Diagonal Accountability
#9Key Findings
Lithuania falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 9) with regard to diagonal accountability.
The media are free from government influence and censorship. Private-sector newspapers and broadcasters express a wide variety of views. The government generally respects media independence, despite some past attempts to restrict media freedom. However, ownership structures lack transparency, and levels of public trust in the media remain relatively low.
Political and civic groups can generally operate without interference. Since 2022, assemblies supporting Russian or Belarusian military aggression have been restricted.
The government consults with trade unions and business organizations through institutionalized channels such s the Tripartite Council, as well as on an ad hoc basis. Social welfare groups rarely participate actively in policy debates. Environmental organizations are increasingly visible at the policy level, and participated in the preparation of the country’s long-term strategy.
The media are free from government influence and censorship. Private-sector newspapers and broadcasters express a wide variety of views. The government generally respects media independence, despite some past attempts to restrict media freedom. However, ownership structures lack transparency, and levels of public trust in the media remain relatively low.
Political and civic groups can generally operate without interference. Since 2022, assemblies supporting Russian or Belarusian military aggression have been restricted.
The government consults with trade unions and business organizations through institutionalized channels such s the Tripartite Council, as well as on an ad hoc basis. Social welfare groups rarely participate actively in policy debates. Environmental organizations are increasingly visible at the policy level, and participated in the preparation of the country’s long-term strategy.
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To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
10
9
9
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
2
1
1
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
Lithuania’s media are not subject to government influence or censorship. Private newspapers and independent broadcasters express a wide variety of views and freely criticize the government. Licensing and regulatory requirements do not expose media outlets to political interference. The media’s independence is generally respected by the government, although there have been a few attempts in the past to restrict media freedom.
For example, the ruling coalition led by the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (2016 – 2020) was alleged to have interfered in the operations of the public broadcaster, Lithuanian Radio and Television. The coalition set up a special parliamentary inquiry commission to investigate the activities of the broadcaster. This commission found that the broadcaster’s operations were ineffective and opaque, and suggested changes to its governance. These changes could politicize appointments to its council and a new board that the recommendations proposed to establish. Although the committee’s conclusions were not approved by the parliament during its plenary vote in November 2018, new legislative proposals were later introduced to implement them.
In September 2018, Lithuanian authorities discontinued the practice of providing free data from the Center of Registers for requests from journalists. However, this decision was later reversed after reporters appealed to government officials.
In 2020, the courts ruled in favor of journalists’ rights to access information in an important case. Skvernelis’ government had refused to provide information about a government meeting and had deleted the recordings. According to Reporters Without Borders, “This set a very important precedent, giving journalists right of access to all nonclassified information” (Reporters Without Borders 2021).
In addition, media independence may be compromised because the government remains a key advertiser, and a large proportion of media outlets are owned by a small number of domestic and foreign companies. Similarly, regional media depend on local government for advertising and other types of support, which might restrict their ability to criticize local authorities. In its 2023 Rule of Law report on Lithuania, the European Commission noted that “following public discussions, legislation to improve the effectiveness and impartiality of media self-regulatory bodies was adopted. As of 2023, public institutions and bodies have to make public on their websites information about the funds they have used for state advertising.”
In recent years, assessments of media freedom and international rankings have shown improvements in Lithuania. In Reporters Without Borders’ 2023 Press Freedom Index, Lithuania was ranked seventh out of 180 countries in terms of press freedom, a significant improvement compared to 2021 when it was ranked 28th. Similarly, the European Center for Press and Media Freedom’s 2022 report noted only one alert in the case of Lithuania – one of the smallest numbers among EU member states.
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. “Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law in Lithuania.” Brussels 5.7.2023. SWD (2023) 815 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “The World Press Freedom Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
European Center for Press and Media Freedom. 2022. “Monitoring Report 2022.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/monitoring-report-2022/
Reporters without Borders. 2021. “The World Press Freedom Index 2021.” https://rsf.org/en/lithuania
For example, the ruling coalition led by the Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (2016 – 2020) was alleged to have interfered in the operations of the public broadcaster, Lithuanian Radio and Television. The coalition set up a special parliamentary inquiry commission to investigate the activities of the broadcaster. This commission found that the broadcaster’s operations were ineffective and opaque, and suggested changes to its governance. These changes could politicize appointments to its council and a new board that the recommendations proposed to establish. Although the committee’s conclusions were not approved by the parliament during its plenary vote in November 2018, new legislative proposals were later introduced to implement them.
