Vertical Accountability
#22Key Findings
Japan performs relatively poorly (rank 22) in the category of vertical accountability.
Political competition is generally fair and transparent, with elections managed impartially. Lawmakers are elected both in single-seat constituencies and via proportional representation. Despite reforms in 1994 to strengthen competition, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has won most elections since 1996. Women are severely underrepresented in the political system.
Parties and politicians are required to disclose their spending and revenue sources, though illegal donations remain common. Parties are easy to form. Frequent shifts in the opposition party field indicates a lack of cohesion. The LDP is built around personal support networks and factions. No significant environmental party exists.
The political system has long been clientelistic. Ideological polarization has declined. Some prominent right-wing and nationalist politicians have made xenophobic or antisemitic statements without significant public backlash. Access to official information is regulated by law, but exemptions are extensive.
Political competition is generally fair and transparent, with elections managed impartially. Lawmakers are elected both in single-seat constituencies and via proportional representation. Despite reforms in 1994 to strengthen competition, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has won most elections since 1996. Women are severely underrepresented in the political system.
Parties and politicians are required to disclose their spending and revenue sources, though illegal donations remain common. Parties are easy to form. Frequent shifts in the opposition party field indicates a lack of cohesion. The LDP is built around personal support networks and factions. No significant environmental party exists.
The political system has long been clientelistic. Ideological polarization has declined. Some prominent right-wing and nationalist politicians have made xenophobic or antisemitic statements without significant public backlash. Access to official information is regulated by law, but exemptions are extensive.
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To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
Political competition in Japan is generally fair and transparent. Only persons who are under guardianship and deemed “incompetent,” those sentenced to prison, and persons who have been found guilty of violating the Public Office Election Law may be banned from standing in elections. The minimum age for candidates ranges from 25 (lower house, city council) to 30 (upper house, governor). The financial deposit required to become a candidate amounts to JPY 3 million (approximately €18,500) in constituency voting and JPY 6 million (approximately €37,000) in proportional representation. Although the deposit is returned after exceeding a certain threshold of votes (in most cases 10%), it constitutes an obstacle for smaller parties and unaffiliated candidates. In April 2023, a pipe bomb was thrown toward Prime Minister Kishida Fumio by a man apparently frustrated he had been denied the right to run in an upper house election for failing to comply with formal requirements.
Japan’s electoral system comprises 289 single-seat constituencies and 189 members elected through proportional representation for the House of Representatives, as well as a mix of single, non-transferable votes and proportional representation for the House of Councilors. While the introduction of the mixed system to the lower house in 1994 aimed to strengthen competition between the two major parties, the LDP has nonetheless won all but one election for the lower house since 1996. The LDP still enjoys some advantage under the new system, and Komeito, its junior coalition partner for over two decades, can reliably mobilize and instruct the members of Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist sect, to vote for LDP candidates in swing districts, which has further fortified the LDP’s position. In the 2021 election, the two parties won a combined 63% of seats, with 47% of votes. The combination of single-seat constituencies and write-in ballots has also exacerbated the problem of hereditary parliamentarianism (Punendra 2023). At present, about 30% of Diet members inherited their constituencies. The advantage of name recognition plus personalized voter support groups incentivizes the LDP to nominate the sons (and in rare cases daughters) of retired lawmakers. This practice has limited opportunities for politicians without familial connections and wealth to gain seats in the Diet as members of the dominant party. Moreover, the government and the Supreme Court of Japan have been reluctant to address the disparity in the value of one vote between rural and urban districts – which exceeds three-to-one – favoring conservative candidates.
A major electoral problem at all levels is the gross underrepresentation of women. Only about 10% of members of the lower house are women, while the number of female cabinet ministers rarely exceeds this threshold. In local elections, female candidates make up only 15% of candidates (NHK 2023). Their representation has been helped by the fact that municipalities play a large role in the expansion of childcare facilities (Tsuji 2017). Another problem of subnational elections is that they fail to attract candidates, and assemblies are increasingly sidelined by mayors or governors (Nikkei Asia). In the unified April 2013 local elections, 40.2% of mayoral posts, as well as 14% of assembly posts in 2023, went uncontested.
Both political parties and politicians are required to disclose their spending and sources of revenue. Nevertheless, incidents of illegal donations remain frequent. The Political Fund Control Law does not require the consolidation of reports from various committees charged with the financial matters of one politician, which decreases the transparency of political funds. Moreover, not all reports are digitized, their preservation period is only three years and individual contributions below JPY 50,000 (below JPY 200,000 in the case of tickets for fundraising events) do not have to be reported.
