Horizontal Accountability
#27Key Findings
Japan falls into the bottom ranks internationally (rank 27) with regard to horizontal accountability.
State revenues and expenditures in Japan are audited annually by the independent Board of Audit/ Data protection is overseen by the Personal Information Protection Commission. This body can issue cease-and-desist orders, but cannot impose fines, though business operators violating orders may face imprisonment.
The judiciary is broadly independent of executive influence. Although courts are often lenient toward the government, civil society groups are learning to use the courts to amend laws and regulations. The parliament’s resources and powers are somewhat constrained, limiting its ability to oversee the executive.
Human and civil rights are generally protected, though police maltreatment remains a concern. Although some municipalities have begun to certify same-sex partnerships, same-sex marriage has not been nationally recognized. Refugees face discrimination, with most asylum requests rejected. Corruption remains a concern particularly within the political system.
State revenues and expenditures in Japan are audited annually by the independent Board of Audit/ Data protection is overseen by the Personal Information Protection Commission. This body can issue cease-and-desist orders, but cannot impose fines, though business operators violating orders may face imprisonment.
The judiciary is broadly independent of executive influence. Although courts are often lenient toward the government, civil society groups are learning to use the courts to amend laws and regulations. The parliament’s resources and powers are somewhat constrained, limiting its ability to oversee the executive.
Human and civil rights are generally protected, though police maltreatment remains a concern. Although some municipalities have begun to certify same-sex partnerships, same-sex marriage has not been nationally recognized. Refugees face discrimination, with most asylum requests rejected. Corruption remains a concern particularly within the political system.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There is no independent and effective audit office.
According to the constitution, state revenues and expenditures are audited annually by the Board of Audit. The Board of Audit Act clarifies the organization and mandate of the board. The board is independent of the cabinet. It is composed of commissioners appointed for five-year terms by the cabinet with the consent of both houses of parliament. Commissioners can be removed from office only if they are sentenced to imprisonment or retire upon reaching the age of 70. While judges were previously appointed from among high-ranking bureaucrats, especially Ministry of Finance officials, at present they are recruited either from academia or from among the Board of Audit bureaucrats, which reduces the risk of collusion with different ministries.
The Board of Audit has the obligation to audit the revenues and expenditures of all state institutions and all juridical persons whose stated capital is based 50% or more on funds provided by the state. If it finds it necessary or is requested by the cabinet, it can audit the financial management of other entities (e.g., those that receive state subsidies). All entities are obliged to accept field audits and provide the requested documents. The board may request the head of a ministry or agency to take disciplinary action against an official who has caused substantial damage to the state. Any crimes must be reported to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Audit reports have to be submitted to, but need not be approved by, the Diet.
Japan ranked average among OECD countries in the Open Budget Survey 2021. A notable weakness of Japan’s Board of Audit is the lack of formal mechanisms for public assistance in audit investigations. Annual audit reports occasionally capture public attention. For example, the November 2023 report revealed 344 instances of wasteful spending or inappropriate accounting, amounting to JPY 58 billion (about €360 million). The board also indicated that unsecured financial assistance from government-affiliated financial institutions aimed at countering the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic amounting to JPY 69.7 billion (about $463 million) had become irrecoverable.
Citations:
Board of Audit of Japan. 1947, amended 2021. “The Board of Audit Act.” https://www.jbaudit.go.jp/english/jbaudit/law.html
International Budget Partnership. 2022. “Open Budget Survey 2021, Japan.” https://internationalbudget.org/sites/default/files/country-surveys-pdfs/2021/open-budget-survey-japan-2021-en.pdf
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
Watanabe, Toru. 2023. “$463 mil. in unsecured COVID loans in Japan irrecoverable, total may hit $6.64 bil.” The Mainichi, November 8. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20231108/p2a/00m/0na/012000c
The Board of Audit has the obligation to audit the revenues and expenditures of all state institutions and all juridical persons whose stated capital is based 50% or more on funds provided by the state. If it finds it necessary or is requested by the cabinet, it can audit the financial management of other entities (e.g., those that receive state subsidies). All entities are obliged to accept field audits and provide the requested documents. The board may request the head of a ministry or agency to take disciplinary action against an official who has caused substantial damage to the state. Any crimes must be reported to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Audit reports have to be submitted to, but need not be approved by, the Diet.
