instance with regard to weak regulation of campaign finance disclosure, asymmetrical access to media outlets favoring government-allied candidates and the misuse of state funds for campaigning, have made it difficult for opposition parties and candidates to match the resources of those running on behalf of Fidesz or the allied Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP).
Additionally, opposition politicians have often been subject to smear campaigns initiated via the government’s misuse of state assets. These structural disadvantages were only partially countered by the opposition through the coverage of the party’s internal primaries, held in autumn 2021. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 2022, the imbalance between the government and the opposition concerning campaign funding, access to media outlets and organizational capacity became evident.
Against this background, it is unsurprising that Fidesz secured a two-thirds majority with 135 seats out of 199. Fidesz won the popular vote by a large margin of 54.13%. The United Opposition grouping could not replicate the success of the last local elections, in which they were on par with the government.
In addition to the two major political formations, a new party, Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland), secured six seats despite the government’s amendments to the electoral law in 2020. The amendment increased the requirement for a party to run nationally from presenting 27 constituency candidates in at least nine counties to 71 candidates in at least 14 counties. An exception to this rule is granted for ethnic minority representations, and the German minority representative won one seat in the elections.
Citations:
Tóka, G. 2019. “The 2018 Hungarian National Elections.” Social Report 314-340.
Bozzay, B. 2022. “Thrown Out Hungarian Mail-In Ballots Found Near Târgu Mureș, Romania.” Telex.hu, March 31. https://telex.hu/english/2022/03/31/thrown-out-hungarian-mail-in-ballots-found-near-targu-mures-romania
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To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
The Hungarian electoral system produces distorting effects. The mixed system, with a strong first-past-the-post element, generally produces large majorities; two-thirds majorities are more the rule than the exception. This has opened the door for the ruling party – for many years Fidesz under Prime Minister Orbán – to establish tailor-made legal norms. As a result, the already-deep rift in society deepens, as parties outside the two organized camps have few opportunities to be represented in parliament. Moreover, the opposition bloc is ideologically and organizationally fragmented. However, the electoral system favors the existence of two blocs of similar size. As a result, opposition parties face significant coordination challenges in finding a strategy compatible with the electoral system and the ability to represent their voters. Few newcomers successfully pass the electoral threshold (5% of the popular vote). For example, the far-right Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) secured some seats as a nonaligned party in the 2022 elections. Most parties feature local and regional bodies, though few establish a strong local presence due to low membership figures and insufficient state funding (Susánszky et al. 2020). Local party chapters are often organized alongside election constituencies. Some parties, especially among the opposition, have difficulties organizing themselves in rural areas, as their programs address urban centers more than those of Fidesz. This weakness is an essential factor in the inability of the opposition to score well outside Budapest. Still, in local and regional elections, this weakness appears to be smaller, as the distorting effects of the national electoral system are absent here, and the number of independent mayors is traditionally relatively high. In the government camp, decision-making is highly centralized, and there is little room for regional interests due to the dominance of top-down political communication. The power of the mayors was diminished a long time ago by the Fidesz government by preventing individuals from simultaneously holding a mayoral position and a mandate in parliament. Most Hungarian parties perceive themselves as catchall parties. However, the discourse on policy is hardly visible. Instead, parties’ rhetoric follows a perpetual clash between different worldviews, especially aligned around cosmopolitan versus national views. As a result, parties compete with each other less over political solutions and more with regard to a cultural clash between identity issues such as migration or sexuality (LGBTQ+). In this standoff of “hipsters” versus “rednecks,” parties remain programmatically vague, and major interests are not explicitly represented in the political discourse. The government counters many opposition attempts to address particular issues and problems with an avalanche of populism and disinformation. The latest example is the “discourse” relating to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Clientelism, in a classical sense, is not strong in Hungary, partly because economic interests are not only steered but also owned by the central core of Fidesz and party members’ wider families. The pattern is not clientelism, in which economic interests steer the government, but rather the government steering economic interests, also referred to as “reverse state capture” (Bozóki and Hegedüs 2018). Societal interests beyond the government-economic complex are generally underrepresented. The publicly articulated anger of healthcare system or education-sector employees demonstrates that the government neglects such central interests. Not surprisingly, party manifestos, although publicly accessible, provide little enlightenment about the parties’ policy preferences, and are instead used to consolidate political camps by stressing the issues that create rifts between the camps. Certain sizable minorities, such as the Roma community, do not have effective representation through political parties, and their associations are routinely co-opted by major political parties, most recently by Fidesz.
Citations:
Bozóki, A., and D. Hegedűs. 2018. “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union.” Democratization 25(7): 1173-1189.
