Vertical Accountability
#22Key Findings
Italy performs relatively poorly (rank 22) in the category of vertical accountability.
Elections are free, fair and competitive. All parties can operate freely, and media access is generally unbiased. Women must make up at least 40% of parties’ electoral lists. All citizens, including those abroad, have the right to vote. Candidates are subject to spending limits based on constituency size.
Two-thirds of representatives are elected in multimember districts, and one-third in single-member districts. Parties must win 3% of the vote to enter parliament. Implementation of freedom of information laws varies significantly across government departments.
The current Meloni-led government is considered to be the first post-WWII radical right-wing government in Western Europe. Meloni has sought to moderate her party’s positions, but grassroots members retain extreme positions. The coalition faces internal polarization, and compromises with the opposition have been difficult to reach.
Elections are free, fair and competitive. All parties can operate freely, and media access is generally unbiased. Women must make up at least 40% of parties’ electoral lists. All citizens, including those abroad, have the right to vote. Candidates are subject to spending limits based on constituency size.
Two-thirds of representatives are elected in multimember districts, and one-third in single-member districts. Parties must win 3% of the vote to enter parliament. Implementation of freedom of information laws varies significantly across government departments.
The current Meloni-led government is considered to be the first post-WWII radical right-wing government in Western Europe. Meloni has sought to moderate her party’s positions, but grassroots members retain extreme positions. The coalition faces internal polarization, and compromises with the opposition have been difficult to reach.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
The Italian constitution and laws establish the conditions for free, fair, and competitive elections that adhere to the principles of a liberal democracy. According to the latest V-Dem data (2022), Italy scores relatively high on the Clean Elections index. This indicates that experts consider Italian elections free from registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote-buying, and electoral violence. Additionally, all parties, including the opposition, can operate freely and participate in elections. Indicators of freedom of expression suggest that the media are generally unbiased and that all parties have access to national broadcasts. Overall, Italy’s data is comparable to other European liberal democracies.
The constitution specifies that active and passive electorates do not coincide. Membership in the Chamber of Deputies requires a minimum age of 25, while the Senate of the Republic requires a minimum age of 40 (Articles 56 and 58). These rules reflect the idea that members of the upper chamber should possess different competencies and skills than those of the lower chamber to help improve the quality of legislation. High civil servants, high-ranking military officers, magistrates, and mayors of municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants are ineligible for the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and Legislative Decree 533/1993).
Moreover, the offices of deputy or senator are incompatible with positions in elected assemblies at the local or supranational level (European Parliament) (Law 60/1953 and subsequent amendments). Lastly, citizens convicted (after all levels of judgment) of certain crimes and sentenced to more than two years in prison cannot be candidates (Legislative Decree 235/2012).
Parties must submit their symbol to the Ministry of the Interior between 44 and 42 days before the election date (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and subsequent amendments), along with a copy of their statute, a declaration of transparency, and the party manifesto (Law 165/2017). Since the 2018 general election, these documents are published on a Ministry of the Interior website accessible to all citizens. Party lists may be excluded from the competition if the symbol does not meet legal standards. In such cases, they can appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation, which decides on their admission. In the September 2022 general election, 101 symbols were presented, of which 75 were accepted (Ministry of Interior 2022).
After submitting their symbols, parties must submit their list of candidates. For both chambers, the list must be signed by at least 1,500 and no more than 2,000 voters for each multi-member district into which the territory is divided (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and subsequent amendments; see also ACE project data).
Following the 2020 constitutional revision, which reduced the number of members of the Chamber of Deputies from 630 to 400 and senators from 315 to 200, there are now 49 districts for the lower house and 26 for the upper house. Therefore, approximately 73,500 signatures are required to present lists nationwide in both houses. However, in early elections, such as those in September 2022, this figure is halved.
Starting in 2022, political parties established as a parliamentary group in at least one of the two chambers by December 31, 2021, are exempt from collecting signatures (Decree Law 41/2022). This rule poses an obstacle to new parties entering electoral competition, although they can circumvent it by allying with existing parties. Similar obstacles to curbing the proliferation of party lists are common in other democracies. Signatures must be authenticated by several institutional authorities (Law 21/1990). Occasionally, there have been disagreements about the legitimacy of signatures collected by the most prominent political parties, but not during the most recent elections, as most significant parties were exempted from collecting them.
Beginning with the 2022 elections, candidates must submit their CVs and a certificate certifying no pending criminal convictions. These documents are then posted on a Ministry of the Interior website, accessible to all citizens (Law 9/2019). Although this requirement provides voters with better tools to evaluate candidates’ competencies and quality, it is ineffective. Voters cannot express a preference for individual candidates because lists are blocked. Additionally, the CV information is highly inconsistent, with some CVs being extraordinarily detailed and others relatively succinct. Selection methods vary from party to party according to their statutes. Only the Five Stars Movement used online closed primaries to select candidates in multi-member districts for both chambers.
