Horizontal Accountability
#11Key Findings
In the category of horizontal accountability, Lithuania falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 11).
The National Audit Office is independent, monitoring compliance with EU fiscal norms and enhancing budget transparency. The State Data Protection Inspectorate is a government agency that oversees enforcement of legal protections for personal data, with considerable legal and policy independence.
The judiciary in Lithuania is independent, but delays in appointments can result due to disagreements between the president and the parliament. While political rights and civil liberties are generally respected, some human rights concerns such as poor prison conditions and discrimination against minorities are reported.
The country has a robust anticorruption framework against corruption. Nevertheless, several high-profile corruption cases have emerged in recent years, and observers say more awareness-raising is needed. The parliament has sufficient powers and resources to monitor the executive and help shape policy effectively.
The National Audit Office is independent, monitoring compliance with EU fiscal norms and enhancing budget transparency. The State Data Protection Inspectorate is a government agency that oversees enforcement of legal protections for personal data, with considerable legal and policy independence.
The judiciary in Lithuania is independent, but delays in appointments can result due to disagreements between the president and the parliament. While political rights and civil liberties are generally respected, some human rights concerns such as poor prison conditions and discrimination against minorities are reported.
The country has a robust anticorruption framework against corruption. Nevertheless, several high-profile corruption cases have emerged in recent years, and observers say more awareness-raising is needed. The parliament has sufficient powers and resources to monitor the executive and help shape policy effectively.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
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9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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6
7
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
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3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
2
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1
There is no independent and effective audit office.
Lithuania has an independent National Audit Office whose autonomy is guaranteed by both the appointment process and its accountability mechanisms. The parliament appoints the auditor general based on a nomination by the president. The National Audit Office is accountable to both the parliament and the president. The parliament’s Committee on Audit reviews financial, compliance and performance audit reports submitted by the office and prepares draft parliamentary decisions concerning the implementation of audit recommendations. Traditionally, the position of the head of the Committee on Audit is allocated to a member of the Seimas opposition. The National Audit Office also collaborates with other parliamentary committees.
In practice, the National Audit Office consults political institutions, stakeholders and society on the question of which audits to undertake. However, it retains the discretion to make the final decisions regarding the audits, which are planned in advance every year. The Seimas has the right to request a particular audit by adopting a resolution. According to the National Audit Office, it determines which audits to undertake based on priority areas, in addition to those audits it is legally required to perform, such as the audits of draft annual state budgets and EU investments.
The National Audit Office serves as an independent fiscal institution, monitoring compliance with EU fiscal-policy norms. According to an OECD review released in 2019, this unique institutional setup, in which the independent fiscal institution (founded in 2015) is part of the National Audit Office, presents several challenges. These include a lack of clear public identity and operational independence, as well as difficulties in recruiting and retaining senior staff members. However, the Budget Policy Monitoring Department (BPMD) was praised for quickly establishing “a reputation for solid independent analysis,” contributing to fiscal transparency and enhancing parliamentary and public debates.
In the past, the National Audit Office has criticized the government’s draft budgets for their lack of compliance with fiscal-discipline provisions and poor allocation of government expenditures. While these criticisms are not always taken into account, there seems to have been progress over time. The Office monitors the implementation of its recommendations and provides up-to-date data on their implementation on its web page. It has also undertaken initiatives to inform the general public about the importance of the efficient and effective use of taxpayers’ money, as well as the challenges to the sustainable development of the state in addressing the most important issues.
Citations:
National Audit Office. https://www.valstybeskontrole.lt/EN
OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Review. 2019. “Lithuania’s Fiscal Independent Institution.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/lithuania-independent-fiscal-institutions-review-2019-en.pdf
In practice, the National Audit Office consults political institutions, stakeholders and society on the question of which audits to undertake. However, it retains the discretion to make the final decisions regarding the audits, which are planned in advance every year. The Seimas has the right to request a particular audit by adopting a resolution. According to the National Audit Office, it determines which audits to undertake based on priority areas, in addition to those audits it is legally required to perform, such as the audits of draft annual state budgets and EU investments.
