Coordination
#28Key Findings
Poland falls into the sample’s bottom ranks (rank 28) in the area of coordination.
The Chancellery evaluates policy proposals using a team of experts and advisers. Under the PiS government, it centralized control over policy proposals from line ministries, ensuring that they aligned with government priorities. These priorities were often coordinated by PiS party head Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the PiS party, rather than by the prime minister.
Under the PiS government, informal meetings with Kaczyński at the PiS headquarters frequently shaped important political decisions, bypassing formal coordination processes within the ministerial structure. Interministerial committees are common. The incoming government’s first such team was tasked with restoring the rule of law and constitutional order.
Poland’s decentralized territorial structure, which includes voivodeships, counties, and municipalities, has historically been considered highly effective. However, the PiS government gradually centralized control, including over municipalities’ revenues, sparking tensions between central and subnational authorities.
The Chancellery evaluates policy proposals using a team of experts and advisers. Under the PiS government, it centralized control over policy proposals from line ministries, ensuring that they aligned with government priorities. These priorities were often coordinated by PiS party head Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of the PiS party, rather than by the prime minister.
Under the PiS government, informal meetings with Kaczyński at the PiS headquarters frequently shaped important political decisions, bypassing formal coordination processes within the ministerial structure. Interministerial committees are common. The incoming government’s first such team was tasked with restoring the rule of law and constitutional order.
Poland’s decentralized territorial structure, which includes voivodeships, counties, and municipalities, has historically been considered highly effective. However, the PiS government gradually centralized control, including over municipalities’ revenues, sparking tensions between central and subnational authorities.
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To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
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9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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7
6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
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4
3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
In Poland, the prime minister’s office or Chancellery (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów) typically evaluates policy proposals using a team of experts and advisers. The specifics of this group’s capacities, including personnel and financial resources, depend on budget allocations and government priorities.
Under Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, the office exerted centralized control over proposals prepared by line ministers, reflecting a broader trend toward bureaucratic centralization. Line ministries were required to involve the Chancellery in the preparation of policy proposals. The degree of involvement varied, but often included legal and technical assessments and consideration of programmatic aspects so as to ensure alignment with government priorities. These priorities were frequently coordinated by Jarosław Kaczyński, the head of the PiS party, rather than by Prime Minister Morawiecki. This was partly due to ongoing tension between Morawiecki and Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro.
Under the PiS government, the office consisted of various departments, but the crucial ones were the Government Work Programming Department and the Legislative Process Coordination Department. Regular meetings between the Chancellery and line ministries were common. These meetings served as a platform for briefings, updates and discussions on new developments that might impact policy proposal preparations. The frequency and depth of these interactions changed based on the nature and urgency of policy matters.
The budget of Prime Minister Morawiecki’s Chancellery grew immensely over the years. In 2021 – 2022, it increased from PLN 379.7 million to PLN 843.3 million, then doubled to PLN 1.54 billion. In 2024, it was planned to reach PLN 2 billion, which is 16 times more than the expenditures during the rule of the PO-PSL coalition in 2015 (Rzeczpospolita 2023).
Citations:
Rzeczpospolita. 2023. “U premiera Morawieckiego na bogato. Budżet jego kancelarii przebił sufit.” https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art39225341-u-premiera-morawieckiego-na-bogato-budzet-jego-kancelarii-przebil-sufit
Under Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, the office exerted centralized control over proposals prepared by line ministers, reflecting a broader trend toward bureaucratic centralization. Line ministries were required to involve the Chancellery in the preparation of policy proposals. The degree of involvement varied, but often included legal and technical assessments and consideration of programmatic aspects so as to ensure alignment with government priorities. These priorities were frequently coordinated by Jarosław Kaczyński, the head of the PiS party, rather than by Prime Minister Morawiecki. This was partly due to ongoing tension between Morawiecki and Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro.
Under the PiS government, the office consisted of various departments, but the crucial ones were the Government Work Programming Department and the Legislative Process Coordination Department. Regular meetings between the Chancellery and line ministries were common. These meetings served as a platform for briefings, updates and discussions on new developments that might impact policy proposal preparations. The frequency and depth of these interactions changed based on the nature and urgency of policy matters.
The budget of Prime Minister Morawiecki’s Chancellery grew immensely over the years. In 2021 – 2022, it increased from PLN 379.7 million to PLN 843.3 million, then doubled to PLN 1.54 billion. In 2024, it was planned to reach PLN 2 billion, which is 16 times more than the expenditures during the rule of the PO-PSL coalition in 2015 (Rzeczpospolita 2023).
Citations:
Rzeczpospolita. 2023. “U premiera Morawieckiego na bogato. Budżet jego kancelarii przebił sufit.” https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art39225341-u-premiera-morawieckiego-na-bogato-budzet-jego-kancelarii-przebil-sufit
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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7
6
7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
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3
4
3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
2
1
1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
The Chancellery of the prime minister plays a crucial role in orchestrating interministerial activities, managing the government’s work, coordinating actions among ministries and overseeing the implementation of government priorities. Joint government committees are established for interministerial coordination, bringing together representatives from various ministries.
