Diagonal Accountability
#9Key Findings
New Zealand falls into the upper-middle ranks (rank 9) in the category of diagonal accountability.
Media freedom is generally respected. There is typically no government censorship, although after the 2019 Christchurch attack, steps were taken to limit extremist content online, especially on social media. Journalists increasingly face online harassment. Concerns about media pluralism persist due to high levels of media ownership concentration.
Political rights like freedom of association and assembly are well-protected. Numerous individuals were arrested for participating in violent demonstrations on the issues of COVID-19 measures and climate change, but these arrests were lawful, without evidence of systematic harassment.
Business interests wield considerably more influence than organized labor. Social welfare groups exert influence through media campaigns and international court cases, framing the public debate. The environmental movement has helped drive changes in policy especially through public protest.
Media freedom is generally respected. There is typically no government censorship, although after the 2019 Christchurch attack, steps were taken to limit extremist content online, especially on social media. Journalists increasingly face online harassment. Concerns about media pluralism persist due to high levels of media ownership concentration.
Political rights like freedom of association and assembly are well-protected. Numerous individuals were arrested for participating in violent demonstrations on the issues of COVID-19 measures and climate change, but these arrests were lawful, without evidence of systematic harassment.
Business interests wield considerably more influence than organized labor. Social welfare groups exert influence through media campaigns and international court cases, framing the public debate. The environmental movement has helped drive changes in policy especially through public protest.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
10
9
9
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
2
1
1
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
Media freedom is generally guaranteed and respected in New Zealand. In the 2023 World Press Freedom Index – published by Reporters Without Borders – New Zealand is ranked 13th, down two places compared to 2022 (Reporters Without Borders 2023).
The news media is considered free from political pressure and intervention. This assessment also applies to the state-owned broadcast networks, Television New Zealand (TVNZ) and Radio New Zealand (RNZ). These outlets operate independently and contribute to the diversity of opinions and information available to the public.
While New Zealand has a legal framework that supports media freedom, certain legal considerations may impact the work of journalists, including defamation and privacy laws. Additionally, regulatory bodies such as the Broadcasting Standards Authority and the Press Council oversee media content to ensure it aligns with ethical and professional standards.
The government does not engage in widespread censorship of online content. It is worth noting, though, that after the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack, the administration under Jacinda Ardern took steps to curb the spread of extremist and violent content on the internet – in particular, passing legislation to hold social media platforms accountable for the spread of extremist material (Roy 2019).
Journalists generally work in an environment free from violence and intimidation, although they increasingly face online harassment. The working conditions became tougher in early 2022 when, during protests against COVID-19 restrictions, journalists were subjected to violence, insults and death threats (Swift 2022).
Citations:
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “New Zealand.” https://rsf.org/en/country/new-zealand
Roy, E. A. 2019. “Christchurch attack: New Zealand tries new tactic to disrupt online extremism.” The Guardian, October 14. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/christchurch-attack-new-zealand-tries-new-tactic-to-disrupt-online-extremism
Swift, M. 2022. “Overwhelming Number of Kiwi Journalists Face Death Threats and Violence – Study.” Newshub, May 10. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2022/05/overwhelming-number-of-kiwi-journalists-face-death-threats-and-violence-study.html
The news media is considered free from political pressure and intervention. This assessment also applies to the state-owned broadcast networks, Television New Zealand (TVNZ) and Radio New Zealand (RNZ). These outlets operate independently and contribute to the diversity of opinions and information available to the public.
While New Zealand has a legal framework that supports media freedom, certain legal considerations may impact the work of journalists, including defamation and privacy laws. Additionally, regulatory bodies such as the Broadcasting Standards Authority and the Press Council oversee media content to ensure it aligns with ethical and professional standards.
The government does not engage in widespread censorship of online content. It is worth noting, though, that after the 2019 Christchurch terrorist attack, the administration under Jacinda Ardern took steps to curb the spread of extremist and violent content on the internet – in particular, passing legislation to hold social media platforms accountable for the spread of extremist material (Roy 2019).
Journalists generally work in an environment free from violence and intimidation, although they increasingly face online harassment. The working conditions became tougher in early 2022 when, during protests against COVID-19 restrictions, journalists were subjected to violence, insults and death threats (Swift 2022).
