Horizontal Accountability
#25Key Findings
Israel scores relatively poorly (rank 25) in the category of horizontal accountability.
The State Comptroller’s Office is an independent body with an extremely broad audit remit. However, it lacks enforcement power, and the current officeholder has deliberately limited critique of the government. The Privacy Protection Authority is part of the Ministry of Justice, and can initiate criminal investigations.
Judicial oversight is conducted by the Supreme Court, which has broad discretion and autonomy. However, recent attempts by the government to limit judicial oversight and politicize the Supreme Court’s appointment process have raised concerns. Public protests have so far blocked these reforms, but the efforts appear to be continuing.
The proposed judicial reforms would put civil rights protection at risk, as proponents have advocated removing courts from this role. Significant progress has been made on LGBTQ+ rights. Legislative resources have been expanded, but these resources remain insufficient for effective oversight of the executive.
The State Comptroller’s Office is an independent body with an extremely broad audit remit. However, it lacks enforcement power, and the current officeholder has deliberately limited critique of the government. The Privacy Protection Authority is part of the Ministry of Justice, and can initiate criminal investigations.
Judicial oversight is conducted by the Supreme Court, which has broad discretion and autonomy. However, recent attempts by the government to limit judicial oversight and politicize the Supreme Court’s appointment process have raised concerns. Public protests have so far blocked these reforms, but the efforts appear to be continuing.
The proposed judicial reforms would put civil rights protection at risk, as proponents have advocated removing courts from this role. Significant progress has been made on LGBTQ+ rights. Legislative resources have been expanded, but these resources remain insufficient for effective oversight of the executive.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There is no independent and effective audit office.
The State Comptroller’s Office is an independent audit office that audits government ministries, local and municipal governments, and other independent governmental organizations, including public universities, all military branches and government-funded corporations. The scope of its audit powers is one of the broadest in the world, giving the comptroller jurisdiction over 1,400 organizations. The office derives its authority from the Basic Law: The State Comptroller, which authorizes it to receive immediate information from bodies being audited.
Additionally, the state comptroller is responsible for auditing campaign and party finances, and reviewing the accounts and finances of party candidates and government ministers. The office also serves as the State Ombudsman, responding to complaints from the public regarding the organizations under its jurisdiction. The State Comptroller’s Office acts independent, and its reports and conclusions are widely covered in the media and public discourse.
The comptroller reports on government ministries and local authorities. The decision on which issues and departments to investigate lies with the comptroller. The reports are also presented in parliamentary committees. Each agency examined must collaborate with the comptroller. Additionally, each agency must provide a response to the comptroller’s reports and findings, explaining their activities and the corrections being made. The comptroller, however, has no legal authority to force an agency to make the necessary amendments.
The state comptroller is elected in a secret vote by the Knesset for a period of seven years. The budget of the State Comptroller’s Office is determined by the Knesset Finance Committee to ensure its independence from the executive branch. The Knesset also decides the state comptroller’s salary and holds the power to remove them from office, although no state comptroller has ever been removed from office in Israel.
The State Comptroller’s Office publishes various types of reports, most of which are discussed by the Knesset. The media discusses the major annual report as well as reports it believes are of public interest. For example, the reports on the fire in Carmel in 2008, housing expenses of Prime Minister Netanyahu and issues that could lead to criminal charges have been discussed in the media.
The current state comptroller was appointed in 2019. Upon entering office, the state comptroller announced several changes to how the State Comptroller’s Office would function, including issuing positive reports in addition to negative ones. Furthermore, the state comptroller closed the department responsible for examining corruption issues and made it more difficult for whistleblowers. Because the state comptroller lacks legal authority to enforce his recommendations, his power derives from his personal influence and the media coverage his reports receive. As the present state comptroller has repeatedly expressed a desire to limit his critique of government activities, it appears that the power of the State Comptroller’s Office has diminished.
