Diagonal Accountability
#15Key Findings
Ireland falls into the middle ranks internationally (rank 15) in the area of diagonal accountability.
The media in Ireland operates independently, largely free from government influence. The publicly owned media are regulated to ensure independence, but concentration is a concern in the private media sector. The government does not censor the media, but a recently passed hate crimes law has introduced some limitations on free speech.
Political and civic groups operate without state interference. Intimidation by far-right forces is a growing factor. A past model of social partnership, in which governments worked closely with civil society organizations, has been weakened in recent years. Groups representing capital and labor have sophisticated abilities to draft policies and regularly consult with the government.
Social welfare and environmental groups exert pressure on the government through a mix of protests, advocacy and policy consultations.
The media in Ireland operates independently, largely free from government influence. The publicly owned media are regulated to ensure independence, but concentration is a concern in the private media sector. The government does not censor the media, but a recently passed hate crimes law has introduced some limitations on free speech.
Political and civic groups operate without state interference. Intimidation by far-right forces is a growing factor. A past model of social partnership, in which governments worked closely with civil society organizations, has been weakened in recent years. Groups representing capital and labor have sophisticated abilities to draft policies and regularly consult with the government.
Social welfare and environmental groups exert pressure on the government through a mix of protests, advocacy and policy consultations.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
10
9
9
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
2
1
1
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
The media in Ireland is largely free from government influence and able to operate independently. Media freedom is guaranteed through the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland (BAI), established on October 1, 2009, and renamed the Media Commission in 2023. Regulations governing publicly owned media ensure relative independence from government influence and political interference. Licensing and regulatory systems for privately owned media also promote independence, though ongoing debates persist about two major concerns: funding for public broadcasting and monopoly ownership in the private media sector. Economics heavily dominates public discourse in Ireland, influenced by neoclassical preferences for economic growth and free markets. Legal regulations do not hinder independent media from reporting freely, and there are restrictions on wiretapping and protections for whistleblowers, with no new regulations enacted between 2022 and 2024.
Regulations concerning the impact of “fake news” on media reporting are complex, especially given Ireland’s role as a major EU regulator for international MNC-owned social media, which is also bound by international directives, political dynamics and practical imperatives. Government or public officials do not censor digital, print or broadcast media. However, the forthcoming Hate Crimes Bill in 2024 will introduce some legitimate limits on free speech. There are few controls over broadcast frequencies, influence on printing facilities, selective distribution of subsidies or advertising (with exceptions for alcohol and tobacco limits and time thresholds), imposing prohibitive tariffs or bribery. Excluding child pornography and similar content, the government does not censor online material. Blasphemy was abolished as a constitutional offense in 2013, although a censorship office still exists.
While Directive (EU) 2016/680, which prohibits the illegal monitoring of journalists by law enforcement authorities, has been transposed into Irish law, the 2011 Data Retention Act still allows the police to monitor the communications of all citizens, including journalists. “Journalistic privilege” is not officially recognized in Ireland, but in practice, the judiciary is reluctant to force journalists to surrender material to the police (Colfer et al., 2022). The European Centre for Press and Media Freedom’s 2022 report ranks Ireland joint 3rd among EU states and does not mention Ireland in relation to the 813 recorded incidences of press violations that year. Freedom House’s “Freedom on the Net” report does not mention Ireland’s potential role in overseeing EU-level social media regulation and enforcement.
The Office of the Press Ombudsman is self-regulated and funded by the press industry but is very poorly resourced, with only 2.5 staff members, including the Ombudsman. The office handled 302 cases in 2022, up 50 from the previous year, and is conscious of the need to address the culture of libel and court action associated with Ireland’s unlimited defamation laws. Self-censorship among journalists can occur due to concerns about the chilling effects of the strict 2009 Defamation Act (with no upper limits on awards) and related libel laws, as well as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). While journalists tend not to face direct harassment, there are increasing threats of libel, including from Sinn Féin politicians. A new defamation bill is due in 2024 and should address these vulnerabilities. There are few arrests, physical assaults and no murders since 1996, but there are concerns about spillover from Northern Ireland, where journalist Lyra McKee was shot dead in Derry in 2019. Perpetrators of crimes against journalists have been effectively prosecuted. Working conditions are increasingly precarious, with poor union engagement in significant media organizations and concerns about the digital safety of journalists.
