Coordination
#17Key Findings
Portugal falls into the sample’s middle ranks (rank 17) with regard to coordination.
Formally, two bodies – the Council of Ministers and the regular meetings of the secretaries of state from various ministries – facilitate government coordination. Line minsters forward proposals to the minister of the presidency, followed by discussions on refinement. These proposals then go to the Council of Ministers.
The Ministry of Finance plays a pivotal role in reviewing issues with economic impact. Regularly scheduled and ad hoc meetings between the prime minister’s inner circle and line ministers also play an important coordinating role. Interministerial commissions address a wide array of subjects.
A reform aiming at greater decentralization is underway, in part with the goal of improving the quality of public services and enhancing local governance powers. Financial transfers to municipalities have accordingly been increased.
Formally, two bodies – the Council of Ministers and the regular meetings of the secretaries of state from various ministries – facilitate government coordination. Line minsters forward proposals to the minister of the presidency, followed by discussions on refinement. These proposals then go to the Council of Ministers.
The Ministry of Finance plays a pivotal role in reviewing issues with economic impact. Regularly scheduled and ad hoc meetings between the prime minister’s inner circle and line ministers also play an important coordinating role. Interministerial commissions address a wide array of subjects.
A reform aiming at greater decentralization is underway, in part with the goal of improving the quality of public services and enhancing local governance powers. Financial transfers to municipalities have accordingly been increased.
Graph View
Graph View
To what extent do established coordination mechanisms between the government’s office and line ministries effectively enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
8
7
6
7
6
Largely functional coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are in place.
5
4
3
4
3
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are only somewhat functional.
2
1
1
Coordination mechanisms between line ministries and the GO/PMO, aimed at enhancing policy coherence, are not at all functional.
Effective coordination within a government necessitates a degree of organic stability. Since its inauguration in March 2022, the XXIII Constitutional Government of Portugal, with an absolute majority from the Socialist Party, has experienced this firsthand. Its organizational framework was established in May 2022, as per Decreto Lei 32/2022. Despite some minor crises leading to changes in ministerial and secretarial positions in September 2022 (Decreto Lei 65/2022), January 2023 (Decreto Lei 7/2023), February 2023 (Decreto Lei 17/2023), and November 2023 (Decreto Lei 108-A/2023), the core government structure has remained relatively stable. This core includes the prime minister, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the prime minister’s secretaries of state for digitalization and administrative modernization and for European affairs, as well as the minister of the presidency of the Council of Ministers along with their secretaries of state for planning and for public administration. Notably, the secretaries of state under the prime minister and the minister of the presidency are most effective at ensuring cross-governmental coordination, particularly in areas like digitalization and public administration reform.
Formally, two collegiate bodies facilitate government coordination: the Council of Ministers and the regular meetings of the secretaries of state from various ministries. These weekly meetings, attended by a representative from each ministry, are crucial for aligning policies before they are submitted to the Council of Ministers.
Line ministers typically forward their legislative proposals to the minister of the presidency, followed by bilateral discussions to refine the proposals. These are then forwarded for approval in the Council of Ministers and, if necessary, to parliament.
Unlike regular briefings from line ministries, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) consistently receives updates on new developments that could influence the preparation of policy proposals.
In accordance with Decree-Law 21/2021, the establishment of the Public Administration’s Planning, Policy, and Foresight Competence Centre (PlanAPP) is integral for high-quality public action. PlanAPP’s mission is to align sectoral strategic planning with national plans through a cooperative network that shares knowledge, thereby enhancing policy coherence.
The prominence of the Ministry of Finance in the government structure is a testament to its pivotal role in addressing key issues such as economic growth, inflation, and fiscal sustainability.
