Horizontal Accountability
#29Key Findings
In the category of vertical accountability, Poland falls into the sample’s bottom ranks (rank 29).
The Supreme Audit Office oversees a broad range of government entities. The Personal Data Protection Office has been headed by a PiS ally whose term was not renewed by the Senate, as the office did not fulfill key functions under his leadership.
The country has undergone a rule-of-law crisis for numerous years. PiS legal reforms strongly undermined the independence of the judiciary. The EU imposed sanctions, demanding compliance with judicial independence rules. In late 2023, the new justice minister blocked many newly appointed judges from adjudicating, signaling compliance with EU rulings.
Civil rights faced setbacks under the PiS government, with LGBTQ+ activists and community members facing significant discrimination. Sexual and reproductive rights have been curtailed. The PiS politicized the judiciary and administration and shifted considerable spending outside the official budget. Anticorruption policy was deemed to be chaotic and poorly coordinated.
The Supreme Audit Office oversees a broad range of government entities. The Personal Data Protection Office has been headed by a PiS ally whose term was not renewed by the Senate, as the office did not fulfill key functions under his leadership.
The country has undergone a rule-of-law crisis for numerous years. PiS legal reforms strongly undermined the independence of the judiciary. The EU imposed sanctions, demanding compliance with judicial independence rules. In late 2023, the new justice minister blocked many newly appointed judges from adjudicating, signaling compliance with EU rulings.
Civil rights faced setbacks under the PiS government, with LGBTQ+ activists and community members facing significant discrimination. Sexual and reproductive rights have been curtailed. The PiS politicized the judiciary and administration and shifted considerable spending outside the official budget. Anticorruption policy was deemed to be chaotic and poorly coordinated.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
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There exists an effective and independent audit office.
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There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
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There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
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There is no independent and effective audit office.
The Supreme Audit Office (Naczelna Izba Kontroli, NIK) serves as Poland’s highest audit authority, operating under the principles of collegiality and accountable to the Sejm (parliament). It oversees various entities, including government administration bodies, the National Bank of Poland, state legal entities and other state organizational units. Furthermore, the NIK is empowered to audit the activities of local government bodies, legal entities of local self-government and other organizational units of local self-government. It broadens its examination to different entities and economic entities (entrepreneurs) to the extent that they use state or municipal assets or funds and fulfill financial obligations to the state. The budget implementation is also within the purview of the NIK’s audit responsibilities. The office can obtain all necessary information and question officials and staff during its audits.
The president of the Supreme Audit Office is appointed by the Sejm upon the request of the marshal of the Sejm or a group of at least 35 deputies, requiring an absolute majority vote with Senate consent. The dismissal of the president is subject to stringent conditions, including a Tribunal of State verdict or severe illness, making the termination of a six-year term challenging. The approval of the budget law by the Polish Sejm concurrently approves the NIK’s financial plan.
The NIK has a central bureau in Warsaw and 16 local branches, with the president wielding powers akin to the minister responsible for budget matters. The release of the NIK’s findings to the media is contingent on the nature and significance of the matter. Depending on the situation, the NIK may opt to make its findings public through interviews with journalists, press conferences, or statements and information published on its website.
Marian Banaś has been the head of Poland’s Supreme Audit Office since 2019. Initially associated with the Law and Justice administration, Banaś became a leading opponent following a Central Anti-Corruption Bureau investigation into alleged links to a criminal group. In 2023, before the parliamentary elections, Banaś threw his support behind the far-right party Konfederacja, citing its advocacy for the independence of the NIK (Notes from Poland 2023).
Citations:
Notes from Poland. 2023. “Head of Polish State Audit Office Holds Press Conference with Far-Right Leader.” https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/07/27/head-of-polish-state-audit-office-holds-press-conference-with-far-right-leader/
The president of the Supreme Audit Office is appointed by the Sejm upon the request of the marshal of the Sejm or a group of at least 35 deputies, requiring an absolute majority vote with Senate consent. The dismissal of the president is subject to stringent conditions, including a Tribunal of State verdict or severe illness, making the termination of a six-year term challenging. The approval of the budget law by the Polish Sejm concurrently approves the NIK’s financial plan.