Citations:
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “New Zealand.” https://rsf.org/en/country/new-zealand
Roy, E. A. 2019. “Christchurch attack: New Zealand tries new tactic to disrupt online extremism.” The Guardian, October 14. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/14/christchurch-attack-new-zealand-tries-new-tactic-to-disrupt-online-extremism
Swift, M. 2022. “Overwhelming Number of Kiwi Journalists Face Death Threats and Violence – Study.” Newshub, May 10. https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2022/05/overwhelming-number-of-kiwi-journalists-face-death-threats-and-violence-study.html
To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
Concerns about New Zealand’s media pluralism, particularly due to high levels of media ownership concentration, have persisted for years (e.g., JMAD 2022; Reporters Without Borders 2023). In the TV segment, competition is mainly between Television New Zealand (TVNZ) – which, despite being publicly owned, operates on a commercial basis – and two international media giants, the U.S.-owned MediaWorks and Australian-owned Sky. Media pluralism faced further threats when MediaWorks sold its Three network, as well as the news and current affairs element under the Newshub banner, to U.S. media company Discovery in 2020. Despite the sale, the news and current affairs programming remained intact (Jennings 2021). In the commercial radio market, MediaWorks and New Zealand Media and Entertainment (NZME) dominate, while publicly owned and non-commercial Radio New Zealand serves as a third player with a loyal audience. In the newspaper and magazine publishing industry, a near-duopoly exists where the market is split between NZME and Stuff. NZME owns the leading daily newspaper, the New Zealand Herald, while Stuff controls the country’s second- and third-highest circulation daily newspapers, The Dominion Post and The Press. Stuff, one of New Zealand’s largest media companies, was sold by its parent company, Nine Entertainment, for $1 to its chief executive, former journalist Sinead Boucher. This deal ended years of speculation about the company’s ownership after lengthy attempts by NZME to buy the company were blocked by the Commerce Commission, which had received submissions from various concerned groups and networks in civil society. Several online media outlets provide alternative sources of news and information (e.g., The Spinoff, Newsroom and The Guardian New Zealand). These outlets have fewer readers than the major news outlets but offer critical and evidence-informed analyses that are often picked up by the main broadcasting actors noted above.
The problem of media pluralism was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, which cost approximately 700 jobs in the sector. For example, the New Zealand Herald laid off 200 staff in 2020, while magazine giant Bauer – publisher of The Listener and the Women’s Weekly – was even forced to close down. The government announced a $50 million aid package; however, this was met with widespread derision by the industry (in comparison, the racing industry received a $72.5 million emergency support package) (Roy 2020).
In early 2023, the Labour administration under Chris Hipkins scrapped its plans to merge TVNZ and RNZ. This decision was welcomed by commercial media outlets, which had feared that the merger would have given the combined entity too much dominance. At the same time, the government announced that RNZ would receive an extra $26 million a year, partly to develop a new digital platform (Pullar-Strecker 2023).
Citations:
JMAD. 2022. “Aotearoa New Zealand Media Ownership 2022.” https://www.jmadresearch.com/_files/ugd/a95e86_131d36c434db480fbbb90e84ed430b14.pdf
Pullar-Strecker, T. 2023. “More than $16m Spent on TVNZ/RNZ Merger Before it Was Called Off.” Stuff, February 8. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/131175405/more-than-16m-spent-on-tvnzrnz-merger-before-it-was-called-off
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “New Zealand.” https://rsf.org/en/country/new-zealand
Roy, E. A. 2020. “New Zealand to Give $50m to Help Ailing Media Groups During Covid-19 Crisis.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/23/new-zealand-to-give-50m-to-help-ailing-media-groups-during-covid-19-crisis
The problem of media pluralism was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, which cost approximately 700 jobs in the sector. For example, the New Zealand Herald laid off 200 staff in 2020, while magazine giant Bauer – publisher of The Listener and the Women’s Weekly – was even forced to close down. The government announced a $50 million aid package; however, this was met with widespread derision by the industry (in comparison, the racing industry received a $72.5 million emergency support package) (Roy 2020).