The National Audit Office serves as an independent fiscal institution, monitoring compliance with EU fiscal-policy norms. According to an OECD review released in 2019, this unique institutional setup, in which the independent fiscal institution (founded in 2015) is part of the National Audit Office, presents several challenges. These include a lack of clear public identity and operational independence, as well as difficulties in recruiting and retaining senior staff members. However, the Budget Policy Monitoring Department (BPMD) was praised for quickly establishing “a reputation for solid independent analysis,” contributing to fiscal transparency and enhancing parliamentary and public debates.
In the past, the National Audit Office has criticized the government’s draft budgets for their lack of compliance with fiscal-discipline provisions and poor allocation of government expenditures. While these criticisms are not always taken into account, there seems to have been progress over time. The Office monitors the implementation of its recommendations and provides up-to-date data on their implementation on its web page. It has also undertaken initiatives to inform the general public about the importance of the efficient and effective use of taxpayers’ money, as well as the challenges to the sustainable development of the state in addressing the most important issues.
Citations:
National Audit Office. https://www.valstybeskontrole.lt/EN
OECD Independent Fiscal Institutions Review. 2019. “Lithuania’s Fiscal Independent Institution.” https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/lithuania-independent-fiscal-institutions-review-2019-en.pdf
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
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9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
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3
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3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
An independent and effective data protection authority exists in Lithuania. The State Data Protection Inspectorate supervises and controls the enforcement of legal protections for personal data. As a government agency, it has the legal and policy independence necessary to make regulatory decisions. The agency has the discretion to decide which audits it will undertake, planning them regularly based on risk assessments and responding to reported incidents in state and private organizations. For instance, in 2022, it conducted 44 planned audits (compared to 16 in 2021) and 12 audits in response to reported incidents (State Data Protection Inspectorate, 2023).
With more than 25 years of experience and a staff of about 43 in 2022 – an increase of 14 positions compared to 2021 – the agency has the capacity and resources to focus on implementing the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, which came into force in 2018 (State Data Protection Inspectorate 2023). According to the organization’s 2022 activities report, its key performance indicator – the share of individuals who contacted the Inspectorate and rated its services very positively or positively – reached 92%, exceeding the target of 82%.
Citations:
State Data Protection Inspectorate. https://vdai.lrv.lt/en/
With more than 25 years of experience and a staff of about 43 in 2022 – an increase of 14 positions compared to 2021 – the agency has the capacity and resources to focus on implementing the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, which came into force in 2018 (State Data Protection Inspectorate 2023). According to the organization’s 2022 activities report, its key performance indicator – the share of individuals who contacted the Inspectorate and rated its services very positively or positively – reached 92%, exceeding the target of 82%.
Citations:
State Data Protection Inspectorate. https://vdai.lrv.lt/en/
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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7
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The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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3
4
3
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
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1
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
Lithuania’s court system is divided into courts of general jurisdiction and courts of special jurisdiction. This differentiated system of independent courts allows for the monitoring of government and public administrative activities’ legality. The Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and other legal acts adopted by the parliament or issued by the president or government. The Supreme Court reviews judgments, decisions, rulings and orders from lower general-jurisdiction courts. Disputes arising in the sphere of public administration are handled within the system of administrative courts. These disputes can include the legality of measures and activities performed by administrative bodies, such as ministries, departments, inspections, services and commissions. The administrative court system consists of five regional administrative courts and the Supreme Administrative Court.
The rule of law and the independence of the courts are established by the constitution and other legal norms, such as the Law on Courts. Generally, the national judiciary possesses the legal autonomy to independently interpret and review existing laws, legislation and policies. The independence of the courts is reinforced by the rules for appointing justices, which distribute these powers between the president and the Seimas, requiring their cooperation. For example, the president of the Supreme Court is proposed by the president of Lithuania upon the advice of the Judicial Council and appointed by the Seimas. The Seimas also appoints members of the Constitutional Court, with candidates proposed by the president of Lithuania, the chair of the Seimas and the president of the Supreme Court.
Sometimes disagreements between the country’s president and the ruling majority in the Seimas regarding the candidacies of justices can lead to significant delays in appointments. For example, the Supreme Court was headed by an acting president from September 2019 until March 2023, when the permanent president was appointed by the Seimas.
According to Vilmorus opinion surveys, levels of public trust in the courts are low. In December 2023, only 20% of survey respondents indicated that they trusted the courts, compared with 22% two years previously, while 35.9% expressed mistrust, compared with 31% two years before. As noted by Freedom House, judicial corruption remains a concern. Its 2023 report on Lithuania expressed “concerns regarding transparency in the selection of judges and low pay for some work in the court system.”