Citations:
The State Comptroller https://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Pages/default.aspx
Additionally, the state comptroller is responsible for auditing campaign and party finances, and reviewing the accounts and finances of party candidates and government ministers. The office also serves as the State Ombudsman, responding to complaints from the public regarding the organizations under its jurisdiction. The State Comptroller’s Office acts independent, and its reports and conclusions are widely covered in the media and public discourse.
The comptroller reports on government ministries and local authorities. The decision on which issues and departments to investigate lies with the comptroller. The reports are also presented in parliamentary committees. Each agency examined must collaborate with the comptroller. Additionally, each agency must provide a response to the comptroller’s reports and findings, explaining their activities and the corrections being made. The comptroller, however, has no legal authority to force an agency to make the necessary amendments.
The state comptroller is elected in a secret vote by the Knesset for a period of seven years. The budget of the State Comptroller’s Office is determined by the Knesset Finance Committee to ensure its independence from the executive branch. The Knesset also decides the state comptroller’s salary and holds the power to remove them from office, although no state comptroller has ever been removed from office in Israel.
The State Comptroller’s Office publishes various types of reports, most of which are discussed by the Knesset. The media discusses the major annual report as well as reports it believes are of public interest. For example, the reports on the fire in Carmel in 2008, housing expenses of Prime Minister Netanyahu and issues that could lead to criminal charges have been discussed in the media.
The current state comptroller was appointed in 2019. Upon entering office, the state comptroller announced several changes to how the State Comptroller’s Office would function, including issuing positive reports in addition to negative ones. Furthermore, the state comptroller closed the department responsible for examining corruption issues and made it more difficult for whistleblowers. Because the state comptroller lacks legal authority to enforce his recommendations, his power derives from his personal influence and the media coverage his reports receive. As the present state comptroller has repeatedly expressed a desire to limit his critique of government activities, it appears that the power of the State Comptroller’s Office has diminished.
Citations:
The State Comptroller https://www.mevaker.gov.il/he/Pages/default.aspx
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
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1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The Privacy Protection Authority, located within the Ministry of Justice, enforces the Privacy Protection Act (1981) and the Digital Signature Act (2001). It regulates and enforces privacy and personal data issues. According to the Privacy Protection Law, the authority is granted regulatory and enforcement power over personal data. It is responsible for protecting all personal information held in digital databases. The regulation includes administrative and criminal enforcement, and applies to all entities (public and private) in Israel that hold or process personal data.
In January 2024, the European Union categorized Israel’s privacy protections as adequate.
The authority has full discretion over the investigations it conducts. Although its budget is part of the Ministry of Justice’s budget, it is managed separately to ensure independence. The chair of the authority must hold qualifications that make them suitable to be appointed as a judge and have no criminal record or indictment. The chair is appointed for a single six-year tenure. These measures ensure independence.
De facto, the findings of the authority are reported mostly in niche media that handle issues of data and privacy, and do not reach the broader public agenda. The authority has the legal tools needed to initiate criminal investigations and uses these tools when necessary.
In January 2024, the European Union categorized Israel’s privacy protections as adequate.
The authority has full discretion over the investigations it conducts. Although its budget is part of the Ministry of Justice’s budget, it is managed separately to ensure independence. The chair of the authority must hold qualifications that make them suitable to be appointed as a judge and have no criminal record or indictment. The chair is appointed for a single six-year tenure. These measures ensure independence.
De facto, the findings of the authority are reported mostly in niche media that handle issues of data and privacy, and do not reach the broader public agenda. The authority has the legal tools needed to initiate criminal investigations and uses these tools when necessary.
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
Judicial oversight is conducted by the Supreme Court, which oversees government decisions, appointments, rules, regulations, ministerial decisions and legislation. The Supreme Court is not codified but is based on norms and previous rulings. Therefore, the court has broad discretion and autonomy on the subject (Lurie 2023). In the past year, the current government has tried to significantly limit judicial oversight, transferring more power to the executive. This attempt has so far failed due to mass public protests.
Anyone can petition the Supreme Court without having to prove direct damage or personal impact from the decision being challenged. However, the court does not hear all petitions and only a proportion of petitions are accepted.