Japan ranked average among OECD countries in the Open Budget Survey 2021. A notable weakness of Japan’s Board of Audit is the lack of formal mechanisms for public assistance in audit investigations. Annual audit reports occasionally capture public attention. For example, the November 2023 report revealed 344 instances of wasteful spending or inappropriate accounting, amounting to JPY 58 billion (about €360 million). The board also indicated that unsecured financial assistance from government-affiliated financial institutions aimed at countering the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic amounting to JPY 69.7 billion (about $463 million) had become irrecoverable.
Citations:
Board of Audit of Japan. 1947, amended 2021. “The Board of Audit Act.” https://www.jbaudit.go.jp/english/jbaudit/law.html
International Budget Partnership. 2022. “Open Budget Survey 2021, Japan.” https://internationalbudget.org/sites/default/files/country-surveys-pdfs/2021/open-budget-survey-japan-2021-en.pdf
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
Watanabe, Toru. 2023. “$463 mil. in unsecured COVID loans in Japan irrecoverable, total may hit $6.64 bil.” The Mainichi, November 8. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20231108/p2a/00m/0na/012000c
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
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There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Personal data protection in Japan is regulated by the Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) from 2003, which was revised in 2017. The APPI was the first non-EU legal regime recognized in an adequacy decision after the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into force. Data protection is managed by the Personal Information Protection Commission, established in 2016. Its chairperson and members are nominated for five-year terms by the prime minister with the consent of both houses of parliament. Apart from bureaucracy, commission members originate from academia and business, which ensures a certain degree of independence and impartiality. The commission enjoys high discretion in conducting audits. It can issue cease-and-desist orders, though it cannot directly impose administrative fines. Business operators who refuse to follow the commission’s orders, however, may be imprisoned for up to one year. In some cases, the reaction of the commission to reports concerning the leaking of important personal data has been slow.
The controls conducted by the Personal Information Protection Commission and its administrative guidance issued to governmental institutions occasionally draw the media’s attention. For instance, in July 2023, the commission inspected the Digital Agency due to problems with implementing the My Number system – individual numbers allocated to all residents that facilitate the administration of benefits and other issues. It was revealed that many numbers had been linked to the wrong bank accounts.
In its report from November 2022, the UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern over the lack of sufficient safeguards, such as independent judicial oversight, against arbitrary surveillance and access to personal data by state institutions in Japan.
Citations:
DLA Piper. 2022. “Data Protection Laws of the World, Japan.” https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/system/modules/za.co.heliosdesign.dla.lotw.data_protection/functions/handbook.pdf?country-1=JP
European Commission. 2019. “European Commission Adopts Adequacy Decision on Japan, Creating the World’s Largest Area of Safe Data Flows.” https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_421
Personal Information Protection Commission, Japan. “Commission.” https://www.ppc.go.jp/en/aboutus/commission/
Watanabe, Junki, and Shuhei Shibata. 2023. “Commission to Probe Digital Agency over My Number Mishaps.” The Asahi Shimbun, July 7. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14950982
U.N. Human Rights Committee. 2022. “Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Japan.” https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsuBJT%2Fi29ui%2Fb4Ih9%2FUIJO87S0HPMR1PnCPt3LQO6EolLe709268JsfEokJ6QyNqFgswSBy1rovzRJaQqYHclTttywUvvrbUCI%2F6iBnTGHkY
The controls conducted by the Personal Information Protection Commission and its administrative guidance issued to governmental institutions occasionally draw the media’s attention. For instance, in July 2023, the commission inspected the Digital Agency due to problems with implementing the My Number system – individual numbers allocated to all residents that facilitate the administration of benefits and other issues. It was revealed that many numbers had been linked to the wrong bank accounts.
In its report from November 2022, the UN Human Rights Committee expressed concern over the lack of sufficient safeguards, such as independent judicial oversight, against arbitrary surveillance and access to personal data by state institutions in Japan.
