Diagonal Accountability
#28Key Findings
In the category of diagonal accountability, Japan falls into the sample’s bottom ranks (rank 28).
Freedom of speech and the press are guaranteed by the constitution and generally respected by the government. There is little active censorship, though some media engage in self-censorship, particularly regarding the imperial family. Traditional newspapers are still popular, offering a broad ideological range.
Public media in Japan tend to avoid harsh government criticism. Private media support diverse political positions. Media ownership is highly concentrated. The decline of traditional media and the rise of digital platforms have allowed nonmainstream voices to emerge, though this has also led to more nationalist and extremist views entering the public discourse.
Civil society in Japan is active, with groups regularly organizing peaceful demonstrations. Trade unions play a key role in labor policymaking. Large corporations hold significant policy influence, particularly on economic matters. Social welfare and environmental organizations lack similar political connections or national influence.
Freedom of speech and the press are guaranteed by the constitution and generally respected by the government. There is little active censorship, though some media engage in self-censorship, particularly regarding the imperial family. Traditional newspapers are still popular, offering a broad ideological range.
Public media in Japan tend to avoid harsh government criticism. Private media support diverse political positions. Media ownership is highly concentrated. The decline of traditional media and the rise of digital platforms have allowed nonmainstream voices to emerge, though this has also led to more nationalist and extremist views entering the public discourse.
Civil society in Japan is active, with groups regularly organizing peaceful demonstrations. Trade unions play a key role in labor policymaking. Large corporations hold significant policy influence, particularly on economic matters. Social welfare and environmental organizations lack similar political connections or national influence.
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Graph View
To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
10
9
9
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
2
1
1
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
Freedom of speech and press, guaranteed in Article 21 of the Japanese constitution, is generally respected by the government. Under the Abe cabinet (2012 – 2020), the government strengthened control over public broadcaster NHK through the controversial appointment of conservative figures to management positions and attempted to influence reporting in private media by repeatedly declaring the need to maintain political neutrality. However, since 2021, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has not employed such practices.
There are concerns that Article 4 of the Broadcast Act of 1950, which stipulates that all broadcasters should ensure their programs are politically fair, could allow state interference in media content. This had long been understood to mean that the government would not censor broadcast programs. However, in 2014, Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Takaichi Sanae stated that, under certain circumstances, evaluations of political fairness could be based on a single program, not only on the entirety of programs aired by a broadcaster. In March 2023, it was leaked to the press that the government had put pressure on bureaucrats to reinterpret this regulation. Prime Minister Kishida did not explicitly retract the interpretation from 2014, but he dismissed the possibility of limiting the freedom of reporting.
Another problem is the Bill on Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, enacted in 2014, which introduced a punishment of up to five years of imprisonment for journalists who disclose information designated as “special secret.” In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic led to the enactment of new regulations that can limit freedom of reporting. In 2020, NHK was added to the list of institutions obliged to follow government instructions in case of a major crisis. In 2021, the government designated 58 areas with restricted public access, punishable by up to two years in prison or a fine of up to JPY 2 million (about €12,400).
There is little active censorship, although some media practice informal forms of self-censorship. The so-called chrysanthemum taboo discourages media from reporting negative information about the imperial family. Journalists who violate this informal rule have occasionally been subject to violence from radical nationalist groups. Moreover, the system of exclusive reporters’ clubs severely limits the access of non-established news organizations, foreign media and freelancers to government events and press conferences.
Citations:
“A return to ideals of Broadcast Law would help end censorship trend.” The Asahi Shimbun, March 13. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14859972
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. 1950. “The Broadcast Act.” https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/Resources/laws/pdf/090204_5.pdf
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “Japan.” https://rsf.org/en/country/japan
There are concerns that Article 4 of the Broadcast Act of 1950, which stipulates that all broadcasters should ensure their programs are politically fair, could allow state interference in media content. This had long been understood to mean that the government would not censor broadcast programs. However, in 2014, Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Takaichi Sanae stated that, under certain circumstances, evaluations of political fairness could be based on a single program, not only on the entirety of programs aired by a broadcaster. In March 2023, it was leaked to the press that the government had put pressure on bureaucrats to reinterpret this regulation. Prime Minister Kishida did not explicitly retract the interpretation from 2014, but he dismissed the possibility of limiting the freedom of reporting.