The judges are appointed by a committee composed of three Supreme Court judges, two representatives of the Law Bar Association, two ministers and two members of the Knesset. This composition limits political interference. To appoint a Supreme Court judge, a majority of seven committee members is required. This ensures consensus and the representation of various interests. However, in the past year, the minister of justice has sought to reform the committee, aiming to politicize it and align the majority of members with the executive. Although the minister failed to reform the committee, he continues to aspire to do so in the future, as evidenced by his refusal over several months to appoint new judges to the committee (an activity under his responsibility).
The Supreme Court, despite its broad discretion, is often reluctant to interfere in politically salient issues and matters of legislation. It prefers to return such cases to the executive or the Knesset, asking them to legislate on the issue. In recent years, the executive has frequently chosen not to decide on various salient issues, forcing the court to intervene, only to later accuse it of interference (Galnoor 2014).
The government complies with the court’s decisions. However, during the judicial overhaul, government ministers threatened not to follow the Supreme Court’s ruling if it overruled the judicial reform. In the end, however, the government followed the court’s decision.
Citations:
Galnoor, I. 2014. “The Judicialization of the Public Sphere in Israel.” Israel Law Review 37 (2–3): 500–542. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002122370001253X
Lurie, G. 2023. “The Invisible Safeguards of Judicial Independence in the Israeli Judiciary.” German Law Journal 24 (8): 1449–1468. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.73
Anyone can petition the Supreme Court without having to prove direct damage or personal impact from the decision being challenged. However, the court does not hear all petitions and only a proportion of petitions are accepted.
The judges are appointed by a committee composed of three Supreme Court judges, two representatives of the Law Bar Association, two ministers and two members of the Knesset. This composition limits political interference. To appoint a Supreme Court judge, a majority of seven committee members is required. This ensures consensus and the representation of various interests. However, in the past year, the minister of justice has sought to reform the committee, aiming to politicize it and align the majority of members with the executive. Although the minister failed to reform the committee, he continues to aspire to do so in the future, as evidenced by his refusal over several months to appoint new judges to the committee (an activity under his responsibility).
The Supreme Court, despite its broad discretion, is often reluctant to interfere in politically salient issues and matters of legislation. It prefers to return such cases to the executive or the Knesset, asking them to legislate on the issue. In recent years, the executive has frequently chosen not to decide on various salient issues, forcing the court to intervene, only to later accuse it of interference (Galnoor 2014).
The government complies with the court’s decisions. However, during the judicial overhaul, government ministers threatened not to follow the Supreme Court’s ruling if it overruled the judicial reform. In the end, however, the government followed the court’s decision.
Citations:
Galnoor, I. 2014. “The Judicialization of the Public Sphere in Israel.” Israel Law Review 37 (2–3): 500–542. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002122370001253X
Lurie, G. 2023. “The Invisible Safeguards of Judicial Independence in the Israeli Judiciary.” German Law Journal 24 (8): 1449–1468. https://doi.org/10.1017/glj.2023.73
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
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There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
Most civil rights in Israel are not constitutionally protected. There are two basic laws that safeguard civil rights – the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. Other civil rights rely on the court’s interpretation of these laws. Consequently, the protection of civil rights hinges on the Supreme Court.
The right of due process is protected by legislation and overseen by the court.
There is a law against discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual orientation or religion. The current government’s coalition agreement aims to change this law, weakening protections against discrimination. However, this has not materialized yet. In addition, the attorney general is responsible for protecting civil rights in policymaking (legislation and decisions).
Over the past year, efforts to overhaul the judiciary have put civil rights protections at risk. Senior politicians argue there is no need for the court to protect civil rights, claiming politicians would assume this role. Additionally, a clause in the coalition agreement signed by the current government proposes to transfer more responsibilities for family issues from the court to religious courts. Although this change has not yet been legislated, if it is it will affect the rights of women, who face discrimination in religious courts. This proposal also demonstrates the limited commitment of many within the government, especially those belonging to religious parties, to protecting civil rights.