To guarantee female representation, Italian electoral law (Law 165/2017) mandates that candidate lists include at least 40% female candidates, following the so-called zipper system, which requires parties to alternate between women and men on their candidate lists. Despite this, women remain underrepresented in both chambers. On one hand, legal sanctions for noncompliance with this rule are relatively soft (see also the International IDEA Gender Quotas Database). On the other hand, parties can easily circumvent the norm by strategically using the possibility of nominating the same candidate in multiple multi-member districts (up to five, according to the electoral law). Female candidates are usually nominated in multiple districts; however, they often opt for only one district, freeing up seats for male candidates further down the list.
For the election campaign, candidates can spend a fixed amount of €52,000 plus a variable amount depending on the size (in terms of registered voters) of the multi-member constituency in which they compete. Parties may spend a maximum of €1 multiplied by the total number of registered voters in all districts where the party competes (Law 515/1993 and subsequent amendments). Candidate and party expenditures are monitored by the Court of Appeals and the Court of Auditors, respectively. For irregularities, there are mainly financial penalties. The 2014 reform eliminated all public funding for parties (Law 13/2014) (see also the IDEA International Political Finance Database). Transparency issues remain concerning the increasingly influential but less visible role of political foundations.
Social media played a significant role in political communication during the campaign leading up to the September 2022 elections, compared to traditional media such as television and newspapers. This trend can be understood in the context of the specific nature of the most recent general election.
First, these were early elections, giving parties little time to organize their campaigns. Second, the campaign took place during the summer, when citizens traditionally engage less in political matters and watch less television. Finally, all polls had long suggested a victory for the center-right coalition, particularly for Brothers of Italy.
These factors contributed to the campaign’s low profile in both public and political debates..
Citations:
Political finance database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/country?country=110&database_theme=302
Gender quotas database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas-database
Ace project: https://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDCountry?set_language=en&topic=PC&country=IT#PC001
V-Dem: https://v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf
Ministry of Interior: https://dait.interno.gov.it/elezioni/trasparenza/elezioni-politiche-2022
The constitution specifies that active and passive electorates do not coincide. Membership in the Chamber of Deputies requires a minimum age of 25, while the Senate of the Republic requires a minimum age of 40 (Articles 56 and 58). These rules reflect the idea that members of the upper chamber should possess different competencies and skills than those of the lower chamber to help improve the quality of legislation. High civil servants, high-ranking military officers, magistrates, and mayors of municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants are ineligible for the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and Legislative Decree 533/1993).
Moreover, the offices of deputy or senator are incompatible with positions in elected assemblies at the local or supranational level (European Parliament) (Law 60/1953 and subsequent amendments). Lastly, citizens convicted (after all levels of judgment) of certain crimes and sentenced to more than two years in prison cannot be candidates (Legislative Decree 235/2012).
Parties must submit their symbol to the Ministry of the Interior between 44 and 42 days before the election date (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and subsequent amendments), along with a copy of their statute, a declaration of transparency, and the party manifesto (Law 165/2017). Since the 2018 general election, these documents are published on a Ministry of the Interior website accessible to all citizens. Party lists may be excluded from the competition if the symbol does not meet legal standards. In such cases, they can appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation, which decides on their admission. In the September 2022 general election, 101 symbols were presented, of which 75 were accepted (Ministry of Interior 2022).
After submitting their symbols, parties must submit their list of candidates. For both chambers, the list must be signed by at least 1,500 and no more than 2,000 voters for each multi-member district into which the territory is divided (President of the Republic Decree 361/1957 and subsequent amendments; see also ACE project data).
Following the 2020 constitutional revision, which reduced the number of members of the Chamber of Deputies from 630 to 400 and senators from 315 to 200, there are now 49 districts for the lower house and 26 for the upper house. Therefore, approximately 73,500 signatures are required to present lists nationwide in both houses. However, in early elections, such as those in September 2022, this figure is halved.
Starting in 2022, political parties established as a parliamentary group in at least one of the two chambers by December 31, 2021, are exempt from collecting signatures (Decree Law 41/2022). This rule poses an obstacle to new parties entering electoral competition, although they can circumvent it by allying with existing parties. Similar obstacles to curbing the proliferation of party lists are common in other democracies. Signatures must be authenticated by several institutional authorities (Law 21/1990). Occasionally, there have been disagreements about the legitimacy of signatures collected by the most prominent political parties, but not during the most recent elections, as most significant parties were exempted from collecting them.