Although there are no legal restrictions on media access for candidates, government officials enjoy greater media coverage, especially in public media. The legalization of social media use in electoral campaigns in 2013 somewhat improved access to voters for non-mainstream candidates.
Citations:
Harris, Tobias, and John McLaughlin. 2021. “The Small Pacifist Party That Could Shape Japan’s Future.” Foreign Policy, November 5. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/04/komeito-ldp-japan-elections-defense-policy-china/
Hayashi, Masao, and Yuki Nikaido. 2023. “Vicious Cycle Leads to More ‘Triple no-Contest’ Local Elections.” The Asahi Shimbun, June 5. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14925299
“Japan’s hollowing out of regional legislatures deepens.” NikkeiAsia, February 10.
Kôshoku Senkyo-hô [Public Office Election Law]. 1970, revised in 2022. e-Gov. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=325AC1000000100
Noguchi, Yo. 2021. “Loopholes Keep Voters in the Dark in Japan.” https://archive.investigativereportingworkshop.org/news/loopholes-keep-voters-in-the-dark-in-japan/
Purnendra Jain. 2023. “Hereditary Politicians Remain Dominant in Japan.” East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/02/28/hereditary-politicians-remain-dominant-in-japan/
Tsuji, Yuki. 2017. “Explaining the Increase in Female Mayors: Gender-Segregated Employment and Pathways to Local Political Leadership.” Social Science Japan Journal 20 (1): 37-57.
“Top Court Fails to Recognize the Harm of Vote Value Disparity.” The Asahi Shinbun, October 19. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15032404
“Women on the Frontline: 15% of Japan’s Politicians.” NHK World, June 10, 2023. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/3016155/
Yamaguchi, Mari. 2023. “Suspect in Japan PM Attack May Have Had Election Grudge.” AP News April 19. https://apnews.com/article/japan-kishida-explosion-suspect-motive-13382736b2532e8aaa54a7e5ec3bf636
Japan’s electoral system comprises 289 single-seat constituencies and 189 members elected through proportional representation for the House of Representatives, as well as a mix of single, non-transferable votes and proportional representation for the House of Councilors. While the introduction of the mixed system to the lower house in 1994 aimed to strengthen competition between the two major parties, the LDP has nonetheless won all but one election for the lower house since 1996. The LDP still enjoys some advantage under the new system, and Komeito, its junior coalition partner for over two decades, can reliably mobilize and instruct the members of Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist sect, to vote for LDP candidates in swing districts, which has further fortified the LDP’s position. In the 2021 election, the two parties won a combined 63% of seats, with 47% of votes. The combination of single-seat constituencies and write-in ballots has also exacerbated the problem of hereditary parliamentarianism (Punendra 2023). At present, about 30% of Diet members inherited their constituencies. The advantage of name recognition plus personalized voter support groups incentivizes the LDP to nominate the sons (and in rare cases daughters) of retired lawmakers. This practice has limited opportunities for politicians without familial connections and wealth to gain seats in the Diet as members of the dominant party. Moreover, the government and the Supreme Court of Japan have been reluctant to address the disparity in the value of one vote between rural and urban districts – which exceeds three-to-one – favoring conservative candidates.
A major electoral problem at all levels is the gross underrepresentation of women. Only about 10% of members of the lower house are women, while the number of female cabinet ministers rarely exceeds this threshold. In local elections, female candidates make up only 15% of candidates (NHK 2023). Their representation has been helped by the fact that municipalities play a large role in the expansion of childcare facilities (Tsuji 2017). Another problem of subnational elections is that they fail to attract candidates, and assemblies are increasingly sidelined by mayors or governors (Nikkei Asia). In the unified April 2013 local elections, 40.2% of mayoral posts, as well as 14% of assembly posts in 2023, went uncontested.
Both political parties and politicians are required to disclose their spending and sources of revenue. Nevertheless, incidents of illegal donations remain frequent. The Political Fund Control Law does not require the consolidation of reports from various committees charged with the financial matters of one politician, which decreases the transparency of political funds. Moreover, not all reports are digitized, their preservation period is only three years and individual contributions below JPY 50,000 (below JPY 200,000 in the case of tickets for fundraising events) do not have to be reported.