According to the European Commission Rule of Law Report 2023 on Lithuania, “new legislation was adopted, improving the transparency of judicial appointments. Stakeholders continue to raise the need for additional safeguards in this regard. The Constitutional Court clarified the principles regarding the dismissal of judges of higher courts, reaffirming the role of the Judicial Council. There are serious concerns regarding the level of remuneration for prosecutors and court staff, which were only partially addressed by the legislative reform. The reform of the legal aid system advanced, while the workload and remuneration of legal aid providers remains to be addressed.”
In the 2023 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, Lithuania was ranked 18th out of 140 countries, and 17th in terms of constraints on government powers.
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. “2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law in Lithuania.” Brussels, 5.7.2023. SWD (2023) 815 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
World Justice Project. “Rule of Law Index: Country 2023 – Lithuania.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Lithuania
The rule of law and the independence of the courts are established by the constitution and other legal norms, such as the Law on Courts. Generally, the national judiciary possesses the legal autonomy to independently interpret and review existing laws, legislation and policies. The independence of the courts is reinforced by the rules for appointing justices, which distribute these powers between the president and the Seimas, requiring their cooperation. For example, the president of the Supreme Court is proposed by the president of Lithuania upon the advice of the Judicial Council and appointed by the Seimas. The Seimas also appoints members of the Constitutional Court, with candidates proposed by the president of Lithuania, the chair of the Seimas and the president of the Supreme Court.
Sometimes disagreements between the country’s president and the ruling majority in the Seimas regarding the candidacies of justices can lead to significant delays in appointments. For example, the Supreme Court was headed by an acting president from September 2019 until March 2023, when the permanent president was appointed by the Seimas.
According to Vilmorus opinion surveys, levels of public trust in the courts are low. In December 2023, only 20% of survey respondents indicated that they trusted the courts, compared with 22% two years previously, while 35.9% expressed mistrust, compared with 31% two years before. As noted by Freedom House, judicial corruption remains a concern. Its 2023 report on Lithuania expressed “concerns regarding transparency in the selection of judges and low pay for some work in the court system.”
According to the European Commission Rule of Law Report 2023 on Lithuania, “new legislation was adopted, improving the transparency of judicial appointments. Stakeholders continue to raise the need for additional safeguards in this regard. The Constitutional Court clarified the principles regarding the dismissal of judges of higher courts, reaffirming the role of the Judicial Council. There are serious concerns regarding the level of remuneration for prosecutors and court staff, which were only partially addressed by the legislative reform. The reform of the legal aid system advanced, while the workload and remuneration of legal aid providers remains to be addressed.”
In the 2023 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, Lithuania was ranked 18th out of 140 countries, and 17th in terms of constraints on government powers.
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. “2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law in Lithuania.” Brussels, 5.7.2023. SWD (2023) 815 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
World Justice Project. “Rule of Law Index: Country 2023 – Lithuania.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/Lithuania
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
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There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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3
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3
There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
2
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1
There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
Lithuania is a democracy in which political rights and civil liberties are generally respected. Gaining Lithuanian citizenship is relatively easy for all residents, and civil rights are officially protected by the constitution and other legislative provisions. However, some issues affect the effective protection of citizens’ rights. According to the U.S. Department of State’s 2022 Human Rights report, Lithuania’s most significant human rights problems include poor prison conditions and inadequate conditions in foreigner registration centers for irregular migrants who have crossed the country’s border with Belarus. Similar criticism was made by Amnesty International in its 2022 report on Lithuania. It noted that while refugees from Ukraine were welcomed and assisted, “other refugees and migrants were forcibly returned to Belarus or arbitrarily detained, denied access to asylum, and in some cases, subjected to torture and other ill-treatment.” It also highlighted that same-sex unions had still not been legalized.
Lithuanian authorities seek to prosecute or otherwise punish officials who commit abuses, and Lithuanian courts provide legal protection against illegitimate or unjustifiable interventions in personal life. As noted by the U.S. Department of State, “the government had mechanisms in place to identify and punish officials who may commit human rights abuses or engage in corruption.” In the 2022 Freedom House report, Lithuania received a score of 51 out of 60 in the category of civil liberties. The report highlighted that “women, LGBT+ people, members of the Romany minority and some other groups experienced varying degrees of discrimination and under-representation in politics.”