Another problem is the Bill on Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, enacted in 2014, which introduced a punishment of up to five years of imprisonment for journalists who disclose information designated as “special secret.” In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic led to the enactment of new regulations that can limit freedom of reporting. In 2020, NHK was added to the list of institutions obliged to follow government instructions in case of a major crisis. In 2021, the government designated 58 areas with restricted public access, punishable by up to two years in prison or a fine of up to JPY 2 million (about €12,400).
There is little active censorship, although some media practice informal forms of self-censorship. The so-called chrysanthemum taboo discourages media from reporting negative information about the imperial family. Journalists who violate this informal rule have occasionally been subject to violence from radical nationalist groups. Moreover, the system of exclusive reporters’ clubs severely limits the access of non-established news organizations, foreign media and freelancers to government events and press conferences.
Citations:
“A return to ideals of Broadcast Law would help end censorship trend.” The Asahi Shimbun, March 13. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14859972
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. 1950. “The Broadcast Act.” https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/Resources/laws/pdf/090204_5.pdf
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “Japan.” https://rsf.org/en/country/japan
To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
Traditional newspapers are still popular in Japan. Japanese media represent a wide range of different points of view – from right-wing (Sankei Shimbun) to left-wing (Akahata, owned by the Japanese Communist Party) – both have a circulation of about one million copies. The two most influential newspapers – Yomiuri Shimbun and Asahi Shimbun – represent center-right and center-left stances, respectively. Other significant titles include Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo Shimbun and Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei).
The Broadcast Act prohibits corporations in which 20% or more of voting rights are held by foreigners from conducting basic broadcasting operations. Cross-ownership between broadcasters and newspaper publishers or other media companies is not regulated, but owning all of the terrestrial television and radio broadcasting, as well as the newspapers in the same area is not allowed if there are no local alternative mass media. As a result, an oligopolistic media structure has emerged, comprising five leading media conglomerates: Nippon Television/Yomiuri, TV Asahi Network, Fujisankei Communications Group, Tokyo Broadcasting System/Mainichi, and the Nikkei, Inc., along with the public broadcaster NHK.
While public media tend to avoid excessive criticism of the government, private media sympathize with different political stances. Japanese journalists have generally performed well as the “fourth power” revealing scandals related to political elites. For instance, in February 2023, Prime Minister Kishida dismissed his executive secretary after the media disclosed the secretary’s discriminatory remarks on sexual minorities, even though the source of the information was kept secret. However, news media have been criticized as being reluctant to critically question government strategies and information during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Tokyo Olympics and the Fukushima triple disaster. Powerful advertising agencies such as Dentsu are thought to have influenced reporting on the Olympics and nuclear power, using their large advertising budgets (NYT 2021; Honma 2012).
Although the high concentration of media ownership is detrimental to pluralism, the gradual decline in traditional media, and growing popularity of foreign and digital media has created opportunities for non-mainstream sources of information. However, this has also made it easier for extremist, mainly nationalist, stances to penetrate the public discourse. In the absence of any law prohibiting the promotion of radical views, xenophobic or historical revisionist content is widely available in books and other print publications.