Although there are no legal restrictions on media access for candidates, government officials enjoy greater media coverage, especially in public media. The legalization of social media use in electoral campaigns in 2013 somewhat improved access to voters for non-mainstream candidates.
Citations:
Harris, Tobias, and John McLaughlin. 2021. “The Small Pacifist Party That Could Shape Japan’s Future.” Foreign Policy, November 5. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/04/komeito-ldp-japan-elections-defense-policy-china/
Hayashi, Masao, and Yuki Nikaido. 2023. “Vicious Cycle Leads to More ‘Triple no-Contest’ Local Elections.” The Asahi Shimbun, June 5. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14925299
“Japan’s hollowing out of regional legislatures deepens.” NikkeiAsia, February 10.
Kôshoku Senkyo-hô [Public Office Election Law]. 1970, revised in 2022. e-Gov. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=325AC1000000100
Noguchi, Yo. 2021. “Loopholes Keep Voters in the Dark in Japan.” https://archive.investigativereportingworkshop.org/news/loopholes-keep-voters-in-the-dark-in-japan/
Purnendra Jain. 2023. “Hereditary Politicians Remain Dominant in Japan.” East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/02/28/hereditary-politicians-remain-dominant-in-japan/
Tsuji, Yuki. 2017. “Explaining the Increase in Female Mayors: Gender-Segregated Employment and Pathways to Local Political Leadership.” Social Science Japan Journal 20 (1): 37-57.
“Top Court Fails to Recognize the Harm of Vote Value Disparity.” The Asahi Shinbun, October 19. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/15032404
“Women on the Frontline: 15% of Japan’s Politicians.” NHK World, June 10, 2023. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ondemand/video/3016155/
Yamaguchi, Mari. 2023. “Suspect in Japan PM Attack May Have Had Election Grudge.” AP News April 19. https://apnews.com/article/japan-kishida-explosion-suspect-motive-13382736b2532e8aaa54a7e5ec3bf636
To what extent can all citizens, both in legal terms (de jure) and in practice (de facto), exercise their right to vote?
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There are no significant barriers, by law or in practice, that hinder citizens or specific groups in society from exercising their right to vote.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles that substantially hinder voting.
The electoral process in Japan is generally free and fair. Voting rights are granted to all citizens above 18 years old, including those living abroad. The only exceptions apply to persons serving a prison sentence and persons who are under legal guardianship and deemed “incompetent.” A five-year voting rights suspension also applies to those who have been convicted of violating the Public Office Election Law. There has been a debate about granting the right to vote in local elections to long-term foreign residents, especially Koreans and Chinese living in Japan for many generations, but so far without much result. Only in a small number of municipalities have foreign residents been granted the right to participate in local referendums. This issue will likely become more prominent as the share of foreign residents is increasing and it is attracting more controversy with some politicians campaigning against such measures (Takao 2022).
Voter registration is based on residential address. While this system facilitates participation in elections, it also leads to abuses. In municipal elections, for example, it is not uncommon for voters to change their residence just three months before an election, which makes them eligible for voting in the election. As the differences in votes for different candidates are usually extremely small at the most local level, such practices can distort results.
Elections take place on Sundays and the secrecy of voting is ensured. National elections under the proportional representation system are managed impartially by the Central Election Management Council, which decides on the election schedule, accepts the lists of candidates and announces results. National elections for constituency voting, as well as gubernatorial and prefectural assembly elections are managed by the prefectural election administration commissions, while municipal election administration commissions manage municipal assemblies and mayoral elections. The ballot design in single-seat constituencies – which requires voters to correctly spell the full name of a candidate – favors incumbents and hereditary politicians. There is no online voting and absentee voting relies on postal services, which sometimes fail to deliver ballots on time. The number of polling stations keeps decreasing due to depopulation, which makes it harder for elderly people in rural areas to vote. A limited number of municipalities provide free transportation to polling stations.