The World Justice Project Rule of Law 2023 report ranked Lithuania seventh out of 142 countries in terms of the accessibility and affordability of civil courts for the general public. It also ranked Lithuania as high as fourth place regarding civil justice being free of discrimination based on socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation or gender identity. Lithuania was ranked eighth in terms of the effectiveness of civil justice enforcement and 18th regarding civil justice being free of improper government or political influence.
Citations:
U.S. Department of State. 2022. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Lithuania.” https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/lithuania
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World 2023: Lithuania.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2023
World Justice Project. 2023. “Rule of Law Index 2023, Lithuania.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/factors/2023/Lithuania/Civil%20Justice
Lithuanian authorities seek to prosecute or otherwise punish officials who commit abuses, and Lithuanian courts provide legal protection against illegitimate or unjustifiable interventions in personal life. As noted by the U.S. Department of State, “the government had mechanisms in place to identify and punish officials who may commit human rights abuses or engage in corruption.” In the 2022 Freedom House report, Lithuania received a score of 51 out of 60 in the category of civil liberties. The report highlighted that “women, LGBT+ people, members of the Romany minority and some other groups experienced varying degrees of discrimination and under-representation in politics.”
The World Justice Project Rule of Law 2023 report ranked Lithuania seventh out of 142 countries in terms of the accessibility and affordability of civil courts for the general public. It also ranked Lithuania as high as fourth place regarding civil justice being free of discrimination based on socioeconomic status, gender, ethnicity, religion, national origin, sexual orientation or gender identity. Lithuania was ranked eighth in terms of the effectiveness of civil justice enforcement and 18th regarding civil justice being free of improper government or political influence.
Citations:
U.S. Department of State. 2022. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Lithuania.” https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/lithuania
Freedom House. 2023. “Freedom in the World 2023: Lithuania.” https://freedomhouse.org/country/lithuania/freedom-world/2023
World Justice Project. 2023. “Rule of Law Index 2023, Lithuania.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/factors/2023/Lithuania/Civil%20Justice
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
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Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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3
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3
Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
2
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1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Over the years, Lithuanian institutions have adopted a legal framework that disincentivizes public officeholders from abusing their positions. The new amendments to the Law on the Prevention of Corruption, which took effect at the beginning of 2022, were welcomed by the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption. In its most recent report of 2022, the group stated that “if each institution can and does effectively design, implement and oversee its own anti-corruption policy within the framework of the law and with the supporting role of the Special Investigation Service and the Chief Official Ethics Commission, it can lead to an efficient and mature system of anti-corruption prevention, but there are several conditions for such a system to work in practice.” It made particular reference in this regard to additional efforts at raising awareness and the provision of practical guidance for officials on integrity standards.
In addition to this law, there are norms aimed at increasing the transparency of political decisions, limits on party funding, requirements that officeholders declare their assets and conflicts of interests, and rules governing public procurement. Lithuanian authorities have also increased penalties for corruption-related crimes, linking these to the damage caused or benefits obtained from the illegal activities. According to EuroPam data based on 2020, Lithuania’s regulatory index score was higher than the European average in the areas of financial disclosure, political financing and conflict of interest.
One of Lithuania’s key corruption prevention measures is an anti-corruption assessment of draft legislation, which grants the Special Investigation Service the authority to carry out corruption tests. According to the Lithuanian Corruption Map of 2022 – 2023, measured by the Special Investigation Service based on surveys, the institutions viewed as most corrupt were hospitals, the courts, the parliament and municipalities. Favors to party members, nepotism and the adoption of laws that favored particular interest groups were considered to be among the most widespread forms of corruption.
Thirty-four percent of the general population considered corruption to be a very serious problem (fifth most serious issue), 24% of business executives viewed it as a very serious problem (seventh most serious issue) and 32% of civil servants considered it a serious problem (fifth most serious issue). However, the assessed dynamics continued to show a positive trend, with the shares in all three groups – especially civil servants – stating that corruption had decreased in the last five years larger than those stating it had increased.
In 2023, several events attracted significant publicity in the area of corruption control. One was the “Skaidrinam” (“Making it transparent”) initiative by activist Andrius Tapinas, who collected information on the potential manipulation of rules governing expense compensation for municipal council members. The evidence of suspected fraud led the Special Investigation Service to initiate pretrial investigations into members of 19 municipal councils.