The NIK has a central bureau in Warsaw and 16 local branches, with the president wielding powers akin to the minister responsible for budget matters. The release of the NIK’s findings to the media is contingent on the nature and significance of the matter. Depending on the situation, the NIK may opt to make its findings public through interviews with journalists, press conferences, or statements and information published on its website.
Marian Banaś has been the head of Poland’s Supreme Audit Office since 2019. Initially associated with the Law and Justice administration, Banaś became a leading opponent following a Central Anti-Corruption Bureau investigation into alleged links to a criminal group. In 2023, before the parliamentary elections, Banaś threw his support behind the far-right party Konfederacja, citing its advocacy for the independence of the NIK (Notes from Poland 2023).
Citations:
Notes from Poland. 2023. “Head of Polish State Audit Office Holds Press Conference with Far-Right Leader.” https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/07/27/head-of-polish-state-audit-office-holds-press-conference-with-far-right-leader/
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
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An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
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A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
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1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
Data protection in Poland is governed by the EU General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) and the Act of May 10, 2018 on the Protection of Personal Data. The same act also established a new data protection authority, the Personal Data Protection Office (Urząd Ochrony Danych Osobowych, UODO). The powers of the UODO include the ability to conduct compliance audits, issue administrative decisions, disclose decisions in the public interest, request disciplinary or legal proceedings against violators, and mandate the timely notification of the outcomes of implemented actions.
The Personal Data Protection Office may: require data controllers and processors or their representatives to provide information deemed necessary; gain access to the premises of data controllers and processors, as well as to equipment and tools used for processing personal data; and obtain from data controllers or processors access to all personal data and any information necessary for the performance of the authority’s tasks.
The follow-up by the executive branch on the actions of the UODO has been limited, as most of the legislation in this area is governed by EU laws. However, the UODO cooperates closely with other public institutions, such as the Chief Pharmaceutical Inspectorate, the Environmental Protection Inspectorate, the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, the National Council of Legal Advisers, and the Office of Electronic Communications.
Although the European Court of Justice mandates that the head of the national data protection authority should be independent and impartial, in Poland, the appointment and removal of the president rest with the political majority in both chambers of the parliament. As a result, in 2019, Jan Nowak, a former member of the Law and Justice party, was elected to serve a four-year term. Due to his visible political engagement, the Polish upper chamber – the Senate, dominated by the opposition – refused in May 2023 to approve his second term in office. The president had failed to discuss and influence legislation on urgent issues like tracking technologies, international data transfers and artificial intelligence. He had also failed to engage in educational campaigns directed toward all citizens.
Citations:
Data Guidance. 2023. “Poland – Data Protection Overview.” https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/poland-data-protection-overview
The Personal Data Protection Office may: require data controllers and processors or their representatives to provide information deemed necessary; gain access to the premises of data controllers and processors, as well as to equipment and tools used for processing personal data; and obtain from data controllers or processors access to all personal data and any information necessary for the performance of the authority’s tasks.
The follow-up by the executive branch on the actions of the UODO has been limited, as most of the legislation in this area is governed by EU laws. However, the UODO cooperates closely with other public institutions, such as the Chief Pharmaceutical Inspectorate, the Environmental Protection Inspectorate, the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection, the National Council of Legal Advisers, and the Office of Electronic Communications.
Although the European Court of Justice mandates that the head of the national data protection authority should be independent and impartial, in Poland, the appointment and removal of the president rest with the political majority in both chambers of the parliament. As a result, in 2019, Jan Nowak, a former member of the Law and Justice party, was elected to serve a four-year term. Due to his visible political engagement, the Polish upper chamber – the Senate, dominated by the opposition – refused in May 2023 to approve his second term in office. The president had failed to discuss and influence legislation on urgent issues like tracking technologies, international data transfers and artificial intelligence. He had also failed to engage in educational campaigns directed toward all citizens.