Citations:
DLA Piper. 2022. “Data Protection Laws of the World, Japan.” https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/system/modules/za.co.heliosdesign.dla.lotw.data_protection/functions/handbook.pdf?country-1=JP
European Commission. 2019. “European Commission Adopts Adequacy Decision on Japan, Creating the World’s Largest Area of Safe Data Flows.” https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_421
Personal Information Protection Commission, Japan. “Commission.” https://www.ppc.go.jp/en/aboutus/commission/
Watanabe, Junki, and Shuhei Shibata. 2023. “Commission to Probe Digital Agency over My Number Mishaps.” The Asahi Shimbun, July 7. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14950982
U.N. Human Rights Committee. 2022. “Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Japan.” https://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsuBJT%2Fi29ui%2Fb4Ih9%2FUIJO87S0HPMR1PnCPt3LQO6EolLe709268JsfEokJ6QyNqFgswSBy1rovzRJaQqYHclTttywUvvrbUCI%2F6iBnTGHkY
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
The constitution guarantees the independence of the Japanese judicial system from the government. Judges are bound only by the constitution and the laws, and cannot be subject to any disciplinary action by the executive power. Justices of the Supreme Court can be arbitrarily appointed by the cabinet, but it is a tradition that the prime minister respects the chief justice’s recommendation for his or her successor. The appointments of Supreme Court justices are subject to review by a popular vote in the House of Representative elections, but this is effectively meaningless as voters are not presented with a choice. The judges of the inferior courts are appointed by the cabinet from a list of persons proposed by the Supreme Court.
According to the constitution, only the Supreme Court may determine the constitutionality of laws, orders, regulations or official acts. In reality, the Supreme Court reviews only specific cases and has frequently dismissed suits concerning the constitutionality of laws because they lacked the case or controversy requirement. It has also refused to decide on the constitutionality of governmental decisions regarding highly political questions. Instead of the Supreme Court, it is the Cabinet Legislation Bureau that issues interpretations of the constitution on daily matters, which decreases the transparency of this process. Since a 2013 appointment to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau the government has sought to ensure that it offers interpretations that are in line with the government view (Yamamoto 2017).
Japanese courts tend to be lenient toward the government, although there is also a growing number of examples in which they challenge the government’s position. The government generally complies with judicial rulings, though it may take some time, for instance, regarding the change of constituency borders to eliminate disparities in parliamentary election votes. Civil society groups and activists have become increasingly adept at using the judicial system and case law to amend laws and regulations (Sala 2023).
Citations:
Matsui, Shigenori. 2011. “Why is the Japanese Supreme Court so Conservative?” Washington University Law Review 88 (6): 1375-1423.
Sala, Adrienne. 2023. “Exploring Litigation, Court Rulings, and Legal Mobilization in Response to Death and Suicide from Overwork: Implications for Labor Law Reform Policy Making in Japan.” Law and Social Inquiry. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/law-and-social-inquiry/article/exploring-litigation-court-rulings-and-legal-mobilization-in-response-to-death-and-suicide-from-overwork-implications-for-labor-law-reform-policymaking-in-japan/A791E3247603AF648E54FBA4C1147344
Yamamoto, Hajime. 2017. “Interpretation of the Pacifist Article of the Constitution by the Bureau of Cabinet Legislation: A New Source of Constitutional Law?” Washington International Law Journal 26 (1): 99-124.
According to the constitution, only the Supreme Court may determine the constitutionality of laws, orders, regulations or official acts. In reality, the Supreme Court reviews only specific cases and has frequently dismissed suits concerning the constitutionality of laws because they lacked the case or controversy requirement. It has also refused to decide on the constitutionality of governmental decisions regarding highly political questions. Instead of the Supreme Court, it is the Cabinet Legislation Bureau that issues interpretations of the constitution on daily matters, which decreases the transparency of this process. Since a 2013 appointment to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau the government has sought to ensure that it offers interpretations that are in line with the government view (Yamamoto 2017).
Japanese courts tend to be lenient toward the government, although there is also a growing number of examples in which they challenge the government’s position. The government generally complies with judicial rulings, though it may take some time, for instance, regarding the change of constituency borders to eliminate disparities in parliamentary election votes. Civil society groups and activists have become increasingly adept at using the judicial system and case law to amend laws and regulations (Sala 2023).
Citations:
Matsui, Shigenori. 2011. “Why is the Japanese Supreme Court so Conservative?” Washington University Law Review 88 (6): 1375-1423.