In early 2023, the Labour administration under Chris Hipkins scrapped its plans to merge TVNZ and RNZ. This decision was welcomed by commercial media outlets, which had feared that the merger would have given the combined entity too much dominance. At the same time, the government announced that RNZ would receive an extra $26 million a year, partly to develop a new digital platform (Pullar-Strecker 2023).
Citations:
JMAD. 2022. “Aotearoa New Zealand Media Ownership 2022.” https://www.jmadresearch.com/_files/ugd/a95e86_131d36c434db480fbbb90e84ed430b14.pdf
Pullar-Strecker, T. 2023. “More than $16m Spent on TVNZ/RNZ Merger Before it Was Called Off.” Stuff, February 8. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/131175405/more-than-16m-spent-on-tvnzrnz-merger-before-it-was-called-off
Reporters Without Borders. 2023. “New Zealand.” https://rsf.org/en/country/new-zealand
Roy, E. A. 2020. “New Zealand to Give $50m to Help Ailing Media Groups During Covid-19 Crisis.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/23/new-zealand-to-give-50m-to-help-ailing-media-groups-during-covid-19-crisis
Graph View
To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
Political rights such as the freedom of association and freedom of assembly are effectively safeguarded. While New Zealand does not have a single written constitution, these rights are protected through various laws, statutes and legal norms – most importantly, through the Bill of Rights Act 1990, which outlines fundamental rights and freedoms like the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, the freedom of association, and specific human rights legislation, such as the Human Rights Act 1993.
The WJP Rule of Law Index 2023 awards New Zealand a score of 0.84 (out of 1.00) on its “freedom of assembly and association” measure, ranking the country 15th in global comparison (World Justice Project 2023).
The government generally applies transparent and nondiscriminatory criteria when evaluating requests for permits to associate and assemble. If a permit request is denied or disputed, individuals or groups have the right to seek judicial review. This legal recourse allows for an independent assessment of whether the decision-making process was fair and aligned with legal standards.
In recent months and years, numerous individuals have been arrested and convicted for participating in violent demonstrations against the government’s COVID-19 measures (Nichols and Harris 2023) and climate change protests (Dunseath 2023). However, these arrests have generally been in accordance with the law, and do not reveal any evidence of the systematic use of intimidation or harassment aimed at hindering citizens from exercising their political rights.
Citations:
Dunseath, F. 2023. “Climate protesters charged after blocking traffic in central Wellington, road open.” Stuff, April 20. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/wellington/131818715/climate-protesters-charged-after-blocking-traffic-in-central-wellington-road-open
Nichols, L., and Harris, K. 2023. “Wellington Parliament protests: Hundreds charged but just 31 convicted so far, IPCA report released.” New Zealand Herald, April 20. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/wellington-parliament-protests-hundreds-charged-but-just-31-convicted-so-far-ipca-report-released/T7HIIWSRAVCJJG6NKJC5MIUARY
World Justice Project. 2023. “Rule of Law Index: New Zealand.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/New%20Zealand/Fundamental%20Rights
The WJP Rule of Law Index 2023 awards New Zealand a score of 0.84 (out of 1.00) on its “freedom of assembly and association” measure, ranking the country 15th in global comparison (World Justice Project 2023).
The government generally applies transparent and nondiscriminatory criteria when evaluating requests for permits to associate and assemble. If a permit request is denied or disputed, individuals or groups have the right to seek judicial review. This legal recourse allows for an independent assessment of whether the decision-making process was fair and aligned with legal standards.
In recent months and years, numerous individuals have been arrested and convicted for participating in violent demonstrations against the government’s COVID-19 measures (Nichols and Harris 2023) and climate change protests (Dunseath 2023). However, these arrests have generally been in accordance with the law, and do not reveal any evidence of the systematic use of intimidation or harassment aimed at hindering citizens from exercising their political rights.
Citations:
Dunseath, F. 2023. “Climate protesters charged after blocking traffic in central Wellington, road open.” Stuff, April 20. https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/wellington/131818715/climate-protesters-charged-after-blocking-traffic-in-central-wellington-road-open
Nichols, L., and Harris, K. 2023. “Wellington Parliament protests: Hundreds charged but just 31 convicted so far, IPCA report released.” New Zealand Herald, April 20. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/wellington-parliament-protests-hundreds-charged-but-just-31-convicted-so-far-ipca-report-released/T7HIIWSRAVCJJG6NKJC5MIUARY
World Justice Project. 2023. “Rule of Law Index: New Zealand.” https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2023/New%20Zealand/Fundamental%20Rights
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
When mapping the landscape of civil society organizations involved in capital and labor issues, one cannot help but note that political power is tilted in favor of business interests at the expense of organized labor (Nicholls 2021).
