Vertical Accountability
#29Key Findings
Poland falls into the bottom ranks (rank 29) in the category of vertical accountability.
The October 2023 parliamentary elections were free but not fully competitive. The governing Law and Justice (PiS) party used state resources and media to support its campaign. A government-initiated referendum also blurred the line between state and party, raising campaign finance concerns.
The election process was efficient, with minimal irregularities, despite the lack of campaign finance transparency. The political landscape is divided between populists, led by PiS, and anti-populists, represented by the Civic Coalition, the Third Way and the Left. Although PiS won the most votes it could not form a majority government.
Parliaments are elected for a four-year term using proportional representation with a 5% threshold for entry. While citizens have the right to access public information, PiS government authorities refused this right to anti-government media.
The October 2023 parliamentary elections were free but not fully competitive. The governing Law and Justice (PiS) party used state resources and media to support its campaign. A government-initiated referendum also blurred the line between state and party, raising campaign finance concerns.
The election process was efficient, with minimal irregularities, despite the lack of campaign finance transparency. The political landscape is divided between populists, led by PiS, and anti-populists, represented by the Civic Coalition, the Third Way and the Left. Although PiS won the most votes it could not form a majority government.
Parliaments are elected for a four-year term using proportional representation with a 5% threshold for entry. While citizens have the right to access public information, PiS government authorities refused this right to anti-government media.
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To what extent is political competition among candidates and political parties free and fair?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to effective political competition.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles to effective political competition.
On October 15, 2023, Poland held parliamentary elections that were free but lacked full competitiveness. Despite a diverse range of parties and candidates, the ruling Law and Justice party had a significant advantage by using state resources, including public companies and media, to support its campaign. Additionally, a government-initiated referendum aimed to amplify the ruling coalition’s campaign messages, involving support from state-controlled companies and blurring the line between state and party, potentially bypassing campaign finance regulations.
The Electoral Code forms the comprehensive legal framework for parliamentary elections, but despite recommendations from OSCE/ODHIR, no changes have been made to constituency boundaries since 2011. This lack of adjustment, coupled with the inclusion of all votes from abroad in the Warsaw constituency, raises concerns about the equality of votes.
In March 2023, significant revisions to the Electoral Code included reducing the minimum number of residents per precinct, establishing a Central Register of Voters, and modifying the eligibility criteria for Constituency Election Commission members. However, challenges arose, such as the rejection of some candidate lists due to formal issues, including problems with supporter addresses in the newly implemented Central Register of Voters.
The regulations on electoral campaign financing, as outlined in the Election Code and the Political Parties Act, require political parties to submit annual financial information to the National Election Commission. In 2023, five political parties faced the potential deprivation of public subsidies due to unfavorable verdicts. During the 2023 elections, three factors negatively impacted the accountability and clarity of campaign finances: a lack of detailed financial reporting before election day, unrestrained third-party campaigning and insufficient campaign finance regulations for the referendum.
Public television and radio stations ostensibly met their legal obligations to provide free airtime to all electoral committees. However, the OSCE reported that the public broadcaster failed to ensure balanced and impartial coverage during the presidential (2020) and parliamentary (2023) elections. Additionally, the ruling coalition leveraged Catholic media, including Telewizja Trwam and Radio Maryja, to appeal to traditional conservative voters. The acquisition of Polska Press by PKN Orlen in 2020 granted the PiS party significant influence over regional media. Despite these developments, the Polish media landscape remains diverse, with public television (TVP), TVN and Polsat dominating the television sector.
Most political campaigns occur online, with politicians and parties using platforms like X and Facebook for promotion and commentary. However, the tone of media content – both online and offline – was generally negative, offensive and radical. While unauthorized new media usage and the spread of fake information were present, they did not majorly impact political competition.
Citations:
OSCE. 2020. Republic Of Poland Presidential Election 28 June and 12 July 2020 ODIHR Special Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/464601.pdf
OSCE. 2023. “International Election Observation Mission Republic of Poland, Parliamentary Elections, 15 October 2023.” Warsaw https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/4/555048.pdf
https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2242509,1,jak-przeprowadzac-wybory-zeby-naprawde-byly-rowne-trzeba-dzialac-juz-i-dwutorowo.read
The Electoral Code forms the comprehensive legal framework for parliamentary elections, but despite recommendations from OSCE/ODHIR, no changes have been made to constituency boundaries since 2011. This lack of adjustment, coupled with the inclusion of all votes from abroad in the Warsaw constituency, raises concerns about the equality of votes.
