Coordination
#20Key Findings
In the category of coordination, Italy falls into the sample’s lower-middle ranks (rank 20).
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has gained influence in recent years, increasingly coordinating ministerial policies. On key issues, the PMO engages in comprehensive consultation with ministries throughout the drafting process. Despite taking more power, the PMO has limited technical and analytical capacities.
Interministerial committees facilitate the exchange of information and opinions on draft policy solutions. Informal meetings between ministerial cabinet heads and the political parties in the governing coalition are common.
Coordination and consultation mechanisms with regions and municipalities include several formal multilevel bodies. Minimum service-level standards are sparse, with healthcare being the primary area in which such standards have been clearly designed and somewhat implemented.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has gained influence in recent years, increasingly coordinating ministerial policies. On key issues, the PMO engages in comprehensive consultation with ministries throughout the drafting process. Despite taking more power, the PMO has limited technical and analytical capacities.
Interministerial committees facilitate the exchange of information and opinions on draft policy solutions. Informal meetings between ministerial cabinet heads and the political parties in the governing coalition are common.
Coordination and consultation mechanisms with regions and municipalities include several formal multilevel bodies. Minimum service-level standards are sparse, with healthcare being the primary area in which such standards have been clearly designed and somewhat implemented.
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To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
8
7
6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
5
4
3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
The administrative structure of the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministers is complex and intricate. As of 2024, it comprises 18 departments responsible for various functional areas, ranging from equal opportunity policies to civil protection coordination, and from European policy coordination to anti-drug policies. Additionally, 10 support offices provide coordination functions, general political direction, and technical-managerial support to the president. There are also seven ad hoc units established by the Premier through a special mission structure to perform specific tasks or implement specific programs. The duration of these structures, specified in the establishing act, does not exceed that of the government that established them. This organizational structure employs approximately 2,000 permanent employees as of 2018, according to the latest official data.
This organizational structure is further supported by the direct collaboration offices of ministers without portfolio, who coordinate the main PMO departments. The number of these offices varies depending on the president of the Council.
Over the past 30 years, since the crisis of the First Republic, two significant characteristics have emerged in decision-making coordination processes. Firstly, the role of the prime minister has become more influential, enhancing the political coordination capabilities of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Concurrently, the State General Accounting Office, part of the Ministry of the Treasury, has grown in importance and plays a crucial role in every decision with significant spending implications. The State General Accounting Office is considered one of the most competent administrations, with strong technical and analytical capabilities. In contrast, the PMO is characterized by a more diverse range of technical and analytical capabilities that are primarily based on a legal background.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is regularly kept informed about policy proposals generated by line ministries. For proposals of particular political relevance to the government, the consultation process begins at the early stages of drafting and is more comprehensive, involving not only formal but also substantive issues. In fields less directly connected with the main missions of the government, exchanges are less intensive.
The process of co-drafting ministerial policies was strongly reinforced under the Draghi government due to the prime minister’s individual leadership. However, the Draghi government assigned the responsibility for coordinating and governing the policies for implementing the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) to the Ministry of the Treasury, considering it more technically equipped for this task. The Meloni government followed a similar approach, emphasizing strong political coordination of ministerial policies but transferring responsibility for the NRRP from the Treasury to the PMO under the direct oversight of the prime minister. The effects of this decision are not yet evident; however, it is suggested that it may render the NRRP implementation process less efficient due to the PMO’s limited technical and analytical capacities.
In summary, there is a trend toward vertical policy coordination, driven primarily by political factors. The bureaucratic aspect of coordination is less prominent. When there is no political focus on particular policies or programs, coordination tends to be weak, as the bureaucracy responds only reactively.
Citations:
on the organization and the staff of the PMO:
https://www.governo.it/it/organizzazione/uffici-dipartimenti-strutture/69
https://presidenza.governo.it/amministrazionetrasparente/personale/index.html
Capano, G., Cavalieri, A., and Pritoni, A. 2023. “Bureaucratic Policy Work and Analytical Capacities in Central Administrations in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain: The Results of a Comparative Survey.” International Review of Administrative Sciences, online first, August 1.
