Diagonal Accountability
#29Key Findings
Poland falls into the bottom ranks (rank 29) in the area of diagonal accountability.
The PiS-led government strongly undermined media independence. A new media regulator cracked down on critical broadcasters, and the public media became propaganda platforms for the government. Abusive litigation and financial penalties were used as key strategies to weaken critical private media and encourage self-censorship among journalists.
Poles can freely join independent political and civic groups. However, civil dialogue in Poland deteriorated under the PiS, with pro-government organizations receiving favorable treatment. Major demonstrations in 2023 supporting opposition parties occurred with fewer arbitrary violations of citizens’ rights than in previous years.
Major union and employer groups participate in the Social Dialogue Council with the government. However, the PiS government paid little attention to proposals from the broader civil sector, with the exception of the Solidarność union, which was led by pro-government figures.
The PiS-led government strongly undermined media independence. A new media regulator cracked down on critical broadcasters, and the public media became propaganda platforms for the government. Abusive litigation and financial penalties were used as key strategies to weaken critical private media and encourage self-censorship among journalists.
Poles can freely join independent political and civic groups. However, civil dialogue in Poland deteriorated under the PiS, with pro-government organizations receiving favorable treatment. Major demonstrations in 2023 supporting opposition parties occurred with fewer arbitrary violations of citizens’ rights than in previous years.
Major union and employer groups participate in the Social Dialogue Council with the government. However, the PiS government paid little attention to proposals from the broader civil sector, with the exception of the Solidarność union, which was led by pro-government figures.
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Graph View
To what extent are the media free from government influence and able to act independently?
10
9
9
There are no disincentives, by law or in practice, for the media to criticize the government and public officials.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
2
1
1
Existing disincentives, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in criticizing the government and public officials.
Until 2015, Poland had a diverse and robust media market featuring strong public media, private broadcasters and foreign investments. The National Broadcasting Council (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji) oversaw the public media, ensuring compliance with laws and exerting indirect control over state-owned media. Despite rules against political affiliations or public activities by its members, the Council became politicized. Legal tools allowed interference with private media content, with political pressure most effectively applied through licensing processes and technical standards. Journalistic confidentiality was protected under the Press Law, with additional protections for whistleblowers and against wiretapping outlined in the criminal laws.
Following the PiS government’s victory, a new body, the National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych), was established. This council took over the authority to appoint and dismiss public media officials from the minister responsible for state treasury matters. In December 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that removing the National Broadcasting Council from these decisions was unconstitutional. Despite objections from Ombudsman for Civil Rights Adam Bodnar, the National Media Council continued to make key appointments at TVP (Telewizja Polska), often bypassing the constitutional body.
Both councils have faced criticism for bias in favor of the Law and Justice party, and Telewizja Polska and Polish Radio were transformed into propaganda platforms. The public media presented a one-sided, pro-government perspective, while attacking critics. Although private media encountered less direct censorship, they too experienced significant pressure. The National Broadcasting Council (NBC) misused its power, imposing arbitrary fines on critical broadcasters. The prevalence of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists, often funded by public money from ruling party politicians or state-owned entities, contributed to a hostile environment for independent journalism. These tactics and financial penalties were used to weaken critical media and encourage self-censorship.
The NBC also created business uncertainty by delaying licenses for private broadcasters like TVN and Radio Tok FM, and by excluding them from state advertising revenue programs. Print media, which has been transitioning to digital formats, faced financial strain, while the local press contended with financial, distribution and legal challenges. Consequently, Poland fell to its lowest-ever rank in the World Press Freedom Index, placing 66th in 2022 and 57th in 2023 (according to Reporters Without Borders). Upon taking office in December 2023, the newly elected government led by Donald Tusk immediately began implementing pluralistic reforms in the public media sector.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
see: Bachmann, K. 2024. Die Geisterfahrer. Polen und acht Jahre PiS. Berlin: Fototapete.