Beginning with the 2022 elections, candidates must submit their CVs and a certificate certifying no pending criminal convictions. These documents are then posted on a Ministry of the Interior website, accessible to all citizens (Law 9/2019). Although this requirement provides voters with better tools to evaluate candidates’ competencies and quality, it is ineffective. Voters cannot express a preference for individual candidates because lists are blocked. Additionally, the CV information is highly inconsistent, with some CVs being extraordinarily detailed and others relatively succinct. Selection methods vary from party to party according to their statutes. Only the Five Stars Movement used online closed primaries to select candidates in multi-member districts for both chambers.
To guarantee female representation, Italian electoral law (Law 165/2017) mandates that candidate lists include at least 40% female candidates, following the so-called zipper system, which requires parties to alternate between women and men on their candidate lists. Despite this, women remain underrepresented in both chambers. On one hand, legal sanctions for noncompliance with this rule are relatively soft (see also the International IDEA Gender Quotas Database). On the other hand, parties can easily circumvent the norm by strategically using the possibility of nominating the same candidate in multiple multi-member districts (up to five, according to the electoral law). Female candidates are usually nominated in multiple districts; however, they often opt for only one district, freeing up seats for male candidates further down the list.
For the election campaign, candidates can spend a fixed amount of €52,000 plus a variable amount depending on the size (in terms of registered voters) of the multi-member constituency in which they compete. Parties may spend a maximum of €1 multiplied by the total number of registered voters in all districts where the party competes (Law 515/1993 and subsequent amendments). Candidate and party expenditures are monitored by the Court of Appeals and the Court of Auditors, respectively. For irregularities, there are mainly financial penalties. The 2014 reform eliminated all public funding for parties (Law 13/2014) (see also the IDEA International Political Finance Database). Transparency issues remain concerning the increasingly influential but less visible role of political foundations.
Social media played a significant role in political communication during the campaign leading up to the September 2022 elections, compared to traditional media such as television and newspapers. This trend can be understood in the context of the specific nature of the most recent general election.
First, these were early elections, giving parties little time to organize their campaigns. Second, the campaign took place during the summer, when citizens traditionally engage less in political matters and watch less television. Finally, all polls had long suggested a victory for the center-right coalition, particularly for Brothers of Italy.
These factors contributed to the campaign’s low profile in both public and political debates..
Citations:
Political finance database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/country?country=110&database_theme=302
Gender quotas database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas-database
Ace project: https://aceproject.org/epic-en/CDCountry?set_language=en&topic=PC&country=IT#PC001
V-Dem: https://v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf
Ministry of Interior: https://dait.interno.gov.it/elezioni/trasparenza/elezioni-politiche-2022
To what extent can all citizens, both in legal terms (de jure) and in practice (de facto), exercise their right to vote?
10
9
9
There are no significant barriers, by law or in practice, that hinder citizens or specific groups in society from exercising their right to vote.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to voting.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to voting.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles that substantially hinder voting.
Until 2021, the minimum voting age for representatives in the Chamber of Deputies was 18, while for the Senate it was 25 (Art. 58 Constitution). Starting with the September 2022 elections, the minimum voting age for the Senate was lowered to 18, aligning it with the chamber. This reform equalizes the bases of representation in both chambers, contributing to greater congruence regarding the number and size of parties represented.
All Italian citizens, whether residing within national borders or abroad – temporarily or permanently – have the right to vote in general elections. For Italian citizens residing abroad, reserved seats are provided (in 2022, 8 in the Chamber of Deputies and four in the Senate) with specific candidate lists in four special districts for different areas of the world. After registering in a particular registry, these citizens can vote by mail. Voting by Italians living abroad has often been questioned for several reasons: these voters do not pay taxes in Italy, and elected representatives from the special districts often lack clear party affiliation, giving them fewer constraints in parliamentary activities.
Following the 2020 constitutional reform, the number of reserved seats was reduced from 12 to 8 in the Chamber of Deputies and from 6 to 4 in the Senate, decreasing their relevance. Additionally, parties have increasingly structured voting abroad by nominating candidates residing in Italy for special districts abroad. Italian citizens living abroad are not entitled to vote in local (regional and municipal) elections. However, foreign citizens from European Union (EU) member countries residing in Italy have the right to vote in municipal elections. Generally, those sentenced to prison are excluded from voting for the duration of their sentence (President of the Republic Decree 223/1967).
Since citizenship is the fundamental requirement for voting – Italian for all elections and EU for municipal elections – all non-EU foreign citizens permanently residing in Italy are automatically excluded. According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) data (October 17, 2023), about 3.7 million non-EU citizens with legal residence permits in Italy cannot vote in any Italian elections. This exclusion is difficult to justify, especially considering that EU citizens can vote in municipal elections and Italians living abroad, who often have fragile ties with Italy, can vote in general elections. However, similar exclusions are found in other European countries, and the issue remains highly debated.
There are no reserved seats for French- and German-speaking minorities. However, the national legal electoral threshold for parties representing these minorities does not apply. This provision, along with the concentration of language groups in specific territories and districts, ensures safe representation in parliament.
Citizens are notified of their voting rights by mail and can appeal to independent judicial bodies if mistakenly excluded from the voter rolls. Many polling stations are located close to voters’ residences, but in 2022 the number slightly decreased to reduce costs (see Ministry of Interior). Unlike regional elections, which are held over two consecutive days, general elections are held on a single day – Sunday. This choice could affect the participation of some voter categories. The September 2022 elections recorded the lowest turnout in the Republican era.
(see International IDEA Voter Turnout Database).
Citations:
ISTAT data for non-EU citizens residing in Italy: https://www.istat.it/it/files//2023/10/REPORT-CITTADINI-NON-COMUNITARI-2023.pdf
International IDEA Voter Turnout Database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/country?country=110&database_theme=293
All Italian citizens, whether residing within national borders or abroad – temporarily or permanently – have the right to vote in general elections. For Italian citizens residing abroad, reserved seats are provided (in 2022, 8 in the Chamber of Deputies and four in the Senate) with specific candidate lists in four special districts for different areas of the world. After registering in a particular registry, these citizens can vote by mail. Voting by Italians living abroad has often been questioned for several reasons: these voters do not pay taxes in Italy, and elected representatives from the special districts often lack clear party affiliation, giving them fewer constraints in parliamentary activities.
Following the 2020 constitutional reform, the number of reserved seats was reduced from 12 to 8 in the Chamber of Deputies and from 6 to 4 in the Senate, decreasing their relevance. Additionally, parties have increasingly structured voting abroad by nominating candidates residing in Italy for special districts abroad. Italian citizens living abroad are not entitled to vote in local (regional and municipal) elections. However, foreign citizens from European Union (EU) member countries residing in Italy have the right to vote in municipal elections. Generally, those sentenced to prison are excluded from voting for the duration of their sentence (President of the Republic Decree 223/1967).
Since citizenship is the fundamental requirement for voting – Italian for all elections and EU for municipal elections – all non-EU foreign citizens permanently residing in Italy are automatically excluded. According to the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) data (October 17, 2023), about 3.7 million non-EU citizens with legal residence permits in Italy cannot vote in any Italian elections. This exclusion is difficult to justify, especially considering that EU citizens can vote in municipal elections and Italians living abroad, who often have fragile ties with Italy, can vote in general elections. However, similar exclusions are found in other European countries, and the issue remains highly debated.
There are no reserved seats for French- and German-speaking minorities. However, the national legal electoral threshold for parties representing these minorities does not apply. This provision, along with the concentration of language groups in specific territories and districts, ensures safe representation in parliament.
Citizens are notified of their voting rights by mail and can appeal to independent judicial bodies if mistakenly excluded from the voter rolls. Many polling stations are located close to voters’ residences, but in 2022 the number slightly decreased to reduce costs (see Ministry of Interior). Unlike regional elections, which are held over two consecutive days, general elections are held on a single day – Sunday. This choice could affect the participation of some voter categories. The September 2022 elections recorded the lowest turnout in the Republican era.
(see International IDEA Voter Turnout Database).
Citations:
ISTAT data for non-EU citizens residing in Italy: https://www.istat.it/it/files//2023/10/REPORT-CITTADINI-NON-COMUNITARI-2023.pdf
International IDEA Voter Turnout Database: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/country?country=110&database_theme=293
Graph View
To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
2
1
1
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
The Italian electoral system introduced by Law 165/2017 is a mixed system with two-thirds of representatives elected in multi-member districts (MMD) by a proportional formula (PR) and one-third in single-member districts (SMD) with plurality rule. Since the Italian bicameral system gives identical powers to both branches of parliament, the main elements that characterize the electoral rules have been harmonized between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate to avoid different outcomes and ensure governability.
Legal thresholds of representation are essential for both individual parties and coalitions. For individual parties, the threshold is 3% of valid votes at the national level. This threshold does not apply to parties representing linguistic and ethnic minorities. Coalitions are eligible for proportional representation seats only if they obtain at least 10% of the votes nationwide and include a party with at least 3%. If these conditions are met, the coalition can count on the votes of all member parties that get at least 1% of the votes nationwide. However, only parties in the coalition with at least 3% of the votes can get a proportional share of the PR seats allocated to the coalition.
The presence of SMDs and legal thresholds of representation can potentially lead to disproportionate results, thus hindering an adequate representation of all social groups. The results of the September 2022 elections confirm a high level of disproportionality, as the center-right coalition won almost all SMDs (121 out of 146 in the chamber; 56 out of 67 in the Senate) (Chiaramonte et al. 2023).
The territorial distribution of the vote reveals important links between parties or coalitions and local interests. Italy’s electoral map has changed dramatically from its traditional layout for the third election in a row. Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), which has acquired the same territorial profile as the League – from which it has drawn many voters – has become the most popular party in the Center-North. At the same time, the Five Star Movement (M5S) has remained by far the most popular party in southern Italy. More generally, center-right parties dominate Italy’s small municipalities, where most voters live. The center-left coalition prevails in large cities in Central and Northern Italy. Finally, in the South, the M5S is the dominant party (Chiaramonte et al. 2023).
The vote distribution between North and South Italy, as well as between rural and urban areas, partly reveals the cultural divide between GAL (Green, Alternative, Libertarian) and TAN (Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist) parties. It also shows the connection of some parties or coalitions with specific local interests: taxation, deregulation, and protectionism for artisans and small and medium enterprises in Northern Italy, and income support policies for southern Italy. The rapid growth of M5S support in southern Italy after introducing citizenship income when it was in government – whose recipients are mainly located in southern regions – is emblematic.
The electoral law requires that party manifestos be published in a special section of the election website maintained by the Ministry of the Interior. This allows them to be consulted by all citizens. Extensive publicity is also given to the manifestos through the main parties’ websites and social media. In the 2022 elections, the manifestos varied widely in length and detail, with those of the League and M5S among the longest. According to quantitative textual analyses (Trastulli and Mastroianni 2023), references to environmental and energy issues – two main topics of Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) – are present in almost all manifestos. Alongside these high-valence issues, parties have continued to emphasize those that traditionally define their ideological profiles in terms of credibility. Specifically, center-left parties focus on labor policies and social issues, while right-wing parties emphasize nationalism, defense, and security. Overall, the manifestos are rather generalist and cover a broad range of themes.
Citations:
Electoral results:https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/
Trastulli, F., and L. Mastroianni. 2023. “What’s New Under the Sun? A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of the 2022 Italian Election Campaign Themes in Party Manifestos.” Modern Italy 1–22. DOI:10.1017/mit.2023.45
Chiaramonte, A., Emanuele, V., Maggini, N., and Paparo, A. 2023. “Radical-Right Surge in a Deinstitutionalised Party System: The 2022 Italian General Election.” South European Society and Politics 00(00): 1–29.
Legal thresholds of representation are essential for both individual parties and coalitions. For individual parties, the threshold is 3% of valid votes at the national level. This threshold does not apply to parties representing linguistic and ethnic minorities. Coalitions are eligible for proportional representation seats only if they obtain at least 10% of the votes nationwide and include a party with at least 3%. If these conditions are met, the coalition can count on the votes of all member parties that get at least 1% of the votes nationwide. However, only parties in the coalition with at least 3% of the votes can get a proportional share of the PR seats allocated to the coalition.
The presence of SMDs and legal thresholds of representation can potentially lead to disproportionate results, thus hindering an adequate representation of all social groups. The results of the September 2022 elections confirm a high level of disproportionality, as the center-right coalition won almost all SMDs (121 out of 146 in the chamber; 56 out of 67 in the Senate) (Chiaramonte et al. 2023).
The territorial distribution of the vote reveals important links between parties or coalitions and local interests. Italy’s electoral map has changed dramatically from its traditional layout for the third election in a row. Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), which has acquired the same territorial profile as the League – from which it has drawn many voters – has become the most popular party in the Center-North. At the same time, the Five Star Movement (M5S) has remained by far the most popular party in southern Italy. More generally, center-right parties dominate Italy’s small municipalities, where most voters live. The center-left coalition prevails in large cities in Central and Northern Italy. Finally, in the South, the M5S is the dominant party (Chiaramonte et al. 2023).
The vote distribution between North and South Italy, as well as between rural and urban areas, partly reveals the cultural divide between GAL (Green, Alternative, Libertarian) and TAN (Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist) parties. It also shows the connection of some parties or coalitions with specific local interests: taxation, deregulation, and protectionism for artisans and small and medium enterprises in Northern Italy, and income support policies for southern Italy. The rapid growth of M5S support in southern Italy after introducing citizenship income when it was in government – whose recipients are mainly located in southern regions – is emblematic.