Citations:
Decreto-Lei no. 32/2022. Diário da República. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/32-2022-183159328
Decreto-Lei no. 65/2022. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/65-2022-201509739
Decreto no. 7/2023. Diário da República. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto/7-2023-213345453
Decreto no. 17/2023. Diário da República. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto/17-2023-215647912
Decreto-Lei no. 108-A/2023. Diário da República. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/108-a-2023-224661323
Decreto-Lei no. 21/2021. Diário da República. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/21-2021-159432384
Formally, two collegiate bodies facilitate government coordination: the Council of Ministers and the regular meetings of the secretaries of state from various ministries. These weekly meetings, attended by a representative from each ministry, are crucial for aligning policies before they are submitted to the Council of Ministers.
Line ministers typically forward their legislative proposals to the minister of the presidency, followed by bilateral discussions to refine the proposals. These are then forwarded for approval in the Council of Ministers and, if necessary, to parliament.
Unlike regular briefings from line ministries, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) consistently receives updates on new developments that could influence the preparation of policy proposals.
In accordance with Decree-Law 21/2021, the establishment of the Public Administration’s Planning, Policy, and Foresight Competence Centre (PlanAPP) is integral for high-quality public action. PlanAPP’s mission is to align sectoral strategic planning with national plans through a cooperative network that shares knowledge, thereby enhancing policy coherence.
The prominence of the Ministry of Finance in the government structure is a testament to its pivotal role in addressing key issues such as economic growth, inflation, and fiscal sustainability.
Citations:
Decreto-Lei no. 32/2022. Diário da República. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/32-2022-183159328
Decreto-Lei no. 65/2022. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/65-2022-201509739
Decreto no. 7/2023. Diário da República. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto/7-2023-213345453
Decreto no. 17/2023. Diário da República. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto/17-2023-215647912
Decreto-Lei no. 108-A/2023. Diário da República. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/108-a-2023-224661323
Decreto-Lei no. 21/2021. Diário da República. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/decreto-lei/21-2021-159432384
To what extent are there positive (formalized) forms of coordination across ministries that aim to enhance policy coherence?
10
9
9
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
8
7
6
7
6
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence sometimes provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
5
4
3
4
3
Interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence rarely provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
2
1
1
There are no interministerial coordination mechanisms targeting policy coherence that provide incentives for identifying synergies and opportunities.
There are numerous interministerial commissions (ICs) addressing a wide array of subjects, ranging from the utilization of European Funds (Portugal 2030) to water management, cooperation, education, and professional training, among others (see references for details). Typically, these ICs involve civil servants from various ministries, each relevant to the specific topic, and occasionally members of the cabinets of line ministers. They also have the option to seek guidance from experts. This implies a significant level of coordination among bureaucratic units from different sectoral ministries.
In practice, these working groups exhibit a fluctuating composition, as the civil servants designated by ministers can vary. Their organizational structure is also unstable, and they often lack a designated meeting location. Unfortunately, very little information is disseminated about their proceedings.
Consider, for instance, the Interministerial Committee for Coordinating Education and Professional Training within the scope of the National Qualifications System (ICCEPF, as per Presidência do Conselho de Ministros et al. 2021). This committee involves six ministers, and its coordination changes every six months. The responsibility alternates between various government sectors: labor and training, education (primary and secondary), science and higher education, and the economy. The committee is supposed to convene once every six months, with technical and logistical support provided by the government office responsible for coordination. Unfortunately, the constant organizational changes and personnel turnover do not bode well for the effectiveness of these working groups.
With few exceptions, such as institutions related to managing the Resilient and Recovery Funds, there are no digital platforms to support these working groups. These meetings, despite their challenges, prove highly effective in fostering policy coordination across the government. Moreover, the assessment of diverse proposals within each ministry extends beyond the attending secretaries of state to include ministerial advisers and, to some extent, senior officials of the public administration.