Moreover, the police have begun systematically violating civil rights by preventing protests against the government, using extreme violence and arresting protesters without cause, thereby implying a political motivation.
The policies implemented by the state are generally effective in preventing discrimination. The civil service code of conduct emphasizes the prevention of discrimination and the importance of impartial service provision. Government practices and procedures are also impartial. There is affirmative action for women in the civil service, along with special positions opened for various minorities to increase equity and diversity. Additionally, each ministry should meet a quota for recruiting people with disabilities or an Arab background. According to the State Comptroller (2021), the outcomes of these measures are limited and insufficient. Although more employees come from disadvantaged groups, they are often not recruited to managerial positions. Furthermore, the 10% goal for recruiting Arab employees has not been updated for many years and does not reflect their share in the population or labor force.
There has been significant progress toward equality for same-sex couples and families. Recently, the right to adoption was also expanded to include same-sex couples and there are laws against workplace discrimination.
All individuals have access to the court system and, as mentioned earlier, the ability to petition the Supreme Court was expanded to increase access.
Citations:
State Comptroller. 2021. “Inclusive employment of various populations in the civil service.” https://www.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Pages/Reports/7302-8.aspx
The right of due process is protected by legislation and overseen by the court.
There is a law against discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual orientation or religion. The current government’s coalition agreement aims to change this law, weakening protections against discrimination. However, this has not materialized yet. In addition, the attorney general is responsible for protecting civil rights in policymaking (legislation and decisions).
Over the past year, efforts to overhaul the judiciary have put civil rights protections at risk. Senior politicians argue there is no need for the court to protect civil rights, claiming politicians would assume this role. Additionally, a clause in the coalition agreement signed by the current government proposes to transfer more responsibilities for family issues from the court to religious courts. Although this change has not yet been legislated, if it is it will affect the rights of women, who face discrimination in religious courts. This proposal also demonstrates the limited commitment of many within the government, especially those belonging to religious parties, to protecting civil rights.
Moreover, the police have begun systematically violating civil rights by preventing protests against the government, using extreme violence and arresting protesters without cause, thereby implying a political motivation.
The policies implemented by the state are generally effective in preventing discrimination. The civil service code of conduct emphasizes the prevention of discrimination and the importance of impartial service provision. Government practices and procedures are also impartial. There is affirmative action for women in the civil service, along with special positions opened for various minorities to increase equity and diversity. Additionally, each ministry should meet a quota for recruiting people with disabilities or an Arab background. According to the State Comptroller (2021), the outcomes of these measures are limited and insufficient. Although more employees come from disadvantaged groups, they are often not recruited to managerial positions. Furthermore, the 10% goal for recruiting Arab employees has not been updated for many years and does not reflect their share in the population or labor force.
There has been significant progress toward equality for same-sex couples and families. Recently, the right to adoption was also expanded to include same-sex couples and there are laws against workplace discrimination.
All individuals have access to the court system and, as mentioned earlier, the ability to petition the Supreme Court was expanded to increase access.
Citations:
State Comptroller. 2021. “Inclusive employment of various populations in the civil service.” https://www.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Pages/Reports/7302-8.aspx
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
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Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
The Department of the Accountant General in the Ministry of Finance is responsible for budget execution and government contracting. This department ensures that all government communications comply with the law. It has the authority to withhold funds or halt communications if it deems them illegal or problematic. Each ministry has a permanent employee from the general accounting office. The department is regarded as very powerful, and the accountant in each ministry often succeeds in preventing corruption or misuse of power.
The law on party funding limits private donations to political parties and candidates. Individual candidates can receive donations of ILS 1,000–2,000 from each donor, while a political party can receive donations of no more than ILS 5,000 from each donor. Parties represented in the Knesset receive funding from the state.
Each officeholder must submit a conflict of interest statement as well as a statement of assets. In practice, many ministers and members of the Knesset do not comply, and enforcement is very weak. Each party or candidate is required by law to publish all sources of donations received, including the donor’s identity and the amount. This regulation is followed.