Citations:
Colfer, B., O’Brennan, J., and Bandelow, N. C. 2022. Ireland Report: Sustainable Governance Indicators 2022. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann.
Media Freedom. 2023. “Freedom House.” https://freedomhouse.org/issues/media-freedom
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom. 2022. “Monitoring Report 2022.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/monitoring-report-2022/
Lowry, H. 2023. Love Not Fear. Dublin: HCC.
Suiter, J., and Flynn, R. 2021. “Irish Media and the Shaping of Political Discourse.” In The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, eds. D. M. Farrell and N. Hardiman, 595-609. Oxford: OUP.
Criminal Justice (Incitement to Violence or Hatred and Hate Offences) Bill 2022. 2022. Houses of the Oireachtas.
Regulations concerning the impact of “fake news” on media reporting are complex, especially given Ireland’s role as a major EU regulator for international MNC-owned social media, which is also bound by international directives, political dynamics and practical imperatives. Government or public officials do not censor digital, print or broadcast media. However, the forthcoming Hate Crimes Bill in 2024 will introduce some legitimate limits on free speech. There are few controls over broadcast frequencies, influence on printing facilities, selective distribution of subsidies or advertising (with exceptions for alcohol and tobacco limits and time thresholds), imposing prohibitive tariffs or bribery. Excluding child pornography and similar content, the government does not censor online material. Blasphemy was abolished as a constitutional offense in 2013, although a censorship office still exists.
While Directive (EU) 2016/680, which prohibits the illegal monitoring of journalists by law enforcement authorities, has been transposed into Irish law, the 2011 Data Retention Act still allows the police to monitor the communications of all citizens, including journalists. “Journalistic privilege” is not officially recognized in Ireland, but in practice, the judiciary is reluctant to force journalists to surrender material to the police (Colfer et al., 2022). The European Centre for Press and Media Freedom’s 2022 report ranks Ireland joint 3rd among EU states and does not mention Ireland in relation to the 813 recorded incidences of press violations that year. Freedom House’s “Freedom on the Net” report does not mention Ireland’s potential role in overseeing EU-level social media regulation and enforcement.
The Office of the Press Ombudsman is self-regulated and funded by the press industry but is very poorly resourced, with only 2.5 staff members, including the Ombudsman. The office handled 302 cases in 2022, up 50 from the previous year, and is conscious of the need to address the culture of libel and court action associated with Ireland’s unlimited defamation laws. Self-censorship among journalists can occur due to concerns about the chilling effects of the strict 2009 Defamation Act (with no upper limits on awards) and related libel laws, as well as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). While journalists tend not to face direct harassment, there are increasing threats of libel, including from Sinn Féin politicians. A new defamation bill is due in 2024 and should address these vulnerabilities. There are few arrests, physical assaults and no murders since 1996, but there are concerns about spillover from Northern Ireland, where journalist Lyra McKee was shot dead in Derry in 2019. Perpetrators of crimes against journalists have been effectively prosecuted. Working conditions are increasingly precarious, with poor union engagement in significant media organizations and concerns about the digital safety of journalists.
Citations:
Colfer, B., O’Brennan, J., and Bandelow, N. C. 2022. Ireland Report: Sustainable Governance Indicators 2022. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann.
Media Freedom. 2023. “Freedom House.” https://freedomhouse.org/issues/media-freedom
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom. 2022. “Monitoring Report 2022.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/monitoring-report-2022/
Lowry, H. 2023. Love Not Fear. Dublin: HCC.
Suiter, J., and Flynn, R. 2021. “Irish Media and the Shaping of Political Discourse.” In The Oxford Handbook of Irish Politics, eds. D. M. Farrell and N. Hardiman, 595-609. Oxford: OUP.
Criminal Justice (Incitement to Violence or Hatred and Hate Offences) Bill 2022. 2022. Houses of the Oireachtas.