Citations:
Data Guidance. 2023. “Poland – Data Protection Overview.” https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/poland-data-protection-overview
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
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3
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
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The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
Since 2015, Poland has faced a rule of law crisis marked by significant institutional changes, sparking domestic and international concerns. Critics argue that these changes, particularly the legal reforms impacting the judiciary, undermine judicial independence – a cornerstone of the rule of law. The government’s actions, including the restructuring of the Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, TK) and the National Council of the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa, KRS), as well as the appointment of judges deemed illegitimate, have been criticized for eroding checks and balances.
In November 2022, the Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) ruled that the Constitutional Tribunal could no longer adjudicate lawfully due to improperly appointed judges. By 2023, the Tribunal faced a deadlock due to interparty conflict within the United Right. The new KRS, chosen by politicians, continued to appoint judges despite Polish and European court rulings deeming it to be illegitimate. The European Court acknowledged legal challenges to government decisions, such as those involving Judge Igor Tuleya and Lech Wałęsa (Ptak 2023).
The European Union has expressed concern over Poland’s rule-of-law situation, initiating infringement proceedings and applying sanctions under Article 7. The EU withheld COVID-19 recovery funds, demanding compliance with judicial independence and green transformation milestones.
Beginning on October 27, 2021, Poland began accruing fines of €1,000,000 daily, which was later reduced to €500,000 on April 21, 2023, following minor legal adjustments. In June 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union ordered the suspension of the new disciplinary chamber for judges, finding it lacked independence and impartiality. This ruling ended the imposition of fines, which had accumulated to a sum of €556 million (PLN 2.5 billion) (Zalan 2023).
On December 21, 2023, the Court of Justice also declared that the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court was neither independent nor impartial.
In mid-December 2023, new Justice Minister Adam Bodnar (ombudsman for human rights from 2015 to 2021) pledged to reverse all rule-of-law violations. His first action was to bar judges appointed by the constitutionally challenged KRS from adjudicating, signaling compliance with EU rulings.
Citations:
Ptak, A. 2023. “Serious concerns persist” over rule of law in Poland, says EU.” https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/07/05/serious-concerns-persist-over-rule-of-law-in-poland-says-eu.
Zalan, E. 2023. “Top EU Court Rules Poland’s Court Reforms ‘Infringe Law’.” June 5. https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/157105
Pech, Laurent. 2022. “Covering up and Rewarding the Destruction of the Rule of Law One Milestone at a Time.” https://verfassungsblog.de/covering-up-and-rewarding-the-destruction-ofthe-rule-of-law-one-milestone-at-a-time/
Sadurski, Wojciech. 2019. Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sołtys, Agnieszka. 2023. “The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Case Law of the Polish Constitutional Court: The Current Breakdown in View of Polish Constitutional Jurisprudence Pre-2016.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 15: 19–49.
In November 2022, the Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) ruled that the Constitutional Tribunal could no longer adjudicate lawfully due to improperly appointed judges. By 2023, the Tribunal faced a deadlock due to interparty conflict within the United Right. The new KRS, chosen by politicians, continued to appoint judges despite Polish and European court rulings deeming it to be illegitimate. The European Court acknowledged legal challenges to government decisions, such as those involving Judge Igor Tuleya and Lech Wałęsa (Ptak 2023).
The European Union has expressed concern over Poland’s rule-of-law situation, initiating infringement proceedings and applying sanctions under Article 7. The EU withheld COVID-19 recovery funds, demanding compliance with judicial independence and green transformation milestones.
Beginning on October 27, 2021, Poland began accruing fines of €1,000,000 daily, which was later reduced to €500,000 on April 21, 2023, following minor legal adjustments. In June 2023, the Court of Justice of the European Union ordered the suspension of the new disciplinary chamber for judges, finding it lacked independence and impartiality. This ruling ended the imposition of fines, which had accumulated to a sum of €556 million (PLN 2.5 billion) (Zalan 2023).
On December 21, 2023, the Court of Justice also declared that the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court was neither independent nor impartial.