In September 2018, Lithuanian authorities discontinued the practice of providing free data from the Center of Registers for requests from journalists. However, this decision was later reversed after reporters appealed to government officials.
In 2020, the courts ruled in favor of journalists’ rights to access information in an important case. Skvernelis’ government had refused to provide information about a government meeting and had deleted the recordings. According to Reporters Without Borders, “This set a very important precedent, giving journalists right of access to all nonclassified information” (Reporters Without Borders 2021).
In addition, media independence may be compromised because the government remains a key advertiser, and a large proportion of media outlets are owned by a small number of domestic and foreign companies. Similarly, regional media depend on local government for advertising and other types of support, which might restrict their ability to criticize local authorities. In its 2023 Rule of Law report on Lithuania, the European Commission noted that “following public discussions, legislation to improve the effectiveness and impartiality of media self-regulatory bodies was adopted. As of 2023, public institutions and bodies have to make public on their websites information about the funds they have used for state advertising.”
In recent years, assessments of media freedom and international rankings have shown improvements in Lithuania. In Reporters Without Borders’ 2023 Press Freedom Index, Lithuania was ranked seventh out of 180 countries in terms of press freedom, a significant improvement compared to 2021 when it was ranked 28th. Similarly, the European Center for Press and Media Freedom’s 2022 report noted only one alert in the case of Lithuania – one of the smallest numbers among EU member states.
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. “Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law in Lithuania.” Brussels 5.7.2023. SWD (2023) 815 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “The World Press Freedom Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
European Center for Press and Media Freedom. 2022. “Monitoring Report 2022.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/monitor/monitoring-report-2022/
Reporters without Borders. 2021. “The World Press Freedom Index 2021.” https://rsf.org/en/lithuania
To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
Lithuania’s electronic and print media markets feature a mix of diversified and oligopolistic ownership structures. However, these ownership structures lack transparency. Regulations overseeing publicly owned media ensure adequate plurality of opinions. At the national level and in digital media, a diverse array of political perspectives is represented, with no censorship of significant political viewpoints. There is consistent critical evaluation of government policies and potential abuses of power.
Business conglomerates often own multiple newspapers and TV channels. Media ownership concentration has increased in recent years due to the purchase of media outlets by domestic and foreign companies. Six media companies – Delfi, 15min, LNK Group, All Media, Lietuvos rytas and Verslo žinios – dominate the media market.
On the municipal level, ownership links between decision makers and media outlets pose a risk to the plurality of opinions. For example, according to a study published on 22 June 2022 by Transparency International (the Vilnius office), 68 politicians, civil servants or their spouses owned one in every eight media outlets in Lithuania. Publicly owned electronic media – the state-funded Lithuanian Radio and Television – to some extent compensates for deficiencies or biases in private sector media reporting.
According to the Media Pluralism Monitor 2022, Lithuania ranked eighth among 32 European countries assessed. The situation in Lithuania was described as posing a medium risk to media pluralism, though it was close to the category of low risk. The highest risk was identified in the category of market plurality, with news media concentration seen as posing a very high risk. The lowest risk was identified in the category of fundamental protection, particularly the independence and effectiveness of the media authority and the protection of freedom of expression.
The risk to media freedom due to ownership concentration has been noted for a number of years by Freedom House. In its 2023 report, Freedom House stated that “increasing concentration of media ownership in the hands of a small number of companies raises the risk of editorial interference by powerful political and business interests. Journalists often engage in self-censorship when reporting on certain large companies. The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic left the media more vulnerable to undue influence and affected the job security of journalists. Journalists also face online harassment and abuse.”
In addition to ownership concentration, another source of the risk of editorial interference from political and business interests is the business model of the largest privately owned media groups, which is heavily dependent on advertising revenues.
As noted by Freedom House, “Under the state of emergency declared after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the transmission of any programs broadcast by Russian and Belarusian television and radio channels was suspended. The state of emergency also allowed for the restriction of Lithuanian media if they were deemed to spread disinformation or propaganda, incite war or breach Lithuanian sovereignty. On the other hand, state institutions, major media outlets and civil society groups stepped up their efforts to fight disinformation on the internet.”