Susánszky, P., Unger, A., and Kopper, Á. 2020. “Hungary’s Over-Powerful Government Party and the Desperate Opposition.” European Review 28(5): 761-777.
Citations:
Bozóki, A., and D. Hegedűs. 2018. “An Externally Constrained Hybrid Regime: Hungary in the European Union.” Democratization 25(7): 1173-1189.
Susánszky, P., Unger, A., and Kopper, Á. 2020. “Hungary’s Over-Powerful Government Party and the Desperate Opposition.” European Review 28(5): 761-777.
To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
There are significant differences between government and opposition parties regarding liberal democratic values. Hungary exhibits many features of an autocracy. Explicitly and outspokenly, Prime Minister Orbán advocates what he calls illiberal democracy – a contradiction in terms. By changing the rules of the democratic game with the help of a two-thirds majority in parliament, frequent constitutional amendments and a continuously maintained state of emergency, the government secures an unchallenged advantage over the opposition. The government is not advancing democratic values, but is threatening them. In a highly polarized environment, the opposition – with the possible exception of the newly formed rightist party Mi Hazánk Mozgalom (Our Homeland), which has an undemocratic core and pushes a strongly nationalistic and othering discourse – aims to restore democracy. Against this background, cooperation between the camps is technically unnecessary due to the overwhelming Fidesz majority, and is not sought by the government. Consensual voting and cross-camp consultations are extremely rare.
Parliamentary committees in Hungary operate with a substantial Fidesz majority, rendering the efforts of opposition legislators almost meaningless. Calls to boycott parliament routinely emerge among opposition parties and intellectuals, but no large-scale abstention has occurred so far. The government majority pushes illiberal and anti-democratic policies, and the intense fusion of government and parliamentary majority results in state capture, severely limiting the ability to fight undemocratic tendencies.
The role of the opposition parties is to highlight disruptions of democracy and present policy alternatives. However, they cannot advance their agenda through parliament, as the government majority controls agenda-setting and voting procedures. Consequently, the opposition is relegated to civil society and street-level activism, where it faces face severe government countermeasures and suffers from organizational shortcomings. Cooperation within the opposition has improved over the past decade despite substantial ideological differences ranging from the left to the right. The electoral system, with strong majoritarian components, enforces this cooperation. Only candidates supported by a united opposition can successfully challenge Fidesz-KDNP candidates, particularly in urban centers like Budapest and Szeged. The process of opposition primaries, established during the run-up to the 2022 elections, fostered cooperation and made the movement more visible to the public. The somewhat surprising election of a conservative candidate, Péter Márky-Zay, as the prime ministerial candidate highlighted this cooperation. However, this did not translate into electoral success; even Márky-Zay lost his constituency to a Fidesz grandee.
The electoral defeat of the broad opposition coalition in 2022 has brought this strategy into question, making cooperation between opposition parties and the organization of primaries increasingly unlikely and difficult ahead of the 2024 municipal and European Parliament elections.
Parliamentary committees in Hungary operate with a substantial Fidesz majority, rendering the efforts of opposition legislators almost meaningless. Calls to boycott parliament routinely emerge among opposition parties and intellectuals, but no large-scale abstention has occurred so far. The government majority pushes illiberal and anti-democratic policies, and the intense fusion of government and parliamentary majority results in state capture, severely limiting the ability to fight undemocratic tendencies.
The role of the opposition parties is to highlight disruptions of democracy and present policy alternatives. However, they cannot advance their agenda through parliament, as the government majority controls agenda-setting and voting procedures. Consequently, the opposition is relegated to civil society and street-level activism, where it faces face severe government countermeasures and suffers from organizational shortcomings. Cooperation within the opposition has improved over the past decade despite substantial ideological differences ranging from the left to the right. The electoral system, with strong majoritarian components, enforces this cooperation. Only candidates supported by a united opposition can successfully challenge Fidesz-KDNP candidates, particularly in urban centers like Budapest and Szeged. The process of opposition primaries, established during the run-up to the 2022 elections, fostered cooperation and made the movement more visible to the public. The somewhat surprising election of a conservative candidate, Péter Márky-Zay, as the prime ministerial candidate highlighted this cooperation. However, this did not translate into electoral success; even Márky-Zay lost his constituency to a Fidesz grandee.
The electoral defeat of the broad opposition coalition in 2022 has brought this strategy into question, making cooperation between opposition parties and the organization of primaries increasingly unlikely and difficult ahead of the 2024 municipal and European Parliament elections.
