Horizontal Accountability
#22Key Findings
Italy performs relatively poorly (rank 22) in the area of horizontal accountability.
The Court of Audit is an independent judicial body. Following recent political tensions, it has lost some review powers. The data protection authority has broad powers, but limited financial resources and politized appointments have hindered its effectiveness.
The judiciary enjoys a robust autonomy protecting it from political interference. Court proceedings are often slow. Overcrowded prison conditions have raised human rights concerns. Implementation of antidiscrimination provisions remains uneven. Corruption remains a pervasive problem within the administration.
Increasingly strict anti-migration laws have raised humanitarian concerns. Critics say an agreement to transfer some migrants to Albania may violate national and EU laws. The legislature has sufficient resources and powers to carry out its monitoring functions, but has lost influence relative to the executive in recent years.
The Court of Audit is an independent judicial body. Following recent political tensions, it has lost some review powers. The data protection authority has broad powers, but limited financial resources and politized appointments have hindered its effectiveness.
The judiciary enjoys a robust autonomy protecting it from political interference. Court proceedings are often slow. Overcrowded prison conditions have raised human rights concerns. Implementation of antidiscrimination provisions remains uneven. Corruption remains a pervasive problem within the administration.
Increasingly strict anti-migration laws have raised humanitarian concerns. Critics say an agreement to transfer some migrants to Albania may violate national and EU laws. The legislature has sufficient resources and powers to carry out its monitoring functions, but has lost influence relative to the executive in recent years.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
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3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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1
There is no independent and effective audit office.
The Italian Court of Audit (Corte dei Conti) is a constitutional body responsible for oversight and judicial functions in public accounting and related legal matters. It also offers expert advice to the government, parliament, and local authorities when requested.
Article 100 of the Italian constitution mandates that the Court of Audit conduct a preventive evaluation of the legality of government actions and assess subsequent state budget management. In jurisdictional matters, the Court has the authority to adjudicate cases involving accountants, administrators, and public officials for all aspects of public resource management.
The leadership of the Court of Audit consists of a board of presidency, which includes a president, four members selected by parliament, four members elected from among the Court’s magistrates, and the Court’s general prosecutor. The president is appointed by decree of the president of the republic on the recommendation of the president of the Council of Ministers. The board’s elected members serve four-year terms and are ineligible for reelection for eight years after their term ends. The Court regularly reports its findings to parliament but is not accountable to it, as it stands as an independent judicial body.
Recently, the Court of Audit has been at the center of public debate due to its oversight responsibilities associated with the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP). The Court’s 2023 report on public finance coordination emphasized that Italy is significantly lagging in spending European funds. This finding prompted a strong response from the Meloni government, which deemed the Court’s attitude counterproductive. These remarks were followed by the approval of Decree Law 44/2023, which reduces the Court’s concurrent control function. The role of the Court in implementing the NRRP, as clarified in a government declaration, is thus successive.
Citations:
Report on public finance coordination: https://www.corteconti.it/Download?id=ddfd70d1-1d57-46c6-b12c-6c0001670bb7
REV: A public statement of the government clarified the role of the Corte dei Conti re NRRP:
www.governo.it/it/articolo/norme-riguardanti-la-corte-dei-conti-e-i-controlli-sul-pnrr-nota-di-palazzo-chigi/22788
Article 100 of the Italian constitution mandates that the Court of Audit conduct a preventive evaluation of the legality of government actions and assess subsequent state budget management. In jurisdictional matters, the Court has the authority to adjudicate cases involving accountants, administrators, and public officials for all aspects of public resource management.
The leadership of the Court of Audit consists of a board of presidency, which includes a president, four members selected by parliament, four members elected from among the Court’s magistrates, and the Court’s general prosecutor. The president is appointed by decree of the president of the republic on the recommendation of the president of the Council of Ministers. The board’s elected members serve four-year terms and are ineligible for reelection for eight years after their term ends. The Court regularly reports its findings to parliament but is not accountable to it, as it stands as an independent judicial body.
Recently, the Court of Audit has been at the center of public debate due to its oversight responsibilities associated with the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP). The Court’s 2023 report on public finance coordination emphasized that Italy is significantly lagging in spending European funds. This finding prompted a strong response from the Meloni government, which deemed the Court’s attitude counterproductive. These remarks were followed by the approval of Decree Law 44/2023, which reduces the Court’s concurrent control function. The role of the Court in implementing the NRRP, as clarified in a government declaration, is thus successive.
