Coordination
#26Key Findings
In the category of coordination, Israel performs relatively poorly (rank 26).
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) coordinates between departments, oversees annual plans and monitors cabinet decisions. While ministers do not need PMO approval for their proposals, the prime minister must agree to include them on the cabinet agenda. PMO capacities have weakened as professional staffers have been replaced by partisan figures.
Interministerial coordination primarily occurs through interministerial committees, which are typically created to promote specific programs. Consultations and information sharing between individuals is common, and informal meetings between officials occur frequently.
Policymaking in Israel is extremely centralized, and local governments have little autonomy. The central government regulates, fund and oversee many services such as education and welfare services. Standards exist for such services, but affluent localities can supplement these services. The remaining services are not regulated, and are left to local authorities.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) coordinates between departments, oversees annual plans and monitors cabinet decisions. While ministers do not need PMO approval for their proposals, the prime minister must agree to include them on the cabinet agenda. PMO capacities have weakened as professional staffers have been replaced by partisan figures.
Interministerial coordination primarily occurs through interministerial committees, which are typically created to promote specific programs. Consultations and information sharing between individuals is common, and informal meetings between officials occur frequently.
Policymaking in Israel is extremely centralized, and local governments have little autonomy. The central government regulates, fund and oversee many services such as education and welfare services. Standards exist for such services, but affluent localities can supplement these services. The remaining services are not regulated, and are left to local authorities.
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To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
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Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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7
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Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
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Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is responsible for coordinating between departments, monitoring and coordinating the preparation of annual plans, and overseeing the implementation of cabinet decisions (Galnoor 2010). The general director of the PMO chairs many of the interministerial committees aimed at developing and implementing interministerial programs.
Ministers do not need to obtain consent from the PMO for their proposals. However, if they want to introduce a cabinet decision, the prime minister must agree to place the decision on the cabinet’s agenda. The PMO does not hold meetings with ministers to hear about their proposals. The PMO can receive information on proposals either when they are introduced to the cabinet or if they pertain to committees chaired by the PMO general director. Otherwise, ministers are not required to submit their plans to the PMO.
The PMO has several departments responsible for coordination and planning. Until recently, the PMO was seen by the line ministries as a powerful entity capable of promoting interministerial projects. However, over the past two years, many officials in the PMO have either left or been replaced by individuals who are less professional and more partisan. Additionally, the general director of the PMO – the person responsible for coordinating all the ministries – is currently a loyalist who lacks the necessary skills and experience for the position, especially when compared to previous general directors. As a result, the PMO has become weaker. This was evident following October 7, as the government failed to respond to mounting social and economic needs, and coordinate between government departments.
At the same time, the void left by the absence of a powerful PMO has been filled by the Ministry of Finance. Almost all proposals need to be reviewed by the Ministry of Finance. The ministry often uses its power to modify proposals even if they do not have financial implications. In addition, the ministry often drafts many of the ministerial legislative proposals as part of the Arrangements Law introduced with the annual budget (Kosti 2021). Hence, for line ministers to promote their policies, they often need the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
Citations:
Galnoor, I. 2010. Public Management in Israel. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203844960
Kosti, N. 2021. “Centralization via Delegation: The Long-Term Implications of the Israeli Arrangements Laws.” In I. Bar-Siman-Tov, eds., Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation 8: 73–94. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72748-2_4
Ministers do not need to obtain consent from the PMO for their proposals. However, if they want to introduce a cabinet decision, the prime minister must agree to place the decision on the cabinet’s agenda. The PMO does not hold meetings with ministers to hear about their proposals. The PMO can receive information on proposals either when they are introduced to the cabinet or if they pertain to committees chaired by the PMO general director. Otherwise, ministers are not required to submit their plans to the PMO.
The PMO has several departments responsible for coordination and planning. Until recently, the PMO was seen by the line ministries as a powerful entity capable of promoting interministerial projects. However, over the past two years, many officials in the PMO have either left or been replaced by individuals who are less professional and more partisan. Additionally, the general director of the PMO – the person responsible for coordinating all the ministries – is currently a loyalist who lacks the necessary skills and experience for the position, especially when compared to previous general directors. As a result, the PMO has become weaker. This was evident following October 7, as the government failed to respond to mounting social and economic needs, and coordinate between government departments.
At the same time, the void left by the absence of a powerful PMO has been filled by the Ministry of Finance. Almost all proposals need to be reviewed by the Ministry of Finance. The ministry often uses its power to modify proposals even if they do not have financial implications. In addition, the ministry often drafts many of the ministerial legislative proposals as part of the Arrangements Law introduced with the annual budget (Kosti 2021). Hence, for line ministers to promote their policies, they often need the approval of the Ministry of Finance.
Citations:
Galnoor, I. 2010. Public Management in Israel. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203844960
Kosti, N. 2021. “Centralization via Delegation: The Long-Term Implications of the Israeli Arrangements Laws.” In I. Bar-Siman-Tov, eds., Comparative Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Omnibus Legislation 8: 73–94. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72748-2_4
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Interministerial coordination primarily occurs when an interministerial committee is established (Shatz et al. 2016). Such committees are usually created to promote specific programs, such as the committee for at-risk youth or the committee addressing violence in the Arab sector. Additionally, there is a forum for general directors, which aims to facilitate the exchange of information. This forum was very active under the previous government, but rarely meets under the current administration. One reason for this is that the current general director of the PMO, who is responsible for summoning the forum, does not do so.
When preparing a government decision, the respective ministry is mandated to consult and obtain the agreement of all ministries relevant to the decision’s implementation. This is another mechanism for information sharing and collaboration. The same is true for legislation drafted within a ministry. This practice usually allows for deliberation between ministries and the modification of proposals.