Cassese S., Melloni A., Pajno A., eds. 2022. I presidenti e la presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri nell’Italia repubblicana, Storia, politica, istituzioni. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Di Mascio, F., A. Natalini, and S. Profeti. 2022. “The Draghi Government Put to the Test by the National Recovery and Resilience Plan.” Contemporary Italian Politics 14 (4): 402-408.
This organizational structure is further supported by the direct collaboration offices of ministers without portfolio, who coordinate the main PMO departments. The number of these offices varies depending on the president of the Council.
Over the past 30 years, since the crisis of the First Republic, two significant characteristics have emerged in decision-making coordination processes. Firstly, the role of the prime minister has become more influential, enhancing the political coordination capabilities of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO). Concurrently, the State General Accounting Office, part of the Ministry of the Treasury, has grown in importance and plays a crucial role in every decision with significant spending implications. The State General Accounting Office is considered one of the most competent administrations, with strong technical and analytical capabilities. In contrast, the PMO is characterized by a more diverse range of technical and analytical capabilities that are primarily based on a legal background.
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is regularly kept informed about policy proposals generated by line ministries. For proposals of particular political relevance to the government, the consultation process begins at the early stages of drafting and is more comprehensive, involving not only formal but also substantive issues. In fields less directly connected with the main missions of the government, exchanges are less intensive.
The process of co-drafting ministerial policies was strongly reinforced under the Draghi government due to the prime minister’s individual leadership. However, the Draghi government assigned the responsibility for coordinating and governing the policies for implementing the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP) to the Ministry of the Treasury, considering it more technically equipped for this task. The Meloni government followed a similar approach, emphasizing strong political coordination of ministerial policies but transferring responsibility for the NRRP from the Treasury to the PMO under the direct oversight of the prime minister. The effects of this decision are not yet evident; however, it is suggested that it may render the NRRP implementation process less efficient due to the PMO’s limited technical and analytical capacities.
In summary, there is a trend toward vertical policy coordination, driven primarily by political factors. The bureaucratic aspect of coordination is less prominent. When there is no political focus on particular policies or programs, coordination tends to be weak, as the bureaucracy responds only reactively.
Citations:
on the organization and the staff of the PMO:
https://www.governo.it/it/organizzazione/uffici-dipartimenti-strutture/69
https://presidenza.governo.it/amministrazionetrasparente/personale/index.html
Capano, G., Cavalieri, A., and Pritoni, A. 2023. “Bureaucratic Policy Work and Analytical Capacities in Central Administrations in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain: The Results of a Comparative Survey.” International Review of Administrative Sciences, online first, August 1.
Cassese S., Melloni A., Pajno A., eds. 2022. I presidenti e la presidenza del Consiglio dei ministri nell’Italia repubblicana, Storia, politica, istituzioni. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Di Mascio, F., A. Natalini, and S. Profeti. 2022. “The Draghi Government Put to the Test by the National Recovery and Resilience Plan.” Contemporary Italian Politics 14 (4): 402-408.
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
8
7
6
7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
5
4
3
4
3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
2
1
1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
The bureaucratic aspect of policy formulation at the centralized national level remains a concealed process, insufficiently examined by scholars. Here are the main features of the bureaucratic side of policy formulation from a formal point of view:
Interministerial committees: Various interministerial committees are responsible for exchanging information, evidence-based opinions, and ideas to advise the government on specific draft policy solutions. The most important committees deal with economic and financial matters, including the Interministerial Committee on Credit and Savings, the Committee for the Planning and Coordination of Financial Education Initiatives, the Committee on Accounting Principles, and the Interministerial Committee on Economic Planning.
Use of information technology: The use of IT in interministerial coordination has increased following COVID-19, though it remains insufficient for drafting policy texts.