To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
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7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
Anti-monopoly policies in Ireland aim to ensure transparency of ownership structures and a plurality of opinions in digital, print and broadcast media outlets. Regulations for publicly owned media help maintain an adequate plurality of opinions. However, media ownership remains a significant concern, posing a high economic risk to media pluralism. While professional journalistic norms generally prevent editorial content from being shaped by commercial or owner influence, the lack of explicit rules mandating this remains problematic. A 2021 study found that fundamental protections for media pluralism in Ireland did not face significant risks, with the overall risk assessed at 23%. Nevertheless, power, wealth and economic resources are highly concentrated in Ireland. This structural reality of golden circles and state capture by domestic and international vested interests (Carrington, 2023) is a crucial context for those seeking transformational change, and media ownership must be understood within this framework.
In practice, many major digital, print and broadcast outlets consistently critique government policies and report on abuses of power. Ireland is rated as low risk for media pluralism, with fundamental protections and political independence also rated as low risk (23% and 30%, respectively) for the main media regulator, the Media Commission. Legal protections for the anonymity of journalistic sources and legislation permitting state access to metadata related to private electronic communications could be more definitive. Social inclusiveness is rated as medium (49%) and improving, with no proven media bias against certain opposition parties or candidates. However, there are gender, class, ethnicity and other equality grounds where some perspectives are less heard or validated. Internal guidelines aim to improve diversity, but the increasingly diverse nature of Irish society is not always reflected in media content. Without stronger regulation, initiatives to combat discriminatory, prejudicial, misleading and hateful content remain ineffective. The awaited Criminal Justice (Hate Crime) Bill in 2024 may address some of these issues.
Regulatory challenges persist, particularly concerning social media. The Media Commission now oversees the entire audiovisual sector, including broadcasting, on-demand audio and visual services, and online platforms such as social media sites. An Electoral Reform Bill regulating political advertising, including online advertising, was passed in 2022. The Future of Media Commission reported in 2022, highlighting funding for public broadcasting as a central issue of public controversy, discussed in two parliamentary committee inquiries into state broadcasting in 2023.
Citations:
R. Flynn. 2021. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era; Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, 2021 Country Report: Ireland. Florence: European University Institute.
Carrington, D. 2023. “Revealed: the industry figures behind ‘declaration of scientists’ backing meat eating.” https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/oct/27/revealed-industry
figures-declaration-scientists-backing-meat-eating>
In practice, many major digital, print and broadcast outlets consistently critique government policies and report on abuses of power. Ireland is rated as low risk for media pluralism, with fundamental protections and political independence also rated as low risk (23% and 30%, respectively) for the main media regulator, the Media Commission. Legal protections for the anonymity of journalistic sources and legislation permitting state access to metadata related to private electronic communications could be more definitive. Social inclusiveness is rated as medium (49%) and improving, with no proven media bias against certain opposition parties or candidates. However, there are gender, class, ethnicity and other equality grounds where some perspectives are less heard or validated. Internal guidelines aim to improve diversity, but the increasingly diverse nature of Irish society is not always reflected in media content. Without stronger regulation, initiatives to combat discriminatory, prejudicial, misleading and hateful content remain ineffective. The awaited Criminal Justice (Hate Crime) Bill in 2024 may address some of these issues.
Regulatory challenges persist, particularly concerning social media. The Media Commission now oversees the entire audiovisual sector, including broadcasting, on-demand audio and visual services, and online platforms such as social media sites. An Electoral Reform Bill regulating political advertising, including online advertising, was passed in 2022. The Future of Media Commission reported in 2022, highlighting funding for public broadcasting as a central issue of public controversy, discussed in two parliamentary committee inquiries into state broadcasting in 2023.
Citations:
R. Flynn. 2021. Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era; Application of the Media Pluralism Monitor in the European Union, 2021 Country Report: Ireland. Florence: European University Institute.
Carrington, D. 2023. “Revealed: the industry figures behind ‘declaration of scientists’ backing meat eating.” https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/oct/27/revealed-industry
figures-declaration-scientists-backing-meat-eating>
Graph View
To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
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9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
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6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
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3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
The 1937 Irish constitution and other legal norms safeguard political rights such as freedom of association and freedom of assembly. In practice, political and civic groups can operate freely without unwarranted state intrusion or interference. Transparent and non-discriminatory criteria are used to evaluate requests for permits to associate and assemble (Papada et al., 2023; WJP 2022). While Ireland experiences some of the global trend of declining civic space, it remained, in 2023, among the world’s 2.1% considered “open” by Civicus, with freedom to associate, demonstrate and express dissent. Nonetheless, government needs to do more to leverage this civil society strength particularly in the local implementation of often controversial policies that lack full consensus. However, there are concerns that powers are not effectively used to police far-right intimidation, with a strategy of soft policing being exercised. Generally, the government does not employ intimidation, harassment or threats of retaliation to hinder citizens from exercising their rights to legally assemble and associate. Nevertheless, there have been incidents of imprisonment of peaceful demonstrators and excessive use of force during some protests, such as the 2023 house evictions and recent environmental protests.