Following the PiS government’s victory, a new body, the National Media Council (Rada Mediów Narodowych), was established. This council took over the authority to appoint and dismiss public media officials from the minister responsible for state treasury matters. In December 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that removing the National Broadcasting Council from these decisions was unconstitutional. Despite objections from Ombudsman for Civil Rights Adam Bodnar, the National Media Council continued to make key appointments at TVP (Telewizja Polska), often bypassing the constitutional body.
Both councils have faced criticism for bias in favor of the Law and Justice party, and Telewizja Polska and Polish Radio were transformed into propaganda platforms. The public media presented a one-sided, pro-government perspective, while attacking critics. Although private media encountered less direct censorship, they too experienced significant pressure. The National Broadcasting Council (NBC) misused its power, imposing arbitrary fines on critical broadcasters. The prevalence of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists, often funded by public money from ruling party politicians or state-owned entities, contributed to a hostile environment for independent journalism. These tactics and financial penalties were used to weaken critical media and encourage self-censorship.
The NBC also created business uncertainty by delaying licenses for private broadcasters like TVN and Radio Tok FM, and by excluding them from state advertising revenue programs. Print media, which has been transitioning to digital formats, faced financial strain, while the local press contended with financial, distribution and legal challenges. Consequently, Poland fell to its lowest-ever rank in the World Press Freedom Index, placing 66th in 2022 and 57th in 2023 (according to Reporters Without Borders). Upon taking office in December 2023, the newly elected government led by Donald Tusk immediately began implementing pluralistic reforms in the public media sector.
Citations:
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
see: Bachmann, K. 2024. Die Geisterfahrer. Polen und acht Jahre PiS. Berlin: Fototapete.
To what extent is a plurality of opinions in the media ensured?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to a pluralistic media landscape that represents all existing political perspectives in society.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the media in representing all relevant political perspectives in society.
Media plurality in Poland is legally protected under the Press Law and other regulations. However, the Media Pluralism Report rates Poland’s media plurality at just 50%, a lower figure than in other Central and East European countries except for Hungary (Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom 2023). This low ranking is partly due to a media landscape divided between public and private broadcasters – both domestically and foreign-owned – with strong political polarization between the government and opposition influencing the most significant players.
Foreign investors such as the U.S.-based Discovery (owner of TVN), the Swiss-German Ringier/Axel Springer and the German Bauer have a notable presence, a fact that drew criticism from the governing PiS party as it advocated for the “repolonization” of Polish media. An early but unsuccessful attempt in this area was the 2021 “Lex TVN” law, which aimed to prevent owners outside the European Economic Area from holding more than 50% of a broadcaster’s shares. Further efforts included nationalizing and centralizing media assets by state-controlled entities like PKN Orlen, which acquired the largest regional media company, Polska Press, from the German Passauer Neue and the major press distributor RUCH. This consolidation led to national control over 90% of regional media and the replacement of independent editors-in-chief.
The use of abusive litigation and financial penalties has been a key strategy to weaken critical media and encourage self-censorship. The business environment has been destabilized by delays in granting licenses to private broadcasters like TVN and Radio Tok FM, and private media have been excluded from state advertising revenue programs. Print media, already struggling to transition to digital formats, faced significant financial strain.
Local media in particular faced financial and distribution challenges and legal threats. Despite this, the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKIK) did not intervene in the significant consolidation of the local newspaper market.
However, UOKIK did block Agora’s (owner of Gazeta Wyborcza) acquisition of Radio Eurozet in 2021, citing concerns about the creation of a harmful duopoly in the radio market. In 2023, Agora successfully appealed this decision, challenging the lack of a legal definition of “duopoly” (Media Freedom Rapid Response 2023).
Currently, no public authority is empowered to assess market concentration in the press sector regarding media pluralism, a fact that has raised concerns from the Commissioner for Human Rights.