Graph View
To what extent can citizens and residents access official information?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose many/various significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
While existing law, especially the constitution, provides for far-reaching access to government information, the Orbán governments have made it increasingly difficult for the public and the media to obtain such information. The amendments to the Freedom of Information Act (autumn 2022) were meant to speed up litigation, but still include barriers to quick handling of cases, such as secrecy. Formally, the public has access to information, but in practice, there are severe limitations. The government and the democratic opposition have constantly fought over access to government data and documents, and many of these cases have gone to court, triggered by complaints from parties or civil society. For example, the European Court of Human Rights ruled against the Hungarian government in a case involving Index.hu, an online newspaper, and Hungarian President János Áder. Information on public procurement has been especially contested, as there is a clear link to corruption within government ranks. Even though watchdog and media organizations such as Transparency International Hungary and K-Monitor have created several online databases to make procurement data more transparent, they routinely encounter obstacles in identifying final beneficiary owners (FBOs) due to the secrecy of wealth management funds.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, access to information was limited, and laws were established that allegedly aimed at preventing the spread of disinformation, but in essence served to secure the government’s grip on political discourse. The state of emergency has been prolonged ever since, and many restrictions rooted in the pandemic have been upheld. The establishment of an office for the protection of sovereignty, a process currently underway, may serve as yet another institutional safeguard for furthering the government’s discursive agenda and as an instrument to restrict the opposition and civil society’s presentation of alternative opinions. Several other institutions meant to be independent of the government, such as the State Audit Office and the Ombudsman Office, do not live up to the promise of independence. Ever since the government secured a two-thirds parliamentary majority and controlled the spread of information via parliamentary scrutiny, barriers to accessing information have grown. The public’s information rights are seriously curtailed, a problem exacerbated by the fact that key government officials, including the prime minister, refuse to give interviews to independent media outlets, and only disclose information through pro-government media or top-down press conferences and media releases. The government has also attempted to misuse the whistleblower protections to allow denunciation of sexual practices, with such efforts aimed at the LGBTQ+ communities. Public consultations on specific policies are rarely held, and the government organizes fake “national consultations” featuring dubious questions to garner support for government action (Bátory and Svennson 2019, Mikola 2023, Pócza and Oross 2022). It remains to be seen how the upcoming digitalization act will influence the spread of information from the government to citizens. Undoubtedly, access to relevant administrative units will become easier, but that does not necessarily mean those administrators will provide more information than before.
Citations:
Bátory, A., and S. Svensson. 2019. “The Use and Abuse of Participatory Governance by Populist Governments.” Policy & Politics 47(2): 227-244.
Mikola, B. 2023. “Fabricating Public Support for Illiberal Policies: The Case of ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary.” Paper presented at the IPSA Conference, July 15-19, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Pócza, K., and D. Oross. 2022. “From Deliberation to Pure Mobilisation? The Case of National Consultations in Hungary.” Politics in Central Europe 18(1): 79-109.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, access to information was limited, and laws were established that allegedly aimed at preventing the spread of disinformation, but in essence served to secure the government’s grip on political discourse. The state of emergency has been prolonged ever since, and many restrictions rooted in the pandemic have been upheld. The establishment of an office for the protection of sovereignty, a process currently underway, may serve as yet another institutional safeguard for furthering the government’s discursive agenda and as an instrument to restrict the opposition and civil society’s presentation of alternative opinions. Several other institutions meant to be independent of the government, such as the State Audit Office and the Ombudsman Office, do not live up to the promise of independence. Ever since the government secured a two-thirds parliamentary majority and controlled the spread of information via parliamentary scrutiny, barriers to accessing information have grown. The public’s information rights are seriously curtailed, a problem exacerbated by the fact that key government officials, including the prime minister, refuse to give interviews to independent media outlets, and only disclose information through pro-government media or top-down press conferences and media releases. The government has also attempted to misuse the whistleblower protections to allow denunciation of sexual practices, with such efforts aimed at the LGBTQ+ communities. Public consultations on specific policies are rarely held, and the government organizes fake “national consultations” featuring dubious questions to garner support for government action (Bátory and Svennson 2019, Mikola 2023, Pócza and Oross 2022). It remains to be seen how the upcoming digitalization act will influence the spread of information from the government to citizens. Undoubtedly, access to relevant administrative units will become easier, but that does not necessarily mean those administrators will provide more information than before.
Citations:
Bátory, A., and S. Svensson. 2019. “The Use and Abuse of Participatory Governance by Populist Governments.” Policy & Politics 47(2): 227-244.
Mikola, B. 2023. “Fabricating Public Support for Illiberal Policies: The Case of ‘National Consultations’ in Hungary.” Paper presented at the IPSA Conference, July 15-19, Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Pócza, K., and D. Oross. 2022. “From Deliberation to Pure Mobilisation? The Case of National Consultations in Hungary.” Politics in Central Europe 18(1): 79-109.