In mid-December 2023, new Justice Minister Adam Bodnar (ombudsman for human rights from 2015 to 2021) pledged to reverse all rule-of-law violations. His first action was to bar judges appointed by the constitutionally challenged KRS from adjudicating, signaling compliance with EU rulings.
Citations:
Ptak, A. 2023. “Serious concerns persist” over rule of law in Poland, says EU.” https://notesfrompoland.com/2023/07/05/serious-concerns-persist-over-rule-of-law-in-poland-says-eu.
Zalan, E. 2023. “Top EU Court Rules Poland’s Court Reforms ‘Infringe Law’.” June 5. https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/157105
Pech, Laurent. 2022. “Covering up and Rewarding the Destruction of the Rule of Law One Milestone at a Time.” https://verfassungsblog.de/covering-up-and-rewarding-the-destruction-ofthe-rule-of-law-one-milestone-at-a-time/
Sadurski, Wojciech. 2019. Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sołtys, Agnieszka. 2023. “The Court of Justice of the European Union in the Case Law of the Polish Constitutional Court: The Current Breakdown in View of Polish Constitutional Jurisprudence Pre-2016.” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 15: 19–49.
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
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There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
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1
There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
Poland’s national legal and constitutional system formally guarantees the protection of civil rights in connection with health, social status and political opinions. However, this stands in stark contrast to many state policies. In 2022, the UN advocated for Poland to introduce 200 amendments concerning civil rights. Although Polish law bans employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, in 2023 the rights organization ILGA-Europe certified Poland as having the worst record on LGBTQ+ rights in the EU for the fourth time since 2020 (Camut 2023). Civil and criminal proceedings targeted LGBTQ+ rights defenders, and activists, including those responsible for the Hate Atlas map, faced SLAPPs. Additionally, there were instances of local homophobic actions such as “LGBT-free zones” being declared by authorities or the “homobuses.”
Also, sexual and reproductive rights in Poland faced restrictions following the Constitutional Tribunal ruling in January 2021 and subsequent UN calls for decriminalization of abortion in April 2022. The death of a woman who was denied an abortion led to protests. The European Court of Human Rights sought Poland’s response to five cases of abortion denial. Despite the government reporting only 32 abortions in 2021, Abortion Without Borders supported 44,000 women that year, including 1,515 from Ukraine. In 2022, the number of registered abortions grew to 161, but the actual number was likely higher. Some human rights defenders, doctors providing help for women, and even women using the day-after pill faced harassment and legal charges.
Judicial reforms have faced scrutiny, leading to the suspension of judges and disciplinary proceedings. International concerns persisted over attacks on judicial independence, causing the suspension of the Polish Recovery and Resilience Plan from the EU. In October 2022, the ECHR ruled that Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn’s suspension violated his fair trial and privacy rights. Additionally, individual rights have been violated by the misuse of the Pegasus spyware system against lawyers, judges and politicians who criticize the ruling party. Calls from the European Parliament in January 2023 for the Polish prosecutor’s office to initiate investigations and clarify the law have gone unheard.
Concerns have risen about the treatment of refugees. On the one hand, Poland opened its borders to Ukrainians, included them in social and educational systems, and granted them full rights in the labor market. On the other hand, attitudes toward refugees from Asia and the Middle East coming from Belarus since July 2021 have been characterized by hostility from authorities.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Poland 2022.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/poland/report-poland
Camut, N. 2023. “Poland Still Worst Country to Be Gay in the EU: Report.” June 5. https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/157105
Also, sexual and reproductive rights in Poland faced restrictions following the Constitutional Tribunal ruling in January 2021 and subsequent UN calls for decriminalization of abortion in April 2022. The death of a woman who was denied an abortion led to protests. The European Court of Human Rights sought Poland’s response to five cases of abortion denial. Despite the government reporting only 32 abortions in 2021, Abortion Without Borders supported 44,000 women that year, including 1,515 from Ukraine. In 2022, the number of registered abortions grew to 161, but the actual number was likely higher. Some human rights defenders, doctors providing help for women, and even women using the day-after pill faced harassment and legal charges.