Citations:
Governo de Portugal. 2023. “Interministerial Commission of Coordination: Portugal 2030.” https://portugal2030.pt/2023/03/10/regulamento-interno-da-comissao-interministerial-de-coordenacao-do-portugal-2030
Presidência do Conselho de Ministros et al. 2021. Despacho 12818/2021 Creates the Interministerial committee for coordinating the education and professional training within the scope of the National Qualifications System. https://files.dre.pt/2s/2021/12/252000000/0002200024.pdf
Direção-Geral de Política do Mar. “Interministerial Commission of Mar Affairs (Comissão Interministerial de Assuntos do Mar).” https://www.dgpm.mm.gov.pt/ciam
Minister of Environment. “Interministerial Commission of Water Management.” https://apambiente.pt/agua/comissao-interministerial-de-coordenacao-da-agua
Camões: Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua. “Interministerial Commission for Cooperation.” https://www.instituto-camoes.pt/activity/o-que-fazemos/cooperacao/atuacao/coordenamos/cic
In practice, these working groups exhibit a fluctuating composition, as the civil servants designated by ministers can vary. Their organizational structure is also unstable, and they often lack a designated meeting location. Unfortunately, very little information is disseminated about their proceedings.
Consider, for instance, the Interministerial Committee for Coordinating Education and Professional Training within the scope of the National Qualifications System (ICCEPF, as per Presidência do Conselho de Ministros et al. 2021). This committee involves six ministers, and its coordination changes every six months. The responsibility alternates between various government sectors: labor and training, education (primary and secondary), science and higher education, and the economy. The committee is supposed to convene once every six months, with technical and logistical support provided by the government office responsible for coordination. Unfortunately, the constant organizational changes and personnel turnover do not bode well for the effectiveness of these working groups.
With few exceptions, such as institutions related to managing the Resilient and Recovery Funds, there are no digital platforms to support these working groups. These meetings, despite their challenges, prove highly effective in fostering policy coordination across the government. Moreover, the assessment of diverse proposals within each ministry extends beyond the attending secretaries of state to include ministerial advisers and, to some extent, senior officials of the public administration.
Citations:
Governo de Portugal. 2023. “Interministerial Commission of Coordination: Portugal 2030.” https://portugal2030.pt/2023/03/10/regulamento-interno-da-comissao-interministerial-de-coordenacao-do-portugal-2030
Presidência do Conselho de Ministros et al. 2021. Despacho 12818/2021 Creates the Interministerial committee for coordinating the education and professional training within the scope of the National Qualifications System. https://files.dre.pt/2s/2021/12/252000000/0002200024.pdf
Direção-Geral de Política do Mar. “Interministerial Commission of Mar Affairs (Comissão Interministerial de Assuntos do Mar).” https://www.dgpm.mm.gov.pt/ciam
Minister of Environment. “Interministerial Commission of Water Management.” https://apambiente.pt/agua/comissao-interministerial-de-coordenacao-da-agua
Camões: Instituto da Cooperação e da Língua. “Interministerial Commission for Cooperation.” https://www.instituto-camoes.pt/activity/o-que-fazemos/cooperacao/atuacao/coordenamos/cic
How effectively do informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination?
10
9
9
Informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
8
7
6
7
6
In most cases, informal coordination mechanisms complement formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
5
4
3
4
3
In some cases, informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
2
1
1
Informal coordination mechanisms undermine formal mechanisms of interministerial coordination.
Informal coordination mechanisms play a pivotal role in the functioning and coordination of the Portuguese government. At the highest levels of government, two primary informal coordination mechanisms are employed:
Regular Coordination Meetings: These meetings take place weekly, typically on Mondays, and involve the prime minister’s inner circle. The composition may vary with changes in government but usually includes the minister of the presidency, the minister of finance, the minister of parliamentary affairs, and two additional ministers chosen by the prime minister for political insights. Additionally, the president of the prime minister’s political party and the leader of the parliamentary group, who sometimes are the same individual, also participate.