Citations:
Dooley, Ben, and Hisako Ueno. 2021. “The Invisible Hand Behind the Tokyo Olympics.” New York Times, July 23. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/business/tokyo-olympics-dentsu.html
Honma, Ryu. “Dentsû to genpatsu hôdô – kyodai kôkoku-nushi to ôte kôkoku dairiten ni yoru media shihai no shikumi” [Dentsu and nuclear power plant coverage: How giant advertisers and major advertising agencies control the media]. Tokyo: Aki Shobou.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. 1950. “The Broadcast Act.” https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/Resources/laws/pdf/090204_5.pdf
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “Japan.” https://rsf.org/en/country/japan
Sawa, Yasuomi, and Reiko Saisho. 2023. “Japan.” Reuters Institute, June 14. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023/japan
The Broadcast Act prohibits corporations in which 20% or more of voting rights are held by foreigners from conducting basic broadcasting operations. Cross-ownership between broadcasters and newspaper publishers or other media companies is not regulated, but owning all of the terrestrial television and radio broadcasting, as well as the newspapers in the same area is not allowed if there are no local alternative mass media. As a result, an oligopolistic media structure has emerged, comprising five leading media conglomerates: Nippon Television/Yomiuri, TV Asahi Network, Fujisankei Communications Group, Tokyo Broadcasting System/Mainichi, and the Nikkei, Inc., along with the public broadcaster NHK.
While public media tend to avoid excessive criticism of the government, private media sympathize with different political stances. Japanese journalists have generally performed well as the “fourth power” revealing scandals related to political elites. For instance, in February 2023, Prime Minister Kishida dismissed his executive secretary after the media disclosed the secretary’s discriminatory remarks on sexual minorities, even though the source of the information was kept secret. However, news media have been criticized as being reluctant to critically question government strategies and information during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Tokyo Olympics and the Fukushima triple disaster. Powerful advertising agencies such as Dentsu are thought to have influenced reporting on the Olympics and nuclear power, using their large advertising budgets (NYT 2021; Honma 2012).
Although the high concentration of media ownership is detrimental to pluralism, the gradual decline in traditional media, and growing popularity of foreign and digital media has created opportunities for non-mainstream sources of information. However, this has also made it easier for extremist, mainly nationalist, stances to penetrate the public discourse. In the absence of any law prohibiting the promotion of radical views, xenophobic or historical revisionist content is widely available in books and other print publications.
Citations:
Dooley, Ben, and Hisako Ueno. 2021. “The Invisible Hand Behind the Tokyo Olympics.” New York Times, July 23. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/business/tokyo-olympics-dentsu.html
Honma, Ryu. “Dentsû to genpatsu hôdô – kyodai kôkoku-nushi to ôte kôkoku dairiten ni yoru media shihai no shikumi” [Dentsu and nuclear power plant coverage: How giant advertisers and major advertising agencies control the media]. Tokyo: Aki Shobou.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan. 1950. “The Broadcast Act.” https://www.soumu.go.jp/main_sosiki/joho_tsusin/eng/Resources/laws/pdf/090204_5.pdf
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “Japan.” https://rsf.org/en/country/japan
Sawa, Yasuomi, and Reiko Saisho. 2023. “Japan.” Reuters Institute, June 14. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023/japan
Graph View
To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
Article 21 of the Japanese constitution guarantees freedom of assembly and association, which is respected by the authorities. Marches and street demonstrations require local police permission, but are rarely refused. Peaceful demonstrations are frequently organized by civil society groups representing different ideological stances. These often include protests in front of the Japanese Diet or embassies of different countries. The police rarely interfere, usually arresting only violent protesters.
In principle, those involved in diverse bottom-up initiatives and lobbying for various goals can operate freely in Japan and are not subject to undue restrictions. The activity of civil society groups is regulated by the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities of 1998, and the Association and Foundation Law of 2008. Nonprofit organizations specialize in a wide array of activities, such as promoting health outcomes, environmental conservation, disaster relief, international cooperation, consumer protections, and science and technology. Citizens are permitted to establish foundations and associations regardless of whether they operate in the public interest or not.
Japan’s civil society is comparatively fragmented. Most officially recognized NGOs (referred to as nonprofit organizations or NPOs in Japan) are small and have little or no professional staff. Since a 1998 reform, there are now more stringent regulations for obtaining official recognition, whereas previously there had been significant bureaucratic discretion. Nonetheless, many NPOs closely cooperate with authorities or even take on semi-public roles, which sometimes blurs the line between civil society and the state (Ogawa 2021).