Historically, New Zealand had a strong trade union sector, because a union voice in politics was institutionally mandated under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. However, the neoliberal market-oriented reforms of the 1980s and 1990s severely undercut the role of trade unions. Most importantly, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 deregulated labor markets and turned all collective contracts into individual contracts between an individual employee and their employer. As a result of these institutional reforms, trade union density dropped below 18% according to 2018 figures (OECD 2021). Today, the three largest trade unions all represent public sector workers: the Public Service Association, the NZ Nurses Organization and the New Zealand Educational Institute (New Zealand Companies Office 2022). The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions acts as the umbrella organization for around 40 affiliated unions. Only a few unions continue to be formally affiliated with the Labour Party, the largest being the Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union (EPMU) (Aimer 2015). In 2022, the Labour government under Ardern passed the Fair Pay Act, which would have strengthened trade unions by allowing sector-wide collective employment negotiations, but this was repealed after the 2023 election by the new National Party government.
The rise in business influence relative to organized labor can also be attributed to new patterns of business lobbying (Nicholls 2021). In 1986, a new lobby group known as the Business Roundtable was established. The group distinguished itself from previous business member-based organizations in that its primary goal was not to represent business owners in wage negotiations or other matters of employment relations but to advocate policy interests. In 2012, the Business Roundtable merged with the New Zealand Institute to form the New Zealand Initiative (NZI), which today operates more as a think tank than an interest group, mobilizing support for pro-market economic and social policies.
In short, the application of free-market imperatives meant that trade unions lost their political influence during the 1980s and 1990s, although their connection with the Labour Party means they have some influence when Labour is in government. Meanwhile, the retention and extension of the neoliberal policy regime – both under Labour and National governments – suggests that “it has been big business and financial lobbies that have gained insider status and influence in the political realm” (Grey 2015: 464). That said, there are a number of CSOs and the Human Rights Commission that champion issues of equal pay, pay transparency and the need to close the ethnic gender pay gap (Beehive 2023; HRC, 2021).
Citations:
Aimer, P. 2015. “The Labour Party.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beehive. 2023. “Government Acts to Close Gender Pay Gap.” https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-acts-close-gender-pay-gap
Grey, S. 2015. “Interest Groups and Policy.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
HRC. 2021. “Human Rights Commission Inquiry into the Pacific Pay Gap.”
New Zealand Companies Office. 2022. “Union Membership Return Report.” https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/all-registers/registered-unions/annual-return-membership-reports/
Nicholls, K. 2021. “Interest Groups and Lobbying.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, 7th ed., ed. J. Hayward. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Historically, New Zealand had a strong trade union sector, because a union voice in politics was institutionally mandated under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. However, the neoliberal market-oriented reforms of the 1980s and 1990s severely undercut the role of trade unions. Most importantly, the Employment Contracts Act 1991 deregulated labor markets and turned all collective contracts into individual contracts between an individual employee and their employer. As a result of these institutional reforms, trade union density dropped below 18% according to 2018 figures (OECD 2021). Today, the three largest trade unions all represent public sector workers: the Public Service Association, the NZ Nurses Organization and the New Zealand Educational Institute (New Zealand Companies Office 2022). The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions acts as the umbrella organization for around 40 affiliated unions. Only a few unions continue to be formally affiliated with the Labour Party, the largest being the Engineering, Printing and Manufacturing Union (EPMU) (Aimer 2015). In 2022, the Labour government under Ardern passed the Fair Pay Act, which would have strengthened trade unions by allowing sector-wide collective employment negotiations, but this was repealed after the 2023 election by the new National Party government.