Under the conservative administration, examples of these operating committees included the Interministerial Team for Developing Changes to the Comprehensive Support Program for Families “For Life” (2020); the Interministerial Team for Polonia and Poles Abroad Affairs (2021); the Interministerial Team for Reviewing Conditions for Investment Processes in the Republic of Poland (2021); and the team addressing threats arising from hazardous materials in Poland’s maritime areas (2022). The newly appointed liberal government initiated its first team tasked with restoring the rule of law and constitutional order on December 13, 2023.
Interministerial agreements have covered projects, reports and other critical documents, such as the “Eighth Government Report for the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC” and the “Fifth Two-Year Report for the Conference of the Parties.” Additionally, agreements included the establishment of the long-term program “Management of Water Resources in Poland.”
Ministries are empowered to submit interministerial interpellations and formal inquiries to seek specific information or actions from other ministries, facilitating the flow of information between them. Interministerial coordination often entails collaborative projects or programs, particularly in areas involving multiple ministries, such as economic development, education or health. Coordination has extended to events significant from a public diplomacy perspective, as demonstrated during the World Urban Forum in 2022. Moreover, joint actions are taken in response to current challenges, exemplified by the interministerial meeting on the situation in the grain market in August 2023.
Effective coordination has played a crucial role in managing European funds. For example, the European Funds for Modern Economy and the European Funds for Social Development (2021 – 2027) required agreements between various ministries and government agencies. Key entities involved included the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development, the Bank of National Economy, the Digital Poland Projects Center, the Center for European Projects and the Chancellery.
Similarly, implementing the European Funds for Digital Development 2021 – 2027 necessitated cooperation between the minister of funds and regional policy and representatives of the Chancellery and the Digital Poland Projects Center. This cooperation was formalized in a trilateral agreement concluded in February 2023.
Earlier strategically pivotal documents, such as the National Reform Program and the Strategy for Responsible Development, were also products of extensive interministerial coordination. Final decisions were reached during Council of Ministers meetings, during which ministers presented and deliberated on their positions.
Under the conservative administration, examples of these operating committees included the Interministerial Team for Developing Changes to the Comprehensive Support Program for Families “For Life” (2020); the Interministerial Team for Polonia and Poles Abroad Affairs (2021); the Interministerial Team for Reviewing Conditions for Investment Processes in the Republic of Poland (2021); and the team addressing threats arising from hazardous materials in Poland’s maritime areas (2022). The newly appointed liberal government initiated its first team tasked with restoring the rule of law and constitutional order on December 13, 2023.
Interministerial agreements have covered projects, reports and other critical documents, such as the “Eighth Government Report for the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC” and the “Fifth Two-Year Report for the Conference of the Parties.” Additionally, agreements included the establishment of the long-term program “Management of Water Resources in Poland.”
Ministries are empowered to submit interministerial interpellations and formal inquiries to seek specific information or actions from other ministries, facilitating the flow of information between them. Interministerial coordination often entails collaborative projects or programs, particularly in areas involving multiple ministries, such as economic development, education or health. Coordination has extended to events significant from a public diplomacy perspective, as demonstrated during the World Urban Forum in 2022. Moreover, joint actions are taken in response to current challenges, exemplified by the interministerial meeting on the situation in the grain market in August 2023.
Effective coordination has played a crucial role in managing European funds. For example, the European Funds for Modern Economy and the European Funds for Social Development (2021 – 2027) required agreements between various ministries and government agencies. Key entities involved included the Polish Agency for Enterprise Development, the Bank of National Economy, the Digital Poland Projects Center, the Center for European Projects and the Chancellery.
Similarly, implementing the European Funds for Digital Development 2021 – 2027 necessitated cooperation between the minister of funds and regional policy and representatives of the Chancellery and the Digital Poland Projects Center. This cooperation was formalized in a trilateral agreement concluded in February 2023.
Earlier strategically pivotal documents, such as the National Reform Program and the Strategy for Responsible Development, were also products of extensive interministerial coordination. Final decisions were reached during Council of Ministers meetings, during which ministers presented and deliberated on their positions.
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
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Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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7
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In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
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Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal communication, including influencing specific political decisions, was common within the United Right government. This practice arose because Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of PiS, chose not to assume the position of prime minister, preferring instead to influence policies unofficially. Formally, he served as the vice-chair of the Council of Ministers from 2020 to 2022 and 2023, as well as the chair of the Council of Ministers’ Committee on National Security and Defense from 2020 to 2022. Informal meetings between high-ranking government officials or party groups often took place at the PiS headquarters on Nowogrodzka Street. These meetings were organized before strategic decisions or to diffuse ongoing conflicts between Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro. The decisions made in Nowogrodzka undermined formal coordination efforts within the ministerial bureaucracy and other bodies.