Another high-profile political corruption case involved allegations of corruption within Lithuania’s Liberal Movement and Labor Party, which prompted the Special Investigation Service to start an investigation in 2017. The parties were suspected of accepting bribes and trading political influence. For instance, two Liberal Movement members allegedly accepted bribes of more than €135,000 on behalf of the party from a vice president of a major business group in exchange for political decisions that benefited the corporation.
In April 2022, the court of first instance acquitted all the suspects in this case. However, in November 2023, the Court of Appeal of Lithuania convicted individuals who were previously acquitted, including businessman Raimondas Kurlianskis, then-Seimas members Eligijus Masiulis, Vytautas Gapšys, Šarūnas Gustainis and Gintaras Steponavičius. Charges included “bribery, trading in influence and abuse of power.” Additionally, the legal entities UAB concern “MG Baltic” (now UAB “MG grupė”), the Liberals’ Movement of the Republic of Lithuania political party (now the Liberal Movement), and the Labor Party were found guilty.
The improvement in the control of corruption in Lithuania has also been noted by Corruption Risk assessments. This organization stated that “Lithuania has managed to construct good constraints to corruption both on the side of government and civil society/freedom of the press, with a dense network of public accountability mechanisms and good access to information. Lithuania was fifth in the world on transparency but lagged in digitalization of the commerce register, land register and tracking current public expenditures. Nevertheless, the country has been on a positive trend for the past decade.”
Similar assessments on recent positive trends were provided by the European Commission in its 2023 Rule of Law report on Lithuania. The report stated that “the implementation of the anti-corruption agenda in 2022 – 2033 advanced well with the adoption of the first implementation action plan. Investigations and prosecutions of corruption-related offenses continue to be carried out efficiently while shortcomings in relation to investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery cases were raised. Public procurement remains a high-risk area for corruption. Laws such as the Law on Corruption Prevention, the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests, and the whistleblower legislation are being efficiently implemented. Further efforts were taken in view of the efficient implementation of the integrity rules.”
In the World Bank’s 2022 Worldwide Governance Indicators, Lithuania scored 76.42 out of 100 on the issue of corruption control, with its score having fluctuated in the 80th percentile over the last several years.
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. “Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the Rule of Law in Lithuania, Brussels.” July 5. SWD (2023) 815 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Special Investigation Service. 2022-2023. “Corruption map survey” (in Lithuanian). https://www.stt.lt/analitine-antikorupcine-zvalgyba/lietuvos-korupcijos-zemelapis/7437
The Corruption Risk Forecast, Lithuania, https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=LTU#forecast
EuroPam. 2023. “European Public Accountability Mechanisms, Lithuania.” https://www.europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Lithuania
Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption. 2022. “Lithuania Evaluation Report.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/lithuania
Andrius Tapinas. 2023. “Skaidrinam” https://tapinas.substack.com/s/skaidrinam-2023
Court of Appeal of Lithuania. https://www.apeliacinis.lt/en/news/court-of-appeal-of-lithuania-all-acquitted-in-mg-baltic-political-corruption-case-are-guilty/1520
In addition to this law, there are norms aimed at increasing the transparency of political decisions, limits on party funding, requirements that officeholders declare their assets and conflicts of interests, and rules governing public procurement. Lithuanian authorities have also increased penalties for corruption-related crimes, linking these to the damage caused or benefits obtained from the illegal activities. According to EuroPam data based on 2020, Lithuania’s regulatory index score was higher than the European average in the areas of financial disclosure, political financing and conflict of interest.
One of Lithuania’s key corruption prevention measures is an anti-corruption assessment of draft legislation, which grants the Special Investigation Service the authority to carry out corruption tests. According to the Lithuanian Corruption Map of 2022 – 2023, measured by the Special Investigation Service based on surveys, the institutions viewed as most corrupt were hospitals, the courts, the parliament and municipalities. Favors to party members, nepotism and the adoption of laws that favored particular interest groups were considered to be among the most widespread forms of corruption.