Ministries do not have access to the digital platforms of other departments.
Job rotations occur regularly in the Ministry of Finance. In other ministries, employees can apply for positions in different ministries, but the decision is personal and there are no incentives for such shifts.
In most cases, ministries are not caught off guard by the policies of other ministries. Although there is no systematic coordination mechanism, there are consultations and information sharing between individuals. However, there are instances where conflicts arise between departments due to a lack of coordination.
Citations:
Shatz, H., Popper, S., Friedrich, S., Abramzon, S., Brodsky, A., Harel, R., and Cohen, O. 2016. Developing Long-Term Socioeconomic Strategy in Israel: Institutions, Processes, and Supporting Information. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. https://doi.org/10.7249/RR275
When preparing a government decision, the respective ministry is mandated to consult and obtain the agreement of all ministries relevant to the decision’s implementation. This is another mechanism for information sharing and collaboration. The same is true for legislation drafted within a ministry. This practice usually allows for deliberation between ministries and the modification of proposals.
Ministries do not have access to the digital platforms of other departments.
Job rotations occur regularly in the Ministry of Finance. In other ministries, employees can apply for positions in different ministries, but the decision is personal and there are no incentives for such shifts.
In most cases, ministries are not caught off guard by the policies of other ministries. Although there is no systematic coordination mechanism, there are consultations and information sharing between individuals. However, there are instances where conflicts arise between departments due to a lack of coordination.
Citations:
Shatz, H., Popper, S., Friedrich, S., Abramzon, S., Brodsky, A., Harel, R., and Cohen, O. 2016. Developing Long-Term Socioeconomic Strategy in Israel: Institutions, Processes, and Supporting Information. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. https://doi.org/10.7249/RR275
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal meetings between officials occur frequently. For instance, they happen before and after weekly cabinet meetings, in the Knesset when officials attend committee sessions, and when parties convene. These meetings occur at all levels, among ministers, general directors, and finance directors across various ministries and the Ministry of Finance. Such meetings help coordinate policies. However, informal meetings are typically held to solve problems, complementing rather than replacing formal coordination mechanisms.
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To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
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The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
In general, there is no national standard for the provision of local services. These services fall into two categories: those regulated by law and primarily funded by the central government; those funded by municipalities through local taxes, which are not regulated by the central government (Finkelstein 2020). Education and welfare services belong to the first category. The government funds 75% of these services, while localities contribute 25%. Most services are regulated in terms of target populations, content and benefits. Affluent localities with large budgets can supplement these services from their own funds, while poorer localities struggle to meet the 25% funding requirement. This disparity creates inequality in the services provided by different localities.
In the second type of services, there is no regulation and the decision on standards is left to the local authority. For instance, the local authority determines how many times a week trash should be collected and what cultural activities are provided. In education and welfare, the central government oversees the local authority to ensure that standards are met. In all other areas, there is no oversight.
Healthcare is national, and local authorities are minimally involved in decisions regarding the placement of clinics and services. Public transport is also national and falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transportation, which regulates all aspects.
Citations:
Finkelstein, A. 2020. Local Government in Israel: General Background, Core Issues and Challenges. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute.
In the second type of services, there is no regulation and the decision on standards is left to the local authority. For instance, the local authority determines how many times a week trash should be collected and what cultural activities are provided. In education and welfare, the central government oversees the local authority to ensure that standards are met. In all other areas, there is no oversight.
Healthcare is national, and local authorities are minimally involved in decisions regarding the placement of clinics and services. Public transport is also national and falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transportation, which regulates all aspects.
Citations:
Finkelstein, A. 2020. Local Government in Israel: General Background, Core Issues and Challenges. Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute.
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
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National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Almost all ministries responsible for providing services have regional offices. These offices oversee service provision at the local level and consult with local authorities. In addition, each local authority has departments for education, welfare and planning, which regularly exchange information with the central government. These communication channels are bureaucratic mechanisms, meaning they do not involve elected local politicians.
However, elected politicians at the local level who are part of the coalition often hold responsibility for specific fields and act like ministers at the local level. Therefore, they frequently try to promote their agendas by utilizing bureaucratic mechanisms.
Local authorities are united under the Local Authorities Center. This organization unites the heads of the local authorities (political rank) and represents the needs of their localities to the central government.
Policymaking in Israel is extremely centralized, and local governments have little autonomy and limited opportunities to express their views regarding policies (Finkelstein 2020). This applies to both bureaucrats and politicians. During the COVID-19 crisis, there was a demand to increase the autonomy and discretion of local authorities. So far, this has not occurred.
Citations:
Finkelstein, A. 2020. Local Government in Israel: General Background, Core Issues and Challenges. Israel Democracy Institute. https://www.idi.org.il/media/15356/local-government-in-israel-general-background-core-issues-and-challenges.pdf
However, elected politicians at the local level who are part of the coalition often hold responsibility for specific fields and act like ministers at the local level. Therefore, they frequently try to promote their agendas by utilizing bureaucratic mechanisms.
Local authorities are united under the Local Authorities Center. This organization unites the heads of the local authorities (political rank) and represents the needs of their localities to the central government.
Policymaking in Israel is extremely centralized, and local governments have little autonomy and limited opportunities to express their views regarding policies (Finkelstein 2020). This applies to both bureaucrats and politicians. During the COVID-19 crisis, there was a demand to increase the autonomy and discretion of local authorities. So far, this has not occurred.
Citations:
Finkelstein, A. 2020. Local Government in Israel: General Background, Core Issues and Challenges. Israel Democracy Institute. https://www.idi.org.il/media/15356/local-government-in-israel-general-background-core-issues-and-challenges.pdf