The rise in business influence relative to organized labor can also be attributed to new patterns of business lobbying (Nicholls 2021). In 1986, a new lobby group known as the Business Roundtable was established. The group distinguished itself from previous business member-based organizations in that its primary goal was not to represent business owners in wage negotiations or other matters of employment relations but to advocate policy interests. In 2012, the Business Roundtable merged with the New Zealand Institute to form the New Zealand Initiative (NZI), which today operates more as a think tank than an interest group, mobilizing support for pro-market economic and social policies.
In short, the application of free-market imperatives meant that trade unions lost their political influence during the 1980s and 1990s, although their connection with the Labour Party means they have some influence when Labour is in government. Meanwhile, the retention and extension of the neoliberal policy regime – both under Labour and National governments – suggests that “it has been big business and financial lobbies that have gained insider status and influence in the political realm” (Grey 2015: 464). That said, there are a number of CSOs and the Human Rights Commission that champion issues of equal pay, pay transparency and the need to close the ethnic gender pay gap (Beehive 2023; HRC, 2021).
Citations:
Aimer, P. 2015. “The Labour Party.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beehive. 2023. “Government Acts to Close Gender Pay Gap.” https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-acts-close-gender-pay-gap
Grey, S. 2015. “Interest Groups and Policy.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
HRC. 2021. “Human Rights Commission Inquiry into the Pacific Pay Gap.”
New Zealand Companies Office. 2022. “Union Membership Return Report.” https://www.companiesoffice.govt.nz/all-registers/registered-unions/annual-return-membership-reports/
Nicholls, K. 2021. “Interest Groups and Lobbying.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, 7th ed., ed. J. Hayward. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
New Zealand follows the Westminster model of democracy, characterized by limited access points for veto players and the centralization of political decision-making power in the executive. Despite this institutional setup, civil society organizations have had considerable success influencing government policy in the field of social welfare through various means (Grey 2015; O’Brien 2015).
Interest groups have, through media campaigns and other communication strategies, been able to frame public debates on social welfare issues. For example, public support for the “26 for Babies” group, which ran a social media campaign and a range of mainstream media events, led to a 2014 budget announcement that the National-led government would increase paid parental leave from 14 to 18 weeks in 2016, despite earlier proclamations by National that it would veto a private member’s bill on extending paid parental leave to 26 weeks.
Moreover, interest groups have shaped social welfare policy by publishing reports and research at both the agenda-setting and evaluation stages of the policy process. For instance, the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) has published evaluation reports showing the inequities caused by the Working for Families policy, which provides payments to “working” parents but not to parents receiving social welfare benefits. CPAG has also taken cases to the Human Rights Tribunal and the High Court to demonstrate that the government’s policy was discriminatory under the law. The legal proceedings held the attention of the media for a number of years between 2002 and 2014. In 2017, Prime Minister Ardern appointed herself minister for child poverty, and the Child Poverty Reduction Act was passed in 2018. The act requires current and future governments to set three-year and 10-year targets for reducing child poverty.
Interest groups have also turned to international courts and supranational bodies to force policy change. In a recent example from 2022, civil society representatives formally asked the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to put pressure on the New Zealand government to address a range of disability issues (Shivas 2022). Meanwhile, Māori groups have used the Waitangi Tribunal to coerce the government into passing welfare policies designed to reduce inequities experienced by Māori. As a result, various policies – such as the Public Health and Disability Act and the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act – now reference the Treaty of Waitangi and include measures specific to improving welfare outcomes for Māori (Moore 2021).
Citations:
Grey, S. 2015. “Interest groups and policy.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th ed., ed. J. Hayward. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moore, C. 2021. “Māori and Social Policy.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, ed. J. Hayward, 7th ed. Oxford University Press.
O’Brien, M. 2015. “Child poverty policy.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shivas, O. 2022. “UN Committee ‘Concerned’ NZ Government Ignoring Disability Rights’ Advice.” Stuff, August 27. https://www.stuff.co.nz/pou-tiaki/129628760/un-committee-concerned-nz-government-ignoring-disability-rights-advice
Interest groups have, through media campaigns and other communication strategies, been able to frame public debates on social welfare issues. For example, public support for the “26 for Babies” group, which ran a social media campaign and a range of mainstream media events, led to a 2014 budget announcement that the National-led government would increase paid parental leave from 14 to 18 weeks in 2016, despite earlier proclamations by National that it would veto a private member’s bill on extending paid parental leave to 26 weeks.