NPOs in Japan are generally exempt from corporation tax, though they have to pay taxes on income related to their profit-making activities. Moreover, there are limitations to tax exemptions and deductions on donations from individuals to certified NPOs, as very few NPOs have the related status (NPO Center).
On the other hand, unjustifiable restrictions on protests became more frequent during the COVID-19 pandemic. In November 2022, the U.N. Human Rights Committee pointed to the problem of arrests of protesters and journalists, as well as excessive use of force by the police and recording of protesters, especially during demonstrations in front of the Diet and in Okinawa.
Citations:
Freedom House. 2022. “Freedom in the World 2022, Japan.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan/freedom-world/2022
Ogawa, Akihiro. 2021. “Civil Society in Japan.” In The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, eds. R.J. Pekkanen and S.M. Pekkanen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 299-316.
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
The Global Development Research Center. 1998. “Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities.” https://www.gdrc.org/ngo/jp-npo_law.pdf
U.N. Human Rights Committee. 2022. “Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Japan.” https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsuBJT%2Fi29ui%2Fb4Ih9%2FUIJO87S0HPMR1PnCPt3LQO6EolLe709268JsfEokJ6QyNqFgswSBy1rovzRJaQqYHclTttywUvvrbUCI%2F6iBnTGHkY
In principle, those involved in diverse bottom-up initiatives and lobbying for various goals can operate freely in Japan and are not subject to undue restrictions. The activity of civil society groups is regulated by the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities of 1998, and the Association and Foundation Law of 2008. Nonprofit organizations specialize in a wide array of activities, such as promoting health outcomes, environmental conservation, disaster relief, international cooperation, consumer protections, and science and technology. Citizens are permitted to establish foundations and associations regardless of whether they operate in the public interest or not.
Japan’s civil society is comparatively fragmented. Most officially recognized NGOs (referred to as nonprofit organizations or NPOs in Japan) are small and have little or no professional staff. Since a 1998 reform, there are now more stringent regulations for obtaining official recognition, whereas previously there had been significant bureaucratic discretion. Nonetheless, many NPOs closely cooperate with authorities or even take on semi-public roles, which sometimes blurs the line between civil society and the state (Ogawa 2021).
NPOs in Japan are generally exempt from corporation tax, though they have to pay taxes on income related to their profit-making activities. Moreover, there are limitations to tax exemptions and deductions on donations from individuals to certified NPOs, as very few NPOs have the related status (NPO Center).
On the other hand, unjustifiable restrictions on protests became more frequent during the COVID-19 pandemic. In November 2022, the U.N. Human Rights Committee pointed to the problem of arrests of protesters and journalists, as well as excessive use of force by the police and recording of protesters, especially during demonstrations in front of the Diet and in Okinawa.
Citations:
Freedom House. 2022. “Freedom in the World 2022, Japan.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan/freedom-world/2022
Ogawa, Akihiro. 2021. “Civil Society in Japan.” In The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, eds. R.J. Pekkanen and S.M. Pekkanen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 299-316.
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
The Global Development Research Center. 1998. “Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities.” https://www.gdrc.org/ngo/jp-npo_law.pdf
U.N. Human Rights Committee. 2022. “Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Japan.” https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsuBJT%2Fi29ui%2Fb4Ih9%2FUIJO87S0HPMR1PnCPt3LQO6EolLe709268JsfEokJ6QyNqFgswSBy1rovzRJaQqYHclTttywUvvrbUCI%2F6iBnTGHkY
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Japanese law protects citizens’ rights to form a union and engage in collective bargaining. The Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengô), which has about seven million members, is an umbrella organization that represents trade unions in the public and private sectors. It is the most important organization on the labor side and traditionally an integral part of labor policymaking, sending members to ministerial advisory councils (shingikai) and being invited by the government to join policy debates on the cabinet level. Traditionally, Rengô has supported opposition parties and was increasingly sidelined under LDP-led governments until 2012. Since then, ties to the ruling LDP have somewhat intensified. In 2017, Rengô initially agreed to negotiate a reform of overtime regulations with employers and the government, but eventually withdrew its support following protests from its members. Trade unions failed to raise real wages for almost three decades. However, labor shortages and inflation helped trade unions push through unusually high raises in collective bargaining in 2023.