The state comptroller is responsible for overseeing party donation rules. After each election, the state comptroller issues a report detailing violations of the Party Funding Law. However, the comptroller lacks sanctioning powers and, as a result, parties often disregard the imposed fines.
The law on party funding limits private donations to political parties and candidates. Individual candidates can receive donations of ILS 1,000–2,000 from each donor, while a political party can receive donations of no more than ILS 5,000 from each donor. Parties represented in the Knesset receive funding from the state.
Each officeholder must submit a conflict of interest statement as well as a statement of assets. In practice, many ministers and members of the Knesset do not comply, and enforcement is very weak. Each party or candidate is required by law to publish all sources of donations received, including the donor’s identity and the amount. This regulation is followed.
The state comptroller is responsible for overseeing party donation rules. After each election, the state comptroller issues a report detailing violations of the Party Funding Law. However, the comptroller lacks sanctioning powers and, as a result, parties often disregard the imposed fines.
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Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Each member of the Knesset has three assistants who are hired directly. Each member of the Knesset also has a personal budget to use at their discretion. In addition, members of the Knesset can utilize the resources of the Knesset Research and Information Center. The center has significantly increased its staff in the last couple of years and now has about 50 full-time employees. The center publishes about 300 research papers a year, including budget assessments for bills, policy papers and comparative reviews on specific issues. It can also respond to short questions from members of the Knesset. This significantly improves the analytical capacity of members of the Knesset and, as a result, enhances their oversight ability. Demand for the center’s papers and evaluations increases every year.
In addition, each committee chair has a legal advisor who can assist with legislation brought before the committee and the Knesset has a legal advisory department to assist members of the Knesset.
At the same time, the budget for each member of the Knesset is limited and typically used for political purposes rather than research. Although the number of assistants increased from two to three, it remains insufficient. One assistant generally handles media issues, another oversees legislation and only one is responsible for all other tasks, including oversight. Furthermore, while some members of the Knesset have very experienced assistants, many others recruit young, inexperienced assistants who are frequently replaced. This high turnover is partly due to the relatively low salaries. Thus, although members of the Knesset have greater access to resources than before, these resources remain insufficient for effective oversight.
In addition, each committee chair has a legal advisor who can assist with legislation brought before the committee and the Knesset has a legal advisory department to assist members of the Knesset.
At the same time, the budget for each member of the Knesset is limited and typically used for political purposes rather than research. Although the number of assistants increased from two to three, it remains insufficient. One assistant generally handles media issues, another oversees legislation and only one is responsible for all other tasks, including oversight. Furthermore, while some members of the Knesset have very experienced assistants, many others recruit young, inexperienced assistants who are frequently replaced. This high turnover is partly due to the relatively low salaries. Thus, although members of the Knesset have greater access to resources than before, these resources remain insufficient for effective oversight.
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
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The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
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The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
In general, Knesset committees in Israel are considered weak compared to parliamentary committees in other countries. Each member of the Knesset is a member of several committees, which is problematic because they cannot attend all the meetings, making it more difficult to professionalize. The norm that committees are chaired by members of the opposition has been violated in the last four years. This further reduces committee powers (Hazan 2001).
Knesset committees can summon any official in the executive and request any information. While representatives of the executive are not legally obligated to appear before a committee or present documents, they have typically appeared before committees. However, in recent years, there have been increasing instances of ministers instructing their officials not to appear before a committee, which has weakened the Knesset’s oversight power.
Each committee holds at least one meeting a year with the respective minister, during which the minister introduces the ministry’s work plan for the upcoming year. This usually occurs during deliberations for the annual budget. The minister answers the committee’s questions and high-ranking officials always accompany the minister to address additional inquiries.
Committees often ask for documents, which are frequently not provided on time. This is either because the ministry does not have the information or because it is trying to delay the response. In most cases, however, the information is eventually provided, even when it is uncomfortable for the government.