In March 2023, significant revisions to the Electoral Code included reducing the minimum number of residents per precinct, establishing a Central Register of Voters, and modifying the eligibility criteria for Constituency Election Commission members. However, challenges arose, such as the rejection of some candidate lists due to formal issues, including problems with supporter addresses in the newly implemented Central Register of Voters.
The regulations on electoral campaign financing, as outlined in the Election Code and the Political Parties Act, require political parties to submit annual financial information to the National Election Commission. In 2023, five political parties faced the potential deprivation of public subsidies due to unfavorable verdicts. During the 2023 elections, three factors negatively impacted the accountability and clarity of campaign finances: a lack of detailed financial reporting before election day, unrestrained third-party campaigning and insufficient campaign finance regulations for the referendum.
Public television and radio stations ostensibly met their legal obligations to provide free airtime to all electoral committees. However, the OSCE reported that the public broadcaster failed to ensure balanced and impartial coverage during the presidential (2020) and parliamentary (2023) elections. Additionally, the ruling coalition leveraged Catholic media, including Telewizja Trwam and Radio Maryja, to appeal to traditional conservative voters. The acquisition of Polska Press by PKN Orlen in 2020 granted the PiS party significant influence over regional media. Despite these developments, the Polish media landscape remains diverse, with public television (TVP), TVN and Polsat dominating the television sector.
Most political campaigns occur online, with politicians and parties using platforms like X and Facebook for promotion and commentary. However, the tone of media content – both online and offline – was generally negative, offensive and radical. While unauthorized new media usage and the spread of fake information were present, they did not majorly impact political competition.
Citations:
OSCE. 2020. Republic Of Poland Presidential Election 28 June and 12 July 2020 ODIHR Special Election Assessment Mission Final Report. Warsaw. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/464601.pdf
OSCE. 2023. “International Election Observation Mission Republic of Poland, Parliamentary Elections, 15 October 2023.” Warsaw https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/4/555048.pdf
https://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/2242509,1,jak-przeprowadzac-wybory-zeby-naprawde-byly-rowne-trzeba-dzialac-juz-i-dwutorowo.read
To what extent can all citizens, both in legal terms (de jure) and in practice (de facto), exercise their right to vote?
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There are no significant barriers, by law or in practice, that hinder citizens or specific groups in society from exercising their right to vote.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles to voting.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose various significant obstacles that substantially hinder voting.
Voting rights, granted to all citizens, require permanent residence in a municipality, with the option to vote in any precinct based on a voting certificate. Polish law allows for the deprivation of public rights, including voting, for a citizen sentenced to at least three years of imprisonment. The 2023 Electoral Code amendments introduced the Central Register of Voters (CRV), replacing 2,477 separate voter registers. Concerns were raised about the CRV’s late introduction potentially affecting its accuracy. The CRV assigned voters to polling stations based on their last voting address, allowing one-time changes up to three days before the election. Voter lists, finalized two days before election day, limited public scrutiny to individual inquiries. Errors in voter addresses emerged during candidate registration and on election day. The total number of eligible voters 29,091,621.
In cases of irregularities, citizens were able to address complaints to the mayor or through the government portal, mObywatel, but the 2023 amendments restricted public scrutiny. The National Election Commission (PKW) oversees the process with a three-level structure. Since 2019, the PKW has had stronger political roots, with seven out of nine members appointed by the Sejm. Elections with sufficient resources are administered on the national, regional and local levels.
Under the terms of the Electoral Code, the president calls for parliamentary elections, with the 2023 election having occurred on October 15, 2023. Amendments in March 2023 increased the total number of polling stations to 31,073, additionally providing for free transportation and enhanced accessibility for individuals with disabilities. The voting process, scheduled from 7:00 to 21:00, faced challenges including overcrowded polling stations due to high turnout. The 2023 elections had minor disruptions of public order, but there were no reported cases of double voting or impersonation.
Overall, the electoral process was efficient and well-organized, with amendments expanding the rights of committees and observers to record procedures. Minor irregularities were observed but promptly resolved without impacting the general election result.