Occasional Coordination Meetings: These meetings occur on an as-needed basis, bringing together a sectoral minister with the Office of the Prime Minister or the minister of the presidency. If the policy under consideration has financial implications, the minister of finance is also invited. These bilateral or trilateral discussions do not follow a fixed schedule but take place whenever a line ministry proposes a significant legislative initiative. These informal horizontal connections between ministries serve to compensate for the absence or rigidity of formal horizontal links.
When examining the relationship between top government officials and political parties, the absolute majority government of the Socialist Party (January 2022 – April 2024) has enabled the passage of legislation independently of other political parties. This implies that coordination primarily occurs within the Socialist Party, reducing the significance of informal coordination with other political parties. Nevertheless, even with an absolute majority government, dialogue with minor parties may still be pursued on special and crucial occasions, such as budget discussions and approval in parliament, to broaden support for the budget.
Regular Coordination Meetings: These meetings take place weekly, typically on Mondays, and involve the prime minister’s inner circle. The composition may vary with changes in government but usually includes the minister of the presidency, the minister of finance, the minister of parliamentary affairs, and two additional ministers chosen by the prime minister for political insights. Additionally, the president of the prime minister’s political party and the leader of the parliamentary group, who sometimes are the same individual, also participate.
Occasional Coordination Meetings: These meetings occur on an as-needed basis, bringing together a sectoral minister with the Office of the Prime Minister or the minister of the presidency. If the policy under consideration has financial implications, the minister of finance is also invited. These bilateral or trilateral discussions do not follow a fixed schedule but take place whenever a line ministry proposes a significant legislative initiative. These informal horizontal connections between ministries serve to compensate for the absence or rigidity of formal horizontal links.
When examining the relationship between top government officials and political parties, the absolute majority government of the Socialist Party (January 2022 – April 2024) has enabled the passage of legislation independently of other political parties. This implies that coordination primarily occurs within the Socialist Party, reducing the significance of informal coordination with other political parties. Nevertheless, even with an absolute majority government, dialogue with minor parties may still be pursued on special and crucial occasions, such as budget discussions and approval in parliament, to broaden support for the budget.
Graph View
To what extent does central government ensure that subnational self-governments meet national (minimum) standards in delivering public services?
10
9
9
The central government effectively ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
8
7
6
7
6
Most of the time, the central government ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
5
4
3
4
3
The central government rarely ensures that subnational self-governments successfully meet national minimum standards for public service delivery.
2
1
1
The central government does nothing to ensure that subnational self-governments successfully meet national standards for public service delivery.
When competencies are centralized within the central government, national standards are largely applied uniformly due to the control and provision of most public services under central government guidance. Conversely, competencies decentralized to subnational governments (regional governments or local municipalities) allow for more diverse application.
According to the theory of fiscal federalism, if there are minimum standards that should be adhered to nationally, these competencies are generally centralized (e.g., national curriculum in education). Conversely, if there is a desire to adapt to local preferences, competencies should be decentralized (e.g., extracurricular activities).
Despite differences between municipalities in certain services, Decree-Law 36/2023 was approved under the “Closer Government” initiative, converting the Regional Coordination and Development Commissions (CCDR) into public institutes. This change at the regional level allows for the creation of a body to coordinate regional reforms, fostering alignment between national public policies and their regional implementation based on a program contract signed by the prime minister and the presidents of each CCDR. This reform aims to provide higher-quality public services and promote territorial cohesion through decentralization. It is still too early to evaluate whether this objective will be achieved.
Citations:
Governo de Portugal. “Descentralização é «o caminho para a coesão territorial».”
https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc23/comunicacao/noticia?i=descentralizacao-e-o-caminho-para-a-coesao-territorial
(02.03.2023)
DRE. 2023. Decreto-Lei nº 36/2023. 1ª série, Nº 102, May 20. https://files.dre.pt/1s/2023/05/10200/0000600027.pdf
Governo de Portugal. “Novos passos no processo de descentralização.”
https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc23/comunicacao/noticia?i=novos-passos-no-processo-de-descentralizacao
(24.05.2023)
According to the theory of fiscal federalism, if there are minimum standards that should be adhered to nationally, these competencies are generally centralized (e.g., national curriculum in education). Conversely, if there is a desire to adapt to local preferences, competencies should be decentralized (e.g., extracurricular activities).