The population displays relatively low levels of trust in the media. According to a representative survey conducted by the Vilmorus company from 22 November to 2 December 2023, 28.6% of respondents indicated they trusted the media, while 30.8% stated they did not. This represents a slight improvement compared to a Vilmorus survey conducted in December 2021, when only 25% of respondents expressed trust in the media and 34% indicated distrust. Despite this improvement, the share of the population that does not trust the media remains higher than the share that does hold this trust.
Citations:
Transparency International (Vilnius Office). 2022. https://transparency.lt/pernai-68-politikai-ir-ju-sutuoktiniai-valde-kas-astunta-ziniasklaidos-priemone-2/
EUI Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. 2022. “Media Pluralism Monitor 2022.” https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2022-general-ranking/ (accessed 22.12.2023)
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World Report 2023: Lithuania.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2023
Vilmorus. 2023. “Naujienos, Pasitikėjimas institucijomis.” http://www.vilmorus.lt/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=2&cntnt01returnid=20
Business conglomerates often own multiple newspapers and TV channels. Media ownership concentration has increased in recent years due to the purchase of media outlets by domestic and foreign companies. Six media companies – Delfi, 15min, LNK Group, All Media, Lietuvos rytas and Verslo žinios – dominate the media market.
On the municipal level, ownership links between decision makers and media outlets pose a risk to the plurality of opinions. For example, according to a study published on 22 June 2022 by Transparency International (the Vilnius office), 68 politicians, civil servants or their spouses owned one in every eight media outlets in Lithuania. Publicly owned electronic media – the state-funded Lithuanian Radio and Television – to some extent compensates for deficiencies or biases in private sector media reporting.
According to the Media Pluralism Monitor 2022, Lithuania ranked eighth among 32 European countries assessed. The situation in Lithuania was described as posing a medium risk to media pluralism, though it was close to the category of low risk. The highest risk was identified in the category of market plurality, with news media concentration seen as posing a very high risk. The lowest risk was identified in the category of fundamental protection, particularly the independence and effectiveness of the media authority and the protection of freedom of expression.
The risk to media freedom due to ownership concentration has been noted for a number of years by Freedom House. In its 2023 report, Freedom House stated that “increasing concentration of media ownership in the hands of a small number of companies raises the risk of editorial interference by powerful political and business interests. Journalists often engage in self-censorship when reporting on certain large companies. The economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic left the media more vulnerable to undue influence and affected the job security of journalists. Journalists also face online harassment and abuse.”
In addition to ownership concentration, another source of the risk of editorial interference from political and business interests is the business model of the largest privately owned media groups, which is heavily dependent on advertising revenues.
As noted by Freedom House, “Under the state of emergency declared after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the transmission of any programs broadcast by Russian and Belarusian television and radio channels was suspended. The state of emergency also allowed for the restriction of Lithuanian media if they were deemed to spread disinformation or propaganda, incite war or breach Lithuanian sovereignty. On the other hand, state institutions, major media outlets and civil society groups stepped up their efforts to fight disinformation on the internet.”
The population displays relatively low levels of trust in the media. According to a representative survey conducted by the Vilmorus company from 22 November to 2 December 2023, 28.6% of respondents indicated they trusted the media, while 30.8% stated they did not. This represents a slight improvement compared to a Vilmorus survey conducted in December 2021, when only 25% of respondents expressed trust in the media and 34% indicated distrust. Despite this improvement, the share of the population that does not trust the media remains higher than the share that does hold this trust.
Citations:
Transparency International (Vilnius Office). 2022. https://transparency.lt/pernai-68-politikai-ir-ju-sutuoktiniai-valde-kas-astunta-ziniasklaidos-priemone-2/
EUI Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. 2022. “Media Pluralism Monitor 2022.” https://cmpf.eui.eu/mpm2022-general-ranking/ (accessed 22.12.2023)
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World Report 2023: Lithuania.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2023
Vilmorus. 2023. “Naujienos, Pasitikėjimas institucijomis.” http://www.vilmorus.lt/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=2&cntnt01returnid=20
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To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
Lithuania’s constitution and other legal norms generally safeguard freedom of association and assembly. Article 35 of the constitution states that “citizens shall be guaranteed the right to freely form societies, parties, and associations, provided that the aims and activities thereof are not contrary to the constitution and laws.” Article 36 says that “citizens may not be prohibited or hindered from assembling unarmed in peaceful meetings.” It also states that “this right may not be limited otherwise than by law and only when this is necessary to protect the security of the State or society, public order, the health or morals of people, or the rights or freedoms of other persons.” The main restrictions, in force since 2022, apply to assemblies that support the military aggression of Russia and Belarus.