Thirty-four percent of the general population considered corruption to be a very serious problem (fifth most serious issue), 24% of business executives viewed it as a very serious problem (seventh most serious issue) and 32% of civil servants considered it a serious problem (fifth most serious issue). However, the assessed dynamics continued to show a positive trend, with the shares in all three groups – especially civil servants – stating that corruption had decreased in the last five years larger than those stating it had increased.
In 2023, several events attracted significant publicity in the area of corruption control. One was the “Skaidrinam” (“Making it transparent”) initiative by activist Andrius Tapinas, who collected information on the potential manipulation of rules governing expense compensation for municipal council members. The evidence of suspected fraud led the Special Investigation Service to initiate pretrial investigations into members of 19 municipal councils.
Another high-profile political corruption case involved allegations of corruption within Lithuania’s Liberal Movement and Labor Party, which prompted the Special Investigation Service to start an investigation in 2017. The parties were suspected of accepting bribes and trading political influence. For instance, two Liberal Movement members allegedly accepted bribes of more than €135,000 on behalf of the party from a vice president of a major business group in exchange for political decisions that benefited the corporation.
In April 2022, the court of first instance acquitted all the suspects in this case. However, in November 2023, the Court of Appeal of Lithuania convicted individuals who were previously acquitted, including businessman Raimondas Kurlianskis, then-Seimas members Eligijus Masiulis, Vytautas Gapšys, Šarūnas Gustainis and Gintaras Steponavičius. Charges included “bribery, trading in influence and abuse of power.” Additionally, the legal entities UAB concern “MG Baltic” (now UAB “MG grupė”), the Liberals’ Movement of the Republic of Lithuania political party (now the Liberal Movement), and the Labor Party were found guilty.
The improvement in the control of corruption in Lithuania has also been noted by Corruption Risk assessments. This organization stated that “Lithuania has managed to construct good constraints to corruption both on the side of government and civil society/freedom of the press, with a dense network of public accountability mechanisms and good access to information. Lithuania was fifth in the world on transparency but lagged in digitalization of the commerce register, land register and tracking current public expenditures. Nevertheless, the country has been on a positive trend for the past decade.”
Similar assessments on recent positive trends were provided by the European Commission in its 2023 Rule of Law report on Lithuania. The report stated that “the implementation of the anti-corruption agenda in 2022 – 2033 advanced well with the adoption of the first implementation action plan. Investigations and prosecutions of corruption-related offenses continue to be carried out efficiently while shortcomings in relation to investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery cases were raised. Public procurement remains a high-risk area for corruption. Laws such as the Law on Corruption Prevention, the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests, and the whistleblower legislation are being efficiently implemented. Further efforts were taken in view of the efficient implementation of the integrity rules.”
In the World Bank’s 2022 Worldwide Governance Indicators, Lithuania scored 76.42 out of 100 on the issue of corruption control, with its score having fluctuated in the 80th percentile over the last several years.
Citations:
European Commission. 2023. “Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the Rule of Law in Lithuania, Brussels.” July 5. SWD (2023) 815 final. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2023-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en
Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay. 2023. “Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023 Update.” www.govindicators.org
Special Investigation Service. 2022-2023. “Corruption map survey” (in Lithuanian). https://www.stt.lt/analitine-antikorupcine-zvalgyba/lietuvos-korupcijos-zemelapis/7437
The Corruption Risk Forecast, Lithuania, https://www.corruptionrisk.org/country/?country=LTU#forecast
EuroPam. 2023. “European Public Accountability Mechanisms, Lithuania.” https://www.europam.eu/?module=country-profile&country=Lithuania
Council of Europe, Group of States against Corruption. 2022. “Lithuania Evaluation Report.” https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/lithuania
Andrius Tapinas. 2023. “Skaidrinam” https://tapinas.substack.com/s/skaidrinam-2023
Court of Appeal of Lithuania. https://www.apeliacinis.lt/en/news/court-of-appeal-of-lithuania-all-acquitted-in-mg-baltic-political-corruption-case-are-guilty/1520
Graph View
Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
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6
7
6
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
5
4
3
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3
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
2
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1
The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
Members of the Seimas have adequate personnel and structural resources to monitor government activities effectively. They have access to personal staff, personnel assigned to parliamentary committees and commissions, and other structures, as well as the Parliamentary Research Unit. This unit provides analyses of other countries’ policies and other issues deemed important by Seimas members. Additionally, the parliamentary Committee for the Future, established after the 2020 Seimas elections, has reinforced focus on the Seimas’s analytical capacities, often organizing discussions with scholars and expert institutions.