Citations:
Report on public finance coordination: https://www.corteconti.it/Download?id=ddfd70d1-1d57-46c6-b12c-6c0001670bb7
REV: A public statement of the government clarified the role of the Corte dei Conti re NRRP:
www.governo.it/it/articolo/norme-riguardanti-la-corte-dei-conti-e-i-controlli-sul-pnrr-nota-di-palazzo-chigi/22788
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
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9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
8
7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The Italian Data Protection Authority (Garante per la Protezione dei Dati Personali, or GPDP) was established in 1996 by Law 675 and further regulated by Legislative Decree 196/2003, which provided a comprehensive data protection framework. In 2018, the GPDP underwent significant changes following Legislative Decree 101/2018, which implemented the GDPR in Italy.
The GPDP is responsible for protecting the privacy of individuals in Italy. It monitors compliance with data protection laws, examines complaints, provides feedback to the government, and issues opinions on new legislation. Additionally, the GPDP offers advice to institutions on applying data protection laws.
The GPDP has a wide range of powers, including adopting guidelines and codes of conduct, conducting on-site inspections, imposing administrative sanctions, and ordering the rectification or deletion of personal data. A four-member board governs the GPDP. The members are elected by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate from a pool of candidates who submit their applications through a public selection process. The board’s term is seven years and cannot be renewed.
Although the GPDP is intended to operate independently of political influence, the appointment of its board members often reflects political considerations rather than professional expertise. This, along with the GPDP’s limited financial resources and staffing, can hinder its effectiveness. However, the relatively short tenure of Italian governments compared to the board’s term of office and the increasing influence of European data protection regulations provide the GPDP with some degree of autonomy and influence.
Citations:
Financial resources (2022): https://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9906258
Staff. 2022. “https://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9845410”
The GPDP is responsible for protecting the privacy of individuals in Italy. It monitors compliance with data protection laws, examines complaints, provides feedback to the government, and issues opinions on new legislation. Additionally, the GPDP offers advice to institutions on applying data protection laws.
The GPDP has a wide range of powers, including adopting guidelines and codes of conduct, conducting on-site inspections, imposing administrative sanctions, and ordering the rectification or deletion of personal data. A four-member board governs the GPDP. The members are elected by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate from a pool of candidates who submit their applications through a public selection process. The board’s term is seven years and cannot be renewed.
Although the GPDP is intended to operate independently of political influence, the appointment of its board members often reflects political considerations rather than professional expertise. This, along with the GPDP’s limited financial resources and staffing, can hinder its effectiveness. However, the relatively short tenure of Italian governments compared to the board’s term of office and the increasing influence of European data protection regulations provide the GPDP with some degree of autonomy and influence.
Citations:
Financial resources (2022): https://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9906258
Staff. 2022. “https://www.garanteprivacy.it/web/guest/home/docweb/-/docweb-display/docweb/9845410”
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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9
The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
8
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The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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3
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
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1
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
The Italian government and administration operate within a robust legal framework that establishes the rule of law. This framework is upheld by a multilayered system of oversight, including the Constitutional Court and a network of local, regional, and national courts. The government’s meticulous adherence to legal principles ensures highly predictable and impartial actions. This commitment to the rule of law is further validated by the V-Dem project’s expert assessment (2023), which assigns Italy a high score on the Rule of Law Index, measuring transparency, independence, predictability, impartiality, and equality of law enforcement, as well as the adherence of government officials to the law.
Italian courts play a pivotal role in the country’s political landscape, exercising significant influence over various aspects of democratic governance. The judicial system enjoys robust autonomy from the executive branch, ensuring independence from political interference. Judges’ and prosecutors’ recruitment, appointment, and career progression are managed by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (CSM), a representative body elected by the judiciary and partially by parliament, safeguarding impartiality and preventing undue influence from the executive.
While these institutional arrangements protect the overall independence of the judiciary as a collective entity, concerns persist regarding the internal independence and impartiality of individual magistrates. This is because the professional advancement of each magistrate is controlled by the CSM, which is internally divided into factions representing competing political ideologies (Dallara and Pederzoli 2022).
The 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard highlights these concerns, revealing a relatively low perception of judicial independence among citizens and businesses. Combined with recent scandals within the CSM, these issues prompted the Draghi government to undertake a comprehensive reform of the CSM, including changes to its composition, election procedures, and rules governing factions within the body (Law 71/2022).
As part of a broader legal system reform within the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) sponsored by the Draghi government, legislative decrees 149 and 150 (2022) aim to address a long-standing issue within the Italian justice system – the protracted nature of civil and criminal proceedings, particularly in civil and commercial disputes. This persistent issue has significantly hampered the effectiveness of judicial action and oversight, as highlighted in the 2022 Committee for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) report.