Papada et al. (2023) rate Ireland 8th in its global database, scoring 0.65 on participation, 0.92 on deliberative democracy and 0.89 on egalitarian democracy. The World Justice Project (WJP) 2023 returns an overall score of 84 for Ireland, with a score of 90 (highest) for freedom from arbitrary interference and 0.78 (lowest) for freedom of religion, all indicators being above regional averages (regional average is 0.74 overall).
Citations:
WJP (World Justice Project). 2023. “WJP 2023 Rule of Law Index | Ireland Insights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPInsights2023.pdf
Papada, E., Altman, D., Angiolillo, F., Gastaldi, L., Köhler, T., Lundstedt, M., Natsika, N., Nord, M., Sato, Y., Wiebrecht, F., Lindberg, S. I. 2023. “Defiance in the Face of Autocratization. Democracy Report 2023.” V-Dem Working Paper - Democracy Report 2023 (March 2). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4560857 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4560857
Papada et al. (2023) rate Ireland 8th in its global database, scoring 0.65 on participation, 0.92 on deliberative democracy and 0.89 on egalitarian democracy. The World Justice Project (WJP) 2023 returns an overall score of 84 for Ireland, with a score of 90 (highest) for freedom from arbitrary interference and 0.78 (lowest) for freedom of religion, all indicators being above regional averages (regional average is 0.74 overall).
Citations:
WJP (World Justice Project). 2023. “WJP 2023 Rule of Law Index | Ireland Insights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPInsights2023.pdf
Papada, E., Altman, D., Angiolillo, F., Gastaldi, L., Köhler, T., Lundstedt, M., Natsika, N., Nord, M., Sato, Y., Wiebrecht, F., Lindberg, S. I. 2023. “Defiance in the Face of Autocratization. Democracy Report 2023.” V-Dem Working Paper - Democracy Report 2023 (March 2). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4560857 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4560857
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
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All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
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6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
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4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Most Irish CSOs exert pressure on the legislature and government through pressure politics or pluralism. Some, however, are better integrated into the policy formulation process via quasi or neo-corporatism or social partnership, which is the Irish term for social dialogue (O’Donnell 2021). While few CSOs leverage their own academic staff or think tanks, or engage in collaborative efforts with academic institutions, many employ a research or policy officer (McInerney 2021). In the 1990s and 2000s, processes involving capital and labor in Ireland also opened up, to a lesser extent, to agricultural, community and voluntary and environmental pillars.
The Irish 1937 constitution has a corporatist orientation, but collective bargaining is not facilitated through legislation. The OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database records no recent social pacts in Ireland. Some policies have facilitated the cultivation of CSOs, such as public funding and making union membership dues tax-deductible. Major CSOs, representing capital and labor, have the organizational strength of peak organizations (ICTU and IBEC). They utilize financial resources, policy experts and connections to other think tanks to independently formulate policies and participate in integrated policy formulation processes with the government, such as pre-budget and policy consultations and national economic dialogue. These major CSOs are cooperative and capable of forming alliances, acting both as confederations and in siloed ways. The general population typically participates in and supports major CSO activity through volunteering, social, sporting and charitable activities, with less involvement in sectoral influencing or political activity (Murphy and O’Connor 2021).
The concept of a “social partnership” was a feature of Irish politics and policymaking from 1986 to 2010, during which successive governments prioritized sectors such as unions, business, farming and community, voluntary and environmental organizations (O’Donnell 2021). This was associated with the developmental characteristics of the Irish state and an “innovative form of networked governance.” In 2010, it was replaced by a relatively weak process of social dialogue. Despite this, a consensus-oriented culture remains among many societal actors. Although attempts to renew social partnership in 2022 have not progressed, some CSOs remain close to and have access to policy-influencing processes and institutions. There is considerable ambiguity regarding whether the government feels obliged to respond to the policy proposals put forward.