Sala, Adrienne. 2023. “Exploring Litigation, Court Rulings, and Legal Mobilization in Response to Death and Suicide from Overwork: Implications for Labor Law Reform Policy Making in Japan.” Law and Social Inquiry. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/law-and-social-inquiry/article/exploring-litigation-court-rulings-and-legal-mobilization-in-response-to-death-and-suicide-from-overwork-implications-for-labor-law-reform-policymaking-in-japan/A791E3247603AF648E54FBA4C1147344
Yamamoto, Hajime. 2017. “Interpretation of the Pacifist Article of the Constitution by the Bureau of Cabinet Legislation: A New Source of Constitutional Law?” Washington International Law Journal 26 (1): 99-124.
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
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There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
The Japanese constitution guarantees all basic human and civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, redress of damages, education, private property, as well as freedom of thought, religion, speech, assembly and association. All people are equal under the law and cannot be discriminated against because of race, sex, creed, social status or family origin. Access to the courts is guaranteed by the constitution. Arrests without a judicial warrant, torture and cruel punishments are prohibited. Confessions made under compulsion are not admitted as evidence.
Maltreatment by the police is still common. Suspects may be detained for 23 days before indictment by a judge, with a risk of rearrest and prolonged detention. The right to access a lawyer and to remain silent is not always respected, as investigators press suspects to confess to alleged crimes. In addition, long pretrial detention is thought to encourage forced confessions (U.S. Department of State 2022). While rarely applied, the death penalty has not been abolished and conditions in prisons are harsh.
Japan has a low litigation rate and the use of alternative conflict resolution models are common. The World Justice Project assesses these to be fairly accessible, impartial and effective.
Despite the government’s efforts to promote the empowerment of women, Japanese society is still largely patriarchal. The revised Labor Policy Comprehensive Promotion Act, which came into effect in 2020, mandates employers to take actions against the harassment of women, but it failed to introduce punishment for non-compliance. Japan ranked 125 out of 146 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index 2023. Only about 10% of members of the House of Representatives are women.
The Act for Eliminating Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, which entered into force in 2016, prohibited the unfair and discriminatory treatment of persons with disabilities by administrative organizations and private businesses. Nevertheless, Japan has not signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which prevents citizens from submitting their complaints to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
A growing number of municipalities are recognizing same-sex partnerships and issuing partnership certificates. However, the legal weight of these certificates is limited and the right to marriage is still not granted. Japan’s legal framework is far less developed than in most other OECD democracies. Although naturalization rules were eased in recent years, some discrimination against Korean and Chinese permanent residents continues. Another discriminated group are refugees. The Japanese government rejects most asylum requests. Foreigners in immigration control facilities are subjected to prolonged detention and inhumane treatment. Foreign workers often face discrimination connected with dangerous working conditions, low wages, and forced overtime work. Since 2021, a smartphone app issued by the Immigration Services Agency of Japan – which is supposed to help verify foreign nationals’ residence cards – has been criticized as discriminating against foreign residents and violating privacy rights. The government has not restricted usage of the app and has even advertised it on public trains.
In Japan, there is no independent agency, such as an ombudsperson, that investigates human rights abuses. Because Japan has not signed the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Japanese citizens cannot submit their complaints to the UN Human Rights Committee.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/2023. The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/POL1056702023ENGLISH.pdf
“Concerns raised over residence card checker app released to public.” https://www.city-cost.com/blogs/City-Cost/GbPm2-living
Human Rights Watch. 2023. “Japan: ‘Hostage Justice’ System Violates Rights.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/25/japan-hostage-justice-system-violates-rights
OECD. 2021. Over the Rainbow? The Road to LGBTI Inclusion. Paris: OECD.
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
U.S. Department of State. 2022. “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Japan.” https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/japan
World Economic Forum. 2023. “Global Gender Gap Report 2023.” https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2023.pdf
World Justice Project. “Japan, civil justice.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Japan/Civil%20Justice/
Maltreatment by the police is still common. Suspects may be detained for 23 days before indictment by a judge, with a risk of rearrest and prolonged detention. The right to access a lawyer and to remain silent is not always respected, as investigators press suspects to confess to alleged crimes. In addition, long pretrial detention is thought to encourage forced confessions (U.S. Department of State 2022). While rarely applied, the death penalty has not been abolished and conditions in prisons are harsh.