The newly formed Meloni government has embarked on a new judicial reform initiative that could significantly impact the careers of judges and magistrates, though this reform is still under discussion.
At the apex of the Italian judicial system, the Constitutional Court ensures that laws conform to the Constitution. Its unique appointment process involves three independent sources – the Head of State, the parliament (with special majority requirements), and the highest judiciary ranks (via election) – effectively safeguarding the Court’s political autonomy and elevating its stature. Comprising eminent legal scholars, experienced judges, and distinguished lawyers, the Constitutional Court has consistently rendered rulings that challenge and sometimes overturn legislation championed by the government and approved by the legislature. However, when the rulings of the Constitutional Court require new legislative norms, their full implementation may be delayed by government and parliamentary inaction.
Citations:
V-Dem: https://v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf
2023 EU Justice Scoreboard: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/db44e228-db4e-43f5-99ce-17ca3f2f2933_en?filename=Justice%20Scoreboard%202023_0.pdf
CEPEJ Evaluation Report 2022 (2020 data): https://rm.coe.int/cepej-fiche-pays-2020-22-e-web/1680a86276
Dallara, C., and Pederzoli, P. 2022. “Corruzione, trasparenza e Rule of Law.” In G. Baldini and A. Pritoni, eds., Il sistema politico italiano. Milano: Mondadori.
Italian courts play a pivotal role in the country’s political landscape, exercising significant influence over various aspects of democratic governance. The judicial system enjoys robust autonomy from the executive branch, ensuring independence from political interference. Judges’ and prosecutors’ recruitment, appointment, and career progression are managed by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (CSM), a representative body elected by the judiciary and partially by parliament, safeguarding impartiality and preventing undue influence from the executive.
While these institutional arrangements protect the overall independence of the judiciary as a collective entity, concerns persist regarding the internal independence and impartiality of individual magistrates. This is because the professional advancement of each magistrate is controlled by the CSM, which is internally divided into factions representing competing political ideologies (Dallara and Pederzoli 2022).
The 2023 EU Justice Scoreboard highlights these concerns, revealing a relatively low perception of judicial independence among citizens and businesses. Combined with recent scandals within the CSM, these issues prompted the Draghi government to undertake a comprehensive reform of the CSM, including changes to its composition, election procedures, and rules governing factions within the body (Law 71/2022).
As part of a broader legal system reform within the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) sponsored by the Draghi government, legislative decrees 149 and 150 (2022) aim to address a long-standing issue within the Italian justice system – the protracted nature of civil and criminal proceedings, particularly in civil and commercial disputes. This persistent issue has significantly hampered the effectiveness of judicial action and oversight, as highlighted in the 2022 Committee for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) report.
The newly formed Meloni government has embarked on a new judicial reform initiative that could significantly impact the careers of judges and magistrates, though this reform is still under discussion.
At the apex of the Italian judicial system, the Constitutional Court ensures that laws conform to the Constitution. Its unique appointment process involves three independent sources – the Head of State, the parliament (with special majority requirements), and the highest judiciary ranks (via election) – effectively safeguarding the Court’s political autonomy and elevating its stature. Comprising eminent legal scholars, experienced judges, and distinguished lawyers, the Constitutional Court has consistently rendered rulings that challenge and sometimes overturn legislation championed by the government and approved by the legislature. However, when the rulings of the Constitutional Court require new legislative norms, their full implementation may be delayed by government and parliamentary inaction.
Citations:
V-Dem: https://v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf
2023 EU Justice Scoreboard: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/db44e228-db4e-43f5-99ce-17ca3f2f2933_en?filename=Justice%20Scoreboard%202023_0.pdf
CEPEJ Evaluation Report 2022 (2020 data): https://rm.coe.int/cepej-fiche-pays-2020-22-e-web/1680a86276
Dallara, C., and Pederzoli, P. 2022. “Corruzione, trasparenza e Rule of Law.” In G. Baldini and A. Pritoni, eds., Il sistema politico italiano. Milano: Mondadori.
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
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9
9
There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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7
6
There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
5
4
3
4
3
There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
2
1
1
There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
The Italian legal system encompasses a comprehensive set of constitutional provisions and ordinary laws that protect a wide range of civil rights. The judiciary’s robust independence ensures the proper enforcement of these rights, at least theoretically. However, in practice, inefficiencies in judicial administration and an excessive backlog of cases lead to lengthy court proceedings. This delays the resolution of penal trials and civil disputes, undermining the effectiveness of personal and property rights protection. The Civil Justice Index by the World Justice Project (2023) ranks Italy 51st out of 141 nations, far below other EU and North American countries.