Proper impact assessments of draft legislation are very rare. Although the Statute of the Seimas includes a provision requiring impact assessments for proposed draft laws, members of the Seimas usually do not provide them. Expenses incurred by calling experts for testimony or consultation can be reimbursed, but members of parliament are typically unwilling to allocate adequate funds for commissioning external impact assessment studies so as to avoid being perceived by the media as wasting taxpayers’ money. Thus, despite the availability of resources, political incentives frequently prevent effective parliamentary oversight, including the commonly held assumption that introducing draft legal initiatives reflects a member of parliament’s diligence, which in turn leads to a heavy focus on lawmaking,
Parties that are part of governing coalitions are often unwilling to engage in self-monitoring, while opposition parties frequently lack the capability for constructive external oversight. They use external expert impact assessments of draft legislation to delay governing coalition initiatives rather than to obtain a genuine analysis of the possible effects of the draft laws. Additionally, the parliament utilizes the results of audit reports produced by the National Audit Office. It is also common for members of the Seimas to employ their party colleagues as advisers or assistants based on relationships of trust rather than these individuals’ specific expertise.
Citation :
Proper impact assessments of draft legislation are very rare. Although the Statute of the Seimas includes a provision requiring impact assessments for proposed draft laws, members of the Seimas usually do not provide them. Expenses incurred by calling experts for testimony or consultation can be reimbursed, but members of parliament are typically unwilling to allocate adequate funds for commissioning external impact assessment studies so as to avoid being perceived by the media as wasting taxpayers’ money. Thus, despite the availability of resources, political incentives frequently prevent effective parliamentary oversight, including the commonly held assumption that introducing draft legal initiatives reflects a member of parliament’s diligence, which in turn leads to a heavy focus on lawmaking,
Parties that are part of governing coalitions are often unwilling to engage in self-monitoring, while opposition parties frequently lack the capability for constructive external oversight. They use external expert impact assessments of draft legislation to delay governing coalition initiatives rather than to obtain a genuine analysis of the possible effects of the draft laws. Additionally, the parliament utilizes the results of audit reports produced by the National Audit Office. It is also common for members of the Seimas to employ their party colleagues as advisers or assistants based on relationships of trust rather than these individuals’ specific expertise.
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Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
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The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
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The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
Members of the Seimas have the right to obtain information not only from the government but also from various government agencies, enterprises and other public sector organizations. When carrying out their oversight function, parliamentary committees can request information and relevant documents from ministries and other state institutions. These documents are normally delivered in full and within an appropriate time frame. Opposition members frequently seek the government’s position on politically salient policy issues. However, there are restrictions on accessing information considered sensitive for state security reasons. Additionally, information from ongoing pretrial investigations and other investigations cannot be provided if it could harm the investigations.
Parliamentary committees can summon ministers and the heads of most other state institutions, with the exception of court judges. Invited individuals, who also attend parliamentary commissions and other groups, generally answer questions posed by members of parliament and provide other relevant information. In some cases, vice ministers or other authorized civil servants may substitute for ministers. However, this instrument of parliamentary control is often used to explain government activities on an ex post basis rather than serving as a forward-looking mechanism. During times of crisis – such as the management of pandemics or geopolitical crises – the more frequent practice of vice ministers substituting for ministers preoccupied with crisis management has sometimes led to friction among members of parliament and particular ministers.
Parliamentary committees can summon ministers and the heads of most other state institutions, with the exception of court judges. Invited individuals, who also attend parliamentary commissions and other groups, generally answer questions posed by members of parliament and provide other relevant information. In some cases, vice ministers or other authorized civil servants may substitute for ministers. However, this instrument of parliamentary control is often used to explain government activities on an ex post basis rather than serving as a forward-looking mechanism. During times of crisis – such as the management of pandemics or geopolitical crises – the more frequent practice of vice ministers substituting for ministers preoccupied with crisis management has sometimes led to friction among members of parliament and particular ministers.
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
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The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
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The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
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The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
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The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
The legislature is generally able to exercise its investigative function. As the 2004 impeachment of President Rolandas Paksas illustrated, the Seimas can make political decisions once sufficient evidence of unconstitutional activities by the executive is presented.