Lack of organizational incentives: There is no significant organizational or structural incentive to coordinate.
Pre-consultation practices: Pre-consultation among ministerial offices is routinely conducted before cabinet meetings in the “Pre-consiglio” (Pre-cabinet) under the aegis of the DAGL (Department for Legal and Legislative Matters of the Presidency of the Council). The head of DAGL is a powerful figure in the administrative dimension of the cabinet and holds a political role due to a direct link with the president of the Council. The Ministry of the Treasury also serves as the central point of reference for any pre-consultation activity.
Overall, the use of information technology in drafting policy texts is insufficient, and positive coordination is less widespread than it should be. Effective coordination depends on the proactive roles of the Treasury or the PMO. It is important to note that many crucial issues are effectively handled through consultations between a few ministers and their ministerial cabinets before being brought to the Council of Ministers or deferred to this procedure after a preliminary discussion in the council. These consultations usually involve the treasury.
Citations:
Piccirilli, G. 2022. “Lo (scarso) impiego delle nuove tecnologie da parte del Governo nella redazione degli atti.” Osservatorio sulle Fonti no. 2: 311-320.
REV: on the functions of DAGL see: https://presidenza.governo.it/DAGL/index.html
Interministerial committees: Various interministerial committees are responsible for exchanging information, evidence-based opinions, and ideas to advise the government on specific draft policy solutions. The most important committees deal with economic and financial matters, including the Interministerial Committee on Credit and Savings, the Committee for the Planning and Coordination of Financial Education Initiatives, the Committee on Accounting Principles, and the Interministerial Committee on Economic Planning.
Use of information technology: The use of IT in interministerial coordination has increased following COVID-19, though it remains insufficient for drafting policy texts.
Lack of organizational incentives: There is no significant organizational or structural incentive to coordinate.
Pre-consultation practices: Pre-consultation among ministerial offices is routinely conducted before cabinet meetings in the “Pre-consiglio” (Pre-cabinet) under the aegis of the DAGL (Department for Legal and Legislative Matters of the Presidency of the Council). The head of DAGL is a powerful figure in the administrative dimension of the cabinet and holds a political role due to a direct link with the president of the Council. The Ministry of the Treasury also serves as the central point of reference for any pre-consultation activity.
Overall, the use of information technology in drafting policy texts is insufficient, and positive coordination is less widespread than it should be. Effective coordination depends on the proactive roles of the Treasury or the PMO. It is important to note that many crucial issues are effectively handled through consultations between a few ministers and their ministerial cabinets before being brought to the Council of Ministers or deferred to this procedure after a preliminary discussion in the council. These consultations usually involve the treasury.
Citations:
Piccirilli, G. 2022. “Lo (scarso) impiego delle nuove tecnologie da parte del Governo nella redazione degli atti.” Osservatorio sulle Fonti no. 2: 311-320.
REV: on the functions of DAGL see: https://presidenza.governo.it/DAGL/index.html
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal meetings are common in the policymaking process. There are regular meetings between the heads of ministerial cabinets as well as between the political parties that make up the ruling majority. Due to the regionalized nature of the Italian political system, meetings between different levels of government – ministries, regions, and municipalities – are ongoing.
Generally, most of these informal meetings are organized to help coordinate efforts at all levels. These meetings are also believed to eliminate many technical issues that could lead to political problems.
Generally, most of these informal meetings are organized to help coordinate efforts at all levels. These meetings are also believed to eliminate many technical issues that could lead to political problems.