Japan has a low litigation rate and the use of alternative conflict resolution models are common. The World Justice Project assesses these to be fairly accessible, impartial and effective.
Despite the government’s efforts to promote the empowerment of women, Japanese society is still largely patriarchal. The revised Labor Policy Comprehensive Promotion Act, which came into effect in 2020, mandates employers to take actions against the harassment of women, but it failed to introduce punishment for non-compliance. Japan ranked 125 out of 146 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index 2023. Only about 10% of members of the House of Representatives are women.
The Act for Eliminating Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, which entered into force in 2016, prohibited the unfair and discriminatory treatment of persons with disabilities by administrative organizations and private businesses. Nevertheless, Japan has not signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which prevents citizens from submitting their complaints to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
A growing number of municipalities are recognizing same-sex partnerships and issuing partnership certificates. However, the legal weight of these certificates is limited and the right to marriage is still not granted. Japan’s legal framework is far less developed than in most other OECD democracies. Although naturalization rules were eased in recent years, some discrimination against Korean and Chinese permanent residents continues. Another discriminated group are refugees. The Japanese government rejects most asylum requests. Foreigners in immigration control facilities are subjected to prolonged detention and inhumane treatment. Foreign workers often face discrimination connected with dangerous working conditions, low wages, and forced overtime work. Since 2021, a smartphone app issued by the Immigration Services Agency of Japan – which is supposed to help verify foreign nationals’ residence cards – has been criticized as discriminating against foreign residents and violating privacy rights. The government has not restricted usage of the app and has even advertised it on public trains.
In Japan, there is no independent agency, such as an ombudsperson, that investigates human rights abuses. Because Japan has not signed the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Japanese citizens cannot submit their complaints to the UN Human Rights Committee.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/2023. The State of the World’s Human Rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/POL1056702023ENGLISH.pdf
“Concerns raised over residence card checker app released to public.” https://www.city-cost.com/blogs/City-Cost/GbPm2-living
Human Rights Watch. 2023. “Japan: ‘Hostage Justice’ System Violates Rights.” https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/25/japan-hostage-justice-system-violates-rights
OECD. 2021. Over the Rainbow? The Road to LGBTI Inclusion. Paris: OECD.
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
U.S. Department of State. 2022. “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Japan.” https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/japan
World Economic Forum. 2023. “Global Gender Gap Report 2023.” https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2023.pdf
World Justice Project. “Japan, civil justice.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Japan/Civil%20Justice/
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
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Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Corruption in Japanese politics has been fueled by patron-client relationships between politicians and voters. The introduction of state subsidies for political parties in 1994 aimed to eliminate such practices. At the same time, total donations to a particular party or political funding entity were limited to JPY 20 million per year from an individual, and to between JPY 7.5 million and JPY 100 million per year from a company, depending on the company size. Moreover, a maximum annual donation ceiling of JPY 1.5 million per person to an individual candidate was introduced. Both political parties and politicians are required to disclose their expenditures and the sources of their revenues, though such reports are not fully transparent.
The new rules have only partially weakened clientelistic practices, however. Corruption scandals are still relatively frequent in Japanese politics. For instance, in September 2023, former Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Akimoto Masatoshi was arrested under on allegations he had received a bribe from a company that promoted the construction of offshore wind power plants.
Collusive and corrupt ties between bureaucrats and businesspersons have been connected with the practice of amakudari – assuming highly paid jobs in public institutions or private companies after retiring from a ministerial position. While amakudari is officially prohibited, bureaucrats still find ways to bypass the law.
Japan is a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Convention Against Corruption, and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In the 2020 Corruption Risk Forecast, Japan was evaluated relatively well in terms of social integrity but below average in terms of transparency. In its 2019 report, the OECD recommended Japan be more proactive in detecting foreign bribery.
Citations:
Corruption Risk Forecast. 2020. “Japan’s Corruption Forecast.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=JPN#forecast
Kyodo News. 2023. “Japan lawmaker arrested in suspected clean energy bribery.” https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/09/df088276e042-update1-japans-ex-vice-foreign-minister-arrested-over-suspected-bribery.html
Nishigaki, Kengo, and Muto, Yoshiaki. “Anti-Corruption in Japan.” https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/anti-corruption-in-japan
OECD. 2019. “Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Phase 4 Report: Japan.” https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Japan-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf
The new rules have only partially weakened clientelistic practices, however. Corruption scandals are still relatively frequent in Japanese politics. For instance, in September 2023, former Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Akimoto Masatoshi was arrested under on allegations he had received a bribe from a company that promoted the construction of offshore wind power plants.