Overcrowded penitentiaries and the resulting poor living conditions for prisoners, along with their treatment by police officers, frequently draw attention from the Italian media, parliament, and the European Court of Human Rights. The Court has repeatedly condemned the Italian state for failing to adequately protect prisoners’ lives (see, for instance, the ECHR judgment of 14 September 2023).
Amnesty International’s 2023 report raises humanitarian concerns regarding the rights of refugees and migrants. In February 2023, the Italian parliament passed a decree imposing stricter regulations on NGO rescue ships operating in the Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, the Meloni government has strengthened its cooperation with Libyan authorities to control irregular migration flows from Libya, despite documented human rights abuses in Libyan detention centers.
In a further development, Meloni signed an agreement with Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama in December 2023 to transfer some migrants rescued in the Mediterranean by Italian military ships to Albania. While the implementation of this agreement remains uncertain, concerns have been raised that it could violate the principles of non-discrimination and the right to asylum enshrined in national, EU, and international laws.
While Italy has established a comprehensive legal framework to address discrimination, its implementation remains uneven, particularly in areas of gender, physical and mental abilities, and ethnic minorities. The country’s ranking of 13th on the Gender Equality Index falls below the EU average, highlighting persistent gender disparities. These inequalities are especially pronounced in the labor market, where Italy has consistently ranked last among EU member states since 2010 (Gender Equality Index 2023). Discrimination against immigrants is also prevalent. While immigrants have access to healthcare services, their rights in other spheres, particularly the labor market, are often inadequately protected. The Italian parliament failed to pass a bill that would have ensured effective access to citizenship for children of foreign nationals born or raised in Italy.
In response to the alarming surge in femicides, the Italian parliament swiftly enacted legislation to combat violence against women in November 2023, with notable support from opposition parties. However, parliament was unable to pass legislation to protect LGBTQ+ individuals from hate crimes.
Citations:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2023.pdf
https://eige.europa.eu/modules/custom/eige_gei/app/content/downloads/factsheets/IT_2023_factsheet.pdf
REV: https://europa.camera.it/osservatorio-sentenze-cedu/sentenze
Overcrowded penitentiaries and the resulting poor living conditions for prisoners, along with their treatment by police officers, frequently draw attention from the Italian media, parliament, and the European Court of Human Rights. The Court has repeatedly condemned the Italian state for failing to adequately protect prisoners’ lives (see, for instance, the ECHR judgment of 14 September 2023).
Amnesty International’s 2023 report raises humanitarian concerns regarding the rights of refugees and migrants. In February 2023, the Italian parliament passed a decree imposing stricter regulations on NGO rescue ships operating in the Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, the Meloni government has strengthened its cooperation with Libyan authorities to control irregular migration flows from Libya, despite documented human rights abuses in Libyan detention centers.
In a further development, Meloni signed an agreement with Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama in December 2023 to transfer some migrants rescued in the Mediterranean by Italian military ships to Albania. While the implementation of this agreement remains uncertain, concerns have been raised that it could violate the principles of non-discrimination and the right to asylum enshrined in national, EU, and international laws.
While Italy has established a comprehensive legal framework to address discrimination, its implementation remains uneven, particularly in areas of gender, physical and mental abilities, and ethnic minorities. The country’s ranking of 13th on the Gender Equality Index falls below the EU average, highlighting persistent gender disparities. These inequalities are especially pronounced in the labor market, where Italy has consistently ranked last among EU member states since 2010 (Gender Equality Index 2023). Discrimination against immigrants is also prevalent. While immigrants have access to healthcare services, their rights in other spheres, particularly the labor market, are often inadequately protected. The Italian parliament failed to pass a bill that would have ensured effective access to citizenship for children of foreign nationals born or raised in Italy.
In response to the alarming surge in femicides, the Italian parliament swiftly enacted legislation to combat violence against women in November 2023, with notable support from opposition parties. However, parliament was unable to pass legislation to protect LGBTQ+ individuals from hate crimes.
Citations:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en/
https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/downloads/WJPIndex2023.pdf
https://eige.europa.eu/modules/custom/eige_gei/app/content/downloads/factsheets/IT_2023_factsheet.pdf
REV: https://europa.camera.it/osservatorio-sentenze-cedu/sentenze
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
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9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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3
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3
Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
2
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1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Corruption remains a pervasive problem within the Italian administration, as evidenced by numerous cases brought to light by the judiciary and the media and by Italy’s relatively low ranking compared to other European countries on the main indices of perceived (Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, CPI 2022; World Bank Control of Corruption Index, Kaufmann and Aart Kraay 2023) and objective corruption (Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer; University of Goteborg Quality of Government Indicators, Charron et al. 2022).