However, investigations of suspected illegal activities are mostly used for political purposes to attract media attention and create additional opportunities for criticizing the governing coalition and its decisions. They rarely lead to substantive policy changes or resignations. For example, in September 2022 the opposition initiated a motion for resignation against Minister of Energy Dainius Kreivys over alleged mishandling of the energy crisis and the reform of electricity market rules. At the end of 2022, another interpellation was initiated by the opposition against the minister of foreign affairs and the head of the main coalition party Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, Gabrielius Landsbergis, over controversial foreign policy decisions. Both of these motions failed when it came to the final vote on forcing the resignation of the ministers because the opposition did not have enough votes in the Seimas, and majority governing coalitions tend to defend their ministers during such votes.
Disagreements between opposition parties can sometimes complicate investigative actions. For example, in November 2022, the opposition’s attempt to establish a temporary commission to investigate the activities of Interior Minister Agnė Bilotaitė failed at the initial stage. This failure occurred not only because ruling coalition parties voted against it but also because some members of the opposition parties abstained from voting.
However, investigations of suspected illegal activities are mostly used for political purposes to attract media attention and create additional opportunities for criticizing the governing coalition and its decisions. They rarely lead to substantive policy changes or resignations. For example, in September 2022 the opposition initiated a motion for resignation against Minister of Energy Dainius Kreivys over alleged mishandling of the energy crisis and the reform of electricity market rules. At the end of 2022, another interpellation was initiated by the opposition against the minister of foreign affairs and the head of the main coalition party Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats, Gabrielius Landsbergis, over controversial foreign policy decisions. Both of these motions failed when it came to the final vote on forcing the resignation of the ministers because the opposition did not have enough votes in the Seimas, and majority governing coalitions tend to defend their ministers during such votes.
Disagreements between opposition parties can sometimes complicate investigative actions. For example, in November 2022, the opposition’s attempt to establish a temporary commission to investigate the activities of Interior Minister Agnė Bilotaitė failed at the initial stage. This failure occurred not only because ruling coalition parties voted against it but also because some members of the opposition parties abstained from voting.
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
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The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
The organization and operations of legislative committees are for the most part well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activities. There is extensive congruence between the current structure of 16 parliamentary committees and the primary areas of competence of Lithuania’s 14 ministries. The Committee for the Future is the most recent addition, established in 2020.
However, there are a few mismatches. Several ministries, such as Economy, Transport and Communications, as well as other state institutions, are monitored by a single Committee on Economics. Conversely, there are several horizontal parliamentary committees, including those on the issues of government audits, European affairs, and human rights.
In addition to these, the parliament had 11 standing commissions as of 2023, some of which were related to policy areas assigned to the Lithuanian ministries. One such example was the Commission for Energy and Sustainable Development. Thus, the composition of parliamentary committees allows government policy to be monitored on both a sectoral and horizontal basis.
Committees meet regularly, but most of their activities focus on considering draft legislation. The workload of individual committees in the legislative process varies substantially, with the committees on Legal Affairs, State Administration and Local Authorities, Social Affairs and Labor, and Budget and Finance accounting for most of the legislative review work delegated to committees. The attention given to parliamentary oversight remains insufficient, although the exact amount depends on the particular committee and its chair.
Citations:
The Seimas, Committees and Commissions, https://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=35733&p_k=2
However, there are a few mismatches. Several ministries, such as Economy, Transport and Communications, as well as other state institutions, are monitored by a single Committee on Economics. Conversely, there are several horizontal parliamentary committees, including those on the issues of government audits, European affairs, and human rights.
In addition to these, the parliament had 11 standing commissions as of 2023, some of which were related to policy areas assigned to the Lithuanian ministries. One such example was the Commission for Energy and Sustainable Development. Thus, the composition of parliamentary committees allows government policy to be monitored on both a sectoral and horizontal basis.
Committees meet regularly, but most of their activities focus on considering draft legislation. The workload of individual committees in the legislative process varies substantially, with the committees on Legal Affairs, State Administration and Local Authorities, Social Affairs and Labor, and Budget and Finance accounting for most of the legislative review work delegated to committees. The attention given to parliamentary oversight remains insufficient, although the exact amount depends on the particular committee and its chair.
Citations:
The Seimas, Committees and Commissions, https://www.lrs.lt/sip/portal.show?p_r=35733&p_k=2