The Japanese political system has been known for granting large corporations organized in the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as the Japan Association of Corporate Executives privileged access to and influence on policymaking. Many large corporations maintain their own think tanks, such as the Mitsubishi Research Institute, and issue their own regulatory and policy reform proposals. While the aims of different industry sectors are not always coherent, they are often reflected in the policies of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Keidanren and member firms also enjoy a strong presence in advisory councils – especially on economic policy – while trade unions are not necessarily represented.
Citations:
“After decades of stagnation, wages are finally rising in Japan.” The Economist, April 13. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/04/13/after-decades-of-stagnation-wages-in-japan-are-finally-rising
“LDP aims to bolster ties with Japan’s largest trade union.” The Japan Times, April 25. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/04/25/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-aim-bolster-ties-rengo/
OECD. 2021. “Main Indicators and Characteristics of Collective Bargaining.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-japan.pdf
The Japanese political system has been known for granting large corporations organized in the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as the Japan Association of Corporate Executives privileged access to and influence on policymaking. Many large corporations maintain their own think tanks, such as the Mitsubishi Research Institute, and issue their own regulatory and policy reform proposals. While the aims of different industry sectors are not always coherent, they are often reflected in the policies of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Keidanren and member firms also enjoy a strong presence in advisory councils – especially on economic policy – while trade unions are not necessarily represented.
Citations:
“After decades of stagnation, wages are finally rising in Japan.” The Economist, April 13. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2023/04/13/after-decades-of-stagnation-wages-in-japan-are-finally-rising
“LDP aims to bolster ties with Japan’s largest trade union.” The Japan Times, April 25. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/04/25/national/politics-diplomacy/ldp-aim-bolster-ties-rengo/
OECD. 2021. “Main Indicators and Characteristics of Collective Bargaining.” https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining-database-japan.pdf
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
One important feature of Japan’s civil society is that most organizations are involved in the provision of services and do not seek to provide expertise or shape policy (Ogawa 2021). The number of organizations promoting healthcare and welfare is 29,641, making it the largest group among Japanese NPOs. NPOs have been particularly active in addressing social problems exacerbated by the economic stagnation of the 1990s, such as suicides and hikikomori (i.e., extreme social withdrawal). The government has provided some funding and encouraged private-public cooperation in this field.
Contrary to the employers’ associations and trade unions, social welfare NPOs do not possess strong connections with the political elites. Although government oversight over NPO activities is much less stringent than before 1998, it is still difficult to function as an NPO without the active promotion by or cooperation of authorities.
Citations:
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2023. “Tokutei Hieiri Katsudô Hôjin no Katsudô bun’ya ni tsuite” [On the Activities of Specified Non-profit Corporations]. https://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/about/toukei-info/ninshou-bunyabetsu
Japan NPO Center. 2014. “Non-profits in Japan.” https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/
Ogawa, Akihiro. 2021. “Civil Society in Japan.” In The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, eds. R.J. Pekkanen and S.M. Pekkanen, 299-316. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Global Development Research Center. 1998. “Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities.” https://www.gdrc.org/ngo/jp-npo_law.pdf
Contrary to the employers’ associations and trade unions, social welfare NPOs do not possess strong connections with the political elites. Although government oversight over NPO activities is much less stringent than before 1998, it is still difficult to function as an NPO without the active promotion by or cooperation of authorities.