McGinnity et al. (2021) have shown that trade union and staff association membership in Ireland is lower than in comparable countries and has issues with effectiveness. While the right to join a trade union is recognized under international treaties and protected under the Irish constitution, it appears this right may not be fully realized for all workers. OECD data indicates that unemployment benefits in Ireland are comparably poor, being the third lowest in the OECD when measured by the share of previous income (OECD 2024), increasing the risk of poverty and deprivation when out of work.
Citations:
OECD. 2023. “AIAS ICTWSS Database.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm
World Justice Project. 2023. “WJP 2023 Rule of Law Index | Ireland Insights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPInsights2023.pdf
O’Donnell, R. 2021. The Social Partners and the NESC: From Tripartite Dialogue via Common Knowledge Events to Network Knowledge. Bristol: Policy Press.
McGinnity, F., H. Russell, I. Privalko, and S. Enright. 2021. Monitoring Decent Work in Ireland. Dublin: ESRI and Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC). https://doi.org/10.26504/bkmnext414
McInerney, C. 2021. “Think Tanks and their Role in Policy Making in Ireland.” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 157-170. Bristol: Policy Press.
Murphy, M. P., and O’Connor, O. 2021. “Civil Society Organisations and Policy Analysis.” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 171-186. Bristol: Policy Press.
IHREC. 2023. “Collective Bargaining and the Irish Constitution - Barrier or Facilitator.” https://www.ihrec.ie/documents/collective-bargaining-and-the-irish-constitution-barrier-or-facilitator/
The Irish 1937 constitution has a corporatist orientation, but collective bargaining is not facilitated through legislation. The OECD/AIAS ICTWSS database records no recent social pacts in Ireland. Some policies have facilitated the cultivation of CSOs, such as public funding and making union membership dues tax-deductible. Major CSOs, representing capital and labor, have the organizational strength of peak organizations (ICTU and IBEC). They utilize financial resources, policy experts and connections to other think tanks to independently formulate policies and participate in integrated policy formulation processes with the government, such as pre-budget and policy consultations and national economic dialogue. These major CSOs are cooperative and capable of forming alliances, acting both as confederations and in siloed ways. The general population typically participates in and supports major CSO activity through volunteering, social, sporting and charitable activities, with less involvement in sectoral influencing or political activity (Murphy and O’Connor 2021).
The concept of a “social partnership” was a feature of Irish politics and policymaking from 1986 to 2010, during which successive governments prioritized sectors such as unions, business, farming and community, voluntary and environmental organizations (O’Donnell 2021). This was associated with the developmental characteristics of the Irish state and an “innovative form of networked governance.” In 2010, it was replaced by a relatively weak process of social dialogue. Despite this, a consensus-oriented culture remains among many societal actors. Although attempts to renew social partnership in 2022 have not progressed, some CSOs remain close to and have access to policy-influencing processes and institutions. There is considerable ambiguity regarding whether the government feels obliged to respond to the policy proposals put forward.
McGinnity et al. (2021) have shown that trade union and staff association membership in Ireland is lower than in comparable countries and has issues with effectiveness. While the right to join a trade union is recognized under international treaties and protected under the Irish constitution, it appears this right may not be fully realized for all workers. OECD data indicates that unemployment benefits in Ireland are comparably poor, being the third lowest in the OECD when measured by the share of previous income (OECD 2024), increasing the risk of poverty and deprivation when out of work.
Citations:
OECD. 2023. “AIAS ICTWSS Database.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm
World Justice Project. 2023. “WJP 2023 Rule of Law Index | Ireland Insights.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPInsights2023.pdf
O’Donnell, R. 2021. The Social Partners and the NESC: From Tripartite Dialogue via Common Knowledge Events to Network Knowledge. Bristol: Policy Press.
McGinnity, F., H. Russell, I. Privalko, and S. Enright. 2021. Monitoring Decent Work in Ireland. Dublin: ESRI and Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission (IHREC). https://doi.org/10.26504/bkmnext414
McInerney, C. 2021. “Think Tanks and their Role in Policy Making in Ireland.” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 157-170. Bristol: Policy Press.