Moreover, interest groups have shaped social welfare policy by publishing reports and research at both the agenda-setting and evaluation stages of the policy process. For instance, the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) has published evaluation reports showing the inequities caused by the Working for Families policy, which provides payments to “working” parents but not to parents receiving social welfare benefits. CPAG has also taken cases to the Human Rights Tribunal and the High Court to demonstrate that the government’s policy was discriminatory under the law. The legal proceedings held the attention of the media for a number of years between 2002 and 2014. In 2017, Prime Minister Ardern appointed herself minister for child poverty, and the Child Poverty Reduction Act was passed in 2018. The act requires current and future governments to set three-year and 10-year targets for reducing child poverty.
Interest groups have also turned to international courts and supranational bodies to force policy change. In a recent example from 2022, civil society representatives formally asked the United Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to put pressure on the New Zealand government to address a range of disability issues (Shivas 2022). Meanwhile, Māori groups have used the Waitangi Tribunal to coerce the government into passing welfare policies designed to reduce inequities experienced by Māori. As a result, various policies – such as the Public Health and Disability Act and the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act – now reference the Treaty of Waitangi and include measures specific to improving welfare outcomes for Māori (Moore 2021).
Citations:
Grey, S. 2015. “Interest groups and policy.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th ed., ed. J. Hayward. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moore, C. 2021. “Māori and Social Policy.” In Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand, ed. J. Hayward, 7th ed. Oxford University Press.
O’Brien, M. 2015. “Child poverty policy.” In J. Hayward, ed. Government and Politics in Aotearoa New Zealand. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shivas, O. 2022. “UN Committee ‘Concerned’ NZ Government Ignoring Disability Rights’ Advice.” Stuff, August 27. https://www.stuff.co.nz/pou-tiaki/129628760/un-committee-concerned-nz-government-ignoring-disability-rights-advice
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
In New Zealand, public concerns about climate change and other environmental issues have grown considerably in recent years. One measure of this concern is the increasing support for environmental organizations. For example, both Greenpeace and Forest & Bird reported over $9 million in donations in 2021 and 2022, respectively (Greenpeace Aotearoa 2021; Forest & Bird 2022).
There are differences among environmental organizations in terms of resources, funding, leadership and strategies. For example, larger, established organizations such as Greenpeace and Forest & Bird have comparatively formal structures that influence their governance and fundraising strategies. In contrast, organizations such as CANA and Save Happy Valley have more grassroots, devolved and informal structures. Additionally, some organizations, including Generation Zero and 350 Aotearoa, adopt hybrid approaches that combine both formal and informal structures. Some of these organizations, such as Greenpeace New Zealand and 350 Aotearoa, have links to global environmental movement actors (Kurian et al. 2022).
New Zealand’s environmental movement has achieved significant successes over the years, leading to positive changes in policies and practices. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, widespread public protests against nuclear testing and the entry of nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships led to the enactment of legislation declaring New Zealand a nuclear-free zone. More recently, environmental interest groups played a key role in getting the Zero Carbon Act enacted in 2019, which makes it mandatory for governments to take action on climate (Hayward 2022).
Māori-led campaigns have also significantly influenced environmental politics. For Māori activists, the fight against climate change and ecological degradation is intertwined with long-standing struggles for decolonization and control over land and resources (Kurian et al. 2022). Similar to other environmentalist actors, Māori groups have taken direct protest action to achieve their objectives, such as the occupation of Ihumātao from 2016 to 2020. Additionally, they have utilized the Waitangi Tribunal to reach negotiated settlements with the government. Many of these settlements included cultural redress aimed at restoring Māori communities’ relationships with the environment and prescribed the establishment of Māori-led institutions with environmental policy and decision-making functions, such as the Waikato River Authority and the Te Urewera Board (Wheen 2022).
However, Māori have also raised concerns and held protests in response to a number of climate change initiatives that were introduced. For example, Iwi leaders (Māori tribal leaders) were not consulted on the oil and gas ban, and there was considerable resistance to the government’s policy to lock up “significant natural areas” on private land, including Māori land. In combination, these initiatives were seen as the government “grabbing” Indigenous resources and land (Harman 2021).