In general, political and civic groups can operate freely without state interference in their activities. According to the Freedom House report of 2023, “freedom of assembly is generally respected,” with a ranking of four out of four points assigned in this category. The World Justice Project Report of 2023 also indicates that the freedoms of assembly and association are effectively guaranteed in Lithuania, giving the country a score of 0.78 out of 1.0, and ranking the country 27th out of 142 states worldwide. Additionally, Civicus Monitor in 2023 assigned Lithuania the status of an open country, with a score of 91 out of 100.
Citations:
The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. 1992. Art. 78. https://lrkt.lt/en/about-the-court/legal-information/the-constitution/192
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World Report 2023: Lithuania.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2023
World Justic Project Report 2023. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Lithuania/Fundamental%20Rights/
Civicus Monitor findings 2023. “Lithuania.” https://monitor.civicus.org/country/lithuania/
In general, political and civic groups can operate freely without state interference in their activities. According to the Freedom House report of 2023, “freedom of assembly is generally respected,” with a ranking of four out of four points assigned in this category. The World Justice Project Report of 2023 also indicates that the freedoms of assembly and association are effectively guaranteed in Lithuania, giving the country a score of 0.78 out of 1.0, and ranking the country 27th out of 142 states worldwide. Additionally, Civicus Monitor in 2023 assigned Lithuania the status of an open country, with a score of 91 out of 100.
Citations:
The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. 1992. Art. 78. https://lrkt.lt/en/about-the-court/legal-information/the-constitution/192
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World Report 2023: Lithuania.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2023
World Justic Project Report 2023. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Lithuania/Fundamental%20Rights/
Civicus Monitor findings 2023. “Lithuania.” https://monitor.civicus.org/country/lithuania/
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Most major civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to shape public policies, although in practice this depends on the particular CSO. Major societal actors, such as trade unions and business organizations, are consulted through institutionalized arrangements – such as the Tripartite Council – as well as through various ad hoc means.
According to the OECD/AIAS ICTWSS Database, trade union density was 10% in 2021, a rise from 7.4% in 2019, while employer organization density was 33% in 2016 (later data is not available). Lithuanian legislation allows taxpayers to donate up to 0.6% of their personal income tax to trade unions and their associations of choice when declaring their annual income. Business organizations are funded by membership fees.
Traditionally, business organizations have been more adept at raising funds and developing expertise to voice their opinions on policy initiatives. The Investors’ Forum, the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists and the Lithuanian Business Confederation are among the most well-resourced business associations. These organizations possess substantial analytical capacities, enabling them to formulate their own policy proposals and contribute to debates on economic and social policy initiatives presented by the government. Recently, major business associations have collaborated to provide common assessments of government initiatives, such as the tax reform debated from 2021 to 2023.
The visibility and capacities of major economic and social CSOs are enhanced through their participation in EU-wide networks of similar organizations. For instance, the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists is a member of Business Europe. Meanwhile, although the visibility and capacities of trade unions have also increased recently, and the Confederation of Trade Unions now plays a more prominent political role than previously, this role remains somewhat weaker than that of employers.
The government frequently consults with social partners on various issues, but it is more inclined to engage with employer organizations than trade unions. Given the government’s limited capacity to shape and coordinate broad political compromises, these consultations tend to be formal rather than substantive contributions to policymaking, particularly on issues that directly impact specific interests. For instance, in 2022 – 2023, the involvement of major societal actors in the review of tax exemptions initiated by the Ministry of Finance did not result in any workable agreement. However, a similar involvement in the preparation of the long-term Lithuania 2050 strategy, led by the State Progress Council, was more productive. Notably, both initiatives included employers but not unions.
Citations:
OECD and AIAS. 2021. Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State.