Members of the Knesset frequently use parliamentary questions as a tool to obtain information. However, ministers often do not provide answers in a reasonable timeframe and some ignore the questions altogether. There is no mechanism to compel ministers to respond.
Citations:
Hazan, Reuven. 2001. Reforming Parliamentary Committees: Israel in Comparative Perspective. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Knesset committees can summon any official in the executive and request any information. While representatives of the executive are not legally obligated to appear before a committee or present documents, they have typically appeared before committees. However, in recent years, there have been increasing instances of ministers instructing their officials not to appear before a committee, which has weakened the Knesset’s oversight power.
Each committee holds at least one meeting a year with the respective minister, during which the minister introduces the ministry’s work plan for the upcoming year. This usually occurs during deliberations for the annual budget. The minister answers the committee’s questions and high-ranking officials always accompany the minister to address additional inquiries.
Committees often ask for documents, which are frequently not provided on time. This is either because the ministry does not have the information or because it is trying to delay the response. In most cases, however, the information is eventually provided, even when it is uncomfortable for the government.
Members of the Knesset frequently use parliamentary questions as a tool to obtain information. However, ministers often do not provide answers in a reasonable timeframe and some ignore the questions altogether. There is no mechanism to compel ministers to respond.
Citations:
Hazan, Reuven. 2001. Reforming Parliamentary Committees: Israel in Comparative Perspective. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
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The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
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The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
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The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
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The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
The Knesset has the authority to establish a parliamentary inquiry committee. To do so, a majority in the plenum is required. This makes it difficult for the opposition to establish such a committee.
Even if such a committee is established, the law does not define its legal mandate. Therefore, parliamentary inquiry committees lack the authority to compel witnesses to appear before the committee and their powers are similar to those of a regular parliamentary committee. Over the years, several dozen such committees have been formed. However, while the respective reports were often critical of the government, the recommendations were rarely implemented.
Even if such a committee is established, the law does not define its legal mandate. Therefore, parliamentary inquiry committees lack the authority to compel witnesses to appear before the committee and their powers are similar to those of a regular parliamentary committee. Over the years, several dozen such committees have been formed. However, while the respective reports were often critical of the government, the recommendations were rarely implemented.
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
In the Israeli Knesset, there is alignment between the task areas of Knesset committees and government ministries. In general, there are fewer committees than ministries. Some committees oversee only one ministry. For example, the Immigration and Absorption Committee oversees the Ministry of Absorption. Other committees oversee many ministries. The Economic Affairs Committee oversees the ministries of transportation, energy, environment, communication, economy, agriculture and tourism. The Economic Affairs Committee is, therefore, overwhelmed with both oversight and legislative tasks. Most committees, however, are less overwhelmed, overseeing two or three ministries, most of which do not produce much legislation.
The cross-cutting issues of finance and legal matters are addressed by the Finance Committee, and the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, respectively. By having each committee handle specific ministries, they can specialize in their respective issue areas.
The committees meet three times a week, with two or three meetings each day. This schedule allows for the discussion of many issues.
A member of the opposition chaired the Economic Affairs Committee until 2019, when they were replaced by a member of the coalition government. Today, only marginal Knesset committees are chaired by members of the opposition.
Draft legislation often changes following committee deliberations. There are, however, some important exceptions. The judicial reform suggested by Minister of Justice Levin was deliberated for a very short period and remained unchanged following the deliberation.
The cross-cutting issues of finance and legal matters are addressed by the Finance Committee, and the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, respectively. By having each committee handle specific ministries, they can specialize in their respective issue areas.
The committees meet three times a week, with two or three meetings each day. This schedule allows for the discussion of many issues.
A member of the opposition chaired the Economic Affairs Committee until 2019, when they were replaced by a member of the coalition government. Today, only marginal Knesset committees are chaired by members of the opposition.
Draft legislation often changes following committee deliberations. There are, however, some important exceptions. The judicial reform suggested by Minister of Justice Levin was deliberated for a very short period and remained unchanged following the deliberation.