Citations:
Forest & Bird. 2022. “Annual Report 2022.” https://www.forestandbird.org.nz/resources/forest-bird-annual-report-2022
Greenpeace Aotearoa. 2021. “Annual Impact Report 2021.” https://www.greenpeace.org/aotearoa/publication/2021-annual-impact-report/
Harman, R. 2021. “Maori Lead Protests Against Shaw’s New Environmental Protection Regulations.” Politik, June 9. https://www.politik.co.nz/maori-lead-protests-against-shaws-new-environmental-protection-regulations/
Hayward, B. 2022. “Climate Policy.” In J. L. MacArthur and Maria Bargh, eds., Environmental Politics and Policy in Aotearoa New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Kurian, P., et al. 2022. “Social movements and the environment.” In Environmental Politics and Policy in Aotearoa New Zealand, eds. J. L. MacArthur and Maria Bargh. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Wheen, N. 2022. “Contemporary Environmental Institutions and Policy-Making.” In Environmental Politics and Policy in Aotearoa New Zealand, eds. J. L. MacArthur and Maria Bargh. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
There are differences among environmental organizations in terms of resources, funding, leadership and strategies. For example, larger, established organizations such as Greenpeace and Forest & Bird have comparatively formal structures that influence their governance and fundraising strategies. In contrast, organizations such as CANA and Save Happy Valley have more grassroots, devolved and informal structures. Additionally, some organizations, including Generation Zero and 350 Aotearoa, adopt hybrid approaches that combine both formal and informal structures. Some of these organizations, such as Greenpeace New Zealand and 350 Aotearoa, have links to global environmental movement actors (Kurian et al. 2022).
New Zealand’s environmental movement has achieved significant successes over the years, leading to positive changes in policies and practices. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s, widespread public protests against nuclear testing and the entry of nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships led to the enactment of legislation declaring New Zealand a nuclear-free zone. More recently, environmental interest groups played a key role in getting the Zero Carbon Act enacted in 2019, which makes it mandatory for governments to take action on climate (Hayward 2022).
Māori-led campaigns have also significantly influenced environmental politics. For Māori activists, the fight against climate change and ecological degradation is intertwined with long-standing struggles for decolonization and control over land and resources (Kurian et al. 2022). Similar to other environmentalist actors, Māori groups have taken direct protest action to achieve their objectives, such as the occupation of Ihumātao from 2016 to 2020. Additionally, they have utilized the Waitangi Tribunal to reach negotiated settlements with the government. Many of these settlements included cultural redress aimed at restoring Māori communities’ relationships with the environment and prescribed the establishment of Māori-led institutions with environmental policy and decision-making functions, such as the Waikato River Authority and the Te Urewera Board (Wheen 2022).
However, Māori have also raised concerns and held protests in response to a number of climate change initiatives that were introduced. For example, Iwi leaders (Māori tribal leaders) were not consulted on the oil and gas ban, and there was considerable resistance to the government’s policy to lock up “significant natural areas” on private land, including Māori land. In combination, these initiatives were seen as the government “grabbing” Indigenous resources and land (Harman 2021).
Citations:
Forest & Bird. 2022. “Annual Report 2022.” https://www.forestandbird.org.nz/resources/forest-bird-annual-report-2022
Greenpeace Aotearoa. 2021. “Annual Impact Report 2021.” https://www.greenpeace.org/aotearoa/publication/2021-annual-impact-report/
Harman, R. 2021. “Maori Lead Protests Against Shaw’s New Environmental Protection Regulations.” Politik, June 9. https://www.politik.co.nz/maori-lead-protests-against-shaws-new-environmental-protection-regulations/
Hayward, B. 2022. “Climate Policy.” In J. L. MacArthur and Maria Bargh, eds., Environmental Politics and Policy in Aotearoa New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Kurian, P., et al. 2022. “Social movements and the environment.” In Environmental Politics and Policy in Aotearoa New Zealand, eds. J. L. MacArthur and Maria Bargh. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Wheen, N. 2022. “Contemporary Environmental Institutions and Policy-Making.” In Environmental Politics and Policy in Aotearoa New Zealand, eds. J. L. MacArthur and Maria Bargh. Auckland: Auckland University Press.