Given the detrimental impact of corruption on public trust, the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration, and the nation’s ability to deliver essential public goods, the Draghi government (February 2021 – July 2022) made combating this pervasive phenomenon a central pillar of its agenda. This commitment was particularly evident in the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR), which presented a unique opportunity to streamline governance processes and enhance transparency. In line with this commitment, the Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) was granted significant enhancements, especially regarding its oversight role in public contracts.
The regulations governing public procurement were amended in accordance with the objectives of PNRR. First, Delegated Law 78/2022 (under the Draghi government) instituted changes, followed by Legislative Decree 26/2023 (under the Meloni government), which introduced further modifications to the Public Procurement Code. These changes have strengthened the oversight functions of the ANAC (ANAC, Annual Report 2023).
These revised regulations mark the latest advancement in Italy’s ongoing anti-corruption efforts, which have resulted in a noticeable improvement in the country’s standing on various corruption indices. From 2014 to 2023, Italy’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has risen from 69th to 53rd, demonstrating the nation’s progress in combating corruption. However, problems remain, particularly in the regulation of interest groups and party financing.
The Meloni government has implemented a series of measures aimed at streamlining the operations of public administrations in the execution of the PNRR. While these measures aim to expedite the process and reduce bureaucratic hurdles, they also raise concerns about potential ambiguities that could be exploited for corrupt practices.
Citations:
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/ita
CPI 2022: https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/Report_CPI2022_English.pdf
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Charron, Nicholas, Victor Lapuente, Monika Bauhr, and Paola Annoni. 2022. “Change and Continuity in Quality of Government: Trends in Subnational Quality of Government in EU Member States.” Investigaciones Regionales-Journal of Regional Research 2022 (53): 5-23. DOI: 10.38191/iirr-jorr.22.008.
ANAC Annual Report 2023: https://www.anticorruzione.it/documents/91439/134902762/Anac+-+Relazione+annuale+2023+su+attività+2022+-+Relazione.pdf/93d500fd-4002-5433-a151-77ecbc45464e?t=1686150360020
Given the detrimental impact of corruption on public trust, the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration, and the nation’s ability to deliver essential public goods, the Draghi government (February 2021 – July 2022) made combating this pervasive phenomenon a central pillar of its agenda. This commitment was particularly evident in the implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR), which presented a unique opportunity to streamline governance processes and enhance transparency. In line with this commitment, the Anti-Corruption Authority (ANAC) was granted significant enhancements, especially regarding its oversight role in public contracts.
The regulations governing public procurement were amended in accordance with the objectives of PNRR. First, Delegated Law 78/2022 (under the Draghi government) instituted changes, followed by Legislative Decree 26/2023 (under the Meloni government), which introduced further modifications to the Public Procurement Code. These changes have strengthened the oversight functions of the ANAC (ANAC, Annual Report 2023).
These revised regulations mark the latest advancement in Italy’s ongoing anti-corruption efforts, which have resulted in a noticeable improvement in the country’s standing on various corruption indices. From 2014 to 2023, Italy’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index has risen from 69th to 53rd, demonstrating the nation’s progress in combating corruption. However, problems remain, particularly in the regulation of interest groups and party financing.
The Meloni government has implemented a series of measures aimed at streamlining the operations of public administrations in the execution of the PNRR. While these measures aim to expedite the process and reduce bureaucratic hurdles, they also raise concerns about potential ambiguities that could be exploited for corrupt practices.
Citations:
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/index/ita
CPI 2022: https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/Report_CPI2022_English.pdf
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Charron, Nicholas, Victor Lapuente, Monika Bauhr, and Paola Annoni. 2022. “Change and Continuity in Quality of Government: Trends in Subnational Quality of Government in EU Member States.” Investigaciones Regionales-Journal of Regional Research 2022 (53): 5-23. DOI: 10.38191/iirr-jorr.22.008.
ANAC Annual Report 2023: https://www.anticorruzione.it/documents/91439/134902762/Anac+-+Relazione+annuale+2023+su+attività+2022+-+Relazione.pdf/93d500fd-4002-5433-a151-77ecbc45464e?t=1686150360020
Graph View
Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
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9
9
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
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7
6
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
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3
4
3
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
2
1
1
The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The Italian parliament has a symmetrical structure with two houses, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, both elected by the people. Both houses have the same powers in terms of lawmaking and control over the executive branch. Each house of the Italian parliament enjoys considerable independence, with its own internal rules governing its operations, including administrative, financial, and even judicial matters (known as autodichia). This autonomy is established in the Italian constitution (Article 64).