Despite differences between municipalities in certain services, Decree-Law 36/2023 was approved under the “Closer Government” initiative, converting the Regional Coordination and Development Commissions (CCDR) into public institutes. This change at the regional level allows for the creation of a body to coordinate regional reforms, fostering alignment between national public policies and their regional implementation based on a program contract signed by the prime minister and the presidents of each CCDR. This reform aims to provide higher-quality public services and promote territorial cohesion through decentralization. It is still too early to evaluate whether this objective will be achieved.
Citations:
Governo de Portugal. “Descentralização é «o caminho para a coesão territorial».”
https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc23/comunicacao/noticia?i=descentralizacao-e-o-caminho-para-a-coesao-territorial
(02.03.2023)
DRE. 2023. Decreto-Lei nº 36/2023. 1ª série, Nº 102, May 20. https://files.dre.pt/1s/2023/05/10200/0000600027.pdf
Governo de Portugal. “Novos passos no processo de descentralização.”
https://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/gc23/comunicacao/noticia?i=novos-passos-no-processo-de-descentralizacao
(24.05.2023)
To what extent do national policymakers effectively collaborate with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services?
10
9
9
National policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
8
7
6
7
6
In general, national policymakers work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
5
4
3
4
3
National policymakers rarely work effectively with regional and local governments to improve the delivery of public services.
2
1
1
There is no effective multilevel cooperation between the central and subnational governments.
Portugal, recognized as one of the more centralized nations within the European Union, is undergoing a transformation in its approach to regional governance. Prime Minister António Costa has emphasized the importance of state reform regarding decentralization, a key element in improving the quality of public services.
This commitment to restructuring state services is evident in the transformation of the CCDRs (Comissões de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional) into public institutes, a move that constitutes a substantial reform in regional administration. These commissions now have a president elected by the mayors of the region rather than being chosen by the government. Only a single vice president, still appointed by the executive, remains, but this will no longer occur after the next municipal elections in 2025.
This reform is seen as a foundational step toward meeting the constitutional mandate of regionalization and creating favorable political conditions for enhanced local governance.
In 2023, this commitment was underscored by a 6.3% increase in financial transfers from the central administration to municipal budgets, marking a clear step toward greater fiscal empowerment of local authorities. However, the process of transferring powers from the central administration to local authorities has been long and complex, with advances and setbacks. According to the judges of the Court of Auditors (TdC), this process has also been characterized by a lack of clarity and transparency, as well as by the scarcity of funds accompanying the new responsibilities of local authorities (Público, 2024).
According to the “Self-Rule Index for Local Authorities in the EU, Council of Europe, and OECD” report, Portugal has seen one of the most notable rises in the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) scores, positioning its municipalities at a medium-high autonomy level. Despite this progress, Portuguese subnational government entities – municipalities, parishes (freguesias), and intermunicipal cooperative units – still possess fewer spending and revenue powers compared to their counterparts in other EU countries. This disparity is reflected in the Portuguese multilevel governance system, which appears considerably centralized when juxtaposed with other European and OECD countries (OECD, 2020).
To address these challenges and improve cooperation, Portugal has established 23 Intermunicipal Councils (CIMs in Portuguese, corresponding to the NUTS 3 level) and created metropolitan areas for Lisbon and Porto. These measures aim to manage tasks beneficial across municipal boundaries and to enhance sustainable mobility, housing, and the licensing process in collaboration with local authorities. However, the role of both metropolitan and non-metropolitan intermunicipal cooperation remains limited, with only a small portion of local spending currently allocated to the CIMs and MAs.
Prime Minister António Costa advocates for executing public policies in areas such as the licensing process, housing, and sustainable mobility in partnership with local authorities. This collaborative approach promises to streamline processes and elevate the standard of public services offered to citizens. The ongoing efforts to decentralize and enhance autonomy reflect a promising shift toward a more equitable distribution of power and responsibilities between the central government and local entities in Portugal. The impact of these initiatives on the centralized system remains to be seen.
Citations:
Decreto-Lei nº36/2023. 2023. DR, 1ª série, Nº 102, p. 6. https://files.dre.pt/1s/2023/05/10200/0000600027.pdf
OECD. 2020. Decentralisation and Regionalisation in Portugal. What Reform Scenarios? https://doi.org/10.1787/fea62108-en
Público. 2024. “Tribunal de Contas: Financiamento para descentralização insuficiente e não claro.” https://www.publico.pt/2024/01/29/local/noticia/tribunal-contas-financiamento-descentralizacao-insuficiente-claro-2022-2078556
This commitment to restructuring state services is evident in the transformation of the CCDRs (Comissões de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional) into public institutes, a move that constitutes a substantial reform in regional administration. These commissions now have a president elected by the mayors of the region rather than being chosen by the government. Only a single vice president, still appointed by the executive, remains, but this will no longer occur after the next municipal elections in 2025.
This reform is seen as a foundational step toward meeting the constitutional mandate of regionalization and creating favorable political conditions for enhanced local governance.
In 2023, this commitment was underscored by a 6.3% increase in financial transfers from the central administration to municipal budgets, marking a clear step toward greater fiscal empowerment of local authorities. However, the process of transferring powers from the central administration to local authorities has been long and complex, with advances and setbacks. According to the judges of the Court of Auditors (TdC), this process has also been characterized by a lack of clarity and transparency, as well as by the scarcity of funds accompanying the new responsibilities of local authorities (Público, 2024).
According to the “Self-Rule Index for Local Authorities in the EU, Council of Europe, and OECD” report, Portugal has seen one of the most notable rises in the Local Autonomy Index (LAI) scores, positioning its municipalities at a medium-high autonomy level. Despite this progress, Portuguese subnational government entities – municipalities, parishes (freguesias), and intermunicipal cooperative units – still possess fewer spending and revenue powers compared to their counterparts in other EU countries. This disparity is reflected in the Portuguese multilevel governance system, which appears considerably centralized when juxtaposed with other European and OECD countries (OECD, 2020).
To address these challenges and improve cooperation, Portugal has established 23 Intermunicipal Councils (CIMs in Portuguese, corresponding to the NUTS 3 level) and created metropolitan areas for Lisbon and Porto. These measures aim to manage tasks beneficial across municipal boundaries and to enhance sustainable mobility, housing, and the licensing process in collaboration with local authorities. However, the role of both metropolitan and non-metropolitan intermunicipal cooperation remains limited, with only a small portion of local spending currently allocated to the CIMs and MAs.
Prime Minister António Costa advocates for executing public policies in areas such as the licensing process, housing, and sustainable mobility in partnership with local authorities. This collaborative approach promises to streamline processes and elevate the standard of public services offered to citizens. The ongoing efforts to decentralize and enhance autonomy reflect a promising shift toward a more equitable distribution of power and responsibilities between the central government and local entities in Portugal. The impact of these initiatives on the centralized system remains to be seen.
Citations:
Decreto-Lei nº36/2023. 2023. DR, 1ª série, Nº 102, p. 6. https://files.dre.pt/1s/2023/05/10200/0000600027.pdf
OECD. 2020. Decentralisation and Regionalisation in Portugal. What Reform Scenarios? https://doi.org/10.1787/fea62108-en
Público. 2024. “Tribunal de Contas: Financiamento para descentralização insuficiente e não claro.” https://www.publico.pt/2024/01/29/local/noticia/tribunal-contas-financiamento-descentralizacao-insuficiente-claro-2022-2078556