Citations:
Media Freedom Rapid Response. 2023. “Media Freedom at a Crossroads: Journalism in Poland Faces Uncertain Future Ahead of Election.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/media-freedom-at-a-crossroads-journalism-in-poland-faces-uncertain-future-ahead-of-election
Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. 2023. “Media Pluralism Report 2023.” https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor-2023/
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
Foreign investors such as the U.S.-based Discovery (owner of TVN), the Swiss-German Ringier/Axel Springer and the German Bauer have a notable presence, a fact that drew criticism from the governing PiS party as it advocated for the “repolonization” of Polish media. An early but unsuccessful attempt in this area was the 2021 “Lex TVN” law, which aimed to prevent owners outside the European Economic Area from holding more than 50% of a broadcaster’s shares. Further efforts included nationalizing and centralizing media assets by state-controlled entities like PKN Orlen, which acquired the largest regional media company, Polska Press, from the German Passauer Neue and the major press distributor RUCH. This consolidation led to national control over 90% of regional media and the replacement of independent editors-in-chief.
The use of abusive litigation and financial penalties has been a key strategy to weaken critical media and encourage self-censorship. The business environment has been destabilized by delays in granting licenses to private broadcasters like TVN and Radio Tok FM, and private media have been excluded from state advertising revenue programs. Print media, already struggling to transition to digital formats, faced significant financial strain.
Local media in particular faced financial and distribution challenges and legal threats. Despite this, the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKIK) did not intervene in the significant consolidation of the local newspaper market.
However, UOKIK did block Agora’s (owner of Gazeta Wyborcza) acquisition of Radio Eurozet in 2021, citing concerns about the creation of a harmful duopoly in the radio market. In 2023, Agora successfully appealed this decision, challenging the lack of a legal definition of “duopoly” (Media Freedom Rapid Response 2023).
Currently, no public authority is empowered to assess market concentration in the press sector regarding media pluralism, a fact that has raised concerns from the Commissioner for Human Rights.
Citations:
Media Freedom Rapid Response. 2023. “Media Freedom at a Crossroads: Journalism in Poland Faces Uncertain Future Ahead of Election.” https://www.ecpmf.eu/media-freedom-at-a-crossroads-journalism-in-poland-faces-uncertain-future-ahead-of-election
Center for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom. 2023. “Media Pluralism Report 2023.” https://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor-2023/
Reporters without Borders. 2023. “Index 2023.” https://rsf.org/en/index
Graph View
To what extent are citizens able to freely form or join independent political and civic groups, openly raise and discuss political issues, and assemble without restrictions?
10
9
9
There are no barriers, by law or in practice to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
8
7
6
7
6
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose very few or no significant obstacles to creating an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
5
4
3
4
3
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
2
1
1
Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to the creation of an engaged society and civil society organizations that are free to operate.
Poles can freely join independent groups, both political and civic, as guaranteed by the national constitution and national and international legislation. Article 31 of the Polish constitution stipulates that any limitations on rights and liberties can only be imposed by law and only if necessary to ensure security, public order, environmental protection, health, public morality, or the freedom and rights of others. Additionally, the “Public Benefit Activity and Volunteerism” law outlines criteria and principles for supporting civil society organizations (CSOs). Polish law also provides an additional benefit for members of associations or trade unions – the ability to deduct and offset membership fees from income. Taxpayers can voluntarily donate 1.5% of their personal income tax to a chosen public benefit organization. Since October 15, 2017, the National Freedom Institute – Center for Civil Society Development has been the main governmental platform for non-governmental organizations (National Freedom Institute, 2023).
Throughout 2022 – 2023, no public assemblies were prohibited, except in the region near the Belarusian border, where the government imposed a state of emergency due to the migration crisis. This state of emergency, which concluded on June 1, 2022, restricted access for humanitarian NGOs, activists, and journalists.
During this period, civil dialogue in Poland deteriorated, and financial treatment favored conservative, pro-government organizations. Arbitrary arrests, detentions, and imprisonments of peaceful demonstrators were less frequent compared to 2020 – 2021, a time when massive protests against tightening abortion laws and changes in the judiciary system brought many Poles to the streets. In June and October 2023, two major demonstrations in support of opposition parties were organized in Warsaw, gathering hundreds of thousands of Poles from across the country. No incidents of violations of citizens’ rights were reported during these demonstrations.
Despite the absence of prohibitions on public assemblies, the government’s state of emergency near the Belarusian border, which ended on June 1, 2022, hindered access for humanitarian NGOs, activists and journalists. Incidents of unlawful behavior by the police, such as the use of excessive force, were not investigated, leading to accusations of politicization within the top police leadership.
Citations:
Le Monde. 2023. “Polish opposition rally draws ‘a million’ protesters to Warsaw.” 1.10.2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/europe/article/2023/10/01/polish-opposition-rally-draws-a-million-protesters-to-warsaw_6142279_143.html
National Freedom Institute (2023): https://niw.gov.pl/en/about-nfi/history/
Throughout 2022 – 2023, no public assemblies were prohibited, except in the region near the Belarusian border, where the government imposed a state of emergency due to the migration crisis. This state of emergency, which concluded on June 1, 2022, restricted access for humanitarian NGOs, activists, and journalists.
During this period, civil dialogue in Poland deteriorated, and financial treatment favored conservative, pro-government organizations. Arbitrary arrests, detentions, and imprisonments of peaceful demonstrators were less frequent compared to 2020 – 2021, a time when massive protests against tightening abortion laws and changes in the judiciary system brought many Poles to the streets. In June and October 2023, two major demonstrations in support of opposition parties were organized in Warsaw, gathering hundreds of thousands of Poles from across the country. No incidents of violations of citizens’ rights were reported during these demonstrations.
Despite the absence of prohibitions on public assemblies, the government’s state of emergency near the Belarusian border, which ended on June 1, 2022, hindered access for humanitarian NGOs, activists and journalists. Incidents of unlawful behavior by the police, such as the use of excessive force, were not investigated, leading to accusations of politicization within the top police leadership.
Citations:
Le Monde. 2023. “Polish opposition rally draws ‘a million’ protesters to Warsaw.” 1.10.2023. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/europe/article/2023/10/01/polish-opposition-rally-draws-a-million-protesters-to-warsaw_6142279_143.html
National Freedom Institute (2023): https://niw.gov.pl/en/about-nfi/history/
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
In Poland, trade unions play a pivotal role in the relationship between capital and labor, a distinction enshrined in the constitution, which guarantees the freedom to form and operate trade unions. The three major umbrella organizations are Niezależny Samorządny Związek Zawodowy “Solidarność” (NSZZ “Solidarność”), Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych (OPZZ) and Forum Związków Zawodowych (FZZ). These unions participate in the Social Dialogue Council with employer representatives and the government.
Beyond these primary organizations, there are roughly 300 federations, 273 national trade unions and approximately 24,000 local trade union entities. Around 7,000 workplace-based unions operate independently at the regional level, separate from the larger umbrella groups. Farmers’ trade unions in Poland hold a distinct legal status. Major trade union organizations often utilize specialists or foundations, particularly in employers’ associations, but rarely establish independent think tank institutions.
As of 2022, the country had 1.4 million members across 11,656 trade unions and 353 active employers’ organizations with 21,600 members. The education sector employed the highest percentage of trade union members at 19.3%, while health and social care dominated the membership of employers’ organizations at 16.6%. Most trade unions included plant, sub-plant and branch-level organizations (76.4%), followed by intercompany unions (20.8%). Additionally, there were federations, confederations, regional or sectoral structures, and 310 so-called unified trade unions (2.7%). From 2014 to 2022, trade union membership declined by 9.6%, whereas employers’ organizations saw a 28.8% increase in membership (GUS 2023).
Furthermore, organizations and professional self-governments representing specific sectors, such as the judges’ association Iustitia and the Supreme Medical Chamber, have gained prominence by opposing government policies. Generally, the PiS government paid little attention to proposals from the broader civil sector, with notable exceptions made for Solidarność, which was led by pro-government figures.