Citations:
Kodeks Wyborczy. 2023. Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. Dz.U.2023.2408 t.j. https://sip.lex.pl/akty-prawne/dzu-dziennik-ustaw/kodeks-wyborczy-17679859
OSCE. 2023. “International Election Observation Mission Republic of Poland, Parliamentary Elections, 15 October 2023.” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/4/555048.pdf
https://www.infor.pl/prawo/nowosci-prawne/6338068,pierwsze-nieprawidlowosci-podczas-wyborow-2023.html
In cases of irregularities, citizens were able to address complaints to the mayor or through the government portal, mObywatel, but the 2023 amendments restricted public scrutiny. The National Election Commission (PKW) oversees the process with a three-level structure. Since 2019, the PKW has had stronger political roots, with seven out of nine members appointed by the Sejm. Elections with sufficient resources are administered on the national, regional and local levels.
Under the terms of the Electoral Code, the president calls for parliamentary elections, with the 2023 election having occurred on October 15, 2023. Amendments in March 2023 increased the total number of polling stations to 31,073, additionally providing for free transportation and enhanced accessibility for individuals with disabilities. The voting process, scheduled from 7:00 to 21:00, faced challenges including overcrowded polling stations due to high turnout. The 2023 elections had minor disruptions of public order, but there were no reported cases of double voting or impersonation.
Overall, the electoral process was efficient and well-organized, with amendments expanding the rights of committees and observers to record procedures. Minor irregularities were observed but promptly resolved without impacting the general election result.
Citations:
Kodeks Wyborczy. 2023. Ustawa z dnia 5 stycznia 2011 r. Dz.U.2023.2408 t.j. https://sip.lex.pl/akty-prawne/dzu-dziennik-ustaw/kodeks-wyborczy-17679859
OSCE. 2023. “International Election Observation Mission Republic of Poland, Parliamentary Elections, 15 October 2023.” https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/4/555048.pdf
https://www.infor.pl/prawo/nowosci-prawne/6338068,pierwsze-nieprawidlowosci-podczas-wyborow-2023.html
Graph View
To what extent do parties articulate and aggregate all societal interests?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective societal integration.
In general, most societal interests are reflected in the political spectrum present in the parliament. The Sejm, consisting of 460 members, is elected for a four-year term using proportional representation and the d’Hondt method, with a 5% threshold for entry (8% for coalitions, waived for national minorities). This rule has eliminated most minor parties from the Polish political scene; they have either disappeared or merged with larger parties, such as the Greens, who joined the Civic Platform in 2023 along with Nowoczesna and Inicjatywa Polska. Most major parties – aside from the newly constituted Polska 2050 – have well-organized local branches based mainly on state administrative divisions. Regional and local party branches report regional challenges to party leaders and are active during party conventions.
With 100 members, the Senate is elected for a four-year term via single-member constituencies and a first-past-the-post voting model. In the 2023 elections, only a few independent candidates not rooted in party politics entered the Senate, and most joined the liberal Senate Pact. The age requirements of 21 for the Sejm and 30 for the Senate do not infringe on the representation of various age groups in parliament. A rule introduced in 2011 requires all parties to allocate at least 35% of places on election lists to women, resulting in steady growth in the number of female parliamentarians, reaching a record 29.6% in the 2023 Sejm elections.
In 2023, all parties published political manifestos in anticipation of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The PiS party called for new spending on social and military causes; Konfederacja advocated for tax cuts; the Civic Platform proposed changes in education and an increase in public sector salaries; the Third Way focused on green development and healthcare; and the New Left centered on restoring reproductive rights and women’s rights. In general, all parties from the democratic opposition advocated reversing unconstitutional reforms of the judiciary system and restoring closer ties with the European Union (Łada-Konefał 2023).
Citations:
Łada-Konefał, A. 2023. “Poland’s Pivotal Elections – High Stakes and an Uncertain Outcome.” https://globaleurope.eu/europes-future/polands-pivotal-elections-high-stakes-and-an-uncertain-outcome/
With 100 members, the Senate is elected for a four-year term via single-member constituencies and a first-past-the-post voting model. In the 2023 elections, only a few independent candidates not rooted in party politics entered the Senate, and most joined the liberal Senate Pact. The age requirements of 21 for the Sejm and 30 for the Senate do not infringe on the representation of various age groups in parliament. A rule introduced in 2011 requires all parties to allocate at least 35% of places on election lists to women, resulting in steady growth in the number of female parliamentarians, reaching a record 29.6% in the 2023 Sejm elections.