Collusive and corrupt ties between bureaucrats and businesspersons have been connected with the practice of amakudari – assuming highly paid jobs in public institutions or private companies after retiring from a ministerial position. While amakudari is officially prohibited, bureaucrats still find ways to bypass the law.
Japan is a signatory to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the UN Convention Against Corruption, and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. In the 2020 Corruption Risk Forecast, Japan was evaluated relatively well in terms of social integrity but below average in terms of transparency. In its 2019 report, the OECD recommended Japan be more proactive in detecting foreign bribery.
Citations:
Corruption Risk Forecast. 2020. “Japan’s Corruption Forecast.” https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=JPN#forecast
Kyodo News. 2023. “Japan lawmaker arrested in suspected clean energy bribery.” https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2023/09/df088276e042-update1-japans-ex-vice-foreign-minister-arrested-over-suspected-bribery.html
Nishigaki, Kengo, and Muto, Yoshiaki. “Anti-Corruption in Japan.” https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/anti-corruption/anti-corruption-in-japan
OECD. 2019. “Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Phase 4 Report: Japan.” https://www.oecd.org/corruption/anti-bribery/OECD-Japan-Phase-4-Report-ENG.pdf
Graph View
Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
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The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Individual parliamentarians have only a few staff members to support their work. Until the 1990s, each parliamentarian could employ only two official secretaries in their legislative office. In reality, secretaries usually served in the politician’s electoral office and communicated with voters. An additional secretarial post in charge of policymaking was introduced in 1993, but even they often lack the expertise and time to focus on policy matters. As a result, proposed bills sponsored by lawmakers are usually drafted by Diet bureaucrats who enjoy considerable independence and leeway due to their expertise. Research bureaus in the secretariats of both chambers examine all matters processed by parliamentary committees. The legislative bureaus of both houses, in turn, examine the constitutionality of bills.
The National Diet Library Research and Legislative Reference Bureau conducts research in cooperation with scholars and experts, which involve interviews, roundtable discussions and field studies. The bureau regularly publishes reports on various studies concerning important national matters.
Due to the rationalization of budget expenses in 2005 and 2010, the number of staff in the secretariats of both chambers was reduced, which contrasts with a gradual increase in the number of Cabinet Office staff. This trend indicates a relative empowerment of the executive against the legislative branch.
Citations:
Zakowski, Karol. 2023. “The Parliamentary Administration of Japan: The Kokkai.” In The Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations, eds. Thomas Christiansen, Elena Griglio, and Nicola Lupo, 656-665. London – New York: Routledge.
The National Diet Library Research and Legislative Reference Bureau conducts research in cooperation with scholars and experts, which involve interviews, roundtable discussions and field studies. The bureau regularly publishes reports on various studies concerning important national matters.
Due to the rationalization of budget expenses in 2005 and 2010, the number of staff in the secretariats of both chambers was reduced, which contrasts with a gradual increase in the number of Cabinet Office staff. This trend indicates a relative empowerment of the executive against the legislative branch.
Citations:
Zakowski, Karol. 2023. “The Parliamentary Administration of Japan: The Kokkai.” In The Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations, eds. Thomas Christiansen, Elena Griglio, and Nicola Lupo, 656-665. London – New York: Routledge.
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
All parliamentarians may pose questions in written form to the cabinet, which have to be answered within seven days. If an answer cannot be given on time, the cabinet has to clarify a reason and the time by when the answer will be provided. Questions of an urgent nature may be posed orally by a resolution of the house. Since the abolishment of the government commissioner system in 1999, cabinet members cannot be replaced by bureaucrats when answering questions in the Diet, though the answers are prepared by ministerial administrative staff. Answers tend to cite the general policy of the government without addressing the contents of questions in any detail.
Traditionally, the budget committees of both houses serve as the prime venues for the interrogation of the prime minister and ministers by the opposition. Cabinet members are often faced with difficult questions and the deliberations are broadcast live. Prime ministers generally comply with requests to participate in budget committee proceedings, but there have been cases of procedural maneuvers with the goal of avoiding having to face criticism in the committees.