Citations:
GUS. 2023. “Partnerzy dialogu społecznego – organizacje pracodawców i związki zawodowe w 2022 r.” https://stat.gov.pl/download/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5490/16/2/1/partnerzy_dialogu_spolecznego_-_organizacje_pracodawcow_i_zwiazki_zawodowe_w_2022_r.pdf
Beyond these primary organizations, there are roughly 300 federations, 273 national trade unions and approximately 24,000 local trade union entities. Around 7,000 workplace-based unions operate independently at the regional level, separate from the larger umbrella groups. Farmers’ trade unions in Poland hold a distinct legal status. Major trade union organizations often utilize specialists or foundations, particularly in employers’ associations, but rarely establish independent think tank institutions.
As of 2022, the country had 1.4 million members across 11,656 trade unions and 353 active employers’ organizations with 21,600 members. The education sector employed the highest percentage of trade union members at 19.3%, while health and social care dominated the membership of employers’ organizations at 16.6%. Most trade unions included plant, sub-plant and branch-level organizations (76.4%), followed by intercompany unions (20.8%). Additionally, there were federations, confederations, regional or sectoral structures, and 310 so-called unified trade unions (2.7%). From 2014 to 2022, trade union membership declined by 9.6%, whereas employers’ organizations saw a 28.8% increase in membership (GUS 2023).
Furthermore, organizations and professional self-governments representing specific sectors, such as the judges’ association Iustitia and the Supreme Medical Chamber, have gained prominence by opposing government policies. Generally, the PiS government paid little attention to proposals from the broader civil sector, with notable exceptions made for Solidarność, which was led by pro-government figures.
Citations:
GUS. 2023. “Partnerzy dialogu społecznego – organizacje pracodawców i związki zawodowe w 2022 r.” https://stat.gov.pl/download/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5490/16/2/1/partnerzy_dialogu_spolecznego_-_organizacje_pracodawcow_i_zwiazki_zawodowe_w_2022_r.pdf
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
Poland has a wide array of organizations based on common interests, such as patient groups, parent associations and youth organizations. These groups can form federations and platforms, such as the portal ngo.pl. They enjoy the same legal protections as other collective activities, including benefits such as the ability to offset membership fees from income. Many large organizations, such as the Batory Foundation and Klon/Javor, have research units staffed by policy experts.
The number of registered organizations grew more than threefold from 2002 to 2021, reaching 138,000. However, the proportion of actively operating organizations is decreasing. The main areas of activity – sports, education and culture – constitute about two-thirds of the social sector in Poland. While the industry primarily provides services and information, fewer organizations are now engaged in advocacy and public mobilization activities such as representing member interests or educating the public. From 2004 to 2021, the average number of members and volunteers per organization declined from 42 to 25 and from 10 to five, respectively. This trend is partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic and a broader shift toward more grassroots-based social engagement, often outside traditional NGO structures (Klon, 2023).
Grants and subsidies from local authorities, public administration and private sources have been the strongest funding sources for NGOs, typically awarded through competitive processes. The ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party has often used public funds to support pro-government organizations. The government’s engagement with civil society organizations in decision-making processes has been limited. For example, there was a notable lack of dialogue with teachers, parents and NGOs during efforts to centralize and increase supervision over the education system.
Citations:
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. 2023. “Statement by civil society organisations after the 2023 parliamentary elections.” https://hfhr.pl/en/news/statement-by-civil-society-organisations-after-the-2023-parliamentary-elections
Klon/Javor. 2023. “Kondycja organizacji pozarządowych. Trendy 2002-2022.” https://www.klon.org.pl/#section1
The number of registered organizations grew more than threefold from 2002 to 2021, reaching 138,000. However, the proportion of actively operating organizations is decreasing. The main areas of activity – sports, education and culture – constitute about two-thirds of the social sector in Poland. While the industry primarily provides services and information, fewer organizations are now engaged in advocacy and public mobilization activities such as representing member interests or educating the public. From 2004 to 2021, the average number of members and volunteers per organization declined from 42 to 25 and from 10 to five, respectively. This trend is partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic and a broader shift toward more grassroots-based social engagement, often outside traditional NGO structures (Klon, 2023).