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
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The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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7
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Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
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The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
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The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
The Polish model of decentralization, based on a three-tier territorial division comprising voivodeships (first level), counties (second level) and municipalities (third level), is among the most effective in Europe, as indicated by the very high score on the Local Autonomy Index. Tasks assigned to municipalities are diverse, and include spatial planning, real estate management, environmental and nature protection, water management, organization of municipal roads and traffic, water supply, telecommunications activities, local public transport, health protection, social assistance, municipal housing construction, public education, and culture.
Supervisory and oversight activities are mainly carried out by the voivode – the representative of the central bureaucracy in the regions – and, in financial matters, by the regional audit office (Regionalna Izba Obrachunkowa). If the oversight authority declares a resolution or order to be invalid, this suspends its execution by the municipal body. In the event of repeated violations of the constitution or laws, the Sejm may dissolve a municipal council.
Starting in 2015, the conservative government initiated a gradual process of centralization. Unlike Hungary, where changes have been more radical, this centralization was achieved through micro-level decisions in various areas. The government increased control over municipalities’ revenues and redistributed them using central grant programs according to a political framework.
By 2021, the government began to expand its competencies further. On June 8, 2023, the Sejm adopted a law that introduced additional municipal oversight criteria, including reliability, economy and efficiency, alongside the existing criterion of legal compliance. Although this legal amendment was not formally enacted, local authorities interpreted the change as an expansion of control rather than mere supervision, which is the chambers’ designated role.
Citations:
Lackowska, M., et al. 2023. “The Local Government Index 2023.” https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The.Local-Government.Index_.2023.pdf
Supervisory and oversight activities are mainly carried out by the voivode – the representative of the central bureaucracy in the regions – and, in financial matters, by the regional audit office (Regionalna Izba Obrachunkowa). If the oversight authority declares a resolution or order to be invalid, this suspends its execution by the municipal body. In the event of repeated violations of the constitution or laws, the Sejm may dissolve a municipal council.
Starting in 2015, the conservative government initiated a gradual process of centralization. Unlike Hungary, where changes have been more radical, this centralization was achieved through micro-level decisions in various areas. The government increased control over municipalities’ revenues and redistributed them using central grant programs according to a political framework.
By 2021, the government began to expand its competencies further. On June 8, 2023, the Sejm adopted a law that introduced additional municipal oversight criteria, including reliability, economy and efficiency, alongside the existing criterion of legal compliance. Although this legal amendment was not formally enacted, local authorities interpreted the change as an expansion of control rather than mere supervision, which is the chambers’ designated role.
Citations:
Lackowska, M., et al. 2023. “The Local Government Index 2023.” https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The.Local-Government.Index_.2023.pdf
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
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National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
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National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
2
1
1
There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Cooperation between central and subnational authorities have been characterized by grown tensions and asymmetry. Poland’s score on the Local Government Index (Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego 2023) dropped from 73.58 to 56.68 points between 2014 and 2021, primarily due to the diminishing political and institutional power of local entities. The Joint Commission of the Government and Local Government (Komisja Wspólna Rządu i Samorządu Terytorialnego or KWRiST) – a forum for developing common positions with 11 thematic commissions – was marginalized, with a fourfold increase in the number of laws prepared by the government that were not reviewed by this body.
The quality of the government’s oversight of local governments was unsatisfactory and politicized, particularly at the voivodeship level, as evidenced by a high rate of annulments of “supervisory acts” by administrative courts. General limitations on independent control of the constitutionality of legal provisions further complicated the situation. Moreover, due to the consequences of COVID-19, the war in Ukraine and very high inflation rates, the financial situation of many municipalities deteriorated, leaving many local budgets in very poor condition. Most municipal administrations continued to provide their basic services, but the quality of these services declined. In many cases, the distribution of financial and governmental support to local administrations depended on their political affiliations. Widespread dissatisfaction with national-local relations was observed, particularly within big cities (for example, on the part of the Association of Polish Cities – Związek Miast Polskich), most of which were governed by the opposition. In contrast, smaller administrations led by PiS supporters were highly supportive of the national government.
Citations:
Lackowska, M., et al. 2023. “The Local Government Index 2023.” https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The.Local-Government.Index _.2023.pdf
The quality of the government’s oversight of local governments was unsatisfactory and politicized, particularly at the voivodeship level, as evidenced by a high rate of annulments of “supervisory acts” by administrative courts. General limitations on independent control of the constitutionality of legal provisions further complicated the situation. Moreover, due to the consequences of COVID-19, the war in Ukraine and very high inflation rates, the financial situation of many municipalities deteriorated, leaving many local budgets in very poor condition. Most municipal administrations continued to provide their basic services, but the quality of these services declined. In many cases, the distribution of financial and governmental support to local administrations depended on their political affiliations. Widespread dissatisfaction with national-local relations was observed, particularly within big cities (for example, on the part of the Association of Polish Cities – Związek Miast Polskich), most of which were governed by the opposition. In contrast, smaller administrations led by PiS supporters were highly supportive of the national government.
Citations:
Lackowska, M., et al. 2023. “The Local Government Index 2023.” https://www.batory.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/The.Local-Government.Index _.2023.pdf