The Board of Oversight and the Review of Specially Designated Secrets were established in 2014 to assess the appropriateness of the designation of “special secrets” by the government. However, the heads of administrative organs may decline board requests for document submissions if the cabinet clarifies why such an act would endanger national security. In practice, often only the lists of “specially designated secrets” – not their contents – are provided to the boards.
Citations:
House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. “The Diet Law.” https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/diet/index.htm
Zakowski, Karol. 2023. “The Parliamentary Administration of Japan: The Kokkai.” In The Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations, eds. Thomas Christiansen, Elena Griglio, and Nicola Lupo. London – New York: Routledge, 656-665.
Traditionally, the budget committees of both houses serve as the prime venues for the interrogation of the prime minister and ministers by the opposition. Cabinet members are often faced with difficult questions and the deliberations are broadcast live. Prime ministers generally comply with requests to participate in budget committee proceedings, but there have been cases of procedural maneuvers with the goal of avoiding having to face criticism in the committees.
The Board of Oversight and the Review of Specially Designated Secrets were established in 2014 to assess the appropriateness of the designation of “special secrets” by the government. However, the heads of administrative organs may decline board requests for document submissions if the cabinet clarifies why such an act would endanger national security. In practice, often only the lists of “specially designated secrets” – not their contents – are provided to the boards.
Citations:
House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. “The Diet Law.” https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/diet/index.htm
Zakowski, Karol. 2023. “The Parliamentary Administration of Japan: The Kokkai.” In The Routledge Handbook of Parliamentary Administrations, eds. Thomas Christiansen, Elena Griglio, and Nicola Lupo. London – New York: Routledge, 656-665.
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
According to the constitution, each house may conduct investigations related to the government, summon witnesses and demand records. However, under the Diet Law, the cabinet may refuse to submit the requested reports and records if it declares that such an act would be severely detrimental to the national interest.
It is unlikely that the opposition parties will initiate an investigation into the government’s mishandling of issues. Summoning witnesses is possible only if the ruling parties agree to investigate a scandal under popular pressure or if the opposition parties hold a majority in the upper house. Moreover, the approval of two-thirds of committee members is needed to charge a witness with violating the law by refusing to testify or perjury, which is almost impossible to achieve without cooperation from the ruling parties. Special committees for investigating particular scandals are rarely established and witnesses are usually summoned by the budget committees of both houses. The last time a witness was summoned before the parliament was in 2018, when Ministry of Finance officials concealed documents related to Prime Minister Abe’s involvement in the Moritomo Gakuen scandal, which concerned the purchase of land by a private school in Osaka at a reduced price. The investigation led to a temporary decrease in the popularity of the government.
Citations:
Giin ni okeru Shônin no Sensei oyobi Shôgen-tô ni kansuru Hôritsu [Act on Witnesses’ Oath, Testimony, etc. Before Both Houses of the Diet]. 1947. e-Gov. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=322AC1000000225_20220617_504AC0000000068
House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. “The Diet Law.” https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/diet/index.htm
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
It is unlikely that the opposition parties will initiate an investigation into the government’s mishandling of issues. Summoning witnesses is possible only if the ruling parties agree to investigate a scandal under popular pressure or if the opposition parties hold a majority in the upper house. Moreover, the approval of two-thirds of committee members is needed to charge a witness with violating the law by refusing to testify or perjury, which is almost impossible to achieve without cooperation from the ruling parties. Special committees for investigating particular scandals are rarely established and witnesses are usually summoned by the budget committees of both houses. The last time a witness was summoned before the parliament was in 2018, when Ministry of Finance officials concealed documents related to Prime Minister Abe’s involvement in the Moritomo Gakuen scandal, which concerned the purchase of land by a private school in Osaka at a reduced price. The investigation led to a temporary decrease in the popularity of the government.