In 2023, all parties published political manifestos in anticipation of the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The PiS party called for new spending on social and military causes; Konfederacja advocated for tax cuts; the Civic Platform proposed changes in education and an increase in public sector salaries; the Third Way focused on green development and healthcare; and the New Left centered on restoring reproductive rights and women’s rights. In general, all parties from the democratic opposition advocated reversing unconstitutional reforms of the judiciary system and restoring closer ties with the European Union (Łada-Konefał 2023).
Citations:
Łada-Konefał, A. 2023. “Poland’s Pivotal Elections – High Stakes and an Uncertain Outcome.” https://globaleurope.eu/europes-future/polands-pivotal-elections-high-stakes-and-an-uncertain-outcome/
To what extent do political parties retain their ability to enable cross-party cooperation in policymaking and implementation?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose no significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose some significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
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Existing obstacles in the party system, by law and in practice, pose various significant barriers to achieving effective cross-party cooperation.
The Polish political landscape was highly divided along ideological lines and split into two blocs: populists and anti-populists. The first bloc dominated from 2015 until the October 2023 elections and represented right-wing populism and national conservatism in the United Right (Zjednoczona Prawica), with the dominant Law and Justice (PiS) party led by Jarosław Kaczyński.
Due to the lack of a stable majority in the parliament (227 out of 460 seats), the government depended heavily on internal discipline and the support of minor parliamentary circles like Kukiz’15 – Direct Democracy (Kukiz15). The conservative spectrum concluded with the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja), which, although not aligned with or supportive of the United Right, called for anti-immigrant regulations, strong opposition to further integration of the European Union and highly liberal economic policies.
In 2022 and 2023, internal divisions within the United Right led to constant intragovernmental conflict between Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro and Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Ziobro, head of a junior ally of the Law and Justice party (PiS), Sovereign Poland, controlled 20 out of 228 seats in the coalition parliamentary club. His small but critical group played a decisive role in passing governmental proposals. The main arena for conflict was on issues relating to the European Union, as the prime minister was a realist, while the justice minister voiced a hard euroskepticism, including support for Polexit. Ziobro’s 2019 judicial reform violated EU law, and led to the introduction of a mechanism linking the disbursement of EU funds with adherence to the rule of law. Despite the intense and open political conflict, Morawiecki supported Ziobro during a vote of no confidence put forward by the opposition.
The anti-populist bloc gathered various parties from the center-right to the left. The strongest in terms of public support was the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), which led the government from 2007 to 2015. The party evolved from a Christian-liberal to a more catchall party with a strong commitment to individual liberties. In the 2023 elections, it focused on building a so-called wealth-care state, further Europeanization, empowerment of local communities and strong anti-PiS rhetoric.
As an alternative to Law and Justice and the Civic Platform, smaller parties formed a political alliance, the Third Way (Trzecia Droga), on 27 April 2023. This coalition included the centrist Poland 2050 (Polska 2050) led by Szymon Hołownia and the agrarian Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) led by Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Leftist voters could support the New Left (Nowa Lewica), which was formed in 2021 by a merger of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Spring (Wiosna). In February 2023, the New Left created an electoral alliance with Together (Razem), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and the Labor Union (Unia Pracy).
In the months leading up to the 2023 parliamentary campaign, Donald Tusk, PO’s leader and a former European Council president, advocated for the creation of a unified list of opposition parties in order to win the “unity premium.” However, in the elections to the lower chamber of parliament, the Sejm, the opposition ran for victory divided into three blocks: the Civic Coalition, the Third Way and the New Left. Despite this division, the opposition successfully formed a united government.
The final count gave PiS 35.4% of the vote, followed by the Civic Coalition at 30.7%, the Third Way at 14.4%, the Left at 8.6% and the far-right Confederation at 7.2% (Euronews 2023). Despite winning the elections, PiS was unable to form a majority government as its potential coalition partner, the Polish People’s Party, declined to cooperate.
The coalition agreement’s main priorities included restoring the rule of law, addressing the climate crisis and improving Poland’s track record on women’s rights. The document also focused on education and healthcare, depoliticizing the public media and combating hate speech. Issues that created a political fracture included LGBTQ+ rights and energy policy, but the most pressing one was opposition to the Third Way’s plan to liberalize Poland’s strict abortion laws.