The electoral law requires that party manifestos be published in a special section of the election website maintained by the Ministry of the Interior. This allows them to be consulted by all citizens. Extensive publicity is also given to the manifestos through the main parties’ websites and social media. In the 2022 elections, the manifestos varied widely in length and detail, with those of the League and M5S among the longest. According to quantitative textual analyses (Trastulli and Mastroianni 2023), references to environmental and energy issues – two main topics of Italy’s National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR) – are present in almost all manifestos. Alongside these high-valence issues, parties have continued to emphasize those that traditionally define their ideological profiles in terms of credibility. Specifically, center-left parties focus on labor policies and social issues, while right-wing parties emphasize nationalism, defense, and security. Overall, the manifestos are rather generalist and cover a broad range of themes.
Citations:
Electoral results:https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/
Trastulli, F., and L. Mastroianni. 2023. “What’s New Under the Sun? A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of the 2022 Italian Election Campaign Themes in Party Manifestos.” Modern Italy 1–22. DOI:10.1017/mit.2023.45
Chiaramonte, A., Emanuele, V., Maggini, N., and Paparo, A. 2023. “Radical-Right Surge in a Deinstitutionalised Party System: The 2022 Italian General Election.” South European Society and Politics 00(00): 1–29.
To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
2
1
1
Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
Italy was governed until July 2022 by a national unity government headed by Mario Draghi. Following the prime minister’s resignation, the president of the republic dissolved the parliament and called early elections for September 2022. The Draghi government took office at the beginning of the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic with a mandate to address two interconnected challenges: effectively managing the pandemic and utilizing the resources provided by the Recovery Fund.
Except for the Brothers of Italy (FdI), which opted to stay in opposition, all parties represented in parliament joined the government. In this new political landscape, parties that were competitors until recently faced the challenge of working together as partners in government. This required them to put aside their differences and find common ground on several issues centered on the health crisis and its economic repercussions, temporarily freezing the competition on the ideological left-right dimension.
At the same time, the parties had to distinguish themselves from their competitors to avoid losing votes, marking their differences mainly on cultural issues or their stance toward the Ukrainian war. In the end, conflict prevailed, bringing down the government (Russo and Valbruzzi 2022).
With the end of the pandemic and the Draghi government, the competition has reconfigured along traditional dividing lines between opposing coalitions. This bipolar structure is characterized by two main parties on the left − the Democratic Party (PD) and the Five Star Movement (M5S) − failing to coordinate electorally by competing separately in the September 2022 elections. On the right side of the left-right divide, there is a rather ideologically compact coalition formed by FdI, the League, and Go Italy (FI). In this bipolar context, moderate-liberal actors are essentially excluded from competition. On paper, these divisions suggest a highly polarized political environment. However, since 2019, the FdI has moderated its stance on a number of issues, including its Euroscepticism. This moderate turn on the part of FdI calls into question the notion that the party’s victory in the recent elections necessarily signifies an increase in the polarization of the Italian party system (Chiaramonte 2023). Despite Meloni’s effort to move the party toward the center of the policy space, the positions of party members and grassroots voters remain rather extreme on many issues, thus contributing to an overall polarized environment.
The right-wing pre-electoral coalition won an absolute majority of seats after the September 2022 elections. A month later, Giorgia Meloni, the leader of FdI, was appointed prime minister. According to PopuList, the Meloni government is considered to be the first post-World War II radical right-wing government in Western Europe, consisting of two parties − FdI and the League − almost unanimously coded as far-right, Eurosceptic and populist, plus a relatively moderate partner like FI.
Despite similarities in their ideological profiles, the governing parties are divided on specific issues such as civil liberties, immigration, the economy, and their stance toward the European Union (EU). These differences have occasionally led to conflicts between the governing parties. However, the institutional context incentivizes parties to compromise in coalition policymaking.
On one hand, the electoral system forces parties to form pre-election coalitions to win elections, both at the national and local levels. On the other hand, the Italian parliament has strong internal institutions that make it easier for parties to control and change government policies. Therefore, to implement its program, the governing coalition must necessarily compromise.
Compromises and agreements between the majority coalition and the opposition have proven difficult on matters of constitutional reform, such as the proposed reform of the government formation process, which might have required a non-majoritarian approach.
In the most recent election (September 2022), left- and right-wing parties that can be categorized as populist collected more than 50% of the popular vote. Two populist parties – FdI and the League – are currently in power. According to most observers, these parties are characterized by a Manichean view of politics, anti-elitism, and people-centrism (see Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey data). Whether these attitudes represent a rhetorical strategy or may translate into specific policies to undermine the liberal-democratic order is still debatable. In the latter case, however, there may be consequences for the quality of democracy, as observed in countries such as Hungary or Poland.