Judicial reforms have faced scrutiny, leading to the suspension of judges and disciplinary proceedings. International concerns persisted over attacks on judicial independence, causing the suspension of the Polish Recovery and Resilience Plan from the EU. In October 2022, the ECHR ruled that Judge Paweł Juszczyszyn’s suspension violated his fair trial and privacy rights. Additionally, individual rights have been violated by the misuse of the Pegasus spyware system against lawyers, judges and politicians who criticize the ruling party. Calls from the European Parliament in January 2023 for the Polish prosecutor’s office to initiate investigations and clarify the law have gone unheard.
Concerns have risen about the treatment of refugees. On the one hand, Poland opened its borders to Ukrainians, included them in social and educational systems, and granted them full rights in the labor market. On the other hand, attitudes toward refugees from Asia and the Middle East coming from Belarus since July 2021 have been characterized by hostility from authorities.
Citations:
Amnesty International. 2023. “Poland 2022.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/europe-and-central-asia/poland/report-poland
Camut, N. 2023. “Poland Still Worst Country to Be Gay in the EU: Report.” June 5. https://euobserver.com/rule-of-law/157105
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
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Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
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7
6
Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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3
Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
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1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
Poland has developed many institutions to fight corruption, including the Internal Security Agency, the National Revenue Administration, the Ministry of National Defense, the Supreme Audit Office, the police and the Border Guard. There are also rules for officeholders intended to ensure transparency, prevent conflicts of interest and promote ethical conduct, such as asset declarations and incompatibility regulations. A sound framework for public procurement debarment is also in place. However, Poland has fallen short in the area of combating foreign bribery.
In 2022, Poland received its lowest score since 2012 on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with 55 points and a ranking of 45th place. The main reasons for this decline included disruptions to the rule of law, such as the politicization of the Constitutional Tribunal and the prosecutor’s office, pressure on courts and individual judges, and the dismissal of charges against high-ranking officials. A significant erosion with regard to fundamental financial principles was also evident. Negative shifts in the public finance system were caused by substantial spending outside the state budget. This situation undermined the effectiveness of the budget law – particularly the state budget – as the primary tool for managing state finances. Additionally, the government had employed mechanisms to understate the state budget deficit and circumvent the stabilizing expenditure rule (Dudek and Kotecki 2023).
The PiS government lacked an effective anti-corruption policy. A damning report by the Supreme Audit Office in December 2022 revealed that the Government Anti-Corruption Program for 2018 – 2020 had failed in most of its planned tasks. The program’s implementation was chaotic and poorly coordinated, with limited success in areas such as training. No subsequent document outlining priorities and tasks for anti-corruption policy had been introduced since the program’s conclusion in 2020 (NIK 2022).
Citations:
Dudek, S., and L. Kotecki. 2023. Stabilny i przejrzysty budżet pod kontrolą obywateli. Warszawa. https://www.efcongress.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Stabilny_i_przejrzysty_budżet.pdf
Najwyższa Izba Kontroli. 2023. “Słabe efekty rządowego programu antykorupcyjnego. Polska nadal daleko w rankingu Transparency International.” https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,27852.pdf
https://www.batory.org.pl/blog_wpis/czy-to-ostatni-rok-spadkow-polski-w-indeksie-percepcji-korupcji/
Materska-Sosnowska, Anna, et al. 2023. Ocena odporności państwa na nadużycia władzy. Edycja 2023. Warszawa: Fundacja Batorego.
In 2022, Poland received its lowest score since 2012 on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with 55 points and a ranking of 45th place. The main reasons for this decline included disruptions to the rule of law, such as the politicization of the Constitutional Tribunal and the prosecutor’s office, pressure on courts and individual judges, and the dismissal of charges against high-ranking officials. A significant erosion with regard to fundamental financial principles was also evident. Negative shifts in the public finance system were caused by substantial spending outside the state budget. This situation undermined the effectiveness of the budget law – particularly the state budget – as the primary tool for managing state finances. Additionally, the government had employed mechanisms to understate the state budget deficit and circumvent the stabilizing expenditure rule (Dudek and Kotecki 2023).
The PiS government lacked an effective anti-corruption policy. A damning report by the Supreme Audit Office in December 2022 revealed that the Government Anti-Corruption Program for 2018 – 2020 had failed in most of its planned tasks. The program’s implementation was chaotic and poorly coordinated, with limited success in areas such as training. No subsequent document outlining priorities and tasks for anti-corruption policy had been introduced since the program’s conclusion in 2020 (NIK 2022).
Citations:
Dudek, S., and L. Kotecki. 2023. Stabilny i przejrzysty budżet pod kontrolą obywateli. Warszawa. https://www.efcongress.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/Stabilny_i_przejrzysty_budżet.pdf
Najwyższa Izba Kontroli. 2023. “Słabe efekty rządowego programu antykorupcyjnego. Polska nadal daleko w rankingu Transparency International.” https://www.nik.gov.pl/plik/id,27852.pdf
https://www.batory.org.pl/blog_wpis/czy-to-ostatni-rok-spadkow-polski-w-indeksie-percepcji-korupcji/
Materska-Sosnowska, Anna, et al. 2023. Ocena odporności państwa na nadużycia władzy. Edycja 2023. Warszawa: Fundacja Batorego.
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Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
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7
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
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As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
2
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1
The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
The offices of the Sejm and the Senate assist the Polish parliament in legal, organizational, advisory, financial and technical matters. They consist of several organizational units, including the Legal and Personnel Affairs Bureau, the Analysis Bureau, the Financial Bureau, the Sejm Information Center, the Legislative Bureau, the Library, the Social Communication Bureau, the Internal Audit Office and the Publishing House.
These institutions assist deputies in carrying out the work of the parliament and its bodies, and in fulfilling their parliamentary mandates in their electoral districts. The offices also provide services to parliamentary clubs and groups, parliamentary teams, and independent deputies.
The legislature exercises oversees the financing of its operations; however, every year, the Supreme Audit Office audits the implementation of the state budget, including the functioning of parliament. In both 2021 and 2022, the Sejm and Senate offices received approval in these audits. The Sejm budget has grown from less than PLN 500 million under the liberal PO-PSL coalition to PLN 576.9 million in 2022 and PLN 683.2 million in 2023 (Rzeczpospolita, 2023).
After the 2015 elections, both the Analysis Bureau (Biuro Analiz Sejmowych, BAS) and the Legislative Bureau lost their fully independent status. Additionally, the choice of experts was directed by the political majority. The BAS is responsible for preparing legal opinions and other information. It publishes journals including the Legal Notebooks of the Sejm Analysis Bureau, INFOS: Socioeconomic Issues, BAS Analyses, BAS Studies and others.
Citations:
Rzeczpospolita. 2023. “Rekordowy budżet Sejmu. Na każdego posła pójdzie 1,6 mln zł.” 01.08.2023. https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art38884141-rekordowy-budzet-sejmu-na-kazdego-posla-pojdzie-1-6-mln-zl.
These institutions assist deputies in carrying out the work of the parliament and its bodies, and in fulfilling their parliamentary mandates in their electoral districts. The offices also provide services to parliamentary clubs and groups, parliamentary teams, and independent deputies.
The legislature exercises oversees the financing of its operations; however, every year, the Supreme Audit Office audits the implementation of the state budget, including the functioning of parliament. In both 2021 and 2022, the Sejm and Senate offices received approval in these audits. The Sejm budget has grown from less than PLN 500 million under the liberal PO-PSL coalition to PLN 576.9 million in 2022 and PLN 683.2 million in 2023 (Rzeczpospolita, 2023).
After the 2015 elections, both the Analysis Bureau (Biuro Analiz Sejmowych, BAS) and the Legislative Bureau lost their fully independent status. Additionally, the choice of experts was directed by the political majority. The BAS is responsible for preparing legal opinions and other information. It publishes journals including the Legal Notebooks of the Sejm Analysis Bureau, INFOS: Socioeconomic Issues, BAS Analyses, BAS Studies and others.
Citations:
Rzeczpospolita. 2023. “Rekordowy budżet Sejmu. Na każdego posła pójdzie 1,6 mln zł.” 01.08.2023. https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art38884141-rekordowy-budzet-sejmu-na-kazdego-posla-pojdzie-1-6-mln-zl.
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
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7
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The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
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4
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The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
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1
The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
Alongside the marshal of the Sejm, the Presidium of the Sejm and the Council of Elders, committees constitute one of the primary organs of the Sejm, and their existence is constitutionally guaranteed. There are three types of committees: mandatory standing; ad hoc, which are established in exceptional situations; and investigative, which are designed to examine specific matters.
Parliamentary commissions serve both legislative and oversight functions. Governmental bodies and officials must answer questions and provide documents requested by commissions. However, this form of oversight is limited because opposition parties rarely hold a majority on such commissions, and the government often fails to support members of parliament with the necessary documents or timely responses. Ministers and leaders of the highest state administration bodies, or their representatives, are required to attend committee meetings when issues within their jurisdiction are being discussed.
In the Polish parliament, only investigative committees have powers that could be described as quasi-prosecutorial, as they can summon witnesses, appoint experts and order individuals to appear before the committee. However, in the 2022 – 2023 period, they were used only to interrogate former officeholders. On May 26, 2023, the Sejm adopted a law on the “State Commission for the Examination of Russian Interference in the Internal Security of Poland,” nicknamed “Lex Tusk,” alluding to the leader of the opposition in the upcoming parliamentary elections (Jałoszewski 2023). Initially, the commission was empowered to decide whether a person should be deprived of the right to hold public office in connection with the management of public funds for up to 10 years. As a result of strong pressure from the EU Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, the power to impose a ban on holding office was amended. After the 2023 elections, the incoming governing majority established three new bodies to scrutinize mail-in votes in 2020, the visa scandal and surveillance through the spyware program Pegasus.
Citations:
Jałoszewski, M. 2023. “Lex Tusk is Violating EU Law, the European Commission has to Intervene [Analysis].” https://ruleoflaw.pl/lex-tusk-is-violating-eu-law-the-european-commission-has-to-intervene-analysis
Parliamentary commissions serve both legislative and oversight functions. Governmental bodies and officials must answer questions and provide documents requested by commissions. However, this form of oversight is limited because opposition parties rarely hold a majority on such commissions, and the government often fails to support members of parliament with the necessary documents or timely responses. Ministers and leaders of the highest state administration bodies, or their representatives, are required to attend committee meetings when issues within their jurisdiction are being discussed.
In the Polish parliament, only investigative committees have powers that could be described as quasi-prosecutorial, as they can summon witnesses, appoint experts and order individuals to appear before the committee. However, in the 2022 – 2023 period, they were used only to interrogate former officeholders. On May 26, 2023, the Sejm adopted a law on the “State Commission for the Examination of Russian Interference in the Internal Security of Poland,” nicknamed “Lex Tusk,” alluding to the leader of the opposition in the upcoming parliamentary elections (Jałoszewski 2023). Initially, the commission was empowered to decide whether a person should be deprived of the right to hold public office in connection with the management of public funds for up to 10 years. As a result of strong pressure from the EU Commission, the U.S. Department of Justice and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, the power to impose a ban on holding office was amended. After the 2023 elections, the incoming governing majority established three new bodies to scrutinize mail-in votes in 2020, the visa scandal and surveillance through the spyware program Pegasus.
Citations:
Jałoszewski, M. 2023. “Lex Tusk is Violating EU Law, the European Commission has to Intervene [Analysis].” https://ruleoflaw.pl/lex-tusk-is-violating-eu-law-the-european-commission-has-to-intervene-analysis
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
Individual members of parliament have the right to obtain necessary documents and information from government administration bodies, local self-government bodies, state-owned institutions or enterprises, social organizations, and non-state economic entities. Groups of at least 15 members of parliament and parliamentary party groups are entitled to request current information from government officials. A member of parliament can also submit important queries about government issues. Such queries should be concise, explain the situation and ask relevant questions. The person being questioned has to provide a written answer within 21 days of receiving the query.