Intervention and Social Pacts, Lithuania – main characteristics and indicators of collective bargaining. OECD Publishing, Paris. www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm (accessed 19.12.2023)
Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor. “The Tripartite Council (in Lithuanian).” https://socmin.lrv.lt/lt/administracine-informacija/lr-trisale-taryba#Tri%C5%A1al%C4%97s%20tarybos%20nariai
Government of Lithuania. “State Progress Council (in Lithuanian).” https://sena.lrv.lt/lt/aktuali-informacija/lietuva-2050/valstybes-pazangos-taryba-2
According to the OECD/AIAS ICTWSS Database, trade union density was 10% in 2021, a rise from 7.4% in 2019, while employer organization density was 33% in 2016 (later data is not available). Lithuanian legislation allows taxpayers to donate up to 0.6% of their personal income tax to trade unions and their associations of choice when declaring their annual income. Business organizations are funded by membership fees.
Traditionally, business organizations have been more adept at raising funds and developing expertise to voice their opinions on policy initiatives. The Investors’ Forum, the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists and the Lithuanian Business Confederation are among the most well-resourced business associations. These organizations possess substantial analytical capacities, enabling them to formulate their own policy proposals and contribute to debates on economic and social policy initiatives presented by the government. Recently, major business associations have collaborated to provide common assessments of government initiatives, such as the tax reform debated from 2021 to 2023.
The visibility and capacities of major economic and social CSOs are enhanced through their participation in EU-wide networks of similar organizations. For instance, the Lithuanian Confederation of Industrialists is a member of Business Europe. Meanwhile, although the visibility and capacities of trade unions have also increased recently, and the Confederation of Trade Unions now plays a more prominent political role than previously, this role remains somewhat weaker than that of employers.
The government frequently consults with social partners on various issues, but it is more inclined to engage with employer organizations than trade unions. Given the government’s limited capacity to shape and coordinate broad political compromises, these consultations tend to be formal rather than substantive contributions to policymaking, particularly on issues that directly impact specific interests. For instance, in 2022 – 2023, the involvement of major societal actors in the review of tax exemptions initiated by the Ministry of Finance did not result in any workable agreement. However, a similar involvement in the preparation of the long-term Lithuania 2050 strategy, led by the State Progress Council, was more productive. Notably, both initiatives included employers but not unions.
Citations:
OECD and AIAS. 2021. Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State.
Intervention and Social Pacts, Lithuania – main characteristics and indicators of collective bargaining. OECD Publishing, Paris. www.oecd.org/employment/ictwss-database.htm (accessed 19.12.2023)
Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor. “The Tripartite Council (in Lithuanian).” https://socmin.lrv.lt/lt/administracine-informacija/lr-trisale-taryba#Tri%C5%A1al%C4%97s%20tarybos%20nariai
Government of Lithuania. “State Progress Council (in Lithuanian).” https://sena.lrv.lt/lt/aktuali-informacija/lietuva-2050/valstybes-pazangos-taryba-2
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
There are various CSOs active in the field of social welfare, such as the Food Bank and others. Lithuanian laws allow taxpayers to transfer up to 1.2% of their personal income tax to the CSOs of their choice. There are also frequent fundraising events aimed at encouraging the general public to donate to various CSOs, such as Maltesers. It should be noted that most CSOs of this type focus on problem-solving through fundraising and mobilizing volunteers rather than on participation in policy debates.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, there was an increase in CSO activities aimed at assisting vulnerable groups in coping with temporary restrictions. Another wave of donations and activism followed Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, with various initiatives focused on helping refugees from Ukraine settle in Lithuania and providing humanitarian and other types of support for Ukrainians defending their country. According to research by the Civil Society Institute conducted in 2022, around two-thirds of the population supported Ukrainians in some capacity, most often by donating money. Some NGOs, such as Blue/Yellow, have been active since 2014. This group had raised more than €51 million by 13 December 2023. However, in a civic empowerment study by the Civil Society Institute conducted in 2022, respondents asked about the influence NGOs and communities have on political decisions important for society provided only 5.1 points to this topic out of a possible 10.