Citations:
PopuList: https://popu-list.org/
Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey: http://poppa-data.eu
Russo, L., and M. Valbruzzi. 2022. “The Impact of the Pandemic on the Italian Party System. The Draghi Government and the ‘New’ Polarisation.” Contemporary Italian Politics 14 (2): 172–190.
Chiaramonte, A. 2023. “Italy at the Polls. Four Lessons to Learn from the 2022 General Election.” Contemporary Italian Politics 15(1): 75–87.
Except for the Brothers of Italy (FdI), which opted to stay in opposition, all parties represented in parliament joined the government. In this new political landscape, parties that were competitors until recently faced the challenge of working together as partners in government. This required them to put aside their differences and find common ground on several issues centered on the health crisis and its economic repercussions, temporarily freezing the competition on the ideological left-right dimension.
At the same time, the parties had to distinguish themselves from their competitors to avoid losing votes, marking their differences mainly on cultural issues or their stance toward the Ukrainian war. In the end, conflict prevailed, bringing down the government (Russo and Valbruzzi 2022).
With the end of the pandemic and the Draghi government, the competition has reconfigured along traditional dividing lines between opposing coalitions. This bipolar structure is characterized by two main parties on the left − the Democratic Party (PD) and the Five Star Movement (M5S) − failing to coordinate electorally by competing separately in the September 2022 elections. On the right side of the left-right divide, there is a rather ideologically compact coalition formed by FdI, the League, and Go Italy (FI). In this bipolar context, moderate-liberal actors are essentially excluded from competition. On paper, these divisions suggest a highly polarized political environment. However, since 2019, the FdI has moderated its stance on a number of issues, including its Euroscepticism. This moderate turn on the part of FdI calls into question the notion that the party’s victory in the recent elections necessarily signifies an increase in the polarization of the Italian party system (Chiaramonte 2023). Despite Meloni’s effort to move the party toward the center of the policy space, the positions of party members and grassroots voters remain rather extreme on many issues, thus contributing to an overall polarized environment.
The right-wing pre-electoral coalition won an absolute majority of seats after the September 2022 elections. A month later, Giorgia Meloni, the leader of FdI, was appointed prime minister. According to PopuList, the Meloni government is considered to be the first post-World War II radical right-wing government in Western Europe, consisting of two parties − FdI and the League − almost unanimously coded as far-right, Eurosceptic and populist, plus a relatively moderate partner like FI.
Despite similarities in their ideological profiles, the governing parties are divided on specific issues such as civil liberties, immigration, the economy, and their stance toward the European Union (EU). These differences have occasionally led to conflicts between the governing parties. However, the institutional context incentivizes parties to compromise in coalition policymaking.
On one hand, the electoral system forces parties to form pre-election coalitions to win elections, both at the national and local levels. On the other hand, the Italian parliament has strong internal institutions that make it easier for parties to control and change government policies. Therefore, to implement its program, the governing coalition must necessarily compromise.
Compromises and agreements between the majority coalition and the opposition have proven difficult on matters of constitutional reform, such as the proposed reform of the government formation process, which might have required a non-majoritarian approach.
In the most recent election (September 2022), left- and right-wing parties that can be categorized as populist collected more than 50% of the popular vote. Two populist parties – FdI and the League – are currently in power. According to most observers, these parties are characterized by a Manichean view of politics, anti-elitism, and people-centrism (see Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey data). Whether these attitudes represent a rhetorical strategy or may translate into specific policies to undermine the liberal-democratic order is still debatable. In the latter case, however, there may be consequences for the quality of democracy, as observed in countries such as Hungary or Poland.
Citations:
PopuList: https://popu-list.org/
Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey: http://poppa-data.eu
Russo, L., and M. Valbruzzi. 2022. “The Impact of the Pandemic on the Italian Party System. The Draghi Government and the ‘New’ Polarisation.” Contemporary Italian Politics 14 (2): 172–190.
Chiaramonte, A. 2023. “Italy at the Polls. Four Lessons to Learn from the 2022 General Election.” Contemporary Italian Politics 15(1): 75–87.
Graph View
To what extent can citizens and residents access official information?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, for citizens seeking to access official information.
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7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose many/various significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
In 2016, Italy introduced the right of generalized civic access to government information, often referred to as FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, Legislative Decree 97/2016). This amendment to Legislative Decree 33/2013 empowers citizens and civic associations to request existing data and documents from the public administration without demonstrating a specific or immediate interest or providing justification for their request.
The scope of this legislation encompasses national, regional, and local public administrations, as well as public economic entities, publicly controlled companies, publicly held companies, and associations and private law entities engaged in public service activities, though with certain limitations. The law only applies to existing data and information. Access requests must clearly specify the documents to be reviewed or provide sufficient details for their identification. Generic requests or those that attempt some form of control over the administration’s actions are not allowed.
Access to information can be denied under specific circumstances, such as safeguarding national security or protecting privacy. FOIA complements the already existing right of documental access, which concerns documents valid for the personal interest of the person making the request (Law 241/1990), and simple civic access, aimed at obtaining the publication of documents and information of public interest (Legislative Decree 33/2013).
Each administration’s website typically features a dedicated “transparent administration” section that provides comprehensive information on the various access options and the procedures for submitting applications to the relevant offices. Additionally, all administrative bodies, both at the national and local levels, have established specialized units called Public Relations Offices explicitly tasked with handling information on access requests.
The administration is mandated to submit a decision on an access request within 30 days. If an access request is denied, the administration must provide a well-founded justification for its decision. In the event of denial, a request for reconsideration can be submitted to the relevant administration’s Head of Prevention and Corruption and Transparency, who must respond within 20 days. If the request for access remains denied after reconsideration, an appeal can be filed to both judicial and non-judicial bodies.
Among non-judicial bodies, there is the Commission for Access to Public Documents under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, which functions as an appeals panel. The commission, composed of parliamentarians and technical experts, possesses limited coercive powers, relying primarily on moral persuasion to influence outcomes. The commission submits an annual report to parliament outlining its activities. The most recent report, covering 2021 data, highlighted a persistent rise in citizens’ appeals and documented the body’s responses.
An independent assessment conducted by the non-governmental organization OpenPolis indicates that not all administrative bodies have embraced the new legislation similarly. This resistance manifests in delayed responses and an overly broad interpretation of the legal limitations to access, particularly in international security and public order matters. In several instances, obtaining the requested documentation requires a formal ruling from an administrative judge. Overall, the implementation of FOIA legislation exhibits significant disparities across administrations, with substantial delays, inconsistencies in the type of data available, and discrepancies in response times.
Citations:
Annual report of the Commission for Access to Public Documents: https://www.commissioneaccesso.it/media/dzlhtuug/relazione-al-parlamento.pdf
OpenPolis FOIA monitoring: https://www.openpolis.it/cosa/foia/
The scope of this legislation encompasses national, regional, and local public administrations, as well as public economic entities, publicly controlled companies, publicly held companies, and associations and private law entities engaged in public service activities, though with certain limitations. The law only applies to existing data and information. Access requests must clearly specify the documents to be reviewed or provide sufficient details for their identification. Generic requests or those that attempt some form of control over the administration’s actions are not allowed.
Access to information can be denied under specific circumstances, such as safeguarding national security or protecting privacy. FOIA complements the already existing right of documental access, which concerns documents valid for the personal interest of the person making the request (Law 241/1990), and simple civic access, aimed at obtaining the publication of documents and information of public interest (Legislative Decree 33/2013).
Each administration’s website typically features a dedicated “transparent administration” section that provides comprehensive information on the various access options and the procedures for submitting applications to the relevant offices. Additionally, all administrative bodies, both at the national and local levels, have established specialized units called Public Relations Offices explicitly tasked with handling information on access requests.
The administration is mandated to submit a decision on an access request within 30 days. If an access request is denied, the administration must provide a well-founded justification for its decision. In the event of denial, a request for reconsideration can be submitted to the relevant administration’s Head of Prevention and Corruption and Transparency, who must respond within 20 days. If the request for access remains denied after reconsideration, an appeal can be filed to both judicial and non-judicial bodies.
Among non-judicial bodies, there is the Commission for Access to Public Documents under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, which functions as an appeals panel. The commission, composed of parliamentarians and technical experts, possesses limited coercive powers, relying primarily on moral persuasion to influence outcomes. The commission submits an annual report to parliament outlining its activities. The most recent report, covering 2021 data, highlighted a persistent rise in citizens’ appeals and documented the body’s responses.
An independent assessment conducted by the non-governmental organization OpenPolis indicates that not all administrative bodies have embraced the new legislation similarly. This resistance manifests in delayed responses and an overly broad interpretation of the legal limitations to access, particularly in international security and public order matters. In several instances, obtaining the requested documentation requires a formal ruling from an administrative judge. Overall, the implementation of FOIA legislation exhibits significant disparities across administrations, with substantial delays, inconsistencies in the type of data available, and discrepancies in response times.
Citations:
Annual report of the Commission for Access to Public Documents: https://www.commissioneaccesso.it/media/dzlhtuug/relazione-al-parlamento.pdf
OpenPolis FOIA monitoring: https://www.openpolis.it/cosa/foia/