As a result of dropping the abortion issue from the coalition agreement, a small faction of the Left, the Razem (Together), decided to leave the coalition but support it in the parliament. In the elections to the upper chamber of the parliament, the Senate Pact between the KO, Polska 2050, PSL and Nowa Lewica, along with independent candidates, resulted in a stable majority of 66 seats out of 100.
Citations:
Euronews. 2023. “Final results show scale of pro-EU opposition victory in Poland.” https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/17/final-results-show-scale-of-pro-eu-opposition-victory-in-poland
Stambulski, Michał. 2022. “Constitutional Populism and the Rule of Law in Poland.” In Anti-Constitutional Populism, eds. Krygier, M., Czarnota, A., and Sadurski, W. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 336-365.
Due to the lack of a stable majority in the parliament (227 out of 460 seats), the government depended heavily on internal discipline and the support of minor parliamentary circles like Kukiz’15 – Direct Democracy (Kukiz15). The conservative spectrum concluded with the far-right Confederation (Konfederacja), which, although not aligned with or supportive of the United Right, called for anti-immigrant regulations, strong opposition to further integration of the European Union and highly liberal economic policies.
In 2022 and 2023, internal divisions within the United Right led to constant intragovernmental conflict between Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro and Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Ziobro, head of a junior ally of the Law and Justice party (PiS), Sovereign Poland, controlled 20 out of 228 seats in the coalition parliamentary club. His small but critical group played a decisive role in passing governmental proposals. The main arena for conflict was on issues relating to the European Union, as the prime minister was a realist, while the justice minister voiced a hard euroskepticism, including support for Polexit. Ziobro’s 2019 judicial reform violated EU law, and led to the introduction of a mechanism linking the disbursement of EU funds with adherence to the rule of law. Despite the intense and open political conflict, Morawiecki supported Ziobro during a vote of no confidence put forward by the opposition.
The anti-populist bloc gathered various parties from the center-right to the left. The strongest in terms of public support was the liberal-centrist Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), which led the government from 2007 to 2015. The party evolved from a Christian-liberal to a more catchall party with a strong commitment to individual liberties. In the 2023 elections, it focused on building a so-called wealth-care state, further Europeanization, empowerment of local communities and strong anti-PiS rhetoric.
As an alternative to Law and Justice and the Civic Platform, smaller parties formed a political alliance, the Third Way (Trzecia Droga), on 27 April 2023. This coalition included the centrist Poland 2050 (Polska 2050) led by Szymon Hołownia and the agrarian Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) led by Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Leftist voters could support the New Left (Nowa Lewica), which was formed in 2021 by a merger of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Spring (Wiosna). In February 2023, the New Left created an electoral alliance with Together (Razem), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and the Labor Union (Unia Pracy).
In the months leading up to the 2023 parliamentary campaign, Donald Tusk, PO’s leader and a former European Council president, advocated for the creation of a unified list of opposition parties in order to win the “unity premium.” However, in the elections to the lower chamber of parliament, the Sejm, the opposition ran for victory divided into three blocks: the Civic Coalition, the Third Way and the New Left. Despite this division, the opposition successfully formed a united government.
The final count gave PiS 35.4% of the vote, followed by the Civic Coalition at 30.7%, the Third Way at 14.4%, the Left at 8.6% and the far-right Confederation at 7.2% (Euronews 2023). Despite winning the elections, PiS was unable to form a majority government as its potential coalition partner, the Polish People’s Party, declined to cooperate.
The coalition agreement’s main priorities included restoring the rule of law, addressing the climate crisis and improving Poland’s track record on women’s rights. The document also focused on education and healthcare, depoliticizing the public media and combating hate speech. Issues that created a political fracture included LGBTQ+ rights and energy policy, but the most pressing one was opposition to the Third Way’s plan to liberalize Poland’s strict abortion laws.
As a result of dropping the abortion issue from the coalition agreement, a small faction of the Left, the Razem (Together), decided to leave the coalition but support it in the parliament. In the elections to the upper chamber of the parliament, the Senate Pact between the KO, Polska 2050, PSL and Nowa Lewica, along with independent candidates, resulted in a stable majority of 66 seats out of 100.
Citations:
Euronews. 2023. “Final results show scale of pro-EU opposition victory in Poland.” https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/17/final-results-show-scale-of-pro-eu-opposition-victory-in-poland
Stambulski, Michał. 2022. “Constitutional Populism and the Rule of Law in Poland.” In Anti-Constitutional Populism, eds. Krygier, M., Czarnota, A., and Sadurski, W. Cambridge Studies in Law and Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 336-365.