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To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
10
9
9
The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
2
1
1
The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
The issue of establishing a minimum standard for public services in Italy is highly complex. Law No. 42 of 2009 on fiscal federalism aimed to address this through several mechanisms: taxation of state transfers, estimation of standard expenditure requirements for territorial authorities, new equalization mechanisms to balance the differences between entities’ fiscal capacities and their needs, convergence toward minimum service standards for all entities, and infrastructure equalization through special interventions. However, these measures have only been partially implemented and are not fully developed in terms of content. Italian policymakers have limited the scope of minimum standards to three main areas: health, welfare, and education (assigned to the Regions under current regulations), and local public transport concerning capital expenditure. The only system of minimum standards that has been clearly designed and somewhat implemented pertains to healthcare. A detailed list of minimum standards is created at the national level for the regions, which are responsible for providing healthcare. A national committee chaired by the Minister of Health conducts annual monitoring, which has revealed significant variations in regional capacity to meet these standards. In the latest monitoring (2021, published in 2023), seven regions did not meet the standards. Notably, these regions do not incur significant costs for failing to meet the standards. Although there was a provision to cut their public funds by 3%, it was never implemented.
Regarding education, the minimum standards set by the state are very general. Decree Law No. 226 of 2005 includes requirements such as meeting attendance demand, providing guidance and tutoring, supporting educational continuity, implementing training apprenticeships and alternate experiences related to professional figures, and acquiring IT and English skills. These standards are formal, not clearly defined, and difficult to monitor.
The 2022 budget law, approved in December 2021, established the first minimum social welfare standards. These include providing 30 nursery places per 100 children aged 3 to 36 months and employing one social worker per 6,500 inhabitants by 2026 in every Italian municipality.
For national standards in utilities (e.g., water, electricity, and telecoms), independent authorities are generally responsible for their definition and implementation. Implementation in this area has been fairly adequate.
Overall, there is no firm government policy on minimum standards for relevant policy fields. Utilities appear to have fair policies due to their distinct management characteristics. Where these standards exist, there is no central policy to correct or adjust local situations where they are not met.
On March 23, 2023, the center-right government presented its bill on differentiated autonomy to parliament. This legislation would allow regions to gain more power in 23 policy areas, provided they guarantee a specific minimum standard for each new policy competence they wish to acquire. The definition of these minimum standards is currently under discussion. The government has set up a committee of 61 experts to develop a proposal.
A significant issue with implementing differentiated autonomy is the allocation of financial resources. Without a robust central redistribution fund, the resources available to less affluent regions would be insufficient to meet minimum standards in critical areas.
Citations:
https://www.salute.gov.it/portale/lea/dettaglioContenutiLea.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=1300&area=Lea&menu=leaEssn
Napolitano, G.M. 2023. Finalmente i livelli.
essenziali delle prestazioni sociali? La legge di bilancio 2022 tra ambiguità e nuovi sviluppi. Diritti regionali n. 1: 51-134
Regarding education, the minimum standards set by the state are very general. Decree Law No. 226 of 2005 includes requirements such as meeting attendance demand, providing guidance and tutoring, supporting educational continuity, implementing training apprenticeships and alternate experiences related to professional figures, and acquiring IT and English skills. These standards are formal, not clearly defined, and difficult to monitor.
The 2022 budget law, approved in December 2021, established the first minimum social welfare standards. These include providing 30 nursery places per 100 children aged 3 to 36 months and employing one social worker per 6,500 inhabitants by 2026 in every Italian municipality.
For national standards in utilities (e.g., water, electricity, and telecoms), independent authorities are generally responsible for their definition and implementation. Implementation in this area has been fairly adequate.
Overall, there is no firm government policy on minimum standards for relevant policy fields. Utilities appear to have fair policies due to their distinct management characteristics. Where these standards exist, there is no central policy to correct or adjust local situations where they are not met.
On March 23, 2023, the center-right government presented its bill on differentiated autonomy to parliament. This legislation would allow regions to gain more power in 23 policy areas, provided they guarantee a specific minimum standard for each new policy competence they wish to acquire. The definition of these minimum standards is currently under discussion. The government has set up a committee of 61 experts to develop a proposal.
A significant issue with implementing differentiated autonomy is the allocation of financial resources. Without a robust central redistribution fund, the resources available to less affluent regions would be insufficient to meet minimum standards in critical areas.