Grants and subsidies from local authorities, public administration and private sources have been the strongest funding sources for NGOs, typically awarded through competitive processes. The ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party has often used public funds to support pro-government organizations. The government’s engagement with civil society organizations in decision-making processes has been limited. For example, there was a notable lack of dialogue with teachers, parents and NGOs during efforts to centralize and increase supervision over the education system.
Citations:
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. 2023. “Statement by civil society organisations after the 2023 parliamentary elections.” https://hfhr.pl/en/news/statement-by-civil-society-organisations-after-the-2023-parliamentary-elections
Klon/Javor. 2023. “Kondycja organizacji pozarządowych. Trendy 2002-2022.” https://www.klon.org.pl/#section1
To what extent do civil society organizations (CSOs) have the capacity to actively participate in the co-creation of relevant policies?
10
9
9
All the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
5
4
3
4
3
Few of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
2
1
1
None of the major CSOs active in the field have the capacity to shape public policies.
The Polish environmental movement comprises various organizations, including associations, foundations, ecological clubs, civil coalitions and naturalist societies. Many of these organizations are designated as public benefit organizations. The landscape includes national branches of international groups, such as Greenpeace Polska and WWF Polska, alongside numerous national entities. As of 2022, environmental organizations accounted for 13% of all civil society organizations, a proportion that has remained stable since 2002 (Klon, 2023). While the Green Party’s political influence remains marginal, grassroots green activism – often localized – has gained increasing traction in recent years.
Environmental CSOs can access public funding, and membership dues are tax-deductible. From 2022 – 2025, the main funding initiative for the sector was the Regional Support Program for Environmental Education, sponsored by the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management. However, many organizations have had to seek alternative financing sources, including public donations and external grants.
Major environmental organizations have established analytical units, though permanent think tanks are rare, with the Institute for Sustainable Development being an exception. These units often include policy experts and collaborate with academic institutions. Common activities include producing reports, drafting position papers, issuing open letters and providing commentary on legal acts. These organizations also collaborate within larger networks like the Polish Green Network (Polska Zielona Sieć), the Federation of Greens Association “GAJA” (Związek Stowarzyszeń Federacja Zielonych “GAJA”) and the Climate Coalition (Koalicja Klimatyczna).
Despite their efforts, the input from these CSOs is often overlooked in major policy initiatives.
Citations:
Klon/Javor. 2023. “Kondycja organizacji pozarządowych. Trendy 2002-2022.” https://www.klon.org.pl/#section1
The Institute for Sustainable Development. 2023. https://www.pine.org.pl/english/
https://civic-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Civic-Space-Report-2023-POLAND-European-Civic-Forum.pdf
Environmental CSOs can access public funding, and membership dues are tax-deductible. From 2022 – 2025, the main funding initiative for the sector was the Regional Support Program for Environmental Education, sponsored by the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management. However, many organizations have had to seek alternative financing sources, including public donations and external grants.
Major environmental organizations have established analytical units, though permanent think tanks are rare, with the Institute for Sustainable Development being an exception. These units often include policy experts and collaborate with academic institutions. Common activities include producing reports, drafting position papers, issuing open letters and providing commentary on legal acts. These organizations also collaborate within larger networks like the Polish Green Network (Polska Zielona Sieć), the Federation of Greens Association “GAJA” (Związek Stowarzyszeń Federacja Zielonych “GAJA”) and the Climate Coalition (Koalicja Klimatyczna).
Despite their efforts, the input from these CSOs is often overlooked in major policy initiatives.
Citations:
Klon/Javor. 2023. “Kondycja organizacji pozarządowych. Trendy 2002-2022.” https://www.klon.org.pl/#section1
The Institute for Sustainable Development. 2023. https://www.pine.org.pl/english/
https://civic-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Civic-Space-Report-2023-POLAND-European-Civic-Forum.pdf