Graph View
To what extent can citizens and residents access official information?
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There are no barriers, by law or in practice, for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose no significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose some significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
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Existing barriers, by law and in practice, pose many/various significant obstacles for citizens seeking to access official information.
Access to public information is a fundamental political right granted to citizens under the Polish Act of September 6, 2001. Individuals can exercise these rights without providing justification, and public information is provided promptly upon request, within 14 days. Requests can be submitted in any form, including electronically. The Bulletin of Public Information (BIP) is a unified system for disseminating information. Citizens can also seek assistance from the Ombudsman for Civil Rights or obtain information through the Government Information Center, which is responsible for information and press services.
This right is closely tied to state organ transparency, particularly in managing public property, and is linked to privacy rights. Courts encounter challenges in interpreting the broad definition of “public information” and identifying the obligated entity, as state tasks extend beyond state bodies. These issues sometimes result in premature request rejections, leading to court complaints. Valid reasons for refusal include the protection of classified information, privacy or personal data.
The lack of proper access to information about the actions and decisions of state authorities was evident from 2022 to 2023. As the Supreme Audit Office revealed, between 2019 and 2021, the number of complaints filed with administrative courts regarding local government bodies’ inaction or delays in matters related to requests for access to public information increased. Despite the duty to inform the press, public authorities refused this right to anti-government media. For example, the Ministry of Finance declined Gazeta Wyborcza’s request for information regarding the budget execution for August 2023. As a result, the non-governmental organization Public Information (Informacjapubliczna.org), created by the Citizens Network Watchdog Poland, issued a letter to Polish parliamentarians in 2022, stating that the law in its current form does not protect the freedom of access to information for citizens.
Poland ranks high in international rankings related to public data provision. In the European Union’s 2023 Open Data Maturity Report, Poland advanced to second place, just behind France. In the Digital Economy and Society Index 2022, which assesses the digital economy and digital society, Poland scored 95% compared to the EU average of 81%. Meanwhile, according to the Open Data Inventory 2022 – 2023, Poland secured second place globally regarding the availability and openness of statistical data published by the Central Statistical Office (Watchdog.org 2023).
Citations:
Informacja.publiczna.org. 2022. “List do parlamentarzystów – postulaty.” https://informacjapubliczna.org/analysis/list-do-parlamentarzystow-postulaty/
Watchdog.org. 2023. “Raport o stanie jawności w Polsce 2023.” https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/raport-o-stanie-jawnosci-w-polsce
This right is closely tied to state organ transparency, particularly in managing public property, and is linked to privacy rights. Courts encounter challenges in interpreting the broad definition of “public information” and identifying the obligated entity, as state tasks extend beyond state bodies. These issues sometimes result in premature request rejections, leading to court complaints. Valid reasons for refusal include the protection of classified information, privacy or personal data.
The lack of proper access to information about the actions and decisions of state authorities was evident from 2022 to 2023. As the Supreme Audit Office revealed, between 2019 and 2021, the number of complaints filed with administrative courts regarding local government bodies’ inaction or delays in matters related to requests for access to public information increased. Despite the duty to inform the press, public authorities refused this right to anti-government media. For example, the Ministry of Finance declined Gazeta Wyborcza’s request for information regarding the budget execution for August 2023. As a result, the non-governmental organization Public Information (Informacjapubliczna.org), created by the Citizens Network Watchdog Poland, issued a letter to Polish parliamentarians in 2022, stating that the law in its current form does not protect the freedom of access to information for citizens.
Poland ranks high in international rankings related to public data provision. In the European Union’s 2023 Open Data Maturity Report, Poland advanced to second place, just behind France. In the Digital Economy and Society Index 2022, which assesses the digital economy and digital society, Poland scored 95% compared to the EU average of 81%. Meanwhile, according to the Open Data Inventory 2022 – 2023, Poland secured second place globally regarding the availability and openness of statistical data published by the Central Statistical Office (Watchdog.org 2023).
Citations:
Informacja.publiczna.org. 2022. “List do parlamentarzystów – postulaty.” https://informacjapubliczna.org/analysis/list-do-parlamentarzystow-postulaty/
Watchdog.org. 2023. “Raport o stanie jawności w Polsce 2023.” https://publicystyka.ngo.pl/raport-o-stanie-jawnosci-w-polsce