Citations:
Giin ni okeru Shônin no Sensei oyobi Shôgen-tô ni kansuru Hôritsu [Act on Witnesses’ Oath, Testimony, etc. Before Both Houses of the Diet]. 1947. e-Gov. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=322AC1000000225_20220617_504AC0000000068
House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. “The Diet Law.” https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/diet/index.htm
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. 1946. “The Constitution of Japan.” https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
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9
9
The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
2
1
1
The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
Standing committees in the Japanese Diet generally correspond to the matters under the jurisdiction of separate ministries, while special committees deal with important matters exceeding the competence of one standing committee. Special parliamentary committees are sometimes used by the government to bypass standing committees, in which deliberations are subject to numerous institutional constraints.
Membership of parliamentary committees is distributed proportionally to the size of political groups in each house. All decisions in the committees are made by a majority vote, with the chairperson’s vote decisive in case of a tie. In the past, with a minimal majority in the house, the ruling party often had to choose between securing a majority of votes or the position of committee chairperson. As of November 2023, however, the ruling parties hold a majority in all House of Representative committees. Opposition politicians chair three of 25 committees in the lower house and seven of 25 committees in the upper house. Only in the House of Councilors, where the ruling coalition has a minimal majority, do opposition lawmakers chair some important committees, such as the Committee on Economy and Industry.
Committees typically meet on a weekly basis or less often. The schedule of Diet deliberations is established by the committees on rules and administration of both chambers, which host the representatives of all parliamentary caucuses. As the government has no way to directly control the legislative process after submission of a bill to the Diet, it relies on a comprehensive advance screening of all bill proposals at the ruling-party level. Once a project is acknowledged as a party decision by the LDP General Council, all LDP lawmakers are obliged to vote for the bill. Because serious deliberations on bill proposals take place in the ruling party before their submission to the Diet, discussion in parliamentary committees is conducted mainly by the opposition parties. Discussion time during plenary sessions is greatly limited in comparison with other parliamentary systems in the world. Negotiations with opposition politicians are conducted outside the Diet by the Diet affairs committees of different parties, which decreases the transparency of the legislative process. For this reason, committee deliberations rarely play a role in modifying draft legislation or monitoring ministry activity.
Citations:
House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. “The Diet Law.” https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/diet/index.htm
Nonaka, Naoto, and Saraba Garapagosu Seiji. 2013. Kimerareru Nihon ni Tsukurinaosu Farewell Galapagos Politics: Rebuilding of Japan that Can Make Decisions]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha.
Zakowski, Karol. 2021. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan. Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London – New York: Routledge, 155-158.
Membership of parliamentary committees is distributed proportionally to the size of political groups in each house. All decisions in the committees are made by a majority vote, with the chairperson’s vote decisive in case of a tie. In the past, with a minimal majority in the house, the ruling party often had to choose between securing a majority of votes or the position of committee chairperson. As of November 2023, however, the ruling parties hold a majority in all House of Representative committees. Opposition politicians chair three of 25 committees in the lower house and seven of 25 committees in the upper house. Only in the House of Councilors, where the ruling coalition has a minimal majority, do opposition lawmakers chair some important committees, such as the Committee on Economy and Industry.
Committees typically meet on a weekly basis or less often. The schedule of Diet deliberations is established by the committees on rules and administration of both chambers, which host the representatives of all parliamentary caucuses. As the government has no way to directly control the legislative process after submission of a bill to the Diet, it relies on a comprehensive advance screening of all bill proposals at the ruling-party level. Once a project is acknowledged as a party decision by the LDP General Council, all LDP lawmakers are obliged to vote for the bill. Because serious deliberations on bill proposals take place in the ruling party before their submission to the Diet, discussion in parliamentary committees is conducted mainly by the opposition parties. Discussion time during plenary sessions is greatly limited in comparison with other parliamentary systems in the world. Negotiations with opposition politicians are conducted outside the Diet by the Diet affairs committees of different parties, which decreases the transparency of the legislative process. For this reason, committee deliberations rarely play a role in modifying draft legislation or monitoring ministry activity.
Citations:
House of Councillors, The National Diet of Japan. “The Diet Law.” https://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/law/diet/index.htm
Nonaka, Naoto, and Saraba Garapagosu Seiji. 2013. Kimerareru Nihon ni Tsukurinaosu Farewell Galapagos Politics: Rebuilding of Japan that Can Make Decisions]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha.
Zakowski, Karol. 2021. Gradual Institutional Change in Japan. Kantei Leadership under the Abe Administration. London – New York: Routledge, 155-158.