Under PiS rule, opposition legislators investigated various issues in 2023, including the system of bonuses and awards for ministerial staff, the unauthorized publication of personal data by the minister of healthcare, and unclear competition procedures in the National Center for Research and Development (Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju, NCBiR). In most cases, reports prepared after such interventions were highly unfavorable to the government. In some instances, especially those made public by the media, the authorities decided to change the heads of the institutions, as in the case of NCBiR. However, they did not launch in-depth investigations or reforms.
Conversely, the number of parliamentary interpellations dropped year by year (from 15,988 in 2020 to 8,045 in 2022) due to the provision of unsatisfactory answers or the failure to respond to queries (Rzeczpospolita 2023). PiS government representatives often ignored this duty, and ministers occasionally declined invitations or did not respond to inquiries.
Citations:
Rzeczpospolita. 2023. “Interpelacje poselskie: Poseł już raczej nie pyta, woli skontrolować.” https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art37878761-interpelacje-poselskie-posel-juz-raczej-nie-pyta-woli-skontrolowac
Under PiS rule, opposition legislators investigated various issues in 2023, including the system of bonuses and awards for ministerial staff, the unauthorized publication of personal data by the minister of healthcare, and unclear competition procedures in the National Center for Research and Development (Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju, NCBiR). In most cases, reports prepared after such interventions were highly unfavorable to the government. In some instances, especially those made public by the media, the authorities decided to change the heads of the institutions, as in the case of NCBiR. However, they did not launch in-depth investigations or reforms.
Conversely, the number of parliamentary interpellations dropped year by year (from 15,988 in 2020 to 8,045 in 2022) due to the provision of unsatisfactory answers or the failure to respond to queries (Rzeczpospolita 2023). PiS government representatives often ignored this duty, and ministers occasionally declined invitations or did not respond to inquiries.
Citations:
Rzeczpospolita. 2023. “Interpelacje poselskie: Poseł już raczej nie pyta, woli skontrolować.” https://www.rp.pl/polityka/art37878761-interpelacje-poselskie-posel-juz-raczej-nie-pyta-woli-skontrolowac
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
10
9
9
The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
2
1
1
The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
In the ninth and tenth terms of the Sejm (2019 and 2023), there were 29 standing committees. The number of Senate committees increased from 16 to 20. The quantity of Sejm committees surpassed that of ministries. Nevertheless, most ministries, even the more significant ones, are associated with only one oversight committee, commonly called a branch committee. Consequently, allocating subject areas among committees does not compromise the parliament’s capacity to oversee ministries.
During the 2019 – 2023 term, the committees varied in size, ranging from several members to more than 50. The number of sessions depended on the committee. For example, the Public Finance Committee held 460 meetings, while the Committee on National and Ethnic Minorities had only 75. In most cases, the frequency of meetings provided a sufficient overview of government activities.
Committee chairpersons and deputies are elected at the first committee meeting via an open simple majority vote. Agreements among parliamentary groups determine the political faction that will provided the committee chairperson. As a result, despite having a significant number of legislators, the opposition was able to exert appreciable influence within only a few committees of lesser importance after the elections in both 2019 and 2023.
During the 2019 – 2023 term, the committees varied in size, ranging from several members to more than 50. The number of sessions depended on the committee. For example, the Public Finance Committee held 460 meetings, while the Committee on National and Ethnic Minorities had only 75. In most cases, the frequency of meetings provided a sufficient overview of government activities.
Committee chairpersons and deputies are elected at the first committee meeting via an open simple majority vote. Agreements among parliamentary groups determine the political faction that will provided the committee chairperson. As a result, despite having a significant number of legislators, the opposition was able to exert appreciable influence within only a few committees of lesser importance after the elections in both 2019 and 2023.