Murphy, M. P., and O’Connor, O. 2021. “Civil Society Organisations and Policy Analysis.” In Policy Analysis in Ireland, eds. J. Hogan and M. P. Murphy, 171-186. Bristol: Policy Press.
IHREC. 2023. “Collective Bargaining and the Irish Constitution - Barrier or Facilitator.” https://www.ihrec.ie/documents/collective-bargaining-and-the-irish-constitution-barrier-or-facilitator/
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Irish social welfare CSOs exert pressure on the legislature and government through pressure politics, pluralism, protests, campaigning and advocacy. Some of these organizations are better integrated into the policy formulation process. Historically, there was quasi-corporatism with the Community and Voluntary Pillar, which includes the Community Platform – a network of 26 groups, some of which have their own membership within the Pillar. Many of these groups are actively consulted by the government through pre-budget submission processes and ad hoc policy consultations. The Amnesty International Report (2022) highlights various societal issues, including concerns about past institutional abuse and the contemporary lack of access to adequate housing, notably for Ukrainians and other refugees. By late 2023, 500 male international protection applicants were experiencing homelessness. Ongoing issues include the use of facial recognition technology in policing public spaces, which is more likely to be introduced following the Dublin riots in November 2023. The Civicus Monitor (2023) scored Ireland highly in freedom rankings but noted concerns about LGBTQI rights, anti-immigrant sentiment and issues related to digital surveillance. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (2022) consistently ranked Ireland 11th out of 142 countries, with an overall score of 82, similar to the rankings in 2021 and 2023.
There are at least 29,000 nonprofit organizations in Ireland (Benefacts). Volunteering and service provision activities, including sports, culture and charity, dominate and often operate “in the shadow of the state.” During the COVID-19 pandemic, civil society established new relationships with local government and other actors. Advocacy campaigns to influence government policy continue to prefer insider consensual change strategies based on clear engagement structures with the government (Vissar 2019) and there is significant demand for more collaborative governance.
However, the Irish state exhibits a passive-aggressive relationship with civil society, espousing partnership and deliberation while also suppressing and inhibiting advocacy (Harvey 2014). This has led to campaigns by the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) for the right to dissent. Irish environmental groups face the highest legal costs in the EU and are often threatened with funding cuts when they pursue legal action against the state. In 2021, the ICCL led the Coalition for Civil Society Freedom, seeking legal reforms to lift prohibitions on civil society actors fundraising for legitimate advocacy work. While much of civil society, particularly the voluntary sector, is now service-oriented and organized into fragmented siloed sectors, it remains a source of politically active citizenship in various public spheres. These include cultural, political and policy-based summer schools, mind festivals, talk forums and arts and culture events, which, although not unique to Ireland, are nonetheless popular (Murphy 2023). Ireland has also experimented with national, regional and local deliberative forms of collaborative governance, including local environmental spheres (JCFC 2020).
Citations:
Murphy, M.P., and O’Connor, O. 2021. Civil Society Organisations and Policy Analysis: Resilience in the Context of Shifting Political Opportunity Structures? Policy Analysis in Ireland. Bristol: Policy Press.
Murphy, M. P. 2023. Creating an Ecosocial Welfare Future. Bristol: Policy Press.
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The state of the world’s human rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2023/03/amnesty-international-report-2022-23
Visser, A. 2019. “Ireland Emerging from the Crisis.” In Report on the State of Civil Society in the EU and Russia, eds. Harvey B., Berlin: EU-Russia Civil Society Forum.
WJP. 2022. “Rule of Law Index.” Ireland Insights. https://worldjusticeproject.org
Civicus Monitor. 2023. “2023 State of Civil Society Report.” https://www.civicus.org/documents/reports-and-publications/SOCS/2023/state-of-civil-society-report-2023_en.pdf
Benefacts. 2018. “Analysis 2018.” https://analysis2018.benefacts.ie/report/thirdsector
Harvey, B. 2014. Are We Paying for That? Dublin: Advocacy Coalition.