Citations:
https://www.salute.gov.it/portale/lea/dettaglioContenutiLea.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=1300&area=Lea&menu=leaEssn
Napolitano, G.M. 2023. Finalmente i livelli.
essenziali delle prestazioni sociali? La legge di bilancio 2022 tra ambiguità e nuovi sviluppi. Diritti regionali n. 1: 51-134
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
10
9
9
National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
2
1
1
There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Multilevel governance in Italy has facilitated the development of formal coordination and consultation mechanisms with regions and municipalities. The primary instruments for this purpose are the State-Regions Conference (Conferenza Permanente per i Rapporti tra lo Stato, le Regioni e le Province Autonome di Trento e Bolzano) and the State-Municipalities-Local Autonomies Conference (Conferenza Stato-Città ed Autonomie Locali), both of which meet at least monthly. Local authorities also use their associations, the Conference of Italian Regions and the National Association of Italian Municipalities, to exert influence on national authorities.
According to the Interactive Rule Index, Italy does not score highly in terms of interaction between different levels of government. However, during the Draghi government (February 2021 – October 2022), subnational governments were largely excluded from the process of formulating the National Resilience and Recovery Plan. This marked a departure from the long-standing cooperation between different levels of government. This decision seems deliberate, aimed at avoiding excessive compromises, and reflects the Draghi government’s lack of trust in the regions’ ability to be proactive and efficient in both the formulation and implementation of the plan.
Aside from this exception, the central government is in constant contact with the regions and municipalities. Consultation and negotiation are common tools in policy formulation and implementation. However, the dynamics of interaction are often influenced by the political alignment between the central government and subnational governments. For example, following the dramatic floods that hit the Emilia Romagna region in May 2023, significant contrasts emerged between the regional and national governments regarding the recovery process and the slowness with which public funds were delivered to the affected areas.
Citations:
Profeti, Stefania, and Brunetta Baldi. 2021. “Le regioni italiane e il PNRR: la (vana) ricerca di canali d’accesso all’agenda.” Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche 2021 (3): 431-457.
Brunetta Baldi and Stefania Profeti. 2022. “Le regioni nel sistema politico: venti splendide cinquantenni?” In Il sistema politico italiano. Cittadini, attori e istituzioni, eds. Milano: Mondadori Università, 278-303.
REV: on the State-Regions Conference see https://www.statoregioni.it/it/conferenza-stato-regioni/, on the State-Cities Conference see: http://www.conferenzastatocitta.it/home/
According to the Interactive Rule Index, Italy does not score highly in terms of interaction between different levels of government. However, during the Draghi government (February 2021 – October 2022), subnational governments were largely excluded from the process of formulating the National Resilience and Recovery Plan. This marked a departure from the long-standing cooperation between different levels of government. This decision seems deliberate, aimed at avoiding excessive compromises, and reflects the Draghi government’s lack of trust in the regions’ ability to be proactive and efficient in both the formulation and implementation of the plan.
Aside from this exception, the central government is in constant contact with the regions and municipalities. Consultation and negotiation are common tools in policy formulation and implementation. However, the dynamics of interaction are often influenced by the political alignment between the central government and subnational governments. For example, following the dramatic floods that hit the Emilia Romagna region in May 2023, significant contrasts emerged between the regional and national governments regarding the recovery process and the slowness with which public funds were delivered to the affected areas.
Citations:
Profeti, Stefania, and Brunetta Baldi. 2021. “Le regioni italiane e il PNRR: la (vana) ricerca di canali d’accesso all’agenda.” Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche 2021 (3): 431-457.
Brunetta Baldi and Stefania Profeti. 2022. “Le regioni nel sistema politico: venti splendide cinquantenni?” In Il sistema politico italiano. Cittadini, attori e istituzioni, eds. Milano: Mondadori Università, 278-303.
REV: on the State-Regions Conference see https://www.statoregioni.it/it/conferenza-stato-regioni/, on the State-Cities Conference see: http://www.conferenzastatocitta.it/home/