Coordination
#16Key Findings
Japan falls into the sample’s middle ranks (rank 16) in the category of coordination.
The well-staffed Cabinet Office coordinates policy with ministries, while the Cabinet Secretariat provides administrative support to enforce top-down policies. Advisory councils overseen by the prime minister also boost the Cabinet Office’s power, as they allow some bureaucratic procedures to be bypassed.
Japanese ministries are staffed by career professionals, with considerable competition for funds and power. This can allow for inter-ministerial trust, but also limits collaboration. Inter-ministerial coordination takes place through informal working teams. Coordination through the LDP party structure is vital, with most legislative initiatives screened here before being submitted.
Strong national standards provide for uniform public service delivery through, overseen by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Digitalization of government services has enhanced service uniformity. Local governments in Japan have limited financial autonomy.
The well-staffed Cabinet Office coordinates policy with ministries, while the Cabinet Secretariat provides administrative support to enforce top-down policies. Advisory councils overseen by the prime minister also boost the Cabinet Office’s power, as they allow some bureaucratic procedures to be bypassed.
Japanese ministries are staffed by career professionals, with considerable competition for funds and power. This can allow for inter-ministerial trust, but also limits collaboration. Inter-ministerial coordination takes place through informal working teams. Coordination through the LDP party structure is vital, with most legislative initiatives screened here before being submitted.
Strong national standards provide for uniform public service delivery through, overseen by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. Digitalization of government services has enhanced service uniformity. Local governments in Japan have limited financial autonomy.
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To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
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9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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7
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Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
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1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
Until the 1990s, the personnel resources at the prime minister’s disposal were considered insufficient, which was redressed by the administrative reforms implemented in 2001. The newly created Cabinet Office (Naikakufu) has the personnel and financial resources to effectively coordinate policy with the ministries. With a staff of more than 1,000, the Cabinet Secretariat is also well-equipped to provide administrative support to coordinate “important policies,” which can now be imposed by the head of government in a top-down manner. Before the reform, the rule of dispersed management (buntan kanri gensoku), and prohibited the prime minister and the Cabinet Secretariat from initiating policies within the domains that fell under the jurisdiction of separate ministers. Moreover, new minister of state for special missions and prime ministerial special adviser posts were created, which allowed the head of government to entrust problems requiring interministerial coordination to direct subordinates. The coordination capacity of the Cabinet Office was also enhanced by the creation of advisory councils under the direct jurisdiction of the prime minister, which enabled some bureaucratic procedures to be circumvented. In particular, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy took over a large part of the budget compilation process from the Ministry of Finance.
Until 2009, coordination on the most important policies between the cabinet and line ministries had been conducted through the Administrative Vice-Ministers’ Council, which gathered on Mondays and Thursdays to establish a schedule for cabinet meetings on the following day. As that organ symbolized the bottom-up decision-making process led by the bureaucrats, it was abolished by the Democratic Party of Japan government in 2009. In 2012, the organ was revived as the Administrative Vice-Ministers’ Liaison Council. It now gathers only after cabinet meetings on Fridays to discuss the implementation of cabinet decisions. This change symbolizes the significant centralization of the decision-making process under the Abe administration (2012 – 2020). Other important institutional changes include the creation of the National Security Council and the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs in 2014. The former organ facilitated interministerial coordination on security and foreign affairs, while the latter enabled the strategic promotion of high-ranking ministerial bureaucrats by the prime minister. These reforms contributed to making Cabinet Office civil servants more loyal to the prime minister and his or her closest advisors.
While the reforms implemented since 2001 have greatly increased the coordination capabilities of the organs under the prime minister’s direct control, effective usage of the new institutional tools depends on the personal skills of the head of government and the chief cabinet secretary. Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has relied to a greater extent on traditional consensus-based decision-making patterns than his direct predecessors, which has sometimes caused confusion over the priorities of his cabinet.