There are at least 29,000 nonprofit organizations in Ireland (Benefacts). Volunteering and service provision activities, including sports, culture and charity, dominate and often operate “in the shadow of the state.” During the COVID-19 pandemic, civil society established new relationships with local government and other actors. Advocacy campaigns to influence government policy continue to prefer insider consensual change strategies based on clear engagement structures with the government (Vissar 2019) and there is significant demand for more collaborative governance.
However, the Irish state exhibits a passive-aggressive relationship with civil society, espousing partnership and deliberation while also suppressing and inhibiting advocacy (Harvey 2014). This has led to campaigns by the Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) for the right to dissent. Irish environmental groups face the highest legal costs in the EU and are often threatened with funding cuts when they pursue legal action against the state. In 2021, the ICCL led the Coalition for Civil Society Freedom, seeking legal reforms to lift prohibitions on civil society actors fundraising for legitimate advocacy work. While much of civil society, particularly the voluntary sector, is now service-oriented and organized into fragmented siloed sectors, it remains a source of politically active citizenship in various public spheres. These include cultural, political and policy-based summer schools, mind festivals, talk forums and arts and culture events, which, although not unique to Ireland, are nonetheless popular (Murphy 2023). Ireland has also experimented with national, regional and local deliberative forms of collaborative governance, including local environmental spheres (JCFC 2020).
Citations:
Murphy, M.P., and O’Connor, O. 2021. Civil Society Organisations and Policy Analysis: Resilience in the Context of Shifting Political Opportunity Structures? Policy Analysis in Ireland. Bristol: Policy Press.
Murphy, M. P. 2023. Creating an Ecosocial Welfare Future. Bristol: Policy Press.
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The state of the world’s human rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2023/03/amnesty-international-report-2022-23
Visser, A. 2019. “Ireland Emerging from the Crisis.” In Report on the State of Civil Society in the EU and Russia, eds. Harvey B., Berlin: EU-Russia Civil Society Forum.
WJP. 2022. “Rule of Law Index.” Ireland Insights. https://worldjusticeproject.org
Civicus Monitor. 2023. “2023 State of Civil Society Report.” https://www.civicus.org/documents/reports-and-publications/SOCS/2023/state-of-civil-society-report-2023_en.pdf
Benefacts. 2018. “Analysis 2018.” https://analysis2018.benefacts.ie/report/thirdsector
Harvey, B. 2014. Are We Paying for That? Dublin: Advocacy Coalition.
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Irish environmental CSOs exert pressure on the legislature and government through pressure politics, pluralism, protest and prefiguration. Some are better integrated into the policy formulation process through historical quasi-corporatism, with the Irish Environmental Network representing environmental CSOs. Additionally, some large CSOs participate directly in government policy processes, often overlapping informally with Green Party membership and engaging in COP-like processes to monitor the implementation of the Irish Climate Action Plan. Few CSOs leverage their own academic staff or think tanks, or engage in collaborative efforts with academic institutions, but many employ a research or policy officer. Wagner and Ylä-Anttila (2018) examined the Irish climate policy network and concluded that domestic NGOs are weak, with powerful economic actors and government departments dominating, a view supported by Flynn (2003). However, it can be argued that the Environmental Pillar has become more effective at policy influencing in recent years. Other CSOs engage in different theories of change, including ruptural and symbiotic approaches (Murphy 2023).
Citations:
Murphy, M. P. 2023. Creating an Ecosocial Welfare State. Bristol: Policy Press.
Wagner, P., and T. Ylä-Anttila. 2018. “Who Got Their Way? Advocacy Coalitions and the Irish Climate Change Law.” Environmental Politics 27 (5): 872–891.
Flynn, B. 2003. “Much Talk but Little Action? ‘New’ Environmental Policy Instruments in Ireland.” Environmental Politics 12 (1): 137–156. https://doi.org/10.1080/714000656
Citations:
Murphy, M. P. 2023. Creating an Ecosocial Welfare State. Bristol: Policy Press.
Wagner, P., and T. Ylä-Anttila. 2018. “Who Got Their Way? Advocacy Coalitions and the Irish Climate Change Law.” Environmental Politics 27 (5): 872–891.
Flynn, B. 2003. “Much Talk but Little Action? ‘New’ Environmental Policy Instruments in Ireland.” Environmental Politics 12 (1): 137–156. https://doi.org/10.1080/714000656