In addition to donations from personal income tax and charities, some CSOs in this field receive funding from state institutions, the EU Social Fund or European Economic Area funding programs. For example, the project on civic empowerment conducted by the Civil Society Institute (Civitas) was funded by the Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor. The Civil Society Institute is also an example of an CSO that has been working to develop a culture of cooperation between NGOs and state institutions in creating new public policy initiatives, often by attracting scholars from academia.
The government has established a fund to strengthen NGOs’ capacity to contribute to policy initiatives and public policymaking. For example, in 2022 approximately €2.9 million were allocated for NGO projects, with around 90% of the funds actually disbursed. Nevertheless, funding remains one of the biggest challenges for the long-term sustainability and capacity of CSOs.
Citations:
Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor. “NGO policy.” https://socmin.lrv.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/nevyriausybiniu-organizaciju-politika/nvo-fondas
Civil Society Institute. 2023. “Projects.” http://www.civitas.lt/en/projects/
Blue/Yellow, https://blue-yellow.lt/en/about-us
During the COVID-19 pandemic, there was an increase in CSO activities aimed at assisting vulnerable groups in coping with temporary restrictions. Another wave of donations and activism followed Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, with various initiatives focused on helping refugees from Ukraine settle in Lithuania and providing humanitarian and other types of support for Ukrainians defending their country. According to research by the Civil Society Institute conducted in 2022, around two-thirds of the population supported Ukrainians in some capacity, most often by donating money. Some NGOs, such as Blue/Yellow, have been active since 2014. This group had raised more than €51 million by 13 December 2023. However, in a civic empowerment study by the Civil Society Institute conducted in 2022, respondents asked about the influence NGOs and communities have on political decisions important for society provided only 5.1 points to this topic out of a possible 10.
In addition to donations from personal income tax and charities, some CSOs in this field receive funding from state institutions, the EU Social Fund or European Economic Area funding programs. For example, the project on civic empowerment conducted by the Civil Society Institute (Civitas) was funded by the Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor. The Civil Society Institute is also an example of an CSO that has been working to develop a culture of cooperation between NGOs and state institutions in creating new public policy initiatives, often by attracting scholars from academia.
The government has established a fund to strengthen NGOs’ capacity to contribute to policy initiatives and public policymaking. For example, in 2022 approximately €2.9 million were allocated for NGO projects, with around 90% of the funds actually disbursed. Nevertheless, funding remains one of the biggest challenges for the long-term sustainability and capacity of CSOs.
Citations:
Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor. “NGO policy.” https://socmin.lrv.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/nevyriausybiniu-organizaciju-politika/nvo-fondas
Civil Society Institute. 2023. “Projects.” http://www.civitas.lt/en/projects/
Blue/Yellow, https://blue-yellow.lt/en/about-us
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Environmental CSOs have become increasingly active and visible in policy debates in Lithuania. They participated actively in the preparation of the long-term Lithuania 2050 strategy. They also react on an ad hoc basis to initiatives from the government and other societal groups, such as farmers.
In addition to benefiting from donations of up to 1.2% of personal income tax from taxpayers, they also receive project-based funding from state institutions and EU programs. For example, the Baltic Environmental Forum received funding from the EU LIFE program and the Lithuanian government for its projects such as Natura Lit. Environmental CSOs are well connected to similar organizations in other European countries. The Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor coordinates state funding for NGOs and provides relevant information on its website.
Citations:
Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor. “NGO policy (in Lithuanian).” https://socmin.lrv.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/nevyriausybiniu-organizaciju-politika/nvo-teikiamas-finansavimas/nvo-teikiamas-finansavimas-2023
Baltic Environmental Forum Lithuania. https://bef.lt/?lang=en
In addition to benefiting from donations of up to 1.2% of personal income tax from taxpayers, they also receive project-based funding from state institutions and EU programs. For example, the Baltic Environmental Forum received funding from the EU LIFE program and the Lithuanian government for its projects such as Natura Lit. Environmental CSOs are well connected to similar organizations in other European countries. The Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor coordinates state funding for NGOs and provides relevant information on its website.
Citations:
Lithuanian Ministry of Social Security and Labor. “NGO policy (in Lithuanian).” https://socmin.lrv.lt/lt/veiklos-sritys/nevyriausybiniu-organizaciju-politika/nvo-teikiamas-finansavimas/nvo-teikiamas-finansavimas-2023
Baltic Environmental Forum Lithuania. https://bef.lt/?lang=en