In line with these principles, two distinct bureaucratic bodies, fully autonomous from the executive branch’s bureaucracy and from each other (except for recently expanded collaborative efforts), currently serve the two houses. Gianniti and Lupo (2023) report 1,042 employees in the Chamber of Deputies and 585 in the Senate, divided between senior officials, stenographers, documentalists, secretaries and assistants. These figures encompass all full-time, permanent employees recruited through public competition and directly hired by the administration. The number of permanent staff is significantly reduced compared to the past due to the empowerment of the executive following attempts to shift the Italian political system toward majoritarianism.
In addition to the permanent staff, which is generally characterized by a high qualitative level, there are also employees hired directly by parliamentary groups – whose funds have been increased to compensate for the end of parties’ public funding – and individual members of parliament. The recruitment processes for these positions are less transparent and regulated, often relying on informal arrangements.
The two parliamentary administrations play a crucial role in supporting the legislative and oversight functions of the Italian parliament. They provide technical, legal, procedural, documentary, and administrative assistance to both houses of parliament. These administrations operate independently and impartially, adhering to the principles of autonomy and fairness.
Both chambers of the Italian parliament are equipped with specialized units dedicated to providing parliamentarians with the necessary documentation to carry out their duties effectively. Alongside the resources offered by the two parliamentary libraries and historical archives, parliamentarians can access the House and Senate Research Departments. These departments compile comprehensive documentation that accompanies and explains the contents of each bill under consideration in parliament. These resources empower members of parliament, particularly those from opposition parties, to scrutinize the information presented by the executive. Research departments periodically produce reports on legislation.
For in-depth technical assessments of the budgetary implications of proposed legislation, the Italian parliament relies on the expertise of the State Budget Departments in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. These departments evaluate the financial impact of bills, amendments, and other laws. Additionally, the Parliamentary Budget Office, established in 2014 following the 2012 constitutional amendment introducing the principle of budget balance, provides specialized analysis and support to Parliament. Operating within parliament with a high degree of independence, the Parliamentary Budget Office maintains its administrative structure, distinct from the two parliamentary departments.
While parliamentarians have significant resources available for effectively monitoring the executive, members of parliament do not always fully utilize them, often opting for more politically visible disputes instead.
Since a 2020 constitutional amendment, the Italian Senate comprises a total of 200 elected (reduced from 315) and so-called life senators, who are appointed for life. The Chamber of Deputies has also been reduced, from 630 to 400 deputies, starting with the 19th legislative term in October 2022. Before this constitutional reform, members of parliament were members of only one committee; however, beginning with the 19th legislature, they may be required to serve on multiple committees. Consequently, the workload of members of parliament within committees is expected to increase, potentially reducing the effectiveness of legislative action and oversight.
Citations:
Gianniti, Luigi, and Nicola Lupo. 2023. “Italy’s Parliamentary Administration.” In Thomas Christiansen, Elena Griglio, and Nicola Lupo, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administration. Abingdon: Routledge, 306-319.
In line with these principles, two distinct bureaucratic bodies, fully autonomous from the executive branch’s bureaucracy and from each other (except for recently expanded collaborative efforts), currently serve the two houses. Gianniti and Lupo (2023) report 1,042 employees in the Chamber of Deputies and 585 in the Senate, divided between senior officials, stenographers, documentalists, secretaries and assistants. These figures encompass all full-time, permanent employees recruited through public competition and directly hired by the administration. The number of permanent staff is significantly reduced compared to the past due to the empowerment of the executive following attempts to shift the Italian political system toward majoritarianism.
In addition to the permanent staff, which is generally characterized by a high qualitative level, there are also employees hired directly by parliamentary groups – whose funds have been increased to compensate for the end of parties’ public funding – and individual members of parliament. The recruitment processes for these positions are less transparent and regulated, often relying on informal arrangements.
The two parliamentary administrations play a crucial role in supporting the legislative and oversight functions of the Italian parliament. They provide technical, legal, procedural, documentary, and administrative assistance to both houses of parliament. These administrations operate independently and impartially, adhering to the principles of autonomy and fairness.
Both chambers of the Italian parliament are equipped with specialized units dedicated to providing parliamentarians with the necessary documentation to carry out their duties effectively. Alongside the resources offered by the two parliamentary libraries and historical archives, parliamentarians can access the House and Senate Research Departments. These departments compile comprehensive documentation that accompanies and explains the contents of each bill under consideration in parliament. These resources empower members of parliament, particularly those from opposition parties, to scrutinize the information presented by the executive. Research departments periodically produce reports on legislation.
For in-depth technical assessments of the budgetary implications of proposed legislation, the Italian parliament relies on the expertise of the State Budget Departments in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. These departments evaluate the financial impact of bills, amendments, and other laws. Additionally, the Parliamentary Budget Office, established in 2014 following the 2012 constitutional amendment introducing the principle of budget balance, provides specialized analysis and support to Parliament. Operating within parliament with a high degree of independence, the Parliamentary Budget Office maintains its administrative structure, distinct from the two parliamentary departments.
While parliamentarians have significant resources available for effectively monitoring the executive, members of parliament do not always fully utilize them, often opting for more politically visible disputes instead.
Since a 2020 constitutional amendment, the Italian Senate comprises a total of 200 elected (reduced from 315) and so-called life senators, who are appointed for life. The Chamber of Deputies has also been reduced, from 630 to 400 deputies, starting with the 19th legislative term in October 2022. Before this constitutional reform, members of parliament were members of only one committee; however, beginning with the 19th legislature, they may be required to serve on multiple committees. Consequently, the workload of members of parliament within committees is expected to increase, potentially reducing the effectiveness of legislative action and oversight.
Citations:
Gianniti, Luigi, and Nicola Lupo. 2023. “Italy’s Parliamentary Administration.” In Thomas Christiansen, Elena Griglio, and Nicola Lupo, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administration. Abingdon: Routledge, 306-319.
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
Italian parliamentary committees, in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, are powerful bodies with significant influence over legislation and government oversight. They have the authority to request documents from the executive branch, compel ministerial appearances for hearings, and summon experts for specialized insights. These powers underscore the prominent role of committees in the Italian legislative process, distinguishing it from other European parliamentary systems.
Standing committees, in particular, hold legislative, investigative, policy-setting, and control functions. During their legislative activities, committees may acquire data and information from the government and carry out fact-finding missions. While the government may not always respond to document requests immediately, there is no substantial evidence suggesting it consistently fails to comply.
In exercising their oversight functions, committees may summon ministers or undersecretaries for hearings and investigative inquiries. Hearings can be formal or informal, with formal hearings subject to a specific publicity regime and their verbatim records published. Summoning members of the executive branch for hearings is common practice, and they typically comply.
Committees also have the power to conduct investigative inquiries on matters within their respective competencies to gather useful information for their work and for the work of the Chamber or the Senate. The verbatim records of sessions held by committees during investigative inquiries are published.
Standing committees, in particular, hold legislative, investigative, policy-setting, and control functions. During their legislative activities, committees may acquire data and information from the government and carry out fact-finding missions. While the government may not always respond to document requests immediately, there is no substantial evidence suggesting it consistently fails to comply.
In exercising their oversight functions, committees may summon ministers or undersecretaries for hearings and investigative inquiries. Hearings can be formal or informal, with formal hearings subject to a specific publicity regime and their verbatim records published. Summoning members of the executive branch for hearings is common practice, and they typically comply.
Committees also have the power to conduct investigative inquiries on matters within their respective competencies to gather useful information for their work and for the work of the Chamber or the Senate. The verbatim records of sessions held by committees during investigative inquiries are published.
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
In addition to the Standing Committees, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate may form special investigative committees, with membership reflecting the strength of parliamentary groups. Article 82 of the Italian constitution regulates these committees, which can be established ad hoc to conduct investigations and research on public interest matters, possessing the same powers and limitations as the judiciary. Their activities include missions and inspections, ministerial hearings, report approvals, conference organization, and thorough research and documentation.
Committees of inquiry can be unicameral or bicameral. Unicameral committees require a resolution from either the Chamber or the Senate for their establishment. Bicameral committees, composed of deputies and senators, must be established by law. In both cases, the opposition often finds it challenging to set up a committee of inquiry without agreement from the governing majority. The constitutive act outlines the purposes, composition, powers and limitations, secrecy regulations, internal organization, and budget ceiling for each committee of inquiry.
During the 18th legislature (2018–2022), 126 bills were introduced to establish bicameral commissions of inquiry, but only five were approved (OpenPolis). Between the start of the 19th legislature (September 2022) and December 2023, 78 bills were introduced for bicameral investigative committees, with three approved.
A parliamentary committee of inquiry into the management of the health emergency caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the measures taken to address it is currently being approved. The bill has passed the Senate and awaits debate in the chamber. Some observers suggest this committee aims to serve as propaganda and retaliation against former prime ministers Conte and Draghi by the new center-right majority, which has criticized mandatory mass vaccinations and pandemic-related movement restrictions.
In general, the work of these committees could benefit from greater transparency, as monitoring their activities is often difficult.
Citations:
OpenPolis. https://www.openpolis.it/parole/cosa-cosa-fanno-le-commissioni-dinchiesta
Committees of inquiry can be unicameral or bicameral. Unicameral committees require a resolution from either the Chamber or the Senate for their establishment. Bicameral committees, composed of deputies and senators, must be established by law. In both cases, the opposition often finds it challenging to set up a committee of inquiry without agreement from the governing majority. The constitutive act outlines the purposes, composition, powers and limitations, secrecy regulations, internal organization, and budget ceiling for each committee of inquiry.
During the 18th legislature (2018–2022), 126 bills were introduced to establish bicameral commissions of inquiry, but only five were approved (OpenPolis). Between the start of the 19th legislature (September 2022) and December 2023, 78 bills were introduced for bicameral investigative committees, with three approved.
A parliamentary committee of inquiry into the management of the health emergency caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the measures taken to address it is currently being approved. The bill has passed the Senate and awaits debate in the chamber. Some observers suggest this committee aims to serve as propaganda and retaliation against former prime ministers Conte and Draghi by the new center-right majority, which has criticized mandatory mass vaccinations and pandemic-related movement restrictions.
In general, the work of these committees could benefit from greater transparency, as monitoring their activities is often difficult.
Citations:
OpenPolis. https://www.openpolis.it/parole/cosa-cosa-fanno-le-commissioni-dinchiesta
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
10
9
9
The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
2
1
1
The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
The Italian parliament possesses a robust committee system that effectively empowers the legislature to scrutinize, control, and amend government policies (Martin 2011; Martin and Vanberg 2020). Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate have numerous standing committees that foster specialization and policy expertise among their members. Until the 18th legislature, both chambers had 14 committees. Following the 2022 constitutional reform, the Senate reduced the number of committees to 10, in line with the reduction of senators to 200. Conversely, the Chamber of Deputies retained 14 committees, even as the number of deputies was reduced to 400.
The organization of committees generally aligns with ministerial jurisdictions, with some minor exceptions, especially in the Senate following the reduction in committees. This structure further enhances policy expertise. Committees also hold the authority to propose amendments to draft bills and can substantially rewrite them. Additionally, committees convene frequently, and their members are supported by highly qualified technical personnel.
Although the Italian parliament retains a significant role in guiding policy, recent research suggests it has lost influence, particularly in the area of budget laws (Cavalieri 2023). The trend toward greater executive dominance, especially evident during the 2024 budget process, combined with Prime Minister Meloni’s growing political clout, has raised concerns about parliament’s ability to safeguard its institutional role.
The composition of parliamentary committees reflects the distribution of power among political parties in parliament. This is evident in the appointment of committee chairpersons, typically drawn from the governing majority parties. However, this does not preclude the opposition from influencing committee proceedings. Enlarged majorities often emerge in committee decisions, driven by members’ seniority, shared interest in specific issues, and common expertise acquired outside the parliamentary sphere (De Micheli and Verzichelli 2004).
Citations:
Martin, S. 2011. “Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative Organization.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 36 (3): 339–361.
Martin, L.W., and Vanberg, G. 2020. “Coalition Government, Legislative Institutions, and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 64(2): 325–340.
De Micheli, C., and Verzichelli, L. 2004. Il Parlamento. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Cavalieri, A. 2023. Italian Budgeting Policy: Between Punctuations and Incrementalism. Cham: Springer.
The organization of committees generally aligns with ministerial jurisdictions, with some minor exceptions, especially in the Senate following the reduction in committees. This structure further enhances policy expertise. Committees also hold the authority to propose amendments to draft bills and can substantially rewrite them. Additionally, committees convene frequently, and their members are supported by highly qualified technical personnel.
Although the Italian parliament retains a significant role in guiding policy, recent research suggests it has lost influence, particularly in the area of budget laws (Cavalieri 2023). The trend toward greater executive dominance, especially evident during the 2024 budget process, combined with Prime Minister Meloni’s growing political clout, has raised concerns about parliament’s ability to safeguard its institutional role.
The composition of parliamentary committees reflects the distribution of power among political parties in parliament. This is evident in the appointment of committee chairpersons, typically drawn from the governing majority parties. However, this does not preclude the opposition from influencing committee proceedings. Enlarged majorities often emerge in committee decisions, driven by members’ seniority, shared interest in specific issues, and common expertise acquired outside the parliamentary sphere (De Micheli and Verzichelli 2004).
Citations:
Martin, S. 2011. “Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative Organization.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 36 (3): 339–361.
Martin, L.W., and Vanberg, G. 2020. “Coalition Government, Legislative Institutions, and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 64(2): 325–340.
De Micheli, C., and Verzichelli, L. 2004. Il Parlamento. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Cavalieri, A. 2023. Italian Budgeting Policy: Between Punctuations and Incrementalism. Cham: Springer.