Citations:
Horiuchi, Yusaku. 2015. “Detecting Electoral Fraud in Japan.” East Asia Forum, April 18. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/04/18/detecting-electoral-fraud-in-japan/
Jojima, Hayato. 2022. “1,701 absentee ballots went invalid in 2021 Japan election after missing deadline.” The Mainichi June 29. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20220629/p2a/00m/0na/018000c
“Kôshoku Senkyo-hô” [Public Office Election Law]. 1970. e-Gov. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=325AC1000000100
“Prevent decrease in polling stations from inconveniencing Japanese voters.” The Mainichi, July 17. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190717/p2a/00m/0na/014000c
Takao, Yasuo. 2022. “Civic rights for foreign residents sparks backlash in Japan.” East Asia Forum February 12. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/02/12/civic-rights-for-foreign-residents-sparks-backlash-in-japan/
Voter registration is based on residential address. While this system facilitates participation in elections, it also leads to abuses. In municipal elections, for example, it is not uncommon for voters to change their residence just three months before an election, which makes them eligible for voting in the election. As the differences in votes for different candidates are usually extremely small at the most local level, such practices can distort results.
Elections take place on Sundays and the secrecy of voting is ensured. National elections under the proportional representation system are managed impartially by the Central Election Management Council, which decides on the election schedule, accepts the lists of candidates and announces results. National elections for constituency voting, as well as gubernatorial and prefectural assembly elections are managed by the prefectural election administration commissions, while municipal election administration commissions manage municipal assemblies and mayoral elections. The ballot design in single-seat constituencies – which requires voters to correctly spell the full name of a candidate – favors incumbents and hereditary politicians. There is no online voting and absentee voting relies on postal services, which sometimes fail to deliver ballots on time. The number of polling stations keeps decreasing due to depopulation, which makes it harder for elderly people in rural areas to vote. A limited number of municipalities provide free transportation to polling stations.
Citations:
Horiuchi, Yusaku. 2015. “Detecting Electoral Fraud in Japan.” East Asia Forum, April 18. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/04/18/detecting-electoral-fraud-in-japan/
Jojima, Hayato. 2022. “1,701 absentee ballots went invalid in 2021 Japan election after missing deadline.” The Mainichi June 29. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20220629/p2a/00m/0na/018000c
“Kôshoku Senkyo-hô” [Public Office Election Law]. 1970. e-Gov. https://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/document?lawid=325AC1000000100
“Prevent decrease in polling stations from inconveniencing Japanese voters.” The Mainichi, July 17. https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190717/p2a/00m/0na/014000c
Takao, Yasuo. 2022. “Civic rights for foreign residents sparks backlash in Japan.” East Asia Forum February 12. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/02/12/civic-rights-for-foreign-residents-sparks-backlash-in-japan/
Graph View
To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
There are few legal restrictions on establishing a political party, and the frequent formation and re-formation of parties on the national level indicates that the lack of organizational cohesion and stability, especially on the part of the opposition, is of greater concern for the functioning of representative democracy in Japan.
Apart from the LDP, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Komeito, most parties have only weak organizational structures on the local level. LDP politicians traditionally rely on personal support networks, called kôenkai, which organize campaigns and are loyal to individual politicians rather than party branches, while the Komeito relies on the Sôka Gakkai Buddhist sect to mobilize voters. Only the JCP features a nationwide party structure, which has allowed it to consistently field candidates in all electoral districts. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), currently the main opposition party, maintains close ties with the moderate trade union umbrella organization Rengô. However, it is not a traditional labor party in the Western European sense. Opposition parties tend to rely more on urban voters than the LDP but are disadvantaged due to the malapportionment of electoral districts.
On the prefectural and local level, formally independent candidates who are supported by multiple parties are most common. In national elections, larger opposition parties often recruit and field candidates from outside the party. This has made them somewhat more inclusive of underrepresented societal groups. But even left and left-of-center parties field more male than female candidates. The LDP, on the other hand, is dominated by factional politics in which tenure and party membership play a large role. The LDP has few young and few female candidates. Also conspicuous is the absence of an avowedly environmental party, even though support for environmental policies is generally high.
Japan’s postwar political system has long been described as clientelistic (Scheiner 2007) and deeply rooted in interest group politics. In the pre-1994 electoral system, LDP candidates were incentivized to “specialize” on specific interest groups so large parties could get two or more members elected in multi-member districts. This often involved pork-barrel spending and organizing a personal vote with relatively weak party ties. This is said to have contributed to massive public works spending. Although many institutions and laws have been reformed with the goal of reining in clientelism, it is noticeable that public works spending has increased again (Statistics Bureau 2023: 32).
All major parties publish manifestos before elections, which make programmatic choices fairly transparent.
Citations:
Hijino, Ken, and Victor Leonard. 2021. “What Drives Japanese Regional Elections? Multilevel Factors and Partisan Independents.” Regional and Federal Studies 31 (3): 419-432.
Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2011. The Rise and Fall of Japan’s LDP. Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Scheiner, Ethan. 2007. “Clientelism in Japan: The Importance and Limits of Institutional Explanations.” In Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, eds. Kitschelt, H., and S.I. Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 276-297.
Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan. 2023. The Statistical Handbook of Japan. Tokyo: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan.
Apart from the LDP, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Komeito, most parties have only weak organizational structures on the local level. LDP politicians traditionally rely on personal support networks, called kôenkai, which organize campaigns and are loyal to individual politicians rather than party branches, while the Komeito relies on the Sôka Gakkai Buddhist sect to mobilize voters. Only the JCP features a nationwide party structure, which has allowed it to consistently field candidates in all electoral districts. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), currently the main opposition party, maintains close ties with the moderate trade union umbrella organization Rengô. However, it is not a traditional labor party in the Western European sense. Opposition parties tend to rely more on urban voters than the LDP but are disadvantaged due to the malapportionment of electoral districts.
On the prefectural and local level, formally independent candidates who are supported by multiple parties are most common. In national elections, larger opposition parties often recruit and field candidates from outside the party. This has made them somewhat more inclusive of underrepresented societal groups. But even left and left-of-center parties field more male than female candidates. The LDP, on the other hand, is dominated by factional politics in which tenure and party membership play a large role. The LDP has few young and few female candidates. Also conspicuous is the absence of an avowedly environmental party, even though support for environmental policies is generally high.
Japan’s postwar political system has long been described as clientelistic (Scheiner 2007) and deeply rooted in interest group politics. In the pre-1994 electoral system, LDP candidates were incentivized to “specialize” on specific interest groups so large parties could get two or more members elected in multi-member districts. This often involved pork-barrel spending and organizing a personal vote with relatively weak party ties. This is said to have contributed to massive public works spending. Although many institutions and laws have been reformed with the goal of reining in clientelism, it is noticeable that public works spending has increased again (Statistics Bureau 2023: 32).
All major parties publish manifestos before elections, which make programmatic choices fairly transparent.
Citations:
Hijino, Ken, and Victor Leonard. 2021. “What Drives Japanese Regional Elections? Multilevel Factors and Partisan Independents.” Regional and Federal Studies 31 (3): 419-432.
Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2011. The Rise and Fall of Japan’s LDP. Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Scheiner, Ethan. 2007. “Clientelism in Japan: The Importance and Limits of Institutional Explanations.” In Patrons, Clients and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition, eds. Kitschelt, H., and S.I. Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 276-297.
Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan. 2023. The Statistical Handbook of Japan. Tokyo: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Japan.
To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
None of the major parties question liberal democracy outright, and Japan stands out internationally for its lack of a major populist movement. In the past, Japan’s democracy has been criticized for its sometimes opaque decision-making processes, with many decisions taken informally by ministerial bureaucrats rather than elected politicians. A number of reforms in the 1990s and 2000s have led to administrative changes, centralized decision-making and strengthened the position of prime minister. However, the fact that constitutional reform is very difficult politically – as any change must be approved by popular vote – has given rise to concerns that governments may undermine the constitution by changing its official interpretation and application. Prime Minister Abe, for example, used a reinterpretation of Article 9 issued by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau to justify participation in collective self-defense pacts. This was considered to be a constitutional breach by most experts.
Prime Minister Abe Shinzô’s (2012 – 2020) efforts to take greater control of the public broadcaster NHK – such as installing a government loyalist as governor – contributed to the Economist Democracy Index downgrading Japan’s democracy to flawed democracy. Under his successors Suga Yoshihide (2020 – 2021) and Kishida Fumio (2021 – present), Japan has regained the status of full democracy, however.
Ideological polarization seems to have declined in recent years. For example, the issue of a close security partnership with the United States used to be highly controversial, contributing to a split in the Socialist Party. Today, most opposition parties do not question the alliance, with the exception of the JCP. Party cooperation in elections has increased in recent years.
However, the Japanese political scene is not fully coherent in its stance on actors who violate the rules of liberal democracy. In 2016, the Hate Speech Elimination Law was enacted against extreme right-wing groups, but it failed to criminalize discriminatory behavior based on race or ethnicity, despite an appeal from left-wing parties. In addition, some members of the LDP, other conservative parties as well as members of the rising Sansei party have repeatedly made xenophobic and in the latter case even antisemitic statements without significant public repercussion. Though such sentiment does not seem widespread, they appeal to Japan’s small but well-funded and organized right-wing and nationalistic organizations (Gill 2018).