Citations:
Makihara, Izuru. 2009. “From a Clerk Room to Government Headquarters: The Cabinet Secretariat and Its ‘Rotation System’ in Transition, 1997 – 2007.” In Germany and Japan after 1989. Reform Pressures and Political System Dynamics, eds. Roland Czada and Kenji Hirashima, Tôkyô Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyûjo Kenkyû Shirîzu, No. 33, Tokyo: Tôkyô Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyûjo.
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1947. “The Cabinet Law.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/cabinet_law_e.html
Zakowski, Karol. 2021. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan: Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London - New York: Routledge.
Until 2009, coordination on the most important policies between the cabinet and line ministries had been conducted through the Administrative Vice-Ministers’ Council, which gathered on Mondays and Thursdays to establish a schedule for cabinet meetings on the following day. As that organ symbolized the bottom-up decision-making process led by the bureaucrats, it was abolished by the Democratic Party of Japan government in 2009. In 2012, the organ was revived as the Administrative Vice-Ministers’ Liaison Council. It now gathers only after cabinet meetings on Fridays to discuss the implementation of cabinet decisions. This change symbolizes the significant centralization of the decision-making process under the Abe administration (2012 – 2020). Other important institutional changes include the creation of the National Security Council and the Cabinet Bureau of Personnel Affairs in 2014. The former organ facilitated interministerial coordination on security and foreign affairs, while the latter enabled the strategic promotion of high-ranking ministerial bureaucrats by the prime minister. These reforms contributed to making Cabinet Office civil servants more loyal to the prime minister and his or her closest advisors.
While the reforms implemented since 2001 have greatly increased the coordination capabilities of the organs under the prime minister’s direct control, effective usage of the new institutional tools depends on the personal skills of the head of government and the chief cabinet secretary. Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has relied to a greater extent on traditional consensus-based decision-making patterns than his direct predecessors, which has sometimes caused confusion over the priorities of his cabinet.
Citations:
Makihara, Izuru. 2009. “From a Clerk Room to Government Headquarters: The Cabinet Secretariat and Its ‘Rotation System’ in Transition, 1997 – 2007.” In Germany and Japan after 1989. Reform Pressures and Political System Dynamics, eds. Roland Czada and Kenji Hirashima, Tôkyô Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyûjo Kenkyû Shirîzu, No. 33, Tokyo: Tôkyô Daigaku Shakai Kagaku Kenkyûjo.
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1947. “The Cabinet Law.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/cabinet_law_e.html
Zakowski, Karol. 2021. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan: Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London - New York: Routledge.
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
Japanese ministries are characterized by strong sectionalism focused on competition for funds and power. Civil servants follow fixed career paths in the ministry that hired them. As a result, intra-ministerial trust and coordination is high, but it may hinder the exchange of information and identification of synergies across ministries. Within ministries, most decisions are made in a bottom-up manner through the round-robin (ringi) system. Bureaucrats from different ministries occasionally establish working teams for coordination on important policy initiatives, but coordination is mostly conducted on an informal level. For that reason, competitive policy initiatives by different ministries are common.
Cabinet meetings have traditionally been treated as mere get-togethers to sign documents. Until 2009, they were always preceded by meetings of the administrative vice-ministers representing all ministries, presided over by the administrative deputy chief cabinet secretary – the highest-ranking bureaucrat among civil servants. Only the decisions authorized by this organ could be submitted for the cabinet’s approval. The Administrative Vice-Ministers’ Liaison Council, which replaced these meetings in 2012, is now only intended for interministerial discussions on how to implement cabinet decisions. Most policy coordination is now conducted by the Cabinet Secretariat (Kantei) in a top-down manner.
Digitalization of government services has been ongoing since the establishment of the Digital Agency in September 2021. One aim is to improve data linkage between governmental institutions. However, so far, digitalization has focused mostly on government-to-citizen rather than government-to-government systems. Plans include migration of local government IT systems onto a central government data cloud and the introduction of public service meshes to facilitate information sharing between various institutions. Both have yet to be fully implemented.
Citations:
Cavanaugh, Luke. 2023. “What Next for Japan’s Digital Agency After the My Number Misfire?” https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/what-next-for-japans-digital-agency-after-the-my-number-misfire/
Mishimi, Ko. 2014. “A Big Bang for Japanese Mandarins? The Civil Service Reform of 2014.” International Journal of Public Administration 40 (13): 1101–1113.
Zakowski, Karol. 2021. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan. Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London – New York: Routledge.
Cabinet meetings have traditionally been treated as mere get-togethers to sign documents. Until 2009, they were always preceded by meetings of the administrative vice-ministers representing all ministries, presided over by the administrative deputy chief cabinet secretary – the highest-ranking bureaucrat among civil servants. Only the decisions authorized by this organ could be submitted for the cabinet’s approval. The Administrative Vice-Ministers’ Liaison Council, which replaced these meetings in 2012, is now only intended for interministerial discussions on how to implement cabinet decisions. Most policy coordination is now conducted by the Cabinet Secretariat (Kantei) in a top-down manner.
Digitalization of government services has been ongoing since the establishment of the Digital Agency in September 2021. One aim is to improve data linkage between governmental institutions. However, so far, digitalization has focused mostly on government-to-citizen rather than government-to-government systems. Plans include migration of local government IT systems onto a central government data cloud and the introduction of public service meshes to facilitate information sharing between various institutions. Both have yet to be fully implemented.
Citations:
Cavanaugh, Luke. 2023. “What Next for Japan’s Digital Agency After the My Number Misfire?” https://thediplomat.com/2023/10/what-next-for-japans-digital-agency-after-the-my-number-misfire/
Mishimi, Ko. 2014. “A Big Bang for Japanese Mandarins? The Civil Service Reform of 2014.” International Journal of Public Administration 40 (13): 1101–1113.
Zakowski, Karol. 2021. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan. Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London – New York: Routledge.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
There is a dense network of informal coordination centered on the ruling party which complements the formal coordination procedures among bureaucrats. Before submission to the Diet, all legislative initiatives are subject to advance screening (jizen shinsa) within the LDP, which has enjoyed almost uninterrupted status as Japan’s dominant party since 1955. The temporary suspension of this system under the rule of the Democratic Party of Japan (2009 – 2012) greatly disturbed interministerial coordination processes, but the LDP returned to the old practices after returning to power in 2012.
Advance screening takes place regularly in LDP’s policy divisions corresponding to different ministries. Bureaucrats explain the contents of bill proposals to LDP backbenchers and promote different projects among the members of the zoku – so-called parliamentary tribes – informal groups of politicians specializing in a given legislative field. The “tribes” represent various interest groups and enjoy considerable veto power in the ruling party, though their influence on the decision-making process weakened under the second Abe administration (2012 – 2020). In theory, decisions of the LDP Policy Research Council and the General Council are made by majority vote, although usually politicians strive for consensus. Under this system, the government would frequently have to make far-reaching concessions to LDP backbenchers. In response, Prime Minister Abe established new intra-party bodies under the LDP president’s direct control to circumvent these constraints. Prime Minister Kishida, however, has been less skillful in using institutional instruments to outmaneuver veto players.
Citations:
Iio, Jun. 2008. Nihon no Tôchi Kôzô [Structure of Government in Japan]. Tokyo: Chûô Kôron Shinsha.
Zakowski, Karol. 2021. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan: Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London: Routledge.
Advance screening takes place regularly in LDP’s policy divisions corresponding to different ministries. Bureaucrats explain the contents of bill proposals to LDP backbenchers and promote different projects among the members of the zoku – so-called parliamentary tribes – informal groups of politicians specializing in a given legislative field. The “tribes” represent various interest groups and enjoy considerable veto power in the ruling party, though their influence on the decision-making process weakened under the second Abe administration (2012 – 2020). In theory, decisions of the LDP Policy Research Council and the General Council are made by majority vote, although usually politicians strive for consensus. Under this system, the government would frequently have to make far-reaching concessions to LDP backbenchers. In response, Prime Minister Abe established new intra-party bodies under the LDP president’s direct control to circumvent these constraints. Prime Minister Kishida, however, has been less skillful in using institutional instruments to outmaneuver veto players.
Citations:
Iio, Jun. 2008. Nihon no Tôchi Kôzô [Structure of Government in Japan]. Tokyo: Chûô Kôron Shinsha.
Zakowski, Karol. 2021. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan: Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London: Routledge.
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
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The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
As a unitary state, Japan has coherent standards for the delivery of public services. Adherence to national standards is supervised mainly by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, which monitors training activities and personnel transfers between the central administration and subgovernments. Implementation of uniform standards of public services is controlled by the field agencies of different ministries. In 2001, a public sector performance assessment on the ministerial level based on plan-do-check-action cycles was introduced through the Government Policy Evaluations Act. Subnational governments are not obliged to perform similar assessments, but all prefectures, almost all major cities and the majority of municipalities have introduced self-evaluation systems.
Plans to allow prefectures to diverge from national standards in Special Economic Zones, initially proposed by the Koizumi government in 2003 and later by the Abe government (2012 – 2020), have introduced the idea of letting regions compete for best practices and regulatory reform (Yashiro 2016). However, this has not yet led to major change and regulatory coherence can still be considered high. Japan scores highly for government effectiveness in the World Governance Index. Municipalities and prefectures enjoy some leeway on how to achieve policy goals (e.g., childcare).
Enhancement of uniformity in the provision of public services is one of the key elements of the digitalization of government services, which accelerated after the establishment of the Digital Agency in September 2021. The introduction of My Number – a 12-digit personal number used to streamline and link all administrative interactions of citizens – has been crucial in this reform. However, the provision of My Number cards to all citizens has been plagued with software glitches and privacy issues. In May 2023, it was revealed that 60% of medical institutions using an online insurance confirmation system had experienced problems with the My Number system, including wrongly linking personal data. In total, 130,000 bank accounts were erroneously linked. The large number of reported problems undermines the public image and reliability of the system, even before successive public services are combined through My Number, starting with the issuance of health insurance cards in 2024.
Citations:
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 2017. “Chihô Kôkyô Dantai ni okeru Gyôsei Hyôka no Torikumi Jôkyô” [Status of administrative evaluation efforts in local governments]. https://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/02gyosei04_04000062.html
“My Number glitches undermine Japan’s digital future.” The Japan Times, June 9. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/06/09/editorials/my-number-failure/
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Yashiro, Naohiro. “Regulatory Coherence: The Case of Japan.” In Gill, D. and P. Intal, Jr., eds.
(eds. 2016. The Development of Regulatory Management Systems in East Asia: Country Studies. Jakarta: ERIA, 2015-4, pp. 27-113.)
Plans to allow prefectures to diverge from national standards in Special Economic Zones, initially proposed by the Koizumi government in 2003 and later by the Abe government (2012 – 2020), have introduced the idea of letting regions compete for best practices and regulatory reform (Yashiro 2016). However, this has not yet led to major change and regulatory coherence can still be considered high. Japan scores highly for government effectiveness in the World Governance Index. Municipalities and prefectures enjoy some leeway on how to achieve policy goals (e.g., childcare).
Enhancement of uniformity in the provision of public services is one of the key elements of the digitalization of government services, which accelerated after the establishment of the Digital Agency in September 2021. The introduction of My Number – a 12-digit personal number used to streamline and link all administrative interactions of citizens – has been crucial in this reform. However, the provision of My Number cards to all citizens has been plagued with software glitches and privacy issues. In May 2023, it was revealed that 60% of medical institutions using an online insurance confirmation system had experienced problems with the My Number system, including wrongly linking personal data. In total, 130,000 bank accounts were erroneously linked. The large number of reported problems undermines the public image and reliability of the system, even before successive public services are combined through My Number, starting with the issuance of health insurance cards in 2024.
Citations:
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 2017. “Chihô Kôkyô Dantai ni okeru Gyôsei Hyôka no Torikumi Jôkyô” [Status of administrative evaluation efforts in local governments]. https://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/02gyosei04_04000062.html
“My Number glitches undermine Japan’s digital future.” The Japan Times, June 9. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/06/09/editorials/my-number-failure/
Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Yashiro, Naohiro. “Regulatory Coherence: The Case of Japan.” In Gill, D. and P. Intal, Jr., eds.
(eds. 2016. The Development of Regulatory Management Systems in East Asia: Country Studies. Jakarta: ERIA, 2015-4, pp. 27-113.)
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
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National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Coordination between the central government and subnational self-governments is conducted mainly through the secondment of ministry staff to field organizations, and through internal party communication between local and national politicians of the ruling party. In the self-rule index for local authorities in the European Union, Council of Europe and OECD countries from 1990 to 2020, local governments in Japan scored relatively low in terms of autonomy in the financial transfer system, as a large proportion of state grants to local authorities are earmarked. On the other hand, municipalities have gained somewhat in fiscal autonomy. While ministries have considerable influence over local budgets, they receive information about the needs of self-governments through a dense network of prefectural and municipal government agencies. This system, however, can lead to the transmission of interministerial frictions to the local level. Central-local coordination is also ensured by politicians of the ruling party who lobby in LDP decision-making organs for the interest of their constituencies. Due to the depopulation of rural regions, many municipalities in Japan have been merged, which has led to a decrease in the number of local politicians with connections to central authorities that could redress the situation.
The abolition of agency-delegated functions following the implementation of the decentralization reform of 2000 strengthened local autonomy. At the same time, the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council was established in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to mediate conflicts between the national government and local self-governments. The council’s rulings are subject to appeal to a high court. Notably, the council became an arena for the legal struggle between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture over the relocation of Futenma U.S. military base. In September 2023, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government’s position.
In addition, meetings of the Forum for Consultations between the national and local governments are held several times each year. The last meeting with the participation of Prime Minister Kishida in October 2023 focused on topics such as decentralization, digital administrative and fiscal reforms, policies for children and child-rearing, and the implementation of the My Number system.
Citations:
Ladner, Andreas, Keuffer, Nicolas, and Bastianen, Alexander. 2021. “Self-rule index for local authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries, 1990-2020.” European Commission. http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
Local Autonomy Law. 1947. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=322AC0000000067
Muramatsu, Michio. 2001. “Intergovernmental Relations in Japan: Models and Perspectives.” World Bank Institute. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/fr/241461468278058512/pdf/330320JP0wbi37178.pdf
Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. 2023. “Forum for Consultations between the National and Local Governments.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/actions/202310/19kunitochiho.html
“Top court ruling on Henoko base suit an insult to local autonomy.” The Asahi Shinbun, 5 September 2023. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14997693
The abolition of agency-delegated functions following the implementation of the decentralization reform of 2000 strengthened local autonomy. At the same time, the Central and Local Government Dispute Management Council was established in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications to mediate conflicts between the national government and local self-governments. The council’s rulings are subject to appeal to a high court. Notably, the council became an arena for the legal struggle between the central government and Okinawa Prefecture over the relocation of Futenma U.S. military base. In September 2023, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government’s position.
In addition, meetings of the Forum for Consultations between the national and local governments are held several times each year. The last meeting with the participation of Prime Minister Kishida in October 2023 focused on topics such as decentralization, digital administrative and fiscal reforms, policies for children and child-rearing, and the implementation of the My Number system.
Citations:
Ladner, Andreas, Keuffer, Nicolas, and Bastianen, Alexander. 2021. “Self-rule index for local authorities in the EU, Council of Europe and OECD countries, 1990-2020.” European Commission. http://www.andreasladner.ch/dokumente/Eigene%20Arbeiten/LAI_2_0%20Final%20report%20published%20on%20the%20website%20of%20the%20EC.pdf
Local Autonomy Law. 1947. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=322AC0000000067
Muramatsu, Michio. 2001. “Intergovernmental Relations in Japan: Models and Perspectives.” World Bank Institute. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/fr/241461468278058512/pdf/330320JP0wbi37178.pdf
Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. 2023. “Forum for Consultations between the National and Local Governments.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/actions/202310/19kunitochiho.html
“Top court ruling on Henoko base suit an insult to local autonomy.” The Asahi Shinbun, 5 September 2023. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14997693