Citations:
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2023. “Tokutei Hieiri Katsudô Hôjin no Katsudô bun’ya ni tsuite” [On the Activities of Specified Non-profit Corporations]. https://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/about/toukei-info/ninshou-bunyabetsu
Japan NPO Center. 2014. “Non-profits in Japan.” https://www.jnpoc.ne.jp/en/nonprofits-in-japan/
Ogawa, Akihiro. 2021. “Civil Society in Japan.” In The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Politics, eds. R.J. Pekkanen and S.M. Pekkanen, 299-316. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Global Development Research Center. 1998. “Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities.” https://www.gdrc.org/ngo/jp-npo_law.pdf
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
The number of nonprofit organizations (NPO) specializing in the protection of the natural environment in Japan is 13,246. Environmental pollution provided the first impetus for the development of Japanese civil society in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1993, the government established the Japan Fund for Global Environment, which supports environmental conservation projects proposed by different, mainly local, NPOs.
Civil society organizations in the environmental field are generally small, and lack a national presence or the capacity to influence policy. However, in the case of nuclear power, citizen movements through class-action law suits have been successful in preventing idle power plants from being restarted following the Fukushima crisis. For this reason, the contribution of nuclear power to overall production is far lower than the government’s stated goal (Koppenborg 2021). It will also make it more difficult to expand nuclear power production as a key method for achieving decarbonization. Government plans foresee a 46% reduction in greenhouse gases between 2020 and 2030, and carbon neutrality by 2050. Unlike in the past, when energy policy was the realm of the so-called nuclear village (genshiryoku mura) – a pro-nuclear nexus of big business, bureaucrats, and politicians – environmental legislative processes are now somewhat more transparent and open to different viewpoints.
Following 2011, there were widespread anti-nuclear demonstrations with participation numbers reminiscent of the student protests of the 1960s and 1970s. Paradoxically, the focus on the anti-nuclear movement may have made Japanese civil society organizations less interested in the topic of global warming.
Citations:
Bochorodycz, Beata. 2023. Fukushima and Civil Society: The Japanese Anti-Nuclear Movement from a Socio-Political Perspective. London and New York: Routledge.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2023. “Tokutei Hieiri Katsudô Hôjin no Katsudô bun’ya ni tsuite” [On the Activities of Specified Non-profit Corporations]. https://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/about/toukei-info/ninshou-bunyabetsu
Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency. “Japan Fund for Global Environment.” https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/about/background.html
Koppenborg, Florentine. 2021. “Nuclear Restart Politics: How the ‘Nuclear Village’ Lost Policy Implementation Power.” Social Science Japan Journal 24 (1): 115–135.
Civil society organizations in the environmental field are generally small, and lack a national presence or the capacity to influence policy. However, in the case of nuclear power, citizen movements through class-action law suits have been successful in preventing idle power plants from being restarted following the Fukushima crisis. For this reason, the contribution of nuclear power to overall production is far lower than the government’s stated goal (Koppenborg 2021). It will also make it more difficult to expand nuclear power production as a key method for achieving decarbonization. Government plans foresee a 46% reduction in greenhouse gases between 2020 and 2030, and carbon neutrality by 2050. Unlike in the past, when energy policy was the realm of the so-called nuclear village (genshiryoku mura) – a pro-nuclear nexus of big business, bureaucrats, and politicians – environmental legislative processes are now somewhat more transparent and open to different viewpoints.
Following 2011, there were widespread anti-nuclear demonstrations with participation numbers reminiscent of the student protests of the 1960s and 1970s. Paradoxically, the focus on the anti-nuclear movement may have made Japanese civil society organizations less interested in the topic of global warming.
Citations:
Bochorodycz, Beata. 2023. Fukushima and Civil Society: The Japanese Anti-Nuclear Movement from a Socio-Political Perspective. London and New York: Routledge.
Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 2023. “Tokutei Hieiri Katsudô Hôjin no Katsudô bun’ya ni tsuite” [On the Activities of Specified Non-profit Corporations]. https://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/about/toukei-info/ninshou-bunyabetsu
Environmental Restoration and Conservation Agency. “Japan Fund for Global Environment.” https://www.erca.go.jp/jfge/english/about/background.html
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