Citations:
Gill, Tom, ed. 2018. “Special Issue: Japan’s New Wave Rightists: Addressing the Action Conservative Movement.” Social Science Japan Journal 21 (2): 157-166.
Economist Intelligence. 2023. “Democracy Index 2022.” https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/
Kotani, Junko. 2018. “Proceed with Caution: Hate Speech Regulation in Japan.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 45 (3): 603-622.
Prime Minister Abe Shinzô’s (2012 – 2020) efforts to take greater control of the public broadcaster NHK – such as installing a government loyalist as governor – contributed to the Economist Democracy Index downgrading Japan’s democracy to flawed democracy. Under his successors Suga Yoshihide (2020 – 2021) and Kishida Fumio (2021 – present), Japan has regained the status of full democracy, however.
Ideological polarization seems to have declined in recent years. For example, the issue of a close security partnership with the United States used to be highly controversial, contributing to a split in the Socialist Party. Today, most opposition parties do not question the alliance, with the exception of the JCP. Party cooperation in elections has increased in recent years.
However, the Japanese political scene is not fully coherent in its stance on actors who violate the rules of liberal democracy. In 2016, the Hate Speech Elimination Law was enacted against extreme right-wing groups, but it failed to criminalize discriminatory behavior based on race or ethnicity, despite an appeal from left-wing parties. In addition, some members of the LDP, other conservative parties as well as members of the rising Sansei party have repeatedly made xenophobic and in the latter case even antisemitic statements without significant public repercussion. Though such sentiment does not seem widespread, they appeal to Japan’s small but well-funded and organized right-wing and nationalistic organizations (Gill 2018).
Citations:
Gill, Tom, ed. 2018. “Special Issue: Japan’s New Wave Rightists: Addressing the Action Conservative Movement.” Social Science Japan Journal 21 (2): 157-166.
Economist Intelligence. 2023. “Democracy Index 2022.” https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index-2022/
Kotani, Junko. 2018. “Proceed with Caution: Hate Speech Regulation in Japan.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 45 (3): 603-622.
Graph View
To what extent can citizens and residents access official information?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose many/various significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
Access to official information in Japan is regulated by the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs of 1999, and the Public Records and Archives Management Act of 2009. Administrative organs are obliged to disclose documents requested by any person within 30 days. Exemptions, however, are quite extensive. They include information concerning specific individuals, national security, international relations, the interests of corporations and law enforcement activities. Not only do the heads of administrative bodies enjoy considerable discretion in refusing disclosure requests, but there are also no sanctions for impeding access to information. In practice, most requests are rejected. Appeals are possible either to the Information Disclosure Review and Personal Information Protection Review Board – whose decisions are not binding – or to the district courts, which is time-consuming and problematic.
The Bill on Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, enacted in 2014, introduced severe punishments for disclosing information designated as a “special secret.” The bill was criticized for vesting too much power in governmental institutions to arbitrarily decide which documents to designate, while granting insufficient prerogatives to the Information Oversight Audit Committees in the Diet responsible for overseeing this process.
Citations:
“Country Report: The Right to Information in Japan.” Article 19, 6 October 2015. https://www.article19.org/resources/country-report-the-right-to-information-in-japan/
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 1999. “Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs.” https://www.soumu.go.jp/english/gyoukan/engv1_03.pdf
Shindô, Muneyuki. 2019. Kanryôsei to Kôbunsho. Kaizan, Netsuzô, Sontaku no Haikei [Bureaucratic System and Official Documents. Manipulation, Forgery, Sontaku]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô.
The Bill on Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, enacted in 2014, introduced severe punishments for disclosing information designated as a “special secret.” The bill was criticized for vesting too much power in governmental institutions to arbitrarily decide which documents to designate, while granting insufficient prerogatives to the Information Oversight Audit Committees in the Diet responsible for overseeing this process.
Citations:
“Country Report: The Right to Information in Japan.” Article 19, 6 October 2015. https://www.article19.org/resources/country-report-the-right-to-information-in-japan/
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 1999. “Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs.” https://www.soumu.go.jp/english/gyoukan/engv1_03.pdf
Shindô, Muneyuki. 2019. Kanryôsei to Kôbunsho. Kaizan, Netsuzô, Sontaku no Haikei [Bureaucratic System and Official Documents. Manipulation, Forgery, Sontaku]. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobô.