Horizontal Accountability
#20Key Findings
In the area of horizontal accountability, Portugal falls into the lower-middle ranks (rank 20).
The Tribunal de Contas is an independent audit institution, overseeing public sector financial activities. The National Data Protection Commission monitors compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation, with the power to issue fines and prosecute rule-breakers, but is understaffed.
The judiciary operates independently of the executive. This autonomy was particularly evident in a series of post-2022 legal challenges against government actions that led to numerous high-profile resignations, including the prime minister. Civil rights are generally upheld, but some marginalized groups face disproportionate discrimination.
Corruption remains a significant issue. Observers say the government’s anticorruption strategy had not been effectively implemented. Funding for the issue has recently been increased. The parliament has ample powers to monitor the executive and help shape policy, but resource constraints are a persistent hindrance.
The Tribunal de Contas is an independent audit institution, overseeing public sector financial activities. The National Data Protection Commission monitors compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation, with the power to issue fines and prosecute rule-breakers, but is understaffed.
The judiciary operates independently of the executive. This autonomy was particularly evident in a series of post-2022 legal challenges against government actions that led to numerous high-profile resignations, including the prime minister. Civil rights are generally upheld, but some marginalized groups face disproportionate discrimination.
Corruption remains a significant issue. Observers say the government’s anticorruption strategy had not been effectively implemented. Funding for the issue has recently been increased. The parliament has ample powers to monitor the executive and help shape policy, but resource constraints are a persistent hindrance.
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Is there an independent audit office? To what extent is it capable of exercising effective oversight?
10
9
9
There exists an effective and independent audit office.
8
7
6
7
6
There exists an effective and independent audit office, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
4
3
4
3
There exists an independent audit office, but its role is considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no independent and effective audit office.
The primary national audit institution in Portugal is the Tribunal de Contas, which operates as a Supreme Audit Institution following the court model. According to the Portuguese constitution and the law, the Court of Auditors is a sovereign body and a Supreme Court with unique jurisdiction. Its primary mission is to externally and independently control public financial activities and enforce financial responsibilities, serving as a cornerstone of the country’s financial governance.
This audit office operates independently from the government while remaining an integral part of the judicial system, as mandated by Lei n.º 98/97. The head of the audit office is appointed by the president of the republic, upon a proposal from the government, ensuring the preservation of its independence.
Additionally, the Tribunal de Contas possesses jurisdiction and financial control powers that enable it to make independent and autonomous decisions regarding the audit processes it undertakes. This court conducts its audits effectively despite encountering persistent challenges, notably the issue of workforce rejuvenation, characterized by a low percentage of employees under the age of 40.
The Organizational and Procedural Law specifies that the Court of Auditors is responsible for evaluating the legality and the economy, effectiveness, and efficiency, based on technical criteria, of the financial management of public entities, including the organization, functioning, and reliability of internal control systems. Article 11(2) also states that the court cooperates with other sovereign bodies – primarily through its support services – to disseminate necessary information for preventing and combating waste, illegality, fraud, and corruption concerning public funds and values at both the national and community levels.
Citations:
Law on Organisation and Procedural Law of the Court of Auditors (LOPTC) (Lei de Organização e Processo do Tribunal de Contas). 1997. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei/98-1997-193663?_ts=1703762058332
This audit office operates independently from the government while remaining an integral part of the judicial system, as mandated by Lei n.º 98/97. The head of the audit office is appointed by the president of the republic, upon a proposal from the government, ensuring the preservation of its independence.
Additionally, the Tribunal de Contas possesses jurisdiction and financial control powers that enable it to make independent and autonomous decisions regarding the audit processes it undertakes. This court conducts its audits effectively despite encountering persistent challenges, notably the issue of workforce rejuvenation, characterized by a low percentage of employees under the age of 40.
The Organizational and Procedural Law specifies that the Court of Auditors is responsible for evaluating the legality and the economy, effectiveness, and efficiency, based on technical criteria, of the financial management of public entities, including the organization, functioning, and reliability of internal control systems. Article 11(2) also states that the court cooperates with other sovereign bodies – primarily through its support services – to disseminate necessary information for preventing and combating waste, illegality, fraud, and corruption concerning public funds and values at both the national and community levels.
Citations:
Law on Organisation and Procedural Law of the Court of Auditors (LOPTC) (Lei de Organização e Processo do Tribunal de Contas). 1997. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei/98-1997-193663?_ts=1703762058332
Is there an independent authority that effectively holds government offices accountable for their handling of data protection and privacy issues?
10
9
9
An independent and effective data protection authority exists.
8
7
6
7
6
An independent and effective data protection authority exists, but its role is somewhat limited.
5
4
3
4
3
A data protection authority exists, but both its independence and effectiveness are considerably limited.
2
1
1
There is no effective and independent data protection office.
The National Data Protection Commission (Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados – CNPD) serves as the primary authority responsible for overseeing and ensuring compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulamento Geral sobre a Proteção de Dados – GDPR). The GDPR aims to safeguard the protection and lawful processing of individuals’ personal data while facilitating its free movement.
Moreover, CNPD operates independently, diligently pursuing its responsibilities and competencies while enjoying administrative and financial autonomy. This autonomy is also reflected in the status of CNPD members and their respective roles within the organization.
The latest activity report from CNPD, published in 2022, reveals a substantial increase in their workload. The Commission investigated and initiated more inquiries (1,785) and tripled the number of prosecution cases (251) compared to the previous year (CNPD, 2022). The total fines imposed also significantly increased, surpassing €4.8 million, primarily due to a €4.3 million fine imposed on the National Institute of Statistics (INE) concerning the 2021 Census, which is currently under appeal (Público, 2023).
However, CNPD faces a concerning structural shortage of human resources. At the end of 2022, CNPD had only 28 employees, a modest increase from 25 workers in 2021. This number remains far from sufficient to meet all demands, as stated in their own assessment (CNPD, 2022). This shortage, coupled with a high number of requests for information and participation (8,310) and increased procedural activities, continues to pose significant obstacles to CNPD’s effectiveness.
Citations:
CNPD. 2022. “Relatório de Atividades 2022.” https://www.cnpd.pt/media/tutpevyh/relato-rio_2022.pdf
Law No. 58/2019, of August 8, Personal Data Protection Law (Lei da Proteção de Dados Pessoais). 2019. Available at https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?artigo_id=3118A0001&nid=3118&tabela=leis&pagina=1&ficha=1&so_miolo=&nversao=#artigo
Público. 2023. “Apesar das condicionantes dos ciberataques, Protecção de Dados averiguou e acusou mais.” https://www.publico.pt/2023/03/15/sociedade/noticia/apesar-condicionantes-ciberataques-proteccao-dados-averiguou-acusou-2042209
Moreover, CNPD operates independently, diligently pursuing its responsibilities and competencies while enjoying administrative and financial autonomy. This autonomy is also reflected in the status of CNPD members and their respective roles within the organization.
The latest activity report from CNPD, published in 2022, reveals a substantial increase in their workload. The Commission investigated and initiated more inquiries (1,785) and tripled the number of prosecution cases (251) compared to the previous year (CNPD, 2022). The total fines imposed also significantly increased, surpassing €4.8 million, primarily due to a €4.3 million fine imposed on the National Institute of Statistics (INE) concerning the 2021 Census, which is currently under appeal (Público, 2023).
However, CNPD faces a concerning structural shortage of human resources. At the end of 2022, CNPD had only 28 employees, a modest increase from 25 workers in 2021. This number remains far from sufficient to meet all demands, as stated in their own assessment (CNPD, 2022). This shortage, coupled with a high number of requests for information and participation (8,310) and increased procedural activities, continues to pose significant obstacles to CNPD’s effectiveness.
Citations:
CNPD. 2022. “Relatório de Atividades 2022.” https://www.cnpd.pt/media/tutpevyh/relato-rio_2022.pdf
Law No. 58/2019, of August 8, Personal Data Protection Law (Lei da Proteção de Dados Pessoais). 2019. Available at https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?artigo_id=3118A0001&nid=3118&tabela=leis&pagina=1&ficha=1&so_miolo=&nversao=#artigo
Público. 2023. “Apesar das condicionantes dos ciberataques, Protecção de Dados averiguou e acusou mais.” https://www.publico.pt/2023/03/15/sociedade/noticia/apesar-condicionantes-ciberataques-proteccao-dados-averiguou-acusou-2042209
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To what extent does an independent judiciary ensure that the government, administration and legislature operate in accordance with the constitution and law?
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9
9
The judiciary effectively ensures that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
8
7
6
7
6
The judiciary usually manages to ensure that the government and legislature act in accordance with the law.
5
4
3
4
3
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal compliance in some crucial cases.
2
1
1
The judiciary fails to ensure effective legal control.
The national judiciary can be regarded as an independent system, accountable solely to the law and bolstered by a heightened level of independence perceived by the general public (European Commission, 2023). Portugal’s judiciary stands as a vital and sovereign entity actively ensuring that both the government and society adhere to the rule of law.
Within the realm of civil jurisdiction, the justice system encompasses the Judicial Courts. These include the Supreme Court – the apex body of the Portuguese judicial system – and the ordinary courts of first and second instance, which comprise courts of appeal, district courts, and specialized courts. The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters and consists of 60 justices known as Conselheiros.
On the administrative jurisdiction front, the system includes the Supreme Administrative Court and the corresponding administrative and tax courts of first and second instance. Additionally, there is the Constitutional Court, which is primarily tasked with assessing the constitutionality or legality of legal norms, as well as the previously mentioned Court of Auditors.
All these legal institutions and judges operate independently and enjoy tenure. For example, when appointing judges to the Constitutional Court, 10 out of the total 13 are appointed by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the members of parliament, while the remaining three are co-opted by the elected judges. These factors potentially contribute to the selection of politically impartial judges (Tribunal Constitucional, n.d).
The judicial autonomy in Portugal has been prominently highlighted since Prime Minister António Costa began his third term in 2022. This period witnessed a surge in legal challenges against government actions, leading to significant resignations, including those of high-ranking officials such as the secretary of state and the minister of infrastructure, the secretary of state for agriculture, and the assistant secretary of state to the prime minister. The most notable political development was Costa’s resignation in November 2023.
Costa’s resignation was precipitated by allegations of his involvement in facilitating procedures related to the lithium and hydrogen industries (JN, 2023). The gravity of the situation was underscored when the attorney general confirmed that Costa was under a corruption investigation. This investigation was the first to lead to the resignation of a sitting prime minister. Although the investigation has yet to produce substantial results, it underscores its capacity to maintain independence from political influence.
Citations:
European Comission. 2023. “2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Portugal.” https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/50_1_52628_coun_chap_portugal_en.pdf
Law on the Organization of the Judicial System (Lei da Organização do Sistema Judiciário). 2013. Law No. 62/2013, of August 26. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=1974&tabela=leis
Tribunal Constitucional. n.d. “Estatuto dos juízes.” https://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/tribunal-estatutojuizes.html
Jornal de Negócios. 2023. “Aberto inquérito no Supremo por alegado envolvimento de Costa nos processos do lítio e hidrogénio.” https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/politica/detalhe/aberto-inquerito-no-supremo-por-alegado-envolvimento-de-costa-nos-processos-do-litio-e-hidrogenio
Within the realm of civil jurisdiction, the justice system encompasses the Judicial Courts. These include the Supreme Court – the apex body of the Portuguese judicial system – and the ordinary courts of first and second instance, which comprise courts of appeal, district courts, and specialized courts. The Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters and consists of 60 justices known as Conselheiros.
On the administrative jurisdiction front, the system includes the Supreme Administrative Court and the corresponding administrative and tax courts of first and second instance. Additionally, there is the Constitutional Court, which is primarily tasked with assessing the constitutionality or legality of legal norms, as well as the previously mentioned Court of Auditors.
All these legal institutions and judges operate independently and enjoy tenure. For example, when appointing judges to the Constitutional Court, 10 out of the total 13 are appointed by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the members of parliament, while the remaining three are co-opted by the elected judges. These factors potentially contribute to the selection of politically impartial judges (Tribunal Constitucional, n.d).
The judicial autonomy in Portugal has been prominently highlighted since Prime Minister António Costa began his third term in 2022. This period witnessed a surge in legal challenges against government actions, leading to significant resignations, including those of high-ranking officials such as the secretary of state and the minister of infrastructure, the secretary of state for agriculture, and the assistant secretary of state to the prime minister. The most notable political development was Costa’s resignation in November 2023.
Costa’s resignation was precipitated by allegations of his involvement in facilitating procedures related to the lithium and hydrogen industries (JN, 2023). The gravity of the situation was underscored when the attorney general confirmed that Costa was under a corruption investigation. This investigation was the first to lead to the resignation of a sitting prime minister. Although the investigation has yet to produce substantial results, it underscores its capacity to maintain independence from political influence.
Citations:
European Comission. 2023. “2023 Rule of Law Report: Country Chapter on the Rule of Law Situation in Portugal.” https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/50_1_52628_coun_chap_portugal_en.pdf
Law on the Organization of the Judicial System (Lei da Organização do Sistema Judiciário). 2013. Law No. 62/2013, of August 26. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=1974&tabela=leis
Tribunal Constitucional. n.d. “Estatuto dos juízes.” https://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/tribunal-estatutojuizes.html
Jornal de Negócios. 2023. “Aberto inquérito no Supremo por alegado envolvimento de Costa nos processos do lítio e hidrogénio.” https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/politica/detalhe/aberto-inquerito-no-supremo-por-alegado-envolvimento-de-costa-nos-processos-do-litio-e-hidrogenio
How well does the executive branch and its members uphold and safeguard civil rights, and to what extent do the courts effectively protect citizens against rights violations?
10
9
9
There are no limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
8
7
6
7
6
There are no significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
5
4
3
4
3
There are some significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
2
1
1
There are multiple significant limits or constraints on the realization of civil rights.
In addition to the 1976 ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Portuguese constitution delineates broad categories of fundamental rights and guarantees for the population, primarily found in Articles 12 to 27. These rights are generally upheld in practice. However, persistent challenges remain in achieving equal access to these rights and liberties for all citizens in Portugal. As a result, there is a growing trend of discriminatory situations disproportionately affecting marginalized groups, including those with lower socioeconomic status and ethnic minorities such as the Roma community, Afro-descendant, and migrant worker communities. Furthermore, discrimination persists and contributes to sexual and gender-based violence against women, as highlighted in the Amnesty International Report 2022/23 (2023: 302).
According to a 2019 report on racism, xenophobia, and ethnic-racial discrimination, constraints and inequalities persist in areas such as access to fair and decent housing, particularly affecting communities of African descent and Roma. Additionally, there are continuing issues related to school dropout rates among Roma girls due to early and forced marriages and a notably low rate of higher education enrollment within these communities. Gender-based violence remains a grave concern in Portuguese society, resulting in the tragic murders of 25 women since the beginning of 2023, with an estimated 15 of these cases classified as femicide (Agência Lusa, 2023).
In response to these challenges, the government has been implementing measures outlined in the National Strategy for Equality and Non-Discrimination, which was initially introduced in 2018. The most recent step in this effort is the approval of the 2023 – 2026 Action Plans, aimed at consolidating progress and implementing policies related to gender equality, preventing and combating violence against women, and addressing discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (CIG, 2023).
Amnesty International has reported ongoing excessive use of force and mistreatment by police officers. Between May and June 2022, the Council of Europe (CoE) Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) visited various prisons and detention facilities in Portugal to assess the treatment and conditions of detainees. These visits revealed that instances of ill-treatment persist, with some individuals alleging mistreatment by officers from the Public Security Police (PSP) and the National Republican Guard (GNR) during apprehension and after they had been brought under control. Additionally, the committee found some prisoners living in degrading conditions, including dirty and deteriorated cells, broken windows, unpartitioned toilets in shared cells, and malfunctioning electrical installations. In response to these findings, the Portuguese government has initiated some procedures to address the committee’s recommendations. However, further investigation is needed to assess the extent of their implementation.
Citations:
Agência Lusa. 2023. “Assassinadas 25 mulheres em Portugal desde o início do ano.” https://observador.pt/2023/11/22/assassinadas-25-mulheres-em-portugal-desde-o-inicio-do-ano/
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The state of the world’s human rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en
Assembleia da República. 2019. “Relatório sobre Racismo, Xenofobia e Discriminação Étnico-racial em Portugal.” https://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=6148523063446f764c324679626d56304c334e706447567a4c31684a53556c4d5a5763765130394e4c7a464451554e455445637655306c4f5243394562324e31625756756447397a51574e3061585a705a47466bZa554e7662576c7a633246764c7a45335a6a637a4d4455784c574d305a5759744e47497a4e5331684e7a67314c574d78596a63355a6a526d595442684d6935775a47593d&fich=17f73051-c4ef-4b35-a785-c1b79f4fa0a2.pdf&Inline=true
CIG. 2023. “Aprovados os Planos de Ação 2023-2026 da ‘Estratégia Nacional para a Igualdade e a Não Discriminação – Portugal+Igual.’” https://www.cig.gov.pt/2023/06/aprovados-os-planos-de-acao-2023-2026-da-estrategia-nacional-para-a-igualdade-e-a-nao-discriminacao-portugaligual/?fbclid=IwAR1ertTlReGzapcHLo6k9bqlMPVDJWO__A7P80RPj_Ib5q99ScMjpKVhSeA
CPT. 2023a. “Report to the Portuguese Government on the periodic visit to Portugal carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT).” https://rm.coe.int/1680adcb76
CPT. 2023b. “Response of the Portuguese Government to the report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) on its visit to Portugal.” https://rm.coe.int/1680adcb8d
According to a 2019 report on racism, xenophobia, and ethnic-racial discrimination, constraints and inequalities persist in areas such as access to fair and decent housing, particularly affecting communities of African descent and Roma. Additionally, there are continuing issues related to school dropout rates among Roma girls due to early and forced marriages and a notably low rate of higher education enrollment within these communities. Gender-based violence remains a grave concern in Portuguese society, resulting in the tragic murders of 25 women since the beginning of 2023, with an estimated 15 of these cases classified as femicide (Agência Lusa, 2023).
In response to these challenges, the government has been implementing measures outlined in the National Strategy for Equality and Non-Discrimination, which was initially introduced in 2018. The most recent step in this effort is the approval of the 2023 – 2026 Action Plans, aimed at consolidating progress and implementing policies related to gender equality, preventing and combating violence against women, and addressing discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (CIG, 2023).
Amnesty International has reported ongoing excessive use of force and mistreatment by police officers. Between May and June 2022, the Council of Europe (CoE) Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) visited various prisons and detention facilities in Portugal to assess the treatment and conditions of detainees. These visits revealed that instances of ill-treatment persist, with some individuals alleging mistreatment by officers from the Public Security Police (PSP) and the National Republican Guard (GNR) during apprehension and after they had been brought under control. Additionally, the committee found some prisoners living in degrading conditions, including dirty and deteriorated cells, broken windows, unpartitioned toilets in shared cells, and malfunctioning electrical installations. In response to these findings, the Portuguese government has initiated some procedures to address the committee’s recommendations. However, further investigation is needed to assess the extent of their implementation.
Citations:
Agência Lusa. 2023. “Assassinadas 25 mulheres em Portugal desde o início do ano.” https://observador.pt/2023/11/22/assassinadas-25-mulheres-em-portugal-desde-o-inicio-do-ano/
Amnesty International. 2023. “Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The state of the world’s human rights.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/5670/2023/en
Assembleia da República. 2019. “Relatório sobre Racismo, Xenofobia e Discriminação Étnico-racial em Portugal.” https://app.parlamento.pt/webutils/docs/doc.pdf?path=6148523063446f764c324679626d56304c334e706447567a4c31684a53556c4d5a5763765130394e4c7a464451554e455445637655306c4f5243394562324e31625756756447397a51574e3061585a705a47466bZa554e7662576c7a633246764c7a45335a6a637a4d4455784c574d305a5759744e47497a4e5331684e7a67314c574d78596a63355a6a526d595442684d6935775a47593d&fich=17f73051-c4ef-4b35-a785-c1b79f4fa0a2.pdf&Inline=true
CIG. 2023. “Aprovados os Planos de Ação 2023-2026 da ‘Estratégia Nacional para a Igualdade e a Não Discriminação – Portugal+Igual.’” https://www.cig.gov.pt/2023/06/aprovados-os-planos-de-acao-2023-2026-da-estrategia-nacional-para-a-igualdade-e-a-nao-discriminacao-portugaligual/?fbclid=IwAR1ertTlReGzapcHLo6k9bqlMPVDJWO__A7P80RPj_Ib5q99ScMjpKVhSeA
CPT. 2023a. “Report to the Portuguese Government on the periodic visit to Portugal carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT).” https://rm.coe.int/1680adcb76
CPT. 2023b. “Response of the Portuguese Government to the report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) on its visit to Portugal.” https://rm.coe.int/1680adcb8d
To what extent are public officeholders prevented from abusing their position for private interests?
10
9
9
Legal, political and public integrity mechanisms effectively prevent public officeholders from abusing their positions.
8
7
6
7
6
Most integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
5
4
3
4
3
Few integrity mechanisms are effective and provide disincentives for public officeholders to abuse their positions.
2
1
1
Public officeholders can exploit their offices for private gain as they see fit without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity.
From a legal standpoint, the Portuguese Penal Code directly addresses the criminalization of power abuse and corruption in Articles 372º to 374º-B. Moreover, the implementation of public accounting standards, as per Annex II of the Accounting Standardization System for Public Administrations (SNC-AP), outlined in Decree-Law No. 192/2015, Article 6, aims to ensure financial oversight of public expenditure. This framework theoretically facilitates corruption detection. Additionally, the Law on the Financing of Political Parties and Electoral Campaigns, outlined in Law No. 19/2003, sets limits on private income for political parties while also providing public funds for election expenses and annual subsidies. Public officeholders convicted of power abuse face penalties, including imprisonment for up to three years or fines, as stated in Decree-Law No. 48/95, Article 382. The enforcement of these regulations – encompassing reporting, oversight, and sanctions – is the responsibility of the Political Accounts and Financing Entity (ECFP), which, however, encounters significant operational challenges.
Despite these legal frameworks, three crucial issues arise. First, regarding party financing regulation, scholars note that political financing in Portugal was largely unregulated until a 2003 law (Law No. 19/2003, of June 20). This law, amended eight times, most recently in 2018, attempted to address these issues. Despite a 2000 ban on corporate donations, challenges remain due to companies disguising illegal contributions. The current framework lacks stringent penalties for those circumventing the law by indirectly covering campaign costs. While the law provides a functional regulatory structure, the primary issue lies in its implementation and adoption by parties and candidates.
The ECFP, tasked with monitoring financial information, faces legal and practical challenges. The 2018 amendment expanded its responsibilities without increasing resources, as highlighted by the ECFP’s chairperson. The ECFP tends to focus more on formal account reporting than on substantive oversight. Additionally, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020 – 2024 (ENAC) has emphasized the need for the publication of political parties’ accounts to be more efficient, uniform, and accessible. However, these proposed measures lack specific details, such as deadlines, methodologies, or clear guidelines on their implementation.
Second, concerning gifts and hospitality, the codes of conduct for parliament and the executive suffer from low compliance, unclear hospitality limits, and a lack of oversight and sanctions. Access to gift and hospitality registers is problematic, with the parliamentary register difficult to access online and the ministerial register available only onsite.
Portugal’s 2019 Transparency package reforms have introduced some improvements. For example, the regime governing the functions of political office holders and high public officials mandates that all such individuals, including judges, prosecutors, and senior public officials, must submit declarations of their interests and assets (Law No. 52/2019 of 31 July). However, these improvements are limited by inadequate enforcement mechanisms, oversight gaps, and insufficient regulation of post-office employment and gift acceptance.
Despite advancements, the system primarily serves as an initial vetting procedure and lacks mechanisms for ongoing supervision or enforcement. Verification of declarations, overseen by the Constitutional Court and the Transparency Entity (ET), faces issues like legal uncertainties, limited resources, and superficial examination processes. No effective internal body within the parliament is responsible for verifying MPs’ declarations or addressing potential conflicts of interest.
Third, regarding the transparency of public procurement procedures, Portugal has seen significant progress, particularly with the development of the Portal BASE, a public procurement platform. This platform is designed to provide details on all contracts formed under the Public Procurement Code (CCP) and is further supported by the Observatory of Public Works, which offers statistical analysis of public procurement activities. Despite these advancements, the transparency level in Portugal’s public procurement processes still does not meet expectations.
The Portal BASE, although aimed at increasing transparency, encounters several challenges. The platform is not particularly user-friendly for various stakeholders and falls short in ensuring the complete publication of all procedures and their associated information. In addition, many public bodies have not fully or properly adhered to their obligation to disclose information. Moreover, the enforcement of regulations and the application of sanctions related to public procurement transparency remains notably weak.
Corruption remains a significant issue in Portugal, affecting both the private and public sectors. The 2022 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index report indicates minimal progress in combating corruption, with 41% of surveyed individuals believing corruption had increased in the previous 12 months. The report criticizes the Portuguese government’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy (ENAC) 2020 – 2024 for ineffective implementation and lack of progress. The European Commission’s rule of law report also highlights issues such as insufficient resources for preventing, investigating, and prosecuting corruption cases in Portugal, along with a lack of effective implementation and monitoring of integrity mechanisms and regulations (EC, 2023).
Portugal’s lack of investment in these areas is also evident in the 2022 GRECO Report from the Group of States Against Corruption. This report assesses the implementation of recommendations from the Fourth Evaluation Round and found that the majority of the recommendations (twelve out of fifteen) remain only partially implemented. Only three of the fifteen recommendations were satisfactorily implemented, labeling the overall compliance as “globally unsatisfactory.” For example, regarding members of parliament, the report highlights the absence of rules or mechanisms to assess interactions between deputies and third parties, establish appropriate sanctions for improper actions, and evaluate the effectiveness of the conflict of interest prevention system (GRECO, 2022).
Finally, it is essential to acknowledge that Portugal experiences significant delays in the prosecution of corruption cases. These delays are particularly pronounced in the legal proceedings against prominent public figures and business leaders. Notably, the legal cases against former Prime Minister José Sócrates (2005 – 2011) and Ricardo Salgado, ex-head of Banco Espírito Santo (BES), are in danger of exceeding the statute of limitations for various crimes within the forthcoming two years (Expresso, 2023; Observador, 2022). These postponements not only impede the legal process but also amplify the challenges in combating corruption effectively.
Moreover, recent developments regarding the investment in human resources dedicated to fighting corruption within the Judiciary Police (Polícia Judiciária, PJ) are noteworthy. The national director has emphasized that “The PJ now possesses unprecedented resources. These personnel are expected to serve for many years,” signaling a substantial step forward in Portugal’s commitment to addressing this widespread issue (DN/Lusa, 2023).
Citations:
Código Penal. 1995. DL n.º 48/95, de 15 de Março. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?artigo_id=109A0373&nid=109&tabela=leis&pagina=1&ficha=1&so_miolo=&nversao=#artigo
Law No. 19/2003. June 20. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=747&tabela=leis&so_miolo=
Law No. 52/2019 of 31 July. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei/52-2019-123610180
GRECO. 2022. “Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Compliance Report 2022.” https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a7d87a
EC. 2023. “2023 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Portugal.” https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/50_1_52628_coun_chap_portugal_en.pdf
Oliveira, H. 2021. “A Estratégia Nacional de Combate à Corrupção poderia e deveria ir muito mais longe.” https://ver.pt/a-estrategia-nacional-de-combate-a-corrupcao-poderia-e-deveria-ir-muito-mais-longe
Transparência Internacional. 2022. “Índice de Perceção da Corrupção 2022.” https://transparencia.pt/indice-de-percecao-da-corrupcao-2022/
2020-2024 National Anticorruption Strategy. https://justica.gov.pt/Estrategia-Nacional-Anticorrupcao-2020-2024#:~:text=O%20programa%20do%20XXII%20Governo,e%20fomentando%20o%20crescimento%20económico
Council of Ministers Resolution No. 143/2021. Available at https://files.dre.pt/1s/2021/11/21300/0002300024.pdf
Expresso. 2023. “Operação Marquês: Sócrates já não será julgado por crimes de falsificação.” https://expresso.pt/sociedade/justica/2023-04-20-Operacao-Marques-Socrates-ja-nao-sera-julgado-por-crimes-de-falsificacao-82675944
DN/Lusa. 2023. “Diretor da PJ diz que nunca esta polícia teve tantos meios para combater a corrupção.” https://www.dn.pt/sociedade/diretor-da-pj-diz-que-nunca-esta-policia-teve-tantos-meios-para-combater-a-corrupcao-17240260.html
Observador. 2022. “Cerca de 40 crimes do megaprocesso BES/GES em risco de prescrever. Ricardo Salgado pode ver cair 15 dos 65 crimes de que está acusado.” https://observador.pt/especiais/cerca-de-40-crimes-do-megaprocesso-bes-ges-em-risco-de-prescrever-ricardo-salgado-pode-ver-cair-15-dos-65-crimes-de-que-esta-acusado/
Despite these legal frameworks, three crucial issues arise. First, regarding party financing regulation, scholars note that political financing in Portugal was largely unregulated until a 2003 law (Law No. 19/2003, of June 20). This law, amended eight times, most recently in 2018, attempted to address these issues. Despite a 2000 ban on corporate donations, challenges remain due to companies disguising illegal contributions. The current framework lacks stringent penalties for those circumventing the law by indirectly covering campaign costs. While the law provides a functional regulatory structure, the primary issue lies in its implementation and adoption by parties and candidates.
The ECFP, tasked with monitoring financial information, faces legal and practical challenges. The 2018 amendment expanded its responsibilities without increasing resources, as highlighted by the ECFP’s chairperson. The ECFP tends to focus more on formal account reporting than on substantive oversight. Additionally, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy 2020 – 2024 (ENAC) has emphasized the need for the publication of political parties’ accounts to be more efficient, uniform, and accessible. However, these proposed measures lack specific details, such as deadlines, methodologies, or clear guidelines on their implementation.
Second, concerning gifts and hospitality, the codes of conduct for parliament and the executive suffer from low compliance, unclear hospitality limits, and a lack of oversight and sanctions. Access to gift and hospitality registers is problematic, with the parliamentary register difficult to access online and the ministerial register available only onsite.
Portugal’s 2019 Transparency package reforms have introduced some improvements. For example, the regime governing the functions of political office holders and high public officials mandates that all such individuals, including judges, prosecutors, and senior public officials, must submit declarations of their interests and assets (Law No. 52/2019 of 31 July). However, these improvements are limited by inadequate enforcement mechanisms, oversight gaps, and insufficient regulation of post-office employment and gift acceptance.
Despite advancements, the system primarily serves as an initial vetting procedure and lacks mechanisms for ongoing supervision or enforcement. Verification of declarations, overseen by the Constitutional Court and the Transparency Entity (ET), faces issues like legal uncertainties, limited resources, and superficial examination processes. No effective internal body within the parliament is responsible for verifying MPs’ declarations or addressing potential conflicts of interest.
Third, regarding the transparency of public procurement procedures, Portugal has seen significant progress, particularly with the development of the Portal BASE, a public procurement platform. This platform is designed to provide details on all contracts formed under the Public Procurement Code (CCP) and is further supported by the Observatory of Public Works, which offers statistical analysis of public procurement activities. Despite these advancements, the transparency level in Portugal’s public procurement processes still does not meet expectations.
The Portal BASE, although aimed at increasing transparency, encounters several challenges. The platform is not particularly user-friendly for various stakeholders and falls short in ensuring the complete publication of all procedures and their associated information. In addition, many public bodies have not fully or properly adhered to their obligation to disclose information. Moreover, the enforcement of regulations and the application of sanctions related to public procurement transparency remains notably weak.
Corruption remains a significant issue in Portugal, affecting both the private and public sectors. The 2022 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index report indicates minimal progress in combating corruption, with 41% of surveyed individuals believing corruption had increased in the previous 12 months. The report criticizes the Portuguese government’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy (ENAC) 2020 – 2024 for ineffective implementation and lack of progress. The European Commission’s rule of law report also highlights issues such as insufficient resources for preventing, investigating, and prosecuting corruption cases in Portugal, along with a lack of effective implementation and monitoring of integrity mechanisms and regulations (EC, 2023).
Portugal’s lack of investment in these areas is also evident in the 2022 GRECO Report from the Group of States Against Corruption. This report assesses the implementation of recommendations from the Fourth Evaluation Round and found that the majority of the recommendations (twelve out of fifteen) remain only partially implemented. Only three of the fifteen recommendations were satisfactorily implemented, labeling the overall compliance as “globally unsatisfactory.” For example, regarding members of parliament, the report highlights the absence of rules or mechanisms to assess interactions between deputies and third parties, establish appropriate sanctions for improper actions, and evaluate the effectiveness of the conflict of interest prevention system (GRECO, 2022).
Finally, it is essential to acknowledge that Portugal experiences significant delays in the prosecution of corruption cases. These delays are particularly pronounced in the legal proceedings against prominent public figures and business leaders. Notably, the legal cases against former Prime Minister José Sócrates (2005 – 2011) and Ricardo Salgado, ex-head of Banco Espírito Santo (BES), are in danger of exceeding the statute of limitations for various crimes within the forthcoming two years (Expresso, 2023; Observador, 2022). These postponements not only impede the legal process but also amplify the challenges in combating corruption effectively.
Moreover, recent developments regarding the investment in human resources dedicated to fighting corruption within the Judiciary Police (Polícia Judiciária, PJ) are noteworthy. The national director has emphasized that “The PJ now possesses unprecedented resources. These personnel are expected to serve for many years,” signaling a substantial step forward in Portugal’s commitment to addressing this widespread issue (DN/Lusa, 2023).
Citations:
Código Penal. 1995. DL n.º 48/95, de 15 de Março. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?artigo_id=109A0373&nid=109&tabela=leis&pagina=1&ficha=1&so_miolo=&nversao=#artigo
Law No. 19/2003. June 20. https://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=747&tabela=leis&so_miolo=
Law No. 52/2019 of 31 July. https://diariodarepublica.pt/dr/detalhe/lei/52-2019-123610180
GRECO. 2022. “Fourth Evaluation Round – Second Compliance Report 2022.” https://rm.coe.int/fourth-evaluation-round-corruption-prevention-in-respect-of-members-of/1680a7d87a
EC. 2023. “2023 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Portugal.” https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/50_1_52628_coun_chap_portugal_en.pdf
Oliveira, H. 2021. “A Estratégia Nacional de Combate à Corrupção poderia e deveria ir muito mais longe.” https://ver.pt/a-estrategia-nacional-de-combate-a-corrupcao-poderia-e-deveria-ir-muito-mais-longe
Transparência Internacional. 2022. “Índice de Perceção da Corrupção 2022.” https://transparencia.pt/indice-de-percecao-da-corrupcao-2022/
2020-2024 National Anticorruption Strategy. https://justica.gov.pt/Estrategia-Nacional-Anticorrupcao-2020-2024#:~:text=O%20programa%20do%20XXII%20Governo,e%20fomentando%20o%20crescimento%20económico
Council of Ministers Resolution No. 143/2021. Available at https://files.dre.pt/1s/2021/11/21300/0002300024.pdf
Expresso. 2023. “Operação Marquês: Sócrates já não será julgado por crimes de falsificação.” https://expresso.pt/sociedade/justica/2023-04-20-Operacao-Marques-Socrates-ja-nao-sera-julgado-por-crimes-de-falsificacao-82675944
DN/Lusa. 2023. “Diretor da PJ diz que nunca esta polícia teve tantos meios para combater a corrupção.” https://www.dn.pt/sociedade/diretor-da-pj-diz-que-nunca-esta-policia-teve-tantos-meios-para-combater-a-corrupcao-17240260.html
Observador. 2022. “Cerca de 40 crimes do megaprocesso BES/GES em risco de prescrever. Ricardo Salgado pode ver cair 15 dos 65 crimes de que está acusado.” https://observador.pt/especiais/cerca-de-40-crimes-do-megaprocesso-bes-ges-em-risco-de-prescrever-ricardo-salgado-pode-ver-cair-15-dos-65-crimes-de-que-esta-acusado/
Graph View
Do members of the legislature possess sufficient personnel and structural resources to effectively monitor government activities?
10
9
9
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring all government activity.
8
7
6
7
6
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for effectively monitoring a government’s key activities.
5
4
3
4
3
As a group, legislative members have access to a range of resources that are suited for selectively monitoring some government activities.
2
1
1
The resources provided to legislative members are not suited for any effective monitoring of the government.
According to the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Services of the Assembly of the Republic (LOFAR), Law No. 77/88, of July 1, members of parliament and their respective groups have the authority to establish offices staffed by individuals of their choosing. These offices are responsible for managing allocated funds, a duty that falls on each parliamentary group. Additionally, support is provided for parliamentary committees, and committee chairs can propose the requisition of technicians or other support staff to assist with advisory tasks.
Despite the ample funding available, with total subsidies amounting to €8.4 million in 2022 – a figure that has remained relatively stable in recent years – there continues to be a significant shortage of expert support staff, according to the latest report (Assembleia da República, 2022). This indicates that the parliament’s ability to oversee government activities largely depends on the expertise of its legislators.
Furthermore, the number of staff assigned to the support offices of parliamentary groups has been steadily decreasing, with only 216 workers in 2022 compared to 244 in 2021 (Assembleia da República, 2022).
Moreover, the parliament’s website consistently publishes only a limited number of reports on government activities and statistical reviews of parliamentary activities.
Citations:
Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Services of the Assembly of the Republic (LOFAR). 1988. Lei de Organização e Funcionamento dos Serviços da Assembleia da República (LOFAR). https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/LOFAR_Anotada.pdf
Assembleia da República. 2022. “Relatório da Conta de Gerência da Assembleia da República – 2022.” https://www.parlamento.pt/GestaoAR/Documents/oar/RelCGAR2022.pdf
Despite the ample funding available, with total subsidies amounting to €8.4 million in 2022 – a figure that has remained relatively stable in recent years – there continues to be a significant shortage of expert support staff, according to the latest report (Assembleia da República, 2022). This indicates that the parliament’s ability to oversee government activities largely depends on the expertise of its legislators.
Furthermore, the number of staff assigned to the support offices of parliamentary groups has been steadily decreasing, with only 216 workers in 2022 compared to 244 in 2021 (Assembleia da República, 2022).
Moreover, the parliament’s website consistently publishes only a limited number of reports on government activities and statistical reviews of parliamentary activities.
Citations:
Law on the Organization and Functioning of the Services of the Assembly of the Republic (LOFAR). 1988. Lei de Organização e Funcionamento dos Serviços da Assembleia da República (LOFAR). https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/LOFAR_Anotada.pdf
Assembleia da República. 2022. “Relatório da Conta de Gerência da Assembleia da República – 2022.” https://www.parlamento.pt/GestaoAR/Documents/oar/RelCGAR2022.pdf
Are legislative committees able to exercise oversight of government activities in practice?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its oversight function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its oversight function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s oversight function is frequently and severely compromised.
In assessing whether legislative committees effectively oversee government activities, the situation presents a mixed picture. According to the Assembleia da República (2023), parliamentary committees and members of parliament have the right to request information from the government, which is legally required to respond within 30 days. Although there is no specific dataset tracking the government’s responsiveness to committee inquiries, individual parliament members frequently report experiencing delays or receiving incomplete information. This issue is highlighted in the most recent SGI report.
Nonetheless, there is evidence of progress in government responsiveness. Data from the first session of the 15th legislature (March 25, 2022 – July 20, 2023) reveals that 86% of inquiries made by parliament members were answered. This figure represents an improvement over previous periods and is detailed in the latest Assessment of Parliamentary Activity report by the Portuguese parliament (Assembleia da República, 2023).
Moreover, the rules mandate that government members must appear before committees at least four times each legislative session. Committees and parliamentary groups also have the authority to request additional hearings, although for committees, this requires agreement across different political parties. This mechanism is designed to facilitate greater oversight of government activities by the legislative branch.
Citations:
Assembleia da República. 2023. “Balanço da Atividade Parlamentar – 1.ª Sessão Legislativa da XV Legislatura.” https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Documents/RelatorioActidadeAR/RA_AR_XV_1_final.pdf
Nonetheless, there is evidence of progress in government responsiveness. Data from the first session of the 15th legislature (March 25, 2022 – July 20, 2023) reveals that 86% of inquiries made by parliament members were answered. This figure represents an improvement over previous periods and is detailed in the latest Assessment of Parliamentary Activity report by the Portuguese parliament (Assembleia da República, 2023).
Moreover, the rules mandate that government members must appear before committees at least four times each legislative session. Committees and parliamentary groups also have the authority to request additional hearings, although for committees, this requires agreement across different political parties. This mechanism is designed to facilitate greater oversight of government activities by the legislative branch.
Citations:
Assembleia da República. 2023. “Balanço da Atividade Parlamentar – 1.ª Sessão Legislativa da XV Legislatura.” https://www.parlamento.pt/ActividadeParlamentar/Documents/RelatorioActidadeAR/RA_AR_XV_1_final.pdf
Do legislative committees have the capacity to investigate unconstitutional or illegal activities carried out by the executive branch?
10
9
9
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function.
8
7
6
7
6
The legislature is able to exercise its investigation function most of the time.
5
4
3
4
3
The legislature faces constraints in exercising its investigation function in a significant number of cases.
2
1
1
The legislature’s investigation function is frequently and severely compromised
Opposition parties can effectively initiate investigative processes by forming ad hoc parliamentary committees of inquiry. These committees are unique because they lack a predetermined role. According to procedural rules, the primary task of each new ad hoc committee is to define its purpose and competencies. This is a crucial aspect, as it requires political parties to negotiate to determine the committee’s objectives. The outcome of these negotiations can significantly influence the committee’s effectiveness and the results it achieves.
Over the past decade, ad hoc committees have become increasingly prominent and impactful in the legislative sphere (Fernandes 2016). Research suggests that these committees are indispensable for oversight by Portuguese political parties, as they are typically established with the express goal of ensuring compliance with constitutional mandates and conducting thorough examinations of various aspects of government and administrative actions (Fernandes and Riera 2019). This underscores the critical role of ad hoc committees in fostering accountability and transparency within the legislative process.
During the evaluated period, the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the Political Control of TAP (Portuguese Airlines) Management exemplified such an initiative. This committee’s primary focus was examining the government’s oversight of TAP’s management. However, the final report produced by this committee was met with controversy. It garnered approval solely through the absolute majority vote of the PS (Socialist Party), prompting criticism from opposition parties. The opposition condemned the report as an insufficient and incomplete evaluation of the situation, alleging it to be an attempt to shield the government from accountability regarding TAP’s management practices.
Citations:
Assembleia da República. n.d. “Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito à Tutela Política da Gestão da TAP.” https://www.parlamento.pt/sites/COM/XVLeg/CPITAP/Paginas/Relatorio-da-Comissao.aspx
Fernandes, J., and P. Riera. 2019. “Committee systems in Portugal and Spain.” In Fernandes, J., and C. Leston-Bandeira, eds., The Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
Fernandes, J. 2016. “Intra-party Delegation in the Portuguese Legislature: Assigning Committee Chairs and Party Coordination Positions.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 22 (1): 108–128.
Regimento da Assembleia da República n.º 1/2020, de 31 de Agosto. https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/RegimentoAR_Simples.pdf
Over the past decade, ad hoc committees have become increasingly prominent and impactful in the legislative sphere (Fernandes 2016). Research suggests that these committees are indispensable for oversight by Portuguese political parties, as they are typically established with the express goal of ensuring compliance with constitutional mandates and conducting thorough examinations of various aspects of government and administrative actions (Fernandes and Riera 2019). This underscores the critical role of ad hoc committees in fostering accountability and transparency within the legislative process.
During the evaluated period, the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the Political Control of TAP (Portuguese Airlines) Management exemplified such an initiative. This committee’s primary focus was examining the government’s oversight of TAP’s management. However, the final report produced by this committee was met with controversy. It garnered approval solely through the absolute majority vote of the PS (Socialist Party), prompting criticism from opposition parties. The opposition condemned the report as an insufficient and incomplete evaluation of the situation, alleging it to be an attempt to shield the government from accountability regarding TAP’s management practices.
Citations:
Assembleia da República. n.d. “Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito à Tutela Política da Gestão da TAP.” https://www.parlamento.pt/sites/COM/XVLeg/CPITAP/Paginas/Relatorio-da-Comissao.aspx
Fernandes, J., and P. Riera. 2019. “Committee systems in Portugal and Spain.” In Fernandes, J., and C. Leston-Bandeira, eds., The Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
Fernandes, J. 2016. “Intra-party Delegation in the Portuguese Legislature: Assigning Committee Chairs and Party Coordination Positions.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 22 (1): 108–128.
Regimento da Assembleia da República n.º 1/2020, de 31 de Agosto. https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/RegimentoAR_Simples.pdf
To what extent are the organization and operations of legislative committees effective in guiding the development of legislative proposals?
10
9
9
The organization and operations of legislative committees are well-suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
8
7
6
7
6
The organization and operations of legislative committees are, for the most part, suited for effectively monitoring ministry activity.
5
4
3
4
3
The organization and operations of legislative committees are rarely suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
2
1
1
The organization and operations of legislative committees are not at all suitable for monitoring ministry activity.
The committee system is pivotal to decision-making processes within the Portuguese Assembleia da República. These committees, essential in legislative lawmaking, have the authority to amend bills after their initial approval in the Plenum. Although changes made at the committee stage require a final floor vote, political parties often reach consensus on bill versions within the committees (Fernandes & Riera, 2019).
In the Portuguese legislative system, there are two distinct categories of committees: permanent (comissões permanentes) and ad hoc (comissões eventuais). These committees are designed to parallel the executive portfolios. Currently, the Assembleia da República includes 14 permanent specialized committees, each focusing on a unique policy area. Although there are 17 executive portfolios, the existing committee structure ensures comprehensive coverage of every policy domain.
These committees are supplemented by subcommittees and working groups, with the former requiring authorization from the Assembly’s president. These groups focus on particular legislative aspects or monitor specific issues, including occasional committees of inquiry for government oversight.
Political parties play a crucial role in determining committee assignments. The allocation of committee positions follows a rule of proportionality, ensuring representation aligns with each party’s size on the legislative floor. However, safeguards exist for smaller parties; regardless of their size, they are guaranteed at least one seat on every committee (Fernandes & Riera, 2019). In the most recent legislative term, the PSD (Social Democratic Party), as the largest opposition party, chaired five major committees, while the PS (Socialist Party) maintained a substantial presence across these committees.
The regular meeting schedule, typically occurring several times a month, facilitates consistent oversight of executive activities. Regular sessions are scheduled for Tuesday and Wednesday mornings, with additional meetings as needed, indicating a system flexible enough to address emerging concerns (Assembly’s Rules of Procedure, Article 57, Paragraph 7).
Citations:
Assembleia da República. n.d. “Comissões – Competências.” https://www.parlamento.pt/sites/COM/XIIILeg/Paginas/Competencias.aspx
Fernandes, J., and P. Riera. 2019. “Committee Systems in Portugal and Spain.” In Fernandes, J., and C. Leston-Bandeira, eds., The Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
Regimento da Assembleia da República n.º 1/2020. 2020. Available at https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/RegimentoAR_Simples.pdf
In the Portuguese legislative system, there are two distinct categories of committees: permanent (comissões permanentes) and ad hoc (comissões eventuais). These committees are designed to parallel the executive portfolios. Currently, the Assembleia da República includes 14 permanent specialized committees, each focusing on a unique policy area. Although there are 17 executive portfolios, the existing committee structure ensures comprehensive coverage of every policy domain.
These committees are supplemented by subcommittees and working groups, with the former requiring authorization from the Assembly’s president. These groups focus on particular legislative aspects or monitor specific issues, including occasional committees of inquiry for government oversight.
Political parties play a crucial role in determining committee assignments. The allocation of committee positions follows a rule of proportionality, ensuring representation aligns with each party’s size on the legislative floor. However, safeguards exist for smaller parties; regardless of their size, they are guaranteed at least one seat on every committee (Fernandes & Riera, 2019). In the most recent legislative term, the PSD (Social Democratic Party), as the largest opposition party, chaired five major committees, while the PS (Socialist Party) maintained a substantial presence across these committees.
The regular meeting schedule, typically occurring several times a month, facilitates consistent oversight of executive activities. Regular sessions are scheduled for Tuesday and Wednesday mornings, with additional meetings as needed, indicating a system flexible enough to address emerging concerns (Assembly’s Rules of Procedure, Article 57, Paragraph 7).
Citations:
Assembleia da República. n.d. “Comissões – Competências.” https://www.parlamento.pt/sites/COM/XIIILeg/Paginas/Competencias.aspx
Fernandes, J., and P. Riera. 2019. “Committee Systems in Portugal and Spain.” In Fernandes, J., and C. Leston-Bandeira, eds., The Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
Regimento da Assembleia da República n.º 1/2020. 2020. Available at https://